

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ARTES SCIENTIA VERITAS

DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939

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1919-1939

Series IA, Volume I

The Aftermath of Locarno
1925-1926

EDITORS' NOTE

The present volume is the first to appear in the names of Professor W. N. Medlicott, Dr. Douglas Dakin and Miss M. E. Lambert. Professor Medlicott has, as recently announced, succeeded Mr. Rohan Butler as senior editor with special responsibility for editing the Second Series. Dr. Dakin continues to be specially responsible for the First Series, and Miss Lambert has assumed a similar responsibility for the new Series IA.

PREFACE

THE present volume is the first to appear in the new Series IA of *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*. As previously announced, this series will cover the years from 1925 to 1929.

In the spring of 1963 the then Editors recommended that in order to accelerate the publication of their documentary presentation of British foreign policy in the inter-war period it would be helpful to introduce a new series, as had been done when the Third Series was split off from the Second Series for the nineteen-thirties. Similar treatment for the earlier decade would now ensure a more even coverage, and the institution of Series IA was approved by the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Earl of Home.

The first problem facing the Editor of the new series was the choice of a convenient starting date which would combine the obvious practical reasons for selecting 1925 with the determining historical considerations. It seemed to the Editor that the diplomatic watershed in the decade was the Locarno Conference of October 1925 which produced agreements setting out the tangible results of improved relations between Germany and her former adversaries. Documentation of the negotiations leading up to this conference would form a logical conclusion to the First Series, and the new series therefore begins immediately after the Locarno Agreements were initialed *ne varietur* on October 16, 1925. The Editor considered that this date, rather than December 1, 1925, when the documents were formally signed, was the best dividing point, as the intervening detailed discussions on German disarmament and Allied concessions in the Rhineland looked forward to the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control from Germany and of the forces of occupation from the Rhineland rather than backward to the Locarno agreements themselves.

The volume opens, unchronologically, with a retrospective memorandum of January 10, 1926, by Mr. J. C. Sterndale Bennett. This document forms an appropriate introduction to the series by recapitulating the views held in the Foreign Office on the main political trends in Western Europe in the six years since the Treaty of Versailles came into force, and by setting the Locarno agreements into the context in which they then appeared to that Office. It was hoped above all that the most important political benefits of the Locarno *détente* would be that the French desire for security would be satisfied while Germany was enabled to enter the League of Nations and thus 'take her rightful place once more in the councils of the European Powers'. These benefits had, it was estimated, been achieved at a reasonable cost to Great Britain, for as Mr. Sterndale Bennett pointed out: 'It is true that Great Britain has undertaken fresh obligations by the Treaty of Locarno, but it is scarcely possible that her obligations could be more narrowly circumscribed

to circumstances in which we have an actual vital interest. Outside the Rhineland our obligations remain what they were. Only in the Rhineland have we assumed extra obligations. Before the Treaty of Locarno we *might* have been called upon, both by our membership of the League of Nations and our participation in the Treaty of Versailles, to intervene in any struggle which broke out in the Rhineland. By the Treaty of Locarno we declare that we *will*, in certain circumstances, intervene.' Thus were British obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee defined as being limited geographically to Germany's western frontiers and legally to the 'case of a flagrant violation of article 2 of the present treaty or of a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles' (article 4 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee). That the Locarno treaties implied 'the weakening and indeed the "doctoring" of article 44 of the Treaty of Versailles' under which 'Great Britain was obliged to march immediately the neutral zone [of the Rhineland] was invaded' was put forward in February 1926 by a French opponent of the treaties (minute by Mr. R. F. Wigram, document No. 281). This objection drew from Sir Austen Chamberlain the following somewhat cryptic comment: 'I held very nearly this view & I made the most of it, but No; she had the right to treat it as a hostile act. Hurst [Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office] held that under the Covenant we should not have been *entitled* thereby to go to war automatically. *A fortiori* we were not obliged. And Frenchmen who believed that every British Govt. would act on this supposed right don't know Britain.'

While Sir Austen Chamberlain might express these misgivings for the future, his own foreign policy was firmly based on two main principles. These were a collaboration with France which was the closer because of the exceptionally intimate relationship between himself and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Aristide Briand, and, in the aftermath of the Locarno Conference, the maintenance of the co-operation there established between the participating Powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Poland and Czechoslovakia) and the extension of this spirit of co-operation throughout European affairs. As the Foreign Secretary explained to the Lithuanian Minister in London: 'It was the spirit of Locarno to which I attached so much value and which I hoped would inform and guide the policy of the whole world. . . . Our policy was one of appeasement. The world was too narrow to admit of any of us remaining indifferent to the possibilities of a new struggle breaking out anywhere, and so far from regarding with jealousy and suspicion any *rapprochement* between neighbouring States, His Majesty's Government welcomed improved relations wherever they were achieved as a contribution to their policy of appeasement.' (document No. 83.)

Since Sir Austen Chamberlain thus saw his policy as applying so generally it has seemed to the Editor most appropriate to arrange in a single chronological series the documents in Chapters I–IV, which relate to British relations with European countries from October 17, 1925, following the initialing of the Locarno agreements, up to May 17, 1926, the eve of the first meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. The bulk

of the documentation in these chapters is concerned with the principal theme of restoring to normal the relations between the former Allied Powers and Germany, but it is hoped that the broad coverage adopted will enable the reader to assess more easily the relative significance of secondary but highly important themes such as the British attitude to Soviet Russia and to Germany's relations with that Power, and to the increasing desire of Mussolini's Italy to play a leading part in international affairs and French response to that challenge.

Chapter I is chiefly concerned with the reactions which Germany had been assured would follow the initialing of the Locarno agreements and which it was hoped would attract support for them within Germany in spite of their endorsement of the Western frontiers defined by the Treaty of Versailles. These reactions by the former Allied Powers were twofold, relating to the conditions of occupation in the Rhineland and to the question of the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. In the former field the Foreign Secretary's attitude was 'that every measure of alleviation be granted in the present régime that is compatible with the terms of the Rhineland Agreement, namely the maintenance, safety and requirements of the armies of occupation, and everything possible done to mark that our relations with Germany are on a wholly new footing since the initialing of the Locarno treaties. His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept every concession that the French Government are prepared to grant' (document No. 89). In the latter field he recalled the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government given in 1923 'that Germany was effectively disarmed' and put forward the hopeful view that 'the peace of Europe will be better guaranteed by the exhibition of a conciliatory spirit on both sides than by insisting upon the meticulous execution by Germany of the whole list of demands contained in the Allied note of the 4th June [1925]. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, therefore, the evacuation of the Cologne zone should now be hastened to the greatest extent compatible with the liquidation of those outstanding points of disarmament which might constitute a real menace to the peace of Europe.' (document No. 50.) Tough negotiating between the Conference of Ambassadors and German representatives led to agreements on these points on November 14 and 16, 1925.

A principal topic of Chapter II is the evacuation of the first zone of occupation in the Rhineland centred on Cologne, an evacuation which should have taken place by January 10, 1925, but which had been delayed by German defaults in executing the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. In pursuance of the agreement of November 16, 1925, this evacuation was completed by February 1, 1926. It was, however, anticipated by German complaints of the burden of the occupying forces on the inhabitants of the reduced area of occupation, such as were to pour into the Foreign Office throughout 1926. This was an embarrassing problem for Sir Austen Chamberlain, who on the one hand considered that Allied concessions were not appreciated in Germany (see document No. 231) or in the Rhineland (see document No. 455) but on the other hand believed that His Majesty's Government

should 'endeavour to cause the doctrine to infiltrate that continued occupation is in fact an anomaly once France and Belgium have the Locarno safeguards in actual operation. . . . Now as to the present number of troops. The situation to-day is little short of intolerable: every time I have to deliver a bludgeon blow on the head of Stresemann [German Minister for Foreign Affairs], I have a feeling that he might very reasonably retaliate with a bland query as to how we reconcile with our consciences the increased numbers of troops.' (document No. 487.)

Chapter II also includes interesting documents relating to two important aspects of the disarmament problem. In the first place, the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations which met in Geneva in December 1925 in connexion with the institution of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference revealed the 'sharp contrast' (document No. 237) between the British and French points of view which was to persist throughout the depressing history of the Conference. As Sir William Tyrrell, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, expressed it: 'We, alone, advocated the restriction of the programme of the [Preparatory] Committee to such lines of enquiry as seemed to give promise of some practical result, while the French, supported by the remainder of the Council, pressed for the inclusion of a number of abstruse theoretical problems such as can only add to the difficulties of a task which is already formidable enough. One of these was the dangerous thesis that, for purposes of comparison, the criterion should be not the peace-time, or mobilisable, strength of each state, but its potential war-strength, that is to say, its maximum ultimate strength based on its industrial, economic and financial resources, as well as on the measure of assistance which it may expect to receive under article 16 of the Covenant. The advantage of this in French eyes is obvious when we consider its application to Germany.' (*ibid.*) Connected points were French fears of a hiatus between the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control from Germany, strongly urged by His Majesty's Government from the other side of the Channel, and the coming into force, subject to German consent, of the scheme for supervision by the League of Nations of the disarmament clauses of the treaties of peace (see Nos. 174 and 199), and a conflict of opinion on the legality of the continued enforcement of these clauses on Germany in the absence of a general scheme of disarmament (see documents Nos. 264, 326, and 508).

The second aspect of the disarmament problem here documented is German aviation. In December 1925 negotiations opened between Allied and German representatives for the withdrawal from Germany of the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee for the application of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles forbidding German military aviation, in return for a German undertaking regarding the civil character of German aviation. In spite of a warning that Germany was maintaining more pilots than she needed for civil purposes and that the development of German aviation had a military tendency (document No. 126), the negotiations resulted in the agreements of May 7-22, 1926.

Chapter III relates mainly to negotiations for German entry into the League of Nations, which it was hoped would be a further beneficial consequence of Locarno. Germany was, however, unable to join the League in March largely because of her own insistence that she alone should receive a permanent seat on the Council in spite of much-canvassed claims by Poland, Spain, and Brazil. In the hopes of promoting a compromise Sir Austen Chamberlain renounced previous British support for Spain and his own inclination in favour of Poland and sought to prevent Brazil from casting a vote of veto against Germany.

Chapter IV illustrates the reactions of His Majesty's Government and of Germany's other partners at Locarno to the German-Soviet treaty of friendship signed at Berlin on April 24, 1926. The initial reaction in the Foreign Office to the prospect of this agreement was that there could be no valid objection to its conclusion and that the German-Soviet link might draw the Soviet Government closer to full membership of the comity of Europe, but that 'if ever the Balance of Power theory again dominates European diplomacy, then this combination may be but the first step to yet another partition of Poland. Against this far distant danger we can only watch, for any opposition offered by us to the signature of this convention would almost certainly be useless and quite certainly strengthen the hands of the extremists (right and left) in Germany and play straight into the hands of the Soviet Government. The latter is a very present danger—the other dangers have at least a time element which may enable us to stave them off.' (Minute by Mr. F. Maxse, see document No. 392). It was perhaps unfortunate that this short-term view prevailed and that although Sir Austen Chamberlain made strong representations regarding German policy (see, for instance, documents Nos. 415 and 434) yet the greater British diplomatic effort was directed towards allaying the very natural anxieties expressed by France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and preventing action by them.

Chapters I–IV further include documents on Anglo-Soviet relations, notably Nos. 20, 46, 65, 74, 142, 150, 181, 416–17, 465, 481, and 504. In the aftermath of the episode of the so-called Zinoviev Letter of 1924 and the refusal of Mr. Baldwin's Conservative Government to recommend ratification of the general treaty and treaty of commerce negotiated in that year by the preceding Government of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, His Majesty's Government adhered to the perhaps understandably negative policy of preserving in Anglo-Soviet relations 'an attitude of reserve, until the Soviet Government puts forward reasonable concrete proposals for the settlement of outstanding differences. This policy of reserve is not dictated by any desire on their part to isolate Russia, but by the fact that the Soviet Government have not up to the present offered any basis for negotiations to which His Majesty's Government could agree, or shown any disposition to control the anti-British activities of the Third International.' (document No. 417.)

The development of Italian policy and of its effects on Great Britain and France is also the subject of documents in these chapters, notably Nos. 165–6, 179, 300, 309, 329, 377, 422, 449, and 488. Sir Austen Chamberlain had

himself established cordial personal relations with Signor Mussolini and tended to adopt an attitude of reserve towards Franco-Italian difficulties. It was noticed in the Foreign Office that Italy's position as a guarantor of the Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee had enhanced her standing in Europe to the detriment of French influence, but it was hoped that there was no danger of Italian aggression and that British influence could always prevent any outbreak.

Chapter V briefly surveys British policy on Middle Eastern questions, notably on the main point at issue which remained, after the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, to prevent the restoration of the traditionally friendly relations between Great Britain and Turkey, namely the frontier between Turkey and British-mandated Iraq in the potentially rich oil-bearing province of Mosul. Here British desire to restore these relations and to avoid any recurrence of hostilities with Turkey was tempered by responsibilities for the young state of Iraq. It was, as Mr. Chamberlain explained to the Swedish Foreign Minister in November 1925, impossible for His Majesty's Government to settle the dispute 'by selling the interests of Irak in return for economic and financial concessions to citizens of Great Britain' (see No. 534). Mr. Chamberlain was also mindful that it was important for the League of Nations that there should be no failure to obtain a manifestly fair and enforceable settlement between one of its most powerful members and a non-member. As he inquired rhetorically on November 2, 1925, 'Are the sanctions available only if Great Britain applies them for someone else's protection? Mosul really matters very little to us—we can exist and flourish without Irak—but can the League stand such a failure for itself? & *can France stand such a failure for the League?*' (see No. 535). Fortunately Turkish need for a settlement and the skilful diplomacy of Sir Ronald Lindsay, His Majesty's Ambassador to Turkey, prevented these questions being put to the test, and the frontier was settled by the Anglo-Iraqi-Turkish treaty signed at Ankara on June 5, 1926.

The Chapter also covers British recognition of Reza Khan as Shah of Persia and anxieties regarding Soviet-Persian relations, in which connexion Sir Percy Loraine, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, advised that 'the right thing is to show Persia that our sympathy and moral support are with her' (No. 567). In continuation of the documentation in the First Series the chapter also includes a few documents relating to British relations with the Hejaz and recognition of the Emir Ibn Saud as King of that state (March 1926), and to relations with France in a Middle Eastern context.

The present Series is designed to further the purpose of the Collection in accordance with the principles and methods already explained in the prefaces in the first volumes of each of the other three Series. In undertaking to produce the Collection the Editors asked for and received unreserved access to the Foreign Office archives and for freedom in the selection and arrangement of their material. In the case of every volume published these conditions have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of the Editor concerned, and this has been regularly recorded in the prefaces. The same is true for the present volume within the extant scope of the Foreign Office archives. Here, however, the

Editors feel bound to draw attention to a matter which has lately been exercising them. This is the official reviewing of Foreign Office records in order to reduce their forbidding bulk.

The mass of paper produced by modern Government Departments is formidable, as the Editors are only too vividly aware. Although it can well be argued that ideally all records ought to be preserved for posterity and that it is for administrative convenience that records are reviewed to select a reduced amount for permanent preservation, the principle of selective preservation, as explained for example in 1954 in the Report of the Grigg Committee on Departmental Records (Cmd. 9163 of 1954), has long been recognized. For their part the Editors appreciate the general case for reducing the great bulk of paper by stripping it, for instance, of duplicate copies and, in justified cases, of strictly subordinate and routine material. Indeed it could be maintained that the preservation of all records is not only administratively impossible but might even be detrimental to the interests of historians because the sheer bulk would mean that the physical processes of preserving, arranging and issuing the material would be slowed down to an unacceptable extent. If, however, historians are to accept the principle of selective preservation, it can only be on the assumption that the selective process is carried out with care and intelligence and that, certainly in the case of the Foreign Office, the main corpus of policy files is left intact.

In his preface of 1963 to Volume IX of the Second Series, for the years 1931–1932, Mr. Rohan Butler has already noted, in the context of preceding volumes and of earlier assurances for the future, the exceptional circumstance for the period in question that the copies of certain documents entered on the main files of the Foreign Office had not been preserved. Subsequent spot-checks, which he initiated, have, however, convinced him and the present Editors that unhappily, even for the years 1931–2, the destruction of filed originals on political files can no longer be regarded as exceptional; and that, while it is now a few years since this kind of archival destruction was stopped and remedied in the Foreign Office, yet its previous incidence raises grievous complications in regard to Foreign Office archives for the period roughly between the middle of the nineteen-twenties and the middle thirties, and in particular for that covered by the present Series IA.

The Editors regret that their work in the Foreign Office archives has tended to bear out the opinion expressed in 1954 in the report of the Grigg Committee on Departmental Records that the results of the then prevailing systems of reviewing of archives in Government Departments in order to select documents for permanent preservation were ‘far from satisfactory’: see paragraph 45 of Cmd. 9163. In some cases, indeed, that may be putting it mildly. The Editors have noted, not without concern, that according to an estimate made in 1962 by the authorities concerned, while the Civil Service and kindred bodies produce roughly 100 miles of records annually, the average annual intake into the Public Record Office of documents for permanent preservation has in recent years been approximately one mile, although the two figures are not precisely comparable owing to the time-lag

between the creation of documents and their transfer to the Public Record Office. In this context, it was perhaps inevitable that pressure for heavy reduction in the bulk of archives should have affected the Foreign Office, but for a period of years, which to their relief the Editors now believe ended, there seems to have been insufficient recognition of the exceptional historical importance of the Foreign Office political files, and hence of the need to preserve for posterity if not the entire archives on matters of policy, at least a very high proportion of them.

It was only in rather recent years that this unsatisfactory state of affairs came to light and, still more, was remedied in the Foreign Office. Apart from the present volume and Volume IX of the Second Series, it has hitherto been possible to edit all the volumes of this Collection from papers which either had not been reviewed or else had been reviewed in accordance with previous more liberal canons of preservation affording no just ground for historical complaint. A reversion to an earlier and sounder tradition of archival reviewing lies at the heart of the thorough reform of procedure which has now been made by the Foreign Office Library in collaboration with the Public Record Office. Now being implemented is the recommendation of the Grigg Committee that the selection of documents for permanent preservation be made on the basis of the file as unit: see paragraph 77 of Cmd. 9163. In the case of the Foreign Office this revised procedure means in practice that once the reviewers of a file have found one paper worthy of preservation then the whole file is preserved. The Editors gratefully acknowledge the care for the interests of historians which is now being taken by everybody concerned in the Foreign Office and in particular by the staff of the Library.

It is not easy to assess the losses caused by the earlier system of reviewing to the main files of the Foreign Office for the period covered by the present volume, as the incidence of destruction varies greatly, but, for example, it might roughly be estimated that about a third of the papers relating to Germany in 1926 are no longer on the files. Some of these papers may have been correctly judged to have little historical value, and others related to questions which were primarily the responsibility of other Government Departments. (For instance the Foreign Office archives now contain very little material relating to reparations, which was a question handled mainly by the Treasury.) Other papers which have not been preserved in the main files of the Foreign Office were, however, of importance, and their destruction must be deemed historically incorrect and damaging.

Fortunately, it has often been possible to trace a copy of these documents in the confidential print. This is a partial and not wholly satisfactory substitute, as in many cases the record of the action taken by the Foreign Office on an incoming document is no longer preserved, and the confidential print is not always an exact reproduction of the original document. Such copies are here printed with a file number such as Germany 24, Turkey 127 or Telegrams 44. Where the confidential print only is preserved in the main file an asterisk is added after the file number. In cases where no printed copy of a

destroyed document has been traced, it has been possible to obtain an indication of the substance of incoming documents from the summary on the docket in the daybook registers of documents received in the Foreign Office. These docketed summaries are not always fully accurate and need to be treated with reserve. No such dockets were made for outgoing correspondence.

Another archival difficulty, which may or may not be due to the same cause, has arisen in relation to note 6 to document No. 46, which includes a reference to the so-called Zinoviev Letter of September 15, 1924. The file containing the originally entered copy of this letter is in certain respects in a seriously unsatisfactory condition, more particularly since it does not contain either any original copy, or the operative and controversial draft, of the letter of October 24, 1924, sent to M. Rakovski, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London, in the name of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. When the attention of the Foreign Office was recently drawn to this disquieting state of affairs, every help was made available and an intensive investigation and search for the missing documents was forthwith put in hand at a high level, unfortunately so far without decisive results.

In compiling this volume the Editor has drawn material from the private papers of Sir Austen Chamberlain, filed as F.O. 800, volumes 258-9. Documentation of the proceedings of the Conference of Ambassadors has been taken from the collected telegraphic reports from His Majesty's Embassy at Paris, filed as General 199, volumes 5 and II, rather than from the extracts from these telegrams dispersed through the main files of the Foreign Office. Where necessary these telegrams have been checked against the French minutes filed as General 166. For convenience of readers cross-references have been given to the English or French editions of the Stresemann Papers rather than to the full German edition: Gustav Stresemann, *Vermächtnis* (Berlin, 1932). Although Volume I, Part 1, of Series B of *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945*, which relates to the period December 1, 1925, to July 1926, is at an advanced stage of preparation, it has unfortunately not been possible to give cross-references.

I should like to thank Sir John Nicholls, K.C.M.G., O.B.E., Deputy Under-Secretary of State, for his specially helpful interest in the publication of this volume, and Mr. Rohan Butler, Historical Adviser to the Foreign Secretary, for valuable advice, as well as Mr. R. W. Mason, C.M.G., and Mr. C. J. Child, O.B.E., and their staff in the Foreign Office Library for their indispensable assistance. I should also like to thank for their help at various stages in the production of the volume, Miss I. Bains, M.A., Mrs. John Morris, B.A., Miss C. J. Cairns, B.A., Miss C. V. J. Pinder, B.A., Miss Jane Flower, B.A., and Miss June Standing.

M. E. LAMBERT

April 29, 1966

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION. Foreign Office Memorandum of January 10, 1926, respecting the Locarno Treaties . . .	1-17
CHAPTER I. Reactions to the Locarno Agreements. October 17-November 30, 1925 . . .	18-179
CHAPTER II. The evacuation of the Cologne Zone and German request for reduction of the occupying forces: the constitution of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference: negotiations regarding German aviation. December 1, 1925-January 31, 1926	180-378
CHAPTER III. The deferment of Germany's entry into the League of Nations. February 1-March 31, 1926 .	379-564
CHAPTER IV. Reactions of the Locarno Powers to the German-Soviet Agreement of April 24, 1926: Agreement regarding German Civil Aviation. April 1-May 17, 1926	565-759
CHAPTER V. Correspondence on British Policy on Middle Eastern Questions: Agreement regarding the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq. October 16, 1925-June 5, 1926	760-845
APPENDIX: Memorandum on the Foreign Policy of His Majesty's Government, with a List of British Commitments in their Relative Order of Importance. April 1926	846-881

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

INTRODUCTION

1 FOREIGN OFFICE	Jan. 10, 1926	Memorandum considering the historical background and terms of the Locarno agreements of Oct. 1925, and assessing the results achieved.	PAGE 1
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CHAPTER I

Reactions to the Locarno Agreements October 17–November 30, 1925

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
2 MR. A. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 18 to Paris Tel. No. 49 to F.O.	Oct. 17	Informs Lord Crewe that he shares desire of M. Briand, French M.F.A., for alleviations in conditions in Rhineland: wishes to do everything possible to mark entirely new footing of relations with Germany.	18
3 MR. A. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 2 to Coblenz Tel. No. 50 to F.O.	Oct. 17	Refers to No. 2 and instructs Col. Ryan to take similar line regarding alleviations in Rhineland: suggests possible modifications in occupation régime and gives reason for belief in changed French policy.	19
4 MR. A. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 14 to Berlin Tel. No. 54 to F.O.	Oct. 17	Instructs Lord D'Abernon to meet Chancellor and M.F.A. on return to Berlin, and to affirm Mr. Chamberlain's conviction that Locarno agreements mark a turning point in European history.	20
5 MR. A. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno Tel. No. 12 to Rome Tel. No. 55 to F.O.	Oct. 17	Instructs Sir R. Graham to express to Signor Mussolini Mr. Chamberlain's appreciation of his personal presence at Locarno.	21
6 MR. A. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno No. 48	Oct. 17	Transmits record by Mr. Chamberlain of a conversation with Count Skrzynski, Polish M.F.A., who was urged to renounce Poland's right, under Vienna Convention of 1924, to expel certain German nationals from Poland.	21
7 MR. A. CHAMBERLAIN Locarno No. 52	Oct. 17	Transmits record by Mr. Selby of a conversation with Herr von Schubert, Secretary of State in German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regarding importance to Germany of fixing of date for evacuation of Cologne zone of occupation, the note on disarmament to be addressed by German Govt. to Conference of Ambassadors, possibility of early evacuation of remaining zones of occupation and alteration of conditions in Rhineland.	23
8 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 583	Oct. 17	Reports that central theme of visit to Berlin of M. Chicherin, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was danger to	26

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Europe of increasing British influence: M. Chicherin failed to deter German Govt. from Locarno policy: Soviet-French debt negotiations are likely to break down over question of credits for U.S.S.R.	
9 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 231	Oct. 18	Reports favourable reaction of Italian press to Locarno agreements.	29
10 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 374	Oct. 19	Has greeted Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann as instructed in No. 4: they expressed appropriate thanks.	30
11 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 102	Oct. 19	Reports favourable reaction in Belgium to Locarno agreements: chief object of Belgian policy has been to supplement military agreement with France by British guarantee.	30
12 COLONEL RYAN Coblenz No. 365	Oct. 20	Comments on possible modifications to Rhineland régime to meet German complaints regarding overflying, strength of armies of occupation, lack of a German Commissioner, and the ordinances of the High Commission: refers to anti-German feeling of French personnel but points out that reconciliation must also be effected from German side.	31
13 To SIR E. HOWARD Washington No. 1664	Oct. 21	Records congratulations received from American Ambassador on Locarno agreements: President Coolidge's support has been valued.	35
14 SIR G. CLERK Prague No. 344	Oct. 21	Reports favourable reactions in Czechoslovakia to Locarno agreements and comments on effects of agreements on position of German minority.	36
15 To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 284	Oct. 22	Has urged on French Ministers Col. Ryan's suggestion (cf. No. 12) for re-appointment of German Commissioner in Rhineland: urges M. Briand to take initiative in proposing this as well as early discussions with Reichskommissar on modifications to occupation régime.	40
16 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1898	Oct. 22	Records conversation with Dr. Sthamer, German Ambassador, regarding effects of Locarno agreements.	41
17 To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris	Oct. 22	Letter from Mr. Chamberlain recording conversations with Spanish Ambassador at Paris and M. de Fleuriau, French Ambassador in London, regarding claims of Poland, Spain and Brazil to permanent seats on Council of League of Nations.	42
18 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 354	Oct. 23	Has given gist of No. 15 to M. Briand who expressed appreciation and agreed that reappointment of Reichskommissar would be useful concession to German opinion.	43

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
19	To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 3481	Oct. 23	Instructions to invite Conference of Ambassadors to take decisions on area to be occupied by British Army after evacuation of Cologne zone, and on arrangements in connexion with this evacuation, especially regarding amnesty.	43
20	MR. PETERS Moscow No. 732	Oct. 23	Considers that likely effect of Locarno agreements on Soviet foreign policy is either to come to some arrangement with Great Britain or to turn from West to East.	45
21	COLONEL RYAN Coblentz Tel. No. 37	Oct. 24	Reports views of French and Belgian colleagues regarding reappointment of the Reichskommissar.	46
22	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 358	Oct. 24	M. Briand has given instructions for <i>démarche</i> regarding Reichskommissar as proposed in No. 15: he considers Allied High Commissioners should reach agreement before discussing modifications to occupation régime with Reichskommissar.	47
23	FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	Oct. 24	Note proposing joint <i>démarche</i> at Berlin for reappointment of Reichskommissar subject to certain conditions.	48
24	SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 110	Oct. 25	Reports conversation with Polish M.F.A. regarding decision not to expel German optants, and Polish attitude to Locarno agreements.	49
25	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 388	Oct. 25	French Ambassador has been informed of proposal regarding Reichskommissar: urges communication to German Govt. be delayed to produce maximum effect.	50
26	To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 211	Oct. 26	Refers to No. 23: instructions to join colleagues in <i>démarche</i> to German Govt. regarding Reichskommissar and also in any other conciliatory measures proposed by French Govt.: instructions to make personal communication to Drs. Luther and Stresemann that H.M. and French Govts. are acting in spirit of Locarno declarations and rely on Germany to play her part.	50
27	To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 212	Oct. 26	Refers to No. 26: instructions to draw attention of Drs. Luther and Stresemann to bad effect on British and French public opinion of attitude adopted by German National People's party's leaders.	51
28	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 2266	Oct. 26	Transmits record of conversation with Herr von Hoesch, German Ambassador, regarding attitude in Germany towards Locarno agreements, alleviations in the Rhineland and the German note of Oct. 23 to the Conference of Ambassadors regarding disarmament.	52
29	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 391	Oct. 27	Crisis caused by resignation from Govt. of Ministers from German National People's party is apparently settled and Dr. Stresemann is convinced Locarno agreements will be ratified: considers concessions	54

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		regarding Rhineland, etc. should be delayed a few days.	
30 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 1 to Coblenz Tel. No. 371 to F.O.	Oct. 27	Message from Mr. Chamberlain recording conversation concerning procedure in regard to alleviations in Rhineland with M. Tirard, to whom British policy of conciliation and of leaving apparent initiative to French Govt. was explained.	55
31 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 395	Oct. 27	Has given message in Nos. 26-27 to Drs. Luther and Stresemann who seemed determined to carry through Locarno agreements: German public must realise delay in carrying out alleviations is due to attitude of German Nationals.	56
32 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 8 to Berlin Tel. No. 376 to F.O.	Oct. 27	Message from Mr. Chamberlain: Drs. Luther and Stresemann should know that attitude of German nationalists is making it difficult for M. Briand to secure approval for contemplated measures in Rhineland.	56
33 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 374	Oct. 27	Reports meeting on Oct. 27 of Conference of Ambassadors which decided to refer German note of Oct. 23 regarding disarmament to Allied Military Committee of Versailles, which should also study arrangements for British army consequent on evacuation of Cologne zone (cf. No. 19): legal advisers will study amnesty question.	57
34 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 594	Oct. 27	Discusses possible solutions, including neutralization of E. Prussia, to problem of Polish Corridor in light of need to improve Polish-German relations.	59
35 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 215	Oct. 28	Message for General Wauchope from War Office transmitting telegrams exchanged between Mr. Chamberlain and Secretary of State for War regarding War Office attitude to German note of Oct. 23 and political need for concessions to Germany.	60
36 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 386	Oct. 28	Message from Mr. Chamberlain recording conversation with Herr von Hoesch who communicated assurances from Drs. Luther and Stresemann of their determination to carry through Treaty of Locarno provided alleviations regarding Rhineland were obtained.	62
37 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 3 to Brussels Tel. No. 397 to F.O.	Oct. 30	Instructions from Mr. Chamberlain to Sir G. Grahame to make sure Belgian representatives in Paris and Berlin are fully cognisant of their Govt.'s policy regarding fulfilment of expectations aroused by Locarno agreements.	63
38 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 14 to Rome Tel. No. 398 to F.O.	Oct. 30	Instructions from Mr. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham to inform Signor Mussolini of No. 37: he has presumably made his policy clear to Italian representatives.	63

XX

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
39	To SIR G. CLERK Prague No. 541	Oct. 30	H.M.G. would welcome any extension to Central Europe of principles of Locarno but would not take initiative: doubts whether concrete proposals for mutual security pacts could be carried into effect now in Central Europe, still less in Balkans.	64
40	To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 1624	Oct. 30	Transmits copy of No. 39: considers goodwill of Italy to be vital factor in applying principles of Locarno to Central Europe: instructions to speak in this sense to Signor Mussolini.	65
41	COLONEL RYAN Coblenz Tel. No. 40	Oct. 31	Discusses procedure for notifying German public of concessions to be made in Rhineland: agreement has been reached regarding Reichskommissar, revision of ordinances and reduction of number of delegates of High Commission.	66
42	MR. A. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	Oct. 31	Memorandum discussing British policy in connexion with preparations for a conference on the reduction of armaments.	67
43	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 410	Nov. 1	Discusses political situation in Germany in light of conversation between French Ambassador and Dr. Stresemann who reiterated his intention to sign Locarno agreements but urged early putting into effect of assurances given at Locarno and pressed for an announcement regarding evacuation of whole occupied area.	70
44	COLONEL RYAN Coblenz Tel. No. 41	Nov. 1	Summarizes agreement on alleviations in Rhineland régime, in respect of Reichskommissar, revision of ordinances and reduction of numbers of delegates and of offences to be tried before military courts.	72
45	COLONEL RYAN Coblenz Tel. No. 42	Nov. 1	Discusses undertaking to be given by German Govt. regarding amnesty in connexion with services rendered to occupation.	73
46	MR. GREGORY Foreign Office	Nov. 1	Memorandum discussing Anglo-Soviet relations in the light of the Locarno agreements: concludes that H.M.G. should await Soviet initiatives.	74
			<i>Note 4:</i> Mr. Lampson's conversation of Oct. 28 with M. Berthelot regarding a possible visit by M. Chicherin to London.	74
47	COLONEL RYAN Coblenz Tel. No. 43	Nov. 2	Refers to No. 44 and discusses agreement on modifications to régime of occupation in Rhineland.	79
48	To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 216	Nov. 3	Instructions to ask Dr. Stresemann to be careful in allusions to discussions at Locarno: his interpretation in speech on Oct. 31 of remarks by Mr. Chamberlain on British obligations has been unfavourably received by British press.	80
49	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 417	Nov. 3	Reports conversation with Dr. Stresemann regarding German political situation: M.F.A. urged that concessions regarding	81

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Cologne and Rhineland should be announced around Nov. 11.	
50 To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 3625	Nov. 3	Discusses understandings reached at Locarno regarding German disarmament and concessions consequent on Locarno agreements, proposes evacuation of Cologne zone should begin on Dec. 1, and suggests lines of reply to be made by Conference of Ambassadors to German note of Oct. 23 on disarmament: instructions to speak to M. Briand.	82
51 To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 3626	Nov. 3	Instructions to propose to M. Briand that simultaneously with note on disarmament (cf. No. 50) note be addressed to German Govt. regarding amnesty (cf. No. 45).	87
52 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 217	Nov. 4	Refers to No. 44: instructions to take action with French and Belgian colleagues regarding communication to German Govt. relating to appointment of Reichskommissar.	88
53 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 218	Nov. 4	Refers to No. 43: instructions to remind German Govt. of earlier correspondence making clear that signature of security pact could involve no modification of provisions of treaty of Versailles regarding occupation.	88
54 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 422	Nov. 4	Has spoken to German Govt. in sense of No. 48 regarding danger of exaggerating British obligations under Locarno agreements: Dr. Stresemann stated his speech of Oct. 31 was misreported.	89
55 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 406	Nov. 4	M. Briand agrees to proposals in Nos. 50-51 regarding evacuation of Cologne zone and amnesty, and proposes that details of the evacuation should be worked out by local Allied and German officials.	90
56 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1978	Nov. 4	Refers to Nos. 48 and 53: transmits copy of instructions to French Ambassador at Berlin relating to relationship between German claims and concessions to be made by France regarding Rhineland occupation and disarmament: instructions to support French colleague's representations to Dr. Stresemann.	91
57 To SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 883	Nov. 4	Records conversation with Polish Minister regarding Polish decision not to expel German optants and the importance of putting into effect the Locarno agreements.	93
58 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 220	Nov. 5	Refers to No. 49: assumes Dr. Stresemann keeps French Ambassador informed on German political developments: would deprecate change in chancellorship.	95
59 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 408	Nov. 5	Reports conversation with M. Massigli who stated that M. Briand agreed with proposals in No. 50 except that (i) German	95

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Govt. should make proposals regarding police and paramilitary associations, (ii) Dec. 1 was too early to begin evacuation: M. Briand agreed that German Govt. should make proposals regarding amnesty and that details of evacuation should be settled locally by Rhineland High Commission: requests approval of draft reply to German note of Oct. 23.	
60 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 222	Nov. 5	Refers to Nos. 49 and 56: leaves to his discretion, with French and Belgian colleagues and Dr. Stresemann, to decide date to announce Rhineland alleviations to German Govt.	97
61 To COLONEL RYAN Coblentz Tel. No. 35	Nov. 5	Refers to Nos. 47 and 56: agrees that govts. rather than High Commission should announce Rhineland alleviations: also agrees to all proposed alleviations except that regarding transfer of jurisdiction from military to German civil courts.	97
62 To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 313	Nov. 5	Refers to No. 55: agrees to local discussion of details of evacuation of Cologne zone: comments on amnesty to be issued by High Commission and on difficulty of giving guarantees against German reprisals.	98
63 To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 319	Nov. 5	Agrees with proposals in No. 59 regarding German police and associations but hopes for advance agreement between M. Briand and Herr von Hoesch: argues in favour of commencement of Cologne evacuation on Dec. 1: suggests verbal amendments to draft reply to German note of Oct. 23.	99
64 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 1988	Nov. 5	Records conversation with Dr. Sthamer who alleged that Allied delay in announcing concessions was holding up reconstruction of German Govt.: this was denied and necessity of greater German goodwill urged: Dr. Sthamer repeated that Dr. Stresemann's speech of Oct. 31 had been misreported (cf. Nos. 48 and 54).	100
65 To MR. PETERS Moscow No. 1079	Nov. 5	Records conversation with Soviet Chargé d'Affaires who was informed that H.M.G. had never proposed formation of anti-Soviet bloc: Mr. Chamberlain wished to avoid rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations even though he had grounds for it, especially in actions of Comintern.	101
66 MR. WIGRAM Paris	Nov. 5	Memorandum recording conversation with M. Laroche who emphasized conciliatory nature of French policy, but stated that unless Germany paid a lump sum French troops must remain in occupation for full treaty term.	104
67 COLONEL RYAN Coblentz Tel. No. 46	Nov. 6	Comments on French instructions in No. 56 regarding suppression of Rhineland ordinances and delegates.	105

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
68	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 425	Nov. 6	Refers to No. 53 and reports conversation with Dr. Stresemann who suggested terms of possible statement on relationship between article 431 of Treaty of Versailles and Locarno agreement.	106
69	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 426	Nov. 6	Reports conversation with Dr. Stresemann regarding conversation on publication of Rhineland reactions between M. Berthelot and Herr von Hoesch: Dr. Stresemann stated that Locarno policy was widely approved in Germany.	107
70	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 411	Nov. 6	M. Briand agrees with points raised in Nos. 62-63 regarding advance agreement on disarmament with Herr von Hoesch, date of evacuation of Cologne and guarantees for application of amnesty.	108
71	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 412	Nov. 6	Reports meeting on Nov. 6 of Conference of Ambassadors which approved (a) reply to German note of Oct. 23 on disarmament; (b) Rhineland Commission's consulting local German authorities on details of evacuation of Cologne; (c) that M. Cambon should make a communication to Herr von Hoesch regarding amnesty; (d) that note should be sent to German Embassy regarding appointment of Reichskommissar.	108
72	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 413	Nov. 6	Refers to Nos. 48 and 54 and reports conversation with M. Briand regarding misleading statements attributed to Dr. Stresemann.	111
73	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 225 TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 321	Nov. 8	Refers to Nos. 68, 70-71: German attitude is rendering difficult granting of concessions by France, but British opinion is anxious for speedy action: hopes to announce settlement on Nov. 17.	111
74	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 625	Nov. 8	Reports conversation on Nov. 7 with M. Chicherin regarding Anglo-Soviet relations and possible Soviet cooperation with League of Nations: considers Soviet Govt. wishes for better relations with London.	113
75	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 227	Nov. 9	Refers to No. 73: instructions to impress on Dr. Stresemann that satisfactory German proposals regarding police, associations and High Command should be made in light of Mr. Chamberlain's wish to announce date for evacuation of Cologne.	115
76	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 226	Nov. 9	Refers to No. 69 and comments on M. Berthelot's suggestions regarding announcement of alleviations: announcement should be related to note of Nov. 6 (cf. No. 71) regarding disarmament and evacuation of Cologne.	116

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
77	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 430	Nov. 9	Has discussed No. 73 with Dr. Stresemann, who will do his best to speed discussions so that evacuation of Cologne can be announced Nov. 17.	116
78	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 431	Nov. 9	German Govt. are telegraphing proposals on disarmament to Paris as suggested in No. 63: Belgian Minister has made communication to German Govt. regarding Rhineland alleviations and disarmament.	117
79	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 417	Nov. 9	Has discussed No. 73 with M. Briand who appreciates need for early settlement on disarmament.	118
80	CENTRAL DEPARTMENT Foreign Office	Nov. 9	Memorandum discussing the question of the German High Command and German fulfilment of Allied demands in this connexion.	118
81	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 434	Nov. 10	French Chargé d'Affaires has requested instructions regarding Belgian Minister's communication (see No. 78) and has made verbal communication to German Govt. regarding disarmament and evacuation of Cologne: German draft reply on disarmament has been sent to Paris.	120
82	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 229	Nov. 10	Belgian Minister should have acted with his colleagues: instructions to concert with French Ambassador wording and presentation of declaration on Rhineland alleviations, disarmament and Cologne as authorised in Nos. 56 and 76, bearing in mind No. 67: statement on date of evacuation of Cologne must depend on German disarmament proposals.	121
83	TO SIR T. VAUGHAN Riga No. 381	Nov. 10	Records conversation with Lithuanian Minister regarding application of spirit of Locarno and hope that Lithuanian Govt. might settle some of its problems in this spirit.	122
84	MR. HOWARD SMITH Foreign Office	Nov. 11	Memorandum on the application of the Locarno system to the position in Central Europe: discusses the question in relation to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Italy, and Hungary.	124
85	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 422	Nov. 11	German Ambassador has requested that Conference of Ambassadors should on Nov. 14 take and publish decisions on alleviations, disarmament and Cologne: communication suggested in No. 82 would be premature.	129
86	SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 113	Nov. 11	Refers to Nos. 78 and 82: Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs were disconcerted by communication made by Belgian Minister at Berlin.	130
87	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 231	Nov. 11	Refers to Nos. 81-82 and 85: is prepared to accept any arrangement in regard to proposed declaration agreeable to Dr.	130

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Stresemann: in wording of statements regarding evacuation of Cologne and disarmament will go as far as French Govt.	
88 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 425	Nov. 11	Reports negotiations proceeding between French and German Govts. on disarmament questions: French Govt. require more definite satisfaction from Germany on certain points before Conference of Ambassadors can meet on Nov. 16.	131
89 To COLONEL RYAN Coblentz No. 800	Nov. 11	Instructions, in light of War Office comments, on general policy regarding alleviations in régime of occupation in Rhineland, and on manner of effecting and publishing them.	132
90 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 441	Nov. 12	Is supporting French colleague in pressing German Govt. for further precisions on five disarmament questions: Gen. Wauchope considers Allies must not surrender regarding police and high command.	134
91 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 440	Nov. 12	Refers to No. 88 and comments on unfavourable reaction on German political situation of postponement of Conference of Ambassadors' meeting to Nov. 16.	134
92 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 427	Nov. 12	Refers to No. 88 and reports further on disarmament negotiations between French and German Govts.: No. 67 regarding Rhineland delegates has been discussed with M. Massigli: importance of Germany making amnesty proposals will be emphasized to Herr von Hoesch by Quai d'Orsay.	135
93 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 442	Nov. 12	German Govt. hope to be able to give satisfaction to French Govt. on four disarmament questions: difficulties remain regarding police: German Govt. hope for publication of Rhineland alleviations on Nov. 15.	136
94 FOREIGN OFFICE	Nov. 13	Notes on the German note and French semi-official reply of Nov. 11 regarding five disarmament questions (cf. No. 88).	137
95 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 443	Nov. 13	Reports conversation on Nov. 12 with Drs. Luther and Stresemann who urged that date in mid-Jan. 1926 be fixed for completion of evacuation of Cologne zone.	139
96 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 428	Nov. 13	Refers to Nos. 90, 93, and 95: Ministry of Foreign Affairs will endeavour to hold Conference of Ambassadors on Nov. 14 if satisfactory German assurances on police and amnesty have been received.	140
97 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 444	Nov. 13	Has pressed M.F.A. to take effective action as indicated in No. 96: holding of Conference of Ambassadors on Nov. 14 has produced favourable effect which would be increased by declaration suggested in No. 95 regarding completion of Cologne evacuation.	140

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
98	To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 329	Nov. 13	Note to German Govt. on Rhineland alleviations should be despatched: suggests modifications to draft: urges early announcement of beginning of Cologne evacuation on Dec. 1: comments on German note of Nov. 11 on disarmament (cf. No. 94) and on fixing date for completion of Cologne evacuation.	141
99	CENTRAL DEPARTMENT Foreign Office	Nov. 13	Memorandum discussing cases in which Britain is bound to go to war by the Locarno agreements and considering objections to these agreements.	142
100	GERMAN EMBASSY Paris	Nov. 13	Refers to notes of Nov. 11 on disarmament (cf. No. 94) and transmits further German explanations and proposals on four disarmament questions (excluding police).	146
101	To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 331	Nov. 14	Records communication from French Ambassador who urged that Cologne evacuation be completed by end of Jan. 1926: is pressing War Office to agree and will take responsibility of agreeing to Feb. 1 if vital.	149
102	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 434	Nov. 15	Refers to Nos. 96, 98 and 100 and reports negotiations prior to meeting of Conference of Ambassadors on Nov. 14, especially regarding German police and taking of decisions regarding Rhineland modifications and evacuation of Cologne.	150
103	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 435	Nov. 15	Reports meeting of Conference of Ambassadors on Nov. 14 when note to German Ambassador on Rhineland modifications and oral communication on disarmament and evacuation of Cologne were approved.	151
104	COLONEL RYAN Coblentz Tel. No. 49	Nov. 16	Reports consideration by High Commission of manner of giving effect to Rhineland alleviations in note of Nov. 14 (cf. No. 103).	154
105	COLONEL RYAN Coblentz Tel. No. 50	Nov. 16	Refers to No. 104 and reports that colleagues were in conciliatory mood regarding Rhineland alleviations: delay in arrival of Reichskommissar is unfortunate.	155
106	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 439	Nov. 16	Reports meeting of Conference of Ambassadors on Nov. 16 which took note of a report on German disarmament by Marshal Foch and approved text of note to German Ambassador on disarmament and evacuation of Cologne.	156
107	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 452	Nov. 17	Reports publication by German Govt. of commentary on, and reactions of German press to, notes of Nov. 14 and 16 (cf. Nos. 103 and 106) on Rhineland alleviations, disarmament and evacuation of Cologne.	157
108	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 441	Nov. 17	French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and German Embassy have reached agreement in principle on amnesty in Rhineland, but differ as to <i>venue</i> of discussions on details.	158

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
109 To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 3803	Nov. 17	Instructions to discuss with M. Briand difficulties in carrying out his suggestion that numbers of British troops of occupation should be reduced.	159
110 To COLONEL RYAN Coblenz No. 815	Nov. 17	Refers to note of Nov. 14 to German Ambassador (cf. No. 103): instructions to discuss with colleagues War Office views against transfer from military to German civil courts of certain classes of cases.	160
111 MR. BAXTER Foreign Office	Nov. 17	Memorandum discussing the application of article 170 of the Treaty of Versailles prohibiting the import into, manufacture in and export from Germany of war material: difficulties in defining war material.	162
112 COLONEL RYAN Coblenz No. 401	Nov. 18	Reports action leading up to issue on Nov. 18 of communiqué and ordinance respecting Rhineland alleviations and discusses German and French attitude thereto.	164
113 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 462	Nov. 20	Considers rapid evacuation of Cologne would enhance British reputation and constitute a diplomatic and political gain.	166
114 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 459	Nov. 24	M. Berthelot states that M. Briand and Dr. Stresemann consider that signature of Locarno agreements should take place in London on Dec. 1 in spite of death of Queen Alexandra.	166
115 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 464	Nov. 26	Reports meeting of Conference of Ambassadors on Nov. 26 which considered questions relating to German overflying of occupied territory, the manufacture of war material in Germany, the organization of German police, and instructions to the Military Commission of Control in Germany in the light of the agreement reached on Nov. 16 regarding disarmament.	167
116 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 2133	Nov. 26	Records conversation between Mr. Lampson and German Chargé d'Affaires regarding certain alleged statements by Dr. Luther on Nov. 23 on allied commitments in respect of German civil aviation and right of Germany to colonial mandates.	170
117 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 643	Nov. 26	Reports that President Hindenburg is not favourable to League of Nations but follows advice of his Ministers in spite of receiving many letters of criticism.	173
118 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 644	Nov. 26	Reports conversation with Herr von Schubert on Nov. 20 regarding need for improved German-Polish relations and difficulties caused by Polish Corridor and Upper Silesian settlement.	173
119 MR. AKERS-DOUGLAS Vienna No. 303	Nov. 26	Refers to No. 39 and discusses application of Locarno principles to Central Europe in light of situation in Austria and of possible 'Anschluss' with Germany.	174

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
120	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 249	Nov. 28	Instructions to inform German Govt. that signature of Locarno agreements will not be occasion for discussion of business.	177
121	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 2531	Nov. 28	Refers to No. 116: has spoken to M. Berthelot regarding German civil aviation and colonial mandates: Italian Ambassador has stated Germany should not acquire a mandate before Italy.	178

CHAPTER II

The evacuation of the Cologne Zone and German request for reduction of the occupying forces: the constitution of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference: negotiations regarding German aviation

December 1, 1925—January 31, 1926

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
122	RECORD OF MEETING London	Dec. 1	Meeting between British, French, Belgian, and German representatives when question of reduction of troops of occupation in light of note from Conference of Ambassadors of Nov. 14 was discussed: questions of German disarmament, aviation, military courts in Rhineland and German claim to colonial mandate were also raised.	180
123	SIR W. TYRRELL Foreign Office	Dec. 2	Record of conversation with Herr von Schubert regarding reduction of troops of occupation, German membership of the League of Nations, Soviet-German relations and German relations with H.M. and French Govts. in light of new situation in Rhineland.	186
124	TO MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 251	Dec. 3	Instructions to Lord Cecil regarding the establishment by the League of Nations of a preparatory committee for a disarmament conference.	189
125	MR. TROUTBECK Foreign Office	Dec. 3	Memorandum discussing the aerial disarmament of Germany and the question of German civil aviation: summarizes recent instructions to Lord Crewe.	190
126	MR. KNATCHBULL- HUGESSEN Paris	Dec. 3	Letter to Mr. Lampson transmitting report of Nov. 20 to Marshal Foch from the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee in Germany which drew attention to excessive number of pilots trained in Germany.	197
127	MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 387	Dec. 4	Message from Lord Cecil requesting instructions regarding proposal to send public invitation to U.S. Govt. to join preparatory committee on disarmament.	201
128	MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 388	Dec. 4	Message from Mr. Cadogan reporting on decisions of Committee of Council of League of Nations on membership of preparatory committee on disarmament and	202

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		its relationship to Permanent Advisory Commission and other League organs.	
129 MR. BATEMAN Foreign Office	Dec. 4	Memorandum respecting the Balkan problem and British policy in the Balkans: considers situation in Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Roumania, Greece, Albania, Italy, Bulgaria, and Turkey.	203
130 MR. PETERS Moscow No. 851	Dec. 4	Considers situation in U.S.S.R. and policy of Soviet Govt. in light of Locarno agreements and forthcoming Congress of Russian Communist party.	213
131 To MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 256	Dec. 5	Message for Lord Cecil referring to No. 127: considers U.S. Govt. is likely to refuse invitation to join preparatory committee on disarmament.	217
132 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 390	Dec. 6	Message from Mr. Cadogan reporting meeting of Committee of Council of League of Nations on Dec. 5 regarding programme for preparatory committee: differing views of British and French representatives regarding limitation of whole potential wartime strength of a country.	217
133 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 391	Dec. 6	Message from Mr. Cadogan reporting meeting on Dec. 5 between British and French representatives which produced joint programme for preparatory committee: main difference of opinion arose over application of article 16 of League of Nations Covenant.	219
134 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 398	Dec. 7	Message from Admiral Aubrey Smith stating that Anglo-French differences of opinion regarding application of article 16 of Covenant are being submitted to Council: Lord Cecil was not supported in urging preparatory committee's enquiry should be limited to peacetime armaments: possible Franco-Belgian attempt to reintroduce Geneva Protocol.	220
135 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 399	Dec. 7	Message from Admiral Aubrey Smith transmitting text of questionnaire to comprise programme for preparatory committee on disarmament as approved by Committee of Council.	221
136 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 481	Dec. 7	Reports discussion on German aviation between Mr. Phipps and MM. Berthelot and Laroche who were alarmed at excessive number of German pilots and considered definite rules regarding German aviation must be imposed.	222
137 MR. LAMPSON Geneva	Dec. 8	Record of a discussion between Sir A. Chamberlain, Mr. Lampson, and Count Bethlen, Prime Minister of Hungary, regarding military control in Hungary and relations between Hungary and her neighbours.	223

XXX

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
138 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 402	Dec. 9	Reports decisions by Council of League of Nations on Dec. 8 regarding name, membership and procedure of Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.	231
139 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 406	Dec. 10	Message from Mr. Cadogan reporting meeting of Council of League of Nations on Dec. 9 regarding programme of studies of Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference.	232
140 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 486	Dec. 10	Reports meeting of Conference of Ambassadors on Dec. 10 when it was decided to form an allied committee to negotiate with German air experts on future of air control in Germany and to draw attention of German Govt. to violation of article 43 of treaty of Versailles by presence of German military bands in neutral zone.	232
141 MR. ADDISON Berlin No. 671	Dec. 10	Discusses attitude of German people to Locarno policy and political situation in Germany leading up to approval of Locarno agreements by Reichstag: considers possible danger arising from German paramilitary associations: discusses three main questions to be settled with Germany, viz., Danzig and the Polish Corridor, Upper Silesia, and Austria.	234
142 MR. MOUNSEY Foreign Office	Dec. 10	Minute recording conversation between Sir R. Hodgson and MM. Maisky and Rosengolz of the Soviet Mission who intimated that the Soviet Govt. wished to settle outstanding questions with H.M.G.: discusses policy to be adopted.	246
143 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 927	Dec. 12	Discusses attitude of Belgian public to Locarno agreements in light of Belgian wish to obtain precise arrangements for British military aid to Belgium in war-time.	249
144 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 490	Dec. 13	Reports meeting on Dec. 12 of Allied representatives on the Mixed Committee on German aviation (cf. No. 140) which discussed Allied requirements to be satisfied by proposed German legislation and future control by League of Nations under article 213 of Treaty of Versailles.	251
145 To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 357	Dec. 14	Refers to Nos. 140 and 144 and discusses form of future agreement between Conference of Ambassadors and German Govt. regarding German aviation, with particular reference to position of League of Nations.	253
146 MR. KIMENS Warsaw No. 739/S. 37	Dec. 14	Discusses commercial relations between Germany and Poland with special reference to Upper Silesia: transmits memo. by H.M. Vice-Consul at Katowice.	255

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
147	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 4096	Dec. 15	Authority to agree to proposals of Allied Military Committee of Versailles regarding entry of German police into Cologne zone upon its evacuation.	258
148	SIR E. HOWARD Washington Tel. No. 348	Dec. 17	Reports conversation with Secretary of State regarding U.S. membership of Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference and relationship between land and sea disarmament.	259
149	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 503	Dec. 17	Comments on attitude of French delegates to Mixed Committee on German aviation and on French fears of threat from German military aviation.	260
150	MR. MOUNSEY Foreign Office	Dec. 17	Record of conversation with M. Rosengolz who was informed (i) that H.M.G. would welcome discussions on improving Anglo-Soviet relations, but doubted whether there was any basis for agreement; (ii) that there was no reason to discuss exchange of Ambassadors.	261
151	MR. HUXLEY Foreign Office	Dec. 17	Memorandum discussing a possible solution of the problem of Danzig and the Polish Corridor.	262
152	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 505	Dec. 18	Refers to No. 149 and reports meeting between Allied and German delegates when German draft ordinance for control of aviation was discussed.	265
153	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 507	Dec. 20	Reports meeting on Dec. 19 between Allied and German air experts when guarantees for Allies provided in German draft ordinance were discussed: in subsequent conversation with Air Attaché Herr Fisch stated German Govt. could not accept any rules restricting quality and quantity of aircraft and was told that his Govt. must allay Allied suspicions regarding number of pilots and high-performance single-seater aircraft.	266
154	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 511	Dec. 23	M. Laroche states that M. Briand was annoyed that Dr. Nord had made a new <i>démarche</i> regarding German police (cf. No. 157) and was considering action.	267
155	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 507	Dec. 23	Reports information on M. Chicherin's visit to Berlin when he expressed views hostile to the League of Nations and H.M.G. but accepted Locarno agreements as accomplished fact.	268
156	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 4218	Dec. 23	Surveys policy of H.M.G. on German air disarmament: Lord D'Abernon has been instructed to impress on German Govt. that no progress in negotiations is possible until they make more satisfactory proposals: discusses possible action in view of unhelpful attitude of French experts.	269

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
157 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 2767	Dec. 23	Refers to No. 154 and transmits note of observations made to Gen. Desticker by Dr. Nord regarding: (I) effectives and distribution of German police; (II) special material for military transport; (III) manner in which military control of Germany was being carried out.	272
158 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 688	Dec. 23	Transmits record of conversation with Dr. Stresemann regarding political situation in Germany following resignation of Dr. Luther's Govt. and attitude of German public to Locarno.	275
159 MR. COLLIER Foreign Office	Dec. 24	Minute referring to No. 151 and discussing suggested solution to problem of Danzig and the Polish Corridor.	276
160 MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 510	Dec. 26	Has carried out instructions on air negotiations (cf. No. 156): M.F.A. promised to use his influence to obtain more satisfactory German proposals.	280
161 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 2788	Dec. 28	Transmits (i) note of Dec. 24 from French Govt. setting out French <i>desiderata</i> in air negotiations with Germany, (ii) memo. by British delegates surveying the position of the negotiations on Dec. 28.	280
162 MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 511	Dec. 30	Reports that German Govt. prefer to postpone signature of Anglo-German civil air-traffic agreement until negotiations on German civil aviation have been concluded.	287
163 TO MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 259	Dec. 31	Refers to Nos. 160-1 and discusses technical and procedural aspects of German air negotiations: instructions to inform M.F.A. of need for German acceptance of League scheme of investigation before withdrawal of Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee.	288
164 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 516	Dec. 31	Reports meeting on Dec. 31 of Conference of Ambassadors which approved instructions to Rhineland High Commission regarding entry of German police into evacuated zone (cf. No. 147).	290
165 MR. EYRES Durazzo No. 193	Dec. 31	President of Albania states he will not agree to Italian request for Albanian consent to declaration of Conference of Ambassadors of Nov. 1921 with regard to Italian right to protect Albania.	291
	1926		
166 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 4	Jan. 1	Comments on Signor Mussolini's policy and gives reasons for thinking his intentions are pacific: discusses Soviet-Italian relations.	292
167 MR. PETERS Moscow No. 3	Jan. 1	Reports on 14th Congress of Russian Communist party and discusses effect of dissensions in the party on Soviet internal and foreign policy.	294

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
168	MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 1	Jan. 2	Refers to No. 163: has spoken to Dr. Stresemann regarding air negotiations, especially (i) air training of members of Reichswehr, (ii) possession of high-powered aircraft, (iii) necessity to agree to a scheme of supervision.	298
169	MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 2	Jan. 5	Refers to No. 168 and reports interview with Dr. Stresemann regarding air negotiations: German delegates have been given satisfactory instructions on points (ii) and (iii) and he hoped for Cabinet consent to prohibition of (i).	299
170	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 2	Jan. 6	Reports discussion between British and French air delegations who agreed on attitude to be adopted in negotiations with German delegation.	300
171	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 4	Jan. 7	Refers to No. 170 and reports on meeting of Allied and German air experts when latter were informed of Allied requirements for replacement of existing rules by a German law and guarantees.	302
172	MR. ADDISON Berlin Tel. No. 3	Jan. 8	Has again impressed on Herr von Schubert importance attached by H.M.G. to prohibition of training of members of Reichswehr in aviation.	303
173	MR. ADDISON Berlin	Jan. 9	Letter to Mr. Lampson transmitting note from Herr von Schubert regarding the protocol to the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty of Dec. 1924.	303
174	M. BRIAND Paris	Jan. 11	Despatch to M. de Fleuriau transmitting table showing state of execution of military control items listed in German note of Oct. 23, 1925, and instructing him to draw attention of H.M.G. to danger of hiatus between withdrawal of Military Commission of Control from Berlin and establishment of supervision by League of Nations.	306
175	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 6	Jan. 12	Herr von Schubert has drawn Mr. Addison's attention (i) to Mr. Chamberlain's promise to reduce British army of occupation to 8,000; (ii) to British requisitions of billets.	310
176	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 7	Jan. 12	Herr von Schubert has informed Mr. Addison of instructions to German air delegates in Paris regarding training of members of Reichswehr in aviation.	311
177	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 8	Jan. 12	Reports meeting between Allied and German air experts when German proposals regarding fighter aircraft and pilotless machines were discussed: Belgian delegates subsequently objected to proposed concessions to Germany regarding fighters.	311
178	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 119	Jan. 12	Instructions to ascertain whether M. Briand has failed to obtain agreement of French military authorities to reduction of French troops in Rhineland.	313

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
179	SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. unnumbered	Jan. 13	Message for Sir W. Tyrrell pointing out that breakdown of forthcoming negotiations on Italian war debt to H.M.G. would have grave effect on Anglo-Italian relations.	314
180	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 4	Jan. 13	Refers to Nos. 161 and 176: instructions to support French delegates in insisting on prohibition of training of members of Reichswehr in aviation.	315
181	MR. PETERS Moscow	Jan. 14	Letter to Mr. Mounsey reporting a conversation with M. Chicherin who believed he would not have been received by Sir A. Chamberlain and did not consider that Anglo-Soviet negotiations could take place at present.	316
182	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 10	Jan. 14	Refers to No. 183: comments on German political situation, and especially on recent attacks on Locarno policy.	317
183	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 9	Jan. 14	Summarizes letter from Dr. Stresemann referring to note of Nov. 14, 1925 (cf. No. 103) and urging reduction of occupying forces, especially French, with particular reference to German political situation.	318
184	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 14	Jan. 15	Refers to Nos. 182-3 and transmits figures regarding strength of French army of occupation.	319
185	MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Jan. 15	Record of conversation with Dr. Sthamer regarding possible hiatus between cessation of Allied control in Germany and establishment of supervision by League of Nations: Dr. Sthamer communicated text of German note of Jan. 12 to League of Nations regarding League scheme of supervision of Sept. 1924.	320
186	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 172	Jan. 15	Comments on views expressed by French Govt. on proposals for amnesty in Rhineland: instructions to bring views of H.M.G. before Conference of Ambassadors.	322
187	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 17	Jan. 17	Message from Sir E. Drummond regarding possible postponement of meeting of Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference owing to situation as regards Germany and U.S.S.R.	325
188	SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels	Jan. 18	Letter to Sir W. Tyrrell reporting conversation with M. Vandervelde who stated M. Berthelot had raised question of possibly curtailing Rhineland occupation and had linked this with possible mobilization of German obligations under Dawes Plan: M. Vandervelde further raised question of Eupen and Malmédy.	326
189	HERR VON SCHUBERT Berlin	Jan. 18	Letter to Sir W. Tyrrell explaining difficulties of German Govt. if strength of Allied troops in Rhineland were not reduced.	328

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
190	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 22	Jan. 19	Transmits proposals approved by allied air experts for limiting German fighter aircraft.	329
191	To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 203	Jan. 19	Refers to note of Nov. 14, 1925 (cf. No. 103) and to No. 122 and discusses obligations on occupying Powers to reduce their forces in Rhineland: instructions to speak to M. Briand regarding reduction of French forces.	330
192	MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Jan. 20	Record of conversation with Dr. Sthamer who again urged reduction of allied forces of occupation in Rhineland: question of German entry into League of Nations was also raised.	333
193	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 31	Jan. 20	Transmits memo. by Mr. Breen regarding the German nationalist associations and their relations with the Communist party and the Soviet Govt.	335
194	To MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 2	Jan. 21	Message from Sir W. Tyrrell for Sir E. Drummond in reply to No. 187: Lord Cecil considers postponement of meeting of Preparatory Commission would have deplorable effect on public opinion.	338
195	To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 218	Jan. 21	Transmits correspondence with War Office regarding advantages of completing British evacuation of Cologne zone by Jan. 31 even if French and Belgian evacuation not completed.	339
196	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 137	Jan. 21	Refers to No. 191 and reports conversation with M. Berthelot who stated that M. Briand hoped for a reduction of French troops in Rhineland but did not accept German interpretation of note of Nov. 14, 1925.	340
197	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	Jan. 21	Letter to Sir W. Tyrrell transmitting (i) letter from Gen. Wauchope explaining why progress on disarmament as regards effectives of German army and police has been slow, (ii) five concessions to German Govt. on disarmament proposed by Gen. Wauchope.	342
198	LORD KILMARNOCK Coblentz Tel. No. 5	Jan. 22	Urges that pressure be put on Belgian Govt. to complete evacuation of Cologne zone before Feb. 20.	344
199	To M. DE FLEURIAU London	Jan. 23	Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell referring to No. 174 and transmitting tentative views regarding Allied obligation to withdraw Military Commission of Control from Germany and German acceptance of supervision under the League Scheme of Sept. 1924.	345
200	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 38	Jan. 23	Reports conversation with Dr. Schacht regarding improvement in German financial position since signature of Locarno agreements and German need for a colonial	347

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		outlet and for improved relations with Poland.	
201 MR. KNATCHBULL- HUGESSEN Paris	Jan. 23	Letter to Mr. Lampson transmitting German formula regarding application of article 213 of Treaty of Versailles to German aviation after withdrawal from Germany of Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee.	349
202 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 19	Jan. 24	Transmits letter from Dr. Stresemann who wishes to make declaration in Reichstag regarding obligation of occupying powers to reduce forces in Rhineland.	350
203 MR. PHIPPS Paris	Jan. 24	Letter to Mr. Lampson referring to No. 189 and reporting conversation with M. Berthelot regarding reduction of French occupying troops and giving further details regarding drafting of note of Nov. 14, 1925.	350
204 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 30	Jan. 25	Refers to No. 195: Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggest that evacuation of Cologne zone should take place by Feb. 5: Belgian Govt. propose Conference of Ambassadors should notify German Govt. of date of completion of evacuation.	352
205 MR. TROUTBECK Foreign Office	Jan. 25	Memorandum referring to No. 185 and discussing German objections to the League of Nations scheme of Sept. 1924 for exercising its right of investigation.	352
206 To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 11 To SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 5	Jan. 26	Refers to No. 202: instructions to enquire whether French/Belgian Govt. agree to proposed reply to Dr. Stresemann regarding reduction of troops of occupation and interpretation of note of Nov. 14, 1925.	357
207 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 20	Jan. 26	Refers to No. 202: Drs. Luther and Stresemann are considering resignation, but hope for majority in Reichstag if they receive favourable answer regarding reduction of occupying forces.	358
208 To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 12	Jan. 26	Refers to No. 204: agrees that Conference of Ambassadors should notify German Govt. of date of completion of evacuation of Cologne: instructions to press Belgian Ambassador to urge his Govt. to complete evacuation on Jan. 30 with French and British armies.	358
209 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. unnumbered	Jan. 26	Italian Govt. are very pleased with terms of agreement (signed on Jan. 27) for settlement of Italian war debt to H.M.G.: urges press campaign to point out favourable nature of terms.	359
210 LORD KILMARNOCK Coblentz Tel. No. 9	Jan. 26	Transmits joint telegram from High Commissioners suggesting that <i>de jure</i> occupation of Cologne should end Feb. 4 and that German Govt. be informed of efforts made for rapid ending of occupation and	360

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		requested to prevent demonstrations after troops have left.	
211 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 33	Jan. 26	Refers to No. 190: Air Attaché has pointed out to German delegate that German proposals on fighter aircraft in No. 212 are unacceptable.	361
212 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 34	Jan. 26	Refers to No. 211 and transmits German proposals for controlling numbers, capacity and use of fighter aircraft and for limiting number of pilots qualified to fly them.	362
213 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 166	Jan. 26	Transmits record by Mr. Phipps of conversations on Jan. 25 with MM. Paul-Boncour and Blum regarding postponement of Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference, ending of Rhineland occupation and reduction of French troops there.	362
214 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 6	Jan. 27	Belgian Govt. agree to terms of proposed note (cf. No. 206) to German Govt. regarding reduction of troops of occupation in Rhineland and interpretation of note of Nov. 14, 1925.	364
215 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 7	Jan. 27	Belgian M.F.A. considers Dr. Stresemann exaggerates his internal difficulties but has a grievance in matter of occupying troops: it is stated that Marshal Foch opposes their reduction.	364
216 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 23	Jan. 27	M. Briand states in reply to No. 202 that French Govt. intend to reduce burden of occupation on Rhineland: Dr. Stresemann states this assurance is too indefinite for Reichstag.	364
217 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 24	Jan. 27	Discusses German case for reduction of troops of occupation in Rhineland in light of note of Nov. 14, 1925.	365
218 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 36	Jan. 27	Reports on German revision of proposals in No. 212 regarding fighter aircraft and on new Anglo-French proposals: Air Attaché believes French Govt. will accept German proposals in No. 219 regarding training of Reichswehr rather than break off negotiations: requests instructions.	366
219 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 39	Jan. 27	Refers to No. 218 and transmits German proposals for limiting training of members of Reichswehr in aviation.	367
220 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 40	Jan. 27	Refers to Nos. 208 and 210 and reports action taken by Conference of Ambassadors to notify German Govt. of evacuation of Cologne zone.	367
221 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 41	Jan. 27	Reports meeting on Jan. 27 of Conference of Ambassadors which considered questions relating to military control in Hungary, aviation hangars at Bochum, the compilation of a list of war material whose export and import is forbidden to	368

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
			Germany, and amnesty in the Rhineland (cf. No. 186).	
222	MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Jan. 27	Record of conversation with German Ambassador regarding participation of German Govt. in work of commissions which will advise Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference.	371
223	MR. PHIPPS Paris	Jan. 27	Record of conversation with M. Berthelot who stated M. Briand wished to speak to Sir A. Chamberlain regarding postponement of meeting of Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference, the Saar, troops of occupation in Rhineland, the forgeries scandal in Hungary, Poland's claim to a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations, the Anglo-Italian agreement of Dec. 1925 regarding Abyssinia and Italian policy regarding Tunisia and Tangier, and British press reports on Syria.	372
224	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 7	Jan. 28	Conference of Ambassadors has notified German Govt. of evacuation of Cologne: instructions to concert with French and Belgian colleagues in representations to German Govt. to prevent demonstrations after troops have been withdrawn.	375
225	LORD KILMARNOCK Coblentz No. 20	Jan. 28	Reports on progress made in transferring cases from military courts to German civil courts and in recodifying the ordinances of the Rhineland High Commission.	375
226	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 28	Jan. 29	Refers to No. 224: Herr von Schubert promised to take necessary measures to prevent demonstrations after troops have left Cologne zone.	377
227	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 22	Jan. 29	Refers to No. 218: authority to accept any solutions agreed by French Govt. regarding air training of members of Reichswehr but restrictions must also apply to German naval and police personnel.	378
228	LORD KILMARNOCK Coblentz Tel. No. 11	Jan. 31	Evacuation of Cologne was completed without incident by British troops on Jan. 30.	378

CHAPTER III

The deferment of Germany's entry into the League of Nations February 1—March 31, 1926

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
229	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 9	Feb. 1	Requests comments on alleged statement by Dr. Stresemann that no German territory had been renounced under Locarno agreements.	379
230	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 30	Feb. 1	Time and manner of withdrawal of British troops from Cologne have caused favourable comment in govt. circles and press.	380

xxxix

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
231	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 8	Feb. 1	Draws attention to prompt fulfilment by Allies of concessions to German Govt. since Locarno Conference as contrasted with lack of progress regarding German disarmament and in air negotiations: instructions to speak to Dr. Stresemann pointing out that Germany must show goodwill.	380
232	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 10	Feb. 1	Refers to No. 231 and states that M. Briand maintains his policy of reconciliation with Germany: instructions to make personal appeal to Drs. Luther and Stresemann to continue work for joint realization of hopes raised by Locarno agreements.	382
233	SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	Feb. 1	Memorandum recording conversation on Jan. 28 with M. Briand regarding Polish claim to permanent seat on Council of League of Nations and discussing advantages in H.M.G.'s supporting this claim.	383
234	MR. CAMPBELL Foreign Office	Feb. 1	Minute commenting on position as regards participation of Soviet Govt. in work of Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.	385
235	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 46	Feb. 2	Refers to No. 218 and reports agreement by British and German delegates on revised proposals on German fighter aircraft and attitude of Allied delegates to German proposals on pilotless machines: reports position as regards various questions of German aviation in Rhineland.	386
236	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	Feb. 2	Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain referring to Nos. 229 and 231-2 and discussing German policy since Locarno Conference: comments on policy of M. Briand especially regarding reduction of French troops in Rhineland and supervision by League of Nations of demilitarization of Rhineland instead of allied occupation.	388
237	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	Feb. 2	Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell discussing application to Germany of difference of opinion between H.M. and French Govts. regarding restriction of enquiries of Preparatory Commission on Disarmament to peacetime strength of each State.	390
238	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 33	Feb. 3	Reports on events leading up to German application to join the League of Nations.	391
239	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 50	Feb. 3	Refers to No. 227 and reports that discussions between British and German delegates reached deadlock regarding total prohibition of air training for members of Reichswehr, German navy and police.	392
240	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 51	Feb. 3	Refers to No. 239 and transmits German formula for limitation of training of German police in aviation: German delegates request separate treatment of this question.	392

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
241	LORD KILMARNOCK Coblentz No. 27	Feb. 3	Comments on No. 231 from point of view of German policy in Rhineland since Locarno Conference and records conversation with Reichskommissar regarding lack of German co-operation.	393
242	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 34	Feb. 4	Drs. Luther and Stresemann thank Sir A. Chamberlain for his message in No. 232 and desire to continue joint prosecution of Locarno policy but appeal for support in overcoming their difficulties.	395
243	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 35	Feb. 4	In view of settlement of question of German entry into League of Nations German Govt. hope for early withdrawal of Military Commission of Control and reduction of troops in Rhineland.	396
244	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 31	Feb. 4	Refers to Nos. 239-40: instructions to discuss privately with French representatives solution regarding air training of Reichswehr and German navy: considers question of air training of police should be settled in Paris.	396
245	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 176	Feb. 4	Records conversation with German Ambassador regarding consequences of Locarno agreements, especially regarding German disarmament and reduction of troops in Rhineland: Dr. Sthamer also raised question of treatment of minorities.	397
246	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 393	Feb. 5	Refers to conversation with M. Briand regarding presidency of Saar Basin Governing Commission: French Ambassador has asked for views of H.M.G.: question of French troops to guard Saar Railways and attitude of French public opinion to Locarno agreements were also mentioned.	400
247	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin	Feb. 5	Letter to Sir A. Chamberlain referring to No. 236: comments on internal difficulties of German Govt., on evacuation of Cologne and on possible curtailment of Rhineland occupation in return for League of Nations supervision.	401
248	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 38	Feb. 6	Refers to No. 231: Herr von Schubert commented on representations in regard to German High Command, associations, police, British use of Rhineland railways and attitude of German Govt. to concessions since Locarno: he urged reduction of occupying troops.	402
249	MR. GAISFORD Munich Tel. No. 1	Feb. 6	Reports that Italian colleague has suggested that protest be made at Berlin about speech on Feb. 5 by Dr. Held, Bavarian Prime Minister, in which he expressed views hostile to Locarno agreements and critical of France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia.	404
250	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 15	Feb. 7	Refers to No. 243: in view of fulfilment by Allies of the concessions promised at Locarno the German Govt. should not ask for	404

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		further concessions in disarmament but should carry out the agreement reached in Paris in Nov. 1925.	
251 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 16	Feb. 7	Refers to No. 250: has just seen, but not examined, No. 248.	405
252 To SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 75	Feb. 8	Records conversation on Polish claim to permanent seat on Council of League of Nations with Polish Minister who was informed of Sir A. Chamberlain's sympathies but warned of opposition in G.B. to claim.	405
253 VISCOUNT CECIL London	Feb. 8	Memorandum on the composition of the Council of the League of Nations: considers that recognized Great Powers only should be permanent members and that addition of further non-permanent members would make it too unwieldy a body: urges that in March Assembly should admit Germany and set up committee to examine changes in constitution of Council.	406
254 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 44	Feb. 9	Summarizes speech on Feb. 9 by Dr. Stresemann referring to a speech on Feb. 6 wherein Signor Mussolini stressed that Italy's frontier was the Brenner Pass.	409
255 To SIR A. GRANT DUFF Stockholm No. 26	Feb. 9	Records conversation with Swedish Minister who stated that his govt. and Belgium opposed creation of permanent seats on Council of League of Nations, except for Germany, and was informed of Sir A. Chamberlain's personal views in favour of claims of Spain and Poland.	409
256 To LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 195	Feb. 9	Comments on German Govt.'s tendency to demand fresh concessions not only from Western Powers but also in commercial negotiations with Poland.	411
257 To VISCOUNT CECIL London	Feb. 9	Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain referring to No. 253 and arguing in favour of permanent seat on Council of League of Nations for Poland: H.M.G. have agreed to support Spanish claim.	412
258 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 58	Feb. 10	Urges that Sir R. Graham be instructed to request Italian Govt. to expedite instructions to Italian delegate as aviation negotiations with Germany are being delayed.	413
259 To H.M. REPRESENTATIVES Paris Tel. No. 36 Rome Tel. No. 33 Brussels Tel. No. 15	Feb. 10	Message for French/Italian/Belgian Govts. regarding summoning of special meeting of Council of League of Nations regarding German membership.	414
260 To MR. SPERLING Berne Tel. No. 2	Feb. 10	Instructions to act as representative of H.M.G. at special meeting of League Council to consider necessary formalities in connexion with German application for membership.	414

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
261	SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 23	Feb. 10	Reports conversations with German Ambassador and Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs on German-Italian relations, especially in light of situation in South Tyrol and recent speeches by Dr. Stresemann and Signor Mussolini.	415
262	SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 24	Feb. 10	Refers to No. 261 and reports further on conversation with Senator Contarini who was perturbed by extreme views expressed by members of Fascist party, and promised to deliver message from Sir R. Graham urging moderation on Signor Mussolini.	417
263	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 455	Feb. 10	Records conversation with French Ambassador who gave information regarding negotiations for a Franco-Yugoslav treaty and invitation to Italy to become a party, and was informed of difficulties arising in connexion with Poland's claim to permanent seat on League Council.	418
264	FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	Feb. 10	Note regarding Germany's position on the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference with particular reference to the Allied note of June 16, 1919, and the preamble to part V of the Treaty of Versailles.	420
265	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 48	Feb. 11	Refers to No. 250: German Govt. hope to have settled questions relating to High Command, Associations, and Police, but Gen. Wauchope is less optimistic: urges need for clear instructions or Control Commission will remain in Germany.	423
266	TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 37	Feb. 11	Refers to No. 258: instructions to approach Italian Govt. regarding German aviation negotiations which H.M.G. wish to conclude speedily before German entry into League.	424
267	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 49	Feb. 11	Refers to No. 265: Gen. Wauchope urges that his proposals for minor concessions on German disarmament be approved by Conference of Ambassadors.	424
268	TO LORD KILMARNOCK Coblentz No. 84	Feb. 11	Approves language to Reichskommissar reported in No. 241: H.M.G. do not wish for recrimination in relations with German Govt. but expect co-operation.	425
269	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 63	Feb. 12	Reports meeting of Conference of Ambassadors on Feb. 12 when questions relating to military rolling stock and alienation of unauthorized military establishments in Germany were considered.	425
270	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 282	Feb. 12	Transmits record by Mr. Phipps of conversation with M. Caillaux who expressed views on interallied debts, the Locarno agreements, the internal situation in France, Italian and Spanish policy, Germany's entry into the League and the attribution of Mosul.	426

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
271	SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 137	Feb. 12	Discusses Italo-German relations in the light of the situation in the South Tyrol and of recent speeches by Dr. Stresemann and Signor Mussolini.	430
272	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 68	Feb. 13	Transmits memo. by Mr. Finlayson regarding German trade with U.S.S.R.	432
273	MR. SPERLING Berne No. 45	Feb. 13	Refers to No. 260 and reports on meeting of Council of League of Nations on Feb. 12 when agenda was drawn up for Assembly meeting on Mar. 8 in connexion with admission of Germany.	434
274	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 51	Feb. 15	Reports on conversations between Sir E. Drummond and Dr. Stresemann and Herr von Schubert: German opposition to Spanish permanent membership of Council is less strong than to Polish.	435
275	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin No. 215	Feb. 15	Records conversation with German Ambassador regarding German opposition to admission of any Power but Germany to permanent membership of Council of League of Nations.	435
276	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 52	Feb. 16	Reports further on Sir E. Drummond's conversations in Berlin regarding German membership of League of Nations and increase in membership of Council.	438
277	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 507	Feb. 16	Refers to Nos. 231, 248, and 250 and transmits letter of Feb. 11 from War Office regarding settlement of question of German police: discusses further questions regarding German disarmament and requests that proposal be made that Control Commission be instructed to settle outstanding questions as speedily as possible.	439
278	SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN Foreign Office	Feb. 16	Memorandum discussing H.M.G.'s policy towards the U.S.S.R. with annexed memo. by Mr. Orde respecting the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R.	442
279	LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 53	Feb. 17	Dr. Stresemann has stated to Sir E. Drummond that M. Briand is being informed that if France proposed permanent membership of League Council for Poland, German application for membership would be reconsidered.	449
280	VISCOUNT CHILSTON Vienna No. 56	Feb. 17	Reports statement by Austrian Chancellor regarding Austria's foreign relations, especially with Italy in light of Signor Mussolini's recent speech.	450
281	MR. WIGRAM Paris	Feb. 17	Minute recording views expressed by MM. Bardoux and Léger regarding effects of Locarno agreements on Anglo-French relations, especially in relation to article 44 of the Treaty of Versailles.	452
282	TO LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 22	Feb. 18	Refers to No. 279: instructions to suggest to Dr. Stresemann that German position regarding permanent membership of	454

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		League Council be reserved for discussion between Locarno Powers at Geneva.	
283 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 54	Feb. 18	On Feb. 17 Dr. Stresemann stated that mission to M. Briand (cf. No. 279) was informative to ascertain position.	455
284 MR. KENNARD Belgrade No. 72	Feb. 18	Reports a conversation with M.F.A. regarding relationship of Franco-Italian-Yugoslav negotiations to dangers of possible Anschluss between Germany and Austria and of possible German-Italian-Soviet agreement.	455
285 SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 11	Feb. 19	Reports conversation with Polish President of Council regarding Poland's claim to permanent membership of Council of League of Nations.	456
286 LORD D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 55	Feb. 19	Refers to No. 283 and reports information from Dr. Stresemann on interview between M. Briand and Herr von Hoesch on claims to permanent membership of League Council: Dr. Stresemann stated Reichstag would oppose German entry into League if other Powers were given permanent seats.	457
287 TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 26	Feb. 21	Refers to No. 285 and expresses anxiety regarding press controversy on permanent membership of League Council: presses suggestion in No. 282 for a conference between Locarno Powers.	458
288 TO SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 9	Feb. 21	Refers to Nos. 282 and 285: is endeavouring to reserve question of permanent membership of League Council for personal discussion before public discussion in Council.	459
289 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 75	Feb. 22	Refers to Nos. 282 and 287: M. Briand denies German right to treat question of additions to Council as condition for joining the League and favours private discussion between Locarno Powers.	459
290 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 42	Feb. 23	Refers to No. 287 and reports conversation regarding claims to permanent membership of League Council with Signor Mussolini who agrees to private discussion between Locarno Powers.	460
291 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 44	Feb. 23	Reports that Signor Mussolini on Feb. 22 expressed views critical of French proposal for a Franco-Italian-Yugoslav pact.	461
292 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 168	Feb. 23	Reports on exchange of messages between Signor Mussolini and Austrian Chancellor regarding latter's speech on Austrian foreign policy (cf. No. 280).	461
293 VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 59	Feb. 24	Has carried out instructions in Nos. 282 and 287: reports views of Dr. Stresemann on increase in membership of League Council: Dr. Stresemann agrees to private talks between Locarno Powers.	462

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
294	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 29	Feb. 24	Explains that Spanish and Brazilian claims to permanent membership of League Council date from 1921, when H.M.G. supported Spanish claim.	463
295	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 78	Feb. 24	Reports on position reached in negotiations regarding German aviation.	463
296	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 79	Feb. 24	Refers to No. 295 and transmits revised Allied formula regarding limitation of training of members of Reichswehr and German navy in aviation matters.	464
297	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 603	Feb. 24	Transmits views on rights of overflying occupied territory.	465
298	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 61	Feb. 25	Reports conversation with M.F.A. regarding a possible international corporation to be formed by G.B., France, and Germany to trade with U.S.S.R.	466
299	TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 58	Feb. 25	Refers to Nos. 290 and 294; instructions to remind Signor Mussolini of previous British support for Spanish claim to permanent seat on League Council; hopes that question will be settled in private discussions.	467
300	TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 59	Feb. 26	Refers to Nos. 263 and 291 and explains views on proposals for Franco-Italian-Yugoslav treaty; instructions to express hope to Signor Mussolini that conversation at Geneva with M. Briand and Signor Scialoja will dispel misunderstandings.	467
301	TO SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 11	Feb. 26	Expresses appreciation of Count Skrzynski's speech presenting Locarno agreements to Polish Diet; Sir A. Chamberlain's object is to keep question of composition of Council open for friendly discussion at Geneva.	468
302	TO MR. RAMSAY Rio de Janeiro No. 51	Feb. 26	Records conversation with Brazilian Ambassador who hinted that Brazil might not assent to German entry into League of Nations if her own claim to permanent seat were not admitted, and was informed that such action would destroy any hope of such a seat for Brazil.	469
303	SIR E. HOWARD Washington No. 309	Feb. 26	Reports conversation regarding composition of League Council with Secretary of State, who pointed out that South America would have a grievance if European Powers only received permanent seats.	470
304	SIR T. VAUGHAN Riga No. 62	Feb. 26	Transmits record by Mr. Carr of a conversation with Counsellor of German Legation who stated that German policy was to prevent Poland's forming a <i>bloc</i> with Baltic States, and to make a German-Soviet-Baltic pact.	471
305	SIR J. TILLEY Tokyo Tel. No. 34	Feb. 27	Reports conversation with Japanese Vice-M.F.A. regarding Japanese attitude to claimants to permanent membership of Council of League of Nations.	473

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
306	TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Madrid Tel. No. 13	Feb. 28	Instructions to inform Spanish Govt. of language to Brazilian Ambassador (see No. 302) if they appear to contemplate refusing to vote for German entry into the League.	473
307	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 85	Mar. 1	Refers to No. 301: reports conversation between Mr. Phipps and M. Berthelot who suggested that Germany should agree to permanent seat on League Council for Spain immediately and for Poland in Sept.	474
308	TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	Mar. 1	Note from Sir A. Chamberlain expressing views on right of Saar Basin Governing Commission to call on French troops in emergency and on permanent establishment in Saar of a military detachment and technical railway commission.	475
309	SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 51	Mar. 2	Refers to No. 300 and reports conversations regarding proposed Franco-Italian-Yugoslav pact with Senator Contarini and Signor Mussolini who expressed views hostile to such a pact or a Franco-Yugoslav one.	476
310	SIR H. RUMBOLD Madrid Tels. Nos. 14-16	Mar. 2	Refers to No. 306 and discusses possibility of Spanish veto on German entry into League: records conversation regarding Spanish and Brazilian claims to permanent seat with Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was informed of warning to Brazil.	477
311	SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 27	Mar. 2	Reports conversation with German Minister who stated his Govt. could admit no other change in composition of League Council when Germany entered but wished to discuss compromise acceptable to Poland.	479
312	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 89	Mar. 3	Refers to allied formula regarding air training of Reichswehr and naval personnel (No. 296) and explains bad impression created by revised German formula in No. 313: requests Lord D'Abernon be instructed to support French colleague in representations to German Govt.	480
313	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 88	Mar. 3	Transmits German formula proposing 200 members of Reichswehr and German navy be authorized to fly.	481
314	TO SIR E. HOWARD Washington Tel. No. 41	Mar. 3	U.S. Ambassador has discussed with Lord Cecil possibility of British and U.S. representatives on Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference working together.	481
315	MR. RAMSAY Rio de Janeiro Tel. No. 9	Mar. 3	Refers to No. 302: M.F.A. states Brazilian Govt. intend to support Germany's admission to League of Nations but object to her claim to exclude others from permanent seats on Council.	482

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
316	MR. RAMSAY Rio de Janeiro Tel. No. 10	Mar. 3	Refers to No. 315: M.F.A. requests British support for Brazil's claim to permanent seat on League Council and denies that Brazil would withdraw from League if claim failed.	482
317	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 56	Mar. 3	Refers to No. 277 and transmits instructions regarding attitude to be adopted at Conference of Ambassadors on questions of recruitment for Reichswehr, reserve cadres, instruction of General Staff officers, and number of police allowed to Germany.	483
318	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 91	Mar. 3	Refers to Nos. 312-13: Allied objections to German formula on flying by Reichswehr and German navy were explained to German delegates who refused to modify attitude.	485
319	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 37	Mar. 4	Refers to No. 312: instructions to support French representations regarding flying by Reichswehr and German navy and to remind Herr von Schubert and Dr. Stresemann of views expressed in Nos. 248 and 169.	485
320	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 59	Mar. 4	Message for Count Skrzynski explaining attitude of British public opinion to question of composition of Council of League of Nations.	486
321	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 58	Mar. 4	German Ambassador has proposed meeting of British, French, German, Italian, and Belgian Govts. at Geneva on Mar. 7 but stressed that no change in German attitude regarding membership of League Council was implied.	487
322	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 95	Mar. 4	Reports meeting of Conference of Ambassadors on Mar. 4 when Lord Crewe made statement on German disarmament as instructed in Nos. 277 and 317, M. Massigli explained position of German air negotiations, and decisions were taken on questions of German police, German effectives, and German recruiting and General Staff.	487
323	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 434	Mar. 4	Reports approval by Conference of Ambassadors of draft notification to League of Nations regarding German fulfilment of undertakings in Treaty of Versailles.	490
324	SIR H. RUMBOLD Madrid Tel. No. 23	Mar. 5	French Ambassador states Spanish M.F.A. has given assurance that Spanish Govt. will act according to wishes of H.M. and French Govts. regarding composition of Council of League of Nations.	491
325	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 71	Mar. 5	M.F.A. states that German Govt. will propose that members of German armed forces to be instructed each year in aviation be limited to twelve.	491
326	VISCOUNT CECIL London	Mar. 5	Memorandum discussing obligations on Germany and other Powers to disarm in accordance with Allied note of June 16,	492

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		1919, and preamble to part V of the Treaty of Versailles.	
327 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 1	Mar. 7	Message from Sir A. Chamberlain recording meeting of representatives of Locarno Powers at which candidatures to League Council were discussed: German position remained unchanged.	494
328 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 7	Mar. 8	Message from Mr. Cadogan referring to No. 323 and reporting meetings of Council of League of Nations on Mar. 8 regarding admission of Germany.	495
329 SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Mar. 9	Letter to Sir W. Tyrrell recording a conversation on Mar. 7 with M. Briand regarding difficulties in Franco-Italian relations, especially respecting proposed triple pact and Albania.	495
330 SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Mar. 9	Letter to Sir W. Tyrrell referring to No. 327 and recording action taken in attempt to settle question of composition of Council of League of Nations.	497
331 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 10	Mar. 10	Message for Cabinet from Sir A. Chamberlain recording conversation on Mar. 9 with Drs. Luther and Stresemann to whom compromise on question of claims to permanent seats on League Council was suggested without success.	499
332 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 14	Mar. 10	Message for Cabinet from Sir A. Chamberlain recording meeting of representatives of Locarno Powers which made no progress on question of composition of League Council.	500
333 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 16	Mar. 10	Message from Sir A. Chamberlain recording unofficial meeting of League Council on Mar. 10 at which pledges of support for German membership were given but Brazilian delegate stated he could not admit any other claim if Brazilian application were refused.	501
334 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 22	Mar. 11	Message from Sir A. Chamberlain recording unofficial meeting on Mar. 11 of League Council which failed to agree regarding permanent seats on Council.	502
335 To SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva	Mar. 11	Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell referring to Nos. 329-30 and 333 and commenting on Franco-Italian relations and Brazilian opposition to unconditional German entry into League of Nations.	503
336 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 28	Mar. 12	Message from Sir A. Chamberlain recording meeting of representatives of Locarno Powers who discussed compromise proposals for permanent seat on League Council for Germany and additional temporary seat for Poland.	505
337 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 32	Mar. 12	Message from Sir A. Chamberlain recording Dr. Luther's rejection of compromise on composition of League Council (cf.	506

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		No. 336) and discussion by Locarno Powers of proposal by M. Unden for Sweden's resignation from Council in favour of Poland.	
338 BRITISH DELEGATE Geneva No. 12 L.N.C.	Mar. 12	Transmits (i) minutes by Mr. Lampson and Sir A. Chamberlain recording conversations on Mar. 10 with M. Paul-Boncour regarding German reservations respecting League scheme of Sept. 1924 for supervising disarmament, (ii) letter of Mar. 12 from Sir A. Chamberlain to M. Briand confirming views in No. 199 regarding validity of League scheme.	507
339 FOREIGN OFFICE	Mar. 12	Memorandum regarding the strength of German police forces: records recent negotiations between Conference of Ambassadors and German Govt.: question turns on 5,000 extra police.	508
340 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 33	Mar. 13	Message for Cabinet from Sir A. Chamberlain recording meeting on Mar. 12 with Dominion representatives at which Lord Cecil suggested that Drs. Luther and Stresemann held differing views regarding compromise on composition of League Council.	512
341 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 34	Mar. 13	Message for Cabinet and Dominions from Sir A. Chamberlain recapitulating negotiations at Geneva on German entry into League of Nations and discussing the situation.	513
342 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 35	Mar. 13	Message for Cabinet from Sir A. Chamberlain reporting that Norwegian delegate had unsuccessfully pressed on German delegate Lord Cecil's compromise proposal regarding composition of League Council (cf. No. 336).	516
343 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 38	Mar. 14	Message for Cabinet from Sir A. Chamberlain recording conversation on Mar. 13 with German Delegation who were unable to make any concession regarding composition of League Council.	516
344 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 38 parts 2 and 3	Mar. 14	Records informal meeting on Mar. 13 of Council of League of Nations at which M. Briand explained French position in light of German rejection of compromise on membership and Japanese Delegate submitted resolution recommending seat for Germany and deferring consideration of other claims.	517
345 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 38 part 4	Mar. 14	Records Swedish opposition to Japanese delegate's proposed resolution.	518
346 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 38 part V	Mar. 14	Records agreement with M. Briand on action to be taken and representations made to Brazilian delegate against blocking German entry into League of Nations: comments on German attitude.	518

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
347	MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 1 to Madrid Tel. No. 39 to F.O.	Mar. 14	Message from Sir A. Chamberlain recording conversation on Mar. 10 with Spanish M.F.A. who was urged that Spain should not withdraw from League if she did not obtain permanent seat on Council: instructs Sir H. Rumbold to speak similarly to Spanish Govt.	520
348	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 114	Mar. 14	Refers to No. 325 and requests instructions regarding proposal by Mixed Committee on German aviation that German forces personnel to receive aviation instruction each year be limited to three.	521
349	MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 44 part I	Mar. 15	Message for Prime Minister from Sir A. Chamberlain requesting approval of proposal for immediate permanent seat on League Council for Germany, election of Poland and Norway in place of Sweden and Czechoslovakia, and subsequent permanent seats for Spain and Brazil.	521
350	MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 44 part II	Mar. 15	Comments on proposals in No. 349.	522
351	TO MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 19	Mar. 15	Message to Sir A. Chamberlain stating that Cabinet would prefer to avoid creation of new permanent seats on League Council but consider solution of deadlock essential.	522
352	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 119	Mar. 15	Transmits letter from Allied delegates to air negotiations to M. Massigli comprising new formula regarding flying by twelve Reichswehr and German naval personnel with comments thereon.	523
353	MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 50	Mar. 16	Message from Sir A. Chamberlain for Cabinet recording meeting of League Council on Mar. 15: proposal for withdrawal of two members of Council was discussed.	524
354	MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 50 part II	Mar. 16	Records statements to League Council on Mar. 15 by M. Briand and Sir A. Chamberlain on question of constitution of Council especially regarding creation of new seats.	525
355	MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 50 part 3	Mar. 16	Records statements to League Council on Mar. 15 regarding possible abolition of permanent seats and rule of unanimity: considers prospect of solution of Polish problem is reasonable: records interview between Lord Cecil and Brazilian delegate whose argument that permanent seat for America already existed was refuted: similar argument used at further meeting of Council: records Anglo-French exchanges regarding non-permanent seats for Poland and Roumania.	526
356	SIR H. RUMBOLD Madrid Tel. No. 4 to Geneva Tel. No. 29 to F.O.	Mar. 16	Refers to No. 347 and reports conversation with King of Spain regarding possible Spanish withdrawal from League: the King raised question of Spain's obtaining	527

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		mandate over Tangier zone and read out Spanish Govt.'s reply to representations in No. 347 promising support for German entry into League but maintaining decision for Spain to withdraw.	
357 SIR B. ALSTON Petropolis Tel. No. 1 to Geneva	Mar. 16	Refers to No. 346 and reports on representations made with French colleague to President of Brazil who was unable to retreat from position taken up regarding German entry into League.	529
358 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 54	Mar. 16	Message from Sir A. Chamberlain recording meeting with Dominion representatives regarding proposals in No. 349 on composition of League Council and proposals in No. 355 for seats for Poland and Roumania: M. Briand subsequently stated latter proposal had been dropped.	530
359 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 55	Mar. 16	Message for Cabinet from Sir A. Chamberlain reporting meeting with M. Briand and German representatives when procedure at League Assembly on Mar. 17 in light of Brazilian attitude was agreed.	531
360 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 56	Mar. 16	Message from Sir A. Chamberlain referring to No. 359 and transmitting text of communiqué issued by representatives of five Locarno Powers expressing hope of German entry into League of Nations at next session of Assembly.	531
361 SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN Geneva No. 9 L.N.A.	Mar. 16	Transmits record by Mr. Lampson of interview on Mar. 14 with M. Massigli who was warned that if Germany did not enter League and Treaty of Locarno did not enter into force France would not obtain equivalent guarantees from H.M.G.	532
362 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 59	Mar. 17	Message from Mr. Lampson reporting private meeting of League Council when Brazilian delegate stated that he could not ask for reconsideration of his instructions regarding German entry into League.	533
363 VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 75	Mar. 17	Reports reactions in Germany to failure of negotiations for German entry into League of Nations.	534
364 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 121	Mar. 17	Transmits text of message from Mixed Committee on Aviation to M. Massigli giving reasons for refusing further concessions to Germany, but suggesting small amendment to formula in No. 352 regarding number of German forces personnel to be authorized to fly.	535
365 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 515	Mar. 18	Transmits note of Mar. 3 from Herr von Hoesch to M. Briand regarding interpretation of term war material as applied to article 170 of the Treaty of Versailles.	536
366 MR. LAMPSON Geneva	Mar. 18	Record of conversation with M. Benes regarding Czechoslovak relations with Austria, Germany, and Hungary.	538

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
367	MR. LAMPSON Geneva	Mar. 18	Letter to Mr. Howard Smith recording information from M. Massigli that M. Briand had assured Dr. Stresemann that the question of German aviation should be settled forthwith: Sir A. Chamberlain agreed: M. Massigli agreed that question of 5,000 extra German police in Rhineland was of little importance.	539
368	SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 248	Mar. 19	Reports conversation on Mar. 18 with Signor Mussolini regarding failure of recent negotiations of League of Nations and Italian attitude to Brazilian policy on German entry into League.	540
369	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 79	Mar. 22	Reports statement to Reichstag by Dr. Stresemann regarding negotiations for German entry into League of Nations and maintenance of Locarno policy.	541
370	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 80	Mar. 22	Points out that in his speech to Reichstag (see No. 369) Dr. Stresemann refrained from criticism of Spain and Brazil and from giving offence to Poland.	543
371	LORD KILMARNOCK Coblenz No. 59	Mar. 23	Reports speech by Dr. Adenauer when President von Hindenburg visited Cologne on Mar. 21: comments on German attitude to British occupation.	543
372	TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Madrid No. 145	Mar. 24	Spanish Ambassador enquired regarding British support for Spain's claim to permanent seat on League Council and was told H.M.G. could undertake no commitments to any Powers.	545
373	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 84	Mar. 25	Reports conversation on Mar. 24 with Dr. Stresemann who made representations regarding statements in Sir A. Chamberlain's speech in Parliament on Mar. 23 respecting the Brazilian note of Dec. 1924 on German entry into the League of Nations.	545
374	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 85	Mar. 25	Refers to No. 373 and reports further conversation with Dr. Stresemann who urged British denial that H.M.G. were committed to support claims of any Power to permanent seat on League Council.	546
375	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 132	Mar. 25	Reports meeting on Mar. 25 of Conference of Ambassadors which considered Dr. Gessler's speech on Mar. 3 on Reichswehr estimates and German note of Mar. 3 on definition of war material (see No. 365).	547
376	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 555	Mar. 25	Reports conversation between M. Massigli and Dr. Nord who had no instructions regarding flying by Reichswehr and German naval personnel but communicated memoranda regarding air training of police and flying in Rhineland.	548
377	SIR R. GRAHAM Rome No. 265	Mar. 25	Discusses recent developments in the formation of the Fascist state.	549

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
378	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 86	Mar. 26	Discusses general position in Germany as regards Locarno policy: urges rapid settlement regarding reduction of Rhineland troops, German aviation and disarmament.	551
379	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 87	Mar. 26	Reports on German Govt.'s reactions to invitation to take part in work of Committee on the Composition of the Council of the League of Nations.	552
380	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 133	Mar. 26	Refers to No. 376 and reports conversation on Mar. 25 between M. Massigli and Dr. Nord who proposed that maximum of 100 Reichswehr and German naval personnel be allowed to fly and also handed in list of proposed airfields in Rhineland.	552
381	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 43	Mar. 27	Refers to Nos. 275 and 374: Parliamentary speech of Mar. 23 should have made clear H.M.G.'s only commitment to Spain was subject to Germany's entry into League.	553
382	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 44	Mar. 27	Refers to No. 379 and hopes German Govt. will accept invitation to take part on equal terms in work of Committee on the Composition of the Council.	554
383	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 91	Mar. 30	Reports conversation with Dr. Stresemann regarding German foreign policy, especially relations with Soviet Govt. who appear to wish for arbitration treaty with Germany.	554
384	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin No. 175	Mar. 30	Comments on effect of recent negotiations for German entry into League of Nations on German internal and external politics: conclusion of an agreement with U.S.S.R. likely to be postponed.	555
385	TO SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels No. 254	Mar. 30	Transmits correspondence of Mar. 17 with Luxembourg Govt. regarding Luxembourg participation in the work of Locarno.	557
386	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 76	Mar. 31	Refers to No. 378: instructions to urge M. Briand to agree to increase of 5,000 in German police and to reduction of troops of occupation in Rhineland.	558
387	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 77	Mar. 31	Instructions to urge M. Briand on political grounds to give instructions for conclusion of aviation negotiations with Germany: suggests additional paragraph to German formula in No. 380 regarding flying by Reichswehr and German naval personnel.	559
388	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 140	Mar. 31	Refers to Nos. 376 and 380 and reports conversation on Mar. 30 between M. Massigli and Dr. Nord regarding flying by Reichswehr and naval personnel, flight over and airfields in Rhineland: transmits German formula regarding Govt. subsidies to flying organizations.	560
389	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin No. 178	Mar. 31	Transmits report by Lieut. Hume of conversation on Mar. 26 with member of Reichswehr Ministry regarding Reichswehr's difficulties in recruiting.	561

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
390	VISCOUNT CHILSTON Vienna No. 91	Mar. 31	Reports on recent events in connexion with a possible 'Anschluss' between Germany and Austria.	563

CHAPTER IV

Reactions of the Locarno Powers to the German-Soviet Agreement of April 24, 1926: Agreement regarding German Civil Aviation April 1—May 17, 1926

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
391	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 93	Apr. 1	Reports statement made in confidence on Mar. 31 by Herr von Schubert regarding German-Soviet relations, especially Soviet proposals for a treaty of neutrality.	565
392	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 93 part 2	Apr. 1	Reports further on conversation with Herr von Schubert who outlined proposed German-Soviet treaty and was warned of unfavourable impression such a treaty would make.	566
393	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 610	Apr. 1	Refers to No. 375 and transmits draft letter to German Ambassador regarding Dr. Gessler's remarks on the attitude of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control to the Reichswehr estimates, which appear to be unduly high.	568
394	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin	Apr. 1	Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell regarding likelihood of Soviet bankruptcy and desirability of obtaining information thereon from Gen. Hoffmann.	570
395	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 144	Apr. 3	Refers to No. 386: on Apr. 2 M. Briand expressed strong objection to granting proposed increase in German police but will do his best to secure reduction of Rhineland troops.	571
396	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 145	Apr. 3	Refers to No. 387: M. Briand hopes for speedy conclusion of German aviation negotiations and suggests fifty-sixty members of Reichswehr and German navy be authorized to fly.	572
397	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 99	Apr. 6	Reports conversation with Herr von Schubert regarding difference between outline of proposed German-Soviet treaty in No. 392 and that communicated to French Govt.	572
398	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 100	Apr. 6	Secretary of State stated that proposed German-Soviet treaty should be regarded as counterpart to Locarno Agreement which remained in full force for Germany.	573
399	VISCOUNT CECIL London	Apr. 6	Memorandum on reorganization of Council of League of Nations: discusses increase in permanent members and considers schemes for distribution of non-permanent seats.	573

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
400	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 47	Apr. 7	Refers to Nos. 391-2 and denies British aim to form anti-Soviet combination: assumes proposed German-Soviet treaty will be in harmony with League Covenant, especially articles 16 and 17.	576
401	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 101	Apr. 7	Comments on effects of Polish-Roumanian treaty of Mar. 26, especially on German-Soviet relations.	577
402	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 632	Apr. 7	Refers to No. 395 and discusses Anglo-French differences on question of German police: requests instructions on answer to German note of Mar. 5 (see No. 339).	578
403	MR. HUXLEY Foreign Office	Apr. 7	Minute discussing Dr. Schacht's speech of Mar. 24 urging the necessity of colonial expansion for Germany.	579
404	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin No. 453	Apr. 8	Instructions to draw attention of Dr. Stresemann to unhelpful attitude of Dr. Nord in aviation negotiations.	580
405	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin No. 454	Apr. 8	Comments on Dr. Stresemann's remark on Mar. 22 (cf. No. 369) respecting declaration by League of Nations on fulfilment by Germany of her international obligations.	581
406	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 641	Apr. 8	Discusses the financial situation of France and the possibility of settling the French war debt to H.M.G.	582
407	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin No. 196	Apr. 8	Records views on German-Soviet relations expressed by a leading German authority.	583
408	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 103	Apr. 9	Refers to No. 400 and reports conversation with Herr von Schubert who stated Germany had refused unrestricted treaty of neutrality with U.S.S.R. and maintained that treaty would be complementary to Locarno agreement.	587
409	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 153	Apr. 9	Refers to No. 410 and reports subsequent conversation between Herr von Hoesch and M. Berthelot who warned that Germany could not go back on Locarno policy and that treaty with U.S.S.R. would have deplorable effect on Western Powers: M. Berthelot asked Mr. Phipps for Sir A. Chamberlain's views.	588
410	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 652	Apr. 9	Transmits memo. by M. Berthelot recording conversation on Apr. 3 with Herr von Hoesch who stated M. Briand desired to settle questions of German aviation and reduction of Rhineland troops: Herr von Hoesch also made a statement regarding proposed German-Soviet treaty.	589
411	WING-COMMANDER SMYTH-PIGOTT Paris	Apr. 9	Letter to Mr. Troutbeck reporting meetings with Herr Fisch and subsequently with Allied delegates to air negotiations regarding proposal for two lists of thirty-six names of Reichswehr and naval personnel permitted to fly: transmits draft letter from Conference of Ambassadors to German	592

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
			Ambassador settling question of airfields in and flying over Rhineland.	
412	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 1111	Apr. 10	Refers to No. 409 and records conversation between M. de Fleuriau and Mr. Gregory who exchanged views regarding the proposed German-Soviet treaty.	594
413	WING-COMMANDER SMYTH-PIGOTT Paris	Apr. 11	Letter to Mr. Troutbeck reporting that on Apr. 10 German delegates to air negotiations stated that over seventy German service personnel were flying and proposed that second list should reach ninety.	596
414	SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 43	Apr. 12	Reports conversation with Count Skrzynski who doubted accuracy of British version of proposed German-Soviet treaty, maintained that it was a defensive alliance and urged that meaning of letter of Dec. 1, 1925, to Germany from Locarno Powers regarding article 16 of Covenant be defined.	597
415	TO MR. INGRAM Berlin Tel. No. 49	Apr. 12	Refers to No. 408: is not greatly disturbed by German-Soviet negotiations, but warns of effects on France and Poland: is concerned by German agitation for colonial mandate: unless German Govt. can give as well as receive they can expect no further allied concessions.	598
416	TO SIR R. HODGSON Moscow No. 273	Apr. 12	Transmits letter of Apr. 6 from Foreign Office to London Chamber of Commerce defining policy of H.M.G. regarding compensation for British claimants against U.S.S.R. and possible abrogation of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1921.	599
417	TO H.M. REPRESENTATIVES Moscow No. 277 Warsaw No. 208 Riga No. 130 Helsingfors No. 66	Apr. 12	Refers to possible guarantee pact between U.S.S.R. and her neighbours and outlines general policy of H.M.G. to U.S.S.R.: H.M.G. have invited Soviet Govt. to make proposals for improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations and would welcome better relations between U.S.S.R. and her neighbours in accordance with League Covenant and Treaty of Locarno.	601
418	TO SIR G. CLERK Prague Tel. No. 12	Apr. 13	Instructions to explain to M. Benes and Count Skrzynski views of H.M.G. on proposed German-Soviet treaty: dangers of opposing its signature.	603
419	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 86	Apr. 13	Authority to agree, subject to certain amendments, to draft letter to German Ambassador in No. 393 regarding speech by Dr. Gessler on Reichswehr estimates.	604
420	TO SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 215	Apr. 13	Records conversation with Polish Minister who stated that his Govt. were more inclined to British view of proposed German-Soviet treaty, and was informed that H.M.G. saw danger in opposing its signature and in commenting on letter of Dec. 1, 1925: M. Skirmunt also referred to slow	604

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		progress of German-Polish commercial negotiations.	
421 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 668	Apr. 13	Refers to No. 412 and reports conversation regarding proposed German-Soviet treaty with M. Briand who agreed that protest at Berlin might be ineffective.	606
422 TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome	Apr. 13	Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain regarding value attached by Signor Mussolini to good relations with H.M.G.: doubts whether Signor Mussolini has aggressive intentions, except possibly in Asia Minor, but expresses concern regarding Franco-Italian relations.	608
423 TO MR. INGRAM Berlin Tel. No. 50	Apr. 14	Refers to No. 414 and presumes Polish Govt. have misleading version of proposed German-Soviet treaty: instructions to urge German Govt. to reassure Polish Govt.	609
424 MR. INGRAM Berlin Tel. No. 107	Apr. 14	Refers to German acceptance of membership of Committee on the Composition of the Council and states that Herr von Schubert was pessimistic regarding German entry into the League of Nations in Sept.	609
425 MR. INGRAM Berlin Tel. No. 108	Apr. 14	Refers to No. 415 and reports representations made to Herr von Schubert regarding German agitation for colonial mandate and especially statements by Minister of Interior and Dr. Schacht.	610
426 MR. INGRAM Berlin Tel. No. 109	Apr. 14	Refers to No. 415 and reports assurances from Herr von Schubert that proposed German-Soviet treaty was not incompatible with League Covenant or Locarno treaty: Herr von Schubert expressed concern at leakages in British press.	611
427 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 155	Apr. 14	Reports meeting on Apr. 14 of Conference of Ambassadors which approved draft letter regarding Dr. Gessler's speech on Reichswehr estimates (cf. Nos. 393 and 419) and report by Allied Military Committee of Versailles regarding the organization of the German High Command, but did not reach agreement regarding increase in German police (cf. No. 402): requests instructions regarding draft note to Austrian Govt. regarding military control in Austria.	611
428 MR. PEROWNE Foreign Office	Apr. 14	Memorandum recapitulating negotiations for the settlement of the French war debt to Great Britain.	613
429 SIR G. CLERK Prague Tel. No. 20	Apr. 15	Refers to No. 418 and reports conversations with M. Benes and Count Skrzynski who take grave view of proposed German-Soviet treaty: M. Benes will send memo. suggesting questions for Locarno Powers to put to Germany: has informed M. Benes and Count Skrzynski of request in No. 423 for German assurances to Poland.	617

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
430	To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 1171	Apr. 15	Records conversation with French Ambassador who suggested Anglo-French conversations to avoid divergence of views at Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference and expressed anxiety regarding possible German use of preamble to part V of Treaty of Versailles: M. de Fleuriau also suggested Anglo-French consultation on German entry into League of Nations.	618
431	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 690	Apr. 15	Reports that after meetings of delegates to German aviation negotiations agreement on outstanding points regarding flying by personnel of Reichswehr and navy (German proposal of Apr. 14 enclosed), airfields in demilitarized zone of Rhineland, and Govt. subsidies to flying organizations is in sight.	620
432	LORD KILMARNOCK Coblenz No. 78	Apr. 15	Comments on effects in Rhineland of policy of reconciliation pursued by Allies since initialing of Locarno agreements: suggests representations be made regarding lack of German response.	621
433	MR. INGRAM Berlin Tel. No. 113	Apr. 16	Refers to No. 423: has urged Herr von Schubert to convey assurances regarding proposed German-Soviet treaty to Polish Govt.	624
434	To MR. INGRAM Berlin No. 508	Apr. 16	Records conversation with German Ambassador who made statement on German-Soviet negotiations and was informed of difficulties caused by German requests for concessions on such questions as disarmament and colonial mandates as well as by German policy towards U.S.S.R.	625
435	To SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw No. 218 To SIR G. CLERK Prague No. 176	Apr. 16	Refers to No. 418 and records conversation with Polish Minister who expressed concern regarding German-Soviet negotiations and was informed of H.M.G.'s confidence in German intentions and doubts of wisdom of representations at Berlin.	628
436	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 700	Apr. 16	Refers to No. 431 and reports further progress in German aviation negotiations, especially regarding subsidies: transmits German drafts of letters to Conference of Ambassadors regarding (i) application of articles 198 and 213 of Treaty of Versailles, (ii) airfields in demilitarized zone of Rhineland.	630
437	SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tels. Nos. 47-48	Apr. 17	Refers to No. 423: German assurances regarding negotiations with U.S.S.R. have had little effect in Poland: Soviet Govt. are reported to be negotiating for further credits from Germany which would emanate from U.S.A.	632
438	MR. TROUTBECK Foreign Office	Apr. 17	Memorandum respecting the evacuation of the zones of occupation in the Rhineland:	633

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		discusses the legal position and examines relevant proposals.	
439 MR. INGRAM Berlin Tel. No. 119	Apr. 20	Reports speech by Dr. Stresemann at Stuttgart on Apr. 18 regarding German foreign policy especially relationship of German-Soviet negotiations to Locarno agreements.	639
440 TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 1208	Apr. 20	Instructions on attitude to be adopted at Conference of Ambassadors on question of definition of war material for purposes of application of Treaty of Versailles.	641
441 TO MR. INGRAM Berlin Tel. No. 54	Apr. 21	Believes that, contrary to German view, Count Skrzynski and M. Benes remain greatly alarmed by proposed German-Soviet treaty.	642
442 TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 55	Apr. 21	Summary in No. 439 of Dr. Stresemann's speech at Stuttgart causes great uneasiness: requests elucidation.	642
443 TO SIR G. CLERK Prague Tel. No. 14	Apr. 21	Considers questions regarding German-Soviet negotiations in Dr. Benes's memo. referred to in No. 429 have been answered by Dr. Sthamer's statements in No. 434 and would deprecate any <i>démarche</i> to German Govt.: instructions to speak to Dr. Benes.	643
444 TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 1220	Apr. 21	Refers to Nos. 431 and 436: comments on points raised in aviation negotiations regarding airfields in demilitarized zone and application of article 213 of Treaty of Versailles.	644
445 MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Apr. 21	Record of conversation with Herr Dufour-Feronce who gave explanations of motives of German Govt. in negotiating with U.S.S.R.: Mr. Lampson suggested Dr. Stresemann should make public assurances given privately.	645
446 SIR R. HODGSON Moscow No. 315	Apr. 21	Transmits letter from Mr. Paton, H.M. Consul at Vladivostok, regarding spying on British firms and H.M. Consulate.	646
447 SIR G. CLERK Prague Tels. Nos. 24-25	Apr. 22	Refers to No. 443 and reports conversation with M. Benes who agreed it was unnecessary to present questionnaire on German-Soviet negotiations: M. Benes would appreciate hint to German Govt. of his good faith in drafting memo.	649
448 TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 1230	Apr. 22	Refers to Nos. 395 and 402: after reconsideration maintains views in No. 386 regarding German police: in view of French attitude question should be dropped.	650
449 TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 1240	Apr. 22	Records conversation with French Ambassador regarding reactions in Europe to proposed German-Soviet treaty, Soviet negotiations with Baltic States, possible Italian aggressive intentions especially in Asia Minor, and proposed League of Nations Economic Conference.	651

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
450	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 124	Apr. 23	Reports conversation on Apr. 22 with Herr von Schubert who expected early signature of German-Soviet treaty, gave further details of its terms, reiterated assurances of its compatibility with League Covenant, and was urged (cf. No. 441) to take steps to allay Polish and Czechoslovak anxiety; Herr von Schubert criticized Polish policy.	654
451	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 91	Apr. 23	Comments on draft German decrees to put into effect the agreement on German aviation.	655
452	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 58	Apr. 23	Refers to No. 447 and allows discretion whether to let German Govt. know that M. Benes's action in drafting memo. on German-Soviet negotiations was inspired by solicitude for League of Nations and German relations with Western Powers.	656
453	TO SIR G. CLERK Prague Tel. No. 17	Apr. 23	Instructions to inform Dr. Benes that it was felt wiser not to give Lord D'Abernon more specific directions than those in No. 452 regarding Dr. Benes's attitude to German-Soviet negotiations.	657
454	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 125	Apr. 23	Outlines salient features of German political situation including attitude to League of Nations and German-Soviet treaty.	657
455	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin No. 554	Apr. 23	Instructions to speak to Dr. Stresemann on unfavourable impression left on H.M.G. by account in No. 432 of lack of German response in Rhineland: German-Soviet treaty is another factor making pursuit of Locarno policy difficult.	658
456	LORD KILMARNOCK Coblenz No. 84	Apr. 23	Refers to No. 432 and reports reactions of Reichskommissar to representations regarding lack of German response in Rhineland.	659
457	TO MR. WIGRAM Paris	Apr. 23	Letter from Mr. Sargent referring to No. 427 and discussing policy on military control in Austria and need for early withdrawal of Organ of Liquidation from Austria.	661
458	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 126	Apr. 24	German-Soviet treaty will be signed on Apr. 24 and text published on Apr. 26: treaty will be registered with League of Nations after ratification.	665
459	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 59	Apr. 24	Refers to No. 450 and comments on remarks by Herr von Schubert on German-Soviet treaty: refutes his criticism of Polish policy.	666
460	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 129	Apr. 25	Reports conversation on Apr. 24 with Dr. Stresemann regarding course of German-Soviet negotiations and aims of Soviet policy.	667
461	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 131	Apr. 25	Refers to Nos. 459-60: considers that conclusion of Treaty of Berlin will lead to developments in German-Polish relations.	668

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
462	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 130	Apr. 25	Continues report in No. 460: Dr. Stresemann also commented on German entry into League of Nations, character of M. Briand, German nationalist associations' relations with similar French bodies, and German relations with Poland.	668
463	SIR R. HODGSON Moscow Tel. No. 106	Apr. 25	Reports speech by M. Litvinov on Apr. 24 regarding Soviet policy in signing treaty with Germany and towards H.M.G.	669
464	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 60	Apr. 25	Comments on German policy as outlined in No. 454 especially regarding composition of League Council and German relations with France, U.S.S.R., and Poland.	670
465	TO SIR R. HODGSON Moscow Tel. No. 113	Apr. 26	Refers to No. 463 and comments on Soviet refusal to believe Locarno agreements were not aimed at U.S.S.R.: H.M.G. remain willing to consider serious proposals for improving Anglo-Soviet relations.	671
466	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 158	Apr. 26	Refers to Nos. 444 and 451: comments on draft agreement on German aviation and especially on reference to application of article 213 of Treaty of Versailles to airfields in demilitarized zone.	672
467	LORD KILMARNOCK Coblenz Tel. No. 16	Apr. 27	German Govt. has made no representations regarding British garrison in Rhineland: Reichskommissar has referred to billeting difficulties and general reduction of occupying forces.	673
468	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 1260	Apr. 27	Refers to No. 395: considers position regarding strength of armies of occupation is indefensible but questions utility of raising the question with French Govt. at present.	674
469	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin No. 561	Apr. 27	Refers to No. 455 and transmits Coblenz despatch No. 80 of Apr. 20 enclosing secret report on remarks made by Prussian Minister of Interior to Rhineland officials on Apr. 13 regarding situation in occupied territory.	675
470	SIR G. CLERK Prague Tel. No. 28	Apr. 28	Refers to No. 453: Dr. Benes is not happy about Treaty of Berlin which has brought fresh considerations to question of German entry into League of Nations.	677
471	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 93	Apr. 28	Refers to No. 466: phrase regarding application of article 213 of Treaty of Versailles to airfields in demilitarized zone should be omitted from draft: investigations could also be undertaken under article 4 of Treaty of Locarno.	678
472	TO H.M. REPRESENTATIVES Buenos Aires Rio de Janeiro Santiago	Apr. 28	Explains policy of H.M.G. in light of meeting of Committee on Composition of Council of League of Nations: German admission is essential and H.M.G. have no other commitments: requests information	678

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
	Montevideo Caracas Lima Guatemala Havana Panama Bogota Tel.		on support likely for Brazilian claim to permanent seat.	
473	To SIR E. HOWARD Washington Tel. No. 88	Apr. 28	U.S. Ambassador states his Govt. had consented to sit on Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference but not on connected League Commissions: Lord Cecil explained to Mr. Houghton the relationship between Preparatory Commission and other League bodies and suggested Commission should appoint its own sub-committees.	680
474	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 160	Apr. 28	Refers to No. 471 and reports further discussion with German delegates regarding application of article 213 of Treaty of Versailles: explains procedure for initialing protocol of aviation agreement: refers to No. 451 and reports agreement on various points regarding German decrees.	681
475	To MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 1288	Apr. 28	Records conversation with French Ambassador regarding terms and implications of Treaty of Berlin.	683
476	MR. ORDE Foreign Office	Apr. 28	Memorandum commenting on Treaty of Berlin and attached exchange of notes.	684
477	To VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin No. 570	Apr. 28	Instructions to inform Dr. Stresemann of unfavourable first impression produced by text of Treaty of Berlin: transmits record of conversation on Apr. 27 between Mr. Lampson and Dr. Sthamer who was informed that wording and timing of treaty were unfortunate.	686
478	MR. LAMPSON Foreign Office	Apr. 28	Record of conversation with Dr. Sthamer to whom No. 477 was read: it was suggested to him that German Govt. should announce publicly that nothing in Treaty of Berlin was contrary to League Covenant or Treaty of Locarno.	689
479	To SIR G. CLERK Prague Tel. No. 18	Apr. 29	Refers to No. 470: first impression is that Treaty of Berlin is not inconsistent with League Covenant and Locarno Treaty: believes Germany is now keen to enter League: hopes Czechoslovak Govt. will maintain attitude of reserve.	690
480	To VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 63	Apr. 29	Opinion on Treaty of Berlin in No. 479 does not qualify that in No. 477: does not wish to admit to other Locarno Powers extent of misgivings.	690
481	To SIR R. HODGSON Moscow	Apr. 29	Letter from Mr. Orde transmitting record of conversation between Mr. Gregory and Col. Mackie on situation in U.S.S.R. and alleged unwillingness of H.M.G. to receive Soviet overtures.	691

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
482	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 137	Apr. 30	Reports conversation with Dr. Stresemann to whom No. 477 was read: he sent message regarding his attachment to Locarno, forthcoming public assurances regarding Treaty of Berlin and reference to article 16 of League Covenant in letter attached to treaty.	693
483	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 139	Apr. 30	Reports press statements regarding alleviations effected in occupied territory since initialing of Locarno agreements.	694
484	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 138	Apr. 30	Has communicated substance of No. 455 to Dr. Stresemann who promised to telegraph to Rhineland authorities to settle complaints by Lord Kilmarnock, but stated difficulties were due to failure to reduce occupying forces.	694
485	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 162	Apr. 30	Reports difficulties have arisen in German aviation negotiations regarding control of glider pilots, construction and importation of racing machines, and maintenance of aviation lists by German Govt.	695
486	SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 48	Apr. 30	Has communicated substance of No. 479 to Belgian M.F.A., who states that members of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs are very critical of Treaty of Berlin: Belgian M.F.A. has written refutation of these criticisms.	697
487	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris	Apr. 30	Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain: instructions to speak to M. Briand informally regarding implementation of Allied declaration of June 1919 on evacuation of Rhineland and reduction of troops of occupation.	698
488	SIR R. GRAHAM Rome	Apr. 30	Letter to Mr. Lampson regarding need for outlet for surplus Italian population: discounts likelihood of early aggression by Italy, especially in view of British influence.	700
489	TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 99	May 1	Attitude of French officials to Treaty of Berlin reported in No. 486 reinforces need to urge M. Briand not to commit himself before receiving considered views of H.M.G.	702
490	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 140	May 1	Summarizes press interview with Dr. Stresemann who argued that Treaty of Berlin would be bridge between League and U.S.S.R. and denied treaty was incompatible with League Covenant.	703
491	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 164	May 1	Mr. Phipps has spoken as instructed in No. 489 to M. Berthelot who stated no action was contemplated on Treaty of Berlin until M. de Fleuriau had seen Sir A. Chamberlain.	704
492	TO H.M. REPRESENTATIVES Prague Tel. No. 19 Paris Tel. No. 100	May 3	Transmits views on Treaty of Berlin: considers it is not inconsistent with League Covenant or Locarno agreements: instructions to communicate views to govt. to which accredited in reinforcement of action taken on No. 479: warns of danger	704

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
	Brussels Tel. No. 39 Rome Tel. No. 123 Warsaw Tel. No. 28		of driving Germany closer to U.S.S.R. and stresses need for German entry into League.	
493	TO MR. PHIPPS Paris	May 3	Letter from Mr. Sargent transmitting letter from Mr. Leith-Ross, Treasury, regarding early payment by Germany of contingent additions to annuities due under Dawes Plan.	707
494	FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	May 3	Note proposing that after agreement between France, Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy the German Govt. should be asked for certain explanations on the Treaty of Berlin.	709
495	VISCOUNT CECIL London	May 4	Memorandum recording conversation with U.S. Ambassador regarding U.S. Senate's reservations to U.S. adhesion to Permanent Court of International Justice and likelihood, after conversation between Lord Cecil and Col. Réquin, of Anglo-French agreement regarding potential strength of a country and opposition to any German claim to increased armaments.	711
496	VISCOUNT CECIL London	May 4	Memorandum recording conversations with Col. Réquin regarding various points relating to disarmament.	712
497	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 168	May 5	Reports conversation regarding views on Treaty of Berlin in No. 492 with M. Briand who agreed on importance of German entry into League but wished for German declaration of intention on matters arising out of articles 16-17 of League Covenant; refers to Nos. 486 and 489; Belgian Ambassador considers exaggerated importance was attached to views of French officials.	713
498	SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 101	May 5	Communication in sense of No. 492 has been made to Secretary-General of Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who believed views of his Govt. on Treaty of Berlin would be in accord with those of H.M.G.	714
499	SIR C. HURST Foreign Office	May 5	Memorandum discussing negotiations for the abrogation of the Belgian-Dutch treaties of 1839 and annexing draft treaty and related documents.	715
500	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 169	May 6	Difficulties in concluding aviation agreement (see No. 485) have been overcome and documents will be initialed on May 7.	720
501	SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 54	May 6	Has communicated views in No. 492 regarding Treaty of Berlin to Belgian M.F.A. who will probably agree and to M. Rolin who stated Belgian Govt. were still rather apprehensive of attitude of French officials.	721

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
502	SIR W. MAX MULLER Warsaw Tel. No. 56	May 6	Has made communication on views in No. 492 regarding Treaty of Berlin to Count Skrzynski who wished for explanations from German Govt. to members of League on ambiguous passages and agreed as to danger of driving Germany closer to U.S.S.R.	722
503	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 171	May 6	Reports meeting on May 6 of Conference of Ambassadors which decided to modify draft reply to German Ambassador on war material to take account of views in No. 440 and to refer to legal advisers question of German military bands in demilitarized zone.	723
504	SIR R. HODGSON Moscow No. 348	May 6	Refers to No. 416: discusses British policy to the U.S.S.R. and argues in favour of reopening negotiations with the Soviet Govt.	724
505	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris	May 6	Letter to Sir A. Chamberlain referring to No. 487: questions of evacuation of Rhineland and reduction of occupying troops were mentioned to M. Briand on May 5.	731
506	TO MR. PHIPPS Paris	May 6	Letter from Mr. Lampson regarding views expressed in France that Germany's entry into League should be postponed: Germany would be driven closer to U.S.S.R. and Locarno guarantees would lapse.	732
507	SIR G. CLERK Prague Tel. No. 31	May 7	Reports conversation on views on Treaty of Berlin in No. 492 with Dr. Benes who agreed generally but expressed uneasiness at German policy.	733
508	SIR C. HURST Foreign Office	May 7	Memorandum annexing memo. by Mr. Beckett arguing that German obligation to remain disarmed does not depend on adoption of any disarmament scheme by Allies.	734
509	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 66	May 8	Refers to Nos. 482, 492, and 497: instructions to suggest to Dr. Stresemann desirability of making a declaration of German intention on articles 16-17 of League Covenant.	737
510	TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. unnumbered	May 8	Refers to No. 509: considers that Dr. Stresemann owes Sir A. Chamberlain a return for influence used on German behalf regarding reception of Treaty of Berlin.	737
511	MR. PHIPPS Paris	May 8	Letter to Mr. Lampson referring to No. 506 and explaining French attitude to German-Soviet treaty: considers Locarno policy will be implemented.	738
512	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 145	May 10	Has discussed advisability of declaration regarding articles 16-17 of League Covenant (see No. 509) with Dr. Stresemann who proposes previous conversation regarding Treaty of Berlin between British, French, and German legal advisers.	739

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
513 VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 146	May 10	Refers to No. 512: Dr. Stresemann sent formal message that there was no ground for anxiety regarding continuation of Locarno policy by German Govt.: conclusion of aviation agreement had increased majority for this policy.	740
514 VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 147	May 10	Refers to No. 513 and reports that Dr. Stresemann admitted that certain wording in Treaty of Berlin could arouse suspicion in the lay mind.	740
515 VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 148	May 10	German reports state that Turkey is considering joining League of Nations: Dr. Stresemann anticipates U.S.S.R. will be represented at Geneva within eighteen months.	741
516 TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR London	May 10	Note from Sir A. Chamberlain giving views of H.M.G. on points in No. 494 regarding Treaty of Berlin: H.M.G. consider treaty is not inconsistent with League Covenant and are gratified M. Briand agrees as to undesirability of protest to German Govt.	741
517 TO MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 32	May 11	Message to Lord Cecil urging early exchange of views with German representative on Committee on the Composition of the Council of the League of Nations.	743
518 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 75	May 12	Message from Lord Cecil referring to No. 517 and reporting conversation with German representative on German policy, especially regarding claims of Poland and Spain to permanent seats on League Council: Spanish and Brazilian representatives insist on permanent seats for their countries.	744
519 TO MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. unnumbered	May 12	Message for Sir C. Hurst from Mr. Lampson: instructions to exchange views on Treaty of Berlin with Belgian, French, German, and Italian colleagues: indicates policy of H.M.G.	744
520 VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 154	May 13	Reports that Prussian police have discovered documents incriminating certain nationalist associations in plans for a <i>putsch</i> against German Govt.	745
521 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 112	May 13	Refers to No. 498: Signor Mussolini agrees with H.M.G. regarding Treaty of Berlin: Senator Scialoja has been instructed to secure admission of Germany to League and to insist on unanimity of League decisions.	746
522 TO VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 69	May 13	Refers to No. 512: instructions to inform Dr. Stresemann of instructions to Sir C. Hurst in No. 519 and express appreciation of his willingness to clear up misunderstandings regarding Treaty of Berlin.	746
523 MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 180	May 13	M. Berthelot has told Mr. Phipps that M. Fromageot is satisfied by explanations of Treaty of Berlin given by Dr. Gaus.	747

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
524	MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 90	May 16	Reports decisions by subcommittee on Composition of Council of League of Nations regarding the eligibility of non-permanent members for re-election: comments on likely effects on Spain and other claimants.	747
525	VISCOUNT CECIL Geneva No. 2 L.N.C.C.	May 16	Reports on proceedings of the Committee on the Composition of the Council of the League of Nations and comments on position reached.	748
526	VISCOUNT D'ABERNON Berlin Tel. No. 163	May 17	Reports on recent Govt. crisis in Germany and on appointment of Dr. Marx as Chancellor.	753
527	MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 91	May 17	Message from Lord Cecil reporting that Committee on Composition of Council of League of Nations have adjourned till June 28 after completing report to Council.	754
528	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 183	May 17	Refers to No. 523: M. Berthelot states that French Ambassador at Berlin has been instructed to request German Govt. to confirm Dr. Gaus's assurances regarding Treaty of Berlin.	755
529	MR. GREGORY Foreign Office	May 17	Memorandum respecting the Polish situation following Marshal Pilsudski's <i>coup d'état</i> .	756
530	VISCOUNT CECIL Geneva	May 17	Record of an interview with Count Bernstorff regarding policy to be adopted by Germany at the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.	758

CHAPTER V

Correspondence on British policy on Middle Eastern Questions: Agreement regarding the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq October 16, 1925—June 5, 1926

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
531	SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople No. 785	Oct. 16	Discusses Anglo-Turkish relations in light of Turkish relations with U.S.S.R., Turkish nationalism, the problem of Kurdistan, and the need to settle the attribution of Mosul.	760
532	SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 328	Oct. 20	Reports conversations with Persian M.F.A. regarding possible deposition of Qajar dynasty and discusses policy to be adopted by H.M.G.	763
533	TO SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 225	Oct. 23	Personal message from Mr. Chamberlain to Persian Prime Minister, Reza Khan, regarding non-interference by H.M.G. in Persian internal affairs, and H.M.G.'s sympathy with Persia.	764

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
534 FOREIGN OFFICE	Oct. 23	Memoranda respecting the Iraq frontier dispute: I. an attempt to estimate the considerations that will influence or decide Turkish policy on the question of Mosul: II. an appreciation of the Turkish attitude and likely action: III. memorandum by the legal advisers on the legal position in the light of the request to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion respecting the authority of the Council of the League of Nations in determining the question.	765
535 MR. OLIPHANT Foreign Office	Nov. 1	Memorandum recording conversation with Mr. Phipps regarding desirability of indicating to M. Briand that the Mosul dispute should be regarded as a matter of Turkey's relations with the League of Nations.	774
536 TO SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 230	Nov. 2	Instructions regarding provisional recognition by H.M.G. of new régime set up in Persia by Reza Khan.	775
537 TO SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople Tel. No. 133	Nov. 2	Instructions regarding attitude of H.M.G. to Turkish suggestions for direct negotiations on the Iraq frontier question.	776
538 SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 354	Nov. 3	Refers to No. 536 and reports interview with Reza Khan who expressed liveliest satisfaction that H.M.G. were first govt. to accord recognition to his régime.	776
539 TO SIR G. LLOYD Cairo Tel. No. 261	Nov. 6	Instructions to inform King Fuad that H.M.G. cannot advise him regarding mediation between King Ali of the Hejaz and Emir Ibn Saud, Sultan of Nejd.	777
540 TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 3779	Nov. 14	Discusses Anglo-French relations in Syria in light of French complaints against H.M. Consul at Damascus and passage of Turkish troops on Syrian railway: instructions to speak to M. Briand.	777
541 SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople Tel. No. 130	Nov. 21	Reports on recent visit to Angora: considers Turkish Govt. will not go to war over Mosul: comments on Prime Minister's hostility to Locarno agreements.	779
542 TO MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris No. 3891	Nov. 23	Records conversation with M. de Fleuriau regarding M. Briand's reply to representations on Anglo-French relations in Syria (cf. No. 540) and French complaint regarding attitude of Sir F. Lugard on League Mandates Commission.	780
543 SIR C. HURST Foreign Office	Nov. 26	Memorandum regarding legal position in event of Turkey's not complying with a decision of Council of League of Nations regarding frontier with Iraq.	783
544 TO SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople No. 1159	Dec. 4	Record of conversation with Turkish Ambassador who was informed that if League Council decided in favour of H.M.G. regarding Iraq frontier, H.M.G. would be willing to enter into conversations with Turkish Govt.	784

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
545	MARQUESS OF CREWE Paris Tel. No. 482	Dec. 7	Reports conversation between Mr. Phipps and M. Berthelot who gave assurances of French support for H.M.G. in Mosul dispute and criticized Swedish proposal to partition vilayet of Mosul.	787
546	TO MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 271	Dec. 11	Message for Sir A. Chamberlain regarding action to be taken should Turkey take military action against Mosul or violate demilitarization provisions of Straits Convention of 1923.	788
547	TO SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 259	Dec. 14	Instructions regarding recognition of Reza Khan as Shah of Persia.	789
548	MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 430	Dec. 15	Message from Mr. Amery to Lord Cecil regarding decision by League Council to uphold the Turkish-Iraq frontier suggested by it in Brussels in 1924 and to request H.M.G. to submit to it a new Anglo-Iraq treaty.	790
549	TO SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople Tel. No. 151	Dec. 19	Soviet Ambassador in Paris has informed Lord Crewe that his Govt. had no intention of interesting themselves in Turkish-Iraq frontier dispute.	791
550	MR. JORDAN Jeddah Tel. No. 191	Dec. 22	Reports assurance of friendship to Great Britain received from Emir Ibn Saud after abdication of King Ali of Hejaz.	791
551	TO SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople Tel. No. 152	Dec. 22	Refers to No. 544 and reports conversation between Mr. Baldwin and Turkish Ambassador regarding Anglo-Turkish conversations on possible <i>accommodements</i> on Turkish-Iraq frontier laid down by League of Nations.	792
552	SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople No. 941	Dec. 29	Reports conversation regarding decision by League of Nations on Turkish-Iraq frontier with Turkish M.F.A. who considered decision unjust.	792
553	SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople No. 943	Dec. 30	Discusses significance of Soviet-Turkish treaty of Dec. 17, 1925, and comments on Turkish reactions to it.	795
554	TO SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople	Dec. 30	Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell discussing likely Turkish policy in view of League decision on Mosul: suggests possible treaty of guarantee of Turkey by G.B., France, and Italy.	797
		1926		
555	TO SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople Tel. No. 3	Jan. 5	Message from Mr. Baldwin referring to No. 551 and recording exchange of communications with Turkish Ambassador regarding Turkish acceptance of proposal for conversations at Angora on Mosul.	799
556	TURKISH AMBASSADOR London	Jan. 9	Note to Sir W. Tyrrell recapitulating communications exchanged with Mr. Baldwin and stating that in conversations with Sir R. Lindsay at Angora his Govt. would base itself on principle that question of Turkish-Iraq frontier was not yet decided.	800

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
557	SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople	Jan. 12	Letter to Sir W. Tyrrell agreeing with views on Turkish policy in No. 554 and discussing advantages to H.M.G. and possible reactions of Turkey, France, Italy, and U.S.S.R. to proposed treaty of guarantee.	801
558	TO SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople Tel. No. 7	Jan. 14	Refers to No. 556: instructions to proceed to Angora and if necessary state H.M.G. cannot ignore decision of League Council on Turkish-Iraq frontier.	803
559	SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 30	Jan. 27	Reports Soviet pressure to secure execution of Soviet-Persian agreement for joint exploitation of Caspian fisheries.	804
560	SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 31	Jan. 27	Refers to No. 559 and explains grounds for uneasiness regarding development of Soviet influence in Persia.	805
561	SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople Tel. No. 8	Jan. 29	Reports conversations at Angora with Turkish M.F.A. and Prime Minister regarding possible adjustments to Turkish-Iraq frontier laid down by League of Nations: comments on Turkish attitude.	806
562	SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople Tel. No. 9	Jan. 29	Comments on internal situation in Turkey in light of dispute with H.M.G. over Iraq frontier.	808
563	SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 32	Jan. 30	Refers to No. 559: is satisfied that Soviet-Persian fisheries agreement will not be ratified by Majlis.	808
564	TO SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 18	Jan. 30	Refers to No. 560 and requests further comments on apparent pro-Soviet policy of Shah: notes failure to settle outstanding questions with H.M.G.	809
565	SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 33	Jan. 30	Refers to No. 563 and reports Soviet embargo on imports from Persia.	809
566	TO SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople	Feb. 1	Letter from Mr. Oliphant referring to Nos. 554, 557, and 561-2: transmits memo. by Sir W. Tyrrell discussing Turkish foreign policy and possible treaty of guarantee: outlines critical views of Sir A. Chamberlain thereon.	810
567	SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 39	Feb. 3	Refers to No. 564 and gives reasons for belief that Shah has not adopted pro-Soviet policy: discusses policy to be adopted by H.M.G.	812
568	TO SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople Tel. No. 15	Feb. 8	Considers visit to Angora to discuss with Turkish Govt. its attitude to foreign interests in Turkey would be inopportune and call attention to Mosul question.	813
569	SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople No. 59	Feb. 8	Reports on nationalism in Turkey and its repercussions on British interests there: proposes to discuss situation with M.F.A.	814
570	SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople	Feb. 8	Memorandum considering the aims of Turkish policy and means of reconciling these with policy of H.M.G., especially by means of a treaty of guarantee.	818

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
571 SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 58	Feb. 15	Refers to No. 567: discusses policy of Persian Govt. to H.M.G. and Soviet Govt. following failure of Caspian fisheries agreement to pass through Majlis.	823
572 TO SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran	Feb. 17	Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain discussing policy of H.M.G. regarding Persian claim to Bahrein.	824
573 SIR P. LORAINÉ Tehran Tel. No. 62	Feb. 19	Repeats message to General Manager at Mohammerah of Anglo-Persian Oil Company regarding help for Persia in view of Soviet refusal to supply petrol.	825
574 SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople No. 79	Feb. 23	Discusses possible representations by Allied Ambassadors regarding alleged Turkish violations of the Straits Convention of 1923 by fortifying the Dardanelles.	826
575 TO SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople Tel. No. 23	Mar. 5	Approves proposal to make protest at Angora in view of further activities against British interests in Turkey (cf. No. 569) but warns against prejudicing subsequent negotiations regarding Iraq frontier.	827
576 TO SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople No. 305	Apr. 5	Instructions for negotiations with the Turkish Govt. regarding Turkish-Iraq frontier.	828
577 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 1	Apr. 18	Reports conversations on Apr. 17-18 with Turkish M.F.A. and Prime Minister to whom draft Anglo-Turkish-Iraqi treaty regarding Turkish-Iraq frontier was communicated.	831
578 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 2	Apr. 21	Reports conversation on Apr. 20 with Turkish M.F.A. who proposed (i) undertaking of mutual neutrality, (ii) cession of territory to Iraq as to a 'fully self-governing state', (iii) participation by Turkey in Iraq oil through allotment of shares.	832
579 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 4	Apr. 22	Refers to No. 578 and reports conversation on Apr. 21 with M.F.A. regarding Turkish participation in Iraq oil: argues in favour of meeting Turkish wishes.	834
580 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 3	Apr. 22	Refers to No. 578: comments on Turkish proposals in Iraq frontier negotiations.	835
581 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora No. 201	Apr. 23	Reports conversation with Soviet Ambassador who adopted sympathetic attitude towards Anglo-Turkish negotiations on Iraq frontier.	836
582 TO SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 6	Apr. 24	Refers to Nos. 578-80: H.M.G. are preparing schemes to meet Turkish wishes in Iraq negotiations so far as possible: refers to conversation on Apr. 23 with Turkish Ambassador and comments on Turkish anxiety regarding possible Italian aggression.	837
583 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 8	Apr. 27	Reports conversation with M.F.A. on Apr. 26 regarding German-Soviet treaty of Apr. 24, resumption of payment of Galata Bridge tolls, and possible mediation	839

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		by H.M.G. between Turkish Govt. and bondholders of Ottoman Public Debt.	
584 To SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 14	May 4	Outlines proposal for Turkish participation in Iraq oil royalties and for improvement in communications between Iraq and Turkey: instructions to explain to M.F.A. advantage of Turkish membership of League of Nations.	839
585 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 14	May 5	Requests speedy instructions regarding Iraq frontier negotiations despite situation in U.K. as Turkey's desire for settlement is unabated.	841
586 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 18	May 7	Refers to No. 584 and reports conversation with M.F.A. on May 6 regarding Turkish participation in Iraq oil: considers Turkish Govt. want cash.	841
587 To SIR R. LINDSAY Constantinople Tel. No. 55	May 17	Authority to agree to payment by Iraq of lump sum or to Turkish participation in Iraq oil revenues to achieve settlement of Iraq frontier question.	842
588 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 25	May 21	Has offered £500,000 to Turkish M.F.A. for complete settlement of Iraq frontier question: M.F.A. expressed disappointment.	843
589 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 38	May 28	Comments on difficulties raised by Turkish counter-draft of Anglo-Turkish-Iraqi treaty.	844
590 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 43	May 30	M.F.A. states that Turkish Govt. will accept 10 per cent. of Iraq oil royalties for twenty-five years.	844
591 SIR R. LINDSAY Angora Tel. No. 57	June 4	All points except those of minor importance were settled with M.F.A. on June 3 and treaty on Iraq frontier should be signed June 5.	845

APPENDIX

Memorandum on the Foreign Policy of His Majesty's Government, with a list of British commitments in their relative order of importance. 846

Introduction

No. 1

Foreign Office Memorandum respecting the Locarno Treaties¹

[C 797/1/18]*²

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 10, 1926

To see the treaties of Locarno in their true perspective it is necessary to consider their historical background, and thus to look back over the five years which preceded their signature. The Treaty of Versailles was signed on the 28th June, 1919, and entered into force on the 10th January, 1920. But while it concluded the war it cannot be said that it brought peace. Its result was rather a prolonged, and sometimes even a precarious, armistice. The problem which has faced the statesmen of Europe for five years has been to turn that armistice into a real peace. The significance of Locarno is that the solution of the problem was, we may hope, found there and its application begun.

2. It will perhaps best illustrate what has been done if we begin by recalling the situation which existed when the last Imperial Conference met in October 1923. That was perhaps the darkest moment in the history of Western Europe since the conclusion of the war. The period between January 1920 and October 1923 had been one of unceasing friction between the Allies and Germany, and even, as a result, between the Allies themselves. Some twenty or more international conferences had by that time been held to deal with the difficulties and disputes arising out of the execution of the Treaty of Versailles. Demand after demand was made upon Germany, whose general attitude was one of sullen recalcitrance in spite of the efforts of some of her more enlightened politicians, such as Herr Wirth,³ to pursue a policy of fulfilment. Relations between France and Germany and even between France and her Allies had been strained almost to breaking point by the temporary occupation of Frankfort in 1920. In March 1921 the Allies, in consequence of German obstruction and bad faith, had applied rigorous economic sanctions to the Rhineland and jointly occupied the Düsseldorf bridge-head. When the Imperial Conference met in 1923 this bridge-head was still occupied by French and Belgian forces and, in addition the French and Belgian Governments, acting independently of and even in opposition to His Majesty's Government, were in occupation of the Ruhr

¹ This memorandum was prepared by Mr. J. C. Sterndale Bennett of the Central Department of the Foreign Office as a basis for a memorandum to be submitted to the Imperial Conference which was due to be held in London in October 1926.

² Throughout this volume an asterisk after the file number denotes that the document has been printed from Confidential Print being the only text preserved: see Preface, p. xii.

³ German Chancellor, May 1921–November 1922.

and of various small strips of German territory on the right bank of the Rhine in excess of the area occupied in virtue of the Treaty of Versailles. Normal industry and commerce in the Ruhr and Rhineland was at a standstill. The French were feverishly trying to restart it and reorganise it under their own control. They were just beginning also their desperate and ill-judged attempt to foist a Separatist Government upon the occupied areas. Germany, an outcast in Europe, threatened with economic ruin and financial disaster, political disintegration and civil war, was practically at her last gasp, and by her desperate plight was a danger not only to her immediate neighbours, but to Europe as a whole.

3. The storm which threatened to burst at that moment was, however, narrowly averted, and it is safe to say that this was largely due to the attitude which His Majesty's Government were able to adopt as a result of the Imperial Conference. Up to that time His Majesty's Government, while indicating their disapproval of the Franco-Belgian Ruhr policy, had neither obstructed it nor opposed it. While they had proffered [*sic*] suggestions for a solution of the questions at issue they had done so in a somewhat tentative fashion. They had felt, in fact, that the proper time for positive steps was after consultation with the representatives of the dominions. Fortified by that consultation their policy underwent a transformation. It had been passive. It became more and more active, and the influence of His Majesty's Government on the situation proportionately increased. In the first place, they firmly opposed the schemes of the French for the dismemberment of Germany by the separation of the Rhineland. They set themselves more resolutely against what they held to be the illegalities committed by the French and Belgians in the Rhineland and the Ruhr. And on the positive side, with the approval of the Imperial Conference, they sounded the United States Government on the subject of the reparation question, which was ostensibly the underlying cause of the Ruhr occupation. By thus calling in once more the New World to redress the balance of the old, they took the first step which led to the setting up of the Dawes Committee.⁴

4. It was left to the patient and persistent diplomacy of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald⁵ to make full use of the opportunity thus created. As a result of his efforts the situation which existed when the last Imperial Conference met had to all appearances much improved when His Majesty's present

⁴ General Charles Dawes, an American citizen, was chairman of the Committee of Experts appointed by the Reparation Commission on November 30, 1923 'to consider the means of balancing the budget and the measures to be taken to stabilise the currency of Germany'. The committee submitted its plan to the Reparation Commission on April 9, 1924 (see Cmd. 2105 of 1924). A draft agreement for carrying into effect the plan for the discharge of the reparation obligations of Germany proposed by the Committee of Experts was formally adopted and signed by the Reparation Commission and the German Government on August 9, 1924 (see Cmd. 2270 of 1924). The Dawes Plan was finally put into effect and the Agreement of August 9, 1924, completed by the London Agreements of August 30, 1924, between the Allied Governments and Germany (see Cmd. 2259 of 1924).

⁵ Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from January to November 1924 when his government was succeeded by the current administration under Mr. Stanley Baldwin, with Mr. (later Sir) Austen Chamberlain as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Government came into office. The Dawes plan was in operation, and the reparation question having thus been taken out of the political arena it seemed that one of the main obstacles to peace had been removed. Further, as a corollary of the operation of the Dawes plan, the burdens of the occupation of the Rhineland had been lightened and the economic exploitation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr had ceased. Germany was on the road to financial recovery, and the better spirit which had been infused into Franco-German relations roused confident hopes that real peace was at hand.

5. To those, however, who were most closely in touch with the situation, it was apparent that most of this was illusory. There was a very real danger that peace would not materialise and that the Dawes scheme would give no more than a breathing space before the old weary round of bickering began once more. For all those German districts which had been occupied in excess of what the treaty warranted were still in French and Belgian occupation, and all that Germany had to depend upon was a promise by the French and Belgian representatives at the London Conference of August 1924 that they would be evacuated in August 1925 if the Dawes plan was loyally carried out. The fulfilment of this promise the Germans hoped for rather than expected. But there were also signs of more immediate difficulties. The question of German disarmament was still in suspense and gave promise of much trouble. Closely linked with it was the question of the evacuation of the Cologne zone.⁶ This, from the German point of view, was to be the touchstone of Allied good faith.

6. When, therefore, His Majesty's present Government on their assumption of office took stock of the situation, they found that, in spite of the Dawes plan, there was far from being a stable peace. The Dawes plan had brought a respite, but a deceptive respite, for all the elements which had caused trouble during the preceding four years still remained. They were merely dormant. Western Europe was still divided into two hostile camps, and there was no prospect of bridging the division, the perils of which were increased by the vague menace of Russia in the background. Everywhere there was a feeling of mistrust and suspicion. Every nation seemed to be uneasily awaiting the outbreak of a fresh catastrophe and to be watching its neighbour closely, ready for immediate and, if possible, for preventive action. When, therefore, His Majesty's Government considered how a stable peace might be brought

⁶ According to article 429 of the Treaty of Versailles a zone of the occupied German territories, including Cologne, was to be evacuated by Allied troops at the expiration of five years from the coming into force of the treaty (i.e. on January 10, 1925), provided that the conditions of the treaty had been faithfully carried out by Germany. A second zone of occupation, centred on Coblenz, and a third zone, centred on Mainz, would similarly be evacuated on the expiration of ten and fifteen years respectively. On January 5, 1925, the Belgian, British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives at Berlin had presented to the German Chancellor a collective note which stated that the Allied Governments had proof that the German Government could not fulfil, by January 10, the conditions laid down by article 429 of the treaty for the evacuation of Cologne, and which cited specific defaults in the execution of the military clauses of the treaty. An English text of this note is printed in *The Times* of January 6, 1925, p. 11. The French text is printed in *Materialen zur Entwaffnungsnote* (Berlin, 1925), vol. i, p. 50.

about, they were confronted at every turn by the problem of allaying fears, of dispelling mistrust, of inspiring confidence. It was clear that the only policy was to create security. But in such a task it was difficult to know where to begin. It seemed, however, to His Majesty's Government that most relief would be brought by concentrating on that part of the problem which concerned an area most vital to the security of Great Britain herself—the frontier between France and Germany. The quarrels of the preceding years between Germany and the Allies, which in the main were quarrels between Germany and France, had ranged so much over details that broad outlines had almost inevitably been obscured. It was clear, however, that even the big sources of trouble—the reparation and disarmament questions—were merely details that had been allowed to assume a gravity out of all proportion to their intrinsic importance. When the events since the close of the war were examined critically and as a whole, it was seen that the two questions were not separate diseases, but rather joint symptoms of a deeper disease—the fear of Germany with which France was obsessed.

7. Four times since 1814 and twice within living memory France has been invaded by German troops. Her legitimate fears that her territory might again be overrun were only increased by the facts of population. For even with the diminished area which resulted from the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had a population in 1922 of 61½ million, and it has been calculated that her population may well number 80 million in 1965. The population of France, on the other hand, numbered in 1924 only 39½ million, and it has been estimated that by 1965 it will have dwindled to 25 million.

8. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the war drove France once more to take up the traditional policy followed by her statesmen ever since the days of Henry of Navarre, namely, to keep Germany weak by encouraging her tendency to internal division, to extend the influence and territory of France as far as the Rhine and to secure that all the territories on the left bank of that river should be in some form or another brought under the political, military and economic control of France. In fact, the thousand-year dispute for the possession of the Rhineland which has disturbed Europe since the Treaty of Verdun⁷ began once more.

9. As early as 1917, while the issue of the war was still in doubt, the French Government were discussing the separation from Germany of the territories west of the Rhine in such a way that the Rhine might form a permanent strategic barrier against German aggression. When the conditions of peace came to be discussed in 1918, the French put forward a scheme which, while stopping short of the annexation of the Rhineland, entailed its practical separation from Germany, its permanent occupation by the military forces of the Allies, and its organisation in a political, military and economic system under Allied control.

10. This French scheme was unacceptable both to His Majesty's Government and to the United States Government. It could not be reconciled with

⁷ By this treaty of 843 the Emperor Lothar and his brothers Louis the German and Charles the Bald divided out the Frankish dominions.

President Wilson's fourteen points,⁸ and by creating a fresh Alsace-Lorraine it threatened to destroy any hope of a permanent peaceful settlement in Europe. France was therefore obliged, after long negotiations, to renounce the only safeguard which would really have allayed her apprehensions. In return, she obtained the following compensations in the peace settlement:—

- (a) Treaties of Guarantee, under which Great Britain and the United States pledged themselves, in the event of any unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany, to come immediately to France's assistance.⁹
- (b) The occupation of the Rhineland for a period of fifteen years (evacuation to be in three stages subject to the faithful execution of the treaty by Germany, and, in the case of the third stage, subject also to the existence of adequate guarantees of French security).
- (c) The demilitarisation of German territory on the left bank of the Rhine and of a strip on the right bank, coupled with an assurance under article 44 of the Treaty of Versailles that any violation by Germany of the demilitarisation provisions would be considered as an act of war.
- (d) The disarmament of Germany under the supervision of an Allied commission.

11. Of these, the treaties of guarantee alone were capable of giving France a real sense of security, for, as Marshal Foch¹⁰ pointed out at the time, safeguards (b) and (d) were but temporary, and (c) was uncertain in effect. The failure to ratify the guarantee treaties was therefore a most serious blow to France, and to it are to be ascribed most of the unhappy events of the five years following the treaty. The French were left with a sense of having been betrayed. Not only had they been refused the Rhine barrier, but they had been deprived of the only serious compensation offered them in return for the abandonment of their main desideratum. It is little wonder, therefore, that they endeavoured to safeguard their security in other ways. Attempts were made, in the first place, to substitute an Anglo-French pact for the guarantee treaties.¹¹ These failed because the French Government wished to commit His Majesty's Government to greater liabilities than the latter were prepared to undertake. Their failure led to a two-sided policy. On the one side, the French Government tried to ensure the permanent occupation

⁸ President Wilson's peace programme of January 8, 1918, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 111, pp. 950–5.

⁹ The Franco-British Treaty of June 28, 1919, is printed *op. cit.*, vol. 112, pp. 213–15. This Treaty remained inoperative owing to non-ratification of the Franco-American treaty of even date, printed *ibid.*, pp. 216–18.

¹⁰ Marshal Foch had been appointed Allied Commander-in-Chief in April 1918. In January 1920 he was appointed President of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles instituted '(a) to act as advisory council to the Allied and Associated Governments in military questions arising out of the execution of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. (b) to carry into execution the orders given it by the Allied and Associated Powers in matters concerning the Commissions of Control and the Allied forces of occupation in the Rhineland and Plebiscite areas.' See First Series, Volume II, No. 54, minute 2.

¹¹ See Cmd. 2169 of 1924, *Papers respecting negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact*.

of the Rhineland by stretching to their utmost limits the vague terms of the Treaty of Versailles and making demands on Germany so onerous that there was no likelihood of her being able to comply with them. Combined with this was the policy of drawing the Rhineland into the orbit of French economic organisation, and it was this which inspired the frequent French demands for 'sanctions' in the Rhineland, and which led eventually to the Ruhr occupation. The other side of the policy was the creation of the Little Entente,¹² the purpose of which was to weld the new States to the east of Germany into a compact block united to each other and connected to France by a system of alliances, subsidies and military missions.

12. This double policy was one of desperation and was foredoomed to failure. The Ruhr policy gradually alienated world sympathy from France and it was quite clear that if continued it would lead not only to her financial collapse, but might even lead to a new war in which she would stand alone. The policy of the Little Entente was also a drain on French resources, and the precarious position of Poland and Roumania, in particular, in relation not only to Germany but also to Russia constituted an element not of security, but of added apprehension and increased liability.

13. It was thus clear to His Majesty's present Government that the root cause of European instability and unrest was French insecurity. It was this which had been responsible for most of the disputes arising out of the Treaty of Versailles. It was this that was to be the crux of a question which was rapidly coming to the fore—the evacuation of Cologne. It will be remembered that the evacuation of this zone fell due in accordance with article 429 of the Treaty of Versailles on the 10th January, 1925, if the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles were faithfully carried out by Germany. There was, as it happened, ample legal justification for non-evacuation on the appointed date, but the failure to evacuate, justifiable though it was, caused a regrettable set-back to the improved relations between the Allies and Germany. It was apparent that these relations would gradually grow worse in proportion to the length of the continued occupation, and this threatened to be considerable, for it became increasingly clear that the French Government had no intention of agreeing to any evacuation until they had received satisfaction regarding their security. Although His Majesty's Government could not possibly recognise that the two questions were legally connected, they were equally unable to ignore the fact that they were closely bound together in practice. The question of French security had, therefore, to be squarely faced and solved. If this were not done, not only was further progress towards normal conditions impossible, but Europe would rapidly slip back once more into chaos and all hope of peace and economic recovery would vanish. The Dawes plan by itself was not enough. Already its effects threatened to wear off, and a still greater effort had to be made if the situa-

¹² i.e. Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. The Czech-Roumanian, Czech-Yugoslav, and Roumanian-Yugoslav treaties of April 23, 1921, August 14, 1920, and June 7, 1921, respectively, are printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 114, pp. 695-6 and 696-7, and vol. 123, pp. 1046-7.

tion was to be saved. Nor was there time for delay and leisurely discussion. Action and immediate action was required.

14. With the failure of the Ruhr policy one-half of the Poincaré¹³ security edifice had fallen to the ground. It was necessary to replace it. It was thus natural that the French should seek to combine discussions on security with the negotiation of the Dawes scheme and to make their acceptance of the scheme dependent on a solution of the security problem. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's Government held out for the entire separation of the two questions and eventually the French consented to this, but only on the understanding that once the Dawes scheme was put into operation discussions about security would begin. That undertaking was recorded in the following passage of the Franco-British memorandum of the 9th July, 1924,¹⁴ concerning the application of the Dawes scheme:—

'The two Governments have likewise proceeded to a preliminary exchange of views on the question of security. They are aware that public opinion requires pacification; they agree to co-operate in devising, through the League of Nations or otherwise, as opportunity presents itself, means of securing this, and to continue the consideration of the question until the problem of general security can be finally solved.'

15. Almost immediately after the London Conference, at which the Dawes plan was brought into operation, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald tried to give effect to the above undertaking. At the meeting of the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations in September 1924 representatives of the then British Government took a leading part in the negotiation of that ambitious scheme of general security known as the Geneva Protocol.¹⁵ The first question which His Majesty's present Government had to decide was whether they could accept this protocol. On examination it was found to be an impracticable document, impossible of effective application and incapable of providing genuine security. It contained, moreover, features which were fundamentally objectionable in themselves. His Majesty's Government did not feel able, for instance, to accept compulsory arbitration in all disputes; still less could they accept the new and very extensive liabilities which the protocol would have entailed upon a maritime Power. Another objection was that the effect of the protocol was to stereotype everywhere the conditions created by the various treaties of peace. The considered opinion of His Majesty's Government was, in fact, that the protocol increased rather than diminished the possibilities of war or the employment of force. Nor was there reason to believe that the protocol by itself would have satisfied French security requirements. There was, in fact, good reason to anticipate that the French Government would still have asked for an Anglo-French

¹³ M. Poincaré was President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs, January 1922–May 1924.

¹⁴ Printed as Cmd. 2191 of 1924.

¹⁵ i.e. the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, adopted by the Assembly on October 2, 1924, and printed as item No. 3 in Cmd. 2273 of 1924.

pact in addition. There was, therefore, no inducement to His Majesty's Government to accept the protocol and every incentive to reject it.

16. There was, however, the danger that this rejection would be regarded by France as a further betrayal and that it would throw her once more into the perilous paths which she had recently forsaken. This was a danger which His Majesty's Government felt bound to obviate for various reasons. In the first place they were committed to an effort to solve the problem not only by the Franco-British memorandum of the 9th July, 1924, but also by an earlier undertaking contained in a note addressed by Lord Curzon to the Allied Governments on the 20th July, 1923,¹⁶ during the reparation controversy. This undertaking read as follows:—

'His Majesty's Government have not dealt in this note with the question of security, but they have already indicated their readiness to enter into sympathetic consideration of the subject whenever it may be thought desirable.'

There was an obligation even more remote. As shown above, France had been induced at the Peace Conference to abandon her extreme claim for security in return for the guarantee treaties with Great Britain and the United States of America. As these treaties had never been ratified there remained a debt unpaid. But quite apart from reasons of this nature, His Majesty's Government felt compelled to seek an alternative solution purely out of self-interest. The interest was perhaps more particularly that of the British Isles, but it was also that of the Empire as a whole. It is after all a matter of supreme importance to the whole Empire that there should exist everywhere conditions in which trade can flourish. In Europe the absence of security was preventing the flow of capital and the revival of markets. The establishment of security was essential to economic and financial recovery. But it was not only economic ties with Europe that decided His Majesty's Government. Not only would Great Britain run the risk of impoverishment if economic depression continued there; she was likely to be involved in a manner more direct. The danger that had to be faced was not the mere continuance of the existing situation but its deterioration. The events of the past four years had given ample warning that if Great Britain disinterested herself in Europe, France and Germany would soon be at each other's throats. And if that happened Great Britain, whether she liked it or not, could no longer remain disinterested. Even if not a belligerent, this country is bound to be vitally affected by anything which seriously affects the peace of Europe. Did the nations which were neutral during the war escape the general financial and economic disturbance? Did they not have to face problems of reconstruction and reorganisation comparable in character and kind to those which confronted the belligerents themselves?

17. But in a renewed struggle between France and Germany neutrality would be out of the question for Great Britain. Her own security would

¹⁶ See item No. 52 in Cmd. 2169. Lord Curzon was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from October 1919 to January 1924.

be at stake. For any Franco-German struggle is bound to concern the status of the Rhineland. Now it has long been an axiom of British policy that no single Power shall be in a position to occupy or dominate the Channel and North Sea ports which could be used as a base for an attack on the shores of this country. It has therefore been the constant aim of Great Britain as far as possible to keep the Low Countries in some way independent of any potential enemy, and to range herself against any Power which attempted to overrun them. The development of aerial warfare has both made this vital interest more acute and extended it to a wider area. For it is equally important that the hinterland of the Channel ports, i.e., the Rhineland, should not be available for bases of attack on this country. Nor can it be said that this is a purely British interest. It will be recognised on reflection to be an essential imperial interest. It is sometimes apt to be forgotten that Great Britain is the heart of the Empire, the seat of imperial power, and the connecting link between the various units of the Empire. Its importance merely as containing a financial centre like London must not be forgotten. If the British Isles were to fall into enemy hands the Empire would have no alternative centre round which it could easily rally, and its disintegration might quickly ensue. The individual power of its component parts would be practically negligible.

18. Imperial defence is generally understood as comprising the defence of the individual dominions and of the sea communications between them and Great Britain. Enough has been said to show that the defence of Great Britain itself is an equally vital factor of imperial defence, though not sufficiently recognised as such.

19. There were other reasons which convinced His Majesty's Government that they could not allow the problem of security to drift. The choice lay between an attempt, and a speedy attempt, to settle it and a policy of isolation. It has been sufficiently shown how inconsonant is a policy of isolation with British interests which are bound to involve this country in any war which might break out between France and Germany. But apart from all question of interests, the existing treaty obligations of Great Britain are incompatible with a policy of isolation. A brief recapitulation of these commitments may be useful. In the first place, there is the Covenant of the League of Nations, from which it is sufficient to quote the following extracts:—

‘Article 10. The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

‘Article 11. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise, the Secretary-General shall, on the

request of any member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. . . .¹⁷

‘Article 13. (Pledging to Arbitration.) In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

‘Article 16. Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under article[s] 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not.

‘It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force[s] the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

‘The members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the Covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

‘Article 17. In the event of a dispute between a member of the League and a State which is not a member of the League, or between States not members of the League, the State or States not members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of articles 12–16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council. . . .¹⁷

‘If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a member of the League, the provisions of article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action. . . .¹⁷

20. Then there are articles 42, 43 and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, which read as follows:—

‘Article 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilom. to the east of the Rhine.

¹⁷ Punctuation as in original quotation.

'Article 43. In the area defined above, the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manœuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilisation, are in the same way forbidden.

'Article 44. In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.'

21. It is thus obvious that the first step in a policy of isolation would have to be withdrawal from the League of Nations and the denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles. Nor, be it remembered, are the obligations flowing from the articles just quoted British obligations alone. They are obligations shared by each of the self-governing dominions who signed the Covenant of the League and the Treaty of Versailles.

22. There was therefore no doubt in the mind of His Majesty's Government that the announcement of their rejection of the Geneva Protocol¹⁸ must be coupled with a declaration of their desire to seek a solution of the security question in some other way. Their first thought was to renew the negotiations for a defensive alliance with France, which had been broken off at Cannes in 1922. The Service Departments, who were consulted, all saw advantages in such a course, but political considerations eventually decided His Majesty's Government against it. It was clear that there would be no wide popular support for any such alliance; for a coalition of two or more States in direct opposition to the assumed designs of other States was not consonant with the general feeling of the country. It was felt that such coalitions were more likely to cause than to prevent war; and, in any case, the recent policy of France had alienated a great deal of sympathy and had produced a disinclination for any alliance with her.

23. It was at this opportune moment that the German Government renewed their proposals for a mutual pact of guarantee, confined in its operation to a definite area—the Rhineland. The German Government were actuated by a recognition of the fact that the problem of French security lay at the root of the two outstanding questions—disarmament and the evacuation of Cologne. It appears that they had also some inkling that His Majesty's Government were considering the possibility of an Anglo-French pact on the old lines directed against Germany. Proposals of a similar nature had been put forward by the German Government at intervals since December 1922, but they had always contained elements which destroyed their value, at least in the eyes of the French Government. These elements were absent from the proposals of the 9th February, 1925.¹⁹ These proposals were purposely in a somewhat nebulous form. They suggested for consideration a variety of alternative arrangements, as, for example, an undertaking between the Powers interested in the Rhine not to go to war with each other,

¹⁸ Mr. Chamberlain's statement to the Council of the League of Nations on March 12, 1925, is printed as Cmd. 2368 of 1925.

¹⁹ This German memorandum is printed as item No. 1 in Cmd. 2435 of 1925.

a comprehensive arbitration treaty between the same Powers for the peaceful settlement of disputes, or a pact guaranteeing the territorial *status quo* and demilitarisation of the Rhineland. In addition Germany declared her willingness to conclude arbitration treaties with all other States besides her neighbours on the Rhine.

24. His Majesty's Government at once recognised that the German offer was an act of great political courage deserving the most serious consideration. Germany was prepared to accept voluntarily and even to guarantee the situation in the west, which she had hitherto accepted only under the compulsion of the Treaty of Versailles. But this was not all. While not prepared to guarantee the situation in the east in the same way, i.e., while not renouncing the hope that her eastern frontiers might be modified by friendly and peaceful means, she was ready to accept arbitration treaties with her eastern neighbours, so comprehensive in character as to ensure a peaceful settlement of all disputes, and thereby eliminate resort to force as a means of obtaining a modification of the eastern frontiers.

25. No useful purpose would be served by attempting in this memorandum to describe in detail the negotiations which began in February and led up to the meeting of the Locarno Conference in October 1925. It will be sufficient to indicate the principles which actuated His Majesty's Government in these negotiations, to describe the solution eventually reached at Locarno and then to attempt to estimate its possible effects.

26. The first five months were spent in overcoming the suspicions of the French Government and in dissuading them from postulating conditions which might have wrecked the chances of agreement with Germany or which might have made impossible the co-operation of His Majesty's Government. The difficulties of this period and of the succeeding months when, as the French advanced, the Germans appeared to lose courage and shrink from the work which they themselves had begun are well known to the dominions, who were throughout kept fully informed by telegraph of every development.

27. The guiding principles which His Majesty's Government followed during the negotiations were laid down in a despatch dated the 28th May, 1925, addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and since published,²⁰ and in a speech made by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons on the 24th June, 1925.²¹ They may be summarised as follows:—

- (1) The best way to carry out the programme of security, arbitration and disarmament was with the co-operation of the League of Nations to supplement the Covenant by making special arrangements in order to meet special needs.
- (2) These arrangements should be purely defensive in character and should be framed in the spirit of the Covenant, working in close harmony with the League and under its guidance.

²⁰ As item No. 6, *ibid.*

²¹ See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 185, cols. 1555–1570.

- (3) They must be mutual in character and not unilateral alliances between certain Powers directed against other Powers.
- (4) Any new obligation undertaken by His Majesty's Government must be specific and limited to the maintenance of the existing territorial arrangement in that area with which British interests are most closely bound up, namely, the frontier between Germany and her western neighbours. His Majesty's Government were not prepared to assume fresh obligations elsewhere in addition to those already devolving upon them as signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
- (5) Nevertheless, by seeking means to strengthen the position in the west, the other provisions of the treaties which form the basis of the public law of Europe must not be weakened.
- (6) While welcoming any treaties of arbitration or conciliation which the continental Powers concerned might be prepared to enter into, and while prepared to guarantee such treaties between Germany and France and Germany and Belgium, His Majesty's Government were not disposed, in view of their peculiar situation and their world-wide responsibilities, to enter into such treaties themselves. Nor were they disposed to guarantee arbitration treaties between Germany and countries other than France and Belgium.
- (7) Any guarantee given by His Majesty's Government, whether to arbitration treaties or to the territorial situation on the west of Germany, could not be invoked by a wrong-doer to shield him in his wrong-doing; and it should only become effective if the wrong-doer, in defiance of arbitration treaties, resorted to force.
- (8) Germany must enter the League of Nations as a prior condition to the entry into force of the proposed agreements, and nothing in the new treaties must affect the rights and obligations attaching to membership of the League under the Covenant.

28. The settlement reached at Locarno was in entire accord with these principles. The main instrument in the settlement, and the only instrument which directly concerns the British Empire, is the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy.²² By this treaty the signatory Powers severally and collectively guarantee—

- (a) The territorial *status quo* resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France;
- (b) The inviolability of those frontiers; and
- (c) The demilitarisation of the Rhineland.

29. The way in which this guarantee operates is as follows: France and Belgium on the one side and Germany on the other undertake not to go to war with one another except in self-defence or in circumstances where the Covenant of the League already permits resort to war. The right to go to

²² Printed as annex A to item No. 1, 'Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, 1925', in Cmd. 2525 of 1925.

war which the parties possessed before the Treaty of Locarno is restricted in two ways. The Treaty of Versailles entitled France to make war on Germany if Germany violated in any way the provisions of articles 42 and 43 of that treaty. The Treaty of Locarno, on the other hand, limits this right of France to the case of a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43, i.e., to the case where the breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and where immediate action is necessary on account of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone. The second restriction concerns paragraph 7 of article 15 of the Covenant of the League. By that paragraph, if a dispute comes before the Council and the Council cannot agree, the members of the League may take such action as they think necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. Now, according to the Treaty of Locarno, France, Belgium and Germany can only legitimately attack each other in virtue of this paragraph if the other has already made an attack.

30. As a corollary of this undertaking not to resort to war, France and Germany and Belgium and Germany enter into comprehensive engagements to settle all causes of difference by peaceful means. The technical details of these engagements are contained in separate conventions signed simultaneously with the main Treaty of Locarno.²³

31. The articles of the main treaty which particularly affect Great Britain are Nos. 4 and 5, which describe the operation of the guarantee. If, without resorting to illegitimate war, France, Belgium or Germany refuse to observe the terms of the arbitration conventions into which they have entered, the matter is brought before the Council of the League, and Great Britain, as one of the guaranteeing Powers, undertakes to take whatever steps the Council may propose. Any allegation that France, Belgium or Germany have resorted to illegitimate war against each other is to be brought at once to the notice of the Council. If the Council upholds the allegation Great Britain is bound to go immediately to the assistance of the Power attacked. Nor is she bound to await the decision of the Council if she herself is satisfied that the allegation is correct and that immediate action is necessary. In the latter case, however, the matter is still not taken out of the hands of the Council. The decision of the Council is merely anticipated and Great Britain, like the other guarantors, is bound to comply with the Council's ultimate finding.

32. Such is the general scheme of the main treaty. It may be useful to examine for a moment how certain difficulties which had arisen in the negotiations were dealt with in the final settlement. The chief difficulties had been three in number. In the first place, while prepared to give immediate help to France in the case of a genuine and serious violation of articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, Great Britain was not prepared to accede to the French demand that her guarantee should operate automatically in the event of any violation, however trivial, of those articles. The above summary shows how this question was solved.

33. The next point concerned Germany's eastern frontiers. France was

²³ *Ibid.*, Annexes C and B respectively to item No. 1.

in a position of peculiar difficulty owing to her previous commitments to Poland and Czechoslovakia.²⁴ She therefore would have liked a settlement on Germany's eastern frontier similar to that on the western frontier. To this Germany could not consent, for, as already shown, she was not willing to accept as final the existing territorial settlement in the east. The difficulty was eventually overcome by the signature of treaties of arbitration between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia,²⁵ analogous to the arbitration conventions between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France. Side by side with these treaties, guarantee treaties were signed between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia by which, if Germany failed to observe the provisions of her arbitration treaties *and coupled such failure with resort to war*, the parties would reciprocally assist each other.²⁶ These guarantee treaties were so worded that any assistance rendered under them would fall within article 16 or article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

34. The third difficulty was the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. This had, from the outset, been laid down both by Great Britain and France as an essential condition of any pact. Germany had, however, always professed anxiety as to how her position might be affected if she joined the League by the obligations contained in article 16 of the Covenant. To calm her apprehensions and to overcome her last scruples about joining the League the Powers represented at Locarno addressed a note to the German Government giving the interpretation which, for their part, they placed on this article of the Covenant.²⁷

35. It is true that Great Britain has undertaken fresh obligations by the Treaty of Locarno, but it is scarcely possible that her obligations could be more narrowly circumscribed to circumstances in which we have an actual vital interest. Outside the Rhineland our obligations remain what they were. Only in the Rhineland have we assumed extra obligations. Before the Treaty of Locarno we *might* have been called upon, both by our membership of the League of Nations and our participation in the Treaty of Versailles, to intervene in any struggle which broke out in the Rhineland. By the Treaty of Locarno we declare that we *will*, in certain circumstances, intervene. But it is little more than an official recognition of what we should be almost certain to do in any case if the contingency arose. Had there been such an official recognition in 1914 the war might well have been averted. And in all cases where we may be called upon to act under the Treaty of Locarno, the British Government of the day remains the judge whether the *casus fœderis*²⁸ has arisen. The obligations assumed are thus a small price to pay for the results obtained.

36. What are those results? It is perhaps full early to attempt to estimate

²⁴ In treaties of February 1921 and January 1924 respectively: see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 118, pp. 342-3, and vol. 120, pp. 181-3.

²⁵ See Cmd. 2525, Annexes D and E respectively to item No. 1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, items Nos. 2 and 3 respectively.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Annex F to item No. 1.

²⁸ i.e. a case contemplated by treaty engagement.

them. But a *détente* has certainly been achieved—and it could not have been achieved without the co-operation of Great Britain. No longer is Western Europe divided into two camps—the victors and vanquished. At Locarno the ex-enemies met on a footing of perfect equality. The Treaty of Locarno is genuinely mutual. If Germany were to attack France in violation of her undertakings in the treaty she would find herself opposed by a combination of Great Britain, Belgium and Italy, as well as France. In the same way, if France were to attack Germany, she would find herself opposed by a combination of Great Britain, Belgium and Italy, as well as Germany. The new spirit engendered by the feeling of mutual co-operation which was the keynote of Locarno has already had certain tangible results. The work begun by the Dawes scheme has been consolidated. The remaining problems which threatened to throw Europe back into chaos have either been solved or are on the way to solution. Thus the question of German disarmament is practically settled and the activities of the Allied Commission of Control will shortly cease. The evacuation of the Cologne zone is proceeding and will soon be an accomplished fact. The whole nature of the Rhineland occupation has been changed. There is even hope of a solution of the vexed question of the control of German aviation, which, but a short time ago, threatened unending friction. All the disputes arising from the execution of the Treaty of Versailles are thus virtually at an end.

37. More important perhaps than this, Germany is about to enter the League and thus to take her rightful place once more in the councils of the European Powers.

38. But valuable as are these immediate results, it is permissible to hope for further results of even greater value. Locarno is but a first step. It is an omen of an international spirit which, if fostered, will lead to far more than practical men have ever dared to hope since the war. It may, for instance, by its example lead to the settlement of other troubled areas, such as the Balkans. It may pave the way for a settlement with Russia and for Russian entry into the League. It might even succeed at long last in removing the doubts felt in the United States regarding co-operation with Europe. Finally, it may prove to be an all-important step on the road to general disarmament. Such, indeed, was the hope of its authors, as will be seen from the words of the final protocol of the Locarno Conference:—

‘The representatives of the Governments represented here declare their firm conviction that the entry into force of these treaties and conventions will contribute greatly to bring about a moral relaxation of the tension between nations, that it will help powerfully towards the solution of many political or economic problems in accordance with the interests and sentiments of peoples, and that, in strengthening peace and security in Europe, it will hasten on effectively the disarmament provided for in article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.’

39. It is surely not possible that the dominions will desire to hold aloof from a work which promises to achieve so much. It is a matter of great regret to

His Majesty's Government that the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Locarno should have been conducted without the co-operation of all parts of the Empire. It has been explained in this memorandum why it was necessary for His Majesty's Government to go forward alone. They were faced with a situation which brooked no delay, a situation the mere continuance of which was perilous not only to European peace but to the safety of this country and therefore of the Empire. The support and assistance of the dominions would have been of incalculable help, but unfortunately they could not be forthcoming in the time available. All that His Majesty's Government could do therefore was to reserve to the Dominion Governments the right to adhere or not to adhere to the instrument that was being negotiated. That is the effect of article 9 of the Treaty of Locarno which follows, in fact, the precedent of article 5 of the Treaty of Assistance between Great Britain and France signed at Versailles on the 28th June 1919.

40. It is now for the dominions to decide whether they are prepared to associate themselves with His Majesty's Government in guaranteeing against unprovoked aggression the frontier between France and Belgium on the one side and Germany on the other. The importance of this frontier to the security of Great Britain and the importance of the security of Great Britain to that of the whole Empire has been sufficiently demonstrated. It may also be recalled that the dominions by their separate signature of the Covenant of the League and of the Treaty of Versailles are already liable to become involved in any dispute which may arise in the Rhineland. A policy of isolation from the affairs of Europe is, in virtue of their commitments and of their interests, just as impossible as it is for Great Britain.

CHAPTER I

Reactions to the Locarno Agreements October 17–November 30, 1925

No. 2

Mr. A. Chamberlain (Locarno) to the Marquess of Crewe¹ (Paris)
No. 18 Telegraphic [C 13120/13120/18]

Very Confidential

LOCARNO, October 17, 1925, 5 p.m.²

Addressed to Paris No. 18.

My despatches Nos. 31 and 44³ contained rough notes of the two discussions here between French, German, Belgian and British heads of delegations regarding *détente* which should inevitably follow entry into force of Pact⁴ and reaction which it should have not only upon question (? of) evacuation of Cologne but also in direction of a general alleviation of conditions in Rhineland.

From its [*sic*] records which are to be treated as highly confidential and non-official you will note very great lengths to which Monsieur Briand⁵ went in his assurance to German Chancellor⁶ that first thing he would do upon his return to Paris would be to take up this question of alleviation in Rhineland with his colleagues and he even went so far as to state that if (though he declared any such thing practically impossible) his views were not met he would resign.

I desire you to know that I fully share and endorse Monsieur Briand's views regarding inevitable and most desirable effect on conclusion of (? pact) and that anything in the nature of mollification in the Rhineland to which

¹ H.M. Ambassador at Paris.

² Time of repetition as No. 49 to the Foreign Office (received at 7.20 p.m. on October 17) where Sir W. Tyrrell, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was in charge during Mr. Chamberlain's absence.

³ Not printed. These despatches transmitted records of meetings on October 12 and 15 respectively.

⁴ The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, initialed at Locarno on October 16: cf. No. 1, note 22. The Treaty, with other instruments initialed at Locarno, was to be signed in London on December 1, and would enter into force when all ratifications had been deposited and Germany had entered the League of Nations. In this connexion Mr. Gaselee, Librarian to the Foreign Office, minuted on November 5 that the submission of treaty engagements to Parliament before signature, instead of between signature and ratification, was, so far as he knew, unprecedented.

⁵ French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁶ Dr. H. Luther was Chancellor of the German Reich.

French are ready to agree will have my strongest support. I am not yet aware of precise form which such mollification is most likely to take but I wish you to be aware of my desire for general conciliation in the Rhineland and thus to be in a position to let my views be known should question be raised with you by French government.

I wish to do everything that can be done to mark at once that our relations with Germany are now on an entirely new footing and that confidence established between us enables concessions to be made which would have been unthinkable earlier.

Repeated to Foreign Office, Coblenz, Brussels and Berlin.

No. 3

Mr. A. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Colonel Ryan¹ (Coblenz)

No. 2² Telegraphic [C 13121/13120/18]

LOCARNO, October 17, 1925

(?Addressed to Berlin, omitted.)³

My telegram No. 18 to Paris.⁴

I rely on you to act on similar lines in discussions which you are bound shortly to have with your French colleague. I cannot help feeling that there must be many directions in which we could quite reasonably make things easier for the inhabitants of the occupied territory. I desire that you will in every way support this policy, for example, I should certainly not be averse to acceptance of a Reich's commissar⁵ (? and) seeing existing High Commissions legislation overhauled thoroughly with a view to cutting out all such provisions as are not *obviously* both necessary and justified under Rhineland agreement namely for 'maintenance of [*sic*] safety and requirements'⁶ of troops of occupation. Indeed I wish to do everything that can be done to mark at once that our relations with Germany are now on an (? entirely) new footing and that confidence established between us enables concessions to be made which would have been unthinkable earlier.⁷

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Ryan was acting as British High Commissioner on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission during the absence of Lord Kilmarnock on sick leave.

² This telegram was addressed to Coblenz as No. 2 and was repeated as No. 50 to the Foreign Office at 6.50 p.m. (received at 8.10 p.m.) on October 17.

³ Thus on filed copy.

⁴ No. 2.

⁵ On April 17, 1923, the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission had notified the then German Commissioner in the Rhineland of the termination of his appointment.

⁶ Cf. article 3 of this agreement of June 28, 1919, printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 112, pp. 219-24.

⁷ As a result of a discussion between Mr. Chamberlain and Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Secretary of State for War, and the Earl of Cavan, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the latter wrote on October 26 to Lieutenant-General J. Du Cane, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine, that 'it is clear that the Foreign Secretary is extremely anxious to make the spirit of Locarno a reality. Instructions have been sent to

Secret. For your secret information

I may add that Monsieur Berthelot⁸ told Mr. Lampson⁹ during conference here that his intention is shortly to transfer Tirard¹⁰ from Coblenz not because he has not the confidence of the French government but because he has drawn up indeed almost created a system of things in the Rhineland which is now bound to undergo very considerable modifications with which it might prove difficult for Tirard to reconcile himself.

This is perhaps as significant as anything of change of heart of French government as regards régime of occupation.

Lord Kilmarnock to this effect, and I am writing to ask you to carry out a policy of alleviation to such an extent as you are enabled and, further, that you will fall in with the spirit of any instructions from Lord Kilmarnock and the Commission based on this policy, unless you have strong military reasons for disagreement.'

⁸ Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁹ Head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office.

¹⁰ President of, and French High Commissioner on, the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

No. 4

Mr. A. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Lord D'Abernon¹ (Berlin)

No. 14² Telegraphic [C 13132/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 17, 1925, 7.30 p.m.

Addressed to Berlin No. 14.

I shall be grateful if you or Mr. Addison³ will arrange to meet the Chancellor and Dr. Stresemann⁴ at the station on their return to Berlin. I would beg you to greet them suitably from me and to say that I shall always remember with pleasure our first meeting in Locarno, and the spirit of sincerity and frankness which they brought to our discussions. To the German government will belong the honour of having taken the initiative in the course of action which has led to the treaty of Locarno. I am convinced that the agreements which have been initialled here will mark a turning point in the history of Europe and I trust that the friendly personal relations established between the British and German Delegations are the sure tokens of the new relationship between our nations.⁵

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 54, and Paris No. 20 by bag.

¹ H.M. Ambassador at Berlin.

² Repeated as No. 54 to the Foreign Office (received on October 19).

³ Counsellor in H.M. Embassy at Berlin.

⁴ German Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵ In Foreign Office telegram No. 201 to Berlin of October 20 Mr. Chamberlain conveyed his 'high appreciation' of Lord D'Abernon's services as H.M. Ambassador at Berlin 'not only to His Majesty's Government but to the peace of Europe', and congratulated him 'on the success of an endeavour to which your influence and advice have so powerfully contributed. His Majesty's Government have been singularly fortunate in finding in yourself and Lord Crewe such able exponents and artizans of their policy.'

No. 5

Mr. A. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir R. Graham¹ (Rome)

No. 12² Telegraphic [C 13344/459/18]

LOCARNO, October 17, 1925, 9 p.m.

Please renew to Mussolini³ the expression of my high appreciation of the value of his personal presence at final sittings of Conference and my great pleasure at his promise to come to London for the signature of the Treaty of Locarno. Assure him of my high regard and most friendly personal sentiments.

My wife begs to be remembered to him.⁴

Repeated to Foreign Office (by bag) No. 55.

¹ H.M. Ambassador at Rome.

² Repeated as No. 55 to the Foreign Office (received on October 22).

³ President of the Italian Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Sir R. Graham replied on October 20 in Rome telegram No. 232 which stated: 'I delivered your message to President of the Council last night. He expressed much gratification and said that he would send you an answer direct. His meeting and conversations with you had given him the utmost satisfaction.' Signor Mussolini sent a written reply to Mr. Chamberlain on October 24, in the sense of his remarks to Sir R. Graham. The two messages are printed in *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Settima Serie, vol. iv, pp. 117-18.

No. 6

Mr. A. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received October 19)

*No. 48 [N 5878/188/55]**

LOCARNO, October 17, 1925

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 6

Memorandum by Mr. A. Chamberlain

LOCARNO, October 17, 1925

I sent a message this morning to Count Skrzynski¹ to ask him to give me an opportunity of five minutes' conversation. He has just been with me. I said that he had been good enough to express to me in very generous terms his appreciation of my attitude towards Poland, both before and at this conference, and of the friendly help that I had given to him. Would he allow me, I asked, in these circumstances to speak to him as a friend and even to offer him friendly advice?

M. Skrzynski replied that he begged me to do so. I then described the

¹ Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

profound emotion which I had felt as I listened to Dr. Stresemann's speech at the close of the conference yesterday, so restrained in its terms, so discreet in its allusions, and yet bringing before us so clearly the unexpressed thoughts and cherished hopes of the German Government, and then to the noble reply of M. Briand, breathing the true spirit of Liberal France. With his mandate exhausted and no longer able to speak in the name of his Government, he yet pledged himself on his return to France to endeavour to give the largest possible satisfaction to the unspoken wishes of the German delegation. None of us who had witnessed that scene would ever forget it. Could not Poland, on her side, show the same magnanimity? There were I knew not how many Germans in Poland whom the Polish Government had decided to expel in pursuance of a right derived, not from the Treaty of Versailles, but from an agreement since entered into between the German Government and themselves.² As far as I knew, no one had ever questioned their legal right so to act. It would, therefore, be all the more impressive if, as a result of the accord which they had also made with Germany, and of the new relationship between the two nations upon which they had thus entered, they would voluntarily renounce their right. Everybody had supposed when we came here that the question of the eastern frontiers and the French guarantee was the greatest difficulty in our path. This had, in fact, not been the case. The entry of Germany into the League of Nations had proved a far more serious obstacle, but public opinion had seen in Poland the crux of the problem and had continued to attribute to the Polish question almost up to the close of the conference every delay or hitch which seemed to affect the negotiations. I felt that the press in my own country and in others had often been unfair to Poland, and, in particular, to Count Skrzynski, but such an act on their part would be an act of the highest statesmanship, the one thing most capable of producing a marked improvement in their relations with Germany and certain to be appreciated in every country in the world. I ventured, therefore, to urge that he should telegraph to his Government, recording the impression made by M. Briand's declaration, informing them of the assurances which M. Briand had voluntarily tendered to the Germans at the conference table, and urging with all his influence this great act of conciliation and appeasement by the Polish Government. I repeated that nothing but the generous appreciation that he had shown of my action authorised me to tender advice of this kind to a foreign Minister on a question which, though affecting external relations, was essentially within the sphere of domestic legislation, but I spoke as a sincere friend. I hoped that he would accept my suggestion in the same spirit and give it his most serious consideration.

² With reference to article 91 of the Treaty of Versailles and articles 3-5 of the Polish Minorities Treaty of June 28, 1919 (printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 112, pp. 232-43), Germany and Poland had concluded a Convention at Vienna on August 30, 1924, to settle questions of nationality arising from Poland's acquisition of former German territories. By this convention persons opting for German or Polish nationality were divided into three categories, leaving Poland or Germany by August 1 and November 1, 1925, and July 1, 1926, respectively. The Convention is printed in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. xxxii, 1925, pp. 331-53.

Count Skrzynski replied that I had certainly the right to speak to him in this way and to offer advice to the Polish Government, that he could not pledge that Government, that there were some 17,000 Germans whom they had a right to expel, and among them a few, perhaps not more than thirty or forty, who lived in fortress zones and could not be allowed to remain there, but that he would do his utmost to secure the revocation of the order of expulsion in respect of as large a number as possible of them, and that he believed that he would be successful.

I thanked him warmly, both for the freedom with which he had allowed me to speak to him and for the resolution which he had just announced to me.

A.C.

No. 7

Mr. A. Chamberlain (Locarno) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received October 20)

No. 52 [C 13240/13120/18]

LOCARNO, October 17, 1925

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 7

Memorandum by Mr. Selby¹

LOCARNO, October 17, 1925

In the course of a conversation which I had with Herr von Schubert² this morning, he said that he still felt some anxiety over the question of Cologne. It was so vitally important that a date should be fixed for the evacuation of Cologne with as little delay as possible if the Security Pact negotiated at Locarno was to be ratified by the Reichstag; and he had the feeling that the procedure agreed on as regards the addressing of a note to the Ambassadors' Conference³ by the German Government, and the consequent reply which it would be necessary to send, might cause dangerous delay. He seemed to apprehend that, if the Ambassadors' Conference simply replied that after such and such points had been dealt with by the German Government Cologne would be evacuated, that would not meet the situation.

I reminded Herr von Schubert of the procedure which had been indicated to him by Monsieur Briand himself, namely that the note to be addressed

¹ Private Secretary to Mr. Chamberlain.

² Secretary of State in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ The Conference of Ambassadors, constituted by a resolution of the Supreme Council of July 28, 1919, sat in Paris from January 26, 1920, in order to determine questions of interpretation and execution of the treaties of peace.

to the Ambassadors' Conference by the German Government should first deal with the points made in the note addressed to the German Government on June 4th⁴ which had already been disposed of; secondly, those points on which an agreement had been reached and which were in course of liquidation—I said I understood that some of the measures would be complete by November 15th, others a little later for technical reasons; and thirdly, those points on which it had not been possible for an agreement to be reached between the Allied Control Commission in Berlin and the German Commission under General Pawells [Pawelsz], with whom they were negotiating. As regards these latter points, I reminded Herr von Schubert of Mr. Chamberlain's exhortation that the German Government should do everything that was possible in their reply to meet the conditions of the Allies and not to adopt a merely *non possumus* attitude in regard to them.

At this point Herr von Schubert interrupted me to say that if it depended simply upon him, he would probably return a reply which would be entirely in conformity with the views of the Allied governments on all the points, but he said that account must be taken of all the conflicting opinions in Berlin. Apart from the expert opinion of the military authorities, there was the Cabinet to be considered. Herr von Schubert said he presumed that I could appreciate the position.

I told Herr von Schubert that, if from the note that they were to address to the Ambassadors' Conference, it appeared that the German Government were showing the utmost measure of goodwill, they would be met in a similar spirit by the Allied governments, and indeed I again reminded him that Monsieur Briand had stated that in such conditions the reply which would be received from the Allied governments would take into account all the political considerations involved in the problem. Surely Herr von Schubert had been sufficiently reassured by the declarations which had been made to him both by Mr. Chamberlain and Monsieur Briand on this point. Monsieur Briand's closing speech was surely sufficient proof that everything possible would be done to facilitate the ratification of the Pact by the Reichstag, and that Cologne would certainly not be allowed to stand in the way if the German Government dealt with the question reasonably, as it was hoped they would.

Herr von Schubert assured me that he was fully alive to the necessity of coming to some agreement on the points outstanding with the Control Commission in Berlin, and he thought that it could be arranged that the Allies would be met on one or two points. He emphasised, however, again that the important point was that the actual date for the evacuation of Cologne should be announced, and that that date should be fixed as early as possible, so as to strengthen Dr. Luther's and Herr Stresemann's hands.

Herr von Schubert then proceeded to deal with the question of the Rhine-

⁴ This note from the Belgian, British, French, Italian, and Japanese Ambassadors at Berlin regarding German fulfilment of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles is printed in Cmd. 2429 of 1925. With reference to the allied note of January 5 (see No. 1, note 6), it set out the German defaults which should be made good.

land. He explained that again some results would be expected by the German public. He had recently communicated a memorandum⁵ of the views of the German Government to Mr. Chamberlain, and he explained that that memorandum was drawn up on his instructions and really was a minimum and not by any means a maximum of the results which it was hoped might follow upon the conclusion of the Pact. There was one point which the German delegates had been careful not to mention in their negotiations, namely the earlier evacuation of the second and third zones. Yet, although they had not mentioned it, for reasons which would be obvious to me, it was still a fact that German public opinion would look to some such result from the concessions which had been made, and Dr. Luther might even be pressed as to whether anything had been said in the course of the negotiations on this point, as well as that of Cologne. Herr von Schubert said that, unless the alleviations adumbrated in the memorandum which had been communicated to Mr. Chamberlain followed without undue delay, Dr. Luther and Herr Stresemann would find themselves without argument to counter the strong opinion for the earlier evacuation of the whole of the occupied territory.

I told Herr von Schubert that I could only congratulate the German delegates upon having refrained from raising the question of the evacuation of the second and third zones, and I hoped sincerely that the German Government would not be so ill-advised as to raise this issue in any case for some time to come. Herr von Schubert must remember that if he was continually pressing on us the difficulties to which the German leaders were exposed, those difficulties did not alone lie on one side. The suspicions of Germany in France were not yet by any means allayed, and while it might be hoped that the general effects of the Pact would in due course make themselves felt in France, time must be allowed for that process. Improved as the state of French opinion was, Monsieur Briand had showed the greatest courage in advancing as far as he had to meet the Germans, and the only effect of straining the position further, in order to facilitate the task of the German leaders, would be to wreck the Pact in France. That was surely not a contingency which the Germans wished to contemplate. As to the question of the mitigation of the existing conditions in the Rhineland, I told Herr von Schubert that he would not expect me to discuss the details of this problem, but I referred him to the repeated statements which had been made by Monsieur Briand on this matter, and I said that it seemed to me that they could rely on him to give effect to his promises. In any case, the action which would almost certainly follow upon the word given by Monsieur Briand should suffice for all reasonable purposes to achieve the object which Dr. Luther and Herr Stresemann had in view.

Herr von Schubert said that he was generally satisfied with the declarations which had been made on this point both by Mr. Chamberlain and Monsieur Briand, and he felt sure that action would follow quickly upon the

⁵ This memorandum, which was handed to Mr. Lampson by Herr von Schubert on October 14, is not printed.

words which had been uttered at this Conference. He hoped he could look to Mr. Chamberlain to render all the assistance that was possible.

Out of this remark of Herr von Schubert's, arose a brief discussion of British policy. Mr. Chamberlain, I said, had made it perfectly clear that the corner stone of the edifice which he had built was friendship with France, and that this would continue to be the basis of his policy. That did not mean, as he had explained, that the well-being of a new friend would be overlooked. Indeed, it was a guarantee for a betterment of the conditions of that new friend, and indeed the only guarantee which would secure such betterment.

Herr von Schubert said that he perfectly appreciated this aspect of the problem. He himself had for many years seen that without a thorough understanding between England and France as regards their policy in Europe, no alleviation could be expected of the difficult position in which Germany felt herself to be.

W. SELBY

No. 8

Lord D'Abnerron (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received October 20)
No. 583 [N 5905/710/38]

BERLIN, October 17, 1925

Sir,

The facts which led to Tchitcherine's¹ visit to Berlin and the events which have taken place here during the last fortnight are now fairly certain so that a connected narrative of his negotiations is possible.

2. He arrived here on September 30 bent on a great campaign against England. His central idea—outside monetary pre-occupations—was to demonstrate to Germany that she was being made a catspaw by us. If Germany signed the western Pact her relations with Russia would be so weakened that she would be a mere pawn in the western combination. Since the menace of a German-Russian alliance would cease to exist, no-one would listen to Germany's views or pay attention to her remonstrances.

3. Alternatively, Tchitcherine's scheme as regards France was to point out that since Russia was no longer bound to Germany by the Rapallo engagement,² a Franco-Russian alliance was possible, the main obstacle to it

¹ M. Chicherin was Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. For documents in connexion with his visits to Warsaw and Berlin see Jane Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (London, 1951 f.), vol. ii, pp. 55-59, 60-61: cf. also Kurt Rosenbaum, *Community of Fate: German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations 1922-1928* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1965), pp. 177 f. See also *Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries, Letters, and Papers* (ed. and trans. by Eric Sutton: London, 1935 f.), vol. ii, pp. 478-80, for Dr. Stresemann's account of a conversation with M. Chicherin on September 30.

² This German-Soviet agreement of April 16, 1922, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 118, pp. 586-70. Cf., however, article 3 of the German-Soviet treaty of friendship signed at Moscow on October 12, 1925, which provided that the Treaty of Rapallo

which had previously existed, namely, unfriendliness between Russia and Poland, having been removed through Tchitcherine's conversations at Warsaw.

4. Tchitcherine's central theme—the constant burden of his conversations—was the danger to European politics of the increasing influence of England. Russia had experience of the nefarious action of England in all parts of the world: in every country in the East she found English agents who not only opposed the promulgation of Soviet doctrines but intrigued with the re-actionary elements in each country to bring about a great combination—almost a crusade—against the Moscow Government. In order to further this crusade, English agents stated, quite erroneously, that the Soviet scheme of policy was one of revolutionary propaganda—that their political aims were subordinated to evangelisation in the interests of the Soviet doctrine. The real truth of the matter was that, while the policy of the Soviet necessarily comprehended support of populations who were being exploited by English capitalism and down-trodden by English military power, there was nothing of a revolutionary character in the action of Soviet diplomatic representatives abroad.

5. There is little doubt that on arriving in Berlin, Tchitcherine was confident of being able to sow such distrust in the mind of the German Government that the latter would find some plausible pretext for not signing the proposed Pact of Guarantee.

6. He was also confident that he would find the representatives of France sufficiently attracted by the conception of a Russian-Polish-French understanding to prevent them from pushing on with the necessary negotiations for the proposed Western Pact.

7. His anticipations regarding Germany were based mainly upon his experience at the time of the Treaty of Rapallo. But he forgot that the position of international politics has altered considerably since 1922, and that, as a matter of fact, even at that period the treaty of Rapallo only came about through a temporary want of liaison between the English and German delegations at Genoa.

8. Apart, however, from the details of this particular episode, the fundamental change which has taken place in the European situation is that Poincaré has been replaced in France by Briand, and this change has effected a vast reaction in German policy.

9. After Tchitcherine had been in Berlin a week, he found that his two main assumptions were erroneous. The German Government were anxious not to break with Russia and were ready to give minor concessions and assurances of further friendliness, but they were not prepared to abandon the policy of the Pact of Mutual Guarantee and were further not prepared to follow Tchitcherine's suggestion that they should refuse to join the League of Nations.

should remain in force. This treaty, together with the Consular treaty and the treaty regarding reciprocal legal assistance signed the same day, is printed *op. cit.*, vol. 122, pp. 707 f.

10. His second assumption that the French would fall in with one of his plans, either for a continental alliance against England or a Franco-Polish-Russian understanding against England and Germany, also proved to be entirely erroneous.

11. During a long conversation with the French Ambassador on 11th October he exhausted every resource of rhetoric in endeavouring to prove that England was gaining a dangerous mastery over Europe, that she had already made Germany a catspaw and that it was due to her malevolence that the Ruhr policy had so completely failed. He further recited innumerable instances in which Russia had found England standing in the path of the liberation of dominated and exploited peoples.

12. All his arguments were unavailing and he was told that France had entered with resolution the path of the Pact of Guarantee and would not be turned aside by any development of Russian policy. The settlement of the Russian debt to France was undoubtedly a matter of grave importance, but as this settlement was subject to the Russian condition that a large amount of new credit should be given to Russia, it was hardly possible for France to carry through the operation alone. The assistance of Capel Court and Wall Street³ would have to be invoked. Fresh money in large amounts could only come from these sources, so that England and America must be partners in—or benevolent spectators of—any general arrangement between France and Russia. However much one might wish to disguise the fact, the key to the position lay in the satisfaction of the financial requirements of Russia.

13. Tchitcherine appears to have swallowed his disappointment together with large draughts of champagne without losing his head. He turned, with amazing rapidity, to a new combination and appears recently to have put forward to a select circle of intimates a scheme that he proposes to lay before the Moscow Government on his return there at the end of next month. This scheme consists in a recognition of the French debt on terms to be discussed—acceptance of the fact of the Pact of Mutual Guarantee—discussion of possible entry of Russia into the League of Nations—reconciliation with England (and, if necessary, with America) through French intermediary.

14. The rapidity with which Tchitcherine had modified his programme is not to be ascribed to his versatility alone. The pressure upon him to devise some solution which will bring money to the Russia[n] Exchequer was urgent. Some method had to be found which will loose the purse-strings of the West.

15. How far Tchitcherine can carry his colleagues at Moscow in a policy of this kind remains, of course, doubtful. While he himself has apparently been convinced that the original Russian policy is impracticable, it is doubtful whether his telegrams and dispatches to Moscow have brought the same degree of conviction to the minds of his colleagues in the Soviet. They have remained in the Moscow atmosphere and have not been brought into close contact with the European mentality as displayed in Berlin. They have probably attributed the failure of their schemes to the fact that Tchitcherine

³ The reference was to the Stock Exchanges of London and New York respectively.

has been unskilful in advocacy or that he has been too easily awed by opposition; they will hold that a further effort should be made to oppose England before going over to a policy of reconciliation.

16. A variety of conclusions may be drawn from the facts related above. Among the most important is the extreme potency of the financial factor. It should be an essential condition of any negotiation with the Soviet neither to give money nor to allow money to be given without a definite *quid pro quo*. Further, the *quid pro quo* should be in precise form and duly signed. It may be doubtful how far the Soviet will carry out written contracts—it is certain they will not carry out any verbal engagements. Whatever payments are made must be by instalments at fairly distant dates, the later instalments only to be paid on complete satisfaction regarding cessation of propaganda and execution of other clauses.* These conditions are shown to be necessary by German experience of relations with Russia during the last few years.

17. In the immediate future it will be much easier to lose money in Russia than to make it. It would be regrettable [*sic*] if in the process of losing money we gained no solid political advantage.

I have, &c.,
D'ABERNON

No. 9

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received October 19, 9 a.m.)
No. 231 Telegraphic [C 13145/459/18]

ROME, October 18, 1925, 8.55 p.m.

Italian press of all shades of opinion is unanimous in expressing greatest satisfaction at results of the conference which are widely regarded as signifying the beginning of the end of confused post-war situation and giving hopes of period of genuine peace. Much importance is attached to participation of Italy and her position at Locarno is contrasted with that which she occupied during peace negotiations at Paris.

Some of the more serious papers also emphasise extent and value of your own contribution to the success of the conference.¹

¹ In a fuller account of Italian press comment on the Locarno conference Sir R. Graham stated in particular in his despatch No. 890 of October 19: 'It is generally remarked that with the Locarno Conference the process of the diplomatic revision of the Treaty of Versailles has begun: not, as the "Popolo d'Italia" points out, its territorial revision, but its "moral and political transformation".'

No. 10

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received October 19, 3 p.m.)
No. 374 Telegraphic [C 13221/459/18]

BERLIN, October 19, 1925, 2.42 p.m.

German delegation arrived here yesterday afternoon but there was no public demonstration. Considerable police precautions were in evidence.

I greeted Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann and gave them your message textually.¹ It is published here this morning.²

Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann expressed their thanks in appropriate terms.

¹ See No. 4. Lord D'Abernon's greeting is printed in Eric Sutton, *Gustav Stresemann*, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 191.

² Lord D'Abernon added in his telegram No. 378 of October 21 that Mr. Chamberlain's message had been published unequivocally in the German press and had 'made a great effect and will powerfully assist government in obtaining necessary support'. He had meanwhile reported in Berlin telegram No. 376 of October 20 that 'Criticism [of the Locarno agreements] from the Right is unexpectedly mild as they have little to say against Pact itself, but concentrate on so-called "reactions" and state that Germany cannot consider Pact unless satisfaction is given to her . . . [text uncertain]. The more moderate papers are enthusiastically favourable.'

No. 11

Sir G. Grahame¹ (Brussels) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received October 20, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 102 Telegraphic: by bag [C 13223/459/18]

BRUSSELS, October 19, 1925

The immense importance of the successful results of the Locarno conference is fully appreciated in Belgium, and I feel sure that they will be ratified by Parliament if not unanimously at any rate almost so. It would be strange if it were otherwise, considering that the chief object of Belgian policy, since 1920, has been to supplement the defensive military agreement with France²—generally considered insufficient—by a British guarantee of security.

The sober and more weighty newspapers emphasize the great value for Belgium of what has taken place at Locarno. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has made a declaration to the press³ in which the results are plainly set forth for the information of public opinion and has expressed his conviction that a new era is opening for Europe.

A certain number of newspapers cavil; the ultra-nationalist ones who still hanker after the Poincaré policy of force declare that the Germans have once more got the better of the Allies, and other opposition newspapers

¹ H.M. Ambassador at Brussels and Minister at Luxembourg.

² See First Series, Volume XII, No. 38.

³ See *The Times* of October 20, 1925, p. 13.

seek to pick holes so as to diminish any success to the credit of the present Cabinet. It is, however, almost inconceivable that the mass of Belgian public opinion can do otherwise than hail with immense relief and satisfaction the splendid work which has been accomplished in the direction of assuring peace in Europe and therewith security for Belgium.

No. 12

Colonel Ryan (Coblenz) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received October 24)

*No. 365 [C 13468/13120/18]**

Confidential

COBLENZ, October 20, 1925

Sir,

With reference to your despatch¹ of the 13th October, transmitting copy of despatch to the Foreign Office, No 31¹ of the same date, relative to the meeting held between the heads of the British, French and German delegations on the 12th October, I have the honour to submit the following general comments on the possible modifications to be made in the Rhineland régime with a view to bringing it into harmony with the new situation.

2. From German official and unofficial sources complaints in regard to the occupation fall under four headings:—

- (a) Aviation.
- (b) The armies.
- (c) German representation with the High Commission.
- (d) The ordinances of the High Commission.

(a) *Aviation*

The Germans demand the right to fly over the occupied territories. In view of the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of the 15th December, 1920,² this question will presumably be settled to German satisfaction on the entry of Germany into the League of Nations.

(b) *The Armies*

1. The Germans complain that the strength of the armies is unnecessarily high and imposes undue burdens on the population in respect of accommodation. This matter is one which falls outside the competence of the High Commission, and is primarily a military question; I therefore do not offer any comments.

2. In the second place, the complaint is raised that the military courts are

¹ Not printed.

² This decision was to the effect that flight over the Rhineland territory should be strictly forbidden to German civil aircraft so long as Germany had not adhered to the Air Navigation Convention of October 13, 1919 (printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 112, pp. 931-70) or joined the League of Nations.

unsatisfactory, being presided over by officers ignorant of the German language, and with small legal knowledge. This question has recently formed the subject of discussions between myself and M. Tirard, who has made the suggestion that it might be possible to associate German jurists in future with the courts either as judges or assessors. I have not yet had an opportunity of studying this question with a view to seeing how far the proposal is compatible with the legal constitution of the courts of the three armies, but the idea merits consideration.

(c) *German Representation with the High Commission*

The proposal is that the Reich and State Commissioner should be re-appointed. This question I have dealt with in my telegram No. 35³ of the 18th October. I would here only add that the re-establishment of this office would seem to be the easiest and quickest step we can take to mark our recognition of the change in our relations with Germany.

(d) *The Ordinances of the High Commission*

The first ordinances and instructions⁴ of the High Commission were drawn up in the autumn of 1919 and the spring of 1920, and were based partly on the military orders in force during the armistice, partly on the Indian Police Code (on the proposal of the late Sir H. Stuart⁵) and partly on the French Civil Code. Given the circumstances of the time when the situation in Germany was in a state of flux, and when it was impossible to foresee how the occupation would develop, the ordinances can be said on the whole to have been liberal in nature, although certain of them formed at the time the subject of a German protest at Versailles. Since then the exigencies of the occupation, the tension that arose at various times between the Allies and Germany, the revival of German Nationalism, and above all the events of 1923-24 which followed on the Franco-Belgian action in the Ruhr, led to a large increase in the number of ordinances (a number of which were adopted with our abstention or against our vote) and an aggravation of the situation. The *détente* which resulted from the London Agreement of the 31st [30th] August, 1924,⁶ caused a general revision of the ordinances to be carried out, though the alleviations that resulted were not so far-reaching as we pressed for.

³ Not printed. In this telegram in reply to No. 3 Colonel Ryan briefly indicated the views expressed below. He also stated that the appointment of a Reich commissioner could not fail to exercise a very beneficial effect in unoccupied Germany as well as in occupied territory and added: 'I have accordingly sounded French High Commissioner as to this appointment and found him by no means enthusiastic, but prepared to raise no objection if some assurance were forthcoming that this official would work with and not against the High Commission. It would however, undoubtedly expedite matter if you could raise question at Paris.'

⁴ These ordinances and instructions were published in the *Official Gazette of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission*.

⁵ H.M. High Commissioner on the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission, 1920-1.

⁶ Cf. No. 1, note 4.

The ordinances may be divided in two categories—those relative to the maintenance and requirements, and those relative to the safety of the armies. Those falling in the first category are of financial rather than of political importance, and have recently been revised in order to bring them into agreement with the financial regulations of the 5th May, 1925,⁷ agreed to by the Allies and Germany. Apart from a further possible revision that may become necessary in view of the recent German demands in regard to article 6 of the agreement, it would seem that few modifications, if any, will be necessary.

It is the ordinances falling in the second category that press the more heavily on the Germans, and in regard to which complaints are heard. German demands refer chiefly to the ordinances regarding circulation, the press censorship, radio telegraphy, the appointment of officials, meetings and the protective ordinances. It is not the purpose of this despatch to discuss these ordinances in detail. I would, however, express the opinion that it should be possible to make considerable modifications in these ordinances and, withal, maintain safeguarded the essential and legitimate interests of the armies.

Regard being had to the genesis of the individual ordinances, it is evident that many of them (in particular those concerning the security of the armies) drawn up to deal with circumstances which no longer obtain or to meet contingencies which, in view of the changed conditions, need no longer be expected, will require modification to bring them into harmony with our new relations with Germany.

There is, perhaps, one further consideration. After the withdrawal of the Military Mission of Control the Rhineland will remain the only point where the Allies are in direct contact with the Germans. According to how it is treated, it may be a means of conciliation or a continuing cause of friction. It may, perhaps, be too much to hope that a more liberal régime will turn the occupied territories into an earthly paradise, where the eagle acknowledges the cock as brother, but a more tactful and sympathetic handling than has hitherto been the case, by minimising the possibility of friction and removing such legitimate grievances as are now in existence, will tend to promote (or at least not to diminish) the reconciliation which has been so happily begun at Locarno.

3. It cannot, however, be denied that there is a strong body of opinion represented by the French military authorities which is hostile to any concessions in the Rhineland. The French officer has been brought up to regard Germany as his hereditary enemy. During his career his studies have been devoted mainly to the solution of the problem as to how Germany is to be met either in attack or defence. After serving through the war he has continued it under another name in the Rhineland and the Ruhr. His gospel is the 'Écho de Paris', and his prophet, Poincaré. It is, therefore, perhaps

⁷ The Financial Regulations for the Contributions under Articles 8–12 of the Rhineland Agreement, known as the Patijn Regulations, are printed in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. IV, as item No. 1318.

not surprising that he should have received the news of the success of the Locarno negotiations with mixed feelings. What effect this feeling will have in the future is hard to say, but it is at least certain that the influence of the French high command has in the past been consistently directed against concessions to the Germans, and has prevented reforms which would have otherwise been carried out.

The above holds good, with certain exceptions, for the personnel of the French High Commissariat. These officials are recruited to a large extent from the corps of officers, and are mainly supporters of the *Bloc national*.⁸ If the necessary reforms are to be carried through at Coblenz it will be most desirable that the instructions sent from Paris should be explicit and firm.

4. It may not be out of place here to express one further hope. If reconciliation is to be effectual it must be mutual. The attitude of the German officials since the *détente* that followed the signature of the London Agreement has not been such as to inspire great confidence for the future in this respect. The non-co-operation, not to say antagonism, of the Germans has during recent months been manifest in many ways—in the press, in the exaggerated demands made on the Allies, in the attitude of the local officials towards the occupation, and in the orders sent from Berlin to the various Rhineland authorities. It is, moreover, an unfortunate characteristic of the German invariably to ask for an ell as soon as he has received an inch. This characteristic has made him receive such concessions as have been given with bad grace, and has rendered the French chary of agreeing to grant further concessions.

If the future is to develop along the lines which we desire, it is necessary that this spirit would change. Neither the local officials nor the population are in themselves hostile to the members of the occupation. Their only desire is to live in peace, but they (in particular the officials), however, conform to the *mot d'ordre* of Berlin. It is therefore necessary, if goodwill is to be established, that the instructions coming from Berlin should be animated with the spirit of Locarno.⁹

⁸ The *Bloc national* was a combination of groups of a right-wing nationalist character which was in power in France from 1919 to 1924.

⁹ In this connexion Colonel Ryan stated in a letter of October 21 to Mr. Lampson: 'It is necessary that we should realise the difficulties in front of us. If we compare the present and the past, it is surprising how little we have advanced locally from the spirit in which the armies first marched into the Rhineland. The present mentality of the Armies (including our own) may be summed up in the sentence "Sit on the German or he becomes insupportable". There is, I fear more than a grain of truth in this, but it is none-the-less disappointing that it should be so. I would mention that there is a further consideration which explains the intransigence of the Armies where Germans are concerned. Individuals react directly to their personal comforts and amenities. The financial agreements of the past year here entailed the disappearance of many privileges which the Armies enjoyed from the beginning of the occupation. This and the high cost of living has created a certain dissatisfaction which has been turned to a feeling of resentment by the action of the Germans themselves. Not content with a reasonable interpretation of the various agreements the latter demand their pound of flesh in claims that are often absurd. The Military Authorities react accordingly. It is this state of affairs that explains the fact that, whereas during the Ruhr British

5. Before concluding, there is one further point to which I would briefly refer. I observe in the conversations on the 12th October that Dr. Stresemann asked that a mixed commission should be set up to study the question of the ordinances. This proposal seems to me to present difficulties. There can be in principle no objection to the establishment of a mixed commission to examine into questions of fact, but questions concerning the safety, maintenance or requirements of the armies are essentially questions of appreciation which concern the Allies alone, and which can hardly be dealt with by a mixed commission on which Germany is represented. On the other hand, in the consideration of these questions, I am of the opinion that it would not only be useful but desirable that Germany's voice should be heard, preferably through the medium of the Reichskommissar.

I have, &c.,
R. S. RYAN

Military opinion was not unfriendly towards the Germans, it is now, in my opinion, distinctly unsympathetic.¹

In replying to this letter on November 4, Mr. Lampson expressed his appreciation of Colonel Ryan's handling of British policy in the Rhineland.

No. 13

Mr. A. Chamberlain¹ to Sir E. Howard² (Washington)
*No. 1664 [C 13347/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 21, 1925*

Sir,

The American Ambassador called upon me this afternoon to offer his warm congratulations on the success of the Locarno Conference. He spoke with generous appreciation of my share in the good work done there. His communication was all the more gratifying to me since he has from the first followed the negotiations with the greatest interest and has done whatever his personal and public relationships permitted to help us to success.

Your Excellency knows how much I have valued the support which the President of the United States has given by his public utterances to this work of pacification.

I am, &c.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ Mr. Chamberlain had returned to London on October 20, having visited Paris on his way back from Locarno.

² H.M. Ambassador at Washington.

Sir G. Clerk¹ (Prague) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received October 26)
No. 344 [C 13559/459/18]*

PRAGUE, October 21, 1925

Sir,

The news of the successful conclusion of the negotiations at Locarno was welcomed in Czechoslovakia with a universal and enthusiastic chorus of approval. Even before the publication of the texts of the treaties, articles appeared in the Czechoslovak press with such titles as 'Peace at Last!' which headed an article in the 'Československa Republika.'

2. These earlier commentaries were naturally of a more general nature, and they assumed a more detailed character in the issues of Tuesday, the 20th instant, which contained the texts of the treaties in full. The official organ, the 'Prager Presse,' has a long and well-informed leader on the subject. It points out that the treaties are all in the spirit that have [*sic*] guided Czechoslovak foreign policy from the beginning and set a crown upon it. The main direct advantage Czechoslovakia reaps is the strengthening of the guarantee which she has hitherto enjoyed by the new Treaty of Arbitration with Germany. There already existed arbitration treaties with Austria and Poland² and treaties of friendship and alliance with Roumania and Jugoslavia; Hungary is therefore now the only State relations with which are not regulated by treaty.

3. Indirectly, the increased stability in the west will be a stabilising influence also in Central Europe.

4. The Polish-German Treaty of Arbitration will also indirectly affirm the position of Czechoslovakia.

5. Further, the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, which is now assured, puts Germany definitively on the side of the pacifist nations. It takes her out of the camp of those who are in permanent opposition to the new status in Europe as settled by the peace treaties, and to any policy of consolidation and pacification; that is to say, by the signatures given by Germany at Locarno, the Nationalist policy of the Reich has been repudiated and with it all thoughts of *revanche*. This implies the defeat of the Nationalist policy of the Nationalist Germans of Central Europe, especially of Austria and Czechoslovakia, who have always been in close touch with the Nationalists within the Reich, and it will also be a discouragement for the Magyar Nationalists operating under the style of legitimists and Greater Magyars.

6. Locarno has confirmed the observation made by President Masaryk to the effect that post-war conditions necessitated for all nations of Europe a

¹ H.M. Minister at Prague.

² The Austrian-Czechoslovak political agreement of December 16, 1921, printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 114, pp. 614-16, included provisions for arbitration. The Polish-Czechoslovak arbitration treaty of April 23, 1925, is printed *op. cit.*, vol. 122, pp. 333-9.

policy of understanding and partnership and solidarity, developing gradually into a United States of Europe.

7. In a leader entitled 'The Real Peace Treaty,' the 'Prager Tagblatt' observes that the fact that England and even theoretically France can in a given case become the ally of Germany is characteristic of the new spirit in Europe. It is true, however, that in this case the Ministers are ahead of their peoples, and it was public opinion in some of the countries at home that made the difficulties in the conclusion of the treaties. England had her insular politicians, France her partisans of sanctions, Germany her Nationalists, and Czechoslovakia and Poland their Germanophobes, and the most complicated passages in the treaties have been put into that form out of consideration for critics at home.

8. Benes's³ great success is that the Rhine Pact does not prevent the French from bringing immediate help to Czechoslovakia. Benes made good use of article 15 of the League of Nations Covenant, and so he need not fear the judgment of the Czech Nationalists. In any case, not even the most radical of Germans dreams of invading Czechoslovakia, and the real importance of Locarno is that the friendly relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia are now confirmed, and more important than the Treaty of Arbitration is the fact that the spirit has come into being which insisted on being embodied in a written document of that kind. The eighth article of the Rhine Pact looks forward to the time when the spirit will be able to do without that body, and the kindly portfolios of Locarno will be consigned to an honourable place in the archives of past history. Not the least of the advantages brought by the treaty is the purpose to disarm which it consecrates. Disarmament will lead to economies in military expenditure, reductions in taxation and the devotion of more attention to cultural ideals.

9. The 'Venkov,' the organ of the Agrarians, writes:—

'We are pacifists and therefore we welcome every serious step on the way to consolidation. The conference at Locarno means for us the first step to this end, because through it the period of Germany's isolation is ended. It will also be an advance when Russia follows the example set by Germany and joins the European firm.'

Several papers emphasise the effect of the new orientation upon Russian politics. The Brno paper 'Lidove Noviny' says that the Soviet, or at least the Third International, have been speculating on a catastrophe. The influence of the International on the Russian Government will now probably collapse and the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs will certainly be obliged to give up its present propaganda and rhetoric and undertake a real policy. 'Pravo Lidu,' the organ of the Czech Social Democrats, says that Russia is the only country that loses as a result of Locarno. It is now diplomatically isolated and will be compelled to seek admission into the League of Nations.

10. The Czechoslovak Minister at Berlin reached Prague before the Minister for Foreign Affairs and explained the main points of the treaties

³ Dr. E. Benes was Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs.

to the local press. He is reported to have said it was of great importance to Czechoslovakia that her existing treaty with France⁴ should not be rendered nugatory by the Rhine Pact. This object has been attained. Witness article 2, paragraph[s] 2 and 3 of the Rhine Pact. In case of an action undertaken in pursuance of a resolution of the Assembly or Council of the League of Nations, or in case of an action arising out of article 15, paragraph 7, article 2 of the Rhine Pact has no application. This article forbids Germany and France and Belgium to attack each other. If, however, the League of Nations is taking action against a member of the League, or if, in case of a League conciliation process, the report of the Council is not unanimously adopted, members of the League statutorily obtain liberty to act against an attacking State. For instance, France, in the hypothesis of Germany being the aggressor, may invade the neutralised zone without a breach of the Rhine Pact. It was in order to make this clear that the Treaty of Guarantee between France and Czechoslovakia was concluded. This treaty is mentioned in the final protocol; since Germany has approved this protocol, it has admitted that the French-Czechoslovak Treaty is not in contradiction to the Rhine Pact. The German-Czechoslovakian and German-Polish Arbitration Treaties are integral treaties which find application in all political questions. The whole complex of the treaties forms a single whole. The Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Guarantee was necessary as a supplementary treaty to the old alliance because France no longer has the free hand that she had before. The preamble to the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty deserves attention; whereas article 2 of the Rhine Pact says that the parties will in no case resort to war, the preamble of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty speaks only of the mutual will to preserve peace. Some conversations were held at Locarno regarding the text of this preamble. It appears that the Czechoslovak point of view was not given expression in the form originally intended.

11. The 'Ceske Slovo,' the organ of Dr. Benes's party, expresses its pride in him as its political leader, and goes on to observe:—

'The Treaty of Locarno has for us also a great significance in our internal politics. The German Republic, in fact, solemnly declares in the treaty that it will not lend its support to German irredentism in our country. It does not refuse to support its countrymen, but Germany has done with the Baorans [*sic*], the Lodgmans⁵ and company. It is no betrayal; it is only a proper understanding of the duty of a country to its neighbour.'

12. In fact, I anticipate that the effect on the mentality of the German

⁴ See No. 1, note 24.

⁵ Dr. Baeran, former German Nationalist deputy for Brno (Brünn), had been sentenced, in January 1923, to four years' penal servitude for espionage. Dr. Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, who had been head of the provisional government of German Bohemia in 1918, was a leader of the German National party in the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies. Sir G. Clerk subsequently reported in his despatch No. 381 the decision, in the aftermath of the Czechoslovak elections of November 15, 1925, of Dr. Lodgman, 'the most rigid opponent of any understanding with the Czechs, to retire from public life'.

minorities in this country of the new policy inaugurated at Locarno will be interesting to watch. The Germans here undoubtedly suffer from certain real grievances; some of them, however, are largely imaginary, and the greatest ground for the *malaise* in which they live is undoubtedly their disability hitherto to make up their minds that they are now an integral part of the Czechoslovak Republic, and that they will certainly be so permanently. They have always had, at the back of their minds, the vague hope that the Treaty of Versailles and the other treaties which ended the Great War might come, before very long, to be revised, and this has continually given them the idea that one day they might find the Czechoslovak-German frontier redrawn so as to include them within the Reich.

13. They are reported to have addressed to the German Government before and during the conference memorials and appeals begging and warning them not to conclude at Locarno any treaty with Czechoslovakia which should eternalise the present frontier. It is true that the Treaty of Versailles needed no confirmation in this respect, but they hoped that the pacts resulting from the negotiations at Locarno might, by not confirming the Treaty of Versailles, be found to weaken it. The text of the treaties, which is now available to them, and especially article 1, paragraph 2, of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty, will have dashed their hopes.

14. It is hardly too much to say that the German minority would, in their present frame of mind, have preferred to continue to have in Germany a neighbour who should not be on most cordial terms with Czechoslovakia, a powerful neighbour to whom they could always appeal and of whose intervention the Czechoslovak Government should always be apprehensive. Relations between the countries have for a long time been correct, but if the Locarno treaties, as everyone else hopes, improve the atmosphere of correctness into one of cordiality, the mentality of the German minority will have to undergo a change. In the atmosphere of mutual friendliness, the Czechoslovak Government may be expected to treat their German nationals more sympathetically, and the latter, not constantly having their eyes fixed on Berlin, will be driven to change their attitude to one of acquiescence at least, if not active co-operation, in the life of this State. They will see that the present international situation in Europe is likely to be of long duration, and they will have to address themselves to life with this as their background.

15. The situation was well summed up in anticipation of the issue now happily realised by the general *rapporteur* for the budget in a debate on the budget in the Senate on the 13th instant. He said:—

‘The pact or guarantee with Germany will have a good influence upon you also, gentlemen (turning to the German Senators). Your obsession will be dissipated. You will no longer hope that the treaties of peace may prove to be only a scrap of paper and that our State may one day become the victim of hostile neighbours. I hope that in coming generations a different outlook may be adopted by the German citizens, and that it

will be possible then to speak of co-operation with them to the common weal of the whole State.⁶

I have, &c.,
GEORGE R. CLERK

⁶ Mr. Howard Smith of the Central Department minuted on October 28 that 'if the Locarno spirit is to prevail the Czechs must make some concessions to their Germans otherwise their mentality will hardly alter much'. Sir W. Tyrrell added his initials on October 29.

No. 15

Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 284 Telegraphic: by bag [C 13127/13120/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 22, 1925, 7.30 p.m.

Lord Kilmarnock's telegram No. 35.¹

Personal for Briand.

I urged this proposal on Monsieur Briand and President of Council. Both were sympathetic. Action on lines proposed by Lord Kilmarnock will give immediate and valued proof of all that was implied in Briand's generous declaration. I wish initiative to remain with him as at Locarno. I beg him therefore to propose at once to Brussels and London that we should forthwith intimate through our Ambassadors at Berlin that we are prepared to agree at once to re-appointment of a Reichs-kommissar at Coblenz. To give full effect to this announcement and to carry out his policy in our own way I should like him to propose at the same time that we three governments instruct our High Commissioners at Coblenz to discuss with Reichs-kommissar, as soon as appointed, the character of the changes which Locarno makes possible in the civil administration and the ordinances governing the occupied territory.

This seems to me at once the quickest and best method of dealing with these questions. We refused and must continue to refuse Stresemann's proposal for a joint commission but I should like to see our High Commissioners prepare ground for governments by discussion with Reichs-kommissar much as jurists in London prepared ground for Ministers at Locarno. I would keep discussion on same informal footing. Governments would reserve the final decision for themselves but probable result would be agreement on many points which governments could at once accept.

Repeat to Briand that I shall be hard pressed to declare concessions by opinion here, but that I believe that it is easier for French government to initiate concessions than to accept them from others and that in the nature of the case an initiative by France is worth in German eyes double at least the same concessions coming from us.

I willingly resign the leadership in this matter to France while he directs

¹ For this telegram from Colonel Ryan see No. 12, note 3.

her foreign policy for I know the largeness of his views, but I beg him to act rapidly.

I am repeating this telegram to Brussels for the confidential information of His Majesty's Ambassador, whom I will instruct to support the French initiative as soon as it is made.

Addressed to Paris No. 284 (by bag); repeated to Coblenz No. 27, Brussels No. 106, Berlin No. 205 and Rome No. 291 in cypher.

No. 16

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

*No. 1898 [C 13379/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 22, 1925

My Lord,

The French Ambassador¹ asked me to give him an appointment to-day, and I thought it well in these circumstances to invite the German Ambassador to come and see me also.

I took the opportunity of repeating my thanks to Herr Sthamer² for the message³ which he had delivered to me at Victoria Station from the Chancellor and Dr. Stresemann.

I then talked to him of the impression made upon me by the German representatives at the conference, of my pleasure in the nature of our co-operation and of my conviction that the work of the Locarno Conference had laid the foundation for a new Europe. It was a pleasure also to tell him of my admiration for the way in which Dr. Stresemann and the Chancellor had presented the German case, and to pay a just tribute to them and to M. Briand for the perfect tact with which the whole discussion had been conducted. I told his Excellency that he and I had sometimes had rather difficult and painful interviews, but I hoped that henceforth all our relations were going to be of the character of those which I had with the members of the German Government at Locarno.

Herr Sthamer replied in the same spirit, and then the conversation passed by a natural transition to the practical consequences to be drawn from the work that was done there, and to the urgency of very early action to translate into facts the accords which we had made.

I was able to tell Herr Sthamer that I had already set to work in this direction, that I knew that M. Briand was doing the same, and that I could speak with as much confidence of his determination to give immediate effect to the new relationship as of my own; but Herr Sthamer must not expect everything to happen at once. Time, and it might be much time, would be

¹ M. de Fleuriau: for his conversation with Mr. Chamberlain, see No. 17.

² German Ambassador in London.

³ Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

needed to develop all the consequences of the Treaty of Locarno, and the German Government must help us just as we were trying to help them.⁴

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁴ In an unnumbered personal telegram of October 23 to Lord D'Abernon, Mr. Chamberlain stated: 'I do not complain of what the German delegates have said so far. . . . Warn them in the most friendly way that Briand's power to act may well be in exact proportion to their continence of speech.' In a further private telegram, No. 209 to Berlin of October 24, Mr. Chamberlain again instructed Lord D'Abernon 'to warn the Germans against pushing us too far'.

No. 17

Letter from Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

[F. O. 800/258]

Private and Personal

October 22, 1925

My dear Crewe,

I forget whether I told you that I had some talk with Quiñones de Leon¹ on the platform of the Gare du Nord about the consequences of Germany's entry into the League, and that by way of ascertaining how the Spanish Government stood I said to him that my hope was that the meeting of the Assembly to admit Germany would be purely formal, and that any question of other changes in the Council would stand over till the annual meeting next Autumn.

Quiñones at once replied that this would place him in a most difficult position. We owe too much to his friendly attitude on the Mosul dispute² for me not to feel obliged to yield to such a statement of his wishes; but if Spain as well as Germany are now given permanent seats on the Council the whole question of the composition of the Council will be opened. There is the claim of Brazil, and worse still there is the claim of Poland. I should like to see Poland come in presently as the holder of one of the temporary seats in place of some other Power which has held such a seat for a long time and which is due for retirement; but I am personally very averse from introducing Poland at the moment when Germany joins, lest it should wear the air of an attempt on our part to build up a party within the Council against Germany.

I took the opportunity of Fleuriau's call this afternoon to ask him to ascertain in the most informal manner possible what Monsieur Briand's views were. I said that I should like to know them before I discussed this question, as I must, with my colleagues in the Cabinet. Monsieur de Fleuriau, who is going to Paris on Saturday,³ said that he would take an opportunity of speaking to Monsieur Briand on the subject.

Yrs sincerely,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ Spanish Ambassador at Paris and Spanish Delegate to the League of Nations.

² For the question of Mosul see Chapter V, *passim*.

³ October 24, 1925.

No. 18

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received October 24, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 354 Telegraphic: by bag [C 13430/13120/18]

PARIS, October 23, 1925

Your telegram No. 284.¹ (Lord Kilmarnock's telegram No. 35).²

I gave the gist of your telegram fully to the President of the Council [*sic*]³ to-day, with a short note explaining exactly what you ask him to do. He greatly appreciated your wish that the initiative in this matter should be with him, and admitted that he was *plus engagé* because, at Locarno, though speaking personally, he had practically pledged his government to undertake some modifications in the occupied territory.

He quite agrees that the early re-appointment of a Reichs-Kommissar at Coblenz will be a useful concession to German opinion, and he concurs with your belief that the High Commissioners can perform much the same sort of work as the jurists did before Locarno. He also quite understood the need for rapid action. He had already given instructions for careful consideration by the officials of the exact functions of the German Commissioner, while entirely agreeing that the German proposal for a joint commission is quite impracticable.

¹ No. 15.

² See No. 12, note 3.

³ The reference is presumably to M. Briand. M. Painlevé did not attend the Locarno Conference.

No. 19

Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 3481 [C 13264/2/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 23, 1925

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 2399¹ of the 14th July, I have to inform you that His Majesty's Government have given further consideration to the question of the area to which the British army on the Rhine should be moved after the evacuation of the Cologne zone, and they have reached the conclusion that in all the circumstances it will be preferable for the British army to be transferred to the Wiesbaden area. As your Lordship is aware, there were reasons which at one time inclined His Majesty's Government to favour Coblenz in preference to Wiesbaden, but they have decided to abandon the idea in view of the difficulties that would in that event arise from the necessity of inviting the High Commission and French troops to leave Coblenz. His Majesty's Government do not doubt that the French authorities, for their part, will meet their views as to the extent of the area to

¹ Not printed.

be allotted to the British troops at Wiesbaden. You will recollect that this matter was mentioned to the French delegation at Locarno, who undertook to do all that they properly could to see that our wishes were met.

2. I request that you will now raise this question in the Ambassadors' Conference and invite them to take a decision on the matter. The procedure that has suggested itself to His Majesty's Government is that the conference should decide in the first instance on the principle of the zone to be taken over by the British army, and should then refer the matter to the Inter-Allied Military Committee of Versailles, who will, after consulting the Allied High Command in the Rhineland, submit proposals as to the precise division of areas.

3. Certain further questions will at the same time arise; detailed arrangements will be necessary for evacuating the troops from the Cologne zone and settling them in their new areas, and, again, for liquidating the civil side of the occupation. On the military side, you will recollect that the Ambassadors' Conference agreed on the 5th August last that the Versailles Committee should be considered as the competent military authority to be entrusted with the task of making arrangements for the evacuation of the Cologne zone. It will no doubt now be well to remind the committee of that decision and to instruct them to set to work without further delay on the necessary military arrangements in conjunction with the Rhineland High Commission and the High Command.

4. On the civil side, I would draw your attention to Lord Kilmarnock's despatch No. 283¹ of the 1st August, a copy of which accompanied my despatch No. 2750² of the 14th August. You will observe that Lord Kilmarnock reported that the chief measures which required to be taken by the High Commission and the armies were—

- (a) The disposal of the prisoners undergoing sentences passed by the military courts and by the German courts for offences against the ordinances.
- (b) The disposal of pending cases.
- (c) The handing over to the German authorities of the premises occupied by the Allies.
- (d) The assessment by the local commission of claims falling under article 6 of the Rhineland Agreement.
- (e) The settlement of claims in respect of contributions under articles 8–12 either by agreement locally or by decision of the Arbitration Commission set up under the Financial Regulations for Contributions under articles 8–12.

5. It would be desirable for the Ambassadors' Conference to inform the High Commission of the instructions given to the Versailles Committee, and to invite them, in co-operation with that body, to make such arrangements as may be necessary to liquidate the civil side of the occupation of the Cologne zone.

6. Further, I am in full agreement with the view expressed by Lord Kilmarnock in his aforementioned despatch that it will be desirable before the

² Not preserved in Foreign Office Archives.

evacuation to obtain from the German Government an understanding similar to the amnesty provisions of the London Agreement³ that no action of any nature will be taken against persons on account of services rendered to the Allies. I request that you will invite your colleagues to consider the desirability of obtaining in due course some such assurance from the German Government.⁴

7. Lastly, there are certain points which may be raised by your colleagues in connection with the evacuation of the Cologne zone. These are the enforcement of various decisions taken by the Allies in the past regarding the execution of articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, e.g., demolition of fortifications and railways. Some of these decisions foreshadowed action before the Cologne zone was evacuated; others before the second and third zones were evacuated; others, again, such as the prohibition of certain projected railway lines, were to last indefinitely. You should refrain from raising these matters yourself, but if they are brought up before the conference you should state the position frankly as I now see it. The whole situation has been fundamentally affected by the initialling of the treaties of Locarno, and I feel convinced that M. Briand will share my view that to insist now upon a series of destructions in the Rhineland, more especially in cases where economic loss would be involved, would be wholly unreasonable in view of conciliation to which both he and I have given expression in our conversations with the Chancellor and Dr. Stresemann. In any case, there can be no question of delaying the evacuation of the Cologne zone pending consideration of such matters. Should the need arise, I request that you will speak personally to M. Briand on these lines.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

³ i.e. Article 7 of the Agreement of August 30, 1924 (cf. No. 1, note 4) printed as item No. 2 in Cmd. 2259 of 1924.

⁴ Lord Crewe acted on the preceding instructions in a note communicated on October 26 to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (copy received in the Foreign Office under cover of Paris formal despatch No. 2258).

No. 20

Mr. Peters¹ (Moscow) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received November 2)

No. 732 [N 6110/6027/38]

MOSCOW, October 23, 1925

Sir,

The signature [*sic*] of the Treaties at Locarno might have been expected to be the subject of active comment in the Soviet Union. In point of fact

¹ Mr. W. Peters, Commercial Secretary for Russia and Siberia, was in charge of H.M. Mission in Moscow during the absence of Sir R. Hodgson, H.M. Chargé d'Affaires. Sir R. Hodgson had received this appointment in accordance with the terms of the British note of February 1, 1924, according *de jure* recognition to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This note is printed in *Survey of International Affairs 1924* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1928), p. 491.

surprisingly little has been said to indicate the possible effects of the Treaties on Soviet foreign policy. A good deal is said about the general results of the Treaties so far as Europe as a whole is concerned: no hint is given of the effect on the Soviet Union or of what the Soviet Government is going to do about it.

As to the general result of the Conference it is everywhere hailed as a great victory for Great Britain, who is represented as emerging as the ruler of the destinies of Europe, although certainly a ruler who herself rules as an instrument of American capital. The general line of argument will be seen from the attached summaries² of political leading articles in Soviet Press.

Soviet foreign policy is purely opportunist. Having failed in the attempt to maintain dissension in Western Europe the Soviet Government now finds itself isolated and will presumably choose between (a) coming to an arrangement with Europe which, if the Soviet interpretation of the situation is sincere, will mean coming to some arrangement with Great Britain, and (b) turning from the West to the East, which would mean a strengthening of the Communist International point of view as expressed by M. Zinoviev³ (see my despatch No. 721⁴ of October 22nd). The developments in China which are reported in to-day's press⁵ may well mean a postponement of the decision regarding future policy.

I have to admit that I can do no more than speculate as to possibilities: I cannot penetrate the screen of secrecy behind which Soviet policy is framed and a prophet deserves no honour in the Soviet Union.

I have, &c.,

WILLIAM PETERS

² Not printed. The summaries were of articles from *Izvestiya* and *Pravda* of October 18, 1925, and from *Izvestiya* of October 21.

³ M. G. Zinoviev was President of the Third or Communist International (Comintern).

⁴ Not preserved in Foreign Office Archives.

⁵ The reference was probably to the launching of a movement against the Peking Government of Marshal Tuan Chi-jui by Marshal Wu Pei-fu, former Inspector-General of Chihli, Shantung and Honan.

No. 21

Colonel Ryan (Coblentz) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received October 25, 9 a.m.)

No. 37 Telegraphic [C 13499/13120/18]

COBLENZ, October 24, 1925, 6 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

The proposed conditions which appear not unreasonable came to me as an agreeable surprise, as in conversations during past few days my French

¹ Not printed. This telegram of October 24 reported that the French Deputy High Commissioner had informed Colonel Ryan and his Belgian colleague that morning of his government's attitude towards the appointment of a German Commissioner for the occupied territory: see No. 23.

colleague (and my Belgian colleague to a lesser extent) wished to hedge in activities of Reichs-Kommissar with numerous restrictions.

Though the three High Commissioners are in agreement as to return of Reichs-Kommissar there is a difference of opinion as to when he should return. French deputy High Commissioner considers allied governments might well inform German government now that they will receive him but that he should only actually take up his post when Germany has proved her goodwill by ratification of Locarno treaties. I argued that while from general point of view I thought the sooner he entered upon his duties the better, it was for allied governments to decide the moment of his return.

Although I do not think any formal decision of High Commission is necessary now that each High Commissioner has expressed his agreement in principle, I felt such a decision might hasten matters and I therefore pressed my colleagues to take it to-day. It was precisely for that reason that they refused, the absence of Monsieur Tirard in Paris being only ostensible reason.

French deputy High Commissioner is I think without definite instructions and is afraid of committing himself.²

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 37. Sent to Berlin, Brussels and Paris.

² Colonel Ryan was informed in a letter of October 26 from Mr. Troutbeck of Central Department of the following minute by Mr. Chamberlain:

'Lord Kilmarnock told me his doctors report was discouraging.

'If he is able to go back he knows my views—If not, let the Acting High Com^r. know that H.M.G. have chosen the policy of Locarno; that this means confidence; & tho' I will not break with France, I will go as far as France will go & will urge France to go as far as possible &, if need be, a bit further. These are his sailing orders.'

No. 22

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received October 24, 10 p.m.)

No. 358 Telegraphic [C 13493/13120/18]

PARIS, October 24, 1925, 6.30 p.m.

Repeated to Coblenz, Brussels, Berlin, Rome.

Your telegram No. 284.¹

I have just received a private letter from Monsieur Briand stating that he this morning sent instructions to London and Brussels for a joint *démarche* as to re-establishment of Reichscommissar, and informed French Ambassador in Berlin.

As regards your suggestion that the Allied High Commissioners should at once enter into discussion with the Reichs Commission as to 'modifications' Monsieur Briand expressed the view that Allied High Commissioners should in the first place reach agreement together in order to carry out the

¹ No. 15.

principle that the decisions come to may appear as due to French initiative and not to negotiation.²

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 358.

² Colonel Ryan stated in Coblenz telegram No. 38 of October 26: 'From practical standpoint Monsieur Briand's proposal that High Commissioners should first reach an agreement seems to me acceptable. It is probable some weeks will elapse before Reich-Kommissar arrives in Coblenz and High Commissioners can make use of this time by drawing up proposals for submission to allied governments. But before any final decisions are taken, I feel it most desirable that some consultation with Reich-Kommissar should take place both to assist allies in working out details of modifications to be made and to assure at least that the wishes of population will be taken into consideration, a procedure which I feel sure will be appreciated.'

No. 23

Note communicated by the French Ambassador

[C 13502/13120/18]*

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, LONDRES, le 24 octobre 1925

L'Ambassadeur de France a été chargé de faire connaître à son Excellence le Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères les vues du Gouvernement français en ce qui concerne le rétablissement du Commissariat du Reich auprès de la Haute-Commission des Territoires rhénans.

Le Gouvernement français est dès maintenant disposé à envisager cette éventualité: elle constitue à ses yeux une mesure de détente s'inspirant de l'état d'esprit qui doit résulter de la Conférence de Locarno.

Cette mesure devrait, toutefois, comporter une certaine contre-partie. La collaboration du nouveau Commissaire d'Empire devra être loyalement acquise aux Hauts-Commissaires alliés dans le règlement des difficultés inhérentes au régime d'occupation, et il devra se garder, comme on avait eu trop souvent à le déplorer auparavant, d'apporter un encouragement à la résistance des populations aux règlements des autorités alliées.

Il devra également s'employer à mettre un terme à l'activité des associations nationalistes, dans l'intérêt de l'ordre public et de la sécurité des troupes d'occupation.

D'autre part, le rétablissement du Commissariat d'Empire ne devra pas avoir pour effet d'empêcher le contact direct entre la Haute-Commission et les autorités locales allemandes pour le règlement des affaires de leur compétence.

Le caractère de 'liaison' que doivent revêtir les relations entre le Commissaire du Reich et les autorités alliées a été déjà envisagé au cours d'une conversation récente entre l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et M. Berthelot.

Enfin, le Gouvernement français est en droit de compter que des instructions seront données aux autorités administratives allemandes en vue de l'établissement de relations correctes et courtoises avec les autorités alliées.

Le représentant français à Coblenz a, dès maintenant, été mis en mesure de s'entretenir de cette question avec ses collègues alliés.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de Mr. Austen Chamberlain, M. de Fleuriau a été chargé de lui exprimer le vœu que des instructions fussent adressées à l'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Berlin en vue d'une démarche concertée avec ses collègues de France et de Belgique.

L'Ambassadeur de France saisit, &c.

No. 24

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received October 26, 9.30 a.m.)

No. 110 Telegraphic [N 5974/188/55]

WARSAW, October 25, 1925, 1.21 a.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me this morning whether I had seen communiqué about optants adding that Polish government had taken this step in the hope of strengthening the atmosphere created at Locarno. They could not bargain their political right under Vienna convention against some economic advantage in a commercial treaty but they had approval even of Poznanian deputies in making concessions as an act of grace. They did not even ask for (? reciprocity) though they hoped for it and they had not renounced their right but only suspended its exercise, though Minister for Foreign Affairs added he did not see how it could now ever be enforced.

In reply to my enquiry Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that economic committee of Cabinet had decided yesterday to endeavour to expedite commercial negotiations with Germany, fresh instructions of a conciliatory nature had been given to Polish delegate.

I told His Excellency that you would hear of this with pleasure as you were most anxious that no opportunity should be lost of improving the relations between Poland and Germany.

Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to resolution of German Nationalist Party not to vote for treaty of Locarno on the ground that it was opposed to the essential needs of the German people² but agreed with me that this was probably bluff with the object of extracting concessions from British and French governments.

As to position here question of Locarno agreements would not come before

¹ Not printed. This telegram of October 24 stated: 'Official communiqué published this morning announces that Polish government have decided not to proceed with expulsion of German optants who under terms of Vienna agreement [cf. No. 6, note 2] had to leave Poland by August 1st or November 1st of the present year. Pending any further decision by the government these persons so far as their right to remain in Poland is concerned will be treated like any other German citizen.' In reply to this telegram, Mr. Chamberlain instructed Sir W. Max Muller on October 26, in Foreign Office telegram No. 61 to Warsaw, to inform Count Skrzynski of His Majesty's Government's great satisfaction at this news.

² This resolution of October 21 had been reported by Lord D'Abernon in Berlin telegram No. 381 of October 22.

Diet till after signature but to judge from discussion in foreign relations committee, there appeared to be a large majority both in Diet and in the country in favour of them and he had no doubt as to their ratification. So far as he could tell only opposition would come from extreme right and extreme left.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 110, repeated to Berlin.

No. 25

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received October 26, 9 a.m.)

No. 388 Telegraphic [C 13519/13120/18]

BERLIN, October 25, 1925, 9.20 p.m.

Your telegram No. 210.¹

French Ambassador has been informed of proposed action regarding appointment of Reichs-Kommissar but has not yet received orders to make a communication to German government.

While I am strongly for action proposed I advocate delaying communication till a moment when it will produce a maximum effect. In present turmoil it might pass without adequate notice. At a slightly later day the appointment of a Reichs-Kommissar and a decision regarding Cologne may solve the crisis.²

¹ Not printed. This telegram of October 24 was a message from Mr. Lampson giving Lord D'Abernon discretion to act in the sense subsequently authorised in No. 26.

² Mr. Chamberlain, who left London on October 26 to attend a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in Paris, replied in a telegram of the same day to Berlin, repeated as Paris telegram No. 367 to the Foreign Office (not preserved in Foreign Office Archives). According to the docket he stated that 'general policy is to proceed with measures contemplated without regard to German crisis and Monsieur Briand agrees with this step'. The precise moment when the communication regarding the Reichs-Kommissar should be made was left to the discretion of Lord D'Abernon and his French colleague.

No. 26

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 211 Telegraphic [C 13502/13120/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 26, 1925, 12 noon

French Ambassador's note of October 24th¹ respecting Reichskommissar of which copy was posted to you on October 24th.

You are authorised to join your French and Belgian colleagues in the proposed communication to German government as well as in any other measures of a conciliatory character which French government may at any time propose. I give you these general instructions in order that no delay may at any time be caused owing to your having to refer to London.

¹ No. 23.

Please make personal communication from me to Chancellor and Stresemann saying that they will see that Briand and I are acting at once in spirit of our Locarno declarations; that I count on them with confidence to do their part and thus facilitate our task. I know that the treaty of Locarno will be ratified, for no nation could afford to draw down upon itself the universal indignation that would follow the rejection of this great act of oblivion and reconciliation. But I am disturbed by irreconcilable attitude of a section of German people and press which renders every concession on our part unnecessarily difficult and if continued may well prevent us from giving to Germany and the Rhineland all the relief we wish.

Addressed to Berlin No. 211, repeated to Coblenz No. 29, Paris No. 292, Brussels No. 109² and Rome No. 301.

² Sir G. Grahame was instructed in Foreign Office telegram No. 110 to Brussels of October 26 to 'take any action you think fit to support French proposal'.

No. 27

Sir W. Tyrrell¹ to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 212 Telegraphic [C 13497/459/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 26, 1925, 7.30 p.m.

My telegram No. 211² (of the 26th October. Alleviations resulting from Locarno).

When speaking to Chancellor and Dr. Stresemann you might remind them that in private conversation at Locarno Dr. Stresemann told me that the Nationalists represented what was best in Germany and were in fact Germany. He gave this as a reason why we should do what would satisfy them of our *bona fides* and rally them to support the treaty of Locarno.

Count Westarp³ and his friends are doing all they can to prove to the French and British public that any idea of reconciliation is a dream, and that the Germany that counts does not want peace and desires to bring to nought our efforts to promote it. Are there not enough good men in the Nationalist camp to save the Rhineland and free Cologne? That is the question of the moment.

Addressed to Berlin No. 212. Repeated to Paris No. 295 (By Bag), Coblenz No. 30, Brussels No. 111 (by bag), and Rome No. 302.⁴

¹ This telegram was sent in accordance with instructions given by Mr. Chamberlain before his departure for Paris.

² No. 26.

³ A leading member of the German National People's Party.

⁴ Lord D'Abernon replied on October 27 in Berlin telegram No. 14 to Paris (393 to the Foreign Office) that he had heard that 'an influential section of Prussian aristocracy is dissatisfied with recent action regarding Locarno and contemplates founding a new party'. On November 11, Lord D'Abernon reported in his telegram No. 436 that a declaration had been published in support of the Government's policy 'signed by a large number of influential territorial magnates and by leaders of important industrial concerns'.

No. 28

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received October 27)
*No. 2266 [C 13587/459/18]**

PARIS, October 26, 1925

His Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note of a conversation with the German Ambassador at Paris on the 26th October.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 28

*Note of a Conversation between Lord Crewe and the German Ambassador at Paris
on October 26, 1925*

The German Ambassador asked to come and see me this morning, and said that he wished to give me an account of his recent visit to Berlin, whence he returned on Saturday, the 24th October. He had seen practically everybody of importance there, and was therefore able to describe clearly the position as it is at this moment.

Both the Chancellor and Herr von Stresemann are absolutely firm for the pact, and are prepared to stand or fall by it; but it will be impossible for them to carry it through unless the German people receive in good time a definite assurance that the modifications in existing conditions which were foreshadowed at Locarno are clearly set out as soon as possible and are in a way to be carried into effect. A failure on the part of the former Allied Powers to satisfy these conditions could only have one of two results, either the two German statesmen would have to abandon the policy of conciliation altogether or, if they adhered to it, they would fall and disappear with it. That is to say that, unless the modifications are announced in good time and their early operation is assured, there would be no prospect of the German representative coming to London on the 1st December.

The Ambassador told me, in strict confidence, that he had seen Marshal Hindenburg,¹ who, in the first instance, was not disposed to regard the pact with favour, but that, later, he had been persuaded that it ought to be accepted, and he would no doubt give it his support. The importance of this fact needed no emphasis. As regards the Nationalists, it was impossible to say what their ultimate attitude would be; it would, of course, be greatly preferable if unanimous agreement could be reached in the Reichstag, in which, it was safe to say, the pact would be carried if the conditions of which he had spoken were fulfilled, and if they were fully carried out unanimity was not altogether impossible.

He had had conversations with M. Briand and M. Berthelot, whom he found generally inclined to meet the German views, and also a very long one with M. Tirard, who was disposed to create all manner of difficulties, though

¹ President of Germany.

even he thought that something might be done in the Rhineland. The two former had frankly approved the appointment of a German High Commissioner, but the Ambassador wished to point out to me the urgency of this concession, and pressed that the nomination might be authorised in a week from now. In addition to this nothing would affect German opinion more agreeably than a change in the system of delegations;² the interference of these officials with the German system of local government creates a perpetual sore which is painfully felt in the occupied territory.

The Ambassador then passed to the matter of a reduced garrison in consequence of the evacuation of the Cologne zone. He said that it was in some ways a strange position that the conclusion of a pact between the different Powers involved should leave part of the territory of one of them in the military occupation of the others. I replied that it was undoubtedly a paradox, but it was a paradox that had to be accepted by everybody, because nobody supposed that the agreements reached at Locarno could involve the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles. The Ambassador agreed that this is so, but that in practice much could be done to remove the anomaly by considerate action on the part of the occupying Powers. It had been hoped by Germany that the military force might be reduced to something like the level of that of the German garrisons before the war; he had found M. Berthelot inclined to be yielding in this direction, but M. Briand had said that the views of his military advisers, and also popular opinion in France, would render any large concessions in this matter very difficult.

As to disarmament, Herr von Hoesch trusted that, in their reply to the German note,³ the Ambassadors' Conference would on no account ask for

² Of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission to the German local authorities.

³ This note of October 23 in reply to the Allied note of June 4 (see No. 7, note 4) is printed as item No. 1 in Cmd. 2527 of 1925. The War Office transmitted the comments of the General Staff upon this note in a letter of October 26 to the Foreign Office. There were no adverse comments upon Lists 1 and 2 attached to the German note, namely 'Demands Fulfilled' and 'Demands which will be Fulfilled by November 15 next', though the General Staff considered that Nos. 19 and 20 in List 2, 'Illegal enlistments' and 'Prohibition of Training of reserve officers' were 'important and complete satisfaction should be insisted upon'. On Nos. '20. Import and export of war material' and '21. Possession of, trading in, and illicit manufacture of war material' in List 3, namely 'Demands, the Execution of which will be Assured by November 15 next', the General Staff commented: 'No progress made to date. This question devolves on whether the Control list of war material or the list included in the Geneva Arms Traffic Convention is to be taken as the authority in deciding this matter. It is now being considered by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, and the General Staff are of opinion that this question should be decided by the Conference of Ambassadors.' Cf. No. 111.

On list 4 'Demands, the Execution of which involves Special Difficulties' the General Staff commented:

'1. ["Police. Titles of the higher officials. Rules for personnel. Barracks."] The abolition of military titles should be insisted upon. Military titles for police officers are quite unnecessary, undoubtedly foster a militarist spirit, and are not in use in the police of other Powers. It is probable that, given a reasonable attitude on the part of our allies and the Germans, the whole police question can be satisfactorily settled.

'2. ["High Command".] The difficulty is understood to be the title to be held by General

any specific conditions, but would confine themselves to a hope that further discussion would produce settlement on the few points still outstanding. He added confidentially that that of the high command presents peculiar difficulty, owing to the position of General von Seeckt, whose personal authority might be seriously affected by any adverse decision.

von Seeckt. The General Staff have no objection to that of "Chef der Heeresleitung [Chief of the Army Command]", but consider that that of "Commander-in-chief" should be done away with. This is only insisting that the German system be made to conform to the practice of other Powers.

'3. ["Prohibition of training with certain weapons".] The General Staff consider this to be of importance; but, in view of the probable change in the relations between the Allies and Germany consequent on the Locarno Conference and of the fact that light machine guns and close support artillery are, when all is said and done, included in the normal armament of cavalry and infantry respectively in all modern armies, they suggest that a concession in this demand could now be made, provided that the total armament allowed to the Reichswehr is not thereby increased.

'4. ["Artillery arming of the fortress of Königsberg".] Although mobile heavy artillery is forbidden by the treaty, such artillery does, in fact, form part of all modern fortresses. In view of this and also of allowing to Germany an efficient fortress for defence against Russia, the General Staff consider that the German demands might now, as a concession to the new relationship referred to above, be acceded to, with the proviso that an undertaking is given that all mobile guns will be only employed for the defence of the fortress and not diverted for use as part of the artillery of the field army.

'5. ["Associations".] The French are understood to have demanded the abolition of all associations. The General Staff do not agree with this, and consider that, provided the German Government give an undertaking strictly to enforce the law prohibiting any connection between associations and the Reichswehr, this question could be considered as settled.

'(NOTE.—The demands contained in Nos. 1, 2 and 5 involve principles which the General Staff consider should not be waived. The concessions now suggested under headings Nos. 3 and 4 are distinct departures from the terms of the treaty and of the successive notes to the German Government. They are put forward as concessions to the new relationship promised by the Locarno Agreement. Incidentally, the General Staff have never believed that these restrictions, if imposed, could ever be enforced in perpetuity.)'

No. 29

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received October 27, 9 a.m.)

No. 391 Telegraphic [C 13654/35/18]

BERLIN, October 27, 1925, 1.25 a.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Ministerial crisis is considered as settled for the present: the three vacant ministries will be taken over by remaining ministers. The Chancellor undertakes Ministry of Finance.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram of October 26 Lord D'Abernon had reported the resignation from the German Government of the three Ministers from the German National People's Party, Dr. Schiele, Herr von Schlieben, and Dr. Neuhaus, Ministers of the Interior, Finance, and Economics respectively.

Dr. Stresemann is convinced that Pact is safe and will be carried through somehow, probably without a dissolution. He said that you could be quite confident on this point.

He added 'of course I count on the co-operation of the French and English Ministers and on a friendly attitude regarding Rhineland, disarmament Cologne etc'.

My opinion is that, while conciliatory action on these questions will be essential, concessions must be held up for a few days till the horizon is a little clearer and we are in presence of a German government with a definite programme for November and December.

Premature action might be mistaken for weakness and as an attempt to buy off German national opposition.

Addressed to Foreign Office, telegram No. 391. Repeated to Paris for Secretary of State.

No. 30

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Colonel Ryan (Coblenz)

No. 1 Telegraphic [C 13670/13120/18]

PARIS, October 27, 1925, 5 p.m.¹

Addressed to Coblenz No. 1.

Following from Mr. Austen Chamberlain.

I had a few words with Monsieur Tirard this morning when we discussed actual procedure to be followed in regard to policy of alleviation in the Rhineland.

We agreed that probably best scheme would be to have three stages, first to come into force at once, second though published now not to come into force until December 1st (date of signature of Locarno treaty) and third to come into force when treaty is actually ratified.

In agreeing generally to those proposals I told Monsieur Tirard of general instructions which I had issued to you namely, to deal with this whole question in largest and broadest spirit of conciliation. He would find you ready to respond at once to any French initiative and indeed in some cases even inclined to press for further concessions. But I was anxious that initiative in all this should *appear* to come from the French as I had already explained to Monsieur Briand.

Monsieur Tirard said he quite understood and would take immediate steps to put (? policy) into practice. He had it in mind to begin at once with the appointment of (? Reichs Kommissar).

Repeated to Berlin No. 6, Foreign Office No. 371, Brussels No. 1 and Rome No. 11.

¹ Time of repetition as No. 371 to the Foreign Office (received at 7.30 p.m. on October 27).

No. 31

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received October 28, 9 a.m.)

No. 395 Telegraphic [C 13718/13120/18]

BERLIN, October 27, 1925, 8.40 p.m.

Your telegram[s] No. 211 and No. 212.¹

I gave your message to Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs last night.

Both seemed determined to carry through the Pact and to be present in London on December 1st to sign.

The only difference between them is that the Chancellor attaches more importance to acquiring German nationals support and is more confident of obtaining it. Stresemann inclines rather to seek the assistance from the Centre and Left.

The future must decide which of these policies will be followed. For the moment important point is that German public should realize that delay in alleviation of conditions in the Rhineland and Cologne is the inevitable consequence of German nationals' attitude.

In private conversation Stresemann says 'Public here never understand details of any foreign question. Last year in Reparation discussion, only point they saw was that it would lead to evacuation of the Ruhr. This year the only point they care about in the Pact of Security is that it will lead to evacuation of Cologne, in improvement in conditions in the Rhineland—and they trust—to some alleviation under article 231.² As for the rest of the Pact they understand article 1 as little as article 6, in fact most of them have not read either one article or the other'.

¹ Nos. 26 and 27 respectively.

² Of the Treaty of Versailles.

No. 32

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 8 Telegraphic [C 13694/13120/18]

PARIS, October 27, 1925, 12 midnight¹

Addressed to Berlin No. 8, repeated to Foreign Office 376, Rome 12, Brussels 2, Coblenz 3.

Following from Secretary of State.

As I feared attitude of German nationalists is having worst effect here and greatly adding to Monsieur Briand's difficulties in securing approval for measures he contemplated in the Rhineland. It puts most dangerous weapon in the hands of military critics of Locarno Pact. Even for me it has immediate and most unfortunate reactions.

¹ Time of repetition as No. 376 to the Foreign Office (received at 9 a.m. on October 28).

Stresemann and Chancellor ought to know this. Nothing could help us more to carry out these measures of appeasement than decisive protest by more reasonable section of nationalists such as is indicated as possible in your telegram No. 14.² I do not understand subservience of nationalist ministers to demands which they know to be unreasonable and contrary to true interests of their country. The extreme nationalists apparently care less about evacuation of Cologne and alleviation of condition of their country³ in the rest of the Rhineland than they do about their party prospects.

² See No. 27, note 4.

³ It was suggested on the filed copy that this word should read 'countrymen'.

No. 33

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received October 28, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 374 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/5]

PARIS, October 27, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the presidency of Monsieur Jules Cambon.¹ I was present, as well as representatives of the Italian and Japanese Embassies. The Belgian Ambassador was also present and a representative of the United States Embassy.

2. The conference had under consideration the German Ambassador's note of October 23rd respecting the military disarmament of Germany (see your despatch No. 3518²) and also a British Embassy memorandum of October 26th (see my despatch No. 2258 of October 26th)³ respecting the arrangements consequent upon the approaching evacuation of the Cologne zone. This memorandum was drafted in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 3481⁴ of October 23rd.

3. All the members of the conference were agreed that the German note must be referred in the first instance to the Versailles Military Committee for the necessary technical examination. There was, however, a considerable divergence of opinion within the conference and particularly amongst the members of the French delegation as to the time which this examination would require. Marshal Foch pointed out that a complete examination might be a protracted one as the second and third lists of demands annexed to the German note concerned questions, the state of execution of which it would not, according to the Germans themselves, be possible to check before November 15th. The first list of demands annexed to the German note could indeed be checked immediately the President⁵ of the Military

¹ French representative on the Conference of Ambassadors.

² This covering despatch is not preserved in Foreign Office archives. For this German note cf. No. 28, note 3.

³ See No. 19, note 4.

⁴ No. 19.

⁵ General Walch of the French Army was President of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany.

Control Commission arrived in Paris on October 29th, and the fourth list could be discussed at the same time. Monsieur Laroche and Monsieur Massigli,⁶ who throughout the conference were obviously speaking for Monsieur Briand, demurred strongly to the Marshal's contentions and claimed that what was needed, if the spirit of the Locarno Conference was to be maintained, was above all a speedy reply to the German note. Even Monsieur Laroche, however, stated that the fourth list raised questions of considerable difficulty, e.g. the status of the police personnel.

4. In view of the attitude adopted by Monsieur Laroche, I refrained from openly contesting the Marshal's point of view, though indeed I pointed out that if it was accepted, there would very probably be no rejoicings in London on December 1st. I also stated that I was pretty certain that at Locarno there had been a general understanding that the Ambassadors' Conference would reply to the German note with not more than ten or twelve days' delay.

5. Eventually, the conference decided to refer the note to the Versailles Military Committee for technical examination, and it is understood that the committee will meet on October 30th, immediately after the arrival in Paris of the President of the Military Control Commission.

6. I have this afternoon impressed upon my military adviser the importance of obtaining the report of the Versailles Committee at the latest by the afternoon of November 1st in order that it may be forwarded to you by that evening's bag. He will do his utmost to obtain definite opinions on the first and fourth lists and some kind of statement regarding the second and third. I trust that you will, in such circumstances, be able to send me instructions to arrive not later than the morning of November 5th.

7. As regards the British Embassy's memorandum of October 26th, I did my best in accordance with your instructions, to secure a definite decision that Wiesbaden should in principle be the new area of occupation for the British army. But, in view particularly of the attitude of Monsieur Cambon, the most I could get was a decision that the Versailles Committee should cause the necessary arrangements to be studied by the military authorities in the Rhineland for the evacuation of the Cologne area and the transfer of the British army to Wiesbaden. General Clive⁷ will, in the Versailles Committee, press for the prosecution of this study with the least possible delay. No doubt the Commander-in-Chief of the British army of the Rhine will be advised of the urgency of the matter.

8. As regards the civil details of the occupation, it was decided in accordance with the proposal in the British Embassy's memorandum of October 26th to ask for a report from the Rhineland Commission, and I have no doubt that Lord Kilmarnock will, from Coblenz, do his best to see that it is produced without delay.

⁶ Director of Political and Commercial Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Secretary-General of the Conference of Ambassadors respectively.

⁷ Military Attaché in H.M. Embassy at Paris and British Representative on the Allied Military Committee of Versailles.

9. Taking advantage of the presence in Paris of Mr. Malkin⁸ and of the Belgian member of the legal committee, it was decided in the first instance to ask it for a report on the question of the amnesty (see last paragraph of British Embassy's memorandum of October 26th). Immediately this report is received, it will be communicated to the Rhineland Commission for their observations.

⁸ Assistant Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office.

No. 34

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received October 29)

No. 594 [N 6038/43/55]

BERLIN, October 27, 1925

Sir,

I have read with interest the various documents which discuss the possible neutralisation of East Prussia as a solution of the Polish Corridor question (see Sir William Max Muller's despatch No. 233¹ of 5th May and your despatch No. 1099 (C. 8063/459/18) of 16th June, 1925).²

2. I have also read Mr Cecil Dormer's³ despatch No. 128¹ of 30th September, stating that Vatican information is to the effect that Polish opposition to a modification of the present Corridor stipulations might be overcome by persistent pressure by France and England provided that that pressure was applied steadily and not too soon.⁴ The idea underlying the information from the Vatican is apparently that instead of the present arrangements, the Corridor and the port of Danzig or a portion of it should be neutralised.

3. I attribute the more importance to this suggestion [? in] that the solution indicated has unquestionably better chances of acceptance here than one consisting in the neutralisation of East Prussia. So far as I am able to judge, the latter proposal would meet with the most violent opposition in Germany. A suggestion to alienate Weimar could hardly encounter more bitter opposition.

4. Whatever the past history of East Prussia may be, it is now considered in German circles not only as an integral part of Germany but as one of the

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed. In this despatch Mr. Chamberlain concluded that suggestions for an alternative outlet to the sea for Poland at Memel and for the neutralization of East Prussia were both impracticable. Mr. Chamberlain considered that the object of British policy should be 'to change as little as possible unless and until existing arrangements prove unworkable'.

³ Mr. Dormer was First Secretary in H.M. Mission to the Holy See.

⁴ In a letter of October 19 to the Northern Department, Warsaw Chancery stated that they found it difficult to furnish observations on the preceding statement, which was attributed to the Polish Ambassador at the Vatican, as it would seem to show that he was 'entirely out of touch with opinions in his own country'. Warsaw Chancery suggested that this question should be allowed to rest in view of the more immediate problem of the reception likely to be given in Poland to the Locarno agreements.

most German of the component parts of the Reich. No peaceable solution can be found along lines which involve a severing of the ties between Germany and East Prussia.

5. Reverting to the Vatican statement, this may be said:—It is doubtful whether the neutralisation of the Corridor would willingly or in the first instance be accepted by Germany. The view taken would be that a tolerable situation—such as neutralisation of the Corridor—would be more likely to last than the prevailing condition, which is esteemed intolerable and, therefore, short-lived. As the neutralised Corridor might last, it would be wiser for Germany not to endorse it. A mediocre solution might stand in the way of a (to Germany) more satisfactory settlement.

6. Many would hold this view; others, perhaps the wiser ones, might hold that Germany would be wise to accept neutralisation of the Corridor if neutralisation is, in truth, to be had.

7. The whole question of the improvement of relations between Germany and Poland is fraught with considerable difficulty. I am constantly urging a reasonable spirit of compromise and accommodation on German Ministers and remind them of the great service rendered in 1920 by Poland to Western Europe in general and to Germany in particular.⁵ But their prejudice is not easy to overcome.

I have, &c.,
D'ABERNON

⁵ See First Series, Volume XI, Chapter II, No. 482, for the Polish victory at Warsaw over Soviet forces in August 1920.

No. 35

*Sir W. Tyrrell to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)*¹

No. 215 Telegraphic [C 13741/13120/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 28, 1925, 7 p.m.*

Following for General Wauchope² from Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, begins.

Following from Mr. Chamberlain in Paris.

'Following for Secretary of State for War and Lord Cavan.

'*Personal.*

'General Staff notes on German note of the 23rd October (War Office letter of October 26th)³ do not seem to me to correspond with your decisions as expressed to me in conversation at War Office.⁴ They appear to me

¹ This telegram was also addressed to Paris as No. 303 by bag for General Clive.

² Chief of the British Section of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany.

³ See No. 28, note 3.

⁴ No record of this conversation has been traced in Foreign Office archives. In this connexion Mr. Lampson had had a conversation on October 22 with Major-General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, and Colonel Arthur

needlessly meticulous in several matters, e.g. insistence on refusal of military titles to police to which Lord Cavan said he offered no objection provided it was kept clearly as a police force.

'I beg you to send urgent instructions to Clive that political consequences of treaty of Locarno ought to be given full weight by Versailles Council and that he is to press strongly for all concessions not absolutely prohibited by military safety.

'I attach highest importance to early and favourable decision which is made doubly necessary by fight now going on among German parties. We must strengthen hands of Luther and Streseman[n] who are behaving with complete loyalty and marked courage.'

Secretary of State for War has replied. 'Your telegram of yesterday, I had not seen General Staff notes which are, of course, correct from the General Staff point of view, but on grounds of military safety and prevention of future wars General Staff do not attach, and never have attached, any great importance to outstanding points in Germany's disarmament except to the destruction of remaining unauthorised war material producing plant which they understood Germany is prepared to complete. I am quite prepared to leave insistence or otherwise on all outstanding points to you. Clive and Wauchope are being instructed in this sense.'

McGrath of the General Staff. No record of this conversation is preserved in Foreign Office archives. According to the docket General Burnett-Stuart stated that the 'Foreign Office policy of conciliation regarding question of military control, evacuation of Cologne and general régime in Rhineland would receive full support of War Office. He considered Germany to be effectively disarmed.'

⁵ General Clive commented on Sir L. Worthington-Evans's telegram in a report of October 29 to the War Office (copy communicated to Mr. Lampson) in which he stated: 'I have no doubt that the French members will be prepared to go far in the matter of concessions: but I do not expect to be able to convince them that no great importance need be attached to any of the outstanding points, other than the destruction of plant. I fear that the adoption of so novel an attitude would be impolitic, for it might well strain the relations between ourselves and the French, who feel strongly on the question of personnel, and who have followed our lead with real loyalty for the last year. I feel that it would fail in its purpose: for although it will hasten the moment of evacuation of Cologne, I do not think it possible to bring it back to the very near date which other circumstances make desirable.

'I think we should do well to bear in mind that the C[omit  ] M[ilitaire] A[ll  ] de V[ersailles] r  le is to advise on military questions, and that the Ambassadors' Conference is responsible for Allied policy. It would appear, therefore, that the various objects in view will best be attained by the following steps:

- '(1) The report by the C.M.A.V. should be drafted so as to include the largest number of concessions—probably including all the 5 points in the 4th list, except the statute for the police and that of bringing the Associations into line with the Treaty of Versailles.
- '(2) The Ambassadors' Conference should reply to the German Government that as that Government itself admits there are many demands whose execution requires completion or verification, which will necessitate the continuance of the C[ommission] M[ilitaire] I[n]terall  e de C[ontr  le] for a short period; but that the execution of disarmament clauses has now reached a stage which justified the evacuation of the Northern Zone.
- '(3) The communication of a date for the commencement of the evacuation, with an

Will General Clive please take up in the C.M.A.V. the attitude described in Secretary of State for War's telegram above, taking his instructions from His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris and will General Wauchope please conform.

undertaking that the transfer of troops will proceed as quickly as arrangements for their accommodation in the new zone will allow, and will be delayed for no other reason.

'I discussed this matter with Mr. Chamberlain last night, putting forward the views given above.'

No. 36

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received October 29, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 386 Telegraphic: by bag [C 13727/459/18]

PARIS, October 28, 1925

Following from Secretary of State.

2. The German Ambassador called upon me this evening by instructions from his government to assure me of the determination of the Chancellor and Herr Stresemann, with the support of the government as reformed and of the President of the Reich, to carry through the treaty of Locarno and of their confidence in their power to do so. Both their will and their power to secure the approval of the Reichstag were, he was instructed to add, dependent on the fulfilment of the verbal assurances given by Monsieur Briand and myself as to our determination to give full effect to the spirit of the treaties by the early evacuation of Cologne and the alleviation of conditions in the territory still remaining occupied.¹

¹ A similar declaration was made that day by the German Ambassador in London to Sir W. Tyrrell. In informing Lord D'Abernon of this *démarche* Mr. Chamberlain stated in his despatch No. 1950 to Berlin of November 2 that Dr. Sthamer's remarks 'gave Sir William Tyrrell an opportunity of suggesting to the Ambassador the desirability of reciprocity in Berlin; for instance, a declaration by the more reasonable section of the Nationalists dissociating themselves from their die-hards. His Excellency quite agreed that such a protest would be very helpful, but he was very doubtful whether the strict party discipline prevailing in the Nationalist party rendered such action possible.

'4. His Excellency ended the interview by reaffirming very solemnly the assurance of the German Government quoted at the beginning of this despatch, and wound up by saying that he understood that the German Ambassador in Paris had been instructed to ask for an interview with me with a view to explain the internal situation in Germany and its effect upon the Locarno Treaty.

'5. A similar declaration was, in fact, made to me by the German Ambassador in Paris and I replied in like terms. Herr von Hoesch, who had just interviewed M. Briand, reported the latter as being ready to go even further in the direction desired by the German Government than I was myself prepared to promise.

'6. He also stated that he had had a long and most satisfactory conversation with M. Tirard.'

No. 37

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)

No. 3¹ Telegraphic [Germany 24/10]

PARIS, October 30, 1925

Following from Secretary of State:—

‘The observations of the Belgian Government on the German note about disarmament caused me some concern, and a conversation which I had with their Ambassador at a dinner here makes me apprehensive lest Belgian representatives in the various Allied bodies dealing with this subject should not be in complete accord with their French and English colleagues.

‘M. Vandervelde, of course, desires that we should give full effect to the expectations aroused by the Locarno Agreement and should carry out generously our assurances as to the logical consequences of this agreement in other spheres.

‘I request that you will make certain that Belgian Ambassador here and Belgian representatives on Versailles and Berlin committees are fully cognisant of policy of Belgian Government and bring the right spirit to bear on the points which remain for discussion.’²

Repeated to Berlin, No. 9, and Rome, No. 13.

¹ Repeated by bag as No. 397 to the Foreign Office (received on October 31).

² Sir G. Grahame replied in Brussels telegram No. 110 to the Foreign Office of October 31, in which he stated in particular: ‘I have just had a long and intimate conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which I was able to say or suggest to him without risk of giving offence, all that I think you would have wished me to on subjects mentioned in your telegram to me from Paris No. 3 of yesterday’s date. M. Vandervelde’s own attitude and language were entirely in accordance with your own as regards necessity for carrying out generously logical consequences of the Locarno Agreement. He told me that he had sent instructions, with the express authority of the Cabinet, to Belgian representatives in Paris and Berlin strongly enjoining upon them to bring a new spirit to bear on points still under discussion with German government and other authorities. He had furthermore told them that Belgian authorities were not to hang back if their British and French colleagues were ready to dispose of any questions as to which they had not been directly instructed.’

No. 38

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 14¹ Telegraphic [Germany 24/10]

PARIS, October 30, 1925

Following from Secretary of State:—

‘My telegram to Sir G. Grahame, No. 3,² repeated to you.

‘It will be well that you should inform M. Mussolini of the substance of

¹ Repeated by bag as No. 398 to the Foreign Office (received on October 31).

² No. 37.

this telegram to Brussels. I know that he will agree and do not doubt that he has already made his policy clear to the Italian representatives.³

Repeated to Berlin, No. 10, and Brussels, No. 4.

³ Sir R. Graham replied in Rome despatch No. 947 of November 12 (not preserved in Foreign Office archives). According to the docket, this despatch transmitted a translation of Signor Mussolini's reply 'expressing agreement with Mr. Chamberlain's views and stating that instructions already given to Italian representatives at Paris and Brussels to act in interests of peace and harmony have been confirmed'.

No. 39

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Sir G. Clerk (Prague)

No. 541 [C 13386/13131/62]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 30, 1925*

Sir,

You will have seen from my despatch No. 532¹ of October 29th and my telegram No. 26¹ of October 27th that both the Czechoslovak and Serb-Croat-Slovene Ministers for Foreign Affairs have been turning their thoughts to the possibility of the application of the principles embodied in the Locarno Treaties to Central Europe and the Balkan States and that as the result of their recent interview in Italy [*sic*],² Dr. Benes and Monsieur Nincic formed the opinion that the initiative in giving effect to such a policy should come either from His Majesty's Government or the French Government.

2. For their part His Majesty's Government would most cordially welcome and give their fullest support to any proposal having for its object the extension to Central Europe of the principles established at Locarno. Salvation, however, must come from within, and there can be no real peace but by consent. If the Great Powers were to impose peace, such peace would remain an outer garment which could be thrown off at any moment. The governments directly concerned must will peace. When they do and then only will peace be a reality.

3. If the smaller powers wish to be reckoned as morally on an equality with the Great Powers they must act in the same spirit and show the same largeness of view and desire of reconciliation as the Great Powers have done. Whosoever refuses to work for this object not only puts his country in the wrong but shows its littleness.

4. I am doubtful whether at the present juncture any concrete proposals could usefully be put forward or carried into effect, but in any case Central Europe offers a better or earlier chance of progress in the direction of mutual security pacts than the Balkans. Time is an essential factor for the realisation of such projects and in my opinion it would be a mistake to endeavour to

¹ Not printed.

² The Czechoslovak and Serb-Croat-Slovene Ministers for Foreign Affairs had met at Bled on October 21.

arrive at definite results in advance of public opinion in the countries concerned. In the meanwhile each government interested should steadily work to the end in view, omit no act which can forward it and avoid any action calculated to hinder it. The government which is felt by the world outside to have been the author or artificer of such a pact will reap its reward in the increased consideration in which it will be held by all other nations while the government which obstructs in any way the realisation of this object will inevitably draw upon itself the odium of the world. As preliminaries to any extension of the Locarno principles in Central Europe the following conditions seem to me to impose themselves:—

- (a) A policy of conciliation and goodwill to minorities.
- (b) the co-operation and goodwill of the Italian Government.

5. In any conversations which you may have on this subject you should endeavour so to frame your observations and advice as to conform with the policy of His Majesty's Government as outlined in this despatch.

6. Similar despatches have been addressed to His Majesty's Representatives at Vienna, Belgrade, Budapest and Bucharest.³

I am, &c.,
(For the Secretary of State)
C. HOWARD SMITH

³ As Nos. 391, 521, 332, and 540 respectively.

No. 40

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 1624 [C 13386/13131/62]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 30, 1925*

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 308¹ and my despatch No. 1616¹ of October 27th and 29th respectively, I transmit to Your Excellency, herewith, copy of a despatch² which I have addressed to His Majesty's representatives at Prague, Vienna, Belgrade, Budapest and Bucharest, on the subject of the extension of the principles embodied in the Locarno Treaties to the Central European States.

2. When at the close of the recent Conference I broached the subject with Monsieur Benes, who declared himself to be wholeheartedly in favour of such a policy and determined to labour for its promotion, I ventured to suggest to him that he should take the opportunity of his presence at Locarno to discuss the matter with Signor Mussolini. My reason for offering Dr. Benes this friendly advice was that I felt convinced that whether or not the Italian Government should desire themselves to enter into a Security Pact with the Successor States, the counsel, assistance and goodwill of Italy as

¹ Not printed.

² No. 39.

the Great Power most directly interested must prove a vital factor in the success of any negotiations which may be entered upon for the purpose of applying to Central Europe the principles established at Locarno.

3. I should be glad if you would find a suitable occasion to speak to Signor Mussolini in the sense of this despatch, adding that I shall continue to use my influence in the interests of a Central European Security Pact in the confident hope that I shall receive his loyal co-operation and that he, for his part, will exercise the full weight of his personal authority in the same direction.³

I am, &c.,
(For the Secretary of State)
C. HOWARD SMITH

³ Sir R. Graham replied in Rome despatch No. 936 of November 6: 'When I saw the President of the Council last night I spoke to him in the sense of your instructions, and read to him in translation the two last paragraphs of your despatch under reference. Signor Mussolini replied that he was in agreement, and that you could count upon his support. The question was, however, a difficult and delicate one, and the ground ought to be thoroughly explored before any forward step was taken. He thought that the forthcoming meeting in London on the 1st December might prove a suitable opportunity for such exploration, and he proposed to converse with you and with Dr. Benes on the subject on that occasion. I think that it is with this idea in his mind that he has asked Senator Contarini [Secretary-General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] to accompany him on his visit to London.' Signor Mussolini later abandoned his intention of visiting London for the signature of the Locarno pacts, possibly as a result of rumours that an attempt might be made on his life while he was out of Italy and that his partisans and antagonists in Great Britain might stage demonstrations.

No. 41

Colonel Ryan (Coblentz) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 1, 9 a.m.)

No. 40 Telegraphic [C 13892/13120/18]

Urgent

COBLENZ, October 31, 1925, 7.45 p.m.

M. Tirard informed Belgian High Commissioner and myself this morning that French government in view of present internal situation in Germany considered that concessions to be made in Rhineland should be notified without delay to German public. I replied that while fully sharing the view that delay was in principle undesirable I considered that allied Ambassadors at Berlin were in a better position than ourselves to judge the moment when announcement would provide the greatest psychological effect on the German nation.

The work of drawing up concessions has made most satisfactory progress and I think the majority if not all of my suggestions will be accepted. Some hesitation was noticeable at first on the part of the French but this has now disappeared almost certainly as a result of further instructions from Paris. Agreement has now been reached on the following points:

(a) High Commission will receive Reich Commissioner as soon as ever necessary formalities in connection with his appointment are completed.

(b) General lines of revision of ordinances have been settled. Details still require to be worked out but I have hopes that by Monday¹ sufficient progress will have been made to enable us to submit our proposals to allied governments.

(c) A large reduction is to be made in the number of delegates and practically all executive power will be taken from those that remain. I hear unofficially (though this requires confirmation) that French are making preparations for a reduction of 60 per cent.

In regard to stages to be followed I have made the following suggestions which have been approved in principle by my colleagues.

When proposals of High Commission have been approved by governments and the latter judge that time has come, the High Commissioners will at once cancel a limited number of ordinances. At the same time it will issue a notice to the press (a) specifying in detail amendments or cancellation of other ordinances which are shortly to be carried out and (b) stating that certain other ordinances are undergoing revision.

Finally it is proposed that concurrently with revised ordinances a new codification be made. This will probably reduce total number to forty and possibly less.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 40, sent to Berlin, Paris and Brussels.

¹ November 2, 1925.

No. 42

Memorandum by Mr. A. Chamberlain on the Reduction of Armaments¹

[W 9748/9/98]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 31, 1925

At its meeting on the 29th July the Cabinet approved a note by Sir Maurice Hankey² containing suggestions as to the procedure to be followed in pursuing enquiries into the question of our obligations in the matter of the reduction of armaments.

Since that note was written, and circulated to the Service Departments, the question of disarmament has been further considered by the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations, whose conclusions were embodied in the following resolutions:—³

‘The Assembly,

‘Taking note of the declarations submitted to the Council and the

¹ This memorandum was prepared for circulation to the Cabinet.

² Secretary to the Cabinet.

³ The Assembly resolution of September 25, and the Council resolution of September 26, 1925, are printed in *League of Nations Official Journal: Special Supplement No. 33*, 1925, p. 130, and *League of Nations Official Journal*, October 1925, p. 1390, respectively.

Assembly of the League of Nations in respect of the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes⁴ and of the fact that the said Protocol has not up to the present received the ratifications necessary for putting it into operation immediately;

‘Convinced that the most urgent need of the present time is the re-establishment of mutual confidence between nations;

‘Declaring afresh that a war of aggression should be regarded as an international crime:

‘Regards favourably the effort made by certain nations to attain those objects by concluding arbitration conventions and treaties of mutual security conceived in the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in harmony with the principles of the Protocol (Arbitration, Security, Disarmament);

‘Records the fact that such agreements need not be restricted to a limited area, but may be applied to the whole world;

‘Recommends that, after these conventions and treaties have been deposited with the League of Nations, the Council should examine them in order to report to the Seventh Assembly on the progress in general security brought about by such agreements;

‘Undertakes again to work for the establishment of peace by the sure method of arbitration, security and disarmament;

‘And, in conformity with the spirit of Article 8 of the Covenant, requests the Council to make a preparatory study with a view to a Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in order that, as soon as satisfactory conditions have been assured from the point of view of general security as provided for in Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly, the said Conference may be convened and a general reduction and limitation of armaments may be realised.’

‘The Council,

‘In view of the Report of the Third Committee to the Sixth Assembly and of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly relating to arbitration, security and disarmament, dated the 25th September, 1925;

‘Decides to refer the report, resolution and minutes of the Assembly, of the Third Committee and of the Sub-Committee of the Third Committee to the Committee of the Council for examination, asking it to meet as soon as possible during the interval between the September and December sessions in order—

‘(1.) To examine the observations made during the Sixth Assembly relating to the constitution and working of the Co-ordination Committee, and submit definite proposals to the Council on the following questions:—

‘(a) The composition and name of the Co-ordination Committee.

‘(b) Status of its different members.

‘(c) Procedure.

⁴ i.e. the Geneva Protocol: see No. 1, notes 15 and 18.

‘(2.) To make the necessary studies for determining the questions which need to be submitted to a preparatory study with a view to a possible conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments, and to draft definite proposals to be submitted to the Council on this subject.

‘The Committee of the Council is asked to submit a report on this matter in time for examination by the Council at its session in December.’

The position consequently is that the preparatory work which is necessary before any general conference on the reduction of armaments can be held is to be put in hand at once, so that there may be no delay in holding a conference immediately the utility of that step appears assured by the requisite improvement in the general state of security.

The lines on which this preparatory work should be conducted are to be decided by the Council after hearing the advice of its committee (a body known as the Committee of the Council and composed of one representative of each State member of the Council), which is to meet as soon as possible and make its recommendations to the Council at the latter's next session in December. The work is then to be entrusted to the body hitherto known as the Co-ordination Committee, but the latter is first to undergo reorganisation at the hands of the Council, who in this also are seeking the advice of their committee.

As at present constituted, the Co-ordination Committee is composed of the Committee of the Council, assisted, in an advisory capacity, by (1) representatives of the three technical organisations of the League (Financial, Economic and Transit Committees), (2) representatives of the Permanent Advisory Committee (the committee composed of advisers, appointed by their Governments, in naval, military and aerial matters), (3) representatives of both employers' and workers' groups of the governing body of the International Labour Office, (4) experts, jurists and others, appointed by the Council. Hitherto, only the members of the Council Committee have had the right of vote, but there is a strong movement in favour of extending that right to other members of the Co-ordination Committee, under its reorganisation, and, to some extent also, in favour of broadening the composition of the Committee. I consider the Committee, even as now constituted, to be very ill-adapted to so difficult a task, and I share the objection which is, I believe, felt by the Service Departments to its expansion. The British representative on the Committee of Council may be able, when the time comes, to do something to enforce this point of view, but he may be overridden and obliged to yield to a general consensus of opinion.

Of far greater importance is the question upon what lines the preparatory work is to be conducted, and here the British representative must be given considered advice. The signature of the Treaty of Locarno and subsidiary instruments will probably be held to justify the summoning of a conference. It is therefore important that the preparatory work should be based on safe lines so that it shall not result in yet another large and ambitious but abortive scheme. Real progress ought now to be possible. The danger is lest once

again the League should lose touch with realities, nations give lip-service to principles which they have no real intention of acting up to, and Great Britain be left to say the truth which many feel, but no one else has the courage to utter.

I should like, therefore, to be in a position to give the Council or its Committee a clear idea of what we think practicable, and incidentally, perhaps even inferentially, of what we think impracticable. Our prestige is now high; our opinion and advice will have weight and our attitude may be decisive, as it was at and before Locarno, *but only if, as at Locarno, we know clearly what we want and exactly what we are prepared to do.*

What I would therefore ask the Cabinet to approve is that the work which by their direction the Service Departments are already engaged upon should be continued with particular reference to the Assembly and Council resolutions and with a special view to giving the British representatives on the Council and its Committee a definite line of policy.

It may well be that the Service Departments should continue each to tackle the problem in the first instance from its own standpoint, but the result of their labours should be made available as soon as possible and be considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence. The C.I.D. would then submit to the Cabinet draft instructions for the guidance of the British representatives.

A. C.

No. 43

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 1, 5.10 p.m.)¹

No. 410 Telegraphic [C 13889/459/18]

BERLIN, November 1, 1925, 7.30 p.m.¹

French Ambassador is proceeding to Paris. He has had a long conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs in which latter set forth his views for communication to Monsieur Briand.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said:—

'There is no doubt whatever that we shall proceed to London on November 30th and shall sign the pact. I do not think we shall be able to do this with the assent of Nationalists, but we count on socialist support which will, I believe, be obtainable without a general election. I am opposed to a general election; it would demoralize the country and lead to no clear or satisfactory result. Up to yesterday we had thought it might be possible to reconcile Nationalists to Locarno but after their declaration of policy² and our reply

¹ There would appear to be some confusion regarding the times of receipt and despatch of this telegram.

² Lord D'Abernon had transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 605 of

to that declaration,³ the chances of a compromise have to a notable degree diminished. My scheme is to run government in Reich on a bourgeois coalition, i.e. "Volks Partei" Centre and Democrats. This coalition would receive general support of the Socialists.

As regards signature in London I take it for granted that friendly assurances given in Locarno will materialise in a practical form without undue delay. I sincerely hope that date of evacuation of Cologne will be officially declared before November 10th. We are doing everything possible to arrive at a settlement regarding disarmament.

Then there is the question of mitigation of Rhineland régime regarding which I am glad to say that friendly dispositions have been announced. We have taken steps on our side to improve relations of German officials with occupying authorities;⁴ but on the side of Western Powers some definite action will be required and must be published.

Further Monsieur Briand ought to know that there is a strong desire here that he should make, in the course of the next few weeks, some declaration regarding action under article 431.⁵ It can easily be realised how important conciliatory words on this subject would be. Their effect on German opinion would be immediate. We do not place this question in the same category as the evacuation of Cologne or improvement of conditions in the Rhineland. There is no engagement regarding it. At the same time I press it strongly upon Monsieur Briand and Mr. Chamberlain.'

Report of conversation ends.

The foregoing statement confirms views reported in my telegram No. 395.⁶ It would seem that during the last few days Stresemann has moved towards the Left and that the idea of a combination between 'Volks Partei' and Socialists has made considerable progress. Luther is (? less) favourable to this combination than Stresemann.

For their part Socialists desire to replace Luther by Marx⁷ but Stresemann has been loyal to Luther and has refused to discuss any such basis. He considers maintenance of Luther indispensable to the success of the pact negotiations. He is also not particularly fond of Marx.

There are persistent rumours here that government will submit accep-

October 31 a translation from the *Lokal Anzeiger* of October 30 which published this declaration. The translation stated in particular 'the Deutschnationale Volkspartei can never admit the voluntary recognition of the dictate of Versailles, the renunciation of German territory and population and the fresh obligations involved by the entry of defenceless Germany into the League of Nations, whereby her freedom of action in the east is taken from her'.

³ The reference was to an official communiqué issued by Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau on October 30, extracts from which were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin despatch No. 604 of October 31.

⁴ Lord D'Abernon had reported in Berlin telegram No. 404 of October 29: 'I am informed officially that Prussian government have cancelled existing order to officials in Rhineland forbidding social relations with occupying authorities. They do not propose to publish this cancellation but effect will soon be manifest.'

⁵ Of the Treaty of Versailles.

⁶ No. 31.

⁷ Dr. W. Marx, German Chancellor from November 1923 to January 1925, was Chairman of the Centre Party.

tance or refusal of pact to a plebiscite. A majority for acceptance would be fairly certain. By this means government might satisfy the Left and avoid election.

They would also prevent Nationalists asserting later that the pact had been signed against the National will.

But there is considerable doubt as to the legality of holding a plebiscite on a question not already submitted to the Reichstag.

No. 44

Colonel Ryan (Coblenz) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received November 2, 9 a.m.)

No. 41 Telegraphic [C 13915/13120/18]

COBLENZ, November 1, 1925, 10.30 p.m.

We have reached agreement on alleviations to be made in the Rhineland régime. Text of proposals which takes the form of a communiqué to the press will be sent to you by bag tomorrow.¹

Following is resumé:

(A) High Commission will receive Reich-Kommissar as soon as appointed.

(B) Following ordinances to be abrogated. 3 Article 11 (postal censorship) 30 (flag[g]ing)² 37 (furnishing of ships manifests) 74 and 123 importation and censorship of films, 173 special powers of delegates instruction 2 Article 2 reports by German authorities. Protective ordinances. (It is proposed that they should be replaced by a system providing for settlement of difficulties by agreement with German authorities and eventually by arbitration.)

(C) Following ordinances to be amended, 71 Article 3. Facilities to be given for use of wireless receiving sets by general public subject to a modified control details of which still require to be worked out. 80. Flight of German aircraft over Rhineland to be permitted subject to reservations. Allied governments to decide when this amendment is to take effect. 85 and 87. Powers of allied Rhine police to be defined more closely. 263. Circulation of [*sic*] rules to be simplified and interference with German regulations to be reduced to a minimum. 284, and instruction 25. German laws to come into force on promulgation subject to the right of High Commission to modify or suspend *a posteriori*. The necessity of communicating municipal regulations to High Commission to be abolished. 286. The categories of officials, notification of whose appointment is necessary, to be considerably reduced. Objections of High Commission to any official to be settled if possible by amicable agreement with Germans. 294. Article 1. Power of delegates to suppress papers to be suppressed. 295. Penalties provided for membership of a prohibited society to be reduced. 299 and instruction 24. Arms permits to be issued by German authorities subject to approval of delegates. In

¹ In Coblenz despatch No. 381, not printed.

² i.e. the display of flags on public buildings.

addition to above certain other ordinances of minor importance are under consideration with a view to amendment or abrogation.

D. Number of delegates to be greatly reduced and their executive powers suppressed. [? E.] Military Courts. It is proposed that certain categories of offences should be left to German courts for trial.

F. Above proposals will render it possible to recodify ordinances and reduce total from 300 to about 30.³

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 41.⁴ Sent to Berlin, Paris and Brussels.

³ Colonel Ryan commented as follows in his fuller report on these proposals in Coblenz despatch No. 384 of November 3: 'I do not think myself that at the present stage it will be advisable to give effect at once to many of the concessions proposed. The German mentality is such that as soon as one concession is given the tendency is to demand another, and I therefore feel that, from a tactical point of view, it will be better to adopt a few ordinances only as tangible evidence of our intention to alleviate conditions in the Rhineland, and only to indicate the majority of the concessions which we have decided to make.'

⁴ Mr. Chamberlain replied to the present telegram and that printed as No. 41 expressing his 'warm approval' of Colonel Ryan's action.

No. 45

Colonel Ryan (Coblenz) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received November 2, 9 a.m.)

No. 42 Telegraphic [Germany 24/10]

COBLENZ, November 1, 1925, 10.50 p.m.

Your telegram No. 31.¹

I have just seen the opinion of legal committee of Conference of Ambassadors in regard to amnesty.²

I doubt if it is wise to ask the Germans to give an undertaking in regard to political acts, an expression which covers a very wide field. It is, in my opinion, unnecessary, on the one hand, since the only political acts that interest us are already covered by amnesty provided by London Protocol, and undesirable, on the other hand, as wideness of terms may deter the Germans from giving undertaking. High Commission shares my views, and in its report,³ which left to-day for Paris, it suggests the German undertaking be confined to relations with or services rendered to occupation. It would,

¹ Not printed. This telegram of October 28 briefly recapitulated paragraphs 8 and 9 of No. 33.

² Cf. No. 51.

³ Not printed. In his despatch No. 382 of November 2 forwarding this report relative to the Civil Measures to be taken on the evacuation of the Cologne zone Colonel Ryan suggested in agreement with his colleagues that 'the evacuation of the northern zone will be a suitable moment for the release of a large majority of the prisoners held by the Allies in the occupied territories. You will remember that an amnesty for political offences was granted after the conclusion of the London Conference of August last year, and I feel that a similar measure, carried out on a larger scale, would be striking evidence of our recognition that our relations with Germany have changed. . . . An amnesty granted by us may, moreover, induce the Germans to give the undertaking that no reprisals will be taken against persons who have had relations with or rendered services to the occupation.'

however, undoubtedly make for pacification if it were extended to include the whole of the occupied territories.

Sent to Paris.

No. 46

Memorandum by Mr. Gregory¹ respecting Anglo-Soviet Relations
[N 6239/102/38]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 1, 1925

The final peace settlement of Europe, so happily attained at Locarno, will ostensibly not be complete until it is ultimately extended to include Russia, and signs are already not wanting in a variety of directions that this will sooner or later be required of European statesmanship. Within the actual realm of international politics the Locarno settlement is likely to give a fresh impetus to the attempts of the majority of the signatories to compose their differences with the Soviet State. Germany is anxious that the recent rebuff to M. Chicherin at Berlin² should not develop into a quarrel; France is seemingly desirous of concluding her negotiations,³ Italy has avowedly made it a cardinal point of her foreign policy to establish cordial terms with Russia; Poland has already transformed the *détente* into a *rapprochement*; Czechoslovakia can at any moment without difficulty resume normal relations. Belgium alone, economically a not unimportant factor in a general resumption of relations with Russia, shows at present no particular tendency to come to a settlement.

Is Great Britain to remain nominally isolated while the co-signatories of Locarno are settling up with the Soviet? Does nominal isolation matter, and, even though it may not, is it, nevertheless, desirable and propitious for His Majesty's Government to revise their existing policy and once again consider whether and on what terms they can resume negotiations? What is the political value of including Russia in the new settlement? What is to be their attitude, should approaches come directly from M. Chicherin or indirectly through M. Briand?⁴ These are questions which may have to be answered.

The comment on the general principle involved in these propositions is that the disadvantage in Great Britain standing apart is not radical. Having

¹ An Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office.

² Cf. No. 8.

³ Franco-Soviet negotiations regarding Russian war debts and a possible commercial agreement had taken place from April to June 1925. When M. Chicherin visited Paris in November and December it was agreed to reopen negotiations in January 1926, but these negotiations remained inconclusive.

⁴ On October 28, Mr. Lampson, acting on instructions from Mr. Chamberlain, had intimated to M. Berthelot in Paris, that should M. Briand suggest to Mr. Chamberlain the desirability of receiving M. Chicherin in London, he 'might not be indisposed to consider the suggestion favourably'.

reassumed the diplomatic leadership of Europe, she can afford the luxury of individual restraint, where others, less reflective and less interested, are not afraid to tread. She can, in fact, bear the privilege of independence without the odium of isolation. A settlement with Russia without this country in it is not a European settlement. Great Britain always has been, and still remains, the avowed principal objective of the foreign policy of the Russian Communist party, whether acting through the Third International to achieve revolution or through the Soviet Government to reach an economic agreement; in the latter sphere the political, as well as the financial, barriers set up by this country have to be demolished before Soviet Russia can feel she is no longer an international outlaw. It is a legitimate paradox, then, to argue that the Powers who make premature agreements with her are those that will suffer isolation.

This does not, however, imply that the exclusion of Russia from the peace settlement will not subject the latter to a certain strain. Inside the area of agreement the Bolshevik virus will continue to be rampant from Danzig to Athens; outside that area Moscow's struggle for mastery, possibly more Russian than Bolshevik, will persistently harry the attempts of the Middle and Far East to stabilise. The 'Great Soviet Empire' may be denied advertisement, but it cannot be wholly ignored. Now that we have got so far in achieving European solidarity, we are bound to do what is possible to protect that achievement, and therefore to consider whether and how the Soviet threat to it can be mitigated and whether the object can be attained by admitting Russia to the League of Nations.

Any reasoning on these lines must necessarily be purely speculative. The first reflection is naturally that the inclusion of a State that gives domicile to the Third International and whose external relations are persistently dominated by it is such a disruptive element that there is no place for it logically within the League. Theoretically, no doubt, that objection is unanswerable. There are, however, two practical arguments on the other side. The first is that there is more likelihood of control if Russia is a member of the League than if she is not. Any intrigues in which she may be inclined to indulge, with Germany or Poland, for instance, can be more easily detected and disposed of if she is in than if she is out. The atmosphere of Geneva may even on her have a mollifying effect. The second argument is that the only possible chance of undoing Russian Communism and dislodging the Third International is by allowing the inevitable conflict between the two policies of the Politbureau⁵ to develop; it is impossible permanently to reconcile the policy of world revolution carried out by Comintern with that of achieving political and economic stability carried out by the Soviet Government within the same party. All that can be done from the outside is to employ dissolvents rather than forcible measures. It has, of course, always been the stock-in-trade argument for establishing normal relations with Soviet Russia that the way to end Bolshevism was to let the fresh air in,

⁵ i.e. the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.

and though this has proved a fallacy in the partial application of the principle, it need not necessarily be so as regards the League. The Bolshevik régime is in its eighth year and is not so fresh as it was. It has had some hard blows from without, and within is finding the peasant pressure rather more uncomfortable than it did. At all events, there is something to be said on this score. On the other hand, it may be clearly argued that to admit Russia to the League will be held inside that country to indicate that the Soviet régime has finally triumphed, and so simply have the effect of consolidating it. This was the familiar objection to our giving diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Government. A continued waiting policy may therefore be more effective in depressing Russian opinion and producing internal dissension; at least, of inducing more favourable terms for us for the future.

It is more than likely, too, from the point of view of the League, that it would be impossible for it to absorb Russia and Germany almost at the same time. The League has still to digest Germany, and the digestive process will be none too easy. Moreover, who knows whether Chicherin's alleged *volte-face* after his defeat at Berlin does not mean that he will now try to transfer his pact-frustrating energies from outside to within the League? The League atmosphere may, indeed, be too strong to permit of internal combinations, but it has not yet had to deal with the poison gas of Moscow.

Viewed, however, from a purely British point of view, we should be, with Russia in the League, in the illogical position of having a partner whose activities from one end of the world are centred on undermining our influence and institutions and who is directed by a Foreign Minister whose avowed object is the overthrow of the British Empire. Whether the times have been so changed by Locarno and the spirit of peace so entered into the world that the Anglo-Russian duel, as well as the Franco-German, can now be ended is beyond immediate calculation, but its termination does seem an equal condition *sine quâ non* for a comprehensive settlement. It is certainly true that during last year's negotiations the Russians pressed us to come to terms with them in regard to Eastern and Far Eastern policy. The root trouble is that then, as indeed now, as indeed in the old Tsarist days, there is no sort of ground for trust. Nevertheless, it might conceivably be argued that a bold attempt is worth the risk, and, in any case, without a political understanding, at least on paper, between ourselves and Russia, the wider settlement, involving her admission to the League, is hardly possible.

A more urgent consideration is the relation of Russia to the question of disarmament, or, more properly defined, the reduction of national armaments to the limit of safety. The discussion is still only in embryo, but it must be fairly clear that in the application of any general principle Poland and Roumania (let alone the controversial position of Germany in this respect) will be a special case, so long as Russia remains outside an otherwise comprehensive scheme. For would it under any circumstances be possible to impose on Russia the control or supervision which other countries would presumably be called on to accept? Given not only her vast European

territory, but an impenetrable Siberian hinterland, the neighbouring States can never feel any security. Whether Russia nominally accedes to a disarmament agreement, or whether she stands out, the distrust engendered by her history or her present régime must inevitably invalidate all ordinary calculations. A solution of the problem must be found elsewhere.

For the first time since Anglo-Soviet relations were seriously debated, the political aspect has come predominantly to the fore. Hitherto, whether in the matter of the Trade Agreement, or at Genoa, or at The Hague or last year,⁶ the economic problem has heavily outweighed the political. It has, however, still to play an essential rôle, and we must once again consider whether a satisfactory economic settlement is to be a condition of reconciliation, whether, if so, our position is still what it was, whether it must be stiffened or whether it can be modified, should it be decided on other grounds that Soviet approaches for further negotiations are not to be discouraged.

The position here is dominated increasingly by the desire of the Soviet Government to obtain credits in the City. But unless that desire is considerably more acute than it was before, we may expect them to maintain their usual unyielding attitude towards both bondholders and former property-owners.⁷ Last year, of course, the *impasse* was complete. But it is possible that now, while on the Russian side growing economic pressure and partial failure of propaganda, coupled with a severe diplomatic defeat, may have produced an effect, on our side desire for trade and confidence in the present Government may make for accommodation. At all events, it is to the City that the Russians will have to look, and it is the City which will decide. Without some preliminary understanding on principle, it does not seem the slightest use our embarking for the fifth time on laborious inter-Government

⁶ For documentation regarding the Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921, between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 114, pp. 373-9) see First Series, Volume VIII, *passim*, and Volume XII, Chapter V. Documentation regarding Anglo-Soviet negotiations at Genoa in 1922, at The Hague in 1922, and in London in 1924 will be printed in subsequent volumes in that series. The latter negotiations resulted in the Anglo-Soviet general treaty and treaty of commerce and navigation, which were signed in London on August 8, 1924 (printed respectively in Cmd. 2260 and 2261 of 1924). In a note of November 21, 1924 (printed in *Survey of International Affairs 1924*, p. 250), Mr. Chamberlain, who had succeeded Mr. Ramsay MacDonald as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as a result of the general election on October 29, informed M. Rakovski, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London, that His Majesty's Government could not recommend the treaties for ratification. In a further note of the same day Mr. Chamberlain referred to M. Rakovski's note of October 25 to Mr. MacDonald in reply to the British note of the preceding day inviting the attention of M. Rakovski to 'the enclosed copy of a letter which has been received by the Central Committee of the British Communist party from the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, over the signature of M. Zinoviev, its president, dated the 15th September.' These three notes are printed as items Nos. 7-9 in Cmd. 2895 of 1927.

⁷ The reference was to claims by British holders of pre-war Russian state and municipal securities for compensation in respect of repudiation of those securities and by British subjects and companies for compensation in respect of nationalized properties and concessions.

negotiations which have wasted oceans of time already and led nowhere. If approaches are made, the Russians must be told that they are perfectly well aware of our requirements, and that unless they can produce a scheme which has *prima facie* a reasonable chance of acceptance, it is no good their coming to us. What should be insisted on is the production by them of a basic scheme before we agree to fresh negotiations, and it will then be possible for us, after consultation with representatives of the banks, the bondholders and the property-owners, to say whether it is worth while to open negotiations. The other alternative would be for us now, while there is nothing doing, to ascertain from the interested parties whether, instead of laying themselves open to all the intrigues and separate negotiations which M. Krassin⁸ is likely to conduct, they would not prefer that we should negotiate for all parties and achieve the best settlement we could within certain prearranged limits; the exact value which they attach to an unequivocal declaration of principle compared with a practical settlement of claims could also be discussed at the same time.

The position as set out in the preceding paragraphs leaves, indeed, the problem virtually without practical suggestions, but a debate on Russia is almost necessarily inconclusive. When it is all boiled down, the net result is always the same: ineradicable distrust, and a practical certainty, based on experience, that, whatever obligations Soviet Russia might assume, she would be totally incapable of acting up to them. Possibly no State can be trusted very far, but the Soviet State cannot be trusted at all.

Nevertheless, certain points appear clear. The first is that we need not fear 'isolation'; the second is that the peace of the world is not likely to be sensibly furthered by the entry of Russia into the League, nor the problem of disarmament brought nearer solution by her admission to a disarmament conference; the third is that a continued waiting policy by His Majesty's Government is the best for British interests.

Indications are not lacking that the policy of 'masterly inactivity' adopted towards Soviet Russia is beginning to produce an effect and that the Soviet Government is beginning to feel uneasy in its outer darkness. This feeling has probably been accentuated both by the Locarno Agreement and by the internal difficulties created by its inability to satisfy the needs of the peasantry and at the same time to maintain the gold standard. So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, they can afford to wait upon events, and are, indeed, more likely to achieve a final pacification of Eastern Europe, and a practicable settlement of Anglo-Soviet problems by so doing.

There remains, therefore, only to consider what our line of action should be if the Soviet Government makes definite approaches either directly when M. Krassin arrives, or indirectly to various interests in the City.

It would be clearly bad policy to reject them offhand; we have, in fact, undertaken to examine any proposals made to us. Moreover, if France succeeds in effecting a settlement, even an ultimately illusory one, for her

⁸ M. L. Krassin had been designated Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London in succession to M. Rakovski who was about to take up his post as Soviet Ambassador at Paris.

bondholders, British claimants will undoubtedly expect us to make at least another effort on their behalf.

Details are naturally beyond the scope of this paper and must be worked out by the Departments concerned, but, briefly, it is suggested that—

In the first case—a direct approach to us by M. Krassin—the reply should be that we are ready to receive any definite proposals, which, when made, we would carefully consider, and which, if found satisfactory as a possible basis of settlement, should be embodied by preliminary mutual agreement as the definite agenda for fresh negotiations.

In the second case—negotiations between M. Krassin and the City—we can, of course, hold our hands and await developments, but such negotiations are as likely to be undertaken with the object of creating dissension in the City as with the object of achieving a settlement. There would be on this ground alone considerable advantage if we had, as suggested above, *previously* obtained the authority of the interested parties to achieve the best settlement we could. Such a course of action would foil M. Krassin's intrigues at the outset.

In the third case—indirect approaches—we should probably be asked, and, again, it might be difficult to refuse, to define the principal conditions which we consider necessary to a settlement.

In this case, we should reply that, until a practical settlement of the claims of British nationals against the Soviet Government has been reached, and until we are fully satisfied that the various undertakings to stop propaganda against our institutions in all parts of the world have duly ceased, it is impossible to throw open to the Soviet Government the practical assistance necessary for the reconstruction of the country, or on an international scale to define our position towards the admission of Russia to the League of Nations. But that once the Soviet Government has given clear proof of its desire to live up to her obligations and displayed its goodwill, we shall be ready to meet it on all grounds, national and international alike.

J. D. G.

No. 47

Colonel Ryan (Coblentz) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 2, 5.30 p.m.)

No. 43 Telegraphic [C 13980/13120/18]

COBLENZ, November 2, 1925, 1.45 p.m.

My telegram No. 41.¹

These modifications which after considerable discussion have been accepted unanimously by High Commission mean the disappearance of all those provisions against which we have for long had objections and satisfy to a very considerable extent German demands. In dealing with this question I have

¹ No. 44.

been guided by two principles. Firstly, in accordance with your instructions the cancellation of all measures which were not obviously necessary for safety or requirement of armies and secondly, presentation of concessions in the manner best calculated to strike public opinion.

The time has been short but I have been able to consult British military authorities who fully appreciate political issues involved and have been most helpful. They are in agreement except in regard to following points to which I would particularly draw your attention. Army consider that it is essential that rights of post censorship be maintained. They state that information obtained in this manner is of great value to their security and could not be obtained by any other means. They urge that number of letters censored is small and that deliveries are not delayed to any appreciable extent. Since I have no competence to express opinion on former statement and agree entirely with latter I would support without hesitation view of army (? but) for following considerations. German complaint is directed not against amount of censorship that is carried out but against principle that letters are liable to allied censorship. They imagine trade espionage and as you will remember have protested on more than one occasion against censorship in our zone. In view of importance of impressing public opinion at the moment I have therefore joined my colleagues in proposing abolition of censorship, feeling that it is better to forego [*sic*] a measure of advantage to us than to run risk of spoiling the ship for a ha'po'rth of tar.

Military authorities are opposed to any weakening of ordinances 295 and 304, which they consider vital to security of armies. I do not think amendment (? which, omit.) proposed a reduction of penalties to be inflicted, will weaken these ordinances to any extent.

Finally army does not desire any extension of jurisdiction of German court over offences against ordinances or armies. Dislike of military court is general and a concession in this respect is in my opinion essential. I see no other solution than the one proposed.

No. 48

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 216 Telegraphic [C 14023/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 3, 1925, 6.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 411¹ (of the 2nd November. Locarno Treaty).

Stresemann's allusion to me² was not tactful nor verbally accurate. It suggests a private assurance given to him but can only be his translation

¹ Not printed. This telegram briefly reported on Dr. Stresemann's speech at Dresden on October 31, printed in translation in *Gustav Stresemann, op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 196-204.

² The relevant passage in Berlin telegram No. 411 reported that Dr. Stresemann had said that 'Mr. Chamberlain said to him: "England's entire navy and army are at your disposal if France crosses your frontier."'

of what I said in the second plenary meeting of the conference and applied equally to the case of attack by France on Germany and of attack by Germany on France in conditions which involved our guarantee. In such conditions we should fight in pursuance of our guarantee and having to fight it stands to reason that we should fight with our whole strength. But I never spoke of the British army or navy being at the disposal of either Germany or France. My words were that what Great Britain undertook by her guarantee was in effect to place her whole strength at the disposal of the League to enforce its decision in the particular case under discussion.

Beg Stresemann to be careful. I have read with some uneasiness some of the declarations made by Luther and him. This particular one has brought the whole British press buzzing about my ears and the worst thing that could happen would be that the Ministers who met at Locarno should now become involved in controversy as to what they said there.

No. 49

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 4, 9 a.m.)

No. 417 Telegraphic [C 14066/13120/18]

BERLIN, November 3, 1925, 10 p.m.

I have just had a long confidential conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs who was anxious to inform me regarding the position.

He attaches great importance to the decision taken at the Chancellor's meeting to-day (see my telegram No. 414)¹ as it means that Volks Partei, Centre and Bavarian Volks Partei consider German Nationalists have rendered themselves unsuitable for further participation in government. If this view is held by the above-mentioned parties it will be held much more strongly by Democrats and Socialists. Further participation of German Nationalists is therefore excluded. The basis on which negotiations will now proceed is as follows:—

Socialists will be offered the great coalition in Prussia, that is to say, the Volks Partei will agree to support them in Prussia thus turning a precarious Left majority there into a stable majority.

As regards the Reich a proposal will be made to Social Democrats that bourgeois coalition shall be continued with unofficial support of the Socialists it being understood that German Nationalists will be excluded from the government of the Reich. This latter point will carry great weight with Socialist opinion and Stresemann hopes that in virtue of it a dissolution may

¹ Not printed. This telegram transmitted the text of the communiqué issued after a meeting on November 3 between members of the German Government and representatives of the parties who formed the Government. The communiqué stated in particular that agreement had been reached as regards the political situation, and that 'the dominant political question . . . was the creation of a foundation of a definite decision on the work of Locarno'.

be avoided. If Socialists decline (? the above) and insist on taking part in the government, Stresemann will endeavour to induce Volks Partei to agree to this plan but considers it unwise as it will be driving German Nationalists too hard. The Socialists press for a change in Chancellorship but Stresemann hopes to convince them that Luther has every title to (? sign) (? Locarno) (? Pact) in London since it is largely his handiwork.

It appears that Luther has himself somewhat receded from his previous attitude of friendship to German National Party, as he realises that they have treated him very badly.

As regards the promised reactions the moment has now come when a clear programme can be established. Stresemann entirely endorses the view that it was wise to delay any announcement up to the present² but he considers that about November 11th a clear, comprehensive and formal announcement should be made. It will only be possible to form a new government in the light of exact knowledge as to what France and England will do as regards Cologne and Rhineland. If, as suggested, a clear declaration of a satisfactory character is made, the Ministers can call upon their supporters throughout the country to initiate a vigorous campaign for the signature of the Pact. He does not doubt that this campaign will be successful but he insisted that decisions about evacuation and alleviations must come . . . tically³ and suddenly. He said 'I submit that it is somewhat unfortunate that papers are now full of news from Wiesbaden, Cologne and Coblenz that this or that decision is about to be taken. The good effect is thus frittered away. As far as possible nothing should be said about any concession until November 11th. Then a great declaration should be made'.⁴

² In his telegram No. 413 of November 2, Lord D'Abernon had stated: 'My opinion as to the desirability of postponing announcement of alleviations in Rhineland and of date of evacuation of Cologne is based upon the view that these concessions should be made to a stable government likely to remain in office for at least a month. . . . The agreement of the Rhineland Commission to far reaching alleviations (reported in Coblenz telegram No. 41 [No. 44]) is eminently satisfactory and will go far—taken together with a decision regarding Cologne—to ensure a sweeping majority for Locarno.'

³ The text is here uncertain.

⁴ Lord D'Abernon reported in his telegram No. 418 of November 4 with reference to the preceding paragraph: 'Herr Stresemann is making similar communication to M. Briand.'

No. 50

Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

*No. 3625 [C 14018/21/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 3, 1925*

My Lord,

Your Excellency is aware that although the questions of German disarmament and the evacuation of Cologne were not raised at the official meetings of the Locarno Conference, yet they were discussed at informal

meetings between the heads of the British, French, Belgian and German delegations. As I explained to your Lordship on my recent visit to Paris, the German delegation insisted that without some measures of alleviation as an immediate result of the Locarno Conference they would find it impossible to win the consent of the Reichstag to the new treaties. Of such measures the most important was the early evacuation of the Cologne zone, for which they pleaded that a definite date should at once be fixed. The Allied delegates, while refusing to admit that any such alleviations could be made a condition for the signature of the pact, agreed that such signature would inevitably involve a complete change of atmosphere and that one of the first results of the change would in the nature of things be to hasten the evacuation of the Cologne zone, provided always that a settlement was previously reached on the important outstanding points of military control. It was finally arranged that the German Government should address a note to the Ambassadors' Conference, showing in detail what points had already been liquidated, what points were on a fair way to settlement and those points on which agreement had not yet been reached. The Ambassadors' Conference would at once, in the light of the German note, consider how far it was possible to meet the wishes of the German Government and, if the position was found to be satisfactory, it might even be possible to fix a definite date for the evacuation of the Cologne zone. The British, French and Belgian delegates undertook that the Ambassadors' Conference would send a reply to the German note within ten or twelve days of its receipt.

2. The above explanations indicate the attitude adopted on the question by the British, French and Belgian delegates at Locarno and show how the German note of the 23rd October¹ regarding disarmament came to be written. It is in the light of these explanations, as well as of the general results of the Locarno Conference, that the note must now be considered.

3. My general feeling upon the whole question of German disarmament is that its importance has been fundamentally modified by the initialling of the Locarno treaties. Your Lordship will recollect that so long ago as 1923 it was the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government, as recorded in replies given in the House of Commons,² that Germany was effectively disarmed. There remained at the same time many outstanding points of greater or less importance in regard to which it was necessary to insist upon Germany fulfilling her treaty obligations, the view of His Majesty's Government as well as of their Allies being, in the words of the Allied note of the 4th June, that 'these defaults, if not promptly rectified, would in the aggregate enable the German Government eventually to reconstitute an army modelled on the principles of a nation in arms.'

4. In brief, the policy of the Allies was to safeguard the peace of Europe by insisting upon Germany's scrupulous execution of her outstanding dis-

¹ See No. 28, note 3.

² By Lieutenant-Colonel Guinness, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War, on March 22 and May 7, 1923: see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 161, col. 2746, and vol. 163, col. 1903.

armament obligations. The initialling of the Locarno treaties, however, has introduced a wholly new spirit into the relations between Germany and the Allies, which so far as it affects the question at hand, is reflected in the view that the peace of Europe will be better guaranteed by the exhibition of a conciliatory spirit on both sides than by insisting upon the meticulous execution by Germany of the whole list of demands contained in the Allied note of the 4th June.

5. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, therefore, the evacuation of the Cologne zone should now be hastened to the greatest extent compatible with the liquidation of those outstanding points of disarmament which might constitute a real menace to the peace of Europe. From this point of view, the only matters to which any great importance need, in the opinion of the War Office, be attached are the destruction of the remaining unauthorised plant for the production of war material, which the German Government, in their note of the 23rd October, declared themselves ready to complete. Provided then that the German Government show good faith in liquidating those matters which they have undertaken to carry out, and provided that they show a reasonable spirit of compromise in respect of the points of difficulty enumerated in list IV of their note of the 23rd October, I see no reason why the evacuation should not begin at a very early date, and I would suggest that the date for its commencement be fixed for the 1st December. The mention of a definite date would go far, I am convinced, to assist Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann in rallying to their support in favour of the pact policy every moderate and reasonable element in Germany, not only among the parties of the Centre and the Left, but also among the Nationalists. It is to my mind important for the future tranquillity of Europe that the treaties of Locarno should receive the widest obtainable support in each of the countries concerned, so that they may be endowed with a really national character.

6. I should be glad if your Lordship would at once see M. Briand personally and explain to him my views, as set forth above. I have every reason to anticipate that he will fully share them; and I should wish you then to sound him as to whether he would agree, when the matter comes before the Ambassadors' Conference on the 5th November, to a reply being sent to Germany somewhat on the following lines, which are not only in accordance with the preceding paragraphs of this despatch, but also are in general agreement with the view of the Versailles Committee, as expressed in their draft report of the 31st October,³ of which I have received a copy direct from General Clive:—

7. The Governments represented in the Ambassadors' Conference welcome the spirit of co-operation and of goodwill manifested in the German note of the 23rd October, and are confident that it will expedite a solution of the outstanding questions of disarmament and the resultant evacuation of Cologne.

³ Not printed. The final version of this report, dated November 2, formed the basis of the draft reply to the German note of October 23; cf. No. 59, note 4.

8. We observe with satisfaction that the German Government consider that by the 15th November every point in the note from the Ambassadors' Conference of the 4th June, with a few exceptions, will have been carried out or will be on a fair way to execution. In regard to the points of difficulty enumerated in list IV of the German note, we are convinced that, given a reasonable spirit of compromise, there should be no difficulty in reaching an agreement satisfactory to all parties. In regard to lists I to III in the German note, we will take the necessary steps without delay to obtain confirmation from the Commission of Control of the general state of German disarmament as depicted therein. Our view is that, if the facts are correctly stated, they show the execution of our requirements to be sufficiently far advanced to enable us to proceed without further delay to the evacuation of the Cologne zone. The evacuation will therefore begin on the 1st December if the Commission of Control are able to confirm the statement—

- (1) That the points enumerated in list I in the German note have been executed.
- (2) That those enumerated in lists II and III have been executed or that satisfactory progress has been made.
- (3) That agreement on the lines set forth below has been reached in regard to the points mentioned in list IV and an undertaking received from the German Government that that agreement will be carried out.

9. In regard to list IV, His Majesty's Government suggest, for the consideration of M. Briand, that the following concessions should be made in the proposed note to Germany:—

(a) *Police*

10. We see no objection to the German desire to retain the existing titles, provided that the duties corresponding to those titles are police and not military duties. But we are unable to go further or to make any modification in the requirements set forth in the note to Germany of the 4th June in respect of the military organisation of the police and the statute of the personnel.

11. As to the number of police to be allowed in barracks, you should suggest to M. Briand that we should agree forthwith to the number of 35,000 for which the Germans ask.

(b) *High Command*

12. It is understood that the German Government have addressed further proposals to the Commission of Control on this point subsequent to the date of their note under reply. So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we should be prepared to accept a formal statement that the head of the Army Directorate will not exercise the powers of a commander-in-chief.

(c) *Prohibition of Training with certain Weapons*

13. We do not desire to interfere with the internal training of the army, subject to the reservation that such training bears only upon the categories of arms enumerated in table II annexed to the military clauses of the treaty⁴ and that the scales for arms do not exceed the figures laid down in the treaty. On the other hand, training in the use of arms not authorised by the treaty (armoured cars, tanks and other similar constructions, aircraft, &c.), as well as the co-operation of aircraft with the army, must remain formally prohibited.

(d) *Königsberg Guns*

14. We are prepared to waive this point, provided that satisfaction is received on the other matters enumerated in this section.

(e) *Associations*

15. On this subject it would be useful to learn M. Briand's proposals. As a general principle, your Lordship may agree to any concessions which the French may propose in this matter (as, indeed, on any of the other points raised in this despatch or in the Versailles Committee's report). The suggestion of our own military authorities is similar to that proposed by the Versailles Committee, that, without requiring the dissolution of associations, we should insist upon the fulfilment of the demands made under this heading in the note of the 4th June, viz., that legislation should be introduced and approved by the Commission of Control to prevent associations, whatever their nature, from occupying themselves with any military matters or having any connection with the Ministry of War or any other military authority. But the difficulty I foresee in regard to this suggestion is that it involves legislation which, as we know, may well complicate matters and prove particularly embarrassing to the German Government at the present moment.

16. Finally you should say, in speaking to M. Briand, that I assume that any minor discrepancies between the Control Commission reports and the German statements would not be allowed to interfere with the work of appeasement to which M. Briand attaches as much importance as do we ourselves.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁴ Of Versailles.

No. 51

Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 3626 [C 13897/2/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 3, 1925*

My Lord,

In my despatch No. 3625¹ of to-day's date I gave you full instructions as to the line His Majesty's Government desire to adopt in regard to the question of German disarmament and the consequent evacuation of the Cologne zone. There is a further question connected with the evacuation of Cologne on which your Lordship should have instructions at the same time, viz., the desirability of obtaining from the German Government an undertaking similar to the amnesty provisions of the London Agreement which is referred to in your despatch No. 2307² of the 31st October.

2. While this question, as pointed out by the Legal Committee to the Ambassadors' Conference in their report² of the 29th October, cannot be made a condition for the evacuation of Cologne, there would seem to be every advantage in addressing a note to the German Government on the matter simultaneously with the note to be addressed to them on the question of disarmament. To introduce this new question at a later date might serve to complicate matters.

3. When speaking to M. Briand, as requested in my despatch under reference, I shall be glad if you will at the same time inform him of my views on this question of amnesty and enquire whether he agrees with the above suggestions. At the same time you should bring to his notice the points raised in Colonel Ryan's telegram No. 42³ of the 1st November, of which I enclose a copy herein for convenience of reference. As regards the wording of the note to the German Government, I am content to leave the matter to your discretion, guided as you will be by the views of the Rhineland High Commission, and I suggest that you should consult M. Briand as to whether it would not be wise in any case to discuss this question of amnesty with the German Ambassador in Paris before the text of the Note is actually agreed upon. The principle involved is so eminently reasonable and proper that the German Government can hardly make difficulties, and it would of course be much the best thing from every point of view that they should of their own initiative offer such a declaration to us.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

C. HOWARD SMITH

¹ No. 50.

² Not printed.

³ No. 45.

No. 52

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 217 Telegraphic [C 13915/13120/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 4, 1925, 3 p.m.*

Coblenz telegram No. 41¹ (of the 1st November; alleviation of conditions in the Rhineland).

Matters have moved with such satisfactory rapidity at Coblenz that I can see no advantage in delaying further the communication to the German government in regard to the Reich-Kommissar. Unless therefore you see serious objection, please take action in conjunction with your French and Belgian colleagues without further delay. I should like to see the appointment made forthwith.

Repeated to Brussels No. 309 [112], Paris No. 309 and Coblenz No. 33.

¹ No. 44.

No. 53

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 218 Telegraphic [C 13889/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 4, 1925, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 410¹ (of 1st November; German attitude towards Locarno Treaty).

I do not understand the request of the German government—if seriously meant—for a declaration on the part of the allies regarding ‘action under article 431 of the Treaty²’. Your Lordship will recollect that in the negotiations leading up to the Locarno Conference it was made perfectly clear that the signing of a Treaty of Security could involve no modification of the occupation clauses of the Treaty. I need only refer to section 2 of the French note of the 16th June.³ Moreover in their reply of 20th July⁴ the German government admitted that their memorandum on security had not made the conclusion of the Pact dependent on the modification of the treaty provisions concerning military occupation. Furthermore, as reported in your telegram No. 97,⁵ (of the 13th March), the German government assured you verbally that they would not demand any such modification and I need not remind you that this was made perfectly clear in the private correspondence that passed between you and me in February last.⁶

¹ No. 43.

² Of Versailles.

³ This note, in reply to the German memorandum of February 9 (see No. 1, note 19), is printed as item No. 9 in Cmd. 2435 of 1925.

⁴ Printed as Cmd. 2468 of 1925.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Not printed. Cf., however, Sir Charles Petrie, *The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain* (London, 1939), vol. ii, pp. 256–60.

The German government have already recognised (see for instance Dr. Luther's recent speech at Essen⁷) that great steps are being taken by the allies to grant alleviations in the Locarno spirit. These are still proceeding, but there is a limit beyond which we cannot go, and there is a risk that the German government, in trying to push us too far, may end by defeating the very object they have in view.

In short they are in grave danger of falling into their usual error of opening their mouths too wide. Time is on their side if they play their cards even moderately well. Can you not make them realise this?

Addressed to Berlin No. 218, repeated to Paris by bag No. 311, Brussels No. 113, Rome No. 313.

⁷ See *The Times* of October 29, 1925, p. 13, and October 30, p. 11.

No. 54

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 4, 9.50 p.m.)

No. 422 Telegraphic [C 14085/459/18]

BERLIN, November 4, 1925, 8.48 p.m.

Your telegram No. 216.¹

I have spoken to German government in the sense of your instructions and have made them understand how inopportune and dangerous exaggerated statements of English obligation are.

It may be hoped that period of intensive oratory here will soon cease.

Stresemann assures me he was mis-reported at Dresden. What he said was 'if English Foreign Minister declared at the Conference at Locarno that England's whole strength would, in the case of an unprovoked conflict, be placed at the disposal of the injured party this may be taken to mean that this guarantee is also at Germany's disposal if France should unprovoked cross the German frontier and invade Germany'.²

This correction has already been sent to German press.³

¹ No. 48.

² In his telegram No. 420 of November 4 Lord D'Abernon quoted extracts in a similar sense from the broadcast speech made by Dr. Stresemann on November 3. For a translation of this speech see Gustav Stresemann, *Essays and Speeches on Various Subjects* (London, 1930), pp. 232-9.

³ With reference to No. 48, Lord D'Abernon transmitted in Berlin despatch No. 620 of November 7 a letter from Herr von Schubert (not printed) with the comment: 'The pre-occupation of the German Government appears to be based on the fear that some public statement would be made of England's liability under the Treaty of Locarno which would omit the obligation under Article IV.'

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received November 5)
No. 406 Telegraphic: by bag [C 14065/13120/18]

PARIS, November 4, 1925

Your despatches Nos. 3625 and 3626.¹

2. I saw M. Briand this evening and handed to him the two aide-memoires contained in my despatches Nos. 2339 and 2340.²

3. On the importance of the maintenance of the principle which underlay the unofficial discussions at Locarno I found M. Briand in complete agreement with you, and he told me at once that he saw no reason why the date for the commencement of the evacuation should not be fixed for December 1st.

4. On the amnesty question he was much taken with the idea that the initiative should come from the German Government.

5. We discussed also briefly the details of the evacuation, the civil side of which is dealt with in the Rhineland Commission's report enclosed in my despatches Nos. 2336 and 2343³ of this afternoon. M. Briand seemed to be in favour, once the principles of disarmament and of the amnesty were settled, of leaving all the details of the evacuation, both military and civil, to the local Allied and German authorities to work out. I am sure that this will be much the best procedure, since the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris is clearly not qualified to discuss such matters.

6. M. Briand asked for time to examine more carefully the proposals in the two aide-memoires, and I shall see him again to-morrow, November 5th. My aim will be to arrive at a clear-cut understanding with the French Government on all points before entering the Conference on November 6th.

7. I have sent you by to-night's bag, in my despatches Nos. 2337⁴ and 2342⁵ German and French documents on the question of the reappointment

¹ Nos. 50 and 51 respectively.

² Not printed. These *aide-mémoire* of November 4 were in execution of the instructions in Nos. 50 and 51 respectively.

³ Not printed. These despatches transmitted respectively copies of the High Commission's report of November 1 (cf. No. 45) and some minor amendments thereto dated November 3.

⁴ Not printed. This despatch transmitted a French translation of a note of November 2 from Herr von Hoesch to M. Briand requesting the *agrément* of the interested governments for the appointment of Baron Langwerth von Simmern, German Ambassador at Madrid, as German Commissioner for the occupied territory. The German Government considered this appointment would offer 'la garantie d'une collaboration loyale avec la Haute-Commission Interalliée des Territoires Rhénans'.

⁵ Not printed. This despatch transmitted a French note of November 4 which recapitulated the conditions stipulated in No. 23 for the reappointment of a German Commissioner, and stated that of these the first was fulfilled by the assurance in the German note of November 2 (see note 4 above) and the fourth had also been fulfilled (cf. No. 43). In view of the impending modifications in the Rhineland régime the French Government would not insist on their third condition regarding direct contacts with the German authorities. The French note continued: 'Par contre, il demeure hautement désirable, dans l'intérêt d'une amélioration durable de relations entre la population allemande et les troupes d'occupation et pour la sécurité de celles-ci, que l'activité des associations nationalistes soit réprimée. Il est donc

of a German commissioner in the Rhineland. M. Briand told me to-night that he hoped that the Conference would be in a position to take a decision on this point also at the meeting on November 6th.

important d'obtenir sur ce point des assurances positives de la part du Gouvernement du Reich. Mais, pour faciliter à cet égard la tâche du Gouvernement allemand, il n'est pas nécessaire que ces assurances soient fournies par écrit. Il suffirait que le président de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs reçût de la conférence mission d'entretenir de la question M. von Hoesch en lui demandant de faire savoir à Berlin que, dès que des apaisements nous auraient été donnés à ce sujet, la conférence notifierait son agrément à la nomination du Baron Langwerth.'

Attached to the French note was a draft reply to the German note of November 2, conveying the *agrément* of the Allied Governments for Baron Langwerth von Simmern's appointment as German Commissioner. After recapitulating the German assurance cited in note 4 above, this French draft stated in particular:

'Les Gouvernements alliés ont pris acte avec plaisir de cette déclaration où ils voient la promesse que le représentant allemand dans les territoires occupés s'emploiera à faciliter les rapports entre les troupes et les autorités d'occupation d'une part, et la population et les autorités allemandes, d'autre part, et qu'il fera en particulier ce qui dépendra de lui pour contribuer à l'apaisement préparé par la conclusion des accords de Locarno.'

'Les mesures déjà prises dans ce sens, notamment les nouvelles instructions envoyées aux autorités allemandes dans les territoires occupés, donnent d'ailleurs à la conférence l'assurance qu'elles [*sic*] interprète exactement les intentions, à cet égard, du Gouvernement du Reich.'

No. 56

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 1978 [C 14081/13120/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 4, 1925*

My Lord,

The French Ambassador left with me this afternoon a copy of instructions issued to Monsieur de Margerie¹ for a communication which he is to make to Dr. Stresemann on the subject of what are called the reactions of the Locarno treaties. I attach a copy of these instructions which seem to me liberal in spirit and wise in policy. Your Lordship will be aware from my telegrams Nos. 216 of yesterday and No. 218 of today² that the utterances of the German ministers had caused me some uneasiness and it is clear that they have disturbed Monsieur Briand. The political situation in France at the present time does not render his task easier and the secession of the German Nationalist Ministers has increased the fears of French Nationalists and of French soldiers of high position who are inclined to repeat Monsieur Poincaré's argument that Germans understand no argument but force, and that if we relax any of our precautions before they have done their part, they will take such advantages as they may have obtained, and decline after all to ratify the Pact. I do not share these fears, but they are not unnatural and they make discretion on the part of the German ministers almost as necessary as good

¹ French Ambassador at Berlin.

² Nos. 48 and 53 respectively.

faith. I accordingly asked Monsieur de Fleuriau to request the French Government to direct Monsieur de Margerie to communicate his instructions to you, and I am telegraphing to you³ to support the representations which he will make to Dr. Stresemann.

[I am, &c.,]

A[USTEN] C[HAMBERLAIN]

ENCLOSURE IN No. 56

Instructions à M. de Margerie

‘Les renseignements recueillis récemment par le Gouvernement Français lui font une nécessité, pour éviter tout malentendu, de marquer nettement la position française dans les négociations consécutives au Pacte de Locarno. Il risquerait en ne le faisant pas, se laisser entraîner soit à des concessions que ne ratifierait pas l’opinion publique, soit à une rupture dangereuse.

‘Le Gouvernement français a décidé pour arriver à la détente morale entre la France et l’Allemagne, de donner au peuple allemand des gages incontestables de ses sentiments pacifiques et généreux, en hâtant l’évacuation de Cologne et réduisant au minimum les charges de l’occupation rhénane.

‘M. Briand a déclaré à M.M. Luther et Streseman[n] qu’il voulait garder l’initiative de ces concessions et adoucissements et qu’il n’admettrait ni marchandage, ni conditions avant la signature du Pacte de sécurité, ni pression après. Dès son retour à Paris, M. Briand a donné des instructions à M. Tirard et au Général Guillaumat⁴ et provoqué des avis de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs, du Comité militaire interallié de Versailles et de la Commission militaire de Contrôle de Berlin.

‘Ces consultations qui ne sont pas entièrement achevées ont amené en principe le Gouvernement Français à envisager les mesures suivantes:

‘1.—L’occupation rhénane qui n’a d’autre but que de garantir l’exécution du Traité de Versailles serait allégée dans toute la mesure compatible avec la sécurité des troupes (dont les effectifs pourraient être sensiblement diminués).

‘2.—Le régime de l’occupation au point de vue administratif serait entièrement refondu (suppression des Délégués, suppression ou atténuation des ordonnances, amnistie des condamnés relevant des tribunaux militaires, rétablissement du Commissaire d’Empire pour régler d’accord tous cas ou incidents nouveaux, abstention de toute ingérence administrative, restitution des écoles, terrains de sport, etc., non indispensables aux troupes, etc. . .).⁵

‘En adoptant une politique aussi largement libérale, le Gouvernement Français se conforme à l’esprit des accords de Locarno et il a confiance que l’attitude des autorités et de la population allemandes vis à vis des troupes d’occupation en assurera le maintien.

³ In Foreign Office telegram No. 219 to Berlin of November 4 (not printed).

⁴ Commander of the French troops in the Rhineland.

⁵ Punctuation as in original quotation.

'Le Gouvernement Français ne se préoccupera en rien des discussions de la politique intérieure allemande, auxquelles il veut rester étranger, confiant qu'il est dans la ratification des accords de Locarno et dans leur signature définitive à Londres, le 1^{er} Décembre, par M. Luther et M. Streseman.

'Nous sommes disposés à nous entendre avec M. Streseman sur la date et la forme où les nouvelles mesures seront annoncées en bloc à l'opinion allemande pour aider dans sa tâche le Gouvernement allemand, et les concessions de la France seront *annoncées* immédiatement et *appliquées* aussitôt après la signature.

'Mais le Gouvernement Français compte s'en tenir à ces mesures et, si libéral qu'il soit disposé à se montrer dans la question du désarmement, il n'acceptera ni de renoncer à régler les points essentiels en suspens, (spécialement les questions de recrutement et d'encadrement de la police de sûreté, qui ont une importance capitale,) ni de laisser poser, de quelque manière que ce soit, par l'Allemagne la question d'une évacuation anticipée des deuxième et troisième zones d'occupation, dont il n'a jamais été question dans les conversations de Locarno, qui constitue la garantie de l'exécution du Traité de Versailles et reste encore liée au paiement des réparations dont l'anticipation pourrait seule justifier la réduction. Cette évacuation ne pourrait être posée que par les événements mêmes, si les espérances que font concevoir aux uns et aux autres le Pacte, viennent à se réaliser.

'Le Gouvernement Français espère que le Gouvernement allemand appréciera la netteté et la largeur de vues dont s'inspire l'attitude française et qu'il y répondra avec une égale loyauté et sans chercher à obtenir de nous des concessions nouvelles, incompatibles avec nos intérêts vitaux et inacceptables par l'opinion française.' (fin des instructions à Berlin)

La France compte sur l'appui de l'Angleterre qui sait que la République n'a aucune visée annexioniste sur le Rhin et ne poursuit aucune politique de domination. En supprimant volontairement l'instrument d'action politique que le régime administratif de l'occupation plaçait entre ses mains et en se contentant de voir l'occupation assurée et la sécurité des troupes garanties, le Gouvernement Français donne un gage incontestable de la loyauté de ses vues. Il est dès lors en droit de réclamer l'appui du Gouvernement anglais pour la défense de ses justes revendications.

No. 57

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)

*No. 883 [C 14082/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 4, 1925*

Sir,

The Polish Minister called upon me yesterday morning to convey a message from Count Skrzynski which he had been unable to deliver earlier owing to my absence in Paris. Count Skrzynski had desired him again to thank me for the help which I had given to Poland at the Locarno

Conference. M. Skirmunt said that he was instructed to add that in suspending the German deportations,¹ with the intention of never again enforcing them, Count Skrzynski had desired certainly in the first place to show that the Polish Government would work in the full spirit of Locarno, but that he had been particularly actuated by his knowledge that I wished this done and attached importance to it.

I repeated to M. Skirmunt my appreciation of the attitude of Count Skrzynski during the conference and still more of the generosity and wisdom of the act of state of which he had just spoken. I was glad to recognise that Count Skrzynski, on his side, had throughout been entirely loyal to the promise which he had given me at Geneva in March that Poland should be no obstacle to our policy of appeasement.

M. Skirmunt then asked me how I viewed the prospects in Germany, and I told him that I had every confidence that the Chancellor and Herr Stresemann would sign the treaties on the 1st December and would carry through their policy in Germany. M. Skirmunt further enquired what was being done in regard to disarmament and the evacuation of Cologne. He remarked that there was a feeling in military circles in Poland that if the western Powers made concessions to Germany on the subject of disarmament, these very concessions might involve the maintenance by Poland of larger forces than she would otherwise desire to keep up. I thought this view dangerous and impolitic. I advised M. Skirmunt to await the announcement of the decisions taken by the western Powers. Whatever concessions we might make, Germany was disarmed and would remain disarmed and incapable for a long time to come of conducting an aggressive war. No doubt if military advisers were asked what precautions were necessary to give absolute safety, their natural desire to safeguard their own responsibility might lead in some cases to exaggerated demands, but the present was an occasion in which political considerations had great and, up to a point, superior importance, and statesmen must see to it that the advantages of Locarno were not lost through idle fears and suspicions or through a meticulous insistence on impossible or unnecessary conditions. I have no doubt that M. Skirmunt will convey the sense of my observations to Count Skrzynski. If he should speak to you upon the subject, you will know what language to hold. It is in the interest of all the countries concerned that when the Locarno treaties have been ratified and their security thus assured, their budgets should be relieved of some part of the high military expenditure which now weighs down Europe, whilst the extent to which credits may be available must inevitably depend on the sense of security prevailing among investors, which in turn will be dependent on their feeling that these treaties have brought in real peace and have induced the nations concerned to put away the thought of war.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ See No. 24.

No. 58

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 220 Telegraphic [C 14066/13120/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 5, 1925, 2 a.m.*

Your Nos. 417¹ and 418.²

I assume from your messages that Stresemann keeps French Ambassador equally well informed on all the aspects of the situation and that you yourself are in constant and close communication with Monsieur de Margerie. This is essential at the stage we have now reached.

Secret. I should greatly regret any change in Chancellorship at this juncture. Would the German parties who support Locarno feel equally sure of their ground if at this moment the French government dropped Briand? Do they not see that for us Luther and Stresemann stand for the Locarno reconciliation, that they have won our confidence as we have I trust won theirs and that it is a bad moment to swop horses.

I can give no instructions for your guidance in this very delicate question. All I can do is to express my thoughts frankly to you and leave the rest to your judgment, but I have worked with Luther and I have confidence in him.

¹ No. 49.

² See No. 49, note 4.

No. 59

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 5, 5 p.m.)

No. 408 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 14125/21/18]

PARIS, *November 5, 1925*

My telegram No. 407.¹

M. Briand sent M. Massigli to see me this morning on the disarmament and evacuation question.

M. Massigli explained that whilst M. Briand, as you knew, was animated in all these questions by the resolve to establish a real *détente* with Germany, he had, after my *aide-mémoire*² of last evening had been examined with his political advisers, found that there were two points of difficulty.

As you knew, M. Briand had made it perfectly plain to M. Stresemann that he did not intend to allow the latter to use the negotiation of the Pact or its signature as a means of bargaining on disarmament or Cologne. On this question the French government had made up its mind that there were certain points in the 4th schedule annexed to the German note on which French opinion required that Germany should give satisfaction. The French

¹ Not printed. This telegram foreshadowed the present telegram.

² See No. 55, note 2.

government would be most reasonable about the manner in which satisfaction was given. But M. Briand did not feel that, as suggested in paragraphs 9-15 of your despatch No. 3625,³ the best way would be to make definite demands on Germany in respect of these points. In the event of incomplete acceptance from Germany the Allies would be in a very difficult position. Let them rather, whilst making it clear that, in respect of police and associations, there were certain points which could not be conceded, ask the German government to forward its own proposals. These proposals would then be examined not by the Control Commission but in Paris, and the Allies would not risk being faced by a German *non possumus*.

Further as regards the fixation of December 1st as the date of the beginning of the evacuation, M. Briand thought, after discussion with his political advisers, that this was not possible. It was, in any case, too early a date, and if the Germans made difficulties it might, under the risk of grave disadvantages be necessary to postpone it.

I did not argue with M. Massigli on the question of leaving the Germans to make proposals, for M. Briand's attitude seems to me reasonable, and I hope you will fall in with it.

On the question of the date, however, I took a strong line and urged vigorously the necessity of naming December 1st. In support of my contention, I argued the ill effect on the position of the German government of continued uncertainty, and the importance of beginning the evacuation coincidentally with the signature of the Locarno agreements. I stressed, moreover, the fact that the beginning of the evacuation would in practice probably only mean the departure of the first battalion.

After considerable discussion M. Massigli, still claiming that December 1st was too early, suggested a vague reference to January 1st. I said that this was too late, but eventually as a possible compromise promised to submit to you December 15th.

M. Massigli, on his side, undertook to submit this to M. Briand, and I have just heard that the latter approves.

My immediately following telegram⁴ contains text of draft note, and I should be glad of your views by telephone this evening.

³ No. 50.

⁴ Not printed. The first six paragraphs of the draft in this telegram corresponded closely with the equivalent paragraphs of the final text of the note of November 6 from the Conference of Ambassadors to the German Ambassador at Paris, printed as item No. 2 in Cmd. 2527 of 1925. Paris telegram No. 409 concluded as follows:

'Paragraph 7. But by reason of importance which may attach to points still in suspense they think it necessary before making a final appreciation of execution of disarmament clauses, that an agreement be realised on the programme still to be accomplished. They therefore ask German government to inform them without delay of its proposals with a view to the settlement of execution of questions mentioned in fourth list and they readily give the German government assurance that they will examine these proposals in widest spirit of conciliation.

'Nevertheless, they must inform German government that particularly on points 1 and 5 of fourth list no proposals can be considered by them which would not result in depriving the police of its military organisation, and which would not prevent associations of whatever

As regards amnesty question M. Briand agrees to M. von Hoesch being asked through M. Cambon to urge German government to come forward with a proposal. M. Cambon will also bring to M. von Hoesch's attention counter-concession proposed by Rhineland Commission.

M. Briand agrees to all details of evacuation—military and civil—being settled between Rhineland Commission and local authorities.

nature they be from occupying themselves with military questions and from having no liaison with Ministry of war or any other military authority.

'Paragraph 8. If German government, as allies do not doubt, conform to their wishes in this respect, Ambassadors Conference firmly hope that, after having taken note of German proposals on this point, it will be possible for it to fix date at which evacuation of first zone can take place. Conference will be happy if German answer permitted fixation at [sic] beginning of evacuation for December 15th.'

No. 60

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 222 Telegraphic [C 14127/13120/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 5, 1925, 7 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 417¹ (of November 3rd) and my telegram No. 219² (of November 4th; alleviations in the Rhineland).

I leave it to your discretion to determine in conjunction with your French and Belgian colleagues and with Dr. Stresemann the date and form of the communication to be made to the German government. The important thing is of course to give Dr. Stresemann all the assistance possible in dealing with his public opinion while keeping absolutely in line with France.

Repeated to Coblenz No. 36, Paris (By Bag) No. 316 and Brussels No. 116.³

¹ No. 49.

² See No. 56, note 3.

³ In his telegram No. 117 to Brussels Mr. Chamberlain instructed Sir G. Grahame to 'keep in constant touch with Belgian government and express confident expectation that necessary instructions have been sent to Belgian Ambassador in Berlin to act in conjunction with his British and French colleagues'. Sir G. Grahame replied in Brussels telegram No. 111 of November 6: 'I have this morning seen Minister for Foreign Affairs. He will renew instructions to the Belgian Minister at Berlin in the sense which you desire. Monsieur Vandervelde and high officials at Ministry assure me that they have every wish to expedite settlement of pending questions and that Belgian representatives abroad have been made fully aware of the attitude of Belgian government.'

No. 61

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Colonel Ryan (Coblenz)

No. 35 Telegraphic [C 14127/13120/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 5, 1925, 7 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 43¹ and 44² (of the 2nd and 3rd November; alleviations in Rhineland).

¹ No. 47.

² Not printed. In this telegram Colonel Ryan had reported in particular: 'My French colleague tells me that M. Briand considers notification of concession should be made by

I concur in suggestion that a declaration by governments will meet the case better than a press communiqué issued by the High Commission, and I have requested Lord d'Abernon to support the action that the French Ambassador in Berlin has already been instructed to take in the matter (see my telegram No. 219 to Berlin.)³ The idea of a press communiqué will accordingly lapse.

In regard to your telegram No. 43 I am informing War Office that I propose to concur in all alleviations proposed by the High Commission with exception of that in regard to military courts. This raises an issue of such complexity that I do not feel justified in over-riding the military authorities without full consultation with the War Office after receiving detailed report from you of what exactly is proposed and what the proposal implies. Please send report as soon as possible, showing more particularly whether the French are prepared to make this concession. *Prima facie* I am not prepared to be behind France in any of the proposed alleviations.⁴

Repeated to Paris No. 315 (by bag), Berlin No. 221 and Brussels No. 115.

the government[s] rather than by the High Commission. I am of the same opinion as I feel sure that a declaration by government[s] will create a much greater impression in Germany than a communiqué issued by a subordinate body like the commission.'

³ See No. 56, note 3.

⁴ With reference to the present telegram, Foreign Office despatch No. 772 to Coblenz of November 6 transmitted to Colonel Ryan copies of correspondence of November 5-6 between the War Office and the Foreign Office (not printed), and stated: '2. You will observe that the Army Council entirely agree as to the undesirability of opposing any modifications to which the French do not object, and that they are prepared to agree to the abolition of the postal censorship and to the reduction of penalties under articles [ordinances] 295 and 304 respecting illegal associations, provided that the French military authorities on the Rhine have signified their agreement.'

'3. You are therefore authorised to accept the alleviations referred to in your telegram No. 41 of the 1st November [No. 44], with the exception of that in regard to military courts.'

No. 62

Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 313 Telegraphic: by bag [C 14065/13120/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 5, 1925, 7 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 406¹ paragraph 5. (Arrangements for the evacuation of Cologne.)

I agree that the details of the evacuation should be left so far as possible to the local allied and German authorities to work out.

As regards the question of amnesty, I am wholly in agreement with High Commission's suggestion to remit, with certain exceptions, the sentences now being undergone by Germans for offences against the armies or the ordinances.

¹ No. 55.

I have received a note² from the French Ambassador asking for assurances that we shall guarantee against eventual reprisals the French nationals established in the Wiesbaden area and the Germans who were on good terms with the French authorities during French occupation of that area. You might point out to the French government that we appreciate their preoccupation and feel that it will be met by accepting the High Commission's proposal for an amnesty, with regard to which our views have already been communicated to them by Your Lordship.

² This note of November 4 is not printed.

No. 63

Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 319 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 14125/21/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 5, 1925, 8.15 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 408¹ and 409.²

Method proposed by French government for dealing with part 4 of German note of October 23rd is approved. But I am most anxious that before German reply is received to this invitation for their proposals on police or associations, maximum degree of agreement should have been reached in advance between M. Briand and German Ambassador in Paris so that there may be real prospect of a settlement. I feel that this is of real consequence; and M. Briand will remember that it tallies exactly with the procedure which he himself suggested to the German delegates at Locarno.

As to date of evacuation, I earnestly hope that M. Briand will ascertain from German Ambassador the relative value to Germany of the dates December 1st and December 15th. To me it seemed it was a matter of real political consequence that it should be announced that evacuation will begin on the date of signature, i.e. December 1st. December 1st has a definite meaning; December 15th has none. Delay of a fortnight has no military advantage and might I think have grave political disadvantage. Please put these arguments before M. Briand personally with all the force at your command letting him know that I feel strongly on the subject.

Subject to the above observations I approve terms of draft note given in your telegram No. 409 provided the purely verbal amendments in paragraph 7 shown in my immediately following telegram³ are made. My reason for these alterations is to avoid present double negative which, as M. Briand will equally remember, Herr Stresemann stated to be untranslatable into German: its elimination also improves the English.

¹ No. 59.

² See No. 59, note 4.

³ Not printed. This telegram gave a revised text of the second paragraph cited in No. 59, note 4, reading '... on points 1 and 5 of fourth list any proposals to be considered by them must comprise provisions for depriving the police of its military organisation and for preventing associations', &c.

*Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)**No. 1988 [C 14155/13120/18]**FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 5, 1925*

My Lord,

The German Ambassador informed me to-day that he was instructed by his Government to speak to me of the position of the German Government in consequence of the attitude assumed by the Nationalist party. It had been decided to reconstitute the Government with the aid of the parties of the Left; this reconstitution, however, could not take place until Germany had tangible evidence of the intention of the Western Powers to fulfil the expectations aroused by the Treaty of Locarno. There was an impression in Berlin that for some reason we were slowing down the policy of concession and alleviation. This held up the reconstruction of the German Government, for the Socialists were not prepared to assume responsibility for the pact and to expose themselves to denunciation as traitors by the Nationalists unless they were convinced that the expectations held out by the Chancellor and Dr. Stresemann were justified. What, therefore, the German Government desired was that at the earliest possible moment, say by the 10th of this month, a declaration should be made by the Allies on this subject and a date fixed, say the 15th of this month, for beginning the evacuation of Cologne.

In reply, I informed Dr. Sthamer that there was absolutely no foundation for the rumour that we were holding back. I could speak with knowledge not only of what had been done by my own Government, but of what had been done by the French Government. No sooner had the Ministers returned from Locarno than they had set to work on the programme which they had there foreshadowed. It was our desire to give evidence at the earliest possible moment of the results of Locarno, but the dates named by him were in any case too early. Material conditions made it impossible to begin the evacuation of Cologne by the 15th November. I added that the action of the Nationalists undoubtedly made our course more difficult, but it had not turned us from our purpose. There must, however, be goodwill and helpfulness on the German side also. Above all, they must not make the mistake of asking the impossible, such as an assurance that the period of occupation of the remaining zones would be shortened, nor the equally grave mistake of treating concessions which would have appeared impossible to them a month ago, and which they now saw within their grasp, as valueless from the moment that they were offered, or of allowing themselves and their public to think that nothing was of any value except that which was refused.

Before making this statement I had asked the Ambassador whether he was speaking on instructions from his Government, as I found it a little difficult to reconcile the communication which he made to me with the last information I had received from Berlin. On his replying in the affirmative, I observed

that your Lordship had indeed advised us not to act immediately after the resignation of the Nationalist Ministers lest our concessions should appear in the light of blackmail paid to them rather than as an act of goodwill to the German Government and the German nation as a whole; and I had understood from your Lordship that Dr. Stresemann himself had desired that our programme should be announced as a whole and that concessions should not be allowed to leak out piecemeal.¹ In any case the French Ambassador and your Lordship would be making a communication to the German Government in a day or two, if, indeed, you had not already done so at the moment at which we were speaking.

The Ambassador took the occasion to repeat that the words attributed to Dr. Stresemann regarding an utterance of mine at Locarno,² had not been used by him, and said that in addition to the communication³ made to Sir William Tyrrell yesterday by Count Bernstorff,⁴ he had to-day received a telegram from Dr. Stresemann informing him that the report in question had only appeared in one inconspicuous Dresden newspaper and not in the more important papers of that city. I told Dr. Sthamer that I had been very glad to see the *démenti*, for the particular language attributed to me was just such as was calculated to arouse the greatest opposition in this country. The incident was only important as showing how necessary it was that on all sides we should use extreme caution in our public utterances.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ See No. 49.

² Cf. Nos. 48 and 54.

³ This communication is not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

⁴ First Secretary in the German Embassy in London.

No. 65

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Mr. Peters (Moscow)

No. 1079 [N 6213/102/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 5, 1925*

Sir,

Monsieur Rakovski paid me a farewell visit to-day. He thanked me for the courtesy I had uniformly [*sic*] shown him and expressed his regret that it had not been in his power to do more to establish better relations between his Government and ourselves.

I replied that I was pretty well informed as to the views held by Monsieur Chicherin on British policy and the language that he had held in Warsaw, Berlin and elsewhere. I knew that he had spoken of a memorandum which it was alleged had been issued by the Foreign Office to these and other Governments proposing the formation of an anti-Soviet block, and that he suffered under an obsession that my whole policy was directed to the isolation

of Russia.¹ There was not an atom of foundation for these suspicions. I had always spoken frankly to Monsieur Rakovski, had told him the truth and the whole truth. No such memorandum had ever gone out from this Office; to no Government had I ever made a proposal for the formation of an anti-Soviet combination. On the contrary, the policy of His Majesty's Government was one of pacification. We had proved this at Locarno where we had worked for reconciliation with a former enemy on the basis of our friendship with our former Ally. The appeasement which we had thus achieved in the sphere in which we were most immediately interested, we hoped might be attained in other spheres; and so far from discouraging the neighbours of Russia or any neighbours to improve the relations existing between them my advice had always been given in the contrary sense.

It was of course true that I had not encouraged Monsieur Rakovski to enter into new negotiations with me, but this was in view of the ceaseless activities of Soviet agencies against the British Empire and the constant interference by these agencies in the internal affairs of other countries. I could have no confidence that any new engagements would be kept. What was needed to improve our relations was a cessation of these hostile activities, on the part, not only of the Soviet Government, but of the Third International which was so closely associated with it.

Monsieur Rakovski thanked me for the declaration I had made about the memorandum, all the more because he himself had always reported to Moscow that my attitude was such as I had described. The trouble, however, was that it was felt in Moscow that, whilst I might be pursuing a general policy of appeasement, my colleagues did not allow me to give full effect to it, and that, apart from influences within the Cabinet, there was a section of opinion in this country, well represented in the Press, which regarded the existence of the Soviet Government as a danger to the peace of the world and demanded its overthrow.

To this I replied in the first place, that there was no foundation for the belief that there had been any difference between my colleagues and myself in regard to the policy to be followed in relation to Soviet Russia. I had myself proposed that policy to the Cabinet, and my colleagues had supported me in it throughout. Briefly it was this, that though we had ample grounds on which to base a rupture of relations with the Soviet Government, and, though we had tolerated from that Government more than we had ever tolerated from the Governments of the Czars, I desired if possible to avoid a rupture. I held that sooner or later the Soviet Government would discover its mistake and become aware that it had more need of us than we had of it.

¹ On November 6 Mr. Peters reported in Moscow despatch No. 763 that M. Litvinov, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, had cited a speech by Mr. Ormsby Gore, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs (see *The Times* of October 26, 1925, p. 8), as 'proof that British policy was directly aimed against the Soviet Union'. In Foreign Office despatch No. 1122 to Moscow of November 20 Mr. Peters was instructed to draw M. Litvinov's attention to Mr. Ormsby Gore's explanation of this speech and to statements by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on November 18: see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 188, cols. 438-42.

Meanwhile we could protect our own interests against any dangers that might threaten them. As to what he had said of a section of public opinion or of the Press, it was no doubt true that such an opinion existed, but what possibility would there be of good international relations if Governments refused to deal with one another because the policy of these Governments did not meet with universal support among their own people? Was I to refuse to treat with Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann because of the attitude of the German Nationalists, or to recognise Monsieur Mussolini as a representative of Italy because some part of the Italian people were vehemently opposed to his policy? Surely this was an absurdity and a dangerous one. I took the opportunity to warn Monsieur Rakovski against the danger to which any country exposed itself, which, like Germany before the war, took as a principle of policy for itself that it was necessary that it should prevent good relations existing between other countries.

Monsieur Rakovski referred to something which had appeared in yesterday's 'Daily Telegraph', and said that he could assure me that in going to Paris he had no idea of attempting to disturb Anglo-French relations. He trusted that I would accept this assurance. I said that I accepted it fully, and, if he would allow me to say so without offence, I should accept it, if for no other reason, because Monsieur Rakovski was far too intelligent a person and far too well informed to suppose that such a policy could have any chance of success. Monsieur Rakovski, taking up a word I had used earlier in connection with the obsessions of Monsieur Chicherin, replied that this policy would be 'idiot'.

He then went on the [*sic*] speak of the Third International. As once before, he said that the Soviet Government was a new Government—only eight years old and bred of revolution—but it was changing, and the change of mind was affecting the Third International also. Certainly there was force in my observation that Russia had need of credits and commerce and suffered from their interruption, but he would suggest that the true way to reform the Third International and to encourage the change that was already taking place in it, was to develop commerce and to give these credits. This, of course, is an argument which we have often heard before.

I was not called upon to reply to it as at that moment the visit of the German Ambassador was announced and our conversation came to an end. In taking leave of him, however, I made a last observation. I repeated that I had nothing to do with the internal policy of another country or with the Government in its domestic relations. I dealt with Governments as Governments, but I was sometimes inclined to ask myself whether the Soviet Government was indeed the Government of Russia or only the instrument of another body. I invited Monsieur Rakovski to ponder this observation.²

[I am, &c.,]

A[USTEN] C[HAMBERLAIN]

² This despatch is printed as item No. 12 in Cmd. 2895 of 1927.

*Memorandum by Mr. Wigram (Paris)*¹

[C 14399/21/18]

PARIS, November 5, 1925

Monsieur Laroche called at the Embassy this afternoon on a small personal matter, and I took the opportunity of talking to him further about the disarmament and Cologne questions.

Monsieur Laroche said that he did not think that the people yet realised, what was fully understood, however, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the great change which French policy had undergone with the negotiation of the Locarno agreements. I had no doubt read the early volumes of Sorel '*L'Europe et la Révolution Française*'² and I would be aware of the contradistinction which was drawn there between the two types of French policy, that of 'magnificence' on the one hand, and of 'realisation' or 'consolidation' on the other. The policy of 'magnificence' which had been pursued [*sic*] by Louis XIV, Napoleon, and it might almost be said in recent years by Monsieur Poincaré, aimed at guaranteeing the security of France by territorial aggrandizement in Western Europe. The policy of 'realisation' or 'consolidation' on the other hand aimed at the maintenance of the French historic frontiers by a policy of reliance upon the treaties.

At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs it was held that the conclusion of the Locarno agreements signified the final abandonment of 'magnificence' and the taking of a decision in favour of the policy of 'realisation'.

But this did not mean that Germany could flout the treaties, and, as regards disarmament, which was now the case in point, demand concessions which went beyond the treaties, and which it was not reasonable to expect France to grant. France having abandoned the policy of 'magnificence' was now actuated on the Rhine by no imperialist or political motive. She would make, with the object of promoting a *détente* with Germany all possible concessions to Germany, and to Great Britain also, but the disarmament clauses of the Treaty³ were part of the guarantee of her historic frontiers, and there were points in the disarmament clauses which she was, from the stand point of her security, not prepared to concede. Monsieur Laroche hoped that this was realised in London.

Monsieur Laroche then turned to the question of the bearing of the Rhine occupation on the reparation clauses. He said that if, like France after the Treaty of Frankfort,⁴ Germany were now prepared and able to come forward with the offer of a large and adequate lump sum, France would accept it, and the French troops would leave the Coblenz and Mainz Zones the day

¹ This memorandum was received in the Foreign Office on November 11 under cover of a letter of November 9 from Mr. Wigram to Mr. Lampson (not preserved in Foreign Office archives). Mr. Wigram was First Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Paris.

² Paris, 1885-1904.

³ Of Versailles.

⁴ This Franco-German peace treaty of May 10, 1871, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 62, pp. 77-86.

after the money had been paid. Once the treaties of Locarno had been signed there would in such circumstances be no other reason for France to remain on the Rhine. But, if Germany contented herself with the liquidation of her reparation debt by the payment only of annuities, then France would remain at Coblenz until 1930 and at Mainz until 1935. Provided Germany was at that date showing good faith in the execution of her reparation obligations, France would then leave the Rhine, but, if not, she would remain there, and she would return there should Germany in any future year fail to discharge the obligation due.

With what authority Monsieur Laroche was speaking I do not know, and probably it would not be fair to quote him to any French authority as the author of the above statement.⁵

⁵ Mr. Howard Smith, Sir W. Tyrrell, and Mr. Chamberlain minuted as follows:

'The question is:—Could Germany pay an *adequate* lump sum? C. Howard Smith 12/11/25.'

'The longer she waits the more adequate the sum may appear to France, if her financial decline continues. W. T. 14/11.'

'Monsieur Laroche's views are not altogether reassuring, but much depends on their application and it would, I think, be a mistake to get into an argument about a hypothetical situation which may never arise. A. C. 16/11.'

No. 67

*Colonel Ryan (Coblenz) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 7, 9.30 a.m.)*

No. 46 Telegraphic [C 14304/13120/18]

COBLENZ, November 6, 1925, 9.15 p.m.

My French colleague read to me to-day Monsieur Briand's instructions to French Ambassador at Berlin.¹

They contain two statements relative to concessions in Rhineland régime to which I venture to draw your attention.

I doubt if expression 'suppression or attenuation of the ordinances' is happily worded as it is likely either to give rise to doubt now, or to disappointment later.

Since it is necessary that there must be some ordinances in existence, what will happen is, that the present body of ordinances will be repealed and replaced by others, limited in number and drawn up to meet essential needs of armies and so far as may be possible the wishes of the population. A wording more in this sense would be preferable.

In the second place M. Briand speaks of 'suppression of delegates'. This I presume means their complete disappearance and, as satisfying completely German demands, has much to be said for it. But in spite of fact that the delegate system has been much abused in the past I have doubts whether it is to our interest and that of Germans completely to abolish them.

¹ See enclosure in No. 56.

It is inevitable that however much ordinances are attenuated some control must continue to be exercised, in the interests of security of the armies, over meetings of associations, arms etc.

Since this control must be to a certain extent carried out locally it must, failing presence of delegates, fall to officers of armies who are entirely removed from supervision of the High Commission.

French army in particular, I fear, may be tempted to undue interference. For practical reasons as well as to conform to Rhineland agreement, the object of which was to substitute civil for military control, I would therefore like to see retained one delegate for British and Belgians and two for French zone.

While bringing these points to your notice I realise, however, very fully that the political may outweigh at the moment the practical considerations.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 46. Sent to Berlin No. 14.

No. 68

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 7, 9 a.m.)

No. 425 Telegraphic [C 14203/13120/18]

BERLIN, November 6, 1925, 9.15 p.m.

Your telegram No. 218.¹

I have had fresh conversation with Stresemann regarding article No. 431.² He does not claim anything as a right or as an integral part of negotiations. But he suggests that if something of the following nature could be said it would facilitate acceptance of the Pact of Security.

'I have already stated that nothing in the Pact of Locarno runs contrary to the treaty of Versailles, and this statement applies both to clauses which establish German obligations and to those clauses which establish German rights. German rights under article 431 are not increased by the Pact. But on the other hand there is no idea that by Locarno possibilities open to Germany in virtue of article 431 are in anyway modified or restricted. As performance by Germany is rendered more easy through improved atmosphere created, so do chances of complete execution and its consequences increase'.

Stresemann's suggestion ends.³

My personal opinion on the above is that nothing more is wanted just now; allied decision as to Cologne and Rhineland alleviations should be enough to carry public opinion here and win adequate support.

The Stresemann suggestion might be kept for future use, if and when required.

¹ No. 53.

² Of the Treaty of Versailles.

³ For the conversations with Dr. Stresemann recorded in the present telegram, No. 69, and No. 69, note 2, cf. also Eric Sutton, *Gustav Stresemann, op cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 207-9. See *ibid.*, pp. 209-10, for a third conversation, on November 8, between Lord D'Abernon and Dr. Stresemann.

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 7, 9 a.m.)

No. 426 Telegraphic [C 14212/13120/18]

BERLIN, November 6, 1925, 9.20 p.m.

I have just seen Minister for Foreign Affairs who read me a telegram from German Ambassador in Paris recounting interview with Berthelot.

Berthelot said that French Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin would be instructed to agree with representatives of England and Belgium and with Stresemann on appropriate form and date for publication of Rhineland reactions.

Speaking confidentially, Berthelot indicated that decisions would probably comprehend (1) Commencement of Cologne evacuation on December 15th; (2) continuation and rapid conclusion of German disarmament; (3) considerable reduction of occupying troops in zones 2 and 3; (4) entire abolition of system of delegates; (5) alteration of ordinances; (6) amnesty.

Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared highly gratified at completeness of this list and said that only point on which he wanted greater precision was fixing of date for end of Cologne evacuation. Public opinion here was difficult and if no date for conclusion was stated they would suspect some hidden design.

I told him any such apprehension was quite unfounded but that material measures necessary for transfer to Wiesbaden required a certain time.

His Excellency urged that a very early date should be fixed for conclusion of evacuation.

Stresemann was particularly pleased with decision to concert the manner and date of publication regarding alleviations in Rhineland with German government. He said he was now of opinion that the sooner communication could be made, the better it would be. Next week would suit admirably.

As soon as German Cabinet had received communication of the reactions they would take a formal decision finally accepting Pact of Locarno. They would then commence a campaign throughout the country to get support for it. Up to the present they had not been able to act in this manner as their decision inadvertently depends upon reactions.¹

His Excellency said that in his whole political experience he had never known more widespread approval of an act of policy than that evoked by Locarno negotiations. Educated opinion in Germany was cumulative and definite for acceptance and he believed when it came to a point a large section of German Nationals would vote in favour. Too much importance should not be attached by observers abroad to certain articles appearing in German press. These articles were inspired by considerations of internal policy and had no effect upon Germany's action abroad.²

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 425, repeated to Coblenz No. 10.

¹ In another text of this telegram the preceding passage read: 'their decision was dependent on (? confirmation of) reactions'.

² Lord D'Abernon further reported in his telegram No. 428 of November 8: 'Minister for

Foreign Affairs is anxious that as little as possible should be said about Alsace Lorraine in comment and in speeches on Locarno. It is the subject which is most likely to embitter the opposition to Pact and increase difficulties of the German government.¹

No. 70

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 7, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 411 Telegraphic: by bag [Germany 24/10]

PARIS, November 6, 1925

Your telegram No. 319.¹

2. I saw M. Briand before the conference this morning and put to him the importance which you attach to all possible agreement being reached between him and the German Ambassador in Paris on the disarmament question before the German Government replies to the note which the conference is sending to it to-day. M. Briand said that he was in complete agreement with your view and that he would act accordingly.

3. As regards the date of evacuation, I urged the arguments contained in the second paragraph of your telegram. M. Briand at first maintained the point of view put to me by M. Massigli on 5th November,² but I continued to press him, and, after a little discussion, he agreed that the question of date really concerned His Majesty's Government more than the French. Accordingly, he and M. Berthelot, who was present, accepted, in deference to your wishes, 1st December.

4. With reference to last paragraph of your telegram No. 313,³ I pointed out to M. Briand the fact that the case of French nationals in the Wiesbaden area could be met in conjunction with the proposals for the amnesty applicable to certain Germans. M. Briand agreed.

¹ No. 63.

² See No. 59.

³ No. 62.

No. 71

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 7, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 412 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/5]

PARIS, November 6, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the presidency of Monsieur Jules Cambon. I was present as well as the Italian and Japanese Ambassadors. Representatives of the Belgian and United States Embassies were also present. The following questions were discussed. . . .¹

¹ Sections 1, 2, 5 and 6, relating to other matters, are not printed.

3. *German Disarmament and Evacuation of Cologne*

(a) *Military questions.* The Versailles Committee's report of November 2nd (See my despatch No. 2323² of November 2nd) was read to the Conference and Marshal Foch communicated to the Conference a further report dated November 5th³ (copies not yet available) on the question of the high command. This latter report gave only the personal opinion of the members of the Versailles Committee.

Monsieur Camerlynck⁴ then read to the Conference the draft reply to the German note of October 23rd which had been drawn up by the French delegation after consideration of the Versailles Committee's report of November 2nd. This draft, a translation of the material part of which was telephoned to you last evening (see my telegram No. 409),⁵ had been further modified before the Conference met by the French and British secretaries in the light of your telegram No. 320⁶ and of Monsieur Briand's decision to accept December 1st as the date of the commencement of the evacuation (see my telegram No. 411⁷). No comments were made on the draft as thus modified until Monsieur Camerlynck reached the reading of the end of paragraph 7. Monsieur Cambon then pressed that a sentence might be inserted there to cover the conclusion reached respecting the high command in the Versailles Committee's report of November 5th. This sentence Marshal Foch suggested might read: 'In the same way on point 2 (high command) the Allied Governments can only hold to the application of Article 160 of the treaty of Versailles which forbids the maintenance or the formation of organizations of command larger than those of army corps.' I suggested at first that it would be greatly preferable not to overload the note, that it would be better to confine ourselves for the moment to the specific mention only of points 1 and 5 of the 4th list, and that the question of the high command might be left as one of the questions respecting which Monsieur Briand had undertaken, through Monsieur von Hoesch, to endeavour to bring the German government into line. The whole of the French delegation, however, including Monsieur Laroche and Monsieur Massigli, pressed for the insertion in the note of some reference to the high command, and in these circumstances I accepted a sentence reading: 'In the same way, as regards point 2 (high command) the eventual solution must be such as to prevent ("interdire") the maintenance or constitution of organizations of command larger than those of army corps.'

Paragraph 8 of the draft note was then read, and after Marshal Foch had pointed out that December 1st was too early a date to admit of the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in the note, had drawn attention to the danger of postponement and had suggested rather the insertion of the words: 'during December', the following final sentence was accepted: 'The Allied Govern-

² Not printed: cf. No. 50, note 3.

³ Not printed: cf. No. 80, paragraph 6.

⁴ Interpreter to the Conference of Ambassadors.

⁶ See No. 63, note 3.

⁵ See No. 59, note 4.

⁷ No. 70.

ments would be happy if the answer of your government enabled them to prepare ("envisager") for December 1st the beginning of the evacuation.'

The note⁸ as accepted by the Conference will be sent to the German Ambassador this afternoon, and I shall hope to send you copies by bag of November 8th.

(b) *Administrative questions.*

The Rhineland Commission reports of November [1st and] 3rd (see my despatches Nos. 2336 and 2343)⁹ were approved, and it was in principle decided that, when the moment arrived, the task of putting them into execution would be left to the Rhineland Commission, who would, for that purpose consult the local German authorities.

(c) *Amnesty measures.*

The Legal Committee's report of October 29th (See my despatch No. 2307¹⁰ of October 31st) was before the Conference, which also took note of that portion of the Rhineland Commission's report of November 4th (see my despatch No. 2336 of November 4th) dealing with the amnesty. The Conference decided to charge Monsieur Cambon with the duty of making an unofficial communication to Monsieur von Hoesch with regard to the desirability of the German government making some offer of an amnesty in respect of relations with or services rendered to the occupation throughout the whole of the occupied territory. Monsieur Cambon was at the same time to bring to the notice of Monsieur von Hoesch the counter measures of clemency mentioned in the relevant portion of the Rhineland Commission's report of November 1st.⁹ It was, further, decided that an aide-mémoire would be drafted by the Secretaries that it would cover the above points and that it would be handed unofficially by Monsieur Cambon to Monsieur von Hoesch.¹¹

4. *German High Commissioner in the Rhineland*

The conference had before it the German Ambassador's note of November 2nd (see my despatch No. 2337¹² of November 4th) as well as the French Delegation's note of November 4th (see my despatch No. 2343 [2342]¹³ of November 4th), covering a draft reply to the note from Monsieur von Hoesch.

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 317¹⁴

⁸ See item No. 2 in Cmd. 2527 of 1925, where the preceding sentence appears in a variant English translation.

⁹ See No. 55, note 3.

¹⁰ Not printed: cf. No. 51.

¹¹ This *aide-mémoire* of November 9, transmitted to the Foreign Office under cover of Paris formal despatch No. 2378 of November 10, is not printed.

¹² See No. 55, note 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, note 5.

¹⁴ Not printed. This telegram instructed Lord Crewe as indicated below, while explaining that Mr. Chamberlain did 'not wish to press this [view] unduly if the French government are insistent. I am only anxious that you should if possible get the French to drop their one remaining condition, so that the note to the German Ambassador may be sent

of November 5th, I urged on the French delegation, before the conference met, your views as to the undesirability of the making to the German government of a request for a verbal assurance in respect of nationalist associations in the Rhineland before the acceptance of the appointment of the High Commissioner. The fact that a general assumption of Germany's good intentions was already made in the second paragraph¹⁵ of the draft reply to the German note was also pointed out to the French Delegation. The latter, however, insisted on some mention of the matter, and, in these circumstances, I accepted the insertion at the end of paragraph 2 of the draft of the words: 'Notamment en s'employant à faire cesser l'activité de certaines associations dans les territoires occupés'. With one other verbal alteration of no importance, the draft was accepted and the note will be sent to the German Embassy this afternoon. Copies¹⁶ will go to you I hope by bag of November 8th. . . .

forthwith.' Mr. Chamberlain further stated: 'It seems to me that since we have decided to grant the appointment in any case, it is foolish to attempt conditions. Moreover I am not much impressed by the usefulness of a *verbal* assurance.'

¹⁵ i.e. the first cited paragraph of the draft reply in No. 55, note 5.

¹⁶ Not printed.

No. 72

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 7, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 413 Telegraphic: by bag [Germany 24/10]

PARIS, November 6, 1925

Your telegram to Berlin No. 216¹ and Berlin telegram No. 422.²

M. Briand spoke to me this morning about some of the recent speeches made by Herr Stresemann, saying that one or two complete misstatements had been made, and that he hoped you would protest as he had done. I was able to tell him that you had already done so in quite direct terms, and that it was hoped there would be no repetition of such misleading and inconvenient statements. M. Briand was pleased to hear that you had already taken action, and expressed the opinion that Germans are sometimes very hard to swallow, and even harder to digest.

¹ No. 48.

² No. 54.

No. 73

Mr. A. Chamberlain to H.M. Representatives at Berlin and Paris

No. 225¹ Telegraphic [C 14203/13120/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 8, 1925, 7.30 p.m.

Addressed simultaneously to Lord Crewe and Lord D'Abernon in identic terms.

¹ No. 225 to Berlin; No. 321 to Paris.

Locarno and its reactions with especial reference to Lord Crewe's No. 411² and report of Ambassadors' Conference³ and to Lord D'Abernon's No. 425.⁴

The situation is a difficult one and our attitude one of great delicacy though probably decisive.

The Germans ask a great deal too much. The attitude of their Nationalists makes more difficult the grant of the concessions for which we were prepared nor are we in any way helped by the attitude of the other parties.

At Locarno it was agreed on all hands that certain things were out of the question and that there could be no *marchandage* in regard to what we were prepared to do. Our concessions were to proceed from our own initiative because we felt that they were the natural results of the treaty of Locarno. They were not a bargain nor the purchase price of German assent.

Since the return of the German delegates, the Nationalists have repudiated the treaty, the Socialists whilst approving it in principle show no courage or resolution in its support, subordinating patriotism to party politics; and the German Ministers in this difficult situation open their mouths wider and wider, demanding the impossible, whilst more and more they and the supporters of the pact use language incompatible with the spirit of Locarno, create the appearance of a *marchandage* and give the impression of a condition or even an ultimatum to the doing of things which were conceived and intended as a free act of appeasement and goodwill. I do not for a moment question the good faith of the Chancellor or Stresemann but this course is full of danger. Lord D'Abernon cannot speak too plainly or strongly in a quite friendly way in this sense. Germany has it in her power to obtain rehabilitation in general estimation, the great political and economic advantages that this rehabilitation will bring with it, the almost immediate evacuation of Cologne and the transformation of the remaining Rhineland occupation. Her present course is in my considered opinion endangering all these prospects and the German Ministers are insufficiently aware of the danger.

On the other hand the reactions of the German attitude on France give me almost equal anxiety. It is evident that Briand is himself affected (and I cannot wonder at it) and that he is hard pressed by others. In my desire to facilitate his task and above all not to be the cause of any delay, I agreed to the suggestions he made for the Ambassadors reply. After I had agreed Foch and Cambon introduced further changes which Lord Crewe felt obliged to accept.⁵ I do not like them; still less do I like what may lie behind them. The Germans make things exceedingly difficult for Briand. I admit it but we must not allow our course to be deflected. See Saturday's⁶ leading article in the 'Times'. I can count on no support here for prolonging the occupation of Cologne. I have to defend our policy in Parliament on November 17th.⁶ It is of the first consequence for me that all should be

² No. 70.

³ See No. 71.

⁴ No. 68.

⁵ November 7, 1925.

⁶ Mr. Chamberlain spoke on November 18: see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 188, cols. 419-32 and 519-29.

settled before that date and that our position should be unequivocally defined. I cannot speak in conditionals. I must state decisions and particularly I must give a definite date for beginning evacuation of Cologne. It is therefore essential that before November 17th there should be a final settlement of the four points relating to disarmament. The initiative should continue to rest with M. Briand, but I must beg him to act quickly and to settle these points with the German Ambassador as he himself proposed at Locarno and then only to exchange further notes embodying the agreement so reached. Lord Crewe should speak to him in this sense.

The situation is critical. Unless we exert all our influence both in Berlin and Paris, the cup may be dashed from our lips.

No. 74

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 12)

No. 625 [N 6274/102/38]

BERLIN, November 8, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that a reception was held last night at the Russian Embassy to celebrate the eighth anniversary of the foundation of the Soviet Republic. It was attended by several German Ministers and officials and by most of the foreign representatives in Berlin, including the Italian Ambassador and the French Chargé d'Affaires. In accordance with your instructions I decided that it would be preferable to attend, this being the first occasion on which I have accepted an invitation to the Russian Embassy.

2. The reception was on the usual lines and there was nothing to distinguish it from similar occasions under the auspices of bourgeois régimes, except that some of the ladies wore hats and some of the men morning clothes. These were, however, the exception.

3. The Soviet Ambassador and his wife did the honours with urbanity and were evidently much gratified both at the large attendance and at the presence of personages who had not been there on previous occasions.

4. In the course of the evening, I had a conversation with Chicherin, of which the following is a summary. He had returned from Wiesbaden, where his cure is proceeding normally. He proposed to remain there for another three weeks and then to spend some days in Berlin before returning to Moscow.

5. As regards a visit to Paris and London, he had not made up his mind as to Paris. It depended on various circumstances.

6. Regarding London, he did not know whether such a visit would be well received as he had no indication of your views upon the matter.

7. He was anxious to discuss with the British Government the different points of divergence which separated the two Governments.

8. London was constantly recurring to the desirability of Russia entering the League of Nations. To him this did not seem the essential or the urgent point. It would be far more useful to come to an agreement with England regarding the main questions which divided the two Governments. When asked what the main questions were he said 'Principally our relations in different countries of the Far East and in Asia. We are in close contact and in constant conflict. The Russian Government had long desired to have a frank explanation, but London had been steadily elusive. Whether discussion of these main points was conducted through diplomatic channels or by a Conference in London was a matter of detail—perhaps preferably in the latter.'

9. As regards the League of Nations, it was and would remain impossible for Russia to join the League because this would involve an obligation to execute decisions taken by a body composed of States organised on a fundamentally different basis from that of the Soviet Republic. This objection was not transitory, it was fundamental.

10. On the other hand, it would have been possible for Russia to send an observer to Geneva were it not for the unfortunate fact that Geneva was in Switzerland. The relations between the Russian and Swiss Governments were so unsatisfactory that Russia could not send an observer to meetings held on Swiss territory. The cause of the divergence with Switzerland was their action on the occasion of the assassination of Worowsky in May, 1923.¹ The Swiss Government had neglected precautions before the act, had not prosecuted the criminals after the act and had refused compensation to the survivors of the victim.

11. In further conversation Chicherin said 'The main obstacle to better relations between England and Russia appears to be the question of Russia's debt to English citizens, but this question might conceivably be arranged. Some draft of a possible arrangement was discussed a long time ago and received the approval of authorities such as Mr. McKenna² and other London bankers. Russia would recognise her indebtedness provided she received new credits. There had been talk at one time of a new credit of £40 millions sterling: this might be combined with an engagement to pay interest on the former debt. Moreover, the money might be transmitted to Russia, for a large part, in goods. This would mean activity for English trade'. Chicherin did not know what the amount of the Russian debt to England was nor had he any precise scheme for combining the operations of the new advance with a liquidation of the past.

12. Throughout the conversation I maintained an attitude of great reserve and was rather aggressively uninformed as to the views and policy of His Majesty's Government regarding Russia. I said, however, that while I had

¹ M. Vorovsky, the Soviet representative in Italy, attending the Lausanne Conference as the unofficial Soviet delegate, was assassinated on May 10, 1923, by M. Conradi, a Swiss subject formerly in the Russian army.

² Chairman of the London Joint City and Midland Bank. Mr. McKenna had been Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1915-16.

no knowledge of the views of His Majesty's Government I knew public opinion in England well enough to be convinced that no arrangement was possible without a fundamental alteration in respect of propaganda. The alleged distinction between the Russian Government and the communistic propaganda societies functioning independently of the Russian Government was too subtle and unsubstantial for the English public to grasp.

13. My overhead impression from the conversation, apart from anything precise which was said—and, indeed, in conflict with much that was said—is:—

- (1) that Moscow is anxious to get on better terms with London both for reasons of policy and reasons of finance. The Pact of Locarno renders necessary a new orientation;
- (2) that, while full membership of the League of Nations is not feasible in the near future, effective participation by Russia in the work of the League might be secured without much delay, particularly if the capitalistic world risked some of its shekels in the interest of the negotiation.

I have, &c.,
D'ABERNON

No. 75

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 227 Telegraphic [C 14311/21/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 9, 1925, 6.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 225¹ (of the 8th November. Evacuation of Cologne).

You will have observed how important I consider it to be from the point of view of public opinion in this country that I should be in a position to inform Parliament on November 17th of a definite date for beginning the evacuation of Cologne. It is therefore essential that the German government should submit satisfactory proposals in regard to police, associations and High Command at a very early date, and I request that you will impress this upon Dr. Stresemann with all the force at your command. It is also important that the Control Commission should submit a report with the least possible delay on the state of execution of the lists I, II and III in the German note of October 23rd. Please so inform General Wauchope and ask him to do all he can to expedite the report.

¹ No. 73.

No. 76

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 226 Telegraphic [C 14212/13120/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 9, 1925, 7 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 426¹ (of the 6th November. Alleviation of conditions in the Rhineland).

I observe that the points which M. Berthelot now suggests should be included in the declaration to be made by the Ambassadors in Berlin contain two items which formed no part of the instructions to M. de Margerie enclosed in my despatch No. 1978,² viz. the evacuation of Cologne and the liquidation of disarmament. I have no objection to the inclusion of these points provided that the reference is in accordance with the note addressed by the Ambassadors' Conference to the German government on the 6th November, of which copies go to you by tonight's bag. The chief point in the note is an invitation to the German government to submit proposals without delay in regard to the police, associations and High Command, which, if satisfactory, should enable the allies to fix the date for beginning the evacuation of Cologne for December 1st. No mention was made in the note of a date for ending evacuation; we decided that it would be equally impolitic to mention an early date, which in the event might prove impossible of execution, or a later date which would intrinsically have no political advantage. Our object will however naturally be to make the move as rapid as possible.

Repeated to Paris No. 323 and Brussels No. 119 (by bag).

¹ No. 69. ² No. 56.

No. 77

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain

(Received November 10, 9 a.m.)

No. 430 Telegraphic [C 14344/13120/18]

BERLIN, *November 9, 1925, 9.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 225.¹

I have discussed situation with Stresemann in the light of your telegrams.

I find that he is in full agreement and will do everything possible to conclude all discussion before November 17th.

The effect of Rhineland alleviations will in his opinion be immense.

¹ No. 73.

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 10, 9 a.m.)

No. 431 Telegraphic [C 14363/13120/18]

BERLIN, November 9, 1925, 9.55 p.m.

Events here have progressed rapidly.

The German government are telegraphing draft reply about disarmament to Paris tonight. This draft will be communicated privately to the French government tomorrow: if they raise no objection it will be sent officially by German government on Tuesday¹ or Wednesday. This procedure is in accordance with your suggestion in your telegram No. 319 to Paris² and has been adopted to minimise the possibility of an official rejection of my [sic] answer.

The German government assured me that their draft will be on most conciliatory lines.

Meanwhile the Belgian Minister made a communication this morning to the German government on the proposed alleviations in the Rhineland saying that these had been agreed to with M. Briand.

Following is the substance:—

1. Alleviation of Rhineland occupation in so far as compatible with the safety of the troops whose numbers would be perceptibly reduced.

2. Radical revision of the occupation régime which would involve suppression of delegates. Suppression or attenuation of ordinances. Revision of cases within the competence of military tribunals. Re-establishment of Reichs Kommissar. Abstention from all administrative interference. Restitution of schools, playing fields and billets not indispensable [sic] for troops.

[? 3] The Belgian government is ready to discuss with the German government the date and form of publication of these measures, but not to discuss their scope. They will be announced immediately and *en bloc* and will be applied after the signature of the Pact.

4. As regards disarmament the Belgian government will press for settlement (? generally of) outstanding points and notably those relating to encadrement and recruitment of security police.

This communication was cordially welcomed by Stresemann. The German government will propose to the Allies the publication of the allied decision with regard to the Rhineland on Thursday and will suggest that this publication might be preceded by a brief statement by the allied governments adverting to the vast importance for Europe of new spirit of Locarno.

The German government are most anxious that at the same time as the announcement is made regarding the alleviations in the Rhineland a statement should be made regarding the date of the evacuation of Cologne—certainly the commencement of the evacuation—and a date for

¹ November 10, 1925.

² No. 63.

the conclusion. Also a statement showing agreement reached regarding disarmament.

If all the above programme can be carried through this week, they are convinced that the policy will obtain a sweeping success throughout Germany.³

³ For Dr. Stresemann's account of his interview with the Belgian Minister, see Eric Sutton, *Gustav Stresemann, op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 211-12.

No. 79

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 10, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 417 *Telegraphic*: by bag [Germany 24/10]

PARIS, November 9, 1925

Your telegram No. 321.¹

I saw M. Briand this afternoon after his return from the country, and fully explained to him the urgency of a definite settlement this week in view of your speech on Tuesday, 17th, when you would have to speak of facts and not of hopes and possibilities. He appreciated your desire that he should see the German Ambassador as soon as possible, and will make an appointment with him for to-morrow, keeping me fully informed as to what passes. He does not himself see why there should be any difficulty in receiving the German reply this week; we had given them full concessions in the matter of the police, and even in that of the high command we had not been intractable, though it was a matter on which the soldiers felt strongly on our side as well as on the side of General von Seeckt.

I told him that a suggestion had been made to me here that, in order to clinch the matter, a German soldier or politician should be invited to come here from Berlin, as he might be a help to Herr von Hoesch. M. Briand thought this would be a mistake, and that it would be easier for Lord D'Abernon on the one hand and the Commission of Control on the other to put the facts before the Germans in a way which would enable them to send a reply which could be accepted at once.

Repeated to Berlin in cypher, No. 11.

¹ No. 73.

No. 80

Memorandum regarding the question of the German High Command

[C 14640/21/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 9, 1925

Article 160 of the Treaty of Versailles reads:—

...¹ 'The divisions must not be grouped under more than two army

¹ Punctuation as in original.

corps headquarters staffs. The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or of other organisations for the command of troops or for preparation for war is forbidden.' . . .¹

2. Against this, General von Seeckt has all the powers of a Commander-in-Chief. He derives these powers from a decree of the 11th August, 1920, and from the military law of the 23rd March, 1921.

3. There are, in point of fact, three German decrees in question:

(i) Decree of the 25th September, 1919, which was considered satisfactory. It provides that the German President is the supreme head of the army and navy; that the Reichswehr Minister is, after the President, the chief of all branches of the army and navy and exercises these powers delegated to him by the President; the 'Chef der Heeresleitung' and the army corps commanders are placed directly under his orders. This decree was replaced by

(ii) Decree of the 11th August, 1920, which is unsatisfactory, (see paragraph 2).

(iii) Military law of the 23rd March, 1921, which is also unsatisfactory, but which was accepted by the Military Control Commission of the day.

4. The Allied demands of June 4th included:

(a) the repeal of the decree of the 11th August, 1920;

(b) legislative and administrative measures to replace the Chef der Heeresleitung in his former position under the decree of 1919 as *Chief of Staff* to the Reichswehr Ministry. (N.B. No reference was made in the Allied demands to the army law of 1921; nor was the re-promulgation of the decree of 1919 demanded.)

5. The Germans say they are prepared to comply with (a). As regards (b) they propose to issue a statement explaining that the Chef der Heeresleitung is the Military Adviser to the Reichswehr Ministry and its *permanent representative* vis-à-vis the army.

6. The Military Control Commission and the Versailles Committee² all agree:

(a) that the Germans should repeal the decree of 1920 (as they say they are prepared to do), and

(b) that the formula 'permanent representative' is unsatisfactory.

There is some difference of opinion what action under (b) is required on the part of the German government. The French are inclined to think that the issue of a new law will be necessary; General Wauchope considers, on the other hand, that a written formal assurance on the part of the German government will be sufficient.

7. The German government have now, by the Ambassadors' Conference note of November 6th, been asked to formulate their proposals for a solution of the outstanding disarmament questions. The note states, with regard to the High Command, that 'the eventual solution must be such as to prevent

² In their report of November 5, not printed.

(“interdire”) the maintenance or constitution of organisations of command larger than those of army corps.’¹

CENTRAL DEPARTMENT

¹ In this connexion, Mr. Lampson, Sir W. Tyrrell, and Mr. Chamberlain minuted as follows:

‘It all strikes me as rather fatuous seeing that once control has stopped the Germans will do just what they please! M. W. Lampson 11/11/25.’

‘Very tiresome, because so unreal. W. T.’

‘This is enough to make a saint swear. I cannot see the slightest practical importance in the demands made. Assume them to be accepted, couldn’t a corporal drive a coach and four through them? A. C. 12/11.’

No. 81

Lord D’Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 10, 7.40 p.m.)

No. 434 Telegraphic [C 14377/13120/18]

Urgent

BERLIN, November 10, 1925, 6.55 p.m.

French chargé d’affaires has communicated to me his instructions which are similar to those in your despatch No. 1978.¹

He is telegraphing to Paris to ask whether he is to make a written communication to German government of full text given in his instructions or to adopt the shorter form of Belgian Minister. In either case I will support verbally the French chargé d’affaires’ communication.

The present position is as follows:—

The German draft reply regarding disarmament was telephoned last night to German embassy, Paris, for private communication to Monsieur Berthelot. If this draft is found satisfactory an official version will be sent to Paris to-morrow.

It should then be possible to make a communication to German government on three points

- (1) Rhineland alleviations,
- (2) Evacuation of Cologne and
- (3) Disarmament, but I should be glad of instructions as to precise form on the two latter.

French chargé d’affaires made on Sunday² a verbal communication to German government regarding disarmament and Cologne, saying that if German answer respecting disarmament was considered satisfactory it would permit the Allies to commence the evacuation of Cologne on December 1st.

Nothing was said as regards conclusion of evacuation. But a statement that operation will naturally be carried through as rapidly as possible ought to be adequate to tranquillise German apprehensions.

¹ No. 56. With reference to this despatch Lord D’Abernon had reported in his telegram No. 432 of November 9 that while he had made no official communication to the German Government he had left them in no doubt of the attitude of His Majesty’s Government.

² November 8, 1925.

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 229 Telegraphic [C 14363/13120/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 10, 1925, 10.15 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 431¹ and 432² (of the 9th November. Rhineland alleviations).

I have no idea why the Belgian Minister did not concert his action with you and the French Ambassador. The arrangement, as I understood it, was that you and your French and Belgian colleagues would concert together and present a declaration to the German government at the same time and on the same lines, viz: those contained in the instructions to M. de Margerie (my despatch No. 1978).³ In my telegram No. 226⁴ I further authorised you to agree to the inclusion of statements regarding Cologne and disarmament provided they were in accordance with the Ambassadors' Conference note of November 6th. The last paragraph of the Belgian communication is quite inconsistent with that note.

The best plan would now seem to be for you and M. de Margerie to agree on the exact wording of the declaration to be made and present it without further delay to Dr. Stresemann, who will be able to publish it at the time most convenient to himself. In this connection you will no doubt bear in mind the considerations contained in Coblenz telegram No. 46.⁵ It is important to avoid saying anything in the declaration which exaggerates the real intentions of the allies. Also it might be advisable to omit the statement that the actual measures of alleviation 'will be announced immediately', as it is not yet decided as to how and when the announcement will be made in the Rhineland (see Coblenz telegram 48⁶).

In regard to the German proposal that the publication of the allied decision might be preceded by a brief statement by the allies regarding the importance of the Locarno spirit, I have no objection to a statement to that effect being included in the declaration to the German government and being published by the latter. You would naturally concert with your French and Belgian colleagues as to its terms.

As regards the German wish for a statement regarding the date of the evacuation of Cologne, this must obviously depend on the nature of their disarmament proposals. At the moment the standpoint of the allies is expressed in the Ambassadors' Conference note of November 6th.

Finally I should be glad to receive by telegraph the text of the declaration to be made. Please also inform me of the precise hour of its publication in Berlin.

Addressed to Berlin No. 229. Repeated to Paris No. 325, and Brussels

¹ No. 78.

² Not printed: see No. 81, note 1.

³ No. 56.

⁴ No. 76.

⁵ No. 67.

⁶ Not printed. In this telegram of November 9 Colonel Ryan had asked to be informed of Mr. Chamberlain's views 'as to manner in which change in ordinances is to be effected'.

No. 120, 'for information of French and Belgian governments,' and Coblenz No. 40.

No. 83

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Sir T. Vaughan¹ (Riga)

No. 381 [C 14493/459/18]*

Sir,

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 10, 1925

The Lithuanian Minister came to see me to-day.

After congratulating me upon the success of the Locarno Conference and observing that it had already produced a certain *détente* in the relations of countries which were not immediately concerned, he asked me what I thought its ultimate effects should be and particularly in regard to the policy of his own country. I told M. Galvanauskas that I had never concealed my hope that the example of the Great Powers might in time be followed by other nations in other regions. I laid stress upon the element of time as well as upon the difference of treatment which might be required by the varying circumstances of different States. It was the spirit of Locarno to which I attached so much value and which I hoped would inform and guide the policy of the whole world. The more neighbouring nations reconciled their differences and cultivated friendship, the better His Majesty's Government was pleased. Our policy was one of appeasement. The world was too narrow to admit of any of us remaining indifferent to the possibilities of a new struggle breaking out anywhere, and so far from regarding with jealousy and suspicion any *rapprochement* between neighbouring States, His Majesty's Government welcomed improved relations wherever they were achieved as a contribution to their policy of appeasement. I took occasion to refer with admiration to the generous decision of the Polish Government, taken immediately after Count Skrzynski's return to Warsaw, doubtless on his advice, to suspend the deportation of the German optants. Here indeed, I said, was an illustration of the Locarno spirit, a voluntary act of conciliation and reconciliation made by the Polish Government of its own free will as a contribution to the peace of the world. I added that I had sometimes wondered why the Lithuanian Government did not settle some of its problems, and notably that of the navigation of the Niemen River, in the same way. Perhaps it might be worth their while to consider whether, as a matter of internal policy within their own jurisdiction, they could not by a liberal and general law settle the question, which was only rendered more difficult of solution when it was treated as one of a number of political issues.

M. Galvanauskas said that his Government were already considering action on these lines. As regards any imitation of the Treaties of Locarno, he spoke of the special difficulties of Lithuania, both in consequence of the

¹ H.M. Minister to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, generally resident at Riga.

Vilna question² and by reason of the low standard of political education amongst her people and the natural intransigence of the peasant mind. I told him that I should not have entered upon this subject if his enquiry had not led me naturally to a development of my thoughts. I certainly had no desire to meddle in the internal affairs of other nations, nor did I think it my business to offer advice unless it was invited. I repeated that I did not underrate the difficulties of overcoming acute animosities, but I added that no nation could afford to live in the past to the neglect of the future or to remain isolated in the Europe of to-day. It was of the first consequence to every nation to cultivate good relations with its neighbours. I realised that the change of heart and mind which was required could not be accomplished in a day, but statesmen must work for the future. From the day I had entered this Office I had worked under the conviction that unless we could change—and that within a few years—the spirit of the relations existing between France and Germany, we should move fatally towards a new catastrophe. The Conference of Locarno had produced an immediate change greater than I had expected, but the merit of Locarno lay in the manner in which agreement had been reached and in the spirit in which the treaties would be executed. They were the voluntary acts of the nations immediately interested, sprung of their own initiative and not imposed by any external power. It was because they were the result of free consent that they appeared to me to give such hope for the future. I knew that many difficulties still lay in our path, but I kept before my eyes, as statesmen in all countries should do, not merely to-day or to-morrow, but the future. What we must do was to create such international relations that the new generations as they grew up could forget an unhappy past and come to manhood without the desire to renew the old struggle.

I record my observations at some length because I see in certain quarters an idea springing up that it is the policy of His Majesty's Government in some way to impose the policy of Locarno on other nations. This is not the case, nor do I believe that the polity [*sic*] of Locarno can be developed in that way. Any further regional pacts must be a natural growth among the nations interested, responding (as did the pacts at Locarno) to the desires and hopes of the great mass of the peoples concerned. But I hold firmly that wise statesmanship in those countries would ponder the example of the Great Powers and would direct its efforts to securing for other countries in such form and manner as is most suited to their circumstances and needs the relief which Locarno has brought to the nations immediately concerned and through them to the whole world. We should therefore hold up the agreements of Locarno as an example of the way in which great nations can compose great feuds and in their common interest prepare a better future, but we should at all times insist that the virtue of Locarno lies not in the form of the par-

² For the occupation of Vilna in October 1920 by a force under General Zeligowski, an independent Polish commander, see First Series, Volume XI, Chapter II *passim*, and for the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations regarding a line of demarcation in the Vilna area see *League of Nations Official Journal*, March 1923, p. 238.

ticular agreements which were there reached, but in the new spirit which brought the conference into existence, which informed its decisions and which inspires, and will continue to inspire, the policy of the countries there represented.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 84

*Memorandum on the Situation in Central Europe*¹

[C 14890/13131/62]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 11, 1925

This memorandum is an attempt by one possessing very insufficient knowledge to investigate how far it may be possible to apply the system contained in the Locarno treaties to the existing position in Central Europe. It is hoped that the tentative suggestions here expressed may be of some value in stimulating further enquiry. Nothing more can be claimed for them.

2. The countries comprised in the term 'Central Europe' are, for the purpose of this paper, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Italy and Hungary, and it may be convenient first to describe shortly the position in each of these countries and the feelings of its population towards the others.

3. Austria is a puny body with an enormous head, and it is perhaps safe to say that what Vienna believes and wishes constitutes the opinion of Austria. The Viennese are notoriously an easy-going people with no thoughts outside their own city. So long as life in Vienna, if not the same as in pre-war times, at any rate approximates thereto in general convenience and comfort, they will make no complaint. They have no desire for the restoration of the Habsburgs, and have no feelings of resentment against the successor States of the Empire, and no irredentist ambitions. They do, however, bitterly resent the treatment by the Italians of the Austrian population of the Alto Adige, a purely German community, and a certain proportion of them definitely aim at political union with the German Reich.

4. Czechoslovakia, like all new nations, is intensely nationalistic. A good instance of this trait is the attempt to establish a Czech Church independent of the Vatican and their quarrel with the Holy See over the Huss celebrations.² This attitude towards the Roman Catholic Church has also reacted upon Czech relations with Slovakia, but not sufficiently to induce the Slovaks again to seek subjection to Hungary. This nationalistic feeling

¹ According to the docket this memorandum was by Mr. Howard Smith.

² In March 1925, the anniversary of the death on July 6, 1415, of the excommunicated Czech national hero and religious reformer, John Hus, was declared a public holiday. After the celebrations, in which the President and members of the Cabinet took part, Mgr. Marmaggi, the Papal Nuncio, was recalled *en congé forcé*. The Prime Minister refused a demand by the Czech National Socialist party for a rupture of relations with the Vatican but relations between Czechoslovakia and the Vatican were conducted through *chargés d'affaires* until 1928.

necessarily renders the Czechs acutely suspicious of Hungary and of the machinations of the considerable Hungarian elements still resident at Pressburg (Bratislava) and at Kaschau in Slovakia. They believe that Hungary is determined sooner or later to reconquer the territories torn from her by the Treaty of Trianon,³ and that their only means of avoiding this consists in keeping Hungary and the Hungarian minorities strictly in subjection coupled with a system of alliance with the other successor States known as the Little Entente.

As regards Germany, Czechoslovakia's difficulties are now at an end with the signature of the Locarno Arbitration Treaty, and she has similar treaties with Poland and Austria. With Western Europe indeed she is little concerned. She feels herself to be the last outpost of Slavdom towards the west, and her aim is a *rapprochement* and an understanding with Russia.

5. Roumania has, as the result of the war, obtained relatively more territorial compensations than any other country, and the result is that she has bitten off more than she can chew. Towards Hungary she is actuated with the same fear as Czechoslovakia, but short-sightedly she fails to adopt the one policy which can kill Hungarian irredentism in Transylvania. Her watchword should be consideration for the minorities: her action consists in petty oppression, discrimination in scholastic and religious matters and pin-pricks of this kind which merely assist in keeping irredentism alive. Perhaps it is too much to expect the Roumanians of Transylvania, after their long subjection to Hungarian rule to treat their Hungarian subjects as equal, but their failure to show them proper consideration makes reconciliation impossible. In her dealings with Hungary, therefore, Roumania must rely on the Little Entente. But Roumania is in a worse position than Czechoslovakia, because, besides her apprehensions of Hungary, she is obsessed with the fear of Russia. It is problematical whether Russia will make any move to regain Bessarabia. She has no nationalistic ambitions in that country, and any attempt to recover the territory would frankly be a war of conquest; but so badly have the Roumanians administered the province since they acquired it, that the population might well look upon the Russians as their deliverers. Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan have recognized by treaty⁴ that Bessarabia properly belongs to Roumania, but Italy and Japan have not up to the present ratified this treaty, which therefore is not in force and is not binding upon the other signatories who like ourselves have ratified. Roumania has therefore legitimate grounds for fear of Russian aggression in this quarter, and to meet this fear she has concluded a military alliance with Poland⁵ directed specifically against Russia. The value of this treaty is, however, problematical, and may decrease in proportion as relations

³ The treaty of peace with Hungary, signed on June 4, 1920, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 113, pp. 486-645.

⁴ This treaty, signed at Paris on October 28, 1920, between the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan and Roumania, is printed *ibid*, pp. 647-51: see First Series, Volume XII, Chapter III *passim*.

⁵ For this alliance of March 3, 1921, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 114, pp. 916-17.

between Czechoslovakia and Poland improve on the basis of *rapprochement* with Russia.

6. Jugoslavia, though a member of the Little Entente, having entered into treaties with Czechoslovakia and Roumania directed against Hungary, is less directly interested in the situation in Central Europe than the other two States. In the first place, the minority question is not so acute in Jugoslavia as in Czechoslovakia and Roumania, and the Hungarians tend to respect the fighting qualities of the Serb. Secondly, the Serb-Croat-Slovene [State] is still predominantly a Balkan country. Her present aim is the development of Southern Serbia and her main preoccupation is to secure predominance over the Balkan Peninsula and in the end federation with Bulgaria with herself as the leading partner. Her interest in Central Europe will probably tend still further to decrease as time goes on, but at present she would march if Hungary attempted any aggressive action against either Czechoslovakia or Roumania.

7. The position of Italy in relation to this question is one of considerable interest. Not only is she the great Power most immediately concerned from her geographical position, but she scents danger on every hand. She is concerned lest the 'Anschluss'⁶ of Austria to Germany may become an accomplished fact. At the moment she would probably fight to prevent it if it were in the realm of immediate practical politics. She is jealous of France and the intimate relations of France with Czechoslovakia, Poland and Jugoslavia, and she is disinclined to favour any move for understanding between the States of Central Europe as this might lead to something akin to a Danube Confederation, or, in other terms, a reconstitution of the Dual Monarchy under another name. Thus her tendency so far has been to cultivate relations with Hungary.

8. For convenience of reference and more detailed study of the Little Entente and its ramifications, a copy of a very comprehensive memorandum prepared last January by Mr. Bateman is annexed.⁷

9. What is the position of the country against whom this elaborate network of treaties and agreements has been designed? Hungary was the predominant partner in the declining years of the Empire. Peopled by a masterful race, ruled on practically feudal lines, she saw herself robbed by the Treaty of Trianon of large portions of territory, which, though inhabited principally by peoples of alien stock, contained many pure Magyars, who had perforce to pass under the rule of the Czechs, Roumanians or Serbs. Though they respect the Serbs as a fighting race, the Magyars detest and despise the Czechs and Roumanians, whom they have always regarded as subject races. They have, moreover, suffered from a period of Bolshevik rule and have seen their country invaded by the hated Roumanians,⁸ who behaved with studied insolence during their occupation. The result of this is a deter-

⁶ i.e. Union.

⁷ Not printed. Mr. Bateman was a member of the Central Department of the Foreign Office.

⁸ See First Series, Volume VI, Chapter I, and Volume XII, Chapter II.

mination among the ruling classes in Hungary that the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon shall not stand, and that it is their sacred mission to rescue their fellow-Magyars from the foreign yoke and restore them to the Kingdom of Hungary. For Hungary is still a kingdom, and its inhabitants desire a monarchical form of government, although they have been compelled by the Little Entente and the Great Powers to declare the perpetual exclusion from the throne of the House of Habsburg.⁹

10. In the face of such suspicion on the one hand and such hatred on the other is reconciliation between Hungary and the Little Entente possible? At the first sight the position seems almost hopeless, but in some respects the position of Hungary is similar to that of Germany. It is clearly not to the advantage of Hungary, as it is not to the advantage of Germany, that the present position should continue indefinitely. Hungary is disarmed as Germany has been disarmed, and it is thus impossible for Hungary to attempt armed action to secure what she believes to be her rights. Here, however, the analogy ceases. Germany came forward to offer France freedom from the fear of a war of revenge because she wished, in her turn, to be free of the danger of extended 'sanctions' in the Rhineland. There is no similar inducement in the case of Hungary. None of her territory is in military occupation. It has been definitely taken from her by the Treaty of Peace. Hungary, again, is not a great manufacturing country like Germany, but an agricultural State which is largely self-sufficing. Hungary does not need foreign credits; Germany does. The true peace, which Germany therefore desires for the re-establishment of her trade, is of less importance to Hungary.

11. It is, therefore, unlikely that Hungary will come forward on her own volition as Germany did unless some inducement is offered her to do so. The Little Entente could offer her such an inducement if they would. As explained above, the crux of the problem is the position of the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Serbia. As affairs now stand these minorities are, strictly speaking, under the protection of the League of Nations, that is to say, any complaint which the minorities may wish to make regarding their treatment must be made in accordance with the terms of the minorities treaties¹⁰ to the secretariat of the League, which has provided an elaborate machinery for dealing with them. This system is doubly unsatisfactory, because it tends to give to insignificant complaints an importance far outweighing their merits, and because it affords the Hungarians a perpetual excuse to foment irredentism by encouraging such petitions and

⁹ For the attitude of the Little Entente in connexion with the attempted restoration of King Charles to the throne of Hungary in 1920-1 see First Series, Volume XII, Chapter II. For the exchange of notes of October-November 1921, between the British, French and Italian Representatives at Budapest and the Hungarian Government relative to the Deposition of all the Members of the House of Hapsburg, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 116, pp. 513-17.

¹⁰ Treaties guaranteeing the rights of minorities were signed between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Roumania respectively in 1919, and are printed *op. cit.*, vol. 112, pp. 502-13, 514-23, and 538-46.

alleging afterwards that the League of Nations have dealt with them inadequately. Moreover, the system leads to interminable debates and long drawn out arguments between the parties which do nothing but exacerbate the relations between the Governments concerned. In affairs of this nature nothing can be effected but by goodwill. If Hungary obstinately refuses to move from her present position that the Treaty of Trianon is iniquitous and that in due time the situation in Europe will so change that either she will recover her lost territories by conquest or the League of Nations will recognise the justice of her claims, nothing can be done. But if Hungary can be induced to see that the frontiers of the Treaty of Trianon will not be altered, and that as time goes on the Hungarians in the lost territories will tend more and more to merge into the nationality of the adopting State, then if the Little Entente will make some practical concession the beginning of an agreement might be in sight.

12. The agreement might be somewhat on the following lines. Hungary would agree to accept the frontiers as laid down by the Treaty of Trianon. Any revision of the frontiers is impossible now. Certain areas might be declared demilitarised zones of a certain depth on each side of the frontier, and each of the States concerned, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Jugoslavia and, if necessary, Austria, would undertake to resist any other State which violated the demilitarised zones. In this way the Little Entente would still exist and operate in the case of Hungarian aggression, while Hungary would herself have the assistance of all the other Powers in the contrary case. This would meet Hungary's present objection that she, who is disarmed, is surrounded by enemies armed to the teeth; and would tend towards general disarmament in this part of Europe. At the same time each of the other States and Hungary would agree that all questions relating to the treatment of the Magyar minorities in the respective countries would no longer be dealt with by appeal to the League of Nations, but by conciliation boards, which would be called on to settle any question affecting the treatment of the Hungarian minority which the Hungarian Government should see fit to bring up. These conciliation boards could be generally on the lines of those settled in the Locarno treaties. They would doubtless be kept busy to begin with, but in time and given goodwill appeals to the boards should grow less and less. This would constitute a considerable concession for the Little Entente, because they would be agreeing to foreign interference in their internal affairs, viz., the treatment by a Government of the citizens of that Government. Short of actual reconquest of her lost territories Hungary could hardly expect any treatment better than this.

13. It is possible to envisage other concessions which the Little Entente might make to Hungary with great effect, e.g., the withdrawal of the ban upon a Habsburg King. In the first instance, however, it is probably wiser not to contemplate any concession on this subject. The Czech fears of the Habsburgs are very real, and Italy and France are also strongly opposed to what they would consider the creation of a nucleus of reaction in Central Europe. At the same time it should be remembered that the treaties of

peace do not make any mention of the House of Habsburg similar to the indictment of the German ex-Emperor, and the exclusion of the House of Habsburg from the Hungarian Throne was only voted by the Hungarian Parliament under direct pressure from the Little Entente and the Great Powers. Any action by the Little Entente tending to withdraw this foreign-imposed veto on the Royal House could not but make reconciliation between Hungary and her neighbours easier.

14. The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing paragraphs would seem to be as follows: Hungary has no special inducement to lead her to seek reconciliation with her neighbours, and she can only regard them with thoughts of hatred and wait for the hour of her revenge, meanwhile taking every step she can to keep the Magyars in the successor States true to their ancient allegiance. No move, therefore, can be expected from her. The States of the Little Entente, on the other hand, have new countries to consolidate, peopled by different races. They require an era of settled peace and goodwill to allow racial passions to cool and to perfect their administration in their new territories. They have, therefore, something definite to gain by appeasing Hungary, and it is for them to move first by offering some practical concessions to their enemy.

No. 85

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 11, 12.45 p.m.)

No. 422 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 14402/13120/18]

Urgent

PARIS, November 11, 1925

Your telegram No. 229 to Berlin.¹

M. Berthelot has just telephoned that the German Ambassador at Herr Stresemann's request has asked that Ambassadors' Conference should at its meeting now fixed for Saturday November 15th [14th] take and publish decision respecting Rhineland alleviation as well as disarmament and commencement of evacuation. It is therefore presumably premature to make or at any rate to publish any communication at Berlin as suggested in your telegram under reference.

French note on the point as well as on German disarmament note which will be officially presented to-day will if possible go to you by tonight's bag.²

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 422, repeated to Berlin No. 13.

¹ No. 82.

² Lord Crewe added in his immediately following telegram of 2 p.m. the same day: 'M. Berthelot has seen a summary of German note, which, he says, is not such as to hold up the announcement of evacuation.' With reference to Paris telegrams Nos. 422-3 Lord D'Abernon reported in Berlin telegram No. 439 of November 11 that the German Government agreed that the decisions to be taken by the Conference of Ambassadors on November 14 should be published on the following day.

No. 86

Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 11, 8.20 p.m.)

No. 113 Telegraphic [C 14443/13120/18]

BRUSSELS, November 11, 1925, 5.6 p.m.

Chef de Cabinet of Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked me to come to the Ministry this morning. I had meanwhile received your telegram No. 120 repeating telegram to Berlin No. 229.¹ Berlin telegrams Nos. 431² and 432³ therein referred to have not been received here.

I told Chef de Cabinet that I gathered that Belgian Minister at Berlin had made a communication to the German government without concerting with the British and French representatives, and that it was not consistent with Ambassadors' Conference note of November 6th and I asked what had happened.

Chef de Cabinet said that he wished to speak to me on this subject and then stated that the Ministry was completely disconcerted by the action of Belgian Minister. Apparently the latter had believed that French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin had made a lengthy communication to the German government, and he had gone to Herr Stresemann and had made what he believed to be an identic communication. He had then discovered that French representative's communication had been different to what he had supposed.

As I was in ignorance of the contents of Berlin telegram[s] No. 431 and No. 432, I confined myself to expressing surprise that Belgian Minister had ignored his general instructions to concert with his British and French colleagues, and to suggesting that a telegram should be sent to him directing him not to make communications to the German government on matters which equally concerned Great Britain and France without consulting their representatives.

A telegram to this effect will be sent to Belgian Minister at once.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 113. Repeated to Berlin.

¹ No. 82.

² No. 78.

³ See No. 81, note 1.

No. 87

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 231 Telegraphic [C 14377/13120/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 11, 1925, 7 p.m.

Your telegram No. 434¹ (of 10th November) and Paris telegram No. 422² (of 11th November: Locarno reactions).

To prevent further confusion I wish to make the position clear.

Subject to the agreement of the French, I am prepared to accept any

¹ No. 81.

² No. 85.

arrangement in regard to the proposed declaration, whether at Berlin or by the Ambassadors' Conference at Paris, that commends itself to Dr. Stresemann. If he still wishes for a declaration by the Ambassadors in Berlin my telegram No. 229³ will have given you the necessary authority. If he prefers Paris (see Lord Crewe's telegram No. 422) well and good. It is in any case difficult to lay down from here the precise form of the statements regarding the evacuation of Cologne and disarmament, as the wording will have to be concerted with the French, and time is too short. But I am prepared to go as far as the French, provided declaration tallies with the facts and with our intentions.

If, as is apparently the case, Dr. Stresemann now prefers declaration to be made by the Ambassadors' Conference at Paris, I certainly do not object; on the contrary, it will have the advantage of simplification, and of cutting short the present cross-fire of telegrams, which is becoming confusing.⁴

Repeated to Paris, No. 326, and Brussels, No. 121 (by bag).

³ No. 82.

⁴ The gist of these instructions to Lord D'Abernon was communicated that day by Mr. Lampson to the German Ambassador in London who had called, according to Mr. Lampson's record of the conversation, to 'press that we should send instructions to Lord D'Abernon to make the declaration at Berlin without delay'. Mr. Lampson further recorded that Dr. Sthamer also 'said he was charged by his government to express to the Secretary of State their most grateful thanks for the great assistance which he had rendered to them in this matter of the implementing of the Locarno spirit; and they fully realised how much they owed to him. I said that I would take note of what he said and lay it before the Secretary of State.'

No. 88

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 12, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 425 Telegraphic: by bag [C 14415/21/18]

PARIS, November 11, 1925

My telegrams Nos. 411,¹ 417,² 420³ and 422.⁴

What now appears to have happened is as follows. Monsieur von Hoesch came to see Monsieur Berthelot at 7 p.m. last night and informed him that the German reply had been in his possession since 7 o'clock in the morning. It was, however, of considerable length and his staff were at that moment still engaged in translating it. All he could, therefore, give Monsieur Berthelot last night was a summary of the note. On this Monsieur von Hoesch appears to have asked for Monsieur Berthelot's comments. Monsieur von Hoesch at the same time seems to have announced that the note itself would be officially presented in the course of to-day. This announcement, of course, went rather contrary to the understanding which I had reached with Monsieur Briand, that no note would be presented which could not be finally accepted. (See particularly my telegrams Nos. 411 and 417.)

¹ No. 70.

² No. 79.

³ Not printed.

⁴ No. 85.

Monsieur Berthelot telephoned this information to the Embassy (see my telegram No. 422 this morning) and stated that the French delegation had been at work on the summary of the German note during a considerable part of last night.

Communication with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been difficult during the day owing to the fact that it is a public holiday here. But this evening Monsieur Massigli communicated to the Embassy an unofficial French memorandum (to be treated as personal) dealing with the summary of the German note. He informed the Embassy also that the German note itself had been officially handed in at 1 o'clock this afternoon, and that it would be circulated to the various members of the Ambassadors' Conference early tomorrow, November 12th.

He also said that a French note, based on the unofficial memorandum above referred to, would be communicated to Monsieur von Hoesch and Monsieur Stresemann this evening and that copies of this note would also be available tomorrow.

Monsieur Massigli explained that the French government's object is now to get out of the Germans before the Conference meets some more definite satisfaction on certain points and, with this object, the Conference will be postponed until the morning of November 16th. Monsieur Massigli in reply to a specific enquiry said that it was in any case quite certain that the Conference would, on November 16th, be able to announce the commencement of the evacuation for December 1st.

The French note respecting the publication of the modifications to be introduced into the present Rhineland régime will be forthcoming tomorrow November 12th.

Copies of the summary of the German note and of the French unofficial memorandum go to Mr. Lampson by bag.⁵

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 425 and repeated to Berlin Nos. 15 and 16.

⁵ Not printed. This summary of the German note of November 11 and the French memorandum of the same date were received in the Foreign Office on November 12. The full texts of the German note and of the French note of November 11 in reply were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatches Nos. 2391 and 2392 of November 12 respectively (not printed). For a summary of these two notes see No. 94.

No. 89

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Colonel Ryan (Coblentz)

*No. 800 [C 14379/13120/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 11, 1925*

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 384¹ of the 3rd November and your telegram No. 48² of the 9th November, I transmit to you herewith a copy of

¹ Not printed. See No. 44, note 3.

² Not printed. See No. 82, note 6.

a letter from the War Office,³ containing the observations and criticisms of the Army Council on the measures of alleviation in the Rhineland proposed by the High Commission.

2. As to the various implications that may arise out of the execution of these proposals as they now stand, I do not feel in a position to form an adequate opinion and I must be guided by your views, possessed as you are of the necessary local knowledge.

3. Of the general principles guiding my attitude you are already aware. I desire that every measure of alleviation be granted in the present régime that is compatible with the terms of the Rhineland Agreement, namely the maintenance, safety and requirements of the armies of occupation, and everything possible done to mark that our relations with Germany are on a wholly new footing since the initialling of the Locarno treaties. His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept every concession that the French Government are prepared to grant, and in this respect the views of the French Government must be held to be represented by the French High Commissioner and not by the French military authorities.

4. Subject to the above, I request that you will give the fullest consideration to the British military views as expressed in the enclosed letter from the War Office, and in this regard, I would draw your particular attention to the last paragraph of that letter. The alleviations must obviously not be allowed to go so far as to render the position of the armies impossible, and I feel confident that I can rely upon you to see that this perfectly legitimate point of view is not lost sight of.

5. On the question of military courts and the revision of Ordinance No. 80 respecting aviation I shall shortly address you further instructions, and you should refrain for the moment from committing yourself on either of these questions.

6. In regard to the manner in which the alleviations are to be effected and made known to the public in the Rhineland, I am prepared to leave the decision to your judgment, acting in conjunction with your colleagues. Doubtless the German Government will themselves shortly offer suggestions through the new Reichskommissar, and you will recollect that the French Government, in their instructions to the French Ambassador in Berlin, a copy⁴ of which was handed to me by the French Ambassador at this Court

³ Not printed. This letter of November 10 recapitulated the views in the War Office letter of November 6 (cf. No. 61, note 4), and expressed general agreement with the proposals in No. 44. The last paragraph of the letter of November 10 stated that the Army Council were in 'entire agreement' with Colonel Ryan's views as cited in No. 44, note 3, and concluded as follows: 'The Army Council, while anxious to lend themselves to the fullest extent to the furtherance of the Foreign Office policy, feel compelled to point out:— (a) That a too sudden and drastic removal of restrictions in the occupied territory is as undesirable from the point of view of the German Authorities who are responsible for the maintenance of order, as it is from that of the Allied Military Authorities, and (b) That as long as the Allied Armies of Occupation remain in the Rhineland, they must retain privileges and powers sufficient to ensure that the occupation does not degenerate into a mere formality. Their position will become impossible unless their prestige is, to a reasonable extent, preserved.'

⁴ Enclosure in No. 56.

on the 4th November, declared themselves ready to agree with Dr. Stresemann as to the date and form in which the new measures would be announced to German opinion.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 90

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 13, 9 a.m.)

No. 441 Telegraphic [Germany 24/10]

BERLIN, November 12, 1925, 9 p.m.

French Chargé d'Affaires has received instructions to press German Government to give further precisions on the five disarmament questions.¹

I am supporting him and urging German Government to reply rapidly and in an affirmative sense.

If German Government do not give satisfaction on the two points of police and higher command, General Wauchope is against Allies surrendering, and considers negotiation must be rather prolonged. He therefore holds the view that it would be better to separate Cologne question from disarmament question, announcing a decision on the former and leaving the latter for subsequent settlement.

Repeated to Paris, No. 19.

¹ i.e. the five questions considered in No. 94.

No. 91

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 13, 9 a.m.)

No. 440 Telegraphic [C 14487/13120/18]

Urgent

BERLIN, November 12, 1925, 9.5 p.m.

Paris telegram No. 425.¹

Postponement of meeting of Ambassadors' Conference until November 16th is most unfortunate in its probable effect here. Party meetings of German nationals and of Centre take place on November 15th and it was of great importance to reach a decision and an announcement regarding Rhineland alleviations before these meetings.

It appears most questionable whether any further precision which can be obtained from Germans before November 16th regarding disarmament can be worth the risk of injuring chances of Pact of Security.

¹ No. 88.

The voting in above-mentioned party meetings would be powerfully affected by publication of Rhineland alleviations.²

Stresemann urges therefore that these should in any case be published Sunday³ morning. If Cologne evacuation and disarmament decisions cannot be published at the same time it will be extremely unfortunate but not so perilous as postponement of the whole.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 440, repeated to Paris No. 18.

² In a letter of November 12 to Mr. Lampson, Colonel Ryan stated: 'the reports I have received from our zone and elsewhere do not show in any quarter more than a lukewarm feeling in favour of the Treaty. . . . The majority of the Electorate has probably not read the Pacts, and if it has, certainly does not understand them, except in the terms of the catch-words in the Press. The "reactions" they do understand, and it is on them, I think, that the Treaty will stand or fall. I do not wish in any way to strike a pessimistic note; our experience of the German attitude before they accepted the Dawes Plan (and the Treaty of Versailles, for the matter of that) is sufficiently vivid to prevent my doing that. But I think that it would be prudent on our part, where a doubt arose as to whether or not a concession in regard to the Rhineland régime should be made, to err on the side of generosity to the Germans.'

³ November 15, 1925.

No. 92

*The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 13, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 427 Telegraphic: by bag [C 14460/13120/18]

PARIS, November 12, 1925

My telegram No. 425¹ and Berlin telegram No. 439² to Foreign Office.

Monsieur Massigli gave the Embassy the following information this evening:—

1. *Disarmament and Evacuation.* Monsieur Massigli explained that the French government hoped, in reply to its semi-official note of November 11th (see my despatch No. 2392)³ to obtain from the German government either officially or unofficially more satisfaction than that contained in the German note of November 11th (see my despatch No. 2391).³ If such satisfaction was forthcoming the conference would on November 16th inform the German government that the explanations asked for in its note of November 6th were satisfactory, that the final details of adjustment would be left to the German authorities to work out with Control Commission and Allied governments, and that Cologne evacuation would begin on December 1st and be concluded as speedily as technical military considerations allowed (i.e., Monsieur Massigli thought, in about six weeks).

If, on the other hand, as French government fear, more definite satisfaction was not forthcoming, Conference would, on November 16th, inform German government that it was still not satisfied with explanations given and that Control Commission would have to work matter out but that, taking

¹ No. 88.

² See No. 85, note 2.

³ See No. 88, note 5.

into account Locarno spirit, it would begin Cologne evacuation on December 1st, concluding as speedily as technically possible.

Drafts to cover either hypothesis will be sent you by bag of tomorrow, November 13th.⁴

As regards final withdrawal of control commission, Monsieur Massigli thought this might, in first hypothesis, be possible in January: in second it was scarcely possible to indicate a date.

2. *Amnesty and modification of remaining occupation.*

Monsieur Massigli communicated for my personal information draft⁵ sent over privately tonight to Mr. Lampson. This draft has not yet been submitted to Monsieur Berthelot, and copies will only be sent officially by bag tomorrow, November 13th.

Comment in Coblenz telegram No. 46⁶ on total suppression of delegates was brought to Monsieur Massigli's attention. He said that the point had already been noticed by Monsieur von Hoesch, who had, after a night's consideration, definitely declared for total suppression.

Monsieur von Hoesch has not yet produced the German government's proposals respecting the amnesty, but Quai d'Orsay will again emphasize to him tomorrow importance of these proposals being submitted before Conference meets on November 16th.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 427. Repeated to Berlin in cypher No. 17.

⁴ These drafts are untraced in Foreign Office archives.

⁵ Not printed. This draft was substantially the same as the final text adopted by the Conference of Ambassadors on November 14 (see No. 103) except that: (i) it contained references to 'les Gouvernements alliés'; (ii) the second paragraph of the draft had a concluding phrase reading 'à cet égard, l'effort fait pour tenir compte de leurs demandes dans le règlement de la question du désarmement, leur paraît comme un symptôme favorable'; (iii) the fifth paragraph of the draft read 'dans toute la mesure compatible avec la sécurité des troupes' where the corresponding passage of the final text read 'dans le cadre de l'Arrangement rhénan'; (iv) the draft did not include a phrase corresponding to 'ceux-ci se rapprochant des chiffres normaux' in the seventh paragraph of the final text; (v) the draft included a phrase 'et qu'il leur sera ainsi possible de maintenir et d'étendre les mesures libérales qu'ils ont librement décidé de prendre' which was omitted from the end of the penultimate paragraph of the final text. For the circumstances attendant on the drafting of this note see further No. 203.

⁶ No. 67.

No. 93

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 13, 9 a.m.)

No. 442 Telegraphic [Germany 24/10]

BERLIN, November 12, 1925, 11.39 p.m.

Secretary of State informs me that French note on disarmament has been examined by competent departments. He hopes that on four of the five

questions German Government will be able to answer in a satisfactory way. This answer will be telegraphed to-morrow about noon.

On remaining point, namely, the police, there are difficulties, and Secretary of State believes there are misunderstandings. To clear these up German Government have sent a special expert to Paris to-night. He will arrive to-morrow at 5 p.m., and it is hoped that he can meet French authorities the same evening. By these means it is believed whole negotiation can be concluded.

German Government attach the utmost importance to a decision by Conference of Ambassadors on Saturday¹ and to publication of decision on Sunday. If complete settlement is impossible, they reiterate that it is urgent to publish Rhineland alleviations on Sunday morning.

Delay may compromise entire position.

Repeated to Paris, No. 20.

¹ November 14, 1925.

No. 94

Notes¹ on the German note of November 11th and the French semi-official reply of the same date regarding disarmament²

[C 14466/21/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 13, 1925

Covering note

The German government ask that the date for beginning the evacuation of Cologne be fixed definitely for December 1st and that arrangements be made for completing it before the end of the year.

Police

(i) Statute of the Personnel

The position is this: In the allied note of June 4th it was stated that the personnel of the Schutzpolizei [*sic*]³ are now enlisted for twelve years, just like soldiers of the Reichswehr, instead of being engaged as life officials. The demand was therefore made that 'The statute of the personnel of the Schutzpolizei shall be similar to that of the Ordnungspolizei [*sic*]³ and must give to that personnel the same status of life officials'.

The German government have accordingly proposed to make all the Schutzpolizei life officials at the age of 32. In addition to this however they propose transferring the members of the Schutzpolizei automatically at the age of 32 into other categories of police (administrative police, municipal police, etc.) and into the gendarmerie. These services were before the war largely recruited from the ranks of retired soldiers. This proposal has already

¹ These notes were probably by Mr. Troutbeck of Central Department.

² Cf. No. 88, note 5.

³ The Schutzpolizei was a security police force. The Ordnungspolizei was a regular police force.

been made to the Control Commission who are not satisfied. They point out that, according to this proposal, the police will only get their life status when they have left the Schutzpolizei. A further result will be that the Schutzpolizei will be wholly composed of young men between the ages of 20 and 32 and will thus be an important military force, and that the whole of the police and gendarmerie (167,000 men in all) will receive training in the Schutzpolizei. The French, in their note to the German Ambassador, accordingly insist on more satisfactory proposals.

(ii) *Numbers of police in barracks*

The Germans repeat their request for 35,000 men. The French have no objection.

(iii) *Titles and duties of police officers*

The Germans ask that the military titles be retained. The French agree, provided the German government undertake to give police officers no military duties.

High Command

The allied note of June 4th said that 'The provisions of the decree of the 11th August, 1920, conferring the powers of [a] Commander-in-Chief on the Head of the Army Directorate, must be cancelled. The Head of the Army Directorate . . .⁴ must be placed again in his old position of Chief of Staff to the Minister of the Reichswehr'.

The German government are now prepared to replace the existing decree of the 11th August, 1920, by a text which says that the Minister of the Reichswehr exercises the command of the Army and that the Corps Divisional Commanders are directly subordinate to him; as regards the Chief of the Army Directorate, however, the new text says that his position is fixed by section 8 of the 'Reichswehr Law', and that he is the *representative* of the Minister in the affairs of the Army.

Section 8 of the Reichswehr Law says that 'At the head of the Reichsheer stands a General as Chief of the Army Directorate . . .'.⁴ One of the ways in which the Control Commission have tried to get their point has been by getting this section of the Law amended, so as to have it laid down definitely that the Chief of the Army Directorate will have no power of command vested in himself. The Control Commission are not satisfied with the German proposal to make him the 'representative' of the Minister. The French note, while admitting that the German proposal is a step forward, asks for further assurances.

Military Instruction

The German government argue that it is not incompatible with the Treaty to train all categories of troops with all the arms allowed to each category,

⁴ Punctuation as in original quotation.

also to train them in the use of armoured lorries (camions), though not with armoured cars, and with civil aeroplanes for instruction in defence only.

The French object to the two latter proposals.

Königsberg guns

The French accept the German proposal[s]⁵ so long as they are not used as a precedent elsewhere.

Associations

The Germans offer to send a circular to the State governments, drawing their attention to the fact that military associations are not allowed.

The French do not think this is enough. They want a law or decree issued, and they also want

- (a) orders to be given to the members of the Reichswehr to prevent them having any relations with military associations;
- (b) the suppression of the special department of the Reichswehr Ministry that deals with associations.

⁵ The German proposals in question read as follows: 'Le Gouvernement allemand demande l'autorisation de maintenir sur affûts mobiles les 22 canons lourds de la forteresse de Königsberg. Il s'engage à ne pas enlever ces canons de la forteresse pour des manœuvres de la troupe et il est prêt, en outre, à faire le nécessaire en vue de la construction de positions fixes pour les 16 canons anti-aériens, bien que la position fixe de ces canons préjudicie sensiblement leur utilité.'

No. 95

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 13, 9 a.m.)

No. 443 Telegraphic [C 14505/2/18]

BERLIN, November 13, 1925, 12.48 a.m.

Chancellor and Herr Stresemann asked me to come round this evening¹ on a most urgent matter. I found them extremely nervous about a date for conclusion of evacuation of Cologne. They said that a distant date was better than none. January 15th or January 20th would assist them considerably, if named as latest date for conclusion, the operation being naturally carried out as rapidly as possible.

I replied that I was extremely unwilling to raise this question again. But they evidently attached such extreme and urgent importance to it that I promised to telegraph as above and put their view forward.

¹ This telegram was drafted on November 12, 1925.

No. 96

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 13, 1.5 p.m.)

No. 428 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 14494/13120/18]

PARIS, November 13, 1925

Berlin telegrams Nos. 441, 442, 443.¹

I have urged Ministry of Foreign Affairs to endeavour to hold conference tomorrow afternoon. This will be done provided that:

1. Satisfactory assurances are forthcoming about disarmament particularly respecting police from German experts who will be received by Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the presence of this Embassy at 6.30 p.m. tonight.

2. Assurances arrive respecting amnesty.

If 2 arrive but not 1, it would still be possible to send Rhineland modification note tomorrow.

I cannot too strongly emphasize that if German government really want[s] both communications tomorrow it is for it to produce both 1 and 2 without further haggling.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Repeated to Berlin No. 18.

¹ Nos. 90, 93 and 95 respectively.

No. 97

Lord D' Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 13, 10 p.m.)

No. 444 Telegraphic [C 14507/13120/18]

Urgent

BERLIN, November 13, 1925, 8.20 p.m.

I communicated substance of Lord Crewe's telegram No. 428¹ to Minister of Foreign Affairs immediately on receipt and pressed him to take instant and effective action on lines indicated.

He was immens[e]ly gratified by our attitude in Paris and promised to put himself in telephonic communication with German Embassy there, so that requisite assurances should be forthcoming.

The Conference of Ambassadors meeting being fixed for tomorrow produced such a favourable effect that I am convinced the Minister for Foreign Affairs will do what is possible to give satisfactory declarations.

If, in addition to action proposed by the Conference of Ambassadors some declaration could be made on lines of my telegram No. 443,² I should regard the prospect here as extremely favourable and success of Locarno policy as assured.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 444, repeated to Paris No. 21.

¹ No. 96.

² No. 95.

Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 329 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 14494/13120/18]

Immediate

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 13, 1925, 10 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 428¹ (of the 13th November. Evacuation of Cologne and alleviations in the Rhineland).

1. Rhineland. In the circumstances it seems obvious that the Conference should send off their note about alleviations in the Rhineland tomorrow (Saturday), so that it can be published on Sunday. The unofficial French draft enclosed in Mr. Wigram's letter of November 12th² (which I understand has since been adopted officially by the French government) is quite satisfactory and has the advantage of being so worded as to render a previous assurance by the German government about amnesty unnecessary. I must however ask for the following small modifications:

(a) The phrase 'allied governments' should be eliminated throughout and replaced by 'the governments represented on the Ambassadors' Conference' or some such phrase.

(b) Paragraph 7. 'Suppression of the system of delegates'. I think there is much force in Colonel Ryan's contention that it is to the interest of the German population that there should be at least one official (with necessary staff) in the British, one in the Belgian, and one in each province of the French zone; and should have thought that the German authorities would have taken the same views. I should therefore have preferred to see the phrase altered to something such as 'great reduction in number of delegates.' But if the French are ready to agree to total suppression and German Ambassador also agrees, as he apparently does, then I can say no more.

2. Cologne. The chief point is that the French now agree to the evacuation beginning on December 1st whatever the German reply may be to their latest representations. Therefore the sooner the announcement is made the better. If the explanations given on the five points of difficulty are satisfactory a statement to that effect could be included in the note. Otherwise the best solution is, as General Wauchope suggests, to separate the two questions of Cologne and disarmament and inform the German government that the Control Commission will remain to settle the outstanding points. It will in any case have to remain on to supervise the execution of such agreement as is reached in principle and to verify the points mentioned in lists I, II and III of the German note.³ In other words the French suggestions contained in your telegram No. 427⁴ seem to meet the case exactly. It depends upon the new German suggestions as to which of the two alternatives is to be employed. If possible the former alternative is of course preferable, but in either case there seems no necessity to delay the announcement regarding the beginning of evacuation: indeed there is every reason to make it.

¹ No. 96.

² Not printed. See No. 92, note 5.

³ Of October 23: see No. 28, note 3.

⁴ No. 92.

My general feeling on the proposals contained in the German note of November 11th is as follows:

- (a) Police. Statute of the personnel. The French seem to me right.
- (b) High Command. I should like to accept the German proposal.
- (c) Military Instruction. The French seem to me right.
- (d) Associations. I am inclined to doubt whether it is essential to insist upon a new law or decree, but I agree with the French that orders should be given to the members of the Reichswehr to prevent them having any relations with military associations, and that the special department of the Reichswehr ministry that deals with associations should be suppressed.

As regards naming a date for completing the evacuation of Cologne, obviously the suggestion in the German note of November 11th that the evacuation should be completed by the end of the year is materially impossible. If we are driven to fix a date we must say that we are informed that it would not be safe to give definitely an earlier date than end of February owing to the material difficulty of preparing barrack accommodation and moving stores; but that every effort will be made to complete the operation earlier.

Please see the French immediately and inform them of my views.

Repeated to Berlin No. 236 and Coblenz No. 41.

No. 99

Memorandum by Central Department

[C 14807/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, [November 13, 1925]¹

Cases in which Great Britain is bound to go to war

1. If the Council of the League holds that an attack has been made on Germany by France or Belgium, or on France or Belgium by Germany: an 'attack' in this sense including a violation of the demilitarised zone established by articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. (Articles 4 (1) and (2), and 2²).

2. If there occurs an 'attack' as under (1) of so flagrant a nature that H.M. Government are convinced that it constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary. H.M. Government would only act in such a case in confident anticipation of a confirmatory decision on the part of the Council of the League. (Articles 4 (3) and 2²).

3. If the Council of the League decides that warlike measures are necessary to enforce an arbitral or judicial decision given under the arbitration treaties between Germany and Belgium or Germany and France. (Articles 5 and 3²).

¹ Date of the covering minute to this undated memorandum.

² Of the Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

Objections in Principle

- A. 'We are giving guarantees in which the Dominions will not follow us, and there is therefore the danger of two foreign policies within the Empire'.³

Foreign policy must be dictated by facts and not by theories. If the facts indicate that one part of the Empire has a vital interest in the solution of some problem, which interest is not shared by other parts of the Empire, then no amount of theorizing over Imperial Unity can make it less desirable for that part of the Empire to satisfy its own imperative needs with the means at its disposal, provided that the use of these means does not conflict with the interests of any other part of the Empire. No one could regard Locarno as having sown the seed of an inter-imperial conflict of interests, especially as by article 10 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee all obligation on the part of the Dominions and India is expressly excluded. Nor is this exclusion in any sense a new departure, for a similar provision was made in article 5 of the Treaty of Guarantee signed by Messrs. Lloyd George and Balfour on June 28th, 1919.⁴ This was done largely on the advice of Sir R. Borden,⁵ who took the line that it was hopeless to expect the Dominion Parliaments to back such a guarantee.

The foreign policy of H.M. Government in Europe must of necessity be dictated in the first place by the vital⁶ interests of Great Britain: in regard to other parts of the world the foreign policy of H.M. Government will naturally pay heed first and foremost to the interests of those parts of the Empire which are most nearly involved.

- B. 'The Locarno treaties isolate Russia by uniting Europe into a hostile camp'.⁷

Who is doing the isolating? The rest of Europe or the Russian government itself? The European camp is not hostile and Russia can enter it by using the passwords which admit its other inhabitants. Surely it is not argued that we should refuse to heal disruption and refrain from drawing Europe together

³ The reference would appear to be to the views of General Smuts, who had been Prime Minister of South Africa from 1919 to 1924. In a speech at Johannesburg on November 11 General Smuts, as quoted in the *Cape Times* of November 12, stated in particular as regards article 10 of the Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee: 'The proposed Anglo-American guarantee of the Western frontier in 1919 [see No. 1, note 9] had a similar provision, but the provision disappeared with the guarantee and the united front in Empire policy was not broken. . . . More and more the foreign policy of the British Government will become simply and solely that of Great Britain, and the day may come when the Dominions might feel that they have little in common with such a policy and will begin their own foreign policies in their own interests.' Cf. *The Times* of November 12, 1925, p. 14.

⁴ Sir W. Tyrrell here made the following marginal comment: 'At a time when General Smuts was still in Paris [as a member of the British Empire Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference]! W. T.'

⁵ Prime Minister of Canada 1911-20.

⁶ This word was inserted by Sir W. Tyrrell.

⁷ The reference is uncertain but cf. *Parl. Debts., 5th ser., H. of C.*, vol. 188, cols. 438-42, for remarks in this connexion made by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald on November 18.

merely because by doing so we may make Russia's isolation more evident. We should welcome any step towards a rapprochement with Russia by any European Power, especially her neighbours.⁸

Legal objections

- (i) That the effect of a guarantee by a third party tends to extend the area of conflict instead of localizing it.
 - a. The whole idea of a guarantee is to prevent a conflict from arising by making a potential aggressor realize that the party whom he attacks will not stand alone.
 - b. This argument could be employed against all forms of guarantee—that given to Belgium in 1839,⁹ for example—or any form of alliance—or the Geneva Protocol.
 - c. No third party would ever give a guarantee unless they believed that the area of conflict might eventually extend to them.
- (ii) That guarantees operating without the League machinery being involved are contrary to the principles of the League. (Article 20 of the Covenant).

The framers of the Locarno Treaties have done their best to bring them within the aegis of the League by making the Council of the League the deciding factor whenever a decision is required which might involve action by one of the guarantors.

- (iii) That the immediate participation by a third party in a case of flagrant aggression (Article 4(3)²) is contrary to the principles of the League—i.e. that we should have the approval of the Council before taking any action.

This is an admirable principle on paper, but in practice, if any feeling of security is to be created and if the Treaties are really to give 'supplementary guarantees' for that purpose, the case of a sudden attack must be provided against. The Council of the League is a body which must have time to arrive at a decision, and a sudden attack may call for instant measures of defence and support.

- (iv) That the provision for a League decision subsequent to the intervention of a guarantor as in (iii) is fictitious, since the rump of the League could not possibly enforce its decision nor, e.g., compel a third party to withdraw from the conflict if the decision were that 'flagrant aggression' had not occurred.

⁸ Sir W. Tyrrell noted against this paragraph: We regret, but cannot help the interpretation which the Soviet Govt. places upon the Locarno Treaty, but it is regrettable that General Smuts should appear to endorse such a distorted interpretation—which will not help to bring Russia in. W. T.'

⁹ The territorial integrity and neutrality of Belgium were guaranteed by the Powers in treaties of April 19, 1839, with the Netherlands and Belgium respectively. For these treaties and the treaty of the same date between the Netherlands and Belgium see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 27, pp. 990–1002.

There is no real answer to this, save that no better arrangement could have been found. If the League is really going to grow in strength no Power will enter into a conflict if the weight of opinion represented even by a 'rump' of the League is against it.

In any case objectors cannot have it both ways. They cannot complain as in (ii) and (iii) that action under the Treaties is not sufficiently within the control of the League, and then complain that the League is too weak to carry out the control for which the Treaties do provide.

(v) That Great Britain may be involved in a war which began in the East of Europe, the question of the Rhine frontier being raised only after war has broken out elsewhere.

To deal with this objection we must go into hypothetical cases. Two such cases chiefly arise:

(1) Germany and Poland disagree and the situation arises under article 15 para. 7 of the Covenant where, the Council of the League having failed to reach unanimity, the nations involved regain their liberty of action—

a. Germany attacks Poland. France attacks Germany in support of Poland. Must we not intervene under our guarantee of the inviolability of the Rhine frontiers?

No, for that guarantee is made subject, under article 2 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, to certain exceptions, of which the third covers the case of action taken in pursuance of article 15, para. 7 of the Covenant 'provided that this action is directed against a State which was the first to attack'. France's action would clearly fulfil this condition and our guarantee would not apply.

b. But supposing Poland attacks Germany and France attacks Germany in support of Poland?

In such a case France will have deprived herself of her right to take action, by her guarantee under article 2 not to attack Germany except in certain cases, which exceptions do *not* include an attack by Poland on Germany. If France persists in violating article 2 we shall have to go to Germany's help, for France would be guilty of an unjustified aggression: the very case in which our guarantee is intended to apply.

(2) France, in virtue of her guarantee of the German-Polish arbitration Treaty, makes a legitimate attack on Germany: the attack fails, and Germany in a successful counter-attack crosses the Rhineland.

From the strictly legal point of view Germany's action in defending herself against France would not make her a wrongdoer as against France, even though she were a wrongdoer in the first instance against Poland, and we could not be called on to intervene in respect of that action either under the Pact or under the Covenant.

But Germany's original aggression against Poland would probably already have brought article 16 of the Covenant into play and would thus have

involved our intervention: nor is it improbable that in such a contingency we should at once intervene in our own interests.

In any case the Locarno Treaties in no way increase our liabilities in such an eventuality, while on the other hand they greatly restrict the freedom of Poland, France or Germany to provoke hostilities.

- (vi) Who decides who is the aggressor in the case under article 15 para. 7 of the Covenant where, owing to a deadlock on the League, the nations involved regain their liberty of action against an alleged aggressor?

Each party decides for itself. The fault in this case, if fault there be, is inherent in the Covenant and is one which Locarno has made neither better nor worse.

No. 100

Note from the German Embassy in Paris¹

[C 14548/21/18]

PARIS, le 13 Novembre 1925

Comme suite à sa lettre en date du 11 Novembre d[ernie]r et se référant à la note de Monsieur Berthelot² du même jour et aux entretiens qui ont eu lieu entre temps, l'Ambassade d'Allemagne a l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint les explications et propositions complémentaires du Gouvernement allemand, en ce qui concerne la question du désarmement.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 100

Haut-Commandement

La Note de M. Berthelot exprime la crainte que, sous prétexte d'être le représentant du Ministre de la Reichswehr dans les affaires concernant l'Armée, le Chef de la Direction de l'Armée pourrait, *de facto*, prendre la place du Ministre. Selon le texte de la proposition allemande, cette crainte n'a pas d'objet.

Il ressort clairement du chiffre II de l'Ordonnance relative au règlement des pouvoirs de commandement dans la Reichswehr, selon le texte actuellement proposé, que seul le Ministre de la Reichswehr exerce le pouvoir de commandement sur l'Armée et que dans l'exercice de ce pouvoir les Commandants des Groupes et les Commandants des divisions relèvent directement de lui. Selon le chiffre III, le Chef de la Direction de l'Armée est encadré dans l'ensemble du Ministère de la Reichswehr. Sa situation dans ce Ministère est délimitée en ce sens qu'il est, d'une part, le conseiller militaire du

¹ The present text of this note was received in the Foreign Office on November 16 under cover of an undated letter from Mr. Wigram to Mr. Lampson (not preserved in Foreign Office archives). A further copy of the note was received on November 17 under cover of Paris despatch No. 2414 of November 16, not printed.

² See No. 94.

Ministre de la Reichswehr et, d'autre part, le représentant de ce dernier dans les affaires concernant l'Armée.

Seul le Ministre de la Reichswehr exerce le pouvoir de service et est responsable pour tout le service. Il est préposé au Chef de la Direction de l'Armée et il décide de sa propre autorité si et à quel point il désire se faire remplacer par le Chef de la Direction de l'Armée dans l'exercice de ses pouvoirs. Les pouvoirs du Chef de la Direction de l'Armée sont donc subordonnés à la décision du Ministre de la Reichswehr. Par conséquent, il est exclu que le Chef de la Direction de l'Armée pourrait [*sic ?* puisse], *de facto*, prendre de sa propre autorité la place du Ministre de la Reichswehr.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 100

Instruction militaire

Abstraction faite de quelques camions isolés et surannés qui n'ont jamais donné lieu, lors de leur présentation, à des objections de la part de la sous-commission de la Commission Militaire Interalliée de Contrôle et qui servent uniquement à titre provisoire jusqu'à l'acquisition de nouveaux camions, la Reichswehr ne dispose pas d'autres autos-blindées que celles servant au transport du personnel, agréé[e]s par la note ci-après de la Commission Militaire Interalliée de Contrôle, sous-commission de l'armement, en date du 12 Juillet 1922, adressée à la Deutsche Heeresfriedenskommission,³ sous-commission de l'armement et signée Bingham.⁴ Le texte de cette note est le suivant (retraduit):

'J'ai l'honneur à [de] vous faire savoir qu'aucune objection n'est élevée au sujet des autos-blindées représentées par les photographies annexées à votre lettre, à condition que le mécanisme de direction arrière, qui avait été critiqué au début, soit enlevé.

Je [vous] prie à présent de vouloir bien me faire connaître la répartition envisagée des 105 camions de cette nature ainsi autorisés.'

L'acquisition des nouveaux camions à concurrence du nombre agréé n'a pas encore pu être réalisée. La condition formulée dans la lettre de la Commission Militaire Interalliée de Contrôle du 12 Juillet 1922 — enlèvement du mécanisme de direction arrière — a été intégralement exécutée.

Les véhicules n'ont aucun armement et ne peuvent être utilisés que pour le transport du personnel sur les routes. L'instruction pour le combat avec ces véhicules n'a pas lieu.

Des avions civils ne seront pas utilisés par l'Armée pour les manœuvres des troupes.

³ The German Army Peace Commission.

⁴ Major-General Sir F. Bingham had been British representative on the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control and President of the armaments Sub-Commission, 1919-24.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN No. 100

Forteresse de Koenigsberg

L'exception accordée pour les 22 canons lourds de Koenigsberg, à savoir l'autorisation de les laisser sur affûts mobiles dans la forteresse même, ne sera pas généralisée ni appliquée aux autres forteresses (ouvrages fortifiés des frontières et des côtes).

ENCLOSURE 4 IN No. 100

Associations

A la place de la circulaire aux Gouvernements des Pays, jugée insuffisante, le Gouvernement allemand a l'intention d'édicter l'*ordonnance* suivante:

Ordonnance

'Aux fins d'application de la loi sur l'exécution des articles 177 et 178 du Traité de Versailles du 22 mars 1921 R[eichs] G[esetz] Bl[att] page 235) et après approbation du Reichsrat il est ordonné:

Art. 1.

'Devront être considérées comme contraires aux stipulations des articles 177 et 178 du Traité de Versailles les associations qui

- (a) s'occupent d'affaires militaires,
- (b) instruisent ou exercent ou laissent instruire ou exercer leurs adhérents dans le métier ou l'emploi des armes de guerre,
- (c) auront un lien quelconque avec le Ministère de la Reichswehr ou avec autre autorité militaire.

Art. 2.

'Les associations, dont les statuts ou l'attitude montrent qu'ils exercent une des activités mentionnées à l'article 1 devront être dissoutes en vertu des dispositions de la loi du 22 mars 1921.'

Le texte des ordres et décrets du Ministère de la Reichswehr, adressés aux membres du Ministère et de la Reichswehr pour empêcher l'entretien d'un lien quelconque avec les associations, a été communiqué à la Commission Militaire Interalliée de Contrôle par lettre du Commissaire du Reich von Pawelsz No 725/10.25 en date du 2 Octobre 1925; il y a lieu notamment de renvoyer au décret imprimé du 30 septembre 1925, signé Dr. Gessler,⁵ dont M. Nord⁶ remettra un exemplaire. L'exécution de ces ordres sera strictement assurée. Il n'existe pas de service spécial entre le Ministère de la Reichswehr ou la Reichswehr et des associations.

⁵ German Minister of Defence.

⁶ A Counsellor in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

No. 101

Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 331 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 14546/2/18]

Most urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 14, 1925, 4.30 p.m.

Date of completion of evacuation of Cologne zone.

French Ambassador this morning communicated telegram from M. Briand to following effect:—

'The German government have strongly impressed upon M. Briand the desirability that they should be told not only that December 1st is the date upon which the evacuation of Cologne shall begin, but also a date, as near as possible to the new year, at which the evacuation shall end.

'M. Briand is disposed to meet this request and to say that the evacuation shall be completed in January, by which he has in mind the end of January. The German Ambassador had given him to understand that such a reply would give satisfaction to Dr. Stresemann.

'General Guillaumat has told M. Briand that two months should suffice for the evacuation; but M. Briand considers that, to fulfil the undertaking thus given, it would be very necessary to issue strict instructions to the military authorities that all unnecessary delay must be avoided.'

Monsieur de Fleuriau added that he had received instructions to ascertain the views of Mr. Chamberlain on the above message, and to communicate them to his government as soon as possible.

Your Lordship is aware that my desire tallies entirely with that of M. Briand, namely to complete the evacuation of Cologne, once begun, as quickly as possible, but I have been handicapped by inability to get the War Office to give an earlier date than three months from when evacuation begins. I am prepared to agree to a statement that we will make every effort to complete evacuation by February 1st, and that we hope to do so. The difficulty is, I am informed, the material difficulty of preparing barrack accommodation and of moving stores etc. etc., but I am ready to pledge myself to use my best endeavour to persuade my colleague, the Secretary of State for War, to issue orders that evacuation be completed by February 1st.

If however you and M. Briand are convinced, after speaking to Herr v. Hoesch, that it is vital to name February 1st definitely as final date, in that case I will take the personal responsibility of saying that it shall be completed by that date.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 16, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 434 Telegraphic: by bag [C 14543/21/18]

PARIS, November 15, 1925

Disarmament, Evacuation and Rhineland Modifications

The following is a summary of developments between the despatch of my telegram No. 428¹ of November 13th and meeting of Ambassadors' Conference last night at 5 p.m.

1. German reply (see my despatch No. 2414)² to French memorandum of November 11th was received in the late afternoon of November 13th. This memorandum dealt with high command, military instruction, Koenigsberg and associations. Oral explanations respecting police were given by German experts, especially sent from Berlin, to Ministry for Foreign Affairs and members of the Embassy staff at 6.30 p.m. on the evening of the 13th. At end of explanations, German experts claimed that difference between allied and German points of view respecting status and barrack accommodation of police affected in each case only 5,000 men. For the latest German proposal agreed that 15,000 Schutzpolizei should be enlisted for life and asked for 40,000 men in barracks exclusive of cadets in schools. French urged that nevertheless Germans must have [*sic ?* make] some additional advance and give more complete explanations respecting organisation of Schutzpolizei. A further meeting with German experts was fixed for 2.30 p.m. on the 14th.

2. After meeting with German experts, members of Embassy staff informed French that, whatever might happen about disarmament, you would expect by afternoon of 14th decisions respecting Rhineland modifications and Cologne evacuation. French claimed, however, that adequate time should be allowed for negotiations with German experts to develop, and that no decision should be taken respecting Cologne and disarmament until November 16th. For according to French, although Germans knew that evacuation was practically decided, they still feared that it might be postponed, and evacuation was still to some extent a lever *vis-à-vis* disarmament. Against the French arguments members of the Embassy put as strongly as they could the political danger from the German point of view of postponement even until November 16th. The French, however, maintained their point of view, and they said that according to their information, the despatch of the Rhineland note on November 14th would be quite sufficient for the German political situation until the 16th.

3. After meeting with French was concluded your telegram No. 329³ arrived. In view of the fact that arguments therein contained had only just been put to the French, I thought it best to make a communication to the French on the following lines early on the morning of the 14th.

¹ No. 96.

² See No. 100, note 1.

³ No. 98.

I communicated to them substance of Berlin telegrams Nos. 444⁴ and 445,⁵ which I pointed out had been despatched from Berlin after the meeting with German experts, and pressed strongly that, if the German experts gave satisfaction at the forthcoming meeting at 2.30 p.m. a great effort must be made, and the conference must decide that evening not only Rhineland modifications but also evacuation and disarmament. I reinforced my argument by pointing out to the French that the more satisfactory instructions, which, according to Lord d'Abernon's telegrams Nos. 444 and 445 were apparently now about to be issued to the German representatives at Paris, were largely the result of my telegram No. 428 to you, which had been repeated to Berlin. The French accepted my request.

4. I then made a communication to the German Ambassador. I pressed him strongly to obtain without fail from Berlin in the course of the morning the modified instructions respecting the police which Lord d'Abernon's telegram No. 445 had foreshadowed. Monsieur von Hoesch said he would do his best to obtain these instructions. He took the opportunity to make to me a communication respecting the extreme importance attached in Germany to a date being fixed for the termination of the evacuation on the lines of the communication already reported in Berlin telegram No. 443.⁶

Monsieur von Hoesch was told that he could scarcely expect me to help him much in this matter, if he did not, on his side, obtain, without making further difficulties, a police settlement.

5. At 2.30 p.m. the German experts again met the French and members of the Embassy. The Germans were informed that their memorandum of November 13th (see my despatch No. 2414) was in principle satisfactory. A long discussion then ensued about the police, as the result of which satisfactory explanations were obtained about the organisation of the Schutzpolizei, and the number of police in barracks was fixed at 32,000 not including cadets.

6. The proceedings of the Ambassadors' Conference which met at 5 p.m. are reported in my immediately following telegram.⁷

⁴ No. 97.

⁵ This telegram of November 13 was as indicated below.

⁶ No. 95.

⁷ No. 103.

No. 103

*The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 16, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 435 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/5]

PARIS, November 15, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference held a special session at 5 p.m. on November 14th, to consider the questions of (1) the modifications of the Rhineland régime and (2) disarmament and evacuation. The Italian Ambassador

presided, as Monsieur Jules Cambon was unable to attend. I was present as well as the Japanese Ambassador. Monsieur Laroche represented the French delegation, and representatives of the Belgian and United States Embassies were also at the table.

Modifications in Rhineland régime

A draft note to the German government (text of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 1 of November 13th) was submitted to the conference by the French delegation. In accordance with the instructions in your telegram No. 329,² I requested that the words 'allied governments' should be changed, wherever they occurred in the draft note, to read 'governments represented on the Ambassadors' Conference' or something similar. My proposal was accepted. In accordance with your telegram No. 329 I also raised again the question of the total abolition of the delegates. Monsieur Laroche said that the point had already been carefully discussed with Monsieur von Hoesch, who, after referring to Berlin, had stated categorically that the German government wanted total abolition. Monsieur Laroche understood that the attitude of the German government in this matter was based on the fact that the delegates were not provided for in the treaty, that in the past they had savoured of allied political interference in local matters, and that in the Ruhr the Germans had found that they got on very well without any delegates at all. In these circumstances I did not press the point of view put in Coblenz telegram No. 46.³ With a few other minor verbal amendments, the French draft was accepted, and the note was sent to the German Ambassador last night. The text, as actually despatched, was sent to you by special messenger on November 14th.⁴ A further minor modification has, however, since been made at the request of the German Ambassador, and the last sentence in paragraph 2 beginning 'à cet égard l'effort fait' and ending 'symptôme favorable' has been omitted.

Evacuation of Cologne and disarmament

Marshal Foch reported to the conference the Versailles Military Committee's views on the German note of November 11th⁵ as modified by the unofficial correspondence exchanged between the French and German governments on November 11th and 13th and by the verbal explanations given by the German experts. The Marshal said that in principle the German proposals were now satisfactory.

The German Ambassador's note of 13th November⁶ contained further suggestions from the German government regarding the high command,

¹ Thus in filed copy. The reference should evidently have been to Paris despatch No. 2401 which transmitted a slightly revised version of the draft referred to in No. 92, note 5. This revised draft was the same as the final text in cases (iii) and (iv) in note 5 to No. 92.

² No. 98.

³ No. 67.

⁴ Under cover of Paris despatch No. 2411 (not printed). The amended text of the note (see below) is printed as item No. 3 in Cmd. 2527.

⁵ Cf. No. 94.

⁶ No. 100.

military instruction, Königsberg guns and associations. As regards the first, provided the Germans were willing to amend the text proposed by them in their note of the 11th, in accordance with the explanations now given, the allies could consider that their views had been met. As regards the other three points the German explanations were satisfactory. As regards the question of police, concerning which discussion had been carried out with the German experts, this question was well on the way to complete settlement. Agreement in principle had been reached on the question of status, recruitment and numbers of police in barracks. The whole of the Schutzpolizei would be officials of the same status as other officials in the various states. As far as Prussia was concerned, 15,000 would remain in the Schutzpolizei enlisted for life. As regards police in barracks, the Germans had asked that the allies should agree to their having 32,000 exclusive of cadets. The Versailles Committee considered that these proposals could be accepted. Provided then that they were put into effect, and so soon as schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the German note of October 23rd were verified, it could be said that the disarmament question was settled in principle.

After the Marshal had spoken, Monsieur Laroche submitted to the conference the draft of an oral declaration to be made to the German Ambassador immediately. Monsieur Laroche explained that this declaration would be followed on November 16th by a confirming note, which, however, could not be despatched immediately owing chiefly to the fact that it would need to be very carefully drafted. Further this delay of two days would enable the conference to obtain definite information from the German Ambassador as to what was the latest date of the termination of the evacuation, which would satisfy German opinion.

In submitting the draft oral declaration, Monsieur Laroche stated that the French government wished it to be clear to everyone that disarmament was not 'terminé et acquis'. The position was that disarmament had reached such a point, that the allies, in view particularly of the Locarno arrangements and of the efforts recently made by the Germans, would not be justified in deferring further the announcement of the commencement of the evacuation. Disarmament, however, would be continued and the control commission would remain in Germany until it had finished its work. Its very presence there would still act as a certain lever upon the Germans. Marshal Foch at this point asked whether, if the German government ceased to show good faith, the progress of the evacuation would be delayed. Monsieur Laroche replied that the allies could not act upon such a supposition. They were now about to announce the commencement of the evacuation and they must suppose that the Germans would continue to show good faith and that the evacuation would be carried through with the utmost possible speed.

Monsieur Laroche further informed the conference that the Germans were pressing strongly, for political reasons, for the fixation of a date for the termination of the evacuation. He added that the French government consider[ed] that there was everything to be gained from fixing such a date,

for, if dates were not fixed, everybody concerned was apt to make difficulties and things went more slowly. During the war, as the Marshal would remember better than anyone, all that had been necessary was to say that a matter should be carried through by a certain time, and it had to be. It was decided to make in the oral declaration a vague mention only of the termination of the evacuation, and, before the despatch of the confirmatory note on November 16th, to consult Monsieur von Hoesch as to what exactly the German government wanted. I am inclined to think that it will be sufficient and it may be safer, to express confident hope of completion by a certain date, such as the 1st of February with a promise to proceed speedily and continuously, rather than to give a solemn pledge, the literal fulfilment of which circumstances might render impossible. Whilst the date of the termination of the evacuation was under discussion, the Belgian representative announced that the Belgian government had always demanded two months notice of the commencement of the evacuation, and that he must ascertain their views before agreeing to any definite date.

The conference then adopted the oral declaration which was communicated to the German Ambassador last evening. The text was telephoned to you last night in my telegram No. 431.⁷ This declaration is *not* intended for publication.

The terms of a communiqué to the press were then agreed upon by the conference. The text of this communiqué was also telephoned to you last evening.⁸

⁷ Not printed. The text of the oral declaration made by the President of the Conference of Ambassadors is printed as item No. 4 in Cmd. 2527.

⁸ In Paris telegram No. 432 (not printed): cf. *The Times* of November 16, 1925, p. 14.

No. 104

Colonel Ryan (Coblentz) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 17, 9 a.m.)

No. 49 Telegraphic [C 14706/13120/18]

COBLENZ, November 16, 1925, 10.30 p.m.

The High Commission considered this morning the manner in which effect should be given to alleviations in the Rhineland as notified to German government by note of Conference of Ambassadors. I informed my colleagues that now that general nature of these alleviations had been made known, we should lose no time in informing public of details so far as it was possible. The French High Commissioner replied that this was entirely the view of the French government. The following procedure was then agreed on.

A communiqué will be issued which will follow in its evolution line (? originally)¹ sent you in my despatch No. 381² of November 2nd. Under

¹ The three preceding words were amended on the filed copy to read: 'main lines draft'.

² Not printed: cf. No. 44.

section 5 it will be stated that delegates' administration is abolished as from 1st, delegates themselves, if necessary, remaining until December 31st to liquidate their affairs.

Section 6 will be modified in the sense that a codification will be made to simplify and to alleviate régime of ordinances.

Simultaneously with issue of communiqué, High Commission will promulgate an ordinance bringing into effect as from December 1st all important modifications with the exception of concession in regard to protective ordinances. Publication of this ordinance which gives effect without delay to majority of statements in the communiqué, will I hope produce a good effect.

Question of aviation (on which no decision of principle has yet been taken) and justice (which is at present forming the subject of conversations with armies) will be dealt with in communiqué in a non-committal way. Decision of High Commission in regard to protective ordinances will also be made known in communiqué (see Section 3 O of draft) but it is not proposed to promulgate ordinance until German government has made known its intention as regards amnesty.

It is probable that drafting of form of communiqué and of ordinance will be completed by. . .³

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 49. Sent to Berlin No. 16.

³ The text is here uncertain. Another text of the telegram here read: 'completed by to-morrow and that publication will be made in the press on Wednesday' (November 18).

No. 105

*Colonel Ryan (Coblenz) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 17, 9 a.m.)*

No. 50 Telegraphic [C 14681/13120/18]

COBLENZ, November 16, 1925, 11.45 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

I have been meeting for some days past with considerable opposition from my colleagues in regard to details, the new Secretary General's tendency being to restrict modifications to the letter and not to spirit of principle agreed on. Today however I found them in a conciliatory mood and practically all my proposals were accepted. The agreement is in my opinion satisfactory: it safeguards the interests of the armies and at the same time goes a long way towards meeting the German demands.

Delay in the arrival of Reichs-Kommissar is unfortunate as it would have been useful to have had his views. But my colleagues and I think that it would be unwise to postpone the publication for this purpose. There can be no question of altering the scope and any alterations demanded by the

¹ No. 104.

Reichs-Kommissar may give rise to considerable discussion and delay. His views can receive consideration when the Secretary General's are codified.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 50, sent to Berlin No. 17.

No. 106

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 17, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 439 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/5]

PARIS, November 16, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this evening under the presidency of Monsieur Jules Cambon to consider the questions of disarmament and the evacuation of Cologne. I was present, as well as the Japanese Ambassador. Representatives of the Italian, Belgian and United States Embassies were also present.

2. Marshal Foch informed the conference that the Versailles Committee had just adopted the following resolution:—

'The execution, duly verified, of the engagements already taken concerning lists 1, 2 and 3 of the German government's letter of October 23rd, 1925, as well as of the agreement established in the *procès-verbal* of a meeting held today at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between German and allied experts concerning list 4, will assure the proper settlement of the demands contained in the allied note of June 4th, 1925.'

The *procès-verbal* referred to in the Versailles Committee's resolution is that agreed today by the German and allied experts. It will be communicated to the Control Commission. The text¹ will be sent you by bag of November 17th. After taking note of Marshal Foch's report, the conference considered a draft note to the German Ambassador submitted by the French delegation.

My comments on this draft, which, with certain minor modifications, was adopted by the conference and the text of which, as communicated to the German Ambassador this evening, is contained in my despatch No. 2427,² are as follows:—

1. The reserve, referring to sub-sections 20 and 21 of list 3, refers to war material.

2. The use of the term 'allied governments' in paragraph 2 of the note is

¹ Not printed. The *procès-verbal* was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2437 of November 18. It was signed by M. Massigli and Dr. Nord and recapitulated the agreement reached on the first four disarmament questions, as reported by Marshal Foch in No. 103. As regards police the agreement he there outlined was completed by the agreement on titles recorded in § (4) of note 7 to No. 115.

² Not printed. The note from the Conference of Ambassadors is printed as item No. 5 in Cmd. 2527.

due to the fact that it was in this passage thought proper to follow verbally article 429 of the treaty.³

3. The wording of paragraph 3, referring to the termination of the occupation, is the result of very pressing representations by the German Ambassador.⁴ You will note the importance of the word 'prévu' in the concluding phrase. This, of course, in reality, leaves even February 20th an indefinite date. The French supported vigorously the wording in question, claiming that, even if it became apparent about February 15th that the evacuation would not be entirely complete by February 20th, it would be much less inconvenient to inform the Germans then than to do so now. The Belgian representative, on the instruction of his government, strongly opposed the mention of any date earlier than February 28th. In view of the word 'prévu' he was, however, at length prevailed on to accept.

4. The references to the withdrawal of the Control Commission were inserted entirely on the initiative of the French.

I should like, in closing this telegram, to place on record the invaluable assistance I have received from the loyal co-operation of General Desticker,⁵ Monsieur Laroche and Monsieur Massigli. Without their help it would never have been possible to achieve these results so rapidly.

³ Of Versailles.

⁴ Mr. Lampson recorded on November 16 that Mr. Wigram had rung up from Paris to request instructions on the following text proposed by the German Ambassador: 'German Government may rely on the Allies proceeding with the utmost expedition compatible with the provision of new accommodation for the troops, so that the evacuation will be finished during the month of January, i.e. by January 31st, provided that no material difficulty intervenes.' Mr. Lampson commented: 'As showing that the German attitude is not all bluff, I attach a letter [cf. No. 91, note 2] received this morning from Col. Ryan showing that it really is important to make concessions and to make them as clearly and unequivocally as possible. M. W. Lampson 16/11/25.'

Sir W. Tyrrell and Mr. Chamberlain thereupon minuted as follows: 'I should strongly favour concessions on all reasonable German demands or suggestions and I consider the evacuation suggestion essentially reasonable, as it strikes the imagination which is a sluggish organ in the German composition. W. T. 16/11.'

'I accept the Ambassador's words. A. C. 16/11.'

Mr. Wigram was so informed by telephone.

⁵ General Desticker was Chief of Staff to Marshal Foch.

No. 107

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 18, 9.20 a.m.)

No. 452 Telegraphic [C 14733/13120/18]

BERLIN, November 17, 1925, 8.20 p.m.

The two notes from Conference of Ambassadors are published in full in all papers today together with an official commentary by German government

which explains in detail practical bearing of concessions made.¹ Berlin press comment so far is dictated mainly by internal party considerations. The right will not admit that anything beneficial to Germany can have been obtained by present government. The papers of centre are afraid to be enthusiastic; the only warm recognition of concessions obtained is given in 'Vorwaerts' which charact[er]izes decisions of Conference of Ambassadors as 'a triumph of spirit of peace'.

¹ Lord D'Abernon had previously reported in Berlin telegram No. 448 of November 16 that 'the impression made [on the German Cabinet] by summarised decision of Saturday [November 14] is stated to have been extremely favourable'.

No. 108

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 18, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 441 Telegraphic: by bag [C 14708/13120/18]

PARIS, November 17, 1925

My despatch No. 2411¹ of November 14th covering Conference note to German Government respecting Rhineland alleviations.

I have forwarded in my despatch No. 2436² of November 17th an *aide-mémoire* from the German Embassy respecting the amnesty. This *aide-mémoire* was not considered quite sufficient by French Government but, since its receipt, conversations have proceeded between German Embassy and Ministry for Foreign Affairs with result that a complete agreement on all points of principle has now been reached on basis of *aide-mémoire* handed by Monsieur Cambon to Monsieur von Hoesch on November 10th (see my despatch No. 2378.)³

The only outstanding point now is that the Germans want the discussions on the details to proceed rather in Paris than in Coblenz. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs are inclined to oppose this, since they feel that it amounts too much to the dispossessing of the Rhineland Commission and since they consider that this is a matter which the Reichskommissar at Coblenz ought properly to negotiate with the Commission.

They will accordingly urge this proposal on the German Ambassador.⁴

¹ See No. 103, note 4.

² Not printed. The enclosed German *aide-mémoire* of November 14 stated that the application of the proposed amnesty (see No. 71) 'pourrait progresser rapidement si les Gouvernements intéressés délimitaient et fixaient d'une manière précise par la voie de conversations l'étendue des mesures gracieuses à prendre de part et d'autre. Le Gouvernement allemand est prêt à engager de telles conversations.'

³ Cf. No. 71, note 11.

⁴ Mr. Chamberlain replied in his telegram No. 335 of November 18 to Paris: 'I entirely agree with the French that discussions on the details should proceed in Coblenz and not in Paris.'

Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)
No. 3803 [Germany 24/10]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 17, 1925

My Lord,

In my despatch No. 3788¹ of the 16th November I forwarded to your Lordship copy of a letter which I had caused to be addressed to the War Office informing them of the desire of the French Government to proceed to the reduction of their troops of occupation in the Rhineland and of the suggestion made by M. Briand that the British and Belgian Governments, in order to render easier the position of the French Government, might also proceed to some reduction in the number of their troops in the occupied area.² I should be glad if you would bring this question up with M. Briand and would ask him in what precise direction he would suggest that the British troops of occupation should be reduced. At the present moment the French troops of occupation are far in excess of either the Belgian or British troops (in round figures, 70,000, 15,000, and 9,000 respectively)—indeed, the last-named have been already so substantially reduced that it is a matter of some difficulty to reduce the numbers still further. It would accordingly be of assistance to know exactly what M. Briand has in mind, and what particular arm he suggests should be affected. The French Government will not be unaware of the difficulty entailed in the reduction below a certain standard force, if the necessary units are to be preserved. And it is this difficulty which I have more especially in mind in asking for the further views of the French Government.

2. In making representations accordingly to M. Briand, you should emphasise that my sole object in putting these enquiries to him is in order that I may be of assistance. With the information at present at my disposal it is not easy to see in what exact direction a reduction of the already low number of British troops in the Rhineland is practicable without disturbing the necessary proportion of the various arms essential for any military unit.³

3. I shall await your Lordship's reply before moving further in this matter.⁴

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. The enclosed letter of November 16 to the War Office was as indicated below.

² The French Ambassador had spoken in this sense to Sir W. Tyrrell on November 13.

³ The War Office informed the Foreign Office in a letter of November 20 that the statements made in the present despatch entirely represented the views of the Army Council, who hoped that 'the requirements of the political situation may be met by some quite minor reduction, such as the withdrawal of the battery of medium artillery, which can be effected without disturbance'.

⁴ Lord Crewe replied in Paris despatch No. 2465 of November 20 that he had spoken to M. Briand that day, and understood that the French force would be reduced from 93,000 to 60,000 and the Belgian from 15,000 to 7,000. M. Briand 'was not prepared to make

any specific request stating which arm of our force should be reduced and to what extent; but he pointed out that the maintenance of a large force in a given area undoubtedly inflicted some hardship on the Germans, so that the object was to bring the figure down to something like the pre-war standard; in the second place, he also had his military opinion to consider, and it was regarded as a hardship if, while the French army in the Rhineland is being so very substantially reduced, no proportionate deduction is made from the British contingent'.

On November 26 Lord Crewe was instructed in Foreign Office despatch No. 3918 to Paris that 'in informing the French Government of the intention to reduce the British forces of occupation by one battalion of infantry and one battery of medium artillery you should accordingly impress upon them the alacrity with which the British military authorities have responded to the appeal made to them.'

No. 110

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Colonel Ryan (Coblenz)

*No. 815 [C 14532/13120/18]**

Sir,

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 17, 1925*

With reference to your despatch No. 388¹ of the 6th November, you will have observed from my despatch No. 813² of the 16th November that the note addressed by the Ambassadors' Conference to the German Government on the 14th November regarding alleviations in the Rhineland included a statement to the effect that measures would be taken to transfer to the German courts a whole category of cases at present judged by the military tribunals. I felt bound to agree to the inclusion of this statement in the Ambassadors' note, seeing that, on the one hand, it had been suggested by the French Government themselves, and it is the general policy of His Majesty's Government not to be behind the French in any modifications to which they are prepared to agree in the Rhineland régime, and, on the other hand, it was in accordance with the views urged in your despatch under reference.

¹ Not printed. This despatch transmitted the report requested in No. 61, and explained that the High Commission proposed 'to restrict the classes of cases to be tried by the military courts very considerably and thus extend the categories of cases which will be tried by the German courts. The judgments of the German courts as regards such offences as they have hitherto tried has [*sic*] been satisfactory, and it is hoped that they will continue so in future.'

Colonel Ryan further stated: 'The question of how the trial of offences against the occupation is to be effected in future is a difficult one. It is generally recognized that the British military courts have carried out their duties justly and efficiently, and the complaints that have arisen concern almost always the courts of our Allies. But, whether just or unjust, military courts are not popular, and a change in the present system would undoubtedly be welcomed by the population on account of the natural antipathy which the average civilian has towards military courts of any kind. It is for this reason of sentiment that I feel that concessions are necessary.' The view of the French High Commission was 'that it should be possible to leave to the German courts the trial of all offences against the ordinances, except those of a very serious nature (e.g., espionage), and also all minor offences against the persons or property of the armies'.

² Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. This despatch transmitted to Coblenz a copy of Paris despatch No. 2411: see No. 103, note 4.

2. At the same time there is clearly some weight in the views of the British military authorities as expressed in the War Office letter of the 13th November,³ of which a copy is transmitted to you herewith. You will observe that General Ducane [*sic*] has grave doubts as to the wisdom of certain of the specific proposals contained in your despatch and more particularly views with alarm the idea that the German court[s] should be empowered to try offences against the persons and property of the armies.

3. The general principle of transferring certain classes of cases to the German courts having now been admitted, it will remain for the Rhineland High Commission to decide what classes of offences shall be so transferred. When discussing this question with your colleagues I request that you will give the fullest consideration to General Ducane's views. While it is my general policy, and indeed that of the French and Belgian Governments, to bring every practicable alleviation into the occupation, the essential interests of the armies themselves must at the same time not be neglected so long as they are indisputably covered by the terms of the Rhineland Agreement. Not only is it in itself clearly necessary to assure tolerable conditions of life for the individual officers and soldiers comprising the armies of occupation, but, as General Ducane justly points out, it would be defeating the very end the Allied Governments have in view to hand over so much to the German courts that it would be found necessary at a later date to transfer back certain classes of cases to the military courts.

4. The whole question in fact requires considerable thought and the most careful handling, and I request that in dealing with it you will bear the above considerations in mind for your guidance. As a general principle you will, of course, continue to be guided by the rule that we are prepared to go just as far in the direction of alleviation as the French Government for their part. But I do not wish that in doing so the real and legitimate interests of the occupying troops should be prejudiced. The criterion must in each case be whether the particular matter is or is not covered by a fair and reasonable reading of the Rhineland Agreement.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

³ Not printed. This letter transmitted a report of November 9 from the Officer commanding the British Army of the Rhine with reference to Coblenz despatch No. 388. Colonel Maxwell Scott stated in particular: 'Whilst it is realised that every effort should be made to make reasonable concessions to German popular sentiment, yet this Army cannot but view with grave concern any alteration in the procedure hitherto enforced in the Military Courts, where such alteration will affect the future prestige and discipline of its members and their families. Worst of all is the suggestion that, should these relaxations be granted now, the future may necessitate the withdrawal of these privileges. The German population would only be led to doubt our good faith. I very strongly urge therefore that the present procedure be maintained and that the Military authorities be allowed to decide what further offences, if any, may be delegated for trial by German Courts.' The War Office letter of November 13 commented on this report that the Army Council were in 'complete agreement' with the arguments therein put forward for the maintenance of the present powers of Military Courts. It was the view of the Army Council 'that these Courts are an essential support to an Army of Occupation'.

No. 111

Memorandum¹ on the Definition of War Material for the purposes of Article 170 of the Treaty of Versailles

[Germany 24/10]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 17, 1925

Article 170 of the Treaty of Versailles runs as follows:—

‘Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war material of every kind shall be strictly prohibited.

‘The same applies to the manufacture for, and export to, foreign countries of arms, munitions and war material of every kind.’

2. No complete and final list has ever been drawn up defining the phrase ‘arms, munitions and war material of every kind,’ i.e., showing the categories of material which, as being war material, Germany is forbidden by article 170 to import and export. Certain rulings have, however, been laid down in the case of sporting rifles and revolvers, with their ammunition.

3. The necessity for having a definite ruling of what constitutes war material for the purposes of article 170 became urgent when, in January 1925, the Allies informed the German Government that the evacuation of Cologne would not take place until Germany had complied with her disarmament obligations. Though the Allied requirements were not then defined, one of them would undoubtedly be the passage of the necessary legislation in Germany to prevent the import and export of war material. The Germans could not well be expected to draw up this legislation without knowing precisely what material it was to cover. Accordingly, instructions were sent to Paris on the 3rd January (Foreign Office despatch No. 28)² to get the Ambassadors’ Conference to instruct the Versailles Committee to draw up the required list. The conference concurred (Paris telegram No. 27² of the 15th January) and the Versailles Committee started work.

4. They found, however, that the Military Control Commission at Berlin had already, on its own initiative, started negotiations with the German Government on the subject, using a list drawn up by itself as a basis of discussion. Copy of this list is enclosed in Paris despatch No. 1109² of the 11th May. It was soon reported (Paris despatch No. 790² of the 1st April) that agreement had been reached with the German Government on all but about ten items.

It was accordingly decided not to interfere with the Control Commission’s negotiations, which seemed to be making very satisfactory progress. It was obviously better that the Control Commission should reach agreement with the German Government on the subject than that the Versailles Committee should draw up a list to which the German Government might later refuse to agree. All that was done was, in order that the list might be complete

¹ According to the docket this memorandum was by Mr. Baxter of Central Department.

² Not printed.

and deal with naval and aeronautical as well as military material, to forward to the Military Control Commission two further lists, one of naval and one of aeronautical material (lists enclosed in Paris despatch No. 1109 of the 11th May, and approved by the conference on the 17th July—Paris telegram No. 247).²

5. But a complication soon arose, which has delayed any further progress. The Arms Traffic Convention was discussed at Geneva throughout May and was concluded on the 17th June, 1925.³ This convention, to which Germany is a party, does not, of course, affect the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and this is expressly stated in article 34, but in article 1 it draws up five categories of 'arms, ammunition and implements.' Naturally, therefore, the Germans are inclined to take the line that the categories of war material for the purposes of the Treaty of Versailles should closely correspond to those already drawn up for the purposes of the Arms Traffic Convention. They cannot ask their manufacturers, their Customs and the Reichstag to recognise two completely different lists.

6. The opinion of the War Office was given in their letter of the 6th October:² 'The General Staff are of opinion that the Geneva list must be accepted by the Commission of Control, as it will be the only one in operation when the League of Nations assumes responsibility for Germany.'

7. About this time the question seems to have been referred from the Military Control Commission back to the Versailles Committee.⁴

8. The German note of the 23rd October forwarded to the Ambassadors' Conference four lists which, they said, gave an exact picture of the situation

³ This Convention is printed in *League of Nations Official Journal*, August 1925, pp. 1118–53.

⁴ An expanded version of this memorandum, dated February 16, 1926, here read:

'On the 26th September, 1925, the German Government put their view formally in writing to the Control Commission. . . . The Arms Traffic Convention, they said, contained a precise definition of war material, a definition drawn up by the representatives of more than forty States, and already signed by more than twenty States, including all the Great Powers. This definition, therefore, constituted an internationally recognised interpretation of the term "war material." It had been signed since the Allied note of the 4th June . . . and its signature had created a new situation. The German Government did not consider it possible to give the term "war material" in the Treaty of Versailles an interpretation different from the term "war material" in the Arms Traffic Convention, especially as the principal signatories of the treaty had also signed the convention. It would not be possible for the German Government to submit to the Reichstag, at the same time as the convention, the draft laws required by the Control Commission, if the laws contained a different interpretation of "war material" from that laid down in the Convention. Moreover, the practical application of the Convention and of these laws would be rendered extremely difficult if the administrative services were obliged to act on two different interpretations of the term.

'On the 10th October the Control Commission referred this letter to Paris. They pointed out that the new German contention not only annulled the progress hitherto made in its negotiations with the German Government, but it also implied a marked regression from the situation resulting from the German legislation hitherto in force. The omissions in the Geneva list were many, and, taken together, were of great military importance. Moreover, by adopting the Geneva list, the Ambassadors' Conference would be admitting that articles not covered by that list are not war material, and the Germans would thereby have an excuse for reopening all sorts of disarmament questions which the Control Commission had considered as settled.'

of the disarmament question. The two questions, 'import and export of war material' and 'possession of, trading in, and illicit manufacture of, war material,' were both placed in list III, which included those points the execution of which would be assured by the 15th November (although not actually completed by that date).

9. The War Office, commenting on these two points on the 26th October,⁵ stated: 'No progress made to date. This question devolves on whether the control list of war material or the list included in the Geneva Arms Traffic Convention is to be taken as the authority in deciding this matter. It is now being considered by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, and the General Staff are of opinion that this question should be decided by the Conference of Ambassadors.'

⁵ See No. 28, note 3.

No. 112

Colonel Ryan (Coblentz) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received November 20)

*No. 401 [C 14858/13120/18]**

Sir,

COBLENZ, November 18, 1925

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the English text¹ of the communiqué, and the French text¹ of the ordinance referred to in my telegram No. 49² of the 16th November.

2. The communiqué was given late last night to the president of the Reichsvermögensverwaltung³ (the senior Reich official in the occupied territories) and was handed to the representatives of the German press this morning. Owing, however, to the fact that to-day is a public holiday in Germany, it will not appear in the newspapers until to-morrow morning.

The final text of the ordinance was approved yesterday evening, and the ordinance will be promulgated this afternoon, as stated in my telegram No. 51¹ of to-day's date.

3. In connection with the action the High Commission had decided to take, I had a long conversation yesterday afternoon with M. Tirard in the course of which he told me that he had received instructions to publish at once and to put into effect as from the 1st December all measures on which agreement had been reached. We then reviewed the situation in the light of the developments that had taken place since the issue of the instructions of the French Government, and the decision of the High Commission of Monday last.⁴ We agreed that the trend of events made it most desirable both that the High Commission should make known to the public without

¹ Not printed.

² No. 104. For ordinance No. 308 and the communiqué of November 18 see the *Official Gazette of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission*, September–December 1925, pp. 23–79; see also *The Times*, November 19, 1925, p. 15.

³ Administration of Reich Property.

⁴ November 16, 1925.

delay the details of the alleviations to be made in the régime of the occupation, and that it should take also some definite action. The main considerations that led to this opinion were the early meeting of the Reichstag, and the complaints that have already appeared in the press to the effect that the so-called 'Reactions' of Locarno are merely assurances to which effect may or may not be given. I have not yet had time fully to study the press comments on the Allied notes that were published yesterday, but in such papers as I have seen, one of the main criticisms is that the revision of the ordinances is at the moment only a matter for discussion by the High Commission and that nothing definite has been decided. The force of this criticism strengthens my opinion that the action taken by the High Commission is, in the circumstances, correct.

At the same time, I cannot but feel that it is somewhat unfortunate that it should have been necessary to take this action before the arrival of the Reichskommissar, whose movements are, incidentally, still unknown to the High Commission. This feeling is strengthened by the commentary⁵ published by the German Government on the note of the Conference of Ambassadors. While the commentary coincides in general with the unofficial communications that have been made to the German Government, it would seem possible that in one or two of the points the explanation given represent[s] a somewhat generous interpretation of the principles contained in the Allied note.

Be this as it may, I considered that it was essential that the communiqué of the High Commission should be drawn up so as not to leave any impression that the High Commission was interpreting these principles more narrowly than the German Government, or that it had taken action quickly in order to present the Reichskommissar on arrival with a *fait accompli*.

Paragraph 6 of the German commentary is to the effect that negotiations in connection with the bringing into effect of the new régime will be taken up at once by the Reichskommissar with the High Commission.

In view of this, it was clearly necessary to show that the ordinance adopted by the High Commission did not represent the completion of the revision of the ordinances.

My French colleague, who shared to a considerable extent these views, was, however, most reluctant to publish anything that might lead to the belief that the principles contained in the new ordinance were open to revision. He considered that this ordinance represented the extreme limit to which we could go, and he was averse from making any further concessions in regard to the remaining ordinances. My opinion in regard to the new ordinance was that, while I considered that the principles contained in it could not be altered, I saw no reason why we should not give effect to any wishes expressed by the Reichskommissar in regard to the details of execution. As to the remaining ordinances, there were a certain number of unimportant provisions that could be omitted when we came to the codification. If he accepted this procedure, which seemed to me necessary in view of the

⁵ Cf. No. 107.

assurances given by the French Government, I thought that there would be no discrepancy between our communiqué and paragraph 6 of the German commentary.

After considerable discussion, he agreed that we should make known at the end of Section IV of the communiqué the intention of the High Commission 'to make the necessary adjustments ("mise au point") in the provisions which still remain in force.'

The present situation therefore is that the High Commission will be prepared to take into consideration any observations the Reichskommissar may have to offer in regard to the methods of execution of the new ordinance, and that certain further alterations will, if necessary, be made in the old existing ordinances. In addition, the Reichskommissar will be able to make known his views in regard to justice, aviation and the protective ordinances, on which no final decision has yet been taken.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

I have, &c.,

R. S. RYAN

No. 113

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain

(Received November 20, 2.30 p.m.)

No. 462 Telegraphic [C 14894/2/18]

BERLIN, November 20, 1925, 1.10 p.m.

I consider it of real importance that evacuation of Cologne should be carried out with the utmost rapidity. Surprise execution and completion of this operation in advance of public expectation would enhance our reputation both for efficiency and good faith, and would constitute a great diplomatic and political gain here.

We should do something striking in this matter, even at cost of inconvenience and money.

No. 114

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain

(Received November 25, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 459 Telegraphic: by bag [C 15088/459/18]

PARIS, November 24, 1925

Monsieur Berthelot read out to Mr. Phipps¹ this evening the text of a telegram sent to the French Ambassador in London by Monsieur Briand this morning, urging the extreme advisability that the Premiers and Ministers for Foreign Affairs concerned should proceed to London to sign the Locarno

¹ Minister in H.M. Embassy at Paris.

Pacts in spite of the lamented death of Queen Alexandra.² Monsieur Berthelot also read out a telegram which Monsieur Briand had just received from the French Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin stating that Herr Stresemann also attached great importance to this³ in view of the German internal situation, and the fact that if he and Dr. Luther did not proceed to London the internal crisis in Germany would probably develop before the signature of the Pact.

Monsieur Berthelot said that both he and Monsieur Briand felt that it was highly desirable that the signature of this epoch-making treaty should be proceeded with with all possible solemnity, although of course there could no longer be any question of festivities. Monsieur Briand felt that, in view of the exceptional part which you had played in the matter, it was all the more desirable that this treaty should be signed by the various Heads of Governments or their Ministers for Foreign Affairs in person and in London.

² On November 20, 1925.

³ Lord D'Abernon reported in Berlin telegram No. 474 of November 24 that the German Government were 'anxious, for weighty reasons, to do nothing which would operate against solemnity and importance of the Locarno Agreements or give colour to view that they are receding from opinion that Locarno represents a fundamental change in European policy. They would also be glad of opportunity of a further meeting with yourself and M. Briand quite apart from any festivities and they consider such a meeting would be useful.'

No. 115

*The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 27, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 464 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/5]

PARIS, November 26, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon. I was present as well as the Belgian Ambassador, the Japanese Ambassador and a representative of the United States Embassy. The following questions were considered:—

1. *Your despatch No. 3866¹ of November 23rd.* I made a statement to the conference to the effect that His Majesty's Government were anxious to see the rescission of the ruling of December 15th, 1920, regarding flight over the Rhineland territory by German civil aircraft, pointing out that the withdrawal of this decision would be wholly in harmony with the other alleviations recently introduced into the Rhineland régime. I asked that the various representatives on the conference should furnish themselves with instructions to enable them to deal with this question at the earliest possible moment. The conference agreed to examine the question as soon as possible. . . .²

¹ Not printed. This despatch gave the instructions on which Lord Crewe was acting.

² The omitted sections related to other matters.

6. *Manufacture of war material in Germany.* Your despatch No. 3849.³ The report of the Versailles Committee⁴ has now been received and is being sent to you in my despatch No. 2515³ of to-day's date. The consideration of this question is adjourned pending receipt of instructions from you. During the discussion of this point, Marshal Foch pointed out that the German proposal amounted to an amendment of the Versailles Treaty which was out of the question as far as the Ambassadors' Conference was concerned. He, however, expressed the view that once Germany had joined the League of Nations, she could resort to the means provided by the League for considering a revision of the treaty on this point. I promised to ask for urgent instructions and to recommend the proposals of the Versailles Committee to your favourable consideration.⁵ . . .²

³ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

⁴ This report of November 19 read as follows:

'A l'unanimité, le C.M.A.V. estime que la nomenclature établie par la Conférence de Genève pour le contrôle du commerce international des armes, munitions et matériel de guerre (Convention du 17 Juin 1925) . . . [thus in filed copy] d'une part, la liste des armes, munitions et matériel de guerre dont l'importation en Allemagne, la fabrication et l'exportation à destination de pays étrangers sont interdites à l'Allemagne, dressée par la Commission de Contrôle et approuvée par la Conférence des Ambassadeurs (Résolution C.A. 283—III—du 17 Juillet 1925) . . . [thus in filed copy] d'autre part, répondent à des fins différentes:

la Nomenclature de Genève a été établie simplement en vue de réglementer le commerce international des armes, munitions et matériel de guerre et d'en permettre la surveillance, la liste des Commissions de Contrôle a été dressée en vue d'assurer l'application des articles 168, 169, 170 et 192 du Traité de Versailles, qui interdisent à l'Allemagne l'importation et l'exportation du matériel de guerre ainsi que la détention, le trafic et la fabrication illicite de matériel de guerre c'est-à-dire, en résumé, en vue d'assurer le maintien du désarmement matériel de l'Allemagne prévu par le Traité de Paix.

'La Conférence de Genève a d'ailleurs reconnu elle-même que la nomenclature qu'elle avait dressée ne répondait pas à tous les cas, mais simplement à celui pour lequel elle était établie, à savoir le "contrôle du Commerce international des armes, munitions et matériel de guerre", puisqu'elle a stipulé expressément à l'Article 34 de la Convention du 17 Juin 1925 que "la présente Convention ne porte en rien atteinte aux droits et obligations qui résultent . . . [thus in filed copy] des Traités signés en 1919 et 1920 à Versailles . . . [thus in filed copy]".

'En conséquence, le C.M.A.V. estime que la liste établie par les Commissions de contrôle et approuvée par la Résolution de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs du 17 Juillet 1925 doit être maintenue comme répondant exactement aux stipulations prévues par les Articles 168, 169, 170 et 192 du Traité de Versailles.

'Toutefois, le C.M.A.V. ne voit pas d'inconvénient à ce que les termes mêmes de la Nomenclature de Genève soient employés dans la liste des Commissions de Contrôle pour désigner les catégories d'armes, munitions et matériel de guerre communes à ces deux listes.'

⁵ The Foreign Office subsequently wrote to the War Office and to the Admiralty who replied on December 9 and 19 respectively (texts of these letters not preserved in Foreign Office archives). According to the dockets the War Office agreed 'as to advisability of accepting suggestions made by Marshal Foch and consider that additional list should be drawn up of articles contained in Control Commission's list and not covered by Geneva classification, and that this list should be used in amplification of Arms Traffic Convention when defining war material in connection with disarmament clauses of Versailles Treaty'. The Admiralty also concurred in the 'opinion of the Versailles Committee that no alteration should be made in scope of list prepared by control commission but that there would be no objection

8. *Organisation of German Police.* See my despatch No. 2514⁶ of to-day's date. The proposals contained in Versailles Committee's letters Nos. 587⁶ and 588⁶ of November 23rd were agreed to.⁷ General Desticker stated that since Versailles Committee had submitted the above report he had received a letter from Herr Wagner, one of the German experts who recently came to Paris, in which it was stated that the German government considered that the number of police in the Rhineland should be reckoned in addition to the 150,000 allowed by the Boulogne note.⁸ It was decided that this request should be met with a refusal.

9. *Instructions to the Military Commission of Control in Germany.* See my despatch No. 2513⁹ of to-day's date. The draft enclosed in Versailles Committee's letter of November 23rd was accepted.

to employing nomenclature of Geneva Convention. Classifications in latter will require additions so as to cover gas apparatus, submarine parts and engines, periscopes, warship boilers and armour plates.'

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ In a minute of November 30, Mr. Baxter stated that the decisions taken by the Conference, in addition to that recorded below regarding the total number of German police, were as follows:

'(2) that the police forces in the occupied Rhineland, numbering 5,379 in 1913 and 8,331 at the present day, may be increased to approximately 10,000 men after evacuation. Of this number 3,000 may be kept in barracks. The total of 32,000 police in barracks allowed for non-occupied territory (see procès-verbal of agreement reached with German experts in Paris on November 16 [see No. 106, note 1]) may thus be progressively increased to 35,000 according as the zones of occupation are evacuated;

'(3) the division of the numbers of the police between the three occupied zones will be fixed immediately, by agreement between the German government and the Control Commission;

'(4) the agreement reached on November 16 with the Germans that the titles of the higher police officials may remain military titles, provided that police officers exercise no military functions, does not affect the Allied demand that the "military organisation of the police must disappear (suppression of special staffs . . . [thus in original quotation].)" The Germans are to be told that this must still be done;

'(5) regarding the distribution of the 32,000 police allowed in barracks in unoccupied territory, the Germans are to be told:—

(a) in Germany outside the demilitarised zone, the German government may distribute police in barracks as they think fit. Nevertheless, the agreement of November 16 implies a reduction of 3,000 men in barracks, and this should be effected by the suppression of several small garrisons, rather than by the reduction of those quartered in large towns;

(b) in the demilitarised zones, the distribution of police in barracks is to be decided upon by agreement between the German government and the Control Commission.'

Mr. Baxter added: 'General Clive has agreed to these proposals, and probably has some idea of the War Office views, but we have not, and I think it is a pity that Lord Crewe agreed to them without first asking us for instructions.'

⁸ This note of June 22, 1920, from M. Millerand, on behalf of the Allied Governments, to the Chairman of the German Peace Delegation in Paris, is printed as item No. 166 in Cmd. 1325 of 1921. For the First Conference of Boulogne see First Series, Volume VIII, Chapter V.

⁹ Not printed. This despatch transmitted a letter of November 23 from the Allied Military Committee of Versailles covering draft instructions to the Interallied Military Commission

of Control in Germany. These instructions recapitulated the agreements reached with the German representatives, referred to two instructions regarding police (untraced in Foreign Office archives: cf., however, note 7 above), and concluded as follows: 'Il appartiendra à la C.M.I.C. de suivre et de vérifier le règlement de ces différentes questions dans les conditions définies par l'accord ci-dessus, ainsi que l'exécution des redressements énumérés dans les trois premières listes annexées à la lettre du 23 Octobre 1925 du Gouvernement allemand. . . . Il serait opportun, cependant, de n'intervenir par des opérations de contrôle, au cours de l'exécution des divers redressements, que lorsque la nature du redressement le comportera. Dans les autres cas, il suffirait de constater, par une vérification, l'achèvement de l'exécution, dès que cet achèvement aurait été notifié par le Gouvernement allemand. Il y aura lieu, en outre, de réduire les effectifs de la C.M.I.C. progressivement, mais sans retard, de manière à ne conserver que le personnel (officiers et hommes de troupe) strictement nécessaire à la mission restant à accomplir.'

No. 116

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

*No. 2133 [C 15189/459/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 26, 1925*

According to a report which appeared in the 'Times' of the 24th November, and of which, for convenience, I enclose a copy,¹ Dr. Luther, in his speech in the Reichstag on the previous day, during the course of the debate on the Locarno treaties, made certain statements which I could not but regard with misgiving.

2. The first of these related to air control. Dr. Luther is reported to have said that the discussion on the air restrictions had already begun.

3. Your Lordship will recollect that this question was raised at the unofficial conversation which took place at Locarno on the 12th October between heads of certain delegations (see Germany print the 15th October, section 1,² to the confidential and unofficial nature of which I would especially draw your attention. Its contents have not been seen or checked by any of the foreign representatives present, and the following summary taken from it cannot be quoted textually). On this occasion Dr. Stresemann said that Germany did not wish to be so handicapped as she was at present. She wished to be on a par with others. This question of differentiation between civil and military aircraft was impossible to maintain. At present Germany was hampered and burdened with restrictions. Again, the Germans could not at present even fly over the Rhineland, nor could they erect radio stations there. In reply, M. Briand said that the question of aviation would have to be examined. He was not *au courant* with that matter, but it was amongst those which all interested countries would have to study. For my part, I said that I was not prepared to enter into details on this question in which I was entirely unversed.

4. The second statement by Dr. Luther, which caused me anxiety and

¹ Not reprinted.

² The reference was to Locarno despatch No. 31 of October 13, not printed.

which forms more particularly the motive of addressing to your Lordship the present despatch, was that 'at Locarno the assurance had been secured . . .³ that her (Germany's) right to colonial mandates should not only be recognised, but should be given practical effect.' This matter was raised at the fourth meeting of the Locarno Conference on the 8th October (Germany print the 16th October, section 3).⁴ Dr. Stresemann had referred to the German Government's note of the 29th September, 1924,⁵ addressed to the Powers represented on the Council of the League, in which the question had been raised of Germany's claim in principle to have colonial mandates. M. Briand's comments on this passage of Dr. Stresemann's speech were, according to the British Secretary's notes, as follows:—

'She (Germany) had mentioned the question of colonies. Her attitude was absolutely legitimate. He appealed to Germany to give her support as far as she could and to consider the problem (i.e., the problem of entry into the League) further. He hoped it would be possible to come to an agreement on this as on all other questions.'

5. As I could not allow this passage in Dr. Luther's speech concerning colonial mandates to go unchallenged, I instructed Mr. Lampson to send for the German Chargé d'Affaires without delay and to speak to him on the subject, saying that while I did not wish to start a public controversy with Dr. Luther, yet if the 'Times' report was correct Dr. Luther had given quite a false impression of what actually took place at Locarno. All that had been indicated was that Germany as a member of the League would be a possible candidate for mandates like all other members of the League, but there had been no thought of 'giving practical effect' to this as declared in his speech by Dr. Luther. Indeed, it was extremely doubtful whether the League had the power to transfer mandates from one State to another. For while mandatories were responsible to the League for the way in which they exercised their mandates, it was highly doubtful whether the mandates themselves actually derived from the League.⁶

³ Punctuation as in original quotation.

⁴ The reference was to the British Secretary's notes of this meeting, transmitted to the Foreign Office under cover of Locarno despatch No. 40 of October 15, not printed.

⁵ This note of September 28/29, 1924, is printed in *League of Nations Official Journal*, March 1925, pp. 325-6.

⁶ In this connexion Sir C. Hurst, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, minuted on December 2: 'There is no provision in the Covenant of the League which authorises the Council to subject to mandates territory other than ex-German possessions and ex-Turkish possessions. Article 22, which is the only article in the Covenant dealing with mandates, is limited to colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them. Were an area of Portuguese territory at the present moment to fall into such a condition of anarchy as to necessitate action by the Powers and were the Powers to agree that the proper solution of the troubles would be to subject the territory to a mandate to be exercised on behalf of the League, the validity of the arrangement would come entirely from the new agreement to be made by the Powers and not from the terms of the Covenant. The arrangement would entail a special agreement rendering article 22 of the Covenant applicable to the case. It follows, therefore,

6. Mr. Lampson spoke to Herr Dufour about colonial mandates precisely on the above lines this afternoon. He impressed upon him that there had been no commitment of any kind at Locarno on this subject. The German delegation had merely to consult their own notes to verify this. Herr Dufour promised at once to telegraph to Berlin.⁷

7. Mr. Lampson then turned to the point in the Chancellor's speech regarding air traffic, and repeated to him what I had myself told Herr Dufour in a private after-dinner conversation on the 20th November, namely, that there was absolutely no commitment of any kind on the part either of myself or of M. Briand at Locarno on the question of air traffic. Mr. Lampson said that he had himself been present when the question was brought up in my room on the 12th October by Dr. Stresemann, and that M. Briand and I had both declined to discuss the matter, each of us saying that we were entirely unversed in the question. Mr. Lampson added a personal observation that he knew that I was beginning to fear that the Germans only wanted those things which could not at once be given them, and he warned Herr Dufour that this was an unfortunate frame of mind in which to place one of Germany's best friends. Mr. Lampson begged Herr Dufour to emphasise this point. Herr Dufour said that he would do his best, but as he had already fully reported what I had said to him on the 20th November he was rather reluctant to say it all over again. Mr. Lampson replied that it was, of course, for him to judge, but the thing that mattered was that His Majesty's Government and the other Governments concerned should not be faced with demands which *at present* could not be met.⁸

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

that the choice of the Mandatory would, if it rested with the Council at all, have been given to them by the terms of the new arrangement between the Powers and not by virtue of any of the existing prerogatives of the League.

'There is equally nothing in the Covenant which deals with a change in the state exercising the mandate. The Covenant does not envisage the possibility of one of the existing mandatory states desiring to transfer the burden to another state. If one of the existing Mandatories desired to be relieved of the burden which it now bears and to secure the transfer of that burden to another state, it would entail a new agreement to which at least the League, the ex-Mandatory and the new Mandatory would have to be parties.

'The net result is that should there be any new Mandates brought into existence or should there be any change in the states at present exercising the mandates which came into being after the late war, Germany would be in a position to exercise her influence in the League to secure any such mandate for herself or to exercise a voice in making the new arrangements which are required. C. J. B. H.'

⁷ Mr. Addison referred to the present despatch in Berlin telegram No. 492 of November 30 (not preserved in Foreign Office archives). The docket thereof read: "'Times" report is not quite accurate. Actual words used by Chancellor were "As regards colonial question Germany's right to colonial mandates is expressly recognised. We expect that her claims will be given practical recognition".'

⁸ A copy of this despatch was sent to Paris under cover of Foreign Office despatch No. 3923 of November 26, not printed. Lord Crewe was instructed to inform M. Briand verbally of Mr. Lampson's conversation with the German Chargé d'Affaires in regard to colonial mandates.

No. 117

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received November 28)
No. 643 [C 15281/459/18]

BERLIN, November 26, 1925

His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit the following information which reaches him from a confidential source.

2. President Hindenburg receives daily numerous letters of criticism and abuse for his action in approving the Pact and still more for accepting the entry of Germany into the League of Nations.

3. These letters proceed largely from old comrades in arms: they deplore the fact that he who had been their idol has now fallen to the low estate of ratifying a second time the scandal of Versailles.

4. So far the President is unshaken and has behaved with sense. He has never pretended to be favourable to the League of Nations, but he has the constitutional sense to follow the advice of his Ministers.

No. 118

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received November 30)
*No. 644 [N 6607/42/55]**

BERLIN, November 26, 1925

Sir,

I took the opportunity on the 20th November, in conversation with the Secretary of State, to refer to the relations of Germany with Poland and to urge the German Government to act in the sense of your despatch No. 818 to Warsaw¹ of the 16th October. I pointed out that the natural complement of Locarno was an improvement in the conditions which prevailed between Germany and Poland. Already a beneficial result had ensued from the action of the Poles in withdrawing expulsion orders and from the reciprocal action

¹ Not printed. In this despatch Mr. Chamberlain recalled that on March 16, 1925, he had urged Count Skrzynski 'to cultivate better relations with Germany'. The despatch also recorded that on October 2, Count Raczynski, first secretary of the Polish Legation, had spoken to Mr. Gregory about M. Chicherin's visit to Warsaw. Mr. Chamberlain commented: 'It is, in my view, no less essential that Poland should seek to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence between herself and Germany than that she should do so between herself and Russia. Although unable to assume responsibility outside the terms of the Covenant of the League, for the territorial settlement between Poland and Germany, His Majesty's Government are none the less aware of the fact that this settlement may contain in it potential causes of unrest and dissatisfaction—a dissatisfaction which, however, I feel confident, can be removed by mutual goodwill and forbearance and by mutual adherence to the conciliatory methods of negotiation laid down in the Covenant.'

on the part of Germany. Was it not possible to go further and prove to the Poles that the sensible attitude they had adopted regarding the Pact of Security and the arbitration treaties had been appreciated in Berlin and would lead to Polish questions being viewed here in a more friendly light?

The Secretary of State replied that he quite shared the hope that the improvement which had already set in would make further progress. He intended, as soon as he returned from London, to devote special attention to Polish problems.

The trouble, however, was that the present boundaries of Poland gave rise to almost insuperable difficulty. He referred both to the corridor and to the settlement regarding Upper Silesia.

I replied that if Germany proposed to await the rectification of her present frontiers as a condition precedent of entering upon an endeavour to improve commercial and political relations with Poland she would probably wait a long time. Speaking personally, it appeared to me that this method was topsy-turvy, and that the only satisfactory course was to initiate better conditions with Poland in the hope that when these better conditions had been appreciated in both countries they would render possible some frontier arrangement less obnoxious to German feeling than the present one apparently was. In other words, the best hope of arriving at a satisfactory settlement of the frontier difficulty was by the indirect and not the direct method.

His Excellency at first differed from this view, and said that it would be impossible to gain public support in Germany for any policy which did not promise an immediate improvement of the present frontier, but, after some discussion, he appeared to agree that it might be expedient to approach the problem indirectly in the light of friendly feelings between the two countries engendered by improved political and commercial relations.

The impression I gained from the conversation is that a serious endeavour will probably be made in the New Year to arrive at a better understanding with Poland.

I have, &c.,
D'ABERNON

No. 119

Mr. Akers-Douglas¹ (Vienna) to Mr. A. Chamberlain (Received November 30)
*No. 303 [C 15343/13131/62]**

VIENNA, November 26, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 391² of the 30th ultimo acquainting me with your views of the possibility of the application of the principles embodied in the Locarno treaties to Central Europe and the Balkan States. I venture to submit a few general observa-

¹ H.M. Minister at Vienna.

² See No. 39.

tions which might be useful if and when the question becomes more ripe for consideration.

2. The Austrian attitude on such a question is likely to differ considerably from that of other States of Central Europe. This is a country in which patriotism as a national principle is extinct, and political enthusiasms centre round local or party institutions rather than the State itself. As I have had the honour to remark on many occasions, a new Austrian national spirit has not yet arisen to replace the devotion to the Habsburg Throne, which in old days was its substitute, and now, with the disappearance of that dynasty, has vanished. There are few regrets beyond sentimental sighs for the happy days of the past to be heard for the dissected provinces of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, the loss of Galicia, Bohemia, Dalmatia and other Slav territories of the Habsburg crown. There is little real sympathy with or interest in the lot of the Germans of Bohemia and Moravia or in the comparatively few Germans of Styria incorporated in the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. There is no fixed resolve, such as exists in Germany or Hungary, sooner or later to attempt to reconquer territories; and, at any rate, Austria knows herself to be too weak to do so.

3. It would therefore at first sight appear that Austria might particularly welcome the conclusion of a pact for Central Europe conceived on Locarno principles, a pact which should save her from all fear of aggression on the part of her neighbours and, above all, secure her against any future Magyar designs on the Province of Burgenland. And yet, I am of opinion, there are reasons why, in spite of certain obvious advantages, such a pact would not be, in present conditions, acceptable to Austria.

4. Of these reasons the chief is the question of the 'Anschluss' to Germany. Neither at the moment nor within the near future is this a goal towards which any Austrian party is ready to take a definite step, for all are well aware of the international obstacles to it and the present reluctance of Germany to be embroiled in any such complication. None the less, no party would for a moment dream of spontaneously or publicly abnegating such a future possibility. The 'Anschluss' is indeed a chief article of the Social-Democratic and the pan-German creeds, and the opposition of these two parties could absolutely block any such step, even if the Christian Socialists favoured it. The latter, however, will always be careful to avoid anything of the kind; there are many among them, indeed, who are said to be adherents of the 'Anschluss,' and none of them ever dares to denounce it. They prefer to leave it an open question, towards which their future attitude will be determined by the interests of their party and their Church.

5. There is a second and equally cogent reason of particular application. In paragraph 4 of your despatch under reference you inform me that 'as preliminaries to any extension of the Locarno principles in Central Europe the following conditions seem to me to impose themselves: (a) A policy of conciliation and goodwill to minorities; (b) the co-operation and goodwill of the Italian Government.' In the case of Austria, these two conditions are, in fact, one. Of all the lost provinces of the old Austrian Empire, South

Tyrol was the only one which has been really mourned. The Germans of Southern Styria were too few; the Bohemian Germans too self-centred for their loss vitally to affect the young republic. But Tyrol has always been alike the favourite playground and the most cherished historic boast of Vienna and German Austria. The loss of this beautiful alpine district, with its 250,000 purely German inhabitants, is one to which no Austrian would be willing to give the sanction of any approval beyond the forced acquiescence of the Treaty of Saint-Germain,³ and though the Austrian Republic, as such, has no hope of recovering it, it is felt that a way to this goal may perhaps later on be found through union with the German Reich. Moreover, the dull acquiescence with which the loss was accepted in the years following the Peace Treaty has since the accession of Fascism to power in Italy been changed to one of bitter resentment at what is considered to be the cruel oppression of the German inhabitants, which appears to exceed anything practised in the succession States against their minorities. Their churches, schools, institutions, businesses, hotels, are said to be suppressed or Italianised; their newspapers are forbidden to appear; bands of Fascists terrorise the townsfolk and peasants; it is rapidly becoming a criminal offence even to employ the German language. Such charges are made daily in the Austrian press and are apparently justified, for they are not denied. But whether justified or not, they are believed, and so long as this state of things continues and the Italian Government offers to the younger States a worse example than the latter follow, it is idle to hope that the principles of Locarno will find an echo in Central Europe.

6. Apart from this consideration and that of the 'Anschluss,' there ought to be no reason why Austria should not welcome the idea of any agreement with her neighbours which would guarantee her security and enable her to pursue without fear of political complications her economic development. Any such understanding might pave the way also to more favourable trade relations. It is true that Austria feels herself fairly secure already against any designs, being more or less in the tutelage of the Powers or at least the object of a special interest and care on their part and on that of the League of Nations. She may consider that, being very weak and incapable of any aggressive policy in any direction, there would be no particular point in entering a pact; that she is sufficiently protected against any Italian or Czech designs by the mere fact of the jealousy between these two Powers; that as regards Hungary, neither of the above-mentioned States would permit of aggression from that quarter; and that, as to her German frontier, any future political or economic penetration by Germany would be precisely what the great majority of Austrians appear to desire.

7. Nevertheless, if an understanding with her neighbours were to include economic advantages, while also securing her against Italy and not insisting upon a further categorical renunciation of all hopes of 'Anschluss' to Ger-

³ The treaty of peace with Austria, signed on September 10, 1919, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 112, pp. 317-498. For the cession of the South Tyrol to Italy, see articles 36-45.

many, Austria might be found not unfavourable to a pact. No initiative, however, could be expected from her, and there is nothing to be hoped for unless the first steps were taken by Italy and Czechoslovakia.

8. Beyond remarking in a few general terms to the Chancellor, a few days ago in a conversation with him, that an understanding in the spirit of Locarno was an object to be aimed at in this part of the world, I have spoken to no one on the subject as yet, because there is at present no one in the Government with whom it would be of the slightest use to discuss larger political questions. The present Minister for Foreign Affairs is shortly leaving his post. The Chancellor, who made no remark at all when I referred to the matter, has no knowledge of nor any great interest in Foreign Affairs, and he and his Government are entirely occupied in the thankless and oppressive task of trying to compose parliamentary strife and to keep together the slight majority by which he has to push through the administrative reforms in the face of Social-Democratic opposition.

I have, &c.,
A. AKERS-DOUGLAS

No. 120

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 249 Telegraphic [C 15304/459/18]

Very urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 28, 1925, 6.55 p.m.*

German Ambassador has informed me that German delegation to London on December 1st will be accompanied by a staff of fifteen including eight secretaries. I have informed Herr Sthamer that His Majesty's Government will be glad to welcome all these gentlemen as their guests. At the same time I am somewhat disturbed by the German proposal which lends credence to the reports in the press that the German delegation are intending to use the occasion of the signature of the treaties to discuss all manner of business.

You will probably think it wise to inform the German government that the French and Belgian delegations will be unaccompanied by any staff, and as far as I know will be wholly unprepared for such discussions. I have this moment learned from the French Ambassador that M. Briand will be obliged to return to Paris on Wednesday¹ morning in consequence of the change of government² there. I shall of course be glad to discuss the position freely with the German Ministers but this is not the moment for them to press for further concessions from us. France, Belgium and Great Britain and I would add Poland have done their part in full reliance on the good faith *and power* of the German government without waiting for signature of the treaties or for Germany's application to enter the League of Nations. In my own personal

¹ December 2, 1925.

² M. Briand formed a new French government on November 28, in succession to that of M. Painlevé.

view without having consulted any of the other interested governments our attitude up to date is far in advance of theirs. I am disappointed by tone of debate in the Reichstag³ and by attitude of parties other than the Nationalists. It is borne in upon me once again that to a German no concession is of any value from the moment that it has been made.

I leave it to your discretion to decide how much of this you should say to Dr. Stresemann. The essential thing is to avoid dangerous misconceptions of what is and what is not at present practicable.⁴

³ For this debate cf. No. 141, paragraph 19.

⁴ Mr. Addison, in the absence in London of Lord D'Abernon, replied in Berlin telegram No. 491 that Herr von Schubert had informed him that only four members of the German party of thirteen would have official standing, and that Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann did not intend to raise any contentious questions or make any further demands. Herr von Schubert added that the utterances of the party leaders in the Reichstag were without practical significance.

No. 121

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 30)

No. 2531 [C 15301/2994/18]*

PARIS, November 28, 1925

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 3923¹ of the 26th November, enclosing a copy of your despatch No. 2133 to Berlin² of the same date, I have the honour to inform you that I spoke to M. Berthelot on the subject to-day, leaving with him an *aide-mémoire* covering its principal points. I had been anxious to present this to M. Briand, in conformity with your instructions, but at the date of your despatch he had not undertaken the responsibility of forming a Government as President of the Council, and you will doubtless understand that it was not possible for him to see me personally to-day.

2. M. Berthelot, however, entirely confirmed your recollection of the unofficial conversations at Locarno in October. He spoke with absolute certainty on this point, and said that his memory of what passed was quite clear. Nothing was said beyond the admission as a matter of principle that Germany, after joining the League, would be capable of undertaking all the duties or privileges attaching to membership, including that of becoming a mandatory Power if occasion should arise.

3. He asked me to let you know of a fact possessing a certain importance—that of a visit which the Italian Ambassador had paid to the Quai d'Orsay drawing attention to Dr. Luther's speech in order to protest against the possible grant to Germany of a colonial mandate so long as Italy remains without one. In the opinion of the Italian Government their country is

¹ Not printed: see No. 116, note 8.

² No. 116.

definitely entitled to precedence whenever the question of granting a mandate comes to be considered at Geneva.³

I have, &c.,
CREWE

³ A similar representation was made to Sir W. Tyrrell on December 1 by the Italian Ambassador in London. Marquis della Torretta was informed in reply of Mr. Lampson's conversation with the German Chargé d'Affaires on November 26 (see No. 116). Cf. also *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Settima Serie, vol. iv, note 2 to document No. 186, for reported remarks by the Secretary of State at Geneva.

CHAPTER II

The evacuation of the Cologne Zone and German request for reduction of the occupying forces: the constitution of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference: negotiations regarding German aviation

December 1, 1925—January 31, 1926

No. 122

Record of a meeting held in Mr. Chamberlain's Room at the Foreign Office, at 5.30 p.m. on December 1, 1925

[C 15502/13120/18]*

Present

GREAT BRITAIN.
Mr. Chamberlain.
Sir W. Tyrrell.
Mr. Lampson.
Mr. Troutbeck.

FRANCE.
M. Briand.
M. Berthelot.

BELGIUM.
M. Vandervelde.

GERMANY.
Dr. Luther.
Dr. Stresemann.
Herr von Schubert.

(The following is a rough note taken of the proceedings by the British Secretary: it has not been checked by the foreign delegations, and should therefore be treated as confidential and non-official):—

MR. CHAMBERLAIN opened the conversation by saying that this was almost a case of Locarno over again.¹ As M. Briand was leaving for Paris early to-

¹ At a formal meeting at the Foreign Office on the morning of December 1, which was also attended by representatives of Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, the Locarno agreements, printed as Annexes A to E to item No. 1 and items Nos. 2 and 3 in Cmd. 2525, had been signed. The collective note to Germany (*ibid.*, Annex F to item No. 1) had also been signed and handed to Dr. Luther by Mr. Chamberlain. Dr. Stresemann's speech on this occasion is printed in Eric Sutton, *Gustav Stresemann, op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 239-40. See *ibid.*, pp. 236-7 for Dr. Stresemann's account of the present meeting.

morrow it had seemed that it might be useful that this meeting should be held to see if there was anything which could usefully be discussed.

DR. LUTHER expressed his gratitude, and said that the German delegation would be glad to say a few words on certain points.

DR. STRESEMANN then raised the question of the reduction of troops in the occupied Rhineland. The German Government were most anxious to know in what length of time this reduction would take place. Again, there had been a demand for increased billeting in certain localities. How did all these matters hang together? Was there, in short, a programme? and if so by what time would that programme be executed? For example, could anything be said about the redistribution of the troops in the second and third zones? He pointed out that this raised the difficulty of an increased burden on certain localities.

M. BRIAND said it was difficult for him to answer these questions of detail because he had not with him the necessary particulars. If it was a fact that the troops evacuating the first zone were requisitioning billets, it was of course to take the place of others leaving. The German delegation were aware that since Locarno many things had been achieved; for example, to quote but one instance, the evacuation of the first zone actually began yesterday. At Locarno the German delegation had asked for a reduction of the troops of occupation to the German pre-war standard. Now that was the point of view from which the French Government had been working. But Dr. Stresemann would remember that at Locarno he, M. Briand, had said that he must of necessity hear the military view. He might state that on returning to Paris from Locarno he had told General Guillaumat to do all that he could to meet the German request. At the moment he was afraid that he, M. Briand, could not state the definite result. But after all the German Government now had their Reichskommissar at Coblenz. The latter could settle many of these things on the spot. He might deal with this question, for instance, locally. However, M. Briand undertook, on getting back to Paris, to instruct General Guillaumat to inform the High Commission exactly how this question stood so that the commission could discuss the matter with the Reichskommissar.

Then there was the question of the local delegates of the High Commission. These had been abolished as requested by the German delegation at Locarno. As to suspending certain actions in the French courts, to which the German delegation had also referred at Locarno, that also had been done.

Here DR. LUTHER interjected the observation that that was indeed good news.

M. BRIAND, continuing, said that there would naturally be many small sources of friction on both sides. For example, General Guillaumat had certainly had all sorts of irritations to put up with. However, as soon as M. Briand got back to Paris he would at once look into the question of billeting.

M. BERTHELOT said that he gathered that one of the localities which the Germans had chiefly in mind in raising this question of billeting was Trèves.

Now, as to that, General Guillaumat had answered certain enquiries. But his answers had not been clear. In consequence M. Berthelot had sent another telegram to him. Referring to the terms of complaint, he did not disguise that the explanations which he had received from the general had not been clear. It was for that reason that he had telegraphed again asking for definite and precise details.

M. VANDERVELDE said that on returning from Locarno he had taken precisely the same steps as M. Briand. It was the intention of the Belgian Government to reduce the Belgian troops of occupation by two-thirds; that is to say by from 6,000 to 7,000 men. As to the billeting, all Belgian troops would be placed in barracks.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that the British troops were also being reduced, but the British army of occupation was the smallest of the armies and consequently our reduction was less in number than either the French or Belgian. But then, of course, it must also be remembered that we had to change our district of occupation completely. However, he also undertook to place himself in immediate communication with the War Office and to ensure that the troops, on their transfer, were placed as far as possible where other troops had been before and thus avoid causing embarrassment to the local population by demanding additional billets to those hitherto occupied by the French.

He wished to add one thing. It was almost inevitable that there should be little troubles in the future between the troops of occupation and the inhabitants. He earnestly trusted that these matters would be settled locally through the medium of the Reichskommissar. He begged the German delegation to do all in their power to prevent these questions, if and when they did arise as they certainly would arise despite all goodwill, from becoming diplomatic questions. Let them be settled locally and not assume larger proportions.

DR. LUTHER fully associated himself with the view that these matters should be settled locally, and more particularly through the agency of the Reichskommissar.

He had now a more general remark to make. After receiving the note of the Ambassadors' Conference of the 14th November regarding the alleviations in the Rhineland, Germany was divided into two camps. But the German Government saw quite clearly that in fact a great step in advance had been taken in the direction of making things easier for the Rhineland population. But it was perhaps only natural that the Germans should want details, and more particularly details as to the reduction to peace standard of the troops of occupation.

Some desultory conversation followed as to the phrasing of the Ambassadors' note of the 14th November, M. BRIAND pointing out that a certain term had been inserted at the special request of the German Ambassador in Paris, in order to meet the political difficulties of the German Government in handling this matter *vis-à-vis* their public opinion.

Finally, DR. LUTHER said that it was not only a question of the numbers of

troops; what they wanted was the same distribution as before the war. There was now a difficulty as regarded married non-commissioned officers. Undoubtedly, more of these men were married now than had been in pre-war time, which certainly made the problem of billets more difficult. What he wanted was general alleviation for the population.

Here M. BERTHELOT intervened with a long explanation of what exactly had been done in regard to the reduction of the numbers of the French occupying forces, and said that the French Government would endeavour to make still further reductions. As much had been done up to date as was possible.

M. BRIAND repeated that he would take the matter up at once on his return to Paris.

DR. LUTHER said that if he had understood aright, the position was that at the present moment there were between 125,000 and 130,000 troops in all the three zones. The proposal was to reduce the French army to 60,000, the British to 8,000 and the Belgian to 7,000. But before the war the Germans had kept only 46,000 in the 2nd and 3rd zones. Assuming that there were 40,000 troops in the 1st zone to-day, the mere evacuation of Cologne should bring the total down to 85,000, apart from all reductions.

M. BRIAND said that after the proposed reductions had been made the total numbers would be about 75,000. He pointed out that those who were now to be withdrawn from the Cologne zone would not all be going straight to their own countries. The British forces, for example, would be going to Wiesbaden.

DR. LUTHER said that surely the troops evacuated from the 1st zone would not go to swell the numbers of those in the 2nd and 3rd zones. He had always received the most positive assurances on that point. He contended that before reductions were considered, the number of troops already in the Cologne zone must first be subtracted and the reductions counted from the number that remained.

M. BRIAND agreed, but added that when the German Government talked of reducing to normal pre-war figures, they must not forget that the German forces west of the Rhine before the war included a larger garrison in Alsace and Lorraine, which was presumably not counted in the pre-war figure of 45,000 to which the Germans had referred.

DR. LUTHER pointed out that the strategic problem to-day was entirely different. He said that all parties in Germany were insistent that the number of troops should be reduced to the normal.

M. BRIAND reminded Dr. Luther that he had given no undertaking to bring the numbers down to 45,000. He had seen the difficulties of the German Government and had sought a formula to help them, but he had given no undertaking beyond saying that he would reduce to what was strictly necessary. He now promised once again to do all he could to make such reductions as would really be felt by the population. But at the moment he had not the necessary technical information and would have to consult his generals.

M. VANDERVELDE said that he felt there was something to be said for the German contention. Assuming the three zones to be of equal value, and taking the total number of troops as roughly 130,000, the evacuation of the Cologne zone should mean an automatic reduction to 85,000.

M. BRIAND agreed that a further effort must be made. The population in the second and third zones must not be left in a position to complain that the first zone was the only one to feel alleviations. The first thing he would do on his return to Paris would be to have the whole problem reconsidered.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said he would study the question also and see that as far as possible no new billets were taken, and that so far as possible only the houses previously requisitioned should be taken again. At the same time, the German delegation must remember that it was Germany who had pressed for immediate evacuation of Cologne, and it was to meet their express desire that matters had been hurried. He had desired to have no delay, and possibly this might have had some reaction on the billeting question at Wiesbaden.

DR. STRESEMANN said he had received information that the British forces entering the Wiesbaden area were actually requisitioning more billets, &c., than had been requisitioned before.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN promised to communicate with the War Office at once and get them to do what they could about it. He thought the reason might be the greater number of married non-commissioned officers and men in the British army than in the French.

Mr. Chamberlain added that he had just received information which seemed to show that the British forces would not, in fact, be requisitioning more than had already been requisitioned by the French.² On Dr. Stresemann saying that this was quite contrary to his information, Mr. Chamberlain promised to have the matter gone into further with the War Office.

DR. LUTHER concluded the subject by saying that the fundamental question was that of numbers.

Dr. Luther then turned to the question of disarmament and complained that recent notes received from the Commission of Control were not in accordance with the latest conversations held in Paris. The commission, in fact, appeared to have very strict instructions as to the method in which the outstanding points were to be settled. He reminded M. Briand of the instructions that he (M. Briand) had sent the French representative on the commission from Locarno, to clear up the outstanding points without raising unnecessary difficulties.

In reply to M. Briand's question as to the specific points of which the Germans complained, HERR VON SCHUBERT said that the commission had reverted to questions of the interpretation of certain principles laid down in the note from the Ambassadors' Conference of the 16th November. It was particularly the French members of the commission who seemed to be over-

² *Note on filed copy:* 'It subsequently appeared that this information was in fact based on a misunderstanding. Any misapprehension on the part of the German delegation was, however, cleared up by a verbal explanation given to the German Ambassador on the 2nd December, and by him passed on to Dr. Stresemann the same day. M. W. L.'

punctilious. In reply to a further question from M. Briand he said that the commission were making demands outside the agreement reached in Paris.

M. BRIAND promised to take the matter up with the French member of the Control Commission as soon as he got back to Paris.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN here interposed to beg the German Government to do all they could on their side to settle these outstanding points and not to be for ever asking concessions on them. There must be goodwill on both sides to reach agreement on these points of detail.

HERR VON SCHUBERT then raised the question of aeronautical control. He said that on the 4th December the discussions were to be resumed in Paris on a German proposal, already put forward by Dr. Nord to the Air Clauses Committee,³ to replace the famous Nine Rules by a decree by the German Government.

M. BERTHELOT said he had heard that the German representative had shown a most conciliatory spirit, and he hoped that an amicable settlement would be reached and that French aeroplanes would now obtain the right to fly over Germany in the same way as British aeroplanes.

HERR VON SCHUBERT said he hoped that the British representative on the Air Clauses Committee in Paris would receive instructions in time to discuss the matter on the 4th December. He gathered that the British representative had been making some difficulties.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said he was sure that it was only a question of getting information and the necessary authority from London.

DR. STRESEMANN asked what the position was as regards withdrawing the Military Control Commission. There had been a report in the press that it was shortly to be withdrawn.

MR. LAMPSON said that no decision had been taken on the matter. There was no foundation for the report.

DR. LUTHER then enquired about the cases pending before the military tribunals. (He presumably referred here to the cases *in contumaciam*, &c., arising out of the Ruhr occupation to which he had referred at Locarno.)

M. BERTHELOT said that the Ministry of War had issued general instructions to suspend all such cases, and he believed the Belgians had done the same. (M. VANDERVELDE confirmed this.)

In reply to an enquiry, MR. LAMPSON said that no similar cases were pending before the British military courts.

M. BRIAND said that he would prefer not to publish the decision of the French Government, as it might cause him considerable difficulties in France if there was an idea of the executive interfering in judicial matters.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out that the British Government were being attacked on this very point in the House of Commons to-day.⁴

³ Of the Conference of Ambassadors. For Dr. Nord's proposal and the Nine Rules, see No. 125.

⁴ The reference was probably to the debate that day regarding the trial of twelve members of the Communist party accused of sedition: see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 188, cols. 2047-8, 2075-2184.

Continuing, Mr. Chamberlain said that he had one observation to make on his side. He had not seen the records in the German press, but in the records in the British press of Dr. Luther's speech in the Reichstag on the 23rd November he had been struck by a phrase that 'at Locarno the assurance had been secured that Germany should have a permanent seat on the Council of the League and that her right to colonial mandates should not only be recognised *but should be given practical effect.*'

DR. LUTHER said that he had not used these words. He proceeded to quote what he actually had said, viz.:—

'As regards the colonial question, Germany's right to colonial mandates is expressly recognised. We expect ("erwarten") that her claims will be given practical recognition.'

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said he had raised the point in order to avoid a misunderstanding in the future. At the moment there were no vacant mandates available. But mandates derived not from the League but from the treaties. He did not wish Dr. Luther to have the impression that Great Britain would ever give up a mandate to hand it over to Germany. The idea was out of the question. Most of our mandates were dominion mandates, and even if the dominions were asked, they would never agree to give them up. There could be no question of such a thing.

DR. LUTHER said that the German Government did not propose to take the matter up now, but he could not say there would not be a time in the future when the German Government would not raise it.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN once more begged Dr. Luther not to put His Majesty's Government in the position of having to refuse a request. Refusals create obstacles and lead to more refusals, and a request on the subject of mandates would be one that the British Government would be bound to refuse.

M. BRIAND said that Italy had no mandates and was somewhat disturbed at the thought that Germany might claim a sort of priority over her. She felt that if there was a question of anybody having a mandate she ought to have it. His opinion was that the question was one that should not be raised now, as it was so full of difficulties.

In reply to a question by Mr. Chamberlain, DR. STRESEMANN said that the Reichskommissar would be returning to Coblenz immediately.

(The meeting broke up at 7 p.m.)

No. 123

Record by Sir W. Tyrrell of a conversation with Herr von Schubert
[C 15509/13120/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 2, 1925*

Herr von Schubert came to see me this morning in order to have an informal talk about current affairs.

He began by repeating what he had already said yesterday afternoon at the

meeting of ministers, that the size of the armies of occupation perturbed him very much, as he himself could not see a way out of the present situation. The difficulty, in his opinion, lay in the fact that, although there had been a considerable reduction in the size of the armies, this had not produced a corresponding relief among the population.

For obvious reasons his government were most anxious to win over to their side, and in favour of Locarno, as much of public opinion as they could get, in order to strengthen their parliamentary position and thus enable them to develop further the work and spirit of Locarno. Herr von Schubert repeated with emphasis that the size of the army of occupation was a cause of much serious concern to his ministers owing to it being an obstacle to popularizing the treaty of Locarno.

I replied that the moment the Chancellor had called M. Briand's attention to the fact that the reduction of the army did not correspond with the relief which it was intended to produce in the Rhineland, the latter had taken the point at once and had impressed me with the earnestness with which he meant to deal with this question immediately upon his return to Paris. Herr von Schubert told me that M. Briand's manner had given him exactly the same impression.

He then touched upon the question of Germany's joining the League of Nations, and begged me to dismiss once and for all any notion that we might have that his government intended to postpone the date of their application with a view to obtain further alleviations from us. He wished to tell me that it was at his particular instance that clause 2 of the bill, enabling his government to sign the treaty yesterday, had been inserted, leaving to the government the choice of the date for joining the League. He assured me that in their choice they would be guided entirely by the political situation at home, which would make it almost physically impossible for Germany to apply at Geneva, since upon their return the ministers were obliged to resign. A ministerial re-shuffle would ensue, and the time-table, therefore, alone would be an obstacle to the new cabinet applying for admission in the present session of the Council, which is to begin next week. His idea was to apply in January, by which time the new Cabinet, which he thought would include both Luther and Stresemann, would be firmer in the saddle, and have a more powerful public opinion behind them in giving effect to clause 2 of the Locarno Act, relating to the admission of Germany to the League. Herr von Schubert added that he hoped that in the meantime we should attach no credence to any rumours that might be put about that there were other sinister motives inspiring the conduct of his government.

I made the obvious reply that he was a better judge of the internal situation of Germany than I could possibly be, but that I could tell him that the sooner Germany applied the greater would be the credit attaching to her application abroad. If, therefore, she desired to obtain her 100 per cent merit from entering the League, she should lose no time in taking the necessary steps at Geneva.

Turning to Russia, Herr von Schubert remarked that, owing to the close

proximity of the two countries, Germany had to be very careful in her attitude, which she hoped would not be misunderstood by us. Germany desired to treat Russia fairly and correctly, partly in order not to give ammunition to their communists in their Russian propaganda, and partly because they did not wish to antagonise so powerful a neighbour.

I told him that the conversations which my Secretary of State had had with his at Locarno would enable my chief to appreciate without fear of misunderstanding the present German attitude towards Russia.

Before taking leave of me Herr von Schubert reverted to the question of alleviations, and told me that his government were fully alive to the invidious task of asking for more, which they had no intention of doing. He was about to expand this statement still more, when I interrupted him by telling him what the Secretary of State had told Herr Dufour on Friday, November 27th,¹ when the latter had asked him for further aerial alleviations on the part of his government. It was on this occasion that Sir Austen Chamberlain² had strongly advised Herr Dufour to suggest to his government that the best procedure to be observed in connection with any requests for further alleviations from either the French or ourselves would be for the German government in the first instance to approach either M. Briand or Sir Austen Chamberlain informally, in order to ascertain what prospect such a request would have of being met. I could assure him that on the part of both ministers there was every desire to meet any reasonable request, but that the political situation, both here and especially in Paris, rendered the granting of concessions at times inadvisable or impossible. The best way, therefore, to ascertain the situation was by an informal approach.

Herr von Schubert entirely agreed, and said that he would make a note of this suggestion, with a view to the procedure recommended by the Secretary of State being adopted in future.

At the end of this interview, I told Herr von Schubert that he should be prepared for the inevitable reaction in a few months' time which was bound to arise after the change of garrison in Wiesbaden. There was no doubt in my mind that at the beginning our troops would be received with open arms, if only because the native population expected a better time under English rule than they had experienced under French, but there was also no doubt in my mind that after the honeymoon period there was bound to be resentment against any foreign garrison being stationed at Wiesbaden, and that was the period which both governments should carefully watch in case such a situation could be tided over by any action on their part.

In this connection it occurred to me that, since we had renounced all jurisdiction in the occupied zone and all disputes between civilians and military would have to be settled in German courts of justice, a more simple and quicker procedure might be adopted for the settlement of such disputes.

Herr von Schubert entirely agreed, and promised to consider some other machinery for the adjustment of such disputes. W. T.

¹ No record of this conversation has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

² Mr. Chamberlain had been invested as a Knight of the Garter on December 1.

Sir A. Chamberlain to Mr. London¹ (Geneva)

No. 251 Telegraphic [W 11152/9/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 3, 1925, 4.30 p.m.*

Following for Lord Cecil.²

My telegram No. 250.³

Cabinet considered question this morning and decided to approve the conclusions of the Committee⁴ subject to the omission from conclusion 2 of

¹ H.M. Consul at Geneva.

² Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, was the British Delegate to the Committee of the Council of the League of Nations relating to the Permanent Organ of the Council for the work of Disarmament (cf. No. 42).

³ Not printed.

⁴ The reference was evidently to draft minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence regarding instructions for Lord Cecil. These instructions, which were drawn up by an interdepartmental committee under the chairmanship of Lord Cecil, stated in particular: 'the following considerations should govern the title, composition and powers of the Special Committee to be set up at Geneva to undertake a preparatory examination, with a view to a Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

(i) The title of the Committee should be "The Preparatory Committee for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments."

(ii) This Committee should consist solely of Government representatives. (This arrangement, however, does not preclude members from obtaining advice from their experts, or the Preparatory Committee from calling in experts to give advice if desired.)

(iii) The nucleus of this Committee should be representatives of the members of Council.

(iv) The additional members of the Committee should be limited to five, or possibly six, who might be invited from the following States in the order given:—

1. U.S.A.

2. Russia.

3. Poland.

4. Hungary.

5. Serbia.

6. Roumania.

7. Holland.

8. Finland.

(v) The Powers of this Committee should be advisory; it should sit in private.

(vi) The Council should delegate to this Committee the power to consult the technical organs of the League and to call in expert advice and assistance as required.

'8. With regard to the second part of our enquiries, namely, the principles on which schemes for the reduction and limitation of armaments might be based, we have drawn up in the form of a programme the questions as to which we think preparatory study might be conducted with advantage. In drawing up this Programme we have had regard to the wish of His Majesty's Government to assist, so far as possible, in the promotion of disarmament, and to avoid any appearance of obstruction. We have, therefore, purposely drawn the Programme as broadly as possible so as to leave to the Preparatory Committee as wide a discretion as possible.

'9. With regard to Naval disarmament we consider that discussion even of a programme of Naval disarmament, except at a conference in which the United States of America was willing to participate, would be quite useless, and, if necessary, the British Representative should point this out and should add that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, in view of the past history of the question, such a conference would best be held at Washington. The situation is, however, a very delicate one, as the British Delegate at Geneva agreed

the following words 'to state that Great Britain would be ready at the proper moment to make a proposal as regards cruisers etc. and'.⁵

to taking part in these preliminary studies and we must be careful to avoid any criticism that, after acquiescence, we are being passively obstructive.

'10. We have been careful, in order to avoid the charge that any suggestion for the abolition of conscription was designed with the object of wrecking the conference, to include this question towards the end of our Programme as a possible alternative should the other investigations suggested be found to hold out little or no hope of securing an appreciable reduction or limitation of armaments. At what period this proposal can most usefully be pressed must depend on circumstances.

'11. The other items on the programme which we recommend are as follows:—

'Land and Air Armaments.

- '(a) Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of any country or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?
- '(b) By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another, e.g., numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditure, &c.?
- '(c) On what principles would it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, e.g., population, resources, geographical position, &c.?
- '(d) Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security; or is any scheme of disarmament impossible unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable, would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?

'Air Armaments only.

- '(e) Is there any, and if so, what, device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for the purposes of disarmament? If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?
- '(f) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (e) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?

'General.

- '(g) Would the universal abandonment of the principle of compulsory service operate as an effectual limitation of armaments without other measures?

Questions (a)–(f) above are printed in League of Nations, *Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference*, Series I (Geneva, 1925), p. 41.

⁵ The approved version of conclusion 2 further instructed Lord Cecil to bear in mind the precedent of the Washington Conference of 1921–2 (see First Series, Volume XIV, Chapter VI) and gave him authority to suggest that some great land Power should take the initiative in regard to land and air armaments.

No. 125

Memorandum¹ on the Future of Air Control in Germany

[C 15323/117/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 3, 1925*

A. *Treaty Position*

1. The aerial disarmament of Germany was provided for in Section III of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. The majority of the clauses of this section were of purely temporary interest, regulating the destruction of the existing

¹ According to the docket this memorandum was by Mr. Troutbeck.

German air force, &c., but the first paragraph of article 198 was of permanent importance. This paragraph reads that:—

‘The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces.’

Another article which permanently affects Germany’s air policy is article 170 (one of the military clauses), which reads that:—

‘Importation into Germany of arms, munitions and war material of every kind shall be strictly prohibited.

‘The same applies to the manufacture for, and export to, foreign countries of arms, munitions and war material of every kind.’

2. By article 203 of the treaty the execution of the clauses of temporary interest was placed under the control of an Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission. This commission was withdrawn as long ago as May 1922, the Allied Governments being then satisfied that its task was completed. The Allies had, however, already announced to the German Government in January 1921 (Annex A)² their determination to assure themselves by constant supervision that Germany was fulfilling her obligations under article 198 of the treaty, as to which she was required to accept the definitions established by the Allies to distinguish civil from military aircraft. The demands of January 1921 were repeated in the Allied ultimatum of the 5th May, 1921 (Annex B),³ which was accepted by the German Government on the 11th May (Annex C).⁴ When, therefore, the Commission of Control was withdrawn it was replaced by an Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee, to ensure the ‘constant supervision’ above mentioned. At the same time, rules were drawn up to distinguish between military and civil aircraft.

3. The scheme for the Committee of Guarantee, together with the nine rules (Annex D), was placed before the German Government in a note from the Ambassadors’ Conference dated the 14th April, 1922.⁵ The scheme was

² Not printed. Annex A comprised the second paragraph of decision No. 5 of the Allied Governments attached to the note of January 29, 1921, to the German Government: cf. First Series, Volume XV, No. 12, note 2. A French text of the decision is printed in *Documents relatifs aux Réparations* (Paris, 1922), p. 121.

³ Not printed. Annex B comprised an extract, including paragraph c (3), from the Allied note of May 5, 1921, printed in First Series, Volume XV, appendix 2 to No. 85.

⁴ Not printed. Annex C comprised a quotation, including subparagraph 3, from this German note, printed in *Parl. Deb.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 141, cols. 1878–9.

⁵ Not printed. Annex D comprised an extract from M. Poincaré’s note to the German Ambassador together with Sub-Annex A thereto which included the Nine Rules to distinguish civil from military aircraft. Nos. 1–7 of these rules were substantially the same as the seven definitions of military aircraft agreed by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles in May 1921 and printed in an English text in First Series, Volume XVI, as the enclosure in No. 804, except that in the annexed text rules 1, 2, 3, and 7 included the phrase ‘donc matériel de guerre’ after the phrase corresponding to ‘deemed to be a military aircraft’. Rules 8 and 9 read as follows:

‘*Règle No. 8.* — Les usines fabriquant du matériel aéronautique devront être déclarées. Tous les appareils et pilotes ou élèves-pilotes devront être immatriculés dans les conditions

not submitted to the German Government as being a matter for discussion; the German Government were merely invited to acknowledge its receipt. They replied on the 1st May (Annex E)⁶ recognising the Committee of Guarantee and promising to take the necessary measures to enable it to enter upon its functions. The original treaty position was thus superseded by this agreement of 1922.

Two points in the scheme may be noted in particular:—

- (a) It was contemplated that the rules laid down would require revision every two years in order to consider if any modifications were rendered necessary by progress in aeronautical science. Revised rules were accordingly due in May 1924 and will be due again in May 1926. In actual fact the first revision was only communicated to the German Government on the 24th June, 1925, and the German Government have never yet replied to the Allied note⁷ containing the revision.
- (b) It was also laid down in the scheme (section (d)) that the Committee of Guarantee would continue until the day when, in accordance with article 429 of the Treaty of Peace, the first zone of occupation could be evacuated; the Allied Governments would then examine whether circumstances rendered its continuance necessary or, on the contrary, permitted of its withdrawal. Thus, clearly, the Allies are in no way bound to withdraw the committee on any particular date; they are merely bound to examine the position when the time comes for evacuating the Cologne zone.

B. *League Scheme*

4. On the other hand, it is clear that the transference to League supervision has been seriously contemplated inasmuch as the League scheme of the 27th September, 1924,⁸ in accordance with which the League will conduct its investigations in the ex-enemy countries, provides for supervision in air matters just as much as in military or naval. Aeronautical advisers took part in the drawing up of the scheme by the Permanent Advisory Commission.

prévues par la convention du 13 octobre 1919. Ces listes seront tenues à la disposition du Comité de Garantie.

'*Règle No. 9.* — Les stocks de moteurs d'aviation, de pièces détachées, d'accessoires de moteurs ne seront pas autorisés au delà de ce qui sera apprécié nécessaire pour satisfaire aux besoins de l'aviation civile. Ces quantités seront déterminées par le Comité de Garantie.'

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ The Allied note of June 24, 1925, is not printed. Paris despatch No. 2510 of November 26, 1925, transmitted a report of November 25 from Wing-Commander Smyth-Pigott, Air Attaché to H.M. Embassy, that Dr. Nord had informed him 'unofficially that the German Government refused to accept the modifications of the Nine Rules, communicated to them by the Council of Ambassadors in June 1925, but that they were loath to put this refusal in writing because it might upset the spirit of Locarno and also force the Council of Ambassadors to take some action or other which he was sure the Ambassadors did not really wish to take'.

⁸ See *League of Nations Official Journal*, October 1924, pp. 1592-5: for a text embodying certain amendments see *League of Nations Document C. 729. 1926. IX.* (L.O.N.P. 1926. IX. 17.)

Chapter I of the scheme lays down that the investigations 'shall, when the Council so decides, cover . . .⁹ any or all the military, naval and air clauses of the said treaties.' Lastly, the categories of experts which each investigating country is invited to provide, include eight experts on air questions.

C. Suggestions for British Policy

5. During July last the question was considered whether, when the time came for handing military control over to the League of Nations, it would not be opportune to withdraw the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee at the same time. The conclusion reached in the Foreign Office was that, while there was no legal obligation upon the Allies, such a course was to be recommended on political grounds. The point was put to the Air Ministry on the 9th July (see Annex F).¹⁰ They replied on the 2nd September¹⁰ concurring generally in the above conclusions, but pointing out that the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee differed from the Military Commission of Control in that it exercised continuous 'post-disarmament' functions of an administrative nature (such as the registration of pilots and factories, the examination of new designs of aircraft, the scrutiny of imports and exports), and that, before it was withdrawn, the League should be given time to make such provision as it might think fit for carrying on those functions.

6. The Air Ministry sent us two further letters on the 5th¹⁰ and 7th October¹¹, enquiring the Foreign Office views on the legal status of the League under article 213 so far as air control was concerned. Could the League lay down rules for the purpose? If so, the Air Ministry suggested that the matter should be brought before the Permanent Advisory Commission at once (without previous discussion with the Allies), and the Permanent Advisory Commission be invited to submit a list of rules to the Council. The Air Ministry would prepare a draft of such rules without delay. Incidentally, this would make it unnecessary for the Allies to consider any further modifications of their own existing rules at the end of the second period of two years, viz., in May 1926.¹²

7. We replied on the 16th October¹⁰ expressing the view that the League was perfectly entitled to define the differences between military and civil aircraft; this amounted to no more than interpreting an article of the treaty which the Council was entrusted to see observed. The question of the means at the Council's disposal to supervise the observance of the regulations it laid down was more difficult. Permanent resident control (which was

⁹ Punctuation as in original quotation.

¹⁰ This letter is not printed.

¹¹ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

¹² Mr. Howard Smith minuted on October 29 that his understanding was that: 'The point which the Air Ministry wish to bring out . . . is that "potentially" Germany is the strongest aerial power in the world. Her technical apparatus for the production of civil aeroplanes is greater than any other country's, and there is no essential difference between civil and military air-craft. They wish us clearly to understand this before committing ourselves to the policy of "no rules".'

apparently necessary for some of the functions now exercised by the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee) was not covered by the treaty. For the rest, we agreed with the procedure proposed by the Air Ministry.

8. That was the position when the British delegation returned from Locarno. But it was at once apparent that the Locarno Conference had entirely changed the whole situation. Quite apart from the general idea of bringing Germany back as an equal into the comity of nations, the questions of air control and the League's general right of investigation under article 213 had been specifically raised by the German delegation at unofficial discussions among the heads of delegations. On the 12th October Dr. Stresemann had raised the question of the existing restrictions upon German aircraft as one of the points upon which the Germans desired alleviations. M. Briand had replied that he was not *au courant* with the matter, but that it was among those which all interested countries would have to study. Mr. Chamberlain had replied to much the same effect. On the 15th October the German delegation had declared that the League scheme of investigation was unacceptable as it stood, and that it would be impossible for Germany to apply for membership of the League without being first assured that she was not thereby implicitly accepting the League scheme. After some discussion the Allied delegations had agreed that the scheme should be re-discussed by the Council when Germany had become a member of that body.

9. The Secretary of State accordingly felt that, in view of what had been said, he could no longer, without a clear breach of faith, agree to His Majesty's Government taking the initiative in proposing the elaboration by the League of Nations of a set of rules for air control when the present Allied control was withdrawn. He came to the conclusion that the question of air control, like that of military investigations by the League, must lie dormant until Germany was herself a member of the League, when, no doubt, the Council would have to consider the application of article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles as regards not only the question of military disarmament in Germany, but also that of the application of article 198.

10. These views were expressed to the Air Ministry in a letter of the 5th November,¹¹ and it was added that Mr. Chamberlain remained of the opinion that when the Cologne zone was evacuated it would be very desirable to withdraw the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee.

11. A number of conversations ensued with the Air Ministry, who saw considerable technical objections to the policy advocated by the Foreign Office. They pointed out that, while article 198 laid Germany under the obligation to have no military air force, it made no attempt to define what a military air force consists of. The air clauses were in this respect entirely different from the military clauses, which laid down in the greatest detail what army Germany was to be allowed. Without further definition article 198 had no meaning. Hitherto its meaning had been defined by rules laid down by the Allies, and the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee had supervised Germany's observance of those rules. The committee was thus the arbiter in any given case as to whether a breach of the treaty had been

committed or not. When the committee was withdrawn, the task devolved upon the Council, but the Council must have some standard to judge by. Therefore, before it entered upon its responsibilities under article 213, it must consider what rules were required, otherwise there would be a gap when there were no rules and no standard by which to say whether Germany was breaking the treaty or not. The result might well be chaos.

12. On the 13th November the Air Ministry wrote¹⁰ officially on the subject and raised the question whether, when the Committee of Guarantee was withdrawn, the nine rules should be considered as lapsing automatically. They were of opinion that His Majesty's Government would be ill-advised to commit themselves to that view,¹³ and suggested that when the Committee of Guarantee was withdrawn the German Government should be informed that the Allies would continue to regard the rules (either in their original or revised form) as in force until Germany raised the question of their withdrawal or modification in her future capacity as a member of the League.

13. In reply, we informed the Air Ministry on the 23rd November¹⁰ that, whatever the legal aspect of the case (and the issue was, indeed, a difficult one), we doubted the wisdom, when withdrawing the Committee of Guarantee, of telling the Germans that we should continue to regard the rules as in force, for the reason that, once control was withdrawn, it would be impossible to supervise their observance. We were not, in fact, convinced that the necessity would in point of fact arise of mentioning the rules at all when the Committee of Guarantee was withdrawn. By that time it was possible that Germany might have been admitted to the League, and the situation in consequence radically affected. If the question was raised by the representatives of other nations at the Permanent Advisory Commission, we requested that the British representatives would refuse to discuss the matter, and take the line that the whole question of League investigations, whether military, naval or aeronautical, would have to be rediscussed when Germany had been admitted to the League. Finally, we said that, while of opinion that it would be desirable to withdraw the Committee of Guarantee at no distant date, now that Cologne was shortly to be evacuated and the Military Control Commission withdrawn, we should be opposed to taking the initiative in that matter at the present moment, but should rather be inclined to wait for it to be raised either by the German Government or by one of the other Governments represented on the Committee of Guarantee.

14. At this point a new move was made on the side of the German Government. On the 24th November Dr. Nord, a representative of the German Foreign Office, asked if he might submit certain proposals to the Air Clauses

¹³ The Air Ministry's letter stated in particular that the Air Council felt 'that a proposal whereby Germany as regards air development would pass at one stroke from a system of elaborate rules administered by a resident Committee to a system of no rules and no Committee might cause alarm to the French and might be strongly opposed by them. In this connection it is of interest that according to recent information received by the Air Ministry the activities of Germany in the way of sporting aviation and as regards the number of persons who are learning to fly are having a disturbing effect upon the French representatives on the Committee of Guarantee.'

Committee in Paris. The request was granted, and Dr. Nord made the following proposals:—

That the nine rules and the Committee of Guarantee should be abolished, in return for which the German Government were prepared to issue a law, roughly, as follows:—

- (1) A guarantee on the part of the Reich never to organise a military or naval aviation force.
- (2) To prohibit any form of liaison between civil aviation (of all kinds) and the military or naval authorities.
- (3) To prohibit the construction of all apparatus that could be used for the purpose of transforming civil aviation aeroplanes into war aeroplanes, e.g., bomb carriers, machine-gun mountings, aeroplane armour.
- (4) The above paragraph to apply also to airships.
- (5) To lay down severe penalties against offenders.

15. His Majesty's Government at once felt that this proposal might well prove a satisfactory solution of the whole problem of air control, though they considered that the matter should not be further discussed in the Air Clauses Committee, but must be submitted officially to the Ambassadors' Conference. At the same time, there was clearly no hope of the proposal's meeting with a favourable reception in the conference unless the French Government were disposed to support, or at least consider it. Instructions were accordingly drafted to Lord Crewe to approach M. Briand personally on the subject and inform him of the views of His Majesty's Government, that it would be neither desirable nor, indeed, practicable to continue Allied control in air matters now that military control was so shortly to be abolished; His Majesty's Government could not help feeling that the retention of the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee with no real means of enforcing control would be merely an irritant, and they were of opinion that the committee should be withdrawn as soon as conveniently possible. Further, once the committee was withdrawn, it would in the nature of things be impossible to exercise any effective supervision of the observance of the rules, which, in the absence of such supervision, would certainly prove rather a source of embarrassment than of security. His Majesty's Government were accordingly disposed to welcome as a way out of a very perplexing situation the proposal put forward by Dr. Nord that both committee and rules should be replaced by legislation, though it would doubtless be necessary to subject the proposed legislation to scrutiny and even perhaps to provide specifically that it should be placed on record with the League of Nations by agreement with the German Government.¹⁴ They hoped that the French Government would be able to support this view when the matter was submitted officially to the Ambassadors' Conference.

16. These instructions were not sent off in their original form in con-

¹⁴ Mr. Lampson had, on December 2, suggested this provision to Herr von Schubert as a 'personal idea'. Herr von Schubert stated in reply that the German Government would welcome this.

sequence of a conversation held on the 1st December¹⁵ between Mr. Chamberlain and the heads of the French, German and Belgian delegations who had come to London to sign the Locarno treaties. After the German delegation had expressed the hope that the various representatives of the Air Clauses Committee might receive instructions before the 4th December (when it had been proposed to discuss the matter again with Dr. Nord), M. Berthelot, on behalf of the French delegation, said that he had heard that the German representative had shown a most conciliatory spirit in the Air Clauses Committee, and he hoped that an amicable arrangement would be reached, which, so far as France was concerned, might result in French civil aircraft obtaining the right to fly over Germany in the same way as British aircraft.

17. Lord Crewe was accordingly instructed on the 2nd December (Annex G)¹⁶ to remind M. Briand of the favourable reception which the French delegation in London had appeared to give to the German proposal, inform him of the views of His Majesty's Government, as expressed in paragraph 15 above, ask whether he would agree to Dr. Nord's being told that the German proposal must be made officially to the Ambassadors' Conference, and, finally, express the hope that when the proposal was submitted officially by the German Government to the Ambassadors' Conference the French Government would feel able to support it.

¹⁵ See No. 122.

¹⁶ Not printed. This annex comprised Foreign Office despatch No. 3979 to Paris which was as indicated below.

No. 126

Letter from Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen¹ (Paris) to Mr. Lampson
[C 15576/117/18]

PARIS, December 3, 1925

My dear Miles,

Foreign Office despatch No. 3979² of December 2nd about the abolition of the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee and of the Nine Rules.

It has been quite impossible to get hold of Monsieur Briand to-day. He has been in the Chamber practically ever since his return to Paris yesterday, there having been an all-night sitting which only finished at midday. The Finance Bill comes before the Senate this afternoon and Monsieur Briand with it, so that for the moment it has been useless to try to get hold of him. We will, of course, do so at the earliest possible moment.

In the meanwhile would you mind looking at the enclosed correspondence from the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee which Smyth Pigott has just brought to our notice. The long and the short of the Guarantee Committee's letter is that in their opinion Germany is maintaining and training

¹ First Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Paris.

² See No. 125, note 16.

more pilots than she ought, and that the development of German aviation 'has a military tendency', (see especially the covering letter and the last two annexes).³ We do not know whether this letter affects the decisions reached in your despatch No. 3979. Quite possibly you were already in possession of the letter when that despatch was written.⁴ But would you be kind enough to let me have a word by telephone⁵ as soon as possible after you get this, to say whether the Guarantee Committee's letter makes any difference. In the meanwhile we will proceed with the arrangements for the Ambassador to have a conversation with Briand on the lines of your despatch.

Yours ever

HUGHE KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 126

Report from the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee

COMITÉ DE GARANTIE

AÉRONAUTIQUE

BERLIN, le 20 Novembre 1925

Le Group Captain Burdett

Président du Comité de Garantie Aérona[u]tique

à Monsieur le Maréchal Foch,

Président du Comité Militaire Allié de Versailles,

8, Boulevard des Invalides, PARIS

Comme suite au rapport mensuel du 5 novembre 1925,⁶ j'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir les renseignements au sujet des pilotes et élèves-pilotes immatriculés à la date du 30 Septembre 1925.

A cette occasion j'ai l'honneur d'attirer votre attention sur le nombre des pilotes et élèves-pilotes formés et immatriculés en Allemagne. Ce nombre qui dépasse actuellement le millier ne semble pas compatible avec: —

- (a) l'article 198 du Traité de Paix.
- (b) la règle 9 modifiée par décision de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs du 24 juin 1925:— 'le nombre des pilotes et d'élèves-pilotes ne devra pas dépasser les besoins raisonnables de l'aviation civile en Allemagne définis par le Comité de Garantie Aéronautique.'

Le Comité estime que le nombre de pilotes excède les besoins de l'aviation commerciale qui emploie un maximum de 200 pilotes.⁷ Mais il n'a pas encore

³ Not printed: see notes 10 and 11 below.

⁴ An English draft of the enclosure below had been received in the Foreign Office on November 25.

⁵ Mr. Troutbeck minuted on December 7 that a telephone message had been sent to Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen. The purport of this message was not recorded.

⁶ Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

⁷ *Note on original*: 'On peut admettre que le taux de remplacement des pilotes civils (pertes, démissions, abandons) est le même en Allemagne que dans les autres pays, c'est-à-dire 15 à 25 % par an. Les besoins actuels de l'aéronautique civile allemande seraient donc au maximum 50 nouveaux pilotes par an.'

pu intervenir, le Gouvernement allemand n'ayant pas reconnu officiellement [le] texte modifié des règles de discrimination malgré les nombreuses insistances, ainsi qu'il vous a été rendu compte par lettre No. 192/25 du 21 Octobre 1925.⁸

La plus grande partie des pilotes sont déclarés être des pilotes de sport, mais le Comité considère que l'expression 'pilote de sport' est inexacte puisque l'instruction de ces pilotes est partiellement ou totalement gratuite et que leur désignation est soumise à l'approbation du Gouvernement.

L'entraînement systématisé des pilotes, le caractère général des individus et leur sélection soigneuse amènent le Comité à considérer que le développement de l'aviation allemande a une tendance militaire.

D'autre part, le Représentant du Gouvernement allemand déclare que le développement de l'aviation a uniquement des buts pacifiques: l'intensification des lignes aériennes et la propagation du sport aérien dans la nation.

L'opinion du Comité est basée sur ce qui suit:

Pilotes enregistrés à la fin du 3ème trimestre 1925:

(a) Pilotes de dirigeables	. 5
(b) Pilotes immatriculés	. 713
(c) Pilotes réentraînés	. 83
(d) Élèves-pilotes	. 267
	<u>1,068</u>

Les nombres ci-dessus ont été calculés uniquement d'après les données fournies par le Gouvernement allemand, après déduction des pilotes tués, disparus ou étrangers. Ce sont donc des minima.⁹

Le nombre de nouveaux pilotes immatriculés au cours d'une période de 5 mois (1er Mai au 30 Septembre 1925) est de 248.

Le nombre de pilotes au service de l'aéronautique commerciale est de 196 et le reste, soit 517, sont des pilotes de sport.

Les pilotes immatriculés pendant le trimestre finissant le 30 Septembre se répartissent en

93 pilotes brevetés A.
et 42 pilotes brevetés B.

Le Comité n'a pas les données nécessaires pour établir la même répartition pour tous les pilotes. En règle générale, les pilotes brevetés A sont considérés comme pilotes de sport, les brevetés B et C comme pilotes de lignes aériennes.

Les conditions requises pour l'obtention des brevets A, B et C sont données en annexe.⁸

Le nombre des membres de l'armée, de la marine et de la police, enregistrés comme pilotes ou élèves-pilotes depuis le 1er Janvier 1924, date à

⁸ Not printed.

⁹ *Note on original*: 'Le Comité de Garantie a constaté à différentes reprises l'immatriculation de nouveaux pilotes qui n'avaient figuré sur aucune liste d'élèves-pilotes. En plus, il manque encore les listes de trois écoles.'

partir de laquelle le Gouvernement allemand a consenti à fournir l'indication des professions, est de 83.

Ce nombre établi par le Comité d'après les inspections et les recoupements avec les annuaires des officiers est de 153.

Ce nombre est certainement inférieur à la réalité étant donné que le Comité n'a pas la possibilité d'identifier les sous-officiers et hommes de troupe.

Le nombre des écoles de pilotage est de 20, dont 9 seulement sont importantes. Ce sont les écoles de la Sportflug.

Le développement de l'instruction des pilotes en Allemagne et consécutivement la création de la Sportflug ont fait l'objet de rapports spéciaux qui vous ont été adressés par le compte-rendu No. 29 du 5 Septembre 1924¹⁰ et par le rapport No. 33/25 du 22 janvier 1925 (annexe page 10).¹¹

7 de ces écoles forment des pilotes de sport (avions)

1 des pilotes de sport (hydravions)

1 forme des pilotes pour la navigation aérienne.

Il est significatif qu'il existe au moins une école de la Sportflug pour chacun des 7 Wehrkreiskommandos (districts militaires); en plus il y a une école de pilotage d'hydravions à Warnemünde.

Il existe en outre, 119 associations aéronautiques groupant environ 20.000 membres. Leurs efforts tendent à un ou deux avions en propriété qui sont mis à la disposition des membres qui veulent maintenir leur entraînement, ainsi qu'il a été constaté au cours de plusieurs inspections du Comité.

La participation du Gouvernement allemand dans la désignation des élèves-pilotes ressort du rapport annuel du Deutscher Luftfahrt Verband,¹² publié en Août 1925. Il dit:

'Le Comité d'avions du D.L.V. demande à ses sociétés affiliées que les jeunes gens de moins de vingt ans considérés comme particulièrement aptes lui soient proposés comme candidats élèves-pilotes. Ne peuvent être prises en considération que les demandes d'associations n'ayant pas

¹⁰ The annexed extract from this report is not printed. It stated, in particular, that according to reports received by the Committee 'le but du Reichswehrministerium serait d'entraîner 2,000 pilotes d'ici fin 1925, et de se procurer des avions militaires équivalents aux avions alliés construits par des firmes allemandes à l'étranger, par Dornier en Suisse et en Italie, Junkers en Russie, Rohrbach au Danemark, Fokker en Hollande. L'argent nécessaire est fourni par les groupes industriels et agricoles et par l'État. . . Le Comité ne peut pas contrôler la véracité de ces renseignements mais les informations provenant d'autres sources, les renseignements de presse et d'informateurs, certain faits constatés au cours des inspections permettent de croire qu'une organisation complète est en voie de formation dans toute l'Allemagne, tendant à reconstituer l'aviation militaire.'

¹¹ Not printed. The annexed extract stated, in particular, that the Sportflug Ltd. was a 'société commerciale ayant plusieurs filiales dans le pays, et donc [dont] le but est la création d'écoles où les jeunes gens peu fortunés peuvent apprendre le pilotage des avions et poursuivre leur entraînement lorsque leur instruction est terminée. D'après des renseignements de source sûre ces cours sont presque gratuits et un certain pourcentage des élèves admis sont des militaires en activité de service.'

¹² German Aviation Association.

la possibilité d'instruire eux-mêmes leurs membres comme pilotes. Aux demandes devront être joints: au moins deux recommandations personnelles de personnalités connues donnant la garantie que les candidats sont dignes de confiance. Les demandes munies de telles recommandations seront présentées avec avis favorable au Ministre des Transports pour affectation des élèves aux écoles. Les frais d'instruction peuvent être en partie ou en totalité couverts par des subventions.'

Il y a lieu de remarquer en outre, que toutes les installations aéronautiques, ports aériens, écoles de pilotage, aérodromes, terrains auxiliaires, sont gardés et contrôlés par des postes permanents de la police de surveillance¹³ aérienne. Le Comité de Garantie a déjà pu recenser 258 policiers au cours d'inspections.

Enfin, la propagande officielle fait les plus grands efforts pour développer le goût de l'aviation. Cette propagande s'exerce par des conférences, des films, des meetings. Des cours d'aviation sont faits dans les écoles; chaque Université possède une chaire d'aviation.

Il est bien certain que la règle No. 9 modifiée par Décision de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs du 24 juin 1925, contrecarre la reconstitution d'un effectif considérable de pilotes jeunes et bien entraînés. De là, la résistance du Gouvernement allemand à accepter le texte modifié des règles de discrimination. En effet, cette modification permet des performances supérieures aux avions commerciaux, mais elle interdit la formation d'un nombre de pilotes supérieur aux besoins de l'aviation civile.

A. B. BURDETT
Group Captain R.A.F.
Président du C.G.Aé.

Belgique
WOUTERS
Italie
SENZADENARI

France
LOUBIGNIAC
Japon
BEPPU

¹³ *Note on filed copy*: 'Luftüber Wachemgspoliza [Wachungspolizei]'.

No. 127

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received December 4, 6.35 p.m.)
No. 387 *Telegraphic* [W 11160/9/98]

Urgent

GENEVA, December 4, 1925, 5.55 p.m.

Following from Lord Cecil.

Find strong opinion here that it would be (?unadvisable to) approach United States privately asking if they would join preparatory committee for

disarmament.¹ It is thought this would merely facilitate their refusal whereas an open invitation to join would place on them full responsibility of hindering disarmament. The relative position of League and United States has been so much modified during last year or two that danger of an American snub for League is no longer alarming. This view which is shared strongly by Secretary General seems also to be correct. Do you agree?

¹ Lord Cecil had proposed at the first meeting of the Committee of the Council on December 3 that the United States and the Soviet Union should be so invited. For the minutes of this meeting see *Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference*, Series I, pp. 8-13.

No. 128

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received December 5, 9 a.m.)

No. 388 Telegraphic [W 11173/9/98]

GENEVA, December 4, 1925, 11 p.m.

Following from Mr. Cadogan.¹

Council Committee met again this morning.²

It decided that preparatory committee should consist of:—

(1) Representatives of States members of Council, it being understood that in the event of any change in composition of latter Council should revise composition of preparatory committee.

(2) Representatives of States non members whom Council may think fit to invite. This category is designed to cover United States, Russia and Germany if the last named is not yet on the Council. It will not be made known for the moment owing to difficulty in connection with invitation to United States.

(3) Representatives of States which in regard to problem of disarmament are in special position by virtue of their geographical position and are not otherwise represented.

It further decided that any State not represented on committee should have the right to submit memoranda on points specially affecting it and to explain and defend its views before the Committee. Further, committee should have the right to invite collaboration for particular questions of any State which committee may consider specially affected.

At special secret session this afternoon it was agreed that Council would recommend to committee that States to be invited under (3) should be Poland, Yugo-Slavia, Roumania, Finland and Holland.

In subsequent ordinary session Council committee discussed written proposal of Belgian delegate for procedure of preparatory committee.³ Briefly this provides that committee is responsible for whole work but is empowered

¹ An Assistant to the British Delegate to the League of Nations.

² For the official minutes of this meeting, see *ibid.*, pp. 13-16.

³ See *ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

to obtain advice from League organs who may also volunteer it. On purely military, naval and air questions it would consult P[ermanent] A[dvisory] C[ommission]. On economic questions advice of economic, transit and financial committees and Labour Office might have to be co-ordinated by joint committee of representatives of each. Joint committee might also call in outside experts. Preparatory committee might of course also summon and hear any particular expert it chose. In such a case it would generally submit experts advice to P.A.C. or joint committee for their comments. These proposals were approved.

No. 129

Memorandum¹ respecting the Balkan Problem and British Policy in the Balkans [C 15882/8243/62]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 4, 1925*

The post-war situation in the Balkans differs radically from the position before the war in that none of the Balkan countries created by the peace treaties can any longer be regarded as pawns in the hands of either Russia or Austria. The post-war problem in the Balkans, however, is similar to the pre-war problem in that—

1. Balkan countries are still more faithful to their hates than to their loves.
2. They are still ultra-Nationalist and even Imperialist.
3. They are still greatly influenced by the trend of events in Europe proper.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom

There is much evidence to show that Yugoslavia regards herself as the foremost and most powerful State in the Balkans, and as a consequence is inclined to impose her will on her neighbours and to resent the intervention of the Great Powers in Balkan questions. By trebling her pre-war area and more than trebling her pre-war population, she has taken the place formerly occupied by Bulgaria, and her geographical position and population alone now entitle her to pre-eminence south of the Danube. The work of national consolidation, however, has not proceeded easily since the war. At first it was hindered by the fear that the divergent interests of the Great Western Powers might eventually produce a conflict of policy in which Yugoslavia would be forced to declare herself for one side or the other. The first phase of this struggle would presumably be financial and economic rather than military, and the prospect of British, French and Italian syndicates struggling to control the finance, transport and commerce of South-Eastern Europe fostered a spirit of narrow nationalism throughout the country while discouraging any genuine impulse towards constructive statesmanship.

¹ According to the docket, this memorandum was by Mr. Bateman of Central Department. The filed copy is evidently an amended text issued about December 24.

Internally acute divisions occurred over the struggle between governmental centralisation in Belgrade and decentralisation in which the Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrins would govern themselves regionally and be only responsible to Belgrade in the same sense as the various States of a confederacy are responsible to the Central Government. This struggle has done much to hinder not only the progress of Yugoslavia but also the formation of a national policy. During the past year, however, these differences have been composed by the Entente arranged between the Croat Peasant party and the Radical Government in Belgrade, and with the political demise of M. Pasic,² it is probable that Yugoslavia will approach nearer to the ideal of internal unity. Even in the present state of things it can be said with confidence that her internal political struggle has not prevented her from presenting at least an appearance of stability to her neighbours, and as far as can be foreseen, she may be regarded as the force conducing most to the preservation of law and order in the Balkans. The fact that the present smoothing over of internal difficulties depends largely on the mercurial and erratic personality of the Croat Peasant leader, M. Radic,³ makes it necessary to postpone for the moment a final judgment on the internal situation of the country, but as regards foreign policy the line to be taken by Yugoslavia is becoming more and more clear. As far as Central Europe and especially Hungary are concerned, her safety is guaranteed by her connection with the Little Entente, and she is therefore free to turn her attention to the Balkan Peninsula. Her interests and those of Italy in the Adriatic have more than once since the war clashed, but happily they have been capable of settlement by arrangement. For the moment it is clear that she means to develop her ports on the Dalmatian coast to the best of her capacity, and no doubt she hopes one day to be able to share in the partition of Albania with Italy. Her main aspiration, however, is towards the formation of a great Slav Kingdom which would include not only the territories comprising the former empire of Stephen Dushan⁴ with an outlet at Salonica, but also those now occupied by Bulgaria. Macedonian troubles and the aspirations of Bulgaria in Macedonia are the real reason why these two States cannot compose their differences, but as Macedonia becomes more settled under Serbian rule this cause of friction will disappear and the formation of a Serb-Bulgar confederacy will become more feasible. Should such a confederacy ever come into being it will settle the Macedonian question and wipe out a good deal of the bitterness left by the second Balkan war⁵ and the events of the Great War. That such a confederacy would be strongly tempted to occupy Western

² M. Pashitch resigned as Serb-Croat-Slovene Prime Minister in April 1926.

³ M. Raditch had recently joined M. Pashitch's government as Minister of Education.

⁴ Stephen Dushan, ruler of Serbia, Albania, the Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia (without Salonika), and overlord of Bulgaria, was crowned Emperor of the Serbs and Greeks in 1346.

⁵ Of July to August 1913. By the peace treaty between Bulgaria and Greece, Montenegro, Roumania and Serbia, which was signed at Bucharest on August 10, 1913, Bulgaria ceded part of the Dobrudja to Roumania: see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 107, pp. 658-73.

Thrace and its littoral, together with practically the whole of Greek Macedonia, goes almost without saying, and already the chief trend of Serbian expansion is towards the Vardar Valley and Salonica. Jugoslavia has a free zone at that port and railway communications with the hinterland, but she is bringing pressure to bear on Greece in order to gain control of the railway and ultimately the possession of the port. She is quite prepared to gain her ends by playing off Greece and Bulgaria against each other and to turn trouble in the Balkans to her own profit.

It is noteworthy that while troubles between Jugoslavia and Greece take a long time to settle, those between Jugoslavia and Bulgaria are capable of more easy adjustment. Finally, it may be said that Jugoslavia suffers from all the complaints of a very young person who has come into an inheritance, her chief symptoms being swelled head and internal trouble. It would be safe to give countenance to her authority in the Balkans if she were not given to sabre-rattling and to administrative corruption. The manner in which she Serbised the territory gained before the war as far south as Nish shows that, given time, a good many of her problems will solve themselves. It will be a convenient policy for the Great Powers, through the League, merely to insist on restraint when troubles with her neighbours arise, and to encourage her to regard herself as holding a great responsibility for the preservation of peace, order and good government. She is, in fact, in a position to hold the balance between Bulgaria and Greece, and it will be as well to recognise this and use it for peaceful ends. Jugoslavia stands as much in need of peace as any other Balkan country. Seven years of continual warfare made enormous ravages in her best man-power, and she would be well advised to think twice before computing her military strength on the assumption that the fighting value of the Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians is the equal of that of the Serbs proper.

Roumania

Roumania, like Jugoslavia, has almost trebled her territory as a result of the war and has more than doubled her population. Unlike Jugoslavia, however, her geographical position renders her not only relatively weaker than Jugoslavia, but also as [*sic*] a country which cannot be regarded purely as a Balkan one. Moreover, there are inherent dangers in Roumania which are not present to the same degree in Jugoslavia. Roumania borders on Soviet Russia, and though fundamentally right in the controversy over Bessarabia,⁶ the justice of her cause is not a sufficient protection against Soviet imperialism. On the contrary, the Bessarabian question is a continual source of anxiety and a perpetual excuse for a quarrel on the part of Soviet Russia. Roumania's foreign policy has been based on the theory of allying herself to those whose interests were as much anti-Soviet as her own, and she relies a good deal on the Little Entente and Poland. The recent visit of M. Chicherin to Warsaw, however, inspired some doubt amongst the Poles as to whether they were wise in complicating their relations with Russia by

⁶ See No. 84, paragraph 5.

an agreement to defend Roumania in case of trouble over Bessarabia, and it is possible that if both Roumania and Poland attach conditions to the renewal of the alliance⁶ in March next, it will not be renewed at all.

Moreover, there are no irredentists like the Hungarians, and the Hungarian minorities in Transylvania will form a great danger to Roumania for many years to come. Unfortunately, neither in Bessarabia nor in Transylvania has Roumania adopted administrative measures which would tend to make such minorities as exist there look to Bucharest for justice or regard Roumania as a better entity to which to belong than those States which formerly claimed their sympathy.

At bottom it is fear of the minorities and of Hungary which makes Roumania tractable by the League, and it is fear of Communism, although denied, that leads her to uphold any Government which combats Communism actively. It is for this reason that she inclines to support the Tsankov Government in Bulgaria. She is, however, geographically set aside from purely Balkan problems and this has enabled her from time to time to play the rôle of mediator in questions arising between Jugoslavia and Bulgaria and between Bulgaria and Greece.

The filching of the Dobrudja from Bulgaria in 1913, however, was an act the morality of which can only be compared with that of the filching of Bessarabia from Roumania by Russia in 1878,⁷ and it may be taken for granted that should Bulgaria ever succeed in regaining her former importance and strength in the Balkans, one of her first moves will be to recover the Bulgarian Dobrudja. Roumania is, therefore, surrounded by enemies or quasi-friends. The Bessarabian Treaty is not technically in force, and it is doubtful whether Roumania would get any assistance even from the Little Entente should real trouble develop with Soviet Russia. Her situation, therefore, is precarious, and much will depend on the manner in which she sets her house in order.

Amongst many false starts, one of her wisest moves was the passing of the Agrarian Law by which the land was divided up so as to give the peasant a proprietary interest. This has done much to aid Roumania in becoming a bulwark against Communism, and the fact that she is now funding her obligations to foreign Powers, balancing her budget and endeavouring to enhance her financial reputation will react in her favour.

The minorities treaties have not proved an unmixed blessing to Roumania. Their object was to give the minorities a chance to air their grievances in countries where administration had not reached a high level. They were never intended to undermine the sovereignty or the authority of the States concerned, but there is much evidence to show that Hungary is deliberately exploiting her minorities to this end.

The only political interest which Great Britain has in the fate of Roumania is that as a signatory of the peace treaties she would be bound to resist any attempt to alter the *status quo* by violence.

⁶ See fn. p. 205.

⁷ See article XLV of the Treaty of Berlin, printed *op. cit.*, vol. 69, p. 764.

It might be argued that it would be advisable to keep Roumania strong in order effectively to bar the Russian road to Constantinople, but the answer to that argument is that if Soviet Russia ever became possessed of Constantinople it would be her Achilles' heel, just as it is Turkey's at the moment.

Greece

Greece also stands much in need of a long period of peace. She has not only new territories to absorb, like Jugoslavia and Roumania, but she has a large immigrant population of over a million from Asia Minor to settle as a consequence of a disastrous war with Turkey.⁸ She is engaged in planting these, with the aid of a League of Nations commission, in Greek Macedonia and Western Thrace, where the Greek element was weak. Strategically at a disadvantage owing to the attenuated shape of her territory in the north, she cannot boast of fighting material as good as the Bulgar or the Serb; and her army, such as it is, is riddled with politics. Against a Serb-Bulgar combination she could not stand up for a moment. But apart from guaranteeing herself against loss of what she has got and a possible expansion at the expense of Albania, her inclination is to direct her policy away from the Balkans. Central European politics do not interest her, and she is not a member of the Little Entente. She looks out more on the Eastern Mediterranean as the appropriate sphere for her acquisitive instincts. She hopes to recover the Dodecanese from Italy, and she aspires to mercantile supremacy in the Levant.

Up to the last year Greek policy in the Balkans was based on the Graeco-Serb Alliance of 1913.⁹ In November 1924 Jugoslavia suddenly denounced the alliance, which consequently expired on the 11th November last. Her grounds for doing this were specious rather than convincing. Greece and Bulgaria had agreed at Geneva in September 1924 to set up a Permanent Mixed Commission to supervise their minorities in Macedonia. Jugoslavia, who regards Macedonian Slavs as Serbs and not Bulgars, declared this to be an unfriendly act. She also complained of the unsatisfactory state of the Ghevgheli Railway and the Serb free zone at Salonica. Whilst it is undeniable that Jugoslavia had substantial grievances under the two last heads, these seem hardly sufficient reason to justify the reversal of a policy of ten years. It is reasonable to suppose that these were but pretexts which the folly of the Greeks had enabled her to use in order to cover a possible change in the orientation of Yugoslav policy. Negotiations, it is true, were at once opened for the renewal of the alliance, but Jugoslavia put forward demands, including Serb control of the Ghevgheli Railway, which no Greek Government could accept. France eventually intervened with a compromise proposal for a French company to run the railway, but M. Nincic has given out that there must be Serbian participation, and that he is prepared to wait for a change of Government in Greece in order to get it.

⁸ The Greco-Turkish Convention regarding the exchange of Greek and Turkish nationals, signed at Lausanne on January 30, 1923, is printed *op. cit.*, vol. 118, pp. 1048-53.

⁹ See *op. cit.*, vol. 108, pp. 686-9.

From the Greek point of view, recent tendencies of Yugoslav policy are distinctly disquieting. Greece finds that she is becoming isolated, and it seems clear that if concessions have to be made in the renewal of the alliance, Greece will have to make them. It is not surprising therefore that in the summer she identified herself through M. Rentis¹⁰ with a proposal for a compulsory arbitration pact. The proposal met with no response in Belgrade. At the same time she began to look about for other friends, and she even turned to Italy.

Italian relations with Greece have hitherto turned on the Corfu incident¹¹ and the Dodecanese question. On the latter, a kind of *impasse* was reached some time ago when Signor Mussolini declared his intention of handing over certain of the less important islands in return for economic compensation and a general settlement with Greece, but omitted to take any steps to open negotiations for the purpose. In the summer, however, after the advent to power of the revolutionary Government of General Pangalos, a fervent admirer of Mussolinian methods, Signor Dino Grandi, Fascist Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had certain conversations in Athens which were renewed with M. Rentis at Geneva in September.¹² No concrete proposals have as yet been put forward, but it is understood that Signor Mussolini has in mind a pact of friendship covering the general settlement of outstanding questions, following the lines of his pact with Yugoslavia.¹³ Italy is anxious for Greek co-operation in seeking markets and outlets for immigrants in Asia Minor and the Black Sea; in return she would give up a few of the Dodecanese, but she knows the weakness of the Greek position, and means, no doubt, to drive a hard bargain. The Greeks since the war have been their own worst enemy. Their chaotic internal condition has contrasted curiously with their readiness to wage war with Turks and Bulgars and to embroil themselves with Italy—a phenomenon which is largely the result of hysteria and nervousness which her northern neighbours are not slow to recognise. Unless Greece achieves some measure of internal stability she must continue to be a source of anxiety to those whose aim is peace, as her very weakness is a continual temptation to the Serb to advance on Salonica, and for the Bulgar to seize Dedeagatch and Kavalla and face Europe with a *fait accompli*.

Albania

Albania in herself is a menace to nobody except in so far as her weakness provides an attraction to her powerful neighbours. Her mediæval form of society is fully absorbed by internal feuds. But frequent revolutions are to be expected, and there is constant danger of outside intervention. The Albanian frontiers have now been completely delimited, Albania finally accepting last

¹⁰ Then Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹¹ For this incident of 1923 see *League of Nations Official Journal*, November 1923, *passim*.

¹² See *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Settima Serie, vol. iv, p. 93.

¹³ This treaty, signed at Rome on January 27, 1924, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 120, pp. 683-4.

month the compromise proposed by the Ambassadors' Conference, whereby the disputed Monastery of San Naoum and the Vermosch Valley went to Jugoslavia in return for certain slight concessions. In the south, she is encountering difficulties in dealing with the Greek minorities, and her primitive methods of administration there cannot be said to inspire confidence. Greece undoubtedly has not given up all hopes of recovering Southern Albania, whilst Albania herself keeps a stake in Northern Epirus in the shape of the Moslems of Albanian origin resident there, who, by a Greek undertaking to Albania, are exempted from the Exchange of Populations Convention with Turkey. Italy claims a very special position in Albania, and an agreement is in existence signed on the 9th November, 1921,¹⁴ by which Great Britain, France, and Japan undertook, in the event of Albania being unable to maintain her integrity, to give a mandate to Italy. The pact between Italy and Jugoslavia undoubtedly covers the case of Albania, and it is noteworthy that during the revolution of June 1924, when Ahmed Zogu¹⁵ was driven from the country, largely because Italian influence was against him, Italy invoked the pact and the two Governments, after exchanging views, announced that they regarded the revolution as an internal affair. In the following December Ahmed returned to power, obviously with Serb assistance. Italy was distinctly disconcerted at what she regarded as Serb intervention, but both Signor Mussolini and M. Nincic gave assurances that neither of them harboured any designs against Albanian independence. There seems no reason to doubt Signor Mussolini's sincerity. Italy has no pleasant recollections of her occupation of Albania, and so long as no one else, viz., Jugoslavia, violates Albanian integrity, her strategic interests in the Adriatic are well served by this strip of coast remaining in weak but independent hands.

Italy

The policy of Italy in the Balkans is obscure and vacillating. She demands to be regarded as having special authority there, and her one immediate concern is, of course, the Adriatic coast. With a view to the latter, Signor Mussolini wisely reversed the policy of his predecessors and concluded a pact of friendship and collaboration with Jugoslavia in 1924, whereby the two Governments undertook to assist one another, and to concert together whenever their common interests were effected [*sic*]. Rumours of secret clauses covering a Serb advance on Salonica and the partition of Albania have been frequently repeated and as frequently denied. At one time, Italy was certainly anxious to see the attention of Jugoslavia diverted from the Adriatic to the Ægean. More recently, it has perhaps been realised that such a policy might defeat itself, and that after breakfasting on Salonica, Jugoslavia might think that she could sup on Fiume. The Italian *rapprochement* with Greece has already been indicated, as well as her special position in Albania.

¹⁴ This declaration is printed in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. xii, p. 383.

¹⁵ Ahmed Zogu Bey had been Albanian Prime Minister. In January 1925 he was elected President of Albania.

Bulgaria

Of all the Balkan countries, Bulgaria still provides the most interesting study. Formerly the most prosperous and hardworking of the Balkan States, with a population noted for its dour tenacity and laborious thoroughness, and with highly practical ideas on hegemony in the Balkans, she finds herself, as the victim of her own intransigence and the result of two disastrous wars, relegated to a position of impotence and comparative unimportance. Twice allotted by recent treaties coveted territory in Macedonia, and once master of Adrianople and Thrace, she nurses a deep resentment against her neighbours for having profited by her weakness and the folly of her rulers by taking from her territories in which she had definitely established claims and planted minorities. That her aspirations for expansion in Southern Macedonia, Greek Macedonia, and Thrace still subsist and will not be allowed to die for many years to come may be taken for granted. The Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation and the Thracian Society are still powers in the land and are able largely to influence the policy of any Bulgarian Government, no matter from what parties it may be formed. This alone is sufficient to cause the deepest suspicion and distrust, not unmixed with fear among her neighbours. For the moment she has been rendered relatively powerless by the Treaty of Neuilly.¹⁶ Her army and finances are controlled by Allied commissions in Sofia, but she can always find rifles and militiamen in any emergency, and there is reason to believe that the experience gained under years of conscription would enable her still to collect a fairly large army if she were not carefully watched. Hers is the only army based on voluntary service in the Balkans, but there is no doubt that she hankers after conscription, and that her military party cannot become reconciled to their lost prestige. She has given much evidence of a desire to evade the military and economic clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly.

Since the war, her internal situation has been troubled and subject to violent changes. A thinly-disguised dictatorship under the Peasant leader M. Stamboliiski,¹⁷ who saw that Bulgaria's only hope was to work in close harmony with Yugoslavia, was overthrown largely through the instrumentality of the military party and the Macedonian autonomists, who saw that all their hopes of upsetting the territorial arrangements made by the peace treaties would vanish if a working arrangement were ever made between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. As a result, the whole of Bulgaria's post-war development has been arrested by the reactionary and repressive Government headed by M. Tsankov, whose intimate liaison with the Macedonians renders a *rapprochement* with Serbia impossible. His one idea of government is to classify all his political adversaries as Communists and to rid himself of a constitutional opposition by clapping them into prison. It is safe to say that, not representing the best elements in Bulgaria, the present Government has lost caste not only in Bulgaria itself but in Europe generally.

¹⁶ The peace treaty with Bulgaria, signed on November 27, 1919, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 112, pp. 781-895.

¹⁷ M. Stamboliiski was Prime Minister of Bulgaria, 1919-23.

They evince an only too patent desire to score off their neighbours and particularly Greece, purely with the idea of gaining *kudos* for themselves and thus retaining office. Briefly, they are a menace to Balkan peace: and there is every reason to believe that, far from being disinterested appellants to the minorities treaties, they deliberately exploit the presence of the Bulgar minorities in Serb and Greek Macedonia and Thrace and encourage them to remain in the latter, despite exchange agreements with Greece, in order to keep their territorial aspirations alive. Cold-shouldered by the Powers, mistrusted by their neighbours, and not believed by the League, their efforts to raise a reconstruction loan under the camouflage of a refugee loan are doomed to failure. Internationally, Bulgaria is as much isolated as Greece, though for different reasons. Her only friend at the moment is Turkey—a State which, as is well known, evinces an all too patent readiness to fish in troubled waters wherever such a policy is possible. No *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia—Bulgaria's only hope at present—will be possible so long as the Macedonian autonomists and federalists have the whip hand of the Government, nor will an understanding with Greece be possible until Bulgaria comes frankly into the open over the question of an outlet to the Ægean and is more amenable to goodwill and common sense in the question of her minorities. The quasi-friendship between Roumania and Bulgaria is only based on a common fear of Bolshevism. The soil is not prepared in either country for the reception of Marxian seed, and a friendship based on fear where interests are at variance is probably not destined to last, should the fear disappear.

Finally, the recent action of the Council of the League in coming forward promptly to stop the Greek invasion of Bulgarian territory¹⁸ should tend to reassure Bulgaria that the Powers, having reduced her to military impotence, are not unmindful of the obligations thereby incurred of protecting her from wanton aggression. The Rumbold Commission's findings should show that, given proper behaviour on Bulgaria's part, she has little to fear from her neighbours. Whether the peace treaties are iniquitous or not is beside the point. Even the Locarno Treaty works within the framework established at Versailles, and any arrangement between Bulgaria and her neighbours must follow suit. In other words, salvation must come from within and not without Bulgaria.

Turkey

It will be sufficient in a scant summary such as the present to mention that the Turkish Government have made it clear recently both at the signature

¹⁸ See *League of Nations Official Journal*, November 1925, pp. 1696–1718, and February 1926, *passim*. On October 29, 1925, the Council of the League of Nations, on being informed that hostilities had ceased and that the Greek troops were withdrawing, had appointed a Commission, presided over by Sir H. Rumbold, H.M. Ambassador at Madrid, to enquire into the incident. The report of this Commission is printed *op. cit.*, February 1926, pp. 196–210.

of the recent Turco-Bulgar Treaty¹⁹ and during the Græco-Bulgar frontier affray of October last that they still regard themselves as a Balkan State, with interests in the peninsula sufficient to warrant the recognition of certain definite rights and interests, especially during conflicts between Balkan States. Turkey would be glad of any occasion to fish in troubled waters, and her animosity against Greece leads her from time to time to make anti-Greek overtures to both Belgrade and Sofia. There are no outstanding questions of importance, however, which would conceivably lead to Turkish intervention in the Balkans.

British Policy in the Balkans

In the criss-cross of chaotic aspirations and the atmosphere of intrigue, fear and suspicion which unfortunately still persists in the Balkans, how best can Great Britain bend the energies to secure peace?

1. In the first place, it is as well to recognise that the train which led from the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 to the European conflagration of 1914 is no longer laid. Even should an outbreak occur south of the Danube, the League machinery now exists and has been very considerably strengthened of late for localising a conflict. Soviet Russia and Turkey might conceivably attempt to profit by an outbreak, but Turkey is immediately vulnerable at Constantinople and Russia's position is far too enigmatical to say what she would do in the event of a Balkan conflict.

As to what should be done in the event of an outbreak on a serious scale, there will be time enough to consider His Majesty's Government's attitude when it is seen how events are shaping.

In other words, Great Britain must wait upon events. No definite policy is either possible or desirable which envisages war on a large scale as a necessary corollary of a conflict between two Balkan States.

2. In the second place, it is as well to recognise that Great Britain can have no purely political motive in the Balkans other than the preservation of peace. There can, therefore, be no question whatever of Great Britain ever assuming an active rôle on a pre-considered plan similar to that of either Austria or Russia before the war. With the efforts of each turbulent State to realise its territorial or other ambitions she can have nothing to do unless active steps are taken by one or the other to disturb the peace. For this reason it is essential that His Majesty's Government should be kept fully informed of political movements so that, assuming the rôle of benevolent and disinterested observer, such advice as she tenders in the interests of peace shall be given in good time.

3. The peace treaties brought about a state of things in the Balkans which may be described as unstable peace, but which at least conform to political realities as they existed after nearly seven years of war in the Balkans. In the above review of conflicting interests there is sufficient to show that any

¹⁹ The Turco-Bulgar Treaty of Friendship signed at Angora on October 18, 1925, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 122, pp. 213-17.

move to revise those treaties—whatever may be the view taken of them—would result in chaos. It is far too early even to think of such a course, and unless a mutual desire to revise is expressed by the Balkan countries themselves, the only practical policy to pursue is one of insisting on the fulfilment of the present treaties—at least in spirit. Just as the Treaty of Locarno falls within the framework of the Treaty of Versailles, so must any rearrangement in the Balkans conform to the instruments which at present ensure peace. In any case, it would be folly to make the revision of the lesser treaties precede that of the greater. The peace treaties must stand as they are until the bitterness left by war has disappeared.

4. If this be a correct interpretation of the present state of affairs, His Majesty's Government must be prepared to help by good counsel and advice, either through the League or apart from it (but within strict limits in the latter case) any State which gives evidence of a capacity for stability and to support the authority of the League in such States. At present, the only State with sufficient interests in the Balkans which answers to this description is Jugoslavia, which is achieving national unity slowly but surely. Any movement conducing to the maintenance of law, order and good administration there should be encouraged where possible, and organisations in Bulgaria tending to upset the existing régime in Macedonia should be discountenanced. It follows also that the application of the minorities treaties there (and, for that matter, in Roumania also) must be handled with the greatest care. Such a policy also connotes letting it be known in Belgrade that, as the foremost State in the Balkans, a responsibility for not provoking quarrels devolves upon the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom.

5. Following the line of argument used in 2 above, no concrete policy can be formulated in advance concerning such cases as a descent of Jugoslavia on Salonica or the formation of a Serb-Bulgar confederacy. It is sufficient to say that His Majesty's Government would uphold whatever action the League thought fit to take in such an event; and that it would be a mistake to underrate the moral influence of the League's judgment, apart altogether from forcible intervention.

6. Rightly understood and practised, the above is a positive policy. The method of its application in any particular emergency can only be decided when the emergency arises.

No. 130

Mr. Peters (Moscow) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received December 14)

No. 851 [N 6823/710/38]

MOSCOW, December 4, 1925

Sir,

There are still no signs that the Soviet Government has taken a definite decision as to the modifications, if any, to be introduced into its foreign policy

as a result of the signature of the Locarno Treaties. The Soviet Press is entirely uninteresting, repeating *ad nauseam* the old fable of the anti-Soviet character of the Locarno agreements, finding proofs of anti-Soviet designs everywhere—in speeches by British Ministers, in articles in French newspapers, in M. Streseman[n]'s defence of the Locarno treaties in the Reichstag. M. Litvinov told the foreign correspondents in Moscow recently that the Soviet Government maintained its 'negative attitude' towards the League of Nations, but having said this he refused to answer any questions and left this task to a member of his staff who in general does not deal with political questions and betrayed considerable confusion when asked to define the attitude of the Government towards various aspects of the work of the League of Nations.

2. The general impression which one derives from all this is that the Soviet Government is still sitting on the fence, hoping for indications of dissensions among the signatories of Locarno which would allow room for the well known Soviet game of 'playing on differences' and at the same time hoping that events in China may take a favourable turn, i.e., hoping that peace and order in that country will not soon be restored.

3. If, however, no decision has yet been taken in questions of foreign policy this does not mean that no discussions are taking place. The 14th Congress of the Russian Communist Party opens on December 15th and local preparatory congresses are being held all over the country, each such congress passing its series of long and intricately worded resolutions on the most varied aspects of party work. The 'Politbureau'—the seven members of which as is well known in effect guide the destinies of the Soviet Union—has been busy preparing theses for submission to the Party Congress, and has recently been meeting much more frequently than usual.

4. It is now a commonplace that the position of the Soviet Union is determined

- (a) by its own (internal) political and economic strength,
- (b) by the differences existing between the capitalist powers with which it has to deal,
- (c) by the support which it receives from the 'labouring masses' of other countries.

Of those three factors the second and third lie outside the province of the Moscow observer. It may, however, at the present moment—when the flood of Communist eloquence at the party congress has not yet been let loose upon us—be convenient to attempt to give an estimate of the internal political and economic situation of the Soviet Union, and of its possible repercussions on Soviet relations with foreign countries. I fear I may be accused of harping on an old theme but it is my belief that without some clear-cut method of approach it is impossible to obtain any clear idea of what has happened and of what is happening in the Soviet Union.

5. The position briefly appears to me to be that the Soviet Government by allowing peasants freedom to produce what they liked and to do what they

liked with their produce has enabled the peasants to work out their own salvation and to raise agriculture to something like pre-war level. The Soviet 'technical' departments, as for example the Commissariat of Agriculture, have done everything in their power with the machinery at their disposal to assist the peasants but fundamentally the restoration of Russian agriculture has been due to the work of the peasants, work conducted on the old lines, with a low level of productivity little affected by the perturbations of the revolutionary and civil war periods.

6. Industry again has shown rapid development ever since the principle of working for profit was introduced. Relations between State enterprises in the Soviet Union (where practically all enterprises belong to the State) do not essentially differ from those between private enterprises in countries where practically all enterprises belong to private individuals and firms. The highest possible price is squeezed out of buyers and the lowest possible price is paid to sellers. Wages are kept as low as possible. Complaints are made of the burden of social insurance.

7. In a word, both agriculture and industry, which had touched rock bottom, i.e., the point at which those engaged in them could only just maintain physical existence, have developed rapidly under the stimulus of self-interest, under what is called in 'capitalist' economics the economic stimulus. Russia has been getting on her feet again.

8. The position of the Soviet Government with regard to this process of economic development is however different from that of Governments in other countries. The Soviet Government claims that in the Soviet Union economic development proceeds according to a plan laid down by itself. Not only so but the Soviet Government retains a monopoly of commercial relations with the outside world: foreign trade has to be conducted in accordance with a State plan which declares beforehand how much trade foreign countries are to do with the Soviet Union.

9. If the Soviet Government's claim were even approximately correct there would not perhaps be much difference between doing business through the Soviet Government and doing business direct. Nothing however is more apparent to the observer of Soviet economic conditions than that most of the plans—three years' plans, five years' plans, and the rest of them—elaborated in such detail in the central planning departments are worth about the waste paper value of the paper they are printed on. Hence there is a constant divergence between Soviet plans and what actually happens. A time table is carefully drawn up for a run from London to Manchester but the train is suddenly reported to have arrived at Plymouth. Both speed and direction often take the Soviet Government by surprise.

10. The Soviet Union is now faced with the difficulties arising out of a miscalculation on which big plans were based. 'Plans' said that there was a good harvest and that the peasant would be in a hurry to sell his grain. The peasant said that there was a goodish harvest and that as taxation had been reduced he would be able to eat more himself, to build up reserves against the rainy day, and to sell less. This miscalculation has involved

- (1) high prices for grain instead of the expected low prices;
- (2) rises in wages to meet the increase in the cost of living;
- (3) stringent financial measures to save the purchasing power of the chervonets¹—reduction in credit which in turn means a reduction in the scale of expenditure on industrial expansion, on housing schemes, etc;
- (4) reduction in exports which means also reduction in imports.

11. There is nothing catastrophic in the situation but the Soviet Government does find itself in a difficulty. It is obvious for example that claiming as it does to represent the Soviet Union so far as foreign trade is concerned its foreign currency reserves are severely strained by the disappearance of a large proportion of anticipated receipts from grain export. In the forefront of every problem in the Soviet Union at present we find the currency question, and rumour speaks of a conflict in Soviet circles between, on the one hand, the representatives of industry interested in supplies of cheap money and hitherto not directly concerned in the effect of currency issues on foreign exchange, and on the other hand the representatives of foreign trade and finance who hope for foreign credits and know that any undermining of the stability of the chervonets would be fatal to these hopes.

12. As regards the internal difficulties the Soviet Government is busy devising schemes for drawing money out of the peasant's pockets (and thereby drawing grain out of the peasant's barn). The re-introduction of vodka is for example a means to this end, and it is understood that the finance departments are in favour of the introduction of further indirect taxation. Every effort is being made to give the peasant cheap goods to buy, though it is questionable whether the methods now used will prove successful. Industry is to be encouraged to produce goods that the peasant wants, goods which will have an immediate effect on the market.

13. These are internal questions. There is however one conclusion which can be drawn from the above analysis of the position, a conclusion which is of interest to foreign countries which have to deal with the Soviet Union. It is that the miscalculation which has disturbed the Soviet plans of export and import and which has led to credit restrictions inside the Soviet Union enhances the importance of foreign credit. Credits were always asked for by the Soviet Government but the urgency of the need was never so great as now. Credit thus becomes an important form of political pressure, and it will probably be found that where advantageous arrangements are to be made with the Soviet Union some credit consideration is the lever which will bring about the desired result.

I have, &c.,
WILLIAM PETERS

¹ A gold monetary unit established in 1922 as worth ten pre-war roubles.

No. 131

Sir A. Chamberlain to Mr. London (Geneva)

No. 256 Telegraphic [W 11160/9/98]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 5, 1925, 3.10 p.m.*

Following for Lord Cecil:—

I see no reason why you should incur odium of resisting general view but I advise you to yield to rather than approve this proposal.¹ I *think* the League will get a refusal.

In this connection see Sir E. Howard's telegram No. 333² which is being repeated to you. It might be useful to fortify yourself with his advice on the subject.

¹ See No. 127.

² Not printed. This Washington telegram of December 3 indicated the sense of that part of President Coolidge's message of December 8 to Congress which referred to disarmament and stated in particular that the President 'says it will gratify United States Government if European powers can come to some agreement on land disarmament and that such agreement will have sympathetic support of United States Government. After that naval disarmament can again be discussed and United States government would be willing to call such a conference or participate in any conference of powers held under conditions that promised success.' See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1925*, vol. i, pp. xii-xiii.

No. 132

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell¹ (Received December 6, 9 p.m.)

No. 390 Telegraphic [W 11189/9/98]

GENEVA, *December 6, 1925, 6 p.m.*

Following from Mr. Cadogan:—

Council committee met again yesterday morning and began discussion of programme of studies for preparatory committee.²

Lord Cecil submitted British programme as approved by Cabinet omitting for the present mention of conscription and suggesting that two supplementary questions might have to be added one [of] which would be as to form of international supervision if any which might have to be instituted.

French delegate³ pointed out that main difference between British and French programme was that former contemplated limitation only of peace armaments or at least of immediately mobilizable forces whereas French

¹ The Permanent Under-Secretary of State was in charge of the Foreign Office during the absence of Sir A. Chamberlain, who arrived in Geneva on December 6 to attend the Council of the League of Nations. From December 17, 1925, to January 26, 1926, Sir A. Chamberlain was on holiday at Rapallo, where he was visited by Signor Mussolini. Sir Austen returned to London on January 29, having visited Paris on the way.

² For the official minutes of this meeting, see *Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference*, Series I, pp. 17-23.

³ M. Paul-Boncour, Chairman of the Committee.

programme took into account the whole possible potential strength of a country. All recent resolutions of assembly made disarmament depend on security. French idea was therefore to take into account all inequalities of strength of various countries in estimating amount of security enjoyed by each. Disarmament must not be considered apart from covenant which contemplated economic assistance to victim of aggression. A neighbour of a more powerful industrial state must fear aggression, unless it can be assured of adequate assistance. Supervision of armaments presented difficulty but any limitation of armaments implied measure of supervision. Supervision was of highest degree of importance during process of conciliation and arbitration. M. Boncour agreed that a general enquiry into all kind of resources of each state was impossible but he thought it difficult to distinguish altogether between visible forces of a state and its ultimate potential strength. He concluded by suggesting that both sets of proposals should be referred to proper technical organ of League for co-ordination. This last proposal was supported by Belgian delegate but opposed by Czechoslovak delegate who thought that for Council committee to refer to a technical organ of Council would be tantamount to shirking their duty. It would moreover entail referring question of a political nature to such technical organ.

Lord Cecil heartily agreed with last speaker. Committee was on verge of a decision on which might depend the whole fate of the work of disarmament. If they were to abdicate now there was no hope of reaching any concrete result. Committee had received definite instructions from Council to make concrete proposals on this vital matter and it was for them alone to recommend the subjects of enquiry by preparatory committee. French scheme would involve investigation of such elaboration that no result could ever be reached. Even if potential strength of countries could be estimated there was no means of limiting that strength and in his view it was only possible to estimate immediately mobilizable strength. He admitted that British interests in this matter were of a secondary character. French and other governments were pre-eminently interested and it was for them to say if they really intended to put in hand practical enquiry. He fully recognised force of proposal that disarmament was dependent on security and question (d) of British programme showed that British government realised that that consideration must be borne in mind. A country assured of assistance of other members of League would feel it had large measure of security and this assurance was already provided by convention.⁴ Question of method of ensuring security was entirely apart from question of reduction of armaments. In considering reduction of armaments it must be assumed that security has already been achieved. He was willing that British proposal should be examined and if necessary extended and he proposed that Council committee should appoint a small drafting committee for the purpose.

French delegate again repudiated idea that an investigation into the whole potential strength of any country was contemplated. All French desired was a recognition that potential strength of a country formed an element in

⁴ In another text of this telegram this word read 'Covenant'.

its vulnerability. He observed that it had not been intended that Council committee should send two programmes to a technical organ of League but that it should recommend that Council itself should do this. He recognised that there would be advantage in submitting only one programme to Council but he doubted whether it would be possible to dispense with technical advice which he felt Council would want to have. He therefore would propose combination of the two programmes into one and to suggest to Council that single programme should be submitted to competent technical organ for its comments.

Finally it was agreed that before this afternoon's meeting of Council committee there should be a meeting between British and French delegations who should endeavour to agree upon a single programme.

No. 133

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received December 6, 7.45 p.m.)
No. 391 Telegraphic [W 11190/9/98]

GENEVA, December 6, 1925, 6 p.m.

Following from Mr. Cadogan.

Informal discussions took place yesterday afternoon between members of British and French delegations resulting in draft programme combining British and French proposals.

At subsequent session of Council committee great part of this programme was approved.¹

Difficulty arose over two points which French wished to insert corresponding to questions five and six of French programme as communicated to His Majesty's Embassy Paris on November 21st.²

French delegate made it clear that his government could not come to disarmament conference unless assured beforehand of practicable plan for immediate and effective application of article sixteen of covenant.

Lord Cecil pointed out first that this was question of security not of

¹ For the official minutes of this meeting on Saturday, December 5, see *ibid.*, pp. 23-28.

² Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. See, however, the French programme printed *ibid.*, p. 18. These two questions probably corresponded to questions 4 and 5 of a French draft questionnaire, communicated to the British Delegation at Geneva in September, a translation of which read as follows:

'4 The possibility, as a result of the previous formulation of plans of action and of economic and financial assistance in pursuance of Article 16 of the Covenant, of re-establishing a relative equality between the countries, so far as concerns their means of industrial and economic mobilisation and the rapidity of this mobilisation.

'5 Examination of the principle according to which no Power should be able to maintain armaments capable, in the event of that Power becoming guilty of an act of aggression, of enabling her to dispose of forces superior to those which the victim of the aggression and the League of Nations could assemble in opposition to her, either by the application of Article 16 of the Covenant or by the operation of regional agreements provided for in Article 21 of the Covenant.'

disarmament and secondly that from point of view of security itself French questions were so framed as to offer prospect of security less even than that contemplated by covenant and that therefore they defeated the ends of their author.

He proposed alternative formula whereby preparatory committee should be invited to examine possibilities of giving effect to article sixteen of convention [Covenant].

Discussion was adjourned till Monday in hope of finding a formula meanwhile by private exchange of views.

Council Committee then dealt with private manufacture of arms and decided that most that could be done was to send out questionnaire as soon as possible with request for replies by June 1st next.

Subsequently at Lord R. [sic] Cecil's request secret session was held at which Lord R. Cecil explained that in the view of His Majesty's Government it would be as useless to discuss naval disarmament in absence of United States of America as it would to discuss land disarmament in absence of France. French delegate recognised force of this reservation and felt bound to add on behalf of his government that the three questions of naval, land and air disarmament formed one indissoluble whole. To this Italian and Japanese emphatically agreed. One must logically therefore face the fact that unless America will join in a general discussion of all three no disarmament conference will be possible—perhaps not even preparatory enquiry.

No. 134

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received December 8, 9 a.m.)

No. 398 Telegraphic [W 11256/9/98]

GENEVA, December 7, 1925, 11.10 p.m.

Following for Admiralty from Admiral Smith:¹

No objection is seen to questionnaire for preliminary studies for disarmament conference adopted by Council Committee today² which is being wired *en clair* in my immediately following telegram.³ Questions Nos. 4 and 5 of original French questionnaire accompanying my letter of September 18th, 1925,⁴ have been reserved as unacceptable to British delegates and Council is being asked to decide if they are to be included in questionnaire. Lord Cecil received little support in urging that enquiries should be limited to peace time armaments. French and Belgian delegates supported by Czechoslovakian by their insistent support of two questions under discussion have given impression that they are attempting to re-introduce Geneva protocol.

¹ Naval Representative on the British Delegation to the League of Nations.

² For the official minutes of this meeting see *ibid.*, pp. 29-32.

³ No. 135.

⁴ This letter is untraced in Foreign Office archives; see, however, No. 133, note 2.

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received December 8, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 399 Telegraphic [W 11244/9/98]

GENEVA, December 7, 1925, 11.20 p.m.

Following for Admiralty from Admiral Aubrey Smith. Begins:—

Following is copy of questionnaire adopted by Council committee to-day, begins:—

1. What is to be understood by the expression 'armaments'?

(a) Definition of the various factors military, economic, geographical etc. upon which the power of a country in time of war depends.

(b) Definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace: the different categories of armaments (military, naval and air) the methods of recruiting, training, organisations capable of immediate military employment etc.

2. (a) Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?

(b) What is to be understood by the expression 'reduction and limitation of armaments'? The various forms which reduction or limitation may take in the case of land, sea and air forces: the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of the different forms or methods, for example, the reduction of the larger peace time units or of their establishment and equipment or of any immediately mobilisable forces: the reduction of the length of active service: the reduction of the quantity of military equipment: the reduction of the expenditure on national defence etc.

3. By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another e.g. numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditure, etc.

4. Can there be said to be 'offensive' and 'defensive' armaments? Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war) or whether on the contrary it is constituted in a spirit of aggression?

5. On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries taking into account for example:—population, resources, geographical situation, length and nature of maritime communications, density and character of the railways, vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centres near the frontiers, the necessary delays varying with different states in transforming peace armaments into war armaments.¹

¹ In the final text of the questionnaire as approved by the Council of the League of Nations on December 12 and printed as the Annex to Cmd. 2594 of 1926, *League of Nations: Thirty-seventh Session of the Council: Report by the Rt. Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, K.G., M.P.*, the preceding phrase began, 'the time required, varying with different States, to transform', and was followed by the additional phrase, 'the degree of security which, in the event of aggression, a State could receive under the provisions of the Covenant or of separate

6. (1) Is there any and if so what device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament? If this is not practicable how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?

(2) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (1) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines.

7. How is it possible to judge the military value of commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?²

8. Admitting that disarmament depends on security to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security or is any scheme of disarmament impossible unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?³ engagements contracted towards that State'. The present question 5 was numbered 5(a); 5(b) read as follows:

'Can the reduction of armaments be promoted by examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed?'

² Foreign Office telegram No. 268 to Geneva of December 10 transmitted a message from the Admiralty instructing Admiral Aubrey Smith to press for the deletion of this question on the grounds that 'Commercial Fleet is not an armament. . . . Proper place to deal with shipping is under Question 5 under the heading of length and nature of maritime communications and vulnerability of the frontiers for sea communications are to some Powers what France's eastern frontier is to France (stop) Exaggerated emphasis is given to shipping by one whole question being devoted to it . . .'. In the final text this question was omitted, but a third section (c) to question 6 (sections 1 and 2 above were designated (a) and (b)) read as follows: 'Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?'

³ In the final text, this question was numbered 7 and read 'impracticable' where the present text reads 'impossible'.

No. 136

*The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received December 8, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 481 Telegraphic: by bag [C 15692/117/18]

PARIS, December 7, 1925

Your telegram No. 350¹ of December 5th.

Mr. Phipps discussed this question this afternoon with Monsieur Berthelot and Monsieur Laroche but found them in a somewhat nervous state in regard to the future of German aviation. They both view with alarm the informa-

¹ Not printed. This telegram was in reply to Paris telegram No. 478 of December 4 which reported that, in the impossibility of seeing M. Briand, Lord Crewe had spoken to M. Berthelot as instructed in Foreign Office despatch No. 3979 (see No. 125, note 16). Foreign Office telegram No. 350 gave Lord Crewe the instructions regarding the German note of November 27 which were carried out by Mr. Phipps: see below. This German note (copy received in Foreign Office on December 2 under cover of Paris formal despatch No. 2553) officially brought the question of air control in Germany before the Conference of Ambassadors.

tion from the Committee of Guarantee to the effect that Germany has at present 600 pilots instead of the 200 which are sufficient for her civil aviation. They consider that German legislation will not be sufficient but that certain definite rules will have to be imposed upon Germany both in regard to the quality and quantity of aeroplanes allowed to her. Mr. Phipps urged, however, that the German note of November 27th should be placed on the agenda of the next Ambassadors' Conference, which is to take place on the 10th instant, with a view to the Air Clauses Committee being authorised, after further interviews with Dr. Nord, to draw up a report on the subject, and to urge Dr. Nord to submit concrete proposals in writing in a more definite shape. To this Monsieur Berthelot and Monsieur Laroche eventually agreed.

Sent to Foreign Office and Geneva.

No. 137

Record of a Discussion between Sir A. Chamberlain, Mr. Lampson and Count Bethlen¹

[C 15915/261/21]*

GENEVA, December 8, 1925

A discussion took place to-day between the Secretary of State and Count Bethlen, Prime Minister of Hungary. Mr. Lampson was also present.

The Secretary of State began the conversation by referring to the question of military control in Hungary. He called Count Bethlen's attention to the new situation resulting from Locarno so far as Germany was concerned. It was now no longer a question of two groups, one the Allies and the other Germany; quite a new footing had been established, a footing of equality. Now he was seriously concerned at the situation which was developing between the Western Powers and Hungary. It would be lamentable if Hungary, as contrasted with Germany, through her action under the military clauses of the treaty,² should have to remain with the status of an ex-enemy country. He appealed to Count Bethlen to recognise the unwisdom of his doing anything which would perpetuate such a relationship as between the ex-Allies and Hungary. He had spoken to the Hungarian Minister in London,³ but neither on that occasion nor on the present did he wish to go into questions of detail. That was a matter for the experts; but very shortly Hungary would be receiving a note from the Ambassadors' Conference. That note would set forth quite clearly the outstanding defaults as regarded disarmament, and he wished to impress upon his Excellency that all the demands embodied in the note had been most carefully drawn up after full consideration by all the military authorities concerned, including the British War Office, who had satisfied themselves that nothing now being asked for went

¹ This record by Mr. Lampson was received in the Foreign Office on December 12.

² Of Trianon.

³ Sir A. Chamberlain had spoken to Baron Rubido-Zichy in a similar sense on December 3.

beyond the treaty or was unjustified by its intrinsic importance.⁴ It was difficult to understand why Hungary should now haggle over minor points when she had already given way on the major points of disarmament. He appealed to Count Bethlen in the interests of Hungary to comply with these demands without further demur.

Count Bethlen said that before giving a reply he wished to ask one question. He had heard that such a note would shortly reach his Government, but was there any guarantee that if the demands were complied with he would not find himself at once faced with a further list of desiderata.

Mr. Lampson at this stage described roughly the form the note would take; it would be modelled on the note addressed last summer to Germany by the Allied Governments. It would contain a specific list of the defaults still outstanding, and would define the measures that Hungary must take to make good those defaults. From the very form of the note it would be evident to the Hungarian Government that it was a final list of the points to be executed before control could be withdrawn.

Sir Austen Chamberlain said that it would be open to Count Bethlen,

⁴ This note, dated December 18, is not printed. In this connexion a Foreign Office memorandum of November 25 had stated in particular: 'the main difficulty to be overcome lies not so much in the fact that a number of clauses have not been integrally executed, as in the deliberate and persistent obstruction which the Hungarian civil and military authorities continue to place in the way of the Control Commission. . . . In such circumstances it has not been possible for the Control Commission definitely to establish the full facts with regard to the munitions, strength of personnel, and organisation of the Hungarian forces. It is, therefore, inevitable that the Allied note, which is shortly to be sent to the Hungarian government, should consist largely of demands for proper facilities for the Commission, the cessation of obstruction and the issue of instructions to all civil and military authorities to give such information and assistance as may legitimately be required by the Commission in the execution of its duties. . . .

'In the light of previous experience it is exceedingly improbable that the Hungarian Government will make any serious effort to carry out the demands contained in the Allied note, and unfortunately they know, as we do, that the Allies have no effective means of enforcing compliance with their requirements, such as is the case in regard to the disarmament of Germany. It is obvious, however, that until the demands are fulfilled the Allies cannot withdraw the Control Commission and hand over further responsibilities to the Council of the League, as this would be tantamount to an admission that the Allies acquiesced in the policy of deliberate obstruction practised by the Hungarians, and moreover, it would entail the risk that the Little Entente, who are particularly susceptible as regards Hungary, would proceed to take matters into their own hands, and if necessary, to employ drastic means to secure the execution of the Treaty. This is a contingency fraught with the gravest dangers for the peace of Central Europe, and one which opens a prospect which no-one can afford to contemplate.

'In the circumstances we must rely upon diplomatic pressure to secure the execution of the demands. If this fails, it is proposed to publish to the world an Allied indictment of the methods employed by the Hungarian Government and to disclose their evasions of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty. This will have an inevitable reaction, upon Hungary's relations with the Great Powers and upon her financial credit abroad, and also an immediate repercussion on Hungary's relations with the Little Entente. At the present juncture it is most important that the Hungarian Government should be made to realise that the Allied Governments, and not merely the Allied War Offices, are determined to use every means available to secure compliance with their demands.'

when he received the note, to write officially to the Ambassadors' Conference asking whether it was quite clear that when this list of demands had been complied with the disarmament of Hungary would be regarded as complete and the Commission of Control withdrawn.

Count Bethlen said that in view of these explanations and of the above suggestion, which he would adopt, he would see that the list was complied with.

Sir Austen Chamberlain promised that instructions should be sent to Paris explaining to Lord Crewe what had passed with his Excellency, so that the Ambassador would understand the position when the Ambassadors' Conference received the Hungarian note asking for a definite answer as to the withdrawal of the Control Commission.

The Secretary of State then turned to the question of the general situation in Central Europe. He said that he had been devoting considerable thought to the situation existing between the Little Entente and Hungary. It seemed to him that fear was the dominant note, just as it had been in the case of France and Germany. Once good faith was established things almost inevitably improved; things that yesterday were impossible entered the sphere of possibility. Now one of the factors which exercised a baneful influence as between Hungary and her neighbours was that of Minorities. For him the treaties were the public law. It was possible that, with the lapse of time and with the application of the terms of the Covenant of the League, the existing territorial situation might alter, but that was for the future. For the moment he must proceed on the basis of existing international law. Now need that really hinder good relations between Hungary and her neighbours? It was true that Hungary had lost much territory by the war, but, as between France and Germany and Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia, that had not prevented their coming to terms without recourse to war. Once there is a will to find a solution and a will to good neighbourly relations, things immediately become possible which were impossible before. He would quote but one instance. Take the example of the German optants in Poland. As the result of what had passed at Locarno and of the spirit of goodwill there engendered, these optants, 17,000 in number, had been allowed by Poland to stay. Now no one could deny that that was an important act of conciliation, but it had only been possible because Poland, having entered into a new relationship with Germany, wished to mark her confidence in that relationship. What was Hungary doing? His mind went back to an interview he had had with Count Apponyi.⁵ He took that interview as an example because he believed it to be an extreme case—he hoped an exception rather than the rule. Count Apponyi had used threatening language as regarded Hungary's neighbours, contemptuous language which perfectly explained the attitude of, say, Roumania towards Hungary. Hungary could use her Minorities for propaganda purposes, for purposes of a new war, but, if Hungary acted

⁵ Count Albert Apponyi, former Hungarian Minister for Public Worship and Education, had been a delegate to the Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations (September 7-26, 1925) to which Sir A. Chamberlain had been a delegate for the British Empire.

liked [*sic*] that, what was the result? If Hungary opposed peace, that was her affair, but so far as the unfortunate Minorities were concerned it excused all the forms of pressure exercised by Roumania. He specifically mentioned Roumania because within the last few days it had been questions regarding Hungarian Minorities in Roumania which had been engaging his personal attention on the Council of the League here in Geneva.⁶ Again, if in these circumstances Hungary came to the League with Minority complaints, if members of the Council were forced to believe that agitation amongst these Minorities was provoked and supported by Hungary, and that the Minorities did not want to accept the territorial settlement as it stood, then obviously the Council of the League were paralysed, because otherwise they became merely the instruments of the Hungarian Government for the purpose of overthrowing the Treaties of Peace. If, on the other hand, Hungary were wise enough to act otherwise, the first to benefit would be the Hungarian Minorities themselves, and the members of the Council would be reinforced in their efforts to see that justice was done to those Minorities. Was there no means whereby Count Bethlen could endeavour to find, as between Hungary and her neighbours, some method of applying the text of Locarno, the lesson of conciliation?

Count Bethlen answered that Baron Rubido Zichy had in fact reported to him the gist of Sir Austen Chamberlain's conversation with him in London on the 4th [3rd] December, but the matter was really too serious for him to be able to decide at once. He must have time to think. There were many details into which he must go. If he decided to adopt the idea thrown out by Sir Austen Chamberlain, he would put his thoughts in writing exactly as they occurred to him. He must state quite frankly that, whatever political colour the Government of the day in Hungary might have, no Hungarian Government would ever regard the territorial settlement under the Peace Treaty as final. They could not do it. It had occurred to him that something on the lines of the treaties of arbitration between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia might be possible, but Hungary could not be the party to propose them. There were a thousand questions which he must settle first. There were also certain principles by which he must be guided. In the first place, any treaties that he negotiated could not be with the Little Entente as a whole, but must be with the neighbouring countries individually. Then there were many questions in suspense. There was the difficulty over Minorities that might conceivably be overcome in a variety of ways. It had occurred to him that there might be an arrangement between the Government of the country concerned and the Minorities themselves. Or there might be a Minorities arrangement direct with the Hungarian Government, just like that which existed already between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Then there was the question of the monarchy in Hungary. He felt that the time was drawing nigh when, in the interests of the Hungarian people,

⁶ For the adoption of a report on Hungarian Minorities in Roumania by the Council of the League of Nations on December 11 see *League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1926, pp. 160-1: see also *ibid.*, pp. 138-44.

something must be decided. The Hungarian nation was monarchist by nature and by inclination. Her neighbours wished to see her forced to become a republic. But a republic would never work in Hungary, that was why the neighbours wanted it; his idea was that sooner or later Hungary must raise this question with the Great Powers and come to some arrangement with them; a point which he specially wished to emphasise was that this was not a matter between Hungary and the Little Entente but between Hungary and the Great Powers; if the Great Powers were satisfied there could be no question of the Little Entente taking forcible measures to prevent a restoration of the monarchy.

Next, there was the question of Hungarian access to the sea. There was no difficulty in the way of making an arrangement with the Italians for facilities of transit to Trieste, but with the Serbs it was quite impossible.

Then there were financial questions, such, for example, as the pensions due to ex-officials of Hungary as constituted before the war, who had now become nationals of and residents in the Successor States. The Successor States maintained that Hungary must pay their pensions. That was quite inequitable.

Again, there was the question of communications. The position really was intolerable. Of the seventeen railways connecting Hungary with Roumania, the Roumanians had cut all but four. The same case arose with regard to Czechoslovakia, where all but seven had been cut. As a result there were cases where towns on each side of the respective frontiers separated by only 30 kilom. were now separated by a railway journey of 300 kilom.

Sir Austen Chamberlain thanked Count Bethlen for the frankness with which he had spoken. He had spoken on many questions which he (Sir Austen Chamberlain) had not known of before. However, he preferred to keep off details and adhere to the broad lines. He wished to make it perfectly clear that he had never thought it possible for any arrangement on the lines of Locarno, such as he had had in mind, to be imposed from without. Its whole value arose from its voluntary nature, from its being freely and spontaneously adopted by each contracting party, as had been the case at Locarno. And as regarded the question of initiative, he thought Count Bethlen rather under-estimated the benefits that came from taking it: he wished to impress upon Count Bethlen that the project which finally took shape at Locarno had lost nothing from the first move having come from the German side. Again, it was obvious that what was done on Germany's western frontier could not be repeated in the case of Hungary. He had always been perfectly clear that Germany herself could not act on her eastern frontier as she had done on the west. On the west Germany had been ready to renounce all claims on Alsace-Lorraine, but on the east she was certainly not ready to renounce a claim to ultimate rectification of the existing frontier. Hungary had every right to retain her hope of a later readjustment of her frontiers, and he agreed with Count Bethlen that a better model for Hungary to work upon was the arbitration agreement between Germany and Poland rather than the treaty relating to the western frontier. This

was more particularly so owing to the question of guarantors, which did not arise in the case of Hungary, and also because as between Germany and France there was already a demilitarised zone, which greatly facilitated matters, but would not enter into the question in Hungary's case. Count Bethlen had said that Hungarian initiative was impossible; that decision lay absolutely with Hungary. He could only repeat that Germany had gained a great deal by her initiative which had proved her good faith and peaceful intent, a fact which Great Britain had at once recognised. If, after the German initiative, the Western Powers had not responded, they would inevitably have suffered in world opinion. Taking the initiative was more important than Count Bethlen seemed to appreciate; so significant for the future that it might draw from her neighbours concessions which would otherwise be unlikely. However, as he had said, that was a matter for Hungary. So far as he could judge, the Little Entente now realised that things could not go on as they were; that they had an example set them at Locarno which they must follow. He would, however, freely admit that time was necessary. Careful preparation was essential. If the Governments concerned had not gone to Locarno with the ground fully prepared and goodwill established, they would not have attained the success which they did. Now he had certain apprehensions regarding one thing which Count Bethlen had just said. He had gathered that before anything could be done many questions must first be settled. (Count Bethlen interposed that that was not his intention; they would be settled at the same time.) Well, that was all to the good. He would end as he had begun. Fear and suspicion were bad counsellors. Some means must be devised to overcome them.

Count Bethlen said that he understood the attitude of Hungary's neighbours. The fear of Hungary was genuine, but the position was quite different from that between Germany and France, to which Sir Austen Chamberlain had made a comparison. Germany was more powerful than Poland and Czechoslovakia—even more powerful than France viewed objectively. Now with Hungary the situation was completely different. It was really ridiculous for the Little Entente to pretend that they were seriously afraid of Hungary, disarmed and dismembered as she now was. And here he called attention to the very existence of the Little Entente. Why had it been formed? Simply out of fear of Hungary. What the countries of the Little Entente wanted was to have twenty years within which to crush the Hungarian Minorities. Once the Minorities were crushed then there was no further danger to the frontiers set up by the Peace Treaty. For if she had no Minorities to think of Hungary might be expected to renounce her claims to regain her lost territory. The Little Entente wished to keep Hungary down—there must be no reconstruction of Hungary, she must be kept imprisoned. Now if Hungary were to enter into any pact arrangement, she (Hungary) was the weakest; but the others—Hungary's neighbours—would not be bound. They were the strongest, and could do as they pleased as regarded keeping their bonds.

Sir Austen Chamberlain replied that he did not think that that was so,

but returned to his main theme. Fear did not inspire reason. Now there was fear on both sides. He would again refer to the effect Locarno had had. He pointed to the fact that as a result France had voluntarily modified and restricted her engagements of alliance with Poland and Czechoslovakia. If Hungary followed the lead which had been set her at Locarno she would have the growing power of the League to fall back upon, a force to which she could always appeal if there were any question of evasion by the other contracting parties of any such arrangements as might be made.

(At this stage Sir Austen Chamberlain had to leave for a meeting of the Council. Count Bethlen continued the discussion with Mr. Lampson.)

Count Bethlen said that he was distinctly taken with this idea of some system of conciliation for Central Europe. He, too, realised that Hungary would stand greatly to gain by it. It was a question of how to set about it, and it had occurred to him that there was a way open to him of doing so. It was in connection with the questions of pensions, to which he had alluded earlier in his conversation. This matter had been referred to the Hungarian Committee of the League; it would come up at Geneva in March next, when the Hungarian Committee would be considering the recommendations made by the League Commissioner-General in Hungary on its financial aspects; what he had in mind to arrange was that on that committee it should be proposed that he and Dr. Benes should settle this matter of pensions direct between themselves. He would seize that opportunity to suggest some sort of arbitration agreement to Dr. Benes; that would be the thin end of the wedge and he hoped would lead to developments. As the question of pensions applied to Hungary's other neighbours also, possibly he might be able to do the same thing in their case. However, he would think it all over and would communicate with us in London, giving us his idea of the methods of procedure which would best be suited to bring the plan to fruition.

I said that his idea seemed to me an excellent one. We all realised that time was essential and that the pace must not be forced too much. I knew the Secretary of State's idea to be that this scheme should be kept alive in men's minds so that it might evolve naturally; the last thing he wished to do was to force an unnatural growth upon Central Europe; he would bless anything on the right lines which might be evolved by the statesmen of Central Europe, and I took the opportunity of suggesting that here was a real chance for Count Bethlen to prove his statesmanship and to make a mark in European politics.

Leaving the question of possible arbitration agreements with Hungary's neighbours, Count Bethlen referred again to the question of the Crown. I thought it as well to let him know perfectly clearly my purely personal view of what he had said to the Secretary of State on this point. I therefore told him that I could imagine nothing more unfortunate or more calculated to cause infinite trouble for Hungary than to broach this question, no matter with whom, at the present time. It would at once bring all the Powers of the Little Entente violently into the field against Hungary, and this of all times was surely the time to let sleeping dogs lie. If he really thought that there

was some reasonable prospect of arbitration arrangements with his neighbours, if for that reason only, I earnestly begged him to say nothing at all just now regarding the Crown.

Count Bethlen said he quite understood my point of view, and he thought that probably it was right; but the question of the restoration of the Crown could not lie dormant for ever—it was far too vital a question for the Hungarian nation.

I said I would like to ask him a question: Was it his intention that the Habsburgs should be restored? He said, 'Certainly.' It was not clear upon whom the choice would ultimately fall; there was the young Archduke Otto, there was the Archduke Joseph and there was the young Archduke Albrecht, who was a good man. He could tell me that the ex-Empress Zita, who was excessively ambitious, was working hard in favour of her son, and he was afraid that the question would be bound to come to a head shortly.

I said that his reply to my enquiry had brought out the very point which I had in mind, namely, that it was the Habsburgs who would be restored. Now, it took no very vivid imagination to see the effect which that must inevitably have upon the Successor States; they would inevitably fear an endeavour on the part of the territories lost by Hungary to return to the allegiance of their former sovereign Crown. Any idea of restoring the Habsburgs would at once bring the Little Entente with all their forces into the field against Hungary.

Count Bethlen said he was afraid there was some truth in that, but what he had in mind was that, if and when restored, the Emperor should formally renounce all claims on the territories lost by Hungary.

I said that I was afraid that would carry but little weight with the Little Entente, or indeed with anyone else, and I must again urge his Excellency on no account to broach this question just now. When I had been in Hungary three years ago I had gained the general impression that all intelligent Hungarians realised the futility of raising this question for many years to come; it would be the greatest pity if any false move were now to be made and it might well have incalculable consequences for Hungary herself.

Before parting we had some dilatory conversation regarding military control, but we covered no ground not already touched upon in the preceding conversation with the Secretary of State, with one exception. I made a personal appeal to his Excellency to see that the members of the Military Control Commission were treated with due and proper respect personally. I had heard rumours to the contrary; but they were representatives of our Government and all men of high integrity placed in a position very often distasteful to them of having to fulfil a task that necessarily did not make them popular. I begged his Excellency to see that in these trying conditions matters were not made even more unpleasant for these officers by any apparent attempt to cold-shoulder them.

Count Bethlen said he was glad I had mentioned the point to him. He would do all he could to make the position of these officers easier.

M. W. LAMPSON

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received December 9, 2.40 p.m.)
No. 402 Telegraphic [W 11321/9/98]

GENEVA, December 9, 1925, 11.30 a.m.

Council met in private session this morning¹ to hear report² on work of Council Committee on disarmament. It approved principles proposed by Council Committee in regard to name, composition, and procedure of preparatory committee.

In subsequent secret session Council discussed choice of states to be invited to join in preparatory work in addition to members of Council. It was agreed to send formal invitations to United States and Russia (and also to Germany if she was not already member of Council). British delegate had suggested desirability of sounding United States informally in the first instance, but yielded to arguments addressed in favour of sending formal invitation. It was understood if Russia refused invitation possibility of inviting Turkey might be considered. On question as to which other states, members of League, should be invited to take part in preparatory work British delegate pointed out danger of Germany on her first admission to Council appearing as sole advocate of ex-enemy states and it was decided to add one more representative of states in this category choice falling on Bulgaria. British delegate informed Council that his impression was that United States would not join in general disarmament conference under League auspices in Geneva or elsewhere. Land and air disarmament must be discussed at Geneva but United States government would probably expect to call naval disarmament conference in Washington.

His Majesty's Government could not discuss naval disarmament in conference in which United States government did not participate.

French delegate said that his government could not take part in any conference in which land and air disarmament were separated from naval disarmament. Council committee's report on programme of studies for preparatory work³ was then read and discussion was adjourned to further secret session tomorrow morning.

¹ This telegram was evidently drafted on December 8. See *op. cit.*, February 1926, pp. 119-20, for the official record of this meeting. See further Cmd. 2594 of 1926.

² See *op. cit.*, February 1926, pp. 218-19.

³ For this report by M. Paul-Boncour, see *Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference*, Series I, pp. 38-42.

No. 139

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received December 10, 11.40 a.m.)
No. 406 Telegraphic [Telegrams 44]

GENEVA, December 10, 1925, 10.10 a.m.

Following from Mr. Cadogan:—

'Council met again in secret this morning¹ to continue discussion of programme of studies for Preparatory Committee on Disarmament. Secretary of State made a reasoned statement of views of British Government on all questions raised in previous discussion, including American participation and character of *questionnaire*. He concluded by saying, however, that he would not oppose insertion of some mention of problems raised by French if, after having heard his objections, Council still desired to proceed on these lines. He indicated the kind of reference which he could accept. Other suggestions were made by Spanish and Belgian representatives, and agreement will probably be reached without much further difficulty.²

'Full report³ by bag.'

¹ This telegram was drafted on December 9.

² For consideration by the Council of the League of Nations on December 12 of reports by M. Benes on the work of the Committee of the Council see *League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1926, pp. 164-9. Appended to M. Benes's second report was the final version of the *questionnaire*: cf. No. 135, note 1.

³ Not printed. In this report Sir A. Chamberlain was recorded as having stated, in particular, that by the Locarno agreements 'the British Government had undertaken certain obligations in regard to the Rhine frontier which they could not undertake in regard to any other part of the world. These obligations had been defined in those agreements in a way in which it would be quite impossible to define the general obligations of the British Government under the Covenant. If any attempt were to be made to define the latter obligations, that would only result in a definition of the very minimum of the assistance which the British Government would be prepared to promise in the case in which it had the least interest.'

No. 140

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received December 11, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 486 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/5]

PARIS, December 10, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the chairmanship of Monsieur Jules Cambon; I was present as well as the Italian Ambassador; also the Belgian Ambassador, and representatives of the Japanese and United States Embassies and considered the following questions:—

1. *Future of German aviation*

Herr von Hoesch's note of November 27th (see my despatch No. 2553¹ of December 1st and your telegram No. 350)¹ was considered. Monsieur

¹ See No. 136, note 1.

Laroche stated that he had received a visit from the German Ambassador who had enquired as to how this matter stood. M. Laroche had stated that it was about to be discussed by the Ambassadors' Conference. German Ambassador had pressed for negotiations to begin next week between German experts and the Air Clauses Committee. M. Laroche replied that it would be necessary to agree upon definite provisions in any German proposal so as to safeguard the allies against the danger of untoward developments in aviation matters in Germany at any future date when an ill-disposed government might be in power there. The allies must have the continued benefit of the treaty clauses by which they were protected. M. Laroche also mentioned to the German Ambassador the unfavourable report recently forwarded by the Committee of Guarantee.² The German Ambassador had pressed that meetings between German experts and the Air Clauses Committee should begin on December 14th. (I may mention that similar views had been expressed to my Air Attaché and to another member of my staff by a Secretary of the German Embassy who called yesterday and explained that it was not possible for the German government to put forward a cut-and-dried scheme of their own accord by which they would voluntarily restrict their own liberty in aviation matters; nor did they relish the idea of being presented with a cut-and-dried scheme previously decided upon by the allies. They hoped therefore that the matter could proceed by negotiation between both parties. The German Embassy show every indication of desiring to push matters forward.)

M. Laroche had subsequently spoken to M. Fromageot.³ M. Fromageot had expressed the view that it would be necessary to take act of the German proposals forwarded in my despatch No. 2499⁴ of November 24th, and of the German suggestion that they should undertake never to organize naval or military aviation. M. Fromageot thought, however, that it would not be sufficient for the matter to be dealt with solely by German legislation. Legislation was an internal matter and consequently was inadequate as an international guarantee. Legislation, therefore, must be supplemented by some international act to which the Allies and the League of Nations must be parties. M. Laroche expressed the view that in replying to the German Ambassador's note the Ambassadors' Conference should take act of the proposals already made, and should explain that additional guarantees were indispensable.

It was finally agreed that an Allied mixed committee consisting of the Air Clauses Committee with a political representative from each allied embassy concerned should be formed to discuss the allied *desiderata* both among themselves and with the German experts. M. Laroche advocated that this committee should be guided by the consideration that their recommendations should cover points which are (a) regarded as necessary by the allies,

² See enclosure in No. 126.

³ Legal Adviser to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Not printed. This despatch transmitted the proposals put forward by Dr. Nord on November 24: see No. 125, paragraph 14.

(b) acceptable to the Germans, and (c) capable of being applied by the League of Nations when that body takes over aeronautical control. It was decided that this committee should be presided over by M. Laroche; that an allied meeting should take place on December 12th, and that the Germans should be invited to send representatives to meet the committee on December 18th. In the meanwhile a reply is to be sent to the German Ambassador's note of November 27th taking act of the proposals already made and convoking the German experts for December 18th. It was also decided to summon the Committee of Guarantee to Paris to be at hand during these negotiations.

If you have any instructions to send for the guidance of British representatives on this committee, I should be glad to have them as soon as possible. Generally speaking, I presume that they will be right in agreeing to anything which is acceptable both to French and Germans. The committee will, of course, work *ad referendum* to Ambassadors' Conference. . . .⁵

4. *Attendance of military bands and Reichswehr detachments at ceremonies in German demilitarised zone*

See my despatch No. 2609⁶ of December 8th. The suggestion of the Versailles Committee was approved. . . .⁵

⁵ The omitted sections related to other matters.

⁶ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. This despatch evidently transmitted report No. 625/1 (not printed) of December 3 from the Allied Military Committee of Versailles proposing that the attention of the German Government should be drawn to the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors of October 6, 1924, that the presence in the neutral zone of military bands drawn from the Reichswehr constituted a violation of article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, and that the German Government should be invited to prevent such incidents. Subsequently on December 15, 1925, the War Office wrote to the Foreign Office (docket only of letter preserved in Foreign Office archives) that the presence of military bands or even unarmed detachments from the Reichswehr might give rise to militarist patriotic demonstrations, and they therefore agreed with the Allied Military Committee of Versailles. The draft sent from Paris of a note to the German Government was criticized in Sir W. Tyrrell's despatch No. 120 to Paris of January 12, 1926, on the grounds that it seemed unnecessary to provoke controversy by calling for a German reply and that the question did not seem of sufficient importance to justify a reference to the Locarno treaty of Mutual Guarantee. It would appear that the note sent on January 16 by the President of the Conference of Ambassadors to the German Ambassador in Paris (text not preserved in Foreign Office archives) drew attention to the infractions of articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and requested the German Government to take steps to give strict orders to prevent such infractions.

No. 141

Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received December 14)

*No. 671 [C 15928/459/18]**

BERLIN, December 10, 1925

Sir,

With the signature of the Locarno treaties it is the confident hope of all those who have the welfare of Europe at heart—and, above all, it is the

heartfelt desire of the statesmen and peoples in the countries which fought Germany—that a new era has been inaugurated and a new spirit born which shall secure peace until such time as the undesirability of war shall have become apparent to the overwhelming majority in every European country. It is clear that the folly and utter futility of a wholesale slaughter, such as took place between 1914 and 1918, will, in the very nature of things, be more apparent to those who have won than to those who have lost. The victorious nations see that the war has inflicted irreparable damage, and that consolation is only to be derived from the reflection that their position might have been much worse had they been defeated. The losers, on the other hand, are apt to ascribe their sufferings, not to the fact that a war took place, but rather to the fact that this war has been lost. They are, therefore, not unnaturally inclined to the belief that another war, if successfully concluded, would be of material advantage. To borrow a homely simile, their mentality resembles that of the man who has lost heavily at baccarat and ascribes his loss to temporary bad luck and not to the folly of gambling at all.

2. The policy which goes under the name of 'Locarno' would seem, therefore, to depend for its success or failure on the manner in which the German Government and people in the near future will conform to its spirit and carry out its underlying principles. If I may be permitted to make it my own, I should like to quote here, as summing up the position, the passage contained in your despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Warsaw, No. 931¹ of the 23rd ultimo, which runs as follows:—

'Locarno had made it possible for new generations of Germans to grow up who would feel that they had too much to lose and ran too great a risk to make them willing again to hazard their fate on such a throw of the dice.'

3. An attempt to estimate, however imperfectly, a few of the factors of this problem does not, it would seem, require any exhaustive analysis of the past, and my object will, therefore, be confined to making certain fragmentary remarks of a general nature, which, occurring as they do to a resident in this country, may not be entirely without some interest to those who have to shape British policy in accordance with the possibilities of achievement abroad.

4. I would preface my observations—which, by their very nature, are bound to confine on the domain of psychology—by the general remark that, as far as I can judge, the policy known by the name of 'Locarno' has met, is meeting, and will continue in the near future to meet, with the approval, or perhaps I should rather say the acquiescence, of the majority of the German nation. It is, of course, inevitable that the agent of a foreign Government should hear innumerable expressions of dissent with regard to any political question, since those with whom he normally comes into contact are the very persons from whom criticism is naturally to be expected.

¹ Not printed.

The same difficulty arises with regard to the observations and reports of any foreigner, for it is in human nature to seek out those whose opinions coincide with one's own and to conclude that those opinions represent the general tendency of public opinion of the foreign country visited. Clearly, a member of the Labour party who, in Berlin, comes into contact, generally speaking, with members of the Social-Democratic party will probably return with the impression that Germany is entirely in favour of Social-Democratic and pacifist legislation; while equally any foreign observer who seeks his information in other quarters may be convinced that this country is on the eve of returning to the state of affairs which obtained before the war.

5. It is the task of the official agent of His Majesty's Government on the spot to attempt to distinguish between the various opinions which are offered to him, the result of which is generally to confirm the well-known fact that the truth, in each particular instance, lies half-way between the extremes.

6. With this precept in mind, and after such enquiry and observation as I have been able to make, I remain of the opinion expressed above, namely, that the foreign policy of the German Government is, on the whole, approved by a substantial majority of the German nation, and, above all, by a large majority of those who count, that is, Government and parliamentary circles, business interests and organised labour.

7. To a foreign observer it may seem a matter of surprise that there should be any opposition at all to an agreement, with its consequences, which it was so obviously to the interest of this country to conclude. But if security, as you once remarked, is a 'state of mind,' so also is the desire to live in peace and amity with neighbouring nations, and it cannot be expected that this desire should suddenly become universal in Germany, but rather should it be a subject of congratulation and some surprise that the major part of the nation should be found on the side of common sense. For it should not be forgotten, and it is patent to anyone residing here for any length of time, that the majority of the German nation believes—

- (1) That Germany is not responsible for the war.
- (2) That Germany largely lost the war as the result of treachery at home.
- (3) That the Treaty of Versailles is iniquitous and imposes conditions on Germany which are without parallel in history.

8. A man or woman who builds on these foundations is hardly likely to erect in his or her mind a palace of peace, and, therefore, as stated above, to a foreign observer it is not so much the opposition to, as the approval of, the pact by public opinion which arouses his astonishment.

9. The reasons are not far to seek, and some of them occur readily to the mind. The business world which, here as elsewhere, has the last word, obviously requires peaceful conditions and foreign credits. The same remark applies to organised labour, while the powerful 'intellectual' element desires nothing more than to be allowed to continue its activities in an atmosphere of quiet to which it is unaccustomed and for which it yearns. A small section

no doubt also approves of Locarno on a very different ground, namely, that it will lead more rapidly to freedom from adequate foreign supervision and to a consequent ability to carry out its own designs. Over and above all, there is an overwhelming desire in the whole population, including and in addition to the categories mentioned above, for peace and quiet in dignity. It will be remembered that in 'John Bull's Other Island,'² the parliamentary candidate explains that 'reform means the maintenance of those reforms which have already been conferred on a grateful electorate by the Liberal party and trusting to the free activities of a free people for further developments on the lines of those reforms,' whereupon an Irish farmer remarks: 'That's right—leave us alone—that's what we want.' This last remark appears to me adequately to represent what the immense majority of the German people think and desire. It is clear that a popular vote can never be decisive in its unanimity, since it is practically impossible to present a clear issue on which the elector can express his opinion without extraneous considerations. But if it had been possible to ask the German electorate the plain question, unencumbered by any other factor: 'Are you in favour of the Pact of Locarno?' I do not doubt that the answer could have been as certainly foretold as the assent of the people to the coronation of Henry VIII: 'Whereunto the people shall saye wythe a grete voyce: "Yea, yea, so be itte, Kynge Henry, Kynge Henry"!"'

10. No account of some of the main phases of the situation since the departure of the German delegation for Locarno at the beginning of October last would be complete without a brief mention of the visit of Chicherin to Berlin. The People's Commissary arrived shortly before this departure, and at once indulged in wild and violent attacks against the intended policy of the German Government. In conversations with German Ministers lasting until the early hours of the morning, and in interviews freely granted to the press, he started a rapid machine-gun fire of criticism which was fully reported from here and as to which it is only necessary to say that his efforts entirely failed. In a country where words ending in 'tus' and 'tum' exercise a considerable influence, his arguments, the very poverty of which disarmed criticism, might have produced some effect, and his failure at the last minute to change the course adopted only served to prove that the German Government were determined to pursue their aims, and that in this determination they had the tacit support of the majority of their fellow countrymen. The only result to the People's Commissary was that he had to sustain his abnormal activities by the absorption of abnormal quantities of brandy, and that as his ostensible object in coming to Germany was to cure an advanced stage of diabetes, the personal danger to which he subjected himself was deserving of a great result.

11. When the delegation left for Locarno they went not merely with the full support of the Cabinet, which comprised three Nationalist members, but also with the full assent of the Nationalist party, since the subject matter of the conference had been discussed at length with the Nationalist organisations

² Play by George Bernard Shaw, published in 1904.

which, after resistance, had agreed to the negotiations, provided that certain concessions were made to Germany. The fact that the opposition of the Right to the pact policy had been diminished by the knowledge that, in case of resistance, an alternative Government was ready to take office, does not diminish the full authority which they undoubtedly gave to the German delegates to negotiate arrangements precisely in the form in which they were in fact concluded. Moreover, during the negotiations at Locarno the Cabinet were kept fully informed as to what was happening from day to day—they even had the advantage of a heart to heart talk with the Secretary of State to the Chancellor, who was sent specially from Locarno, in the middle of the negotiations in order to explain how everything stood. It is perfectly plain that all that the Nationalist members of the Cabinet and the Nationalist party in the Reichstag expected—in addition to the adoption of the main principles enumerated in the pact and ancillary treaties—was the concession to Germany of certain alleviations which in fact were granted. So little, however, does the average German possess of political sense that, instead of representing the result of Locarno as in the nature of a triumph, which could not have been obtained without the presence in the German Government of a Nationalist element, the Nationalist members of the Cabinet and the Nationalist party leaders allowed the result to be presented to their electors as if they had been unwilling parties to something which fell far short of German expectations.

12. When the delegation returned and the results of the conference were published, the press of the Right was unable to criticise with any show of reason either the manner in which their delegates had been received or the results which their delegates had attained, and it was therefore compelled merely to state with energy that the pact could not be accepted unless the 'reactions' were satisfactory. It would be useless to enumerate the arguments used which disarmed criticism by the mere fact that they were entirely senseless and pointless. They usually revolved round the central contention that although Germany had no desire to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine, yet the German Government should never have given their moral assent to this negative intention and, in their general futility, were only deserving of the reply once made by Dr. Johnson: 'Sir, I have given you a reason, I cannot give you an understanding.'³ Dr. Stresemann once said to me during this period: 'I am entirely exhausted by the ridiculous arguments which are presented to me and I am weary of answering questions the exact form of which I know beforehand containing as they do not one spark of sense or one element of reasonableness.'

13. The campaign in the press, coupled with the weakness of the Nationalist members of the Cabinet, led to the natural result that a party meeting on the 21st October last declared that the Reichstag fraction of the party failed to see in Locarno the fulfilment of those demands which were essential

³ The correct quotation would appear to be: 'Sir, I have found you an argument; but I am not obliged to find you an understanding.' Cf. *Boswell's Life of Johnson* (ed. G. B. Hill and L. F. Powell, Oxford, 1934), vol. iv, p. 313.

to the vital interests of the German people, as also any *quid pro quo* which could compensate Germany 'for the sacrifice she is required to make.' Violent discussions also took place with the party leaders and in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag, and finally, on the 23rd October last, the leaders of the Nationalist party attended a meeting of representatives of the provincial delegations which adopted a resolution to the effect that 'the Treaty of Locarno, as it is at present, cannot be accepted by the party.' In accordance with this decision, the Reichstag party met on the 25th October last and decided to oppose the treaty, whereupon the three Nationalist members of the Cabinet resigned office.

14. Hardly had this been done when the Nationalists realised the mistake which they had made, and I am convinced that they would have been glad to return to the fold if they could have done so unnoticed. It also is clear to me, although incapable of proof, that, had the pact been in danger, they would have acted as they did in the division on the Dawes Report.⁴ In my opinion the leaders and the majority of the Reichstag party were in favour of the pact as such, although, as you will have seen from Lord D'Abernon's telegrams and despatches, showing a certain narrow-minded obstinacy on points which, to a non-German mentality, would appear to be comparatively trivial. They allowed themselves to be stampeded by the delegates from the provinces, who, in their honest simplicity, could not be brought to see why that which had been preached should not be practised. So, in spite of protests from the most influential and money-giving sections of the party, the Reichstag fraction finally voted against the treaty and by so doing would appear to have excluded themselves, at any rate for some time, from participation in the internal administration of the country which it had been their main aim to secure and which it should have been their only object to maintain.

15. Much of the blame for this very unsatisfactory state of affairs, from the Nationalist point of view, must be ascribed to the Nationalist Ministers themselves. None of these three men is a man of high intellectual attainments, and not one of them is really versed in parliamentary or electoral tactics. MM. Schiele, Neuhaus and von Schliebon [Schlieben] are quiet sensible men and undoubtedly represent much that is good in German life. The same remark in general also applies to Professor Hoetzsch⁵ and Count Westarp, who, however, represent a higher grade of intellect. The three former are of the type of which thousands of examples are to be found in country houses in England. Their thoughts run mainly on the prospects of the crops and the chances of a good shooting season. They represent thousands of individuals whose thoughts run on similar lines, and they are, as above mentioned, honest persons who are quite out of place in an electoral

⁴ In August 1924 some members of the German National People's Party initially voted against one of the German laws in execution of the Dawes plan but voted in favour of this law at its third reading.

⁵ Professor of Eastern European History and International Relations at Berlin University and a prominent member of the German National People's Party in the Reichstag.

assembly, and quite unversed in electoral tactics. If their adversaries on the Left and extreme Left are largely composed of persons who were once described in France as 'médecins sans clients et avocats sans cause,' they are at any rate more accustomed to dealing with their fellow creatures and would more readily have produced the appropriate arguments in such a situation as that in which the Nationalist leaders found themselves. A Minister of the Centre would have explained that the interests of Catholicism demanded a change of front: a Minister of the Social-Democratic party would have expounded that the final abandonment of any claim to Alsace-Lorraine was a necessary step towards the nationalisation of mines and certain industries of public interest. The Nationalist Minister appears to have been unable to explain anything except that he was very sorry that under a Government of which he was a member Germany should have attained to a position which was beyond the wildest dreams of any German at the time he took office.

16. I do not think that the political situation since the retirement of the Nationalist Ministers from the Cabinet requires extended comment. The vacant Ministries were taken over by remaining members of the Cabinet, and the immediate task of the Government was that of finding a safe majority for the pact. The difficulty, of course, chiefly lay in the fact that Social-Democratic support was necessary, and that the party might, not unnaturally, have demanded heavy compensation in return for saving, at the eleventh hour, the situation for a Government formed with the express object of opposing its ideals. It must be said, to the honour of the party, that they made no impossible demands, and that after some preliminary fencing they subordinated party to national interests. I understand that Braun, the Social-Democratic Minister-President of Prussia, played a considerable part in achieving this satisfactory result, as also in resisting the Social-Democratic demand for a general election. It is clear that this would have been most unwise. Opinions differ as to whether the Nationalists would have lost seats and, if so, how many; but inasmuch as under the German system of strict proportional representation, a decrease of 1,200,000 votes only entails the loss of twenty seats, a general election could have served no useful purpose, since the opposition to the pact, even though in slightly reduced numbers, would have been emphasised, and foreign public opinion would, not unnaturally, have concluded that all the Nationalists voters had decided against Locarno instead of realising that they had acted, as usual, from a variety of motives.

17. As early as the 27th October Dr. Stresemann was able to inform His Majesty's Ambassador that he could count with practical certainty on a majority of about 120. All the parties which agreed to support the Government were bound, for electoral reasons, to couple this assent with declarations that the pact could only be accepted provided that certain concessions should have been made by the Allied Governments; but the publication of these concessions, together with the conciliatory action of Poland in respect of German optants in that country, effectually removed all opposition.

18. Before the Reichstag met on the 23rd ultimo, the draft Bills empowering the Government to sign the treaties and to enter the League of Nations had been approved by the representatives of the German States, and I have heard that the only representative who really showed a totally uncompromising attitude was Dr. Held, who delivered a violent speech, the gist of which was that the Government should have insisted on the departure of all foreign 'mercenaries' from German soil before they would even consider the question of practising with the enemy. The Minister-President of Bavaria was, however, probably aware that the pact was secure, and that he could thus safely indulge in the luxury of a *geste de magnificence*. The Bills had also been approved by the Reichsrat by a majority of 46 to 4, with 3 abstentions.

19. The debate in the Reichstag itself was mild to the point of dullness, and the whole matter appears to have been treated as a foregone conclusion. After the Chancellor had made an opening speech of the usual kind, the opposition was voiced by Count Westarp, whose arguments were, however, quite moderate and fell very flat. He found an ally in Clara Zetkin, who delivered the usual violent sentiments expected from a member of the Communist party. Dr. Stresemann also made a speech pitched in a quiet key in replying to such arguments as appeared to warrant an answer. Finally, on the 27th ultimo, the whole complex of treaties was adopted by a majority of 117, thus entirely justifying the prophecy of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he was sure of a majority of about 120.

20. The conclusion of the pact, therefore, now belongs to the domain of past history, and interest should be concentrated alone, as mentioned at the beginning of this despatch, on the question as to whether Germany will revert to type or will enter wholeheartedly on the path which has been traced for her. I confess that this question, which involves considerations bordering on psycho-analysis, is one to which I can return no adequate answer, and the most that can be attempted is to stress some of the mental and moral characteristics of the race as they occur to one who resides here, and to indicate a few of the problems which stand in the way of the object which we have in view.

21. Inasmuch as the manner in which the representatives of a nation behave is but a reflex of the character of the race which they represent, and this character in turn is conditioned by certain prominent features—the result of climate, past history and other factors—the main characteristics of the German race provide the surest ground for basing any surmise with regard to the conduct of Germany in the future. Now the predominant feature in the German character which obtrudes itself upon the notice of every foreign observer is something for which I can find no better word than 'ungraciousness.' Anybody can enumerate the many sterling qualities of the German, but it is unfortunate for him that they are those which, by their very nature, are apt to remain hidden, and that his defects are precisely those which attract attention. Generally speaking, the German has little, if any, of that spirit of give and take and of that grace of demeanour

which make for pleasantness in daily intercourse. He appears to have adopted as his rule in life the maxim advocated by the 'Misanthrope'⁶—

'Je veux que l'on soit homme et qu'en toute rencontre
Le fond de notre cœur dans nos discours se montre,
Que ce soit lui qui parle et que nos sentiments
Ne se masquent jamais sous de vains compliments.'

22. He is for ever thinking of his dignity, and imagining upon the slightest provocation that he is being subjected to some slight. This leads him to suspicion, which in turn inclines him to irritation. He turns every problem over in his mind until he has become completely bewildered, and applies to this process what he imagines to be the strictest principles of pure logic. As a result he forges unto himself a conception of the world and of the relations of human beings towards each other, which bears no relation to fact and is only what he thinks it ought to be. It is therefore very difficult to argue with him, because the clearest of reasonings and the most obvious of arguments are invariably met by the reply 'es ist so weil es so sein muss,'⁷ to which, in turn, the only answer is one which he cannot understand, namely, that 'things are not as they should be but as they are.' This national characteristic invariably leads him to a totally wrong estimate of what is thought or is likely to be attempted in foreign countries. As an instance, I would quote the opinion delivered by a so-called expert witness at the recent trial in Munich of the libel case known as the 'Dolchstoß Prozess.' The witness, who was a retired general or admiral (I forget which), stated that it was considered advisable, at meetings held in Berlin at the moment when Germany was making proposals for an armistice—that is to say at the very moment when she was announcing publicly to the Allies that which the Allies already knew, namely, that the German army was beaten—that the U boat campaign should be intensified, 'um einen Druck auszuüben.'⁸ In short, here was a man who should have known better, who was seriously endorsing the contention that if Germany, at the moment of defeat, had thoroughly irritated British public opinion by an intensified U boat campaign, the said public opinion would have been more ready to grant generous terms of peace. If it had been explained to this expert witness that the effect in England would probably have been exactly the contrary he would not have understood. He had evolved an opinion of humanity entirely based on the German curriculum. To frighten the enemy is obviously the best way of getting that enemy to agree to that which you desire, and 'es ist so weil es so sein muss.'

23. There is a further unpleasant ingredient in the German character, so far as any general statement can be true, and that is that the average German has no respect for weakness. As M. Herriot⁹ once truly remarked, it is

⁶ Play by J. B. Molière, first performed in 1666.

⁷ It is so because it must be so.

⁸ In order to exert pressure.

⁹ President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs, June 1924–April 1925.

therefore difficult to negotiate with them because they must behave 'en maître ou en valet.' Broadly speaking, in Germany you either have the right to give orders or it is your duty to receive them, and since it is your right it is also obviously your duty to give your orders with the maximum sound of voice and the minimum amount of consideration. Thus it is that the average German naturally believes that no concession can possibly be made merely from kindness of heart or from a general feeling of doing justice, and, since this is so, it follows that the reason for any concession is that others require him as much as he requires them, and it consequently further follows that he should take full advantage of the situation and ask for something more. There are, of course, exceptions to this general tendency. Dr. Luther and, above all, Dr. Stresemann are not, at any rate for the present, typical Germans in their mental outlook. But even they are surrounded in official and political life by people whose thoughts develop on such lines and, if you have rightly been surprised during the last few months by the fact that concessions appeared to Germans to be of no value as soon as they had been gained, I think that the explanation is to be found not in any Machiavellian line of policy, but simply and solely in the fact that the German Government in the long run is but the expression of the average German mentality. It is impossible to convey to a German the value of a line of conduct expressed in such terms as 'wait and see' or 'time will show.' Since the Western Powers have made a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee of frontiers, obviously the presence of foreign troops on German soil is unnecessary; therefore those troops ought to leave at once: *quod erat demonstrandum*. It is as simple as a proposition of Euclid, and it is no use explaining that Euclid has nothing to do with treaties of guarantee and of arbitration.

24. Now this ungraciousness, this system of a pedantic application of logic to the ordinary relations of life has a distinct bearing on the future in so far as it is to be expected that both in their relations with their former enemies and in their behaviour in the League of Nations, the German mental processes will continue to be the same as in the past. This is, of course, a matter of speculation, but, once the danger shall have been realised, it becomes a question of diplomatic tactics so to manage the situation as to counteract German opposition and engage German co-operation, at any rate, until such time as new factors—as, for instance, the reawakening of Russia or complications in the Far East—shall have cast a new complexion over European problems.

25. One of the most powerful assets in the conversion of Germany to a new mentality is the absence of military service, the effects of which are increasingly to be seen on every side, and, therefore, one of the chief tasks of the Western Powers will be to prevent the reawakening of the militarist spirit. This is a most difficult problem, for every club and association in this country, whatever be the purpose for which it was founded, tends to assume in time a character which fosters militarist tendencies. No German can enjoy the amenities of a sporting or athletic association unless they be organised under strict discipline. This, to his mind, carries with it the

necessity of marching about occasionally in close formation under the direction of leaders who issue orders in a loud voice. Obviously it is also much more agreeable that this marching about should be done in some form of distinctive dress—something that shall elevate him above his fellow men. But parades in a sort of civil uniform are nothing compared to real uniforms and real parades with real rifles from which to fire real bullets. And so, absurd as it may sound, every club and association of young men in this country—the German mentality being what it is—is a potential source of ultimate danger, be its object that of a ‘Turn-Verein’¹⁰ or merely the more gentle pastimes of bowls or croquet.

26. It is almost impossible to provide an effective remedy for this moral problem. There are those who, contrasting modern times with the days of Goethe and Schiller, appear to imagine that the German character has changed owing to Prussian influence, and that the Germany of the ‘Romantiker’ was pacifist, when, in reality, it was only weak through division. There never was a moment in historical times when the German was not first and foremost a soldier by instinct and was not fighting in all the armies of the world. The only difference is that his energies are now confined within his own borders and his exertions devoted to the military supremacy of his own country, with the result that the nuisance has become evident to the rest of the world. Moreover, he cannot usually be got to see anything morally wrong in modern warfare, and, if he thinks about it at all, will tell you, as a perfectly sane man once said to me, that war is ‘eine Göttliche Institution,’¹¹ designed by Providence to eliminate the weak and very properly exalt the strong.

27. What should be done in such circumstances adequately to guard against a recurrence of danger, except of course to keep a sharp look-out, appears to be almost beyond the wit of man to devise. A nation of 65 millions cannot be forbidden to indulge in any form of physical or corporate activity. The German cannot be prevented from playing games or developing his muscles on a trapeze.

28. All that would appear possible, therefore, if the danger be recognised, is to watch with care the major of these associations, to take steps to put a stop at the appropriate moment to any activities which tend to assume a character of organised military effort, and to trust that these measures, combined with the absence of any adequate military service, will, at any rate for a long period of years, ensure peace, if possible through a change or [*sic*] heart, but at any rate owing to the impossibility of waging war.

29. There remains to be considered whether there are not several questions which should be solved as constituting hardships to which this country can hardly be expected to submit for any length of time. Leaving out of account such minor questions as aerial development, occupation of the Rhineland and the status of the Saar district, which will no doubt receive their natural solution in a comparatively short space of time, there appear to me to be

¹⁰ Athletics Club.

¹¹ A divine institution.

obviously three main questions which it will tax the statesmanship of the Western Powers to settle in a manner conducive to the peace of Europe.

30. These three questions are, in their order of importance:—

- (1) Danzig and the corridor.
- (2) Upper Silesia.
- (3) Austria.

31. The fact that an essentially German town, the possession of which by a non-German community constituted one of the main problems of the 18th century, should again have been separated from the body of which it is naturally a constituent part, together with the fact that an artificial barrier between two portions of German territory, which it had also been the aim of Prussian diplomacy in the 18th century to remove, should have been recreated, is considered in this country as an insupportable grievance. Apart from the question of Danzig itself, it is not of the slightest use for anyone here to argue that in fact the existence of the corridor creates but little inconvenience. Neither the question of the size of the corridor nor the question as to whether trains shall be sealed or not has any bearing on the problem. The German in Hamburg who, in order to visit his property in East Prussia, has either to undertake a sea journey or to pass through foreign territory looks upon this state of affairs as intolerable, and will be conciliated by no concession short of a complete removal of these conditions. It is beyond my province and competence to suggest any remedy, and all I can do is to indicate that the desire for revenge in this people will never be eradicated unless and until some adequate solution shall have been found.

32. The same remarks apply almost equally to the question of Upper Silesia. Here again it is not necessary to enter into a consideration as to whether the territory which was transferred to Poland was properly transferred or not. The plain fact remains that the decision is regarded in this country as a gross injustice, and that unless, also, some solution be found, Germany will, on the first favourable occasion, seek to reverse it, if necessary by force of arms.

33. Finally, there is the question of Austria, which, if not quite so pressing, is yet as real. It is true that, as pointed out on previous occasions, there are many currents of opinion in this country which are not favourable to the 'Anschluss,' at any rate for the present. An addition of about 7 million Catholics to a State which, in its federal aspect, still preserves a Protestant complexion, is not welcome to those who do not wish to see the material predominance of Protestantism over Catholicism and of the north over the south disturbed. Nor is the addition of a large town—which might become the competitor of Berlin—and of a bankrupt State to the body corporate viewed with any particular favour. But over and above all these minor considerations there is the fact that a nation of about 7 million people, which should normally belong to Germany, is forcibly being kept separate from the main body, and sooner or later the question will have to be faced, for,

as matters stand, it will in the long run be as impossible to prevent the 'Anschluss' as it would be to keep Lancashire as an entity separate from the United Kingdom.

34. With the entry of Germany into the League of Nations it is probable that these three problems, in their order of merit, will become 'questions d'actualité,' specially if the German tendency to raise at once every grievance which logically demands treatment be taken into account. It is for this reason that I have ventured to allude to these obvious subjects and to attempt to indicate, so far as in me lies, the state of German public opinion with regard to them.¹²

I have, &c.,
JOSEPH ADDISON

¹² Mr. Troutbeck stated in a minute of December 15: 'There is one aspect of the question which Mr. Addison barely touches on, that is the economic. On the face of it the economic forces at the moment seem to be all on Germany's side. She is in difficulties, it is true, but seemingly in no such difficulties as her neighbours on either side—France and Poland—who are rapidly sinking into bankruptcy. What the future holds out on that score is impossible to predict, but at the moment it looks as though Germany only has to play a waiting game for her old provinces on either frontier to slip back into her power, merely because their new possessors are financially incapable of holding them.' Foreign Office despatch No. 2258 to Berlin of December 18 conveyed Sir A. Chamberlain's thanks to Mr. Addison for 'the illuminating review . . . of the movement of German opinion' during the negotiations at Locarno and of the effect of the Locarno treaties on the general situation in Germany.

No. 142

Minute by Mr. Mounsey¹

[N 6982/102/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 10, 1925*

Sir R. Hodgson came to see me this morning in order to report a conversation which he had yesterday with MM. Maisky and Rosengolz² at Chesham House.

M. Maisky began by complaining of the way in which the Soviet Mission is kept at a distance and practically ignored by the British Govt. He cited the incidents of the absence of British officials from the Soviet celebrations of November 7th and from the leave-taking of M. Rakovsky on his departure to Paris. Sir Robert replied that these matters were governed by rules of protocol and there has been no adverse treatment of the Soviet Mission on either occasion. M. Maisky then remarked that the same attitude was adopted in more important spheres: e.g. it was understood that H.M. Govt. took exception to what they regarded as hostile Soviet action or influence in the Far East: but M. Rakovsky was never sent for or asked for explanations, in

¹ Head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office.

² Counsellor in the Soviet Mission in London, located at Chesham House, and Soviet Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* respectively.

order to try and bring about a better understanding, and when he asked to see the Secretary of State himself, he was never encouraged to endeavour to bring about better relations between the two Governments. The Soviet Govt. were seriously desirous of coming to a settlement of outstanding questions with us, but the Mission really did not know what steps they could take in the matter, and felt from the general attitude of the Foreign Office in particular that there was no desire to meet any advances on their part. Sir R. Hodgson reminded M. Maisky and M. Rosengolz of the statements made by the Secretary of State in Parliament³ and said that while he believed H.M.G. would welcome the establishment of better relations with the Soviet Govt. they were not aware that the Soviet Govt. were prepared to come to any terms on a satisfactory basis, and there was no use in embarking on new negotiations until and unless there was a real prospect of bringing them this time to a definite and satisfactory conclusion.

M. Rosengolz intimated that he was ready to discuss a settlement but appealed to Sir R. Hodgson for advice as to how to set about opening proceedings. Would it be advisable to ask to have an informal conversation with me, for instance, at the Foreign Office and, if so, would Sir R. Hodgson be able to be present?

Sir R. Hodgson said he did not know if this suggestion would be welcomed or not; as far as he was concerned, he would be only too glad to assist in any way he could in bringing about an improvement in Anglo-Russian relations. His present intention was to leave for Paris today and he did not know whether he would come back here or not before returning to Moscow.

Sir R. Hodgson thought it his duty to report this move on the part of M. Rosengolz to me; as it showed that the Soviet Govt. are clearly very anxious to come to terms with us, no doubt as a result of the Locarno arrangements; he thought M. Rosengolz spoke with some authority in all probability as he has considerable influence at Moscow with the Communist party; he also thought that, while the Soviet Govt. are in this amenable mood, they might be disposed to come to a more favourable arrangement now than at any other time, and that it might be to our advantage also to embark on negotiations before they have actually concluded terms with the French. It was however also possible that Rosengolz had made this move on M. Tchicherin's instructions in order to discover how a direct proposal that M. Tchicherin should have a meeting with the Secretary of State would be likely to be received.

In any case Sir R. Hodgson desired to warn me that if an informal conversation did take place one of the first points which M. Rosengolz would raise would be to inquire the precise grounds on which H.M. Govt. had declined to ratify the 1924 agreements.

I told Sir R. Hodgson that this new *démarche* would of course require careful

³ Cf., for example, *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 179, col. 679; vol. 180, col. 910; vol. 181, cols. 1316-17 and 2243-4; vol. 184, cols. 1361-2; vol. 187, cols. 13-16; vol. 188, cols. 345-7, for Parliamentary statements on December 15, 1924, February 17, March 11, March 18, May 27, July 27 and November 18, 1925, respectively.

consideration. The Secretary of State was at Geneva, and I believed would not return to England before the middle of January. I was doubtful whether he would wish conversations even of an informal nature to be embarked on in his absence. I would however let him know our decision. If it was decided to encourage M. Rosengolz to come and see me, I would let Sir R. Hodgson know whether his presence would be required; if we preferred to drop the matter for the moment, he need do no more than perhaps write M. Rosengolz from France that he would not be coming back here before his return to Moscow.

I feel some hesitation as to how we should meet this move of M. Rosengolz.

On the one hand there would seem to be no harm in allowing Sir R. Hodgson to arrange an informal meeting between M. Rosengolz and myself. At such a meeting I would no doubt have to say that our main objection to the 1924 agreement was the provision of a Govt. loan, unsecured, for the payment of debts, the concrete settlement of which was moreover relegated to future arrangement. I could add a statement in the sense of the last para: of Mr. Gregory's memorandum of November 1st,⁴ and then merely take note of what M. Rosengolz might have to say, for future consideration.

On the other hand I question whether the real authorities at Moscow have yet definitely decided what their post-Locarno policy is to be, whether they have given M. Rosengolz any concrete instructions for coming to a settlement, and whether his object is not simply to get into closer touch with the Foreign Office with a view to moving us from that attitude of reserve which so greatly worries and puzzles the Soviet Govt. without having anything of use to offer for a concrete settlement. It seems to me still rather too early for anything satisfactory to emerge from conversations, and I am not sure that we would not have more to gain by waiting awhile to see how the Franco-Soviet negotiations, which are just about to be re-opened, proceed. If the Soviet Govt. are seriously anxious to come to terms with us, some further delay on our part might be all to the good, and we could well afford to ignore this *démarche* and await events.

A third alternative would be for me to send for M. Rosengolz, tell him Sir R. Hodgson has reported his conversation to me, say that in the absence of the Secretary of State it would be preferable to defer any discussion of this question, but that if on his return the Mission have any concrete proposals to submit, likely to lead to the renewal of negotiations on a satisfactory basis, we shall of course be happy to consider them in whatever form they like to put them forward. It would however be useless to put forward any proposals which did not cover a satisfactory settlement of British claims.

On the whole perhaps this third alternative would be the best course to pursue. It would avoid the charge of a rebuff, delay matters a little and also make the Soviet Mission realise that we do not wish a mere talk.⁵

⁴ No. 46.

⁵ It was agreed by Mr. Gregory and Sir W. Tyrrell that the third course was preferable, but that Mr. Mounsey should not send for M. Rosengolz especially to make the communication.

Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received December 15)
*No. 927 [C 16061/459/18]**

BRUSSELS, December 12, 1925

Sir,

As I have had the honour to inform you by my despatch No. 921¹ of yesterday's date, the Belgian Government have laid before Parliament a Bill for the ratification of the Locarno treaties. There is every likelihood that it will be passed at an early date with only a few, if any, dissentient votes.

2. While Belgian public opinion entirely approves the conclusion of the Locarno treaties, it cannot be said that this great international act was regarded in Belgium in quite the same manner as in England and elsewhere. It was not greeted here with the same spontaneous outburst of confident optimism and enthusiastic approval. There is undoubtedly satisfaction, but not the same intense relief as was manifest in England at the prospect of a real and lasting *détente* in the European situation.

3. The reason for this difference may possibly be found in the fact that Belgians are, generally speaking, if not less interested in the idea of a general reconciliation in Europe, at any rate less inclined to believe in its durable quality than the average Englishman, while they are much more preoccupied by the question of their own national security. Indeed, everything is viewed from this angle. Their principal aim—pertinaciously pursued ever since the armistice—has been to secure tangible guarantees both from France and Great Britain than [*sic*] any future attack on Belgium by Germany will be immediately resisted with the full force at the disposal of those two countries, and to know that arrangements have been made so that Belgium will receive succour of such an immediate and efficient character as to prevent the invader penetrating into Belgium and fighting taking place on this side of the Belgian frontier.

4. In 1920 Belgian opinion enthusiastically welcomed the conclusion of the defensive convention with France and the accompanying military agreements designed to ensure full co-operation between the Belgian and French armies. Since the signature of the Franco-Belgian convention, a French military mission has been in Brussels for this purpose, and its work is supplemented by the constant coming and going of Belgian and French officers between the two countries in order to maintain a proper liaison between the Belgian and French General Staffs.

5. Now, five years later, Belgium has obtained, by the Locarno Treaty, the British guarantee; but there is still lacking what is, in informed Belgian opinion, a most important factor in their country's future security, that is to say, precise arrangements with His Majesty's Government concerning the despatch of an expeditionary force to Belgium and for combined action between it and the Belgian army and French forces in Belgium.

¹ Not printed.

6. The present Democratic Cabinet, which is in a great measure dominated by M. Vandervelde, would, if they moved in the matter, probably seek to attain the above-mentioned aim by less direct methods than former Cabinets might have done. The Belgian Socialists have always in the past looked askance at the French convention and its corollaries, not only because their opponents were responsible for it, but also because they dislike, in theory, anything akin to the purely military alliances of the old type. It seems therefore likely that, if the present Government take any action, it would be by the roundabout road through Geneva.

7. During the last few years, Belgian politicians belonging to various parties have declared their belief in the Covenant of the League of Nations, but at the same time have persistently urged that it should be supplemented and reinforced, in the interests of real security, by regional agreements. M. Hymans, when Minister for Foreign Affairs,² expressed the same view to me with regard to the Geneva Protocol. It is not improbable that something similar may happen as regards the Locarno Treaty, and that it will be urged that specific arrangements must be made, possibly in connection with article 16 of the Covenant, so that immediate and effective military assistance can be afforded by Great Britain to Belgium if suddenly attacked.

8. It would probably be maintained that the only means of ensuring that such aid would be forthcoming in a sure and practical manner would be a formal and authorised arrangement between the General Staffs laying down the number of British troops to be sent to the aid of Belgium, with provisions as to the ports, railways, &c., to be used by them; so that, in the case of a German attack, nothing would have to be improvised.

9. I have not yet seen a full account of what has lately been taking place at Geneva in connection with the disarmament proposals of the French Government, but it was reported a few days ago in several Belgian organs that M. de Brouckère, the Socialist Senator who represents Belgium on the Disarmament Committee of the Council of the League of Nations, stated, in this connection, that precise military arrangements were needed with a view to immediate assistance being forthcoming in the case of attacks made upon smaller nations.³

I have, &c.,
GEORGE GRAHAME

² March 1924–May 1925.

³ This despatch was minuted as follows by Mr. Lampson and Sir W. Tyrrell:

‘We shall have to be *very* careful over this. In the first place let us always remember what happened over the pre-war, “informal” talks between the French and British General Staffs. [See *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*, edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London, 1926 f), vol. iii, chap. xx.] Let us also remember the so-called Anglo-Belgian Military Convention which the Germans found in the Brussels archives & published. [See *ibid.*]

‘The position is this. If there *are* to be talks, then they must be between *all* the General Staffs concerned, i.e. not only with Belgium & France: *but also with Germany* (? and Italy). And my own belief is that it will, on general grounds of policy, be far better that *there should be no talks with anyone at all*. After all, our own people can work out their own plans (I have

no doubt they have already done so) & keep them nicely docketted for production as & when required.

'The net result (if the above premises be considered correct) is that we should do nothing at all.

'In any case, as the Locarno Treaties are not yet in force, there *can* be no question of immediate action.

'I am not sure that it is wise to circulate this despatch?—save normal print circulation to posts abroad. M. W. LAMPSON 20/12/25.'

'I agree—limit circulation to posts abroad. W. T. 21/12.'

No. 144

*The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received December 14, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 490 Telegraphic: by bag [C 15924/117/18]

PARIS, December 13, 1925

My telegram No. 486.¹ Section 1.

A meeting of the Allied Representatives on the Mixed Committee on German aviation took place yesterday afternoon. Monsieur Laroche presided. General Desticker and French experts attended and the Air Attachés and one Diplomatic Secretary from Belgian, British, Italian and Japanese Embassies were present.

It was clearly understood that committee was working *ad referendum*, and that any decisions reached were subject to views of each government represented.

The object of the meeting was to reach an agreement as to the Allied requirements which it will be necessary for proposed German legislation to satisfy.

There was general agreement that Committee of Guarantee could not be withdrawn until League of Nations took over responsibilities under Article 213², as otherwise there would be a dangerous hiatus during which things would be left under the sole control of Germany and final authority of the League might thereby suffer. British representatives pointed out undesirability of Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee remaining after Military Control Commission had been withdrawn. French expressed view that this was most unlikely to occur in practice. As regards ultimate League control the British representatives reminded the Committee of undertakings given at Locarno that the League scheme of September 27th, 1924, was to form the subject of further examination after Germany had joined the League. British representatives also urged that German delegates should not be confronted on December 18th with a cut-and-dried scheme and Monsieur Laroche explained that such was not the intention. Germans would first be asked to explain their own proposals, Allied representatives being guided by agreement reached at previous separate meetings.

As regards Allied requirements in German legislation the Committee in

¹ No. 140.

² Of the Treaty of Versailles.

deference to French wishes examined the Nine Rules with a view to deciding how much of them must be included, how much could be dropped and how much could be retained for purposes of negotiation.

It was generally agreed that it would be desirable to secure that German legislation should cover Rules 1, 2 and 3. British representatives made a reserve as regards Rule 1 pointing out extreme probability that Germans would not accept a stipulation which would exclude them from participating in international races: as regards Rule 3 the British view that 'superchargers' should be allowed was supported by all except the French who made a reserve.

It was decided that rules 4-7 inclusive could be dropped if German proposals appeared to be adequate. French representatives, however, strongly contended that these rules should be included but they agreed that if Aerial Clauses Committee could so strengthen rules 8 and 9 before the next meeting they would be prepared to reconsider their decision.

As regards dirigibles, general inclination apart from French was to abolish laws of discrimination against them, though Italians and Belgians were without definite instructions. French, however, thought it would be best to begin by asking Germans to agree to a maximum size of 50,000 cubic feet. Though not committing themselves it would appear that French are not disposed to be intransigent as regards airships.

As regards rules 8 and 9 Aerial Clauses Committee are meeting on December 15th to agree if possible upon suitable rules on a quantitative basis either as to machines or pilots or both.

As regards the Friedrichshaven shed,³ it was agreed to use this question for bargaining. The French stated that they realized that this shed could not really be destroyed. As regards the Bickendorf aerodrome and all installations in the Rhineland the committee held that these matters must be dealt with by Ambassadors' Conference, and were not within their competence. As regards Bickendorf please see my despatch No. 2568 [2658]⁴ of December 13th.

General impression was that rules 4-7 would be abolished subject to working out by Aerial Clauses Committee of satisfactory substitute on quantitative basis.

Meeting of Aerial Clauses Committee will take place to consider the above outstanding questions on December 15th and a further full meeting of allied committee will take place immediately afterwards.

³ In December 1921 the Conference of Ambassadors had authorized the exemption of the dirigible shed at Friedrichshafen from destruction under article 202 of the Treaty of Versailles while an airship was being built for the United States Government, provided that the shed be destroyed on delivery of the airship. Although delivery had been made in September 1924 the shed had not been destroyed.

⁴ Not printed. This despatch transmitted a French note of December 11 giving a non-committal reply to a note of December 2 from H.M. Embassy. The British note had been sent in pursuance of instructions in Foreign Office despatch No. 3958 of December 1 to Paris to suggest to M. Briand that Bickendorf aerodrome should not, in spite of article 202 of the Treaty, be dismantled before the British troops left Cologne, as 'a most unfavourable impression would be caused'.

British representatives pointed out to the meeting that allies having failed in the past to induce Germany to accept modification of the nine rules, it was undesirable to expect that they could impose present French *desiderata* on her.

I am instructing Air Attaché to proceed to London on evening of December 15th after next meeting of committee to report progress and receive instructions before first meeting with Germans but I should be glad of any comments and instructions before Tuesday⁵ on any of the above points and also especially on the following point. It was evident from the meeting that other delegates assumed that control by League of Nations would entail regular periodical submission by German government of lists of pilots, machines etc. Do His Majesty's Government agree to this or do they advocate inclusion in German law of satisfactory provisions such as would preclude the necessity for this and only maintain the right of the League to carry out investigation in consequence of an application addressed to it by some interested party?

Monsieur Laroche also raised the question of flight over German territory and Rhineland. The committee were informed that the German delegates had authority to examine with the French the question of 'survol reciproque', the French attitude as regards flight by German aeroplanes over the Rhineland would depend on German attitude on general question of 'survol reciproque'. A note⁶ has been addressed to allied Embassies by French government on this point, but has not yet reached me.

Please send a copy of this telegram to Air Ministry urgently as Air Attaché is not reporting separately.

⁵ December 15, 1925.

⁶ This note of December 11, transmitted under cover of Paris despatch No. 2682 of December 15, is not printed.

No. 145

Sir W. Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 357 Telegraphic [C 15924/117/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 14, 1925, 7 p.m.

Your telegrams Nos. 486¹ section 1 and 490² (of the 10th and 13th December. Future of aeronautical control in Germany).

The general line taken by the Ambassadors' Conference in dealing with this question is wholly acceptable. It is obvious that the only way of reaching a solution is by discussion between the ex-allied and German experts. At the same time it might be well to warn the German government, if this has not already been done, that a discussion is contemplated not only of the technical but of the political aspects of the question.

In regard to the question whether German legislation is in itself an adequate guarantee of compliance with the terms of the treaty³, there seems

¹ No. 140.

² No. 144.

³ Of Versailles.

some force in M. Fromageot's contention that the legislation should be supplemented by some international act, though you will recollect that simple legislation has been accepted in a large number of questions respecting *military* control. On the other hand it is a matter for consideration whether M. Fromageot's suggestion to include the League of Nations as a party to the act should be accepted. The difficulty in finding a practical solution to the question of the rights and status of the League in regard to supervision of ex-enemy states lies in the fact that the wording of article 213 of the treaty tends to place the League in an anomalous position, viz. to make it a party to a continuous dispute between the ex-allies and the ex-enemies. This was accentuated to some extent by the League Scheme of September 1924, and it was a great achievement when the idea was discredited at Locarno in the course of informal conversations between the heads of delegations. The objection to M. Fromageot's suggestion of making the League a party to an international act regularising Germany's aeronautical rights is that it tends to go back to the old idea, and it is moreover doubtful whether the suggestion is in harmony with the undertakings given to the German delegates at Locarno.

The procedure outlined in my despatch No. 3979⁴ seems greatly preferable, viz. that the proposed legislation possibly supplemented, as M. Fromageot suggests, by some international act should be placed on record with the League by mutual agreement with the German government. This procedure would, equally with M. Fromageot's proposed procedure, give the League a definite text upon which to base any investigation it found itself called upon to make in the future under article 213.

In regard to your telegram No. 490, the Air Ministry are sending the Air Attaché instructions on the technical aspects of the question. There are, however, questions of policy raised. In regard to the question whether the Committee of Guarantee should be retained until the League takes over responsibilities under article 213, my view has been throughout that it will be wholly undesirable to endeavour to retain the Committee once the Military Commission of Control is withdrawn. For the moment however I feel we should be ill-advised to press the point of *when* the Committee is to be withdrawn. If the present negotiations go well, it will work itself out automatically.

As regards the scope of League control I am definitely opposed to the idea that the German government should be asked to submit regular periodical lists of pilots etc., etc. to the League. In the first place it is surely for the Council and not for the Ambassadors' Conference to make such a proposal to the German government; secondly it is to my mind hardly consonant with the wording of art. 213; or with the undertakings given to the German delegation at Locarno; thirdly it tends to perpetuate the idea of using the League as a kind of allied police. If the general disarmament discussions now being conducted by the League result in every nation binding itself to send in such reports, well and good. But it seems out of the question to

⁴ See No. 125, note 16.

expect that Germany will agree to be the only power to do so. As a compromise the German government might be asked to include in their proposed legislation a provision binding themselves to keep such lists up to date, so that the League might inspect them from time to time when it has taken over its responsibilities under article 213.

No. 146

Mr. Kimens¹ (Warsaw) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received January 4, 1926)
*No. 739/S. 37 [N 17/17/55]**

WARSAW, December 14, 1925

Sir,

In the 'Economist' of the 10th and 17th October there appeared two articles entitled 'The Commercial War in Upper Silesia,' dealing mostly with the effect which the partition of the district has had on the productive capacity and on the general economic situation in Polish Upper Silesia.

2. I thought it right to send these articles to His Majesty's vice-consul at Katowice, requesting him to make his observations on them, and I am enclosing herewith a memorandum prepared by Mr. Buchan.

3. Mr. Buchan endorses most of the conclusions at which the writer in the 'Economist' has arrived, and I also share Mr. Buchan's opinion.

3A. In connection with the above, I venture to observe that the forecasts which I made in my report on Polish Upper Silesia,² a copy of which was forwarded to the Foreign Office under cover of His Majesty's Minister's despatch No. 158³ of the 24th March, 1922.⁴ I pointed out that the satisfactory development of the district would depend mainly on the possibility of maintaining by Poland her former markets, especially Germany, and on the co-operation of the German and Polish proprietors of Polish Upper Silesia.

4. In subsequent reports I had the honour to place on record the fact that the loss of the German market would entail grave complications, as I did not consider it possible to find a substitute for it; my anticipations have since been fully realised.

5. I am, however, of the opinion that the general economic depression in Central Europe, the small purchasing capacity of the individual States and the impossibility of finding a market in Russia are largely responsible for the present situation in Polish Upper Silesia.

6. I do not agree with the writer of the articles under reference, that the smaller production is due to worse administration. As a matter of fact, although a number of Poles have been appointed in various companies

¹ Commercial secretary to H.M. Legation at Warsaw.

² See First Series, Volume XVI, No. 387.

³ See *ibid.*, note 1.

⁴ This sentence appears to be incomplete.

in Polish Upper Silesia controlled by German money, the management has remained German, and in most cases in the hands of those who were responsible for it prior to the partition.

7. I feel that if there had not been an all round deterioration of economic conditions in Central Europe and Russia had been opened up for the import of foreign goods, conditions in Polish Upper Silesia would at the present moment have been considerably more satisfactory than they are at present.

8. The improvement depends, as I had the honour to state in previous reports, mainly on the re-establishment of normal commercial relations with Germany which would enable the export of Upper Silesian products to that country,⁵ and on a general improvement of the economic conditions in Poland itself, which would increase the purchasing capacity of the nation.

9. I trust that I shall be forgiven for not enclosing the articles in the 'Economist' referred to above, but as I only possess one copy of them I am anxious to keep them in my archives.

I have, &c.,
R. E. KIMENS

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 146

Memorandum

KATOWICE, *November 14, 1925*

The two articles on 'The Commercial War in Upper Silesia,' which appeared in the 'Economist' of the 10th and 17th October, 1925, describe, in the main correctly, the effects of the partition of Upper Silesia and of the commercial war between Poland and Germany. Translations of the articles appeared in the 'Oberschlesischer Kurjer' of the 6th and 8th November, 1925, and, as many of the statements contained in the first article were unpalatable to the Polish authorities, the issue of the 6th November was confiscated by order of the public prosecutor. It is also a tribute to the general accuracy of the statements and conclusions of the writer that no Polish journal has seen fit to challenge them.

No one can deny that the partition gave to Poland a predominating share of mineral wealth, that the largest towns, Katowice and Königshütte, had each an overwhelming German population (the former town alone voted to the extent of 88 per cent. for Germany), and that the effect of cutting a highly industrialised area in two was unfortunate—so unfortunate that there is still a widespread view that the whole territory should have been attributed either to Germany or to Poland.

⁵ Negotiations for a German-Polish Commercial treaty had met with difficulties in connexion with a German refusal of a Polish request for the continuance after June 15, 1925, of the duty-free importation of products, notably coal, from Upper Silesia, as provided in the Geneva Convention of May 1922 (see First Series, Volume XVI, Chapter II, especially Nos. 393-6). In June 1925 both Governments had imposed restrictions on trade between the two countries.

The feeling continues to rankle in the minds of Germans who have become Polish citizens that the attribution to Poland of the greater part of the industrial area was an injustice, and it is very evident that, although circumstances have made them Polish citizens, they are buoyed up by the hope of reassuming German citizenship at some future time. The Poles themselves are by no means certain that the last word has been heard of the partition, hence the activity of the Polish authorities in (a) prosecuting a polonising campaign and (b) extending municipal boundaries of towns such as Katowice so as to include suburbs or villages inhabited by Poles. Poles have been introduced as directors, &c., of practically all the large German-owned concerns, and the complaints regarding the inefficiency of many of these newcomers are met by a charge against the Germans of keeping responsible work from them.

In regard to economic matters, German capital invested in Polish Upper Silesia may have amounted to 80 per cent. at the time of the partition, but at the present time 60 per cent. would be a more correct estimate. During the inflation period under the Polish régime profits gained were transferred, it is said, in large measure to Germany, and German owners have since limited capital expenditure.

The French occupation of the Ruhr did give a temporary stimulus to the coal and iron industries of Polish Upper Silesia. It is doubtful, however, whether a crisis would have occurred earlier but for this event, as coal (the mining of which is the predominating industry in Polish Upper Silesia) would have been exported to the south-eastern parts of Germany to some extent until the 15th June of this year, a date which was really the signal for the outbreak of a commercial war between the two countries.

Coal production has, it must be admitted, decreased ever since the Poles took over the territory, although it is also true that the output for the whole of Upper Silesia was declining at the time of the partition. Recently, however, the elimination of unproductive elements has effected an improvement in output per man and shift, which for August 1925 stood at 86·36 per cent. of the 1913 production, as against 50·42 in 1923 and 60·57 in 1924.

The effect of the commercial war on the coal industry is seen from the following statistics:—

	Average, January–May 1925.	July 1925.	August 1925.
Coal output	1,900,008	1,562,984	1,543,029
Consumption	1,574,819	1,372,643	1,440,285
Of which to—			
Polish Upper Silesia	416,341	368,753	356,123
Poland	378,327	585,179	593,688
Abroad	780,151	418,711	490,474

For the first time since the area became Polish, strong efforts were made to increase home consumption and markets abroad, other than Germany, and

these efforts, it will be observed, met with some degree of success. The number of workmen employed was 78,579 in August 1925, against 97,575 in January 1925.

The iron industry was in a serious position before the commercial war broke out, and matters would have assumed a different aspect if the Polish plans for building railways, bridges and houses had materialised. The breaking-off of commercial relations with Germany affected most of the works (and especially those such as the Bismarckhütte and the Baildonhütte, who worked principally for German account), and resulted in the close-down of many departments.

The zinc industry has suffered a heavy blow from the prohibition of export into Germany of zinc sheets, and production in this branch has gone back considerably.

In the 'Economist' article reference is made to naphtha 'produced in Upper Silesia' being excluded from entry into Germany. Naphtha is not produced, however, in this area, nor is the import of the product in question into Germany prohibited.

The net result of the economic conflict has been a general decrease in production, accompanied by further unemployment and distress. A continuance of the struggle is by no means desired by the majority of the population of Upper Silesia, and the present crisis has demonstrated that the measures taken by the German Government have caused more injury to Upper Silesia than the counter-measures on the part of Poland.

No. 147

Sir W. Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 4096 [C 15866/2/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 15, 1925*

My Lord,

With reference to Mr. Phipps' despatch No. 2571¹ (33/457/1925) of the 3rd December, I transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of correspondence² with the War Office and the Acting British High Commissioner at Coblenz, relative to the entry of German police into the Cologne zone upon its evacuation.

2. You are hereby authorised to agree to instructions being addressed to the Rhineland High Commission in the sense of Marshal Foch's report No. 603/1 of the 28th November. At the same time I request that you will bear in mind Colonel Ryan's recommendation that the decision of the Am-

¹ Not printed. This despatch transmitted report No. 603/1 of November 28 from the Allied Military Committee of Versailles to the Conference of Ambassadors to the effect that it had been agreed with the German representatives in Paris during the previous week that 'au moment de l'évacuation de la Zone de Cologne, des agents de police allemands pourraient entrer dans cette zone au fur et à mesure du retrait des troupes alliées'.

² Not printed.

bassadors' Conference should state clearly that the strength of the various drafts and the dates of their entry into the Cologne zone should be settled by agreement between the High Commission and the German authorities.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

C. HOWARD SMITH

No. 148

Sir E. Howard (Washington) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received December 18, 9 a.m.)

No. 348 Telegraphic [W 11638/9/98]

Confidential

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1925, 7.36 p.m.

Secretary of State¹ showed me to-day text of invitation addressed by League of Nations to United States government to send representatives to commission that is to study agenda for disarmament conference.² He said he had not yet discussed matter with president nor come to any decision himself. He felt however that field of investigation for commission as stated in invitation was so vast as to be impracticable to serve as a basis for agenda at any subsequent conference. He particularly objected to discussion of question of any limit being set to a state's political resources in war. 'We could never agree, and I do not suppose Great Britain would either, to have any restriction placed on our using any of our resources whether in men or materials with risk that if we were suffered³ to exceed those limits we might be declared an aggressor nation.'

As regards land armament he repeated that this was almost entirely a European problem for the moment and dwelt on certain obvious difficulties connected with it⁴ as regards naval disarmament, he said that for the moment there were only five great naval powers which counted. A world's naval disarmament conference would be unwieldy and even absurd. What would Germany have to say in such a conference or certain south American states? If conference was to be a success it should be limited to certain definite questions which should be dealt with by states principally interested on lines of London conference⁵ and Locarno conference, which had been successful because they had not tried to achieve too much. I said nevertheless I thought it would produce a good effect in Europe if United States government did not decline the invitation and it would at least give them opportunity of expressing their views. Secretary of State did not dissent from this but said that to send a representative delegation from this country would require

¹ Mr. Kellogg.

² This note of December 12, 1925, from M. Scialoja, President of, and Italian Delegate to, the Council of the League of Nations, is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1926*, vol. i, pp. 40-42.

³ In another text of this telegram this word read 'supposed'.

⁴ It is possible that the text should here include a colon.

⁵ Presumably the conference of 1924 on the Dawes Plan: cf. No. 1, note 4.

special appropriation and he doubted whether Congress would pass it before February 15th.

The government might however appoint certain officials now in Europe as for instance the United States Minister in Berne, Admiral Bristol⁶ and others without having to apply for an appropriation. In any case however he did not know what decision would be arrived at.⁷

⁶ United States High Commissioner to Turkey.

⁷ For the United States Government's acceptance on January 29, 1926, of the invitation to be represented on the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference see *ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

No. 149

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received December 18)
No. 503 Telegraphic: by bag [C 16186/117/18]

Confidential

PARIS, December 17, 1925

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

2. Attitude of French delegates came somewhat as a surprise, as at the last two meetings they had shown conciliatory tendencies. French delegates informed British delegates in conversation afterwards that, on being informed of the concessions expected of the French delegation in order to reach an agreement with other delegations, M. Briand had expressed the greatest concern.

3. M. Laroche, who made a statement of the French point of view to the Committee, informed them that if concessions to Germany involved in British proposals took shape, France would feel her security threatened. M. Laroche even spoke of the possibility of France having to encourage the development of Czecho-Slovak military aviation as a means of threatening Berlin in the event of Paris being threatened by German military aviation.

4. It is a little difficult to reconcile these violent statements with the attitude taken up in private conversation with individual members of the French delegation, who are quite ready to admit that it is essential to reach an agreement with Germany in the present negotiations owing to the danger of leaving Germany the liberty which would result from their failure, and who are inclined to hint that in the last resort the French attitude may be modified.

5. There seems, however, very little doubt that the French are genuinely afraid of public opinion here getting the idea that they are making too great concessions in the matter of aviation, and no doubt, in the present somewhat

¹ Not printed. This telegram of December 17 reported on a meeting that day of the mixed committee on German aviation when, in view of 'a most emphatic statement' in a note from M. Briand that the French Government 'could not abandon their previous point of view on technical matters such as rules to restrict the quality of aeroplanes, etc.', it was agreed that, although the political points could be adjusted, further discussion in the committee should be abandoned and the German proposals heard on December 18.

uncertain general political position, this argument may be weighing with them.²

6. I will send a copy of Monsieur Briand's statement³ which was read at the Committee by tomorrow's bag, and hope also to report the result of the first meeting with the German delegates. At that meeting I propose to instruct British delegates to avoid as much as possible discussion of any individual point and in particular, of technicalities.

7. Please send copy to Air Ministry.

² In Paris telegram No. 502 Lord Crewe had reported that in private conversation the 'French Delegation also emphasized that a satisfactory settlement of question of "survol" between Germany and France was with them a *sine qua non* of French acceptance of any settlement of question in hand'.

³ It would appear that Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen was not able to obtain a copy of M. Briand's statement.

No. 150

Record by Mr. Mounsey of a conversation with the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires
[N 6982/102/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 17, 1925

M. Rosengolz asked for an appointment to see me this morning, and during our interview addressed to me three questions.

1. Had Sir R. Hodgson reported to me his conversation with M. Rosengolz,¹ and what did I think of the proposal of informal discussions which Sir R. Hodgson had put forward. M. Rosengolz emphasized that this proposal had come from Sir R. Hodgson and not from himself. I said that we would certainly welcome any discussions which held out a prospect of producing an improvement in our mutual relations; but it seemed to me that the views of our Governm[en]ts were at present so divided on certain important questions of principle that I asked myself whether any sound basis existed for arriving at a general agreement. In the absence of any such basis, I doubted whether it would be advisable to embark on discussions which might lead to no satisfactory conclusion. M. Rosengolz said his Government had never been informed what were our objections to the unratified agreement of 1924; they would be glad to come to a settlement of outstanding difficulties but he did not see how they could take the first step in this matter until they knew what those objections were. I said I thought the Soviet Govt. must be well aware of the main objections of principle, such as their failure to admit their full responsibilities and obligations in the questions of debts and claims and in regard to the question of a loan. M. Rosengolz asked which was the better, a Government which did not accept such obligations in principle, but was ready to come to some practical compromise, or a Government which while accepting its obligations, failed to meet them. I replied that he was putting only two out of several other possible alternatives; but that it seemed to me that the 1924 negotiations had largely foundered in consequence of

¹ See No. 142.

the endeavour then made to avoid facing questions involved in differences of principle.

After some further discussion M. Rosengolz said that he had not come to see me with the object of pressing Sir R. Hodgson's tentative proposals but in order to ascertain our views. He now understood them to be generally that H.M. Govt. would welcome a renewal of discussions if and when there was some clear prospect of coming to a final understanding on all points, that they did not at the present moment see such a prospect and that their attitude was one of patience—and hope.

2. If it was desirable to improve our mutual relations, would this end not be furthered by the promotion of Sir R. Hodgson and M. Krassin to the rank of Ambassadors? M. Rosengolz thought my answer on this point would be largely influenced by what I had said on point 1; but it might assist Sir R. Hodgson's position if he held the rank of Ambassador though the question was of less personal importance in the case of M. Krassin, owing to the Soviet diplomatic system. I said I did not quite see the reason for raising this question just now; it was one very largely of form, and it seemed to me that it would be raised more appropriately after than before the conclusion of any future agreement.

3. Could I tell him how the press reports of a possible meeting between M. Chicherin and Sir Austen Chamberlain had originated? M. Rosengolz could assure me that his mission had been in no way responsible for these reports, but he had been led to believe that they emanated from the Foreign Office.

I said I thought his informants must be mistaken. So far as I knew the Secretary of State had gone to Geneva with the intention afterwards of taking a much needed holiday in Italy. I was not aware of what M. Chicherin's future movements or plans might be; nor was I aware that any concrete suggestion had been made from any quarter of a meeting between them. Press correspondents were always easily led to jump to unwarranted conclusions.

On leaving, M. Rosengolz told me he is going to Berlin to-night for about a week, and will see M. Chicherin there.

G. MOUNSEY

No. 151

Memorandum by Mr. Huxley¹

[C 15735/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 17, 1925*

... In view² of the policy clearly laid down by the Secretary of State³ it is perhaps unwise and undesirable even to discuss the Corridor problem at the

¹ A member of the Central Department of the Foreign Office.

² The preceding portion of this memorandum summarized previous correspondence regarding the Polish Corridor: see Nos. 34 and 118.

³ See No. 34, note 2.

present time. Nevertheless, the problem exists, and it cannot be held to be impossible or even improbable that the German Government will attempt to reopen the matter at Geneva or elsewhere in the near future.

I attach an article from a recent number of the American 'Harper's Magazine',⁴ which gives expression to a view often held by neutral observers, namely that the present Danzig Corridor is the 'ground where the next European war will start'. The article is perhaps sensational, but there is a large grain of truth in it, and it is difficult to avoid the feeling that if His Majesty's Government refuse pointblank on all occasions to consider even the possibility of a territorial revision, Poland will do likewise until the time comes when Germany feels strong enough to force acceptance of her own solution. We may leave the matter for future generations to deal with: but was it not precisely this attitude of mind which led to the late war?

Having been rash enough to put forward these views it is clearly incumbent on me to suggest an alternative. This may perhaps be arrived at:—

(1) By deciding what are the essential requirements of Poland and Germany;

(2) Seeing whether these are not compatible; and

(3) If, in fact, proposals can be put forward which might in theory satisfy claims of both sides, keeping them in mind against the moment when Germany does attempt to reopen the question, and then urging them on the interested parties.

The minimum German requirements appear to be that essentially German lands shall not be separated geographically; and that the individual German shall be able to pass from Germany proper to East Prussia and vice versa without encountering a foreign frontier. The minimum Polish requirements appear to be that no Polish population shall be subject to the denationalisation, expropriation and general squeezing out which was the lot of Poles under German sovereignty in the past; and that Poland as a whole shall receive that 'free and secure access to the sea'⁵ which was promised her by the Allies.

Is there no solution which could combine these *desiderata*? One cannot but feel that human ingenuity is capable of reconciling the two points of view, given sufficient inducement on both sides.

Suppose that it were possible to adopt the following proposals:

(1) The present Free City of Danzig, and the Corridor, say all present Polish territory north of a line running south of Tuchel and Neuenburg, to constitute two separate Länder under German sovereignty.

(2) The second of these two communities, which would be overwhelmingly Polish in population, to have complete autonomy as regards language, education, proprietary legislation, local government, and administration of civil and criminal laws, as well as its own local police force.

(3) The whole area to be neutralised, i.e., its permanently domiciled

⁴ Not attached to filed copy.

⁵ The quotation is from the thirteenth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points: cf. No. 1, note 8.

inhabitants to be exempt from military service, its inviolability in case of war to be guaranteed by Germany and Poland specially and the League generally, it being left to the Council of the League to authorise the despatch of troops or munitions across it, under League supervision, in either direction on the appeal of either party.

(4) The railways in the whole area to form a separate administration under a mixed German-Polish Commission, having its seat at Danzig, with a neutral president appointed by agreement, or, failing that, by the Council of the League, the staff being drawn from those at present domiciled and employed on the railways in the area, and replacements being drawn from its inhabitants.

(5) A similar commission to regulate the course of and navigation on the Vistula in the area.

(6) The budget of the administrations under (4) and (5) to be guaranteed in equal shares by Germany and Poland.

(7) The whole area to be made, for the purposes of commerce, a free port and zone under the guarantee of the League.

It appears from the correspondence summarised above that German opinion may still be brought to accept half a loaf, as being better than no bread, whereas with increasing confidence and strength it seems likely that Germany's demand for the whole loaf will grow louder as time goes by. As regards Poland, however bitter the pill might seem, she might well be brought to swallow it by the knowledge that in refusing to accept a solution which would fulfil her essential requirements she would alienate all hope of support in this country, and that Frenchmen, in their newfound security, and with other preoccupations, will probably become less and less inclined to throw themselves upon Germany in order to preserve Poland's access to the sea.

I fear that so much hypothetical argument on a subject which has puzzled so many wise heads may be considered entirely superfluous; but I have held up these papers for some weeks and I am still unable to get rid of the conviction that the last word has not been said in regard to this problem. If, as a result of this minute and the tentative and incomplete suggestion made above, the last word is eventually said, it will have served its purpose.⁶

M. H. HUXLEY

⁶ Mr. Lampson and Sir W. Tyrrell minuted as follows on this document: 'I really do not think that we should write to either Lord D'Abernon or Sir W. Max-Muller as suggested above [in a brief minute by Mr. Howard Smith: not printed]. The question is far too delicate for us to do so. A false move now might well be most disastrous. Let us not forget the intense suspicion with which, only recently, we were viewed at Warsaw: let us remember the popular demonstrations against H.M. Legation there only a few weeks ago. In short, let us above all things hasten *very* slowly here.'

'Mr. Huxley's minute is most interesting and it is extremely useful that members of the Department should endeavour to think out the problems with which we have to deal. But do not his specific proposals amount in practice to the re-writing of the Treaty of Versailles? I think they do. And let us never forget that, at this moment of time, there are certain "shibboleths" we must respect: one of them is the sanctity of the treaty of Versailles.'

'I am absolutely convinced that the way *not* to solve the German-Polish question is to

stir up public discussion about it. Let sleeping dogs sleep—or if they won't, let us try to make them sleep. I may be quite wrong, but it seems to me that the only way this problem will solve itself is to let the Germans & the Poles have time to realise that they are dependent to some extent on one another: for example 40% of Germany's exports go to Poland: & so on. If only we can keep peace between them, I hazard the view that it is a matter of time until these two neighbouring countries come to realise they *must* work more or less together. And when they have realised that & got on terms, then many other things may follow.

'Of course there are *other* possible solutions, for example the overthrow of Poland by Russia. But I gather that since Tchicherin's visit to Warsaw, relations are much improved.

'To sum up then. Let us leave this question severely alone. Our considered views are already on record both at Berlin and at Warsaw. I do not think they need revision in any sense. So let us leave it at that.

'This may seem like stagnation: I do not think it is! M. W. LAMPSON 20/12/25.'

'Stagnation at times may be & is preferable to earthquakes. W. T. 21/12.'

No. 152

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received December 19, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 505 Telegraphic: by bag [C 16226/117/18]

PARIS, December 18, 1925

My telegram No. 503.¹

A meeting took place this afternoon with German delegates who put forward proposals contained in my despatch No. 2723.²

Some preliminary discussion took place on a few points with the object of bringing out certain important *lacunae* in the German draft. These were especially:

1. Absence of any provision to prevent German government from subsidizing an excessively large number of pilots.

¹ No. 149.

² Not printed. The German draft ordinance enclosed in this despatch of December 18 read as follows:

'En vertu de l'article 77 de la Constitution du Reich et après approbation du Reichsrat, il est ordonné:

'1. Devront aussi être considérées comme contraires aux articles 177 et 178 du Traité de Versailles les associations qui, en relations avec le Ministère de la Reichswehr, organisent des forces militaires aériennes sur terre et sur mer. L'article 2 de la première ordonnance du [thus in filed copy] pour l'exécution de la loi sur l'application des articles 177 et 178 du Traité de Versailles s'applique à ces associations.

'2. Quiconque construit ou importe ou met en circulation des avions blindés ou protégés d'une façon analogue ou munis d'une installation lui permettant de recevoir un armement quelconque, des canons, des torpilles bombes, ou ayant des aménagements de visée pour ces engins, sera puni d'une amende jusqu'à 10,000 [RM.] ou d'emprisonnement jusqu'à trois mois.

'3. Cette ordonnance entrera en vigueur le jour de sa promulgation. A la même date seront rapportés la loi sur la restriction des constructions des avions du 29 juin 1921 ("Reichsgesetzblatt" [1], p. 789), et l'ordonnance sur la construction des avions du 5 mai 1922 ("Reichsgesetzblatt" 1, p. 476).'

2. Inadequacy of provision in Section 1 of the German draft excluding associations in relation with the Reichswehr ministry from organizing military aviation. It was pointed out that this prohibition should be made to apply to all ministries.

The Germans were asked to submit as soon as possible some form of guarantee that would prevent subsidizing of an excessive number of pilots. They undertook to consider this.

It was agreed that the technical delegates should meet with the Germans tomorrow morning to consider further technical points. The Germans were asked to furnish a more complete and precise draft and they agreed to do so.

The discussions were cordial on both sides. The German delegates were, however, most emphatic that it was impossible for them to accept any rules on the lines of those now in existence.

In reply to a question as to how the German delegates proposed to reinforce the law by some international act, they suggested that this act should take the form of an exchange of notes, which should be placed on record with the League of Nations.

Please inform Air Ministry. Air Attaché is not reporting separately.

No. 153

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received December 21, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 507 Telegraphic: by bag [C 16265/117/18]

PARIS, December 20, 1925

A meeting between the Air Experts of the Mixed Committee and those of the German delegation took place on December 19th.

1. *Question of pilots.* The Germans were asked what guarantee their proposed law contained to restrict the training of a large number of pilots over and above normal requirements. They replied that they were prepared to forbid any form of military aerial training. Pressed further the Germans promised to study the question—they thought they could find a satisfactory formula to allay suspicions.

2. *Aerial training of Reichswehr personnel.* The Germans stated that they could not prevent personnel from learning to fly in their own time and at their own expense. They urged us not to press this matter as it was a question of honour and restriction of liberty of the person. The question was adjourned for further examination.

3. *Registration of factories, machines, motors, commercial companies and lines, civil aviation organisations, and private owners of aeroplanes.* The Germans stated that these were already registered under their existing laws.

4. *Retention of Rule 2 of existing Nine Rules.* The Germans were also asked to consider this question.

5. Further small details practically non-controversial in connection with the rewording of the two clauses in the German proposal were also discussed.

6. Finally the Germans were asked to consider what guarantee existed under the two clauses in their draft to prevent the construction of a large number of uneconomic high-powered single seaters over and above the number required for races, etc. As it was getting late this matter was not discussed but the Germans made it quite clear that they would accept no qualitative rules.

After the meeting Air Attaché had a conversation with Herr Fisch the head German Technician, who expressed concern at the manner in which our arguments were developing and again repeated that rules based on restriction of quality and quantity were out of the question. After further discussion, during which the Air Attaché made it perfectly clear that no restriction of development of civil aviation was contemplated but that he considered that Germans should study some means of allaying suspicions on such matters as an abnormal number of pilots over and above civil requirements and an abnormal number of high performance single seater machines, the German Technician asked whether these suspicions could be allayed in the form of a note addressed to the ex-Allies which would be attached to a copy of the law and forwarded to each ally. Air Attaché replied that the object of the meetings was to explore every avenue—the Germans having indicated one, there was every reason for him to develop it, though Air Attaché could not definitely inform him if that particular avenue would reach the required destination.

To date it would appear that Germans may give satisfaction over the following points:—

1. Excessive number of pilots.
2. Subsidies for training.
3. *Enregistrement* of factories, etc.
4. Rule 2. (of the existing 9 Rules).

Please send copy to Air Ministry. Air Attaché not reporting separately.

No. 154

*The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received December 24, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 511 Telegraphic: by bag [C 16480/30/18]

PARIS, December 23, 1925

Monsieur Laroche informed a member of my staff this evening that, during Dr. Nord's recent visit here in connection with German aviation, he approached General Desticker with suggestions for certain modifications of the arrangements already come to on the subject of the number of German police. Particulars of Dr. Nord's proposal go to you in my despatch No. 2767.¹

¹ No. 157.

Monsieur Laroche stated that Monsieur Briand was much annoyed on learning of this *démarche*, and that French government are considering instructing their Ambassador in Berlin to inform the German government of the unfortunate effect which proposals of this kind create. Alternatively something may be said to German Ambassador here. French government do not propose to mention the matter to the Ambassadors' Conference or to pursue it in any other manner in order to avoid giving it undue importance.

No. 155

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received December 24, 9 a.m.)

No. 507 Telegraphic [N 7063/710/38]

Secret

BERLIN, December 23, 1925, 9.40 p.m.

Chicherin left Berlin last night after a stay of three days. He had several interviews with Minister for Foreign Affairs and other German authorities including General von See[c]kt.¹

I hear from a very confidential but reliable source that his tone on this occasion was quite different from two months ago. Then he menaced and bullied, his language about Locarno having been much more violent than was admitted at the time. On present occasion he was quite mild apparently regarding Locarno as an accomplished fact against which it was useless to rail. He advocated an intended² development of commercial relations with Germany urging German government to adopt a system similar to that of English Trade Facilities Act.³ He also laid himself out to get on friendly terms with the Right.

Regarding League of Nations, Chicherin advanced a new argument against joining. It was this, that by going to Geneva a power is compelled in the case of a dispute to declare herself for or against a given country. This was inconvenient and embarrassing as one had to take sides instead of giving friendly assurances to both litigants. There were enough enemies in the world without going to Geneva to swell their number.

As regards negotiations in Paris he expressed himself fully satisfied and hopeful. Indeed he appeared to expect considerable credits for Russia would again become available from French sources. This account of negotiations with Monsieur Briand tallied exactly with account Paris gave Berlin.

Chicherin stated that a treaty of neutrality had been concluded between Russia and Turkey⁴ and would be published today. This information appears to have surpassed⁵ German government because they thought there

¹ Cf. Kurt Rosenbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 190 and 195-6.

² It was suggested on the filed copy that this word should read 'intensive'.

³ The Trade Facilities Act of 1925 is printed in *The Public General Acts* (15 & 16 Geo. 5. c. 13).

⁴ Printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 125, pp. 1001-2.

⁵ It was suggested on the filed copy that this word should read 'surprised'.

already existed between Turkey and Russia something much closer than a treaty of neutrality.

As regards England, Chicherin's language was unchanged. He still represented England as seducer and Germany as seduced saying 'why play Marguerite to England's Faust? Nothing but disaster can come to you from such a relationship'. He declared that England was endeavouring to effect financial starvation of Russia by preventing other countries from giving her credits. He alleged however that English policy had failed as regards America as further financial facilities for Russian commerce were already forthcoming from that quarter.⁶

⁶ For this report cf. Lord D'Abernon, *An Ambassador of Peace* (London, 1929), vol. iii, pp. 214-16. Cf. also the press statement made by M. Chicherin on December 23, printed by Jane Degras, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 77-79.

No. 156

Sir W. Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

*No. 4218 [C 16470/117/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 23, 1925*

My Lord,

Your despatches respecting the discussions now proceeding in Paris on German aerial disarmament seem to render a general survey of the position advisable in order to clear our minds as to the essential factors in the situation.

2. As long ago as 1921 German aerial disarmament, as prescribed by the Treaty of Versailles, was declared by the Allies to be complete. In the normal course inter-Allied control would then have ceased, but as a consequence of the London ultimatum of the 5th May, 1921, the continuation of a modified form of control (the Committee of Guarantee and the nine rules) was imposed upon Germany.

3. The German Government, in accordance with their rights under the notes exchanged with the Ambassadors' Conference in 1922, have now raised the question of the withdrawal of the Committee of Guarantee and the abolition of the nine rules. They were perfectly entitled to raise the question seeing that the fate of the Committee of Guarantee was to come up when the evacuation of Cologne took place. They have now proposed that in place of the Committee of Guarantee and the nine rules the German Parliament should pass legislation to secure the permanent observance by Germany of her obligations under the treaty forbidding the possession of any military or naval air forces.

4. Now although by the exchange of notes in 1922 the Allied Governments are not bound to do more than examine whether circumstances permit of the withdrawal of the Committee of Guarantee, yet His Majesty's Government never made any secret that they whole-heartedly welcomed this initiative

by Germany. At the same time they realised that the German offer could serve no real purpose so long as it remained in the indefinite form of Dr. Nord's proposals of the 24th November¹ and the German Ambassador's note to the Ambassadors' Conference of the 27th November.² The request made by the conference to M. von Hoesch on the 11th [10th] December³ that the proposals should be defined and completed was fully in accordance with the view of His Majesty's Government as expressed in my telegram to your Lordship No. 350² of the 5th December.

5. The proposals hitherto submitted by the German experts to the Mixed Committee in Paris have left an unfavourable impression upon His Majesty's Government, and instructions have accordingly been addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin, in a telegram of which a copy is transmitted to you herewith, to impress upon the German Government that progress is impossible until their experts come forward with more satisfactory proposals.⁴

6. But if the attitude of the German experts has been unsatisfactory, that adopted by the French experts appears to have been far from helpful. The British representatives on the committee have clearly indicated that they will not be content with any vague or unsatisfactory proposals on the part of Germany, yet to all their suggestions for a practical and common-sense solution the French experts have turned a deaf ear. They have insisted rather upon the retention of highly technical rules which, in spite of there being a committee resident in the country to see they are carried out, have been proved by past experience to be thoroughly unsatisfactory. It is only necessary to refer to the latest report⁵ of the Committee of Guarantee upon the training of pilots, to show what small effect these rules, in practice, have upon the situation. It is noteworthy that even the Belgian Government are not unaware of the impracticability of these technical rules.

7. It seems at least doubtful whether the French Government have fully considered what the result will surely be if their technicians are allowed to persist in this attitude. Clearly the German Government are not prepared even to discuss the continuation of these technical restrictions, and if the French Government insist upon them, the present negotiations will speedily reach a deadlock. It may be argued that the Committee of Guarantee will even so remain in function. As to this, however, the French Government would do well to consider why it is that the Committee of Guarantee has hitherto been as successful as it has been in carrying out its duties. The answer is mainly that the German Government have shown a modicum of goodwill and have not obstructed the committee in its work. Now, do the

¹ See No. 125, paragraph 14.

² See No. 136, note 1.

³ The reference is to the note of December 10 sent by the Conference of Ambassadors in accordance with their decision recorded in No. 140, section 1, and transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2651 of December 11.

⁴ Not printed. This telegram, No. 256 to Berlin of December 23, was on the lines of the preceding three paragraphs.

⁵ See No. 126.

French Government seriously believe that this degree of goodwill will continue, if once the evacuation of Cologne is complete and the Military Commission of Control is withdrawn, the existing system of aeronautical control is insisted upon by the Allied Governments? The contrary will be the case, and in the place of the present goodwill the Committee of Guarantee will be faced with continual obstruction and ill-will; it will be physically unable to carry out its duties effectively and its continued presence in Germany will in short degenerate into an ever-increasing source of irritation in the relations between the Western Powers and Germany.

8. That is a situation which would undoubtedly in a short time become intolerable to His Majesty's Government (unless indeed it was clear that the fault lay entirely with the German Government), and it is not to be contemplated that they would long agree to the retention in the midst of an actively obstructive Germany of a handful of British officers, useless from a practical point of view and actually harmful to friendly international relations from a practical point of view.⁶

9. In brief, if the French Government refuse to go halfway to meet the German Government in reaching a solution of the question, they may well end in finding themselves without a Committee of Guarantee, without any German legislation to take its place, and without even the support of His Majesty's Government.

10. That is the position as it appears to His Majesty's Government at the moment, and to show you that their attitude is reasonable and backed by British expert advice, a copy is enclosed of a semi-official letter⁷ from the Air Ministry showing that the latter regard the French attitude as neither sound nor tenable.

11. It is not clear that the moment has arrived when a personal interview with M. Briand is required. Your telegram No. 507⁸ seems to indicate that a change of attitude may be expected on the part of the French technicians. Further, it is to be gathered from Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen's letter to Mr. Lampson of the 20th December,⁹ that M. Briand's name may to some extent have been taken in vain by his subordinates. It may therefore be that the discussions will proceed in the future on more fruitful lines so far as the French experts are concerned. At the same time it may assist you to have the views of His Majesty's Government before you so that, if and when the moment seems opportune, you may be in a position to develop them to M. Briand. The gist of the matter is that His Majesty's Government are fully conscious of the anxieties actuating the present rigid attitude of the French Government, and they are prepared to give them their full support in obtaining a reasonable and workable settlement from the German Government; but they cannot be a party to any endeavour to continue the imposition of highly technical rules which, far from adding to security, can only result in continued and

⁶ It is possible that the preceding six words were included in the text in error.

⁷ This letter of December 19 is not printed.

⁸ No. 153. The reference should, however, probably be to No. 149.

⁹ Not printed.

ever-increasing friction. Finally, the French Government would do well to bear in mind the provisions of the Treaty of Locarno, by which, were France to be the victim of unprovoked attack by Germany, she would find at her side the united forces of Belgium, Italy and Great Britain. That is surely a greater measure of security than any technical rules against German aircraft.

I have, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN¹⁰

¹⁰ Thus in the copy preserved in the file.

No. 157

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received December 24)
No. 2767 [C 16486/30/18]

PARIS, December 23, 1925

His Majesty's Representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper

Reference to previous correspondence:

Paris telegram No. 511¹ of December 23rd 1925.

Name and Date

Subject

From:

Ministry for Foreign Affairs 21st
December 1925.

German Police.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 157

Copie

21.12.25.

Note

Le Général Desticker a reçu M. Nord le 19 Décembre.

Ce dernier lui a transmis un certain nombre de demandes et lui a présenté plusieurs observations relatives au contrôle en Allemagne et qui sont exposées ci-après.

I. Police

(a) Répartition de la Police d'Etat

Le Gouvernement allemand a demandé à la C[ommission] M[ilitaire] I[n]teralliée de] C[ontrôle] (le chiffre des Policiers d'Etat étant d'accord avec elle fixé à 100.000), que la répartition de ces policiers sur le territoire allemand soit laissée entièrement à sa disposition. La C.M.I.C. a soulevé des

¹ No. 154.

objections et a prétendu limiter le nombre des localités où une police d'Etat serait autorisée.

M. Nord demande que des instructions soient envoyées à la C.M.I.C. pour que satisfaction soit donnée sur ce point au Gouvernement allemand.

(b) *Effectifs de la Police d'Etat*

Le Gouvernement allemand a exposé à la C.M.I.C. que le nombre des villes où une police d'Etat serait autorisée ayant été augmenté, il était indispensable d'augmenter légèrement le nombre des policiers d'Etat; cette augmentation amènerait une diminution proportionnelle des policiers communaux pour que l'effectif total de 150.000 ne se trouve pas modifié. C'est ainsi que la Prusse aurait besoin d'un supplément de 3.000 policiers d'Etat et que les autres Etats auraient besoin de 1.700 policiers d'Etat environ.

La C.M.I.C. a refusé et déclaré s'en maintenir au chiffre de 100.000 policiers d'Etat.

Pour arriver à une entente, M. Nord a proposé que dans les villes hanslatiques [*sic*] (Hambourg, Brême, Lubeck), qui ont un effectif total de 7.766 policiers (dont 3.000 encasernés) et qui sont tous policiers d'Etat (puisque l'Etat et la Commune se confondent) et comptés, par conséquent, dans les 100.000 policiers d'Etat, les policiers encasernés soient seuls appelés policiers d'Etat et que les 4.766 policiers non encasernés soient considérés comme policiers communaux.

Le Gouvernement allemand pourrait ainsi gagner un chiffre de 4.766 policiers d'Etat, qui seraient répartis comme suit:

3.000 à la Prusse — 1.766 aux autres Etats du Reich.

(c) *Police en territoires occupés*

(1) L'effectif de la police en Territoires occupés a été fixé à 10.000, ce chiffre étant compris dans l'ensemble des 150.000 policiers accordés au Reich.

M. Nord demande que 5.000 hommes seulement soient compris dans l'effectif des 150.000, et que, par suite, le chiffre des policiers soit porté de 150.000 à 155.000. (Ce chiffre ne comprendrait pas la police de la Sarre, qui serait en surplus.)

(2) Le Gouvernement allemand estime que le chiffre des 10.000 policiers pour les territoires occupés ne vise que *la rive gauche du Rhin* et demande d'avoir en plus 1.200 policiers (dont 730 policiers d'Etat) pour les têtes de pont (rive droite du Rhin). Ce chiffre de 1.200 policiers serait compris dans l'effectif total des 155.000.

(3) Le Gouvernement allemand demande que les policiers dont l'effectif a été fixé pour les 2ème et 3ème Zones d'occupation soient employés à l'intérieur du Reich en attendant l'évacuation des dites zones.

II. *Matériel Spécial Servant aux Transports Militaires*

La C.M.I.C. a demandé, conformément à la Note du 4 Juin, que le matériel spécial servant aux transports militaires soit dispersé.

Le Gouvernement allemand a prescrit, en conséquence, la dispersion de ce matériel dans un certain nombre de gares du Reich. Or, la C.M.I.C. entend par dispersion vente du matériel comme cela s'est fait pour les usines.

M. Nord a exposé que cette vente était impossible, le matériel en question n'ayant aucune valeur marchande; et que, par suite, la dispersion, telle qu'elle était envisagée par la C.M.I.C., équivaldrait à une destruction; il a, en conséquence, demandé que la thèse de son Gouvernement au sujet de la dispersion, soit acceptée.

M. Nord s'est de plus élevé contre la prétention de la C.M.I.C. dans le cas où sa thèse serait acceptée, de contrôler sur place la dispersion.

Les ordres de dispersion fournis à la C.M.I.C., a-t-il ajouté, doivent suffir; la Note du 4 Juin ne stipulant pas sur ce point (comme elle l'a fait pour d'autres questions) que la C.M.I.C. *surveillerait l'exécution* du redressement.

III. Exécution du Contrôle par la C.M.I.C.

M. Nord s'est plaint vivement de la manière dont s'effectuait le contrôle depuis le mois d'Octobre dernier. Il a demandé que la C.M.I.C. traite les questions en suspens par conversations avec le Représentant qualifié du Gouvernement allemand ou ses Délégués, et non par des échanges de Notes dont le ton, souvent comminatoire, nuisait aux bons rapports entre la C.M.I.C. et les autorités allemandes et retardait le règlement de ces questions.

M. Nord a cité comme exemple, la correspondance [*sic*] échangée entre la C.M.I.C. et le Général von Pawel[s]z au sujet des redressements concernant l'Etat-Major Général et les effectifs (lettre 921-11-25² du 14 Novembre du Général v. Pawel[s]z—lettre 2967² du 27 Novembre 1925 du Général Walch) et expliqué à ce sujet que les ordres [*sic*] signés Hasse,³ dont la valeur avait été contestée par la C.M.I.C., avaient été donnés par ce haut fonctionnaire en l'absence du Ministre de la Reichswehr et du Général von See[c]kt.

M. Nord s'est également élevé contre la prétention de la C.M.I.C.⁴ de demander, relativement aux effectifs de l'Armée allemande, la publication d'un décret signé du Président du Reich — ce qui, a-t-il ajouté, est illégal.

M. Nord a terminé en demandant que le rôle de la Commission se borne maintenant à la *vérification* des redressements demandés par la Note du 4 Juin, et que le mot de *Contrôle*, vexant pour les Allemands, ne soit plus employé.

Le Général Desticker a répondu à M. Nord, qu'il communiquerait au C[omit ] M[ilitaire] A[llié] de V[ersailles] les demandes et observations qu'il lui avait présentées au cours de cet entretien.

² Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

³ General Otto Hasse, Chief of the Truppenamt (section charged with questions of organization and employment of troops) of the Reichswehrministerium.

⁴ *Note on original*: 'voir lettre 2967 du 27 Novembre 1925 de la C.M.I.C. au Général von Pawel[s]z'.

No. 158

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received December 29)

No. 688 [C 16628/35/18]

BERLIN, *December 23, 1925*

His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin presents his compliments to His Majesty's Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum recording a confidential talk with Dr Stresemann.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 158

BERLIN, *December 23, 1925*

Discussing the general position yesterday, Dr Stresemann was, as usual, extremely optimistic and appeared quite undismayed by his unpopularity in certain quarters and by the numerous plots against him.

He said that public opinion was gradually beginning to recognise the great merits of the Locarno Pact. It was noteworthy that German opinion in Alsace had been unanimously favourable. If opinion in Germany was lukewarm that was possibly to some extent the fault of the German Government. Instead of directing attention to the re-actions and complaining that these re-actions were performed inadequately by the Western Powers, the German Government might have magnified the attainments of Locarno and created a more enthusiastic atmosphere. It had perhaps been a mistake to endeavour to conciliate opinion on the Right instead of endeavouring to ride it down. These, however, were belated reflections and it was also possible that by concentrating discussion upon the re-actions, hostile fire had been taken off the clauses of the Pact. There were thus possible advantages in both attitudes.

Dr Stresemann attributed the failure of the attempt to form a Great Coalition¹ to the absence of Herr Ebert's² influence. If the late President had been alive, even if he had not remained President, his strong common sense would have prevailed against petty party considerations which had prevented the Socialists from showing courage. The fact was the Socialists had no great leader. Dr Braun, the Minister President of Prussia, was an extremely able man but he was also very lazy and if an opportunity offered to shoot stags he left the Socialists party to take care of itself and went after the stags for six weeks. Modern politics required greater energy and concentration. Severing³ was also very able but he was a sick man.

Turning to press matters, Dr Stresemann told me that in the near future

¹ The resignation of Dr. Luther's German Government on December 5 had been followed by unsuccessful negotiations for the formation of a new government. On December 18 Lord D'Abernon had reported in Berlin telegram No. 503 that President von Hindenburg had postponed further negotiations until the second week of January 1926.

² Herr Ebert, first President of Germany, had died in office on February 28, 1925.

³ Prussian Minister for the Interior.

both the 'Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung' and the 'Kreuz Zeitung' would change hands and would also change editors. They would both cease to be rabidly nationalistic.⁴

⁴ Lord D'Abernon further reported in Berlin telegram No. 506 of December 23 that Dr. Stresemann had forecast that Dr. Luther would form a new German Government. 'He added that he did not anticipate that new Government would find any difficulty in proceeding with necessary steps for entry of Germany into League of Nations. The President still remained somewhat hostile, but would act constitutionally. Minor problems would have to be settled, such as use of German as a language of debate and appointment of German officials on the permanent staff of League of Nations, but these were points which could be discussed when the time came and were better left till then.' See also Lord D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 214. For Dr. Stresemann's account of this conversation see Eric Sutton, *Gustav Stresemann, op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 366-7.

No. 159

Minute by Mr. Collier¹

[C 15735/459/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 24, 1925

I notice, with relief, that this question² is not regarded as one upon which it is incumbent for the Northern Department to discuss at length as a matter of urgency.

At the same time, I quite agree with Mr. Huxley that it must, sooner or later, come up in an acute form. When that happens we shall no doubt be expected to have some views about it, even if we are not directly concerned; and I therefore venture to submit the following observations, for what they may be worth, as my contribution to the formation of such views.

It seems to me, in the first place, that this question must be regarded as one of psychology more than anything else. The Poles have proved conclusively, to my mind, that it is not really necessary, for any material reason, that there should be communication through German territory between East Prussia and the rest of Germany; similarly, the Germans have proved equally conclusively that there is no material reason why Poland should require an outlet to the sea through Polish territory. The experience of Czechoslovakia shows that satisfactory conventional arrangements can be made for a much greater volume of traffic passing from the territory of one country through the territory of another than is ever likely to pass either between Germany and East Prussia or between Poland and overseas countries.

But this, of course, does not end the matter from the German point of view, as Mr. Addison has pointed out.³ Still less does it end the matter from the Polish point of view. And it is this latter point of view, I think, which is not sufficiently taken into account in Mr. Huxley's scheme.

I once pointed out to an intelligent Pole my reasons for believing that *terri-*

¹ A member of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office.

² See No. 151.

³ See No. 141.

torial access to the sea was not essential to any country, quoting the case of Czechoslovakia, as above. His reply was—‘It is not a question of commerce, it is a question of prestige. Can you expect a nation, with our history and traditions, and with thirty million inhabitants, to accept the same position as Czechoslovakia?’; and no amount of argument on my part could convince him that the matter should be looked at from the material aspect alone. This attitude is, of course, unreasonable; but it must be taken into account. The Poles have been well described as ‘a nation of exaltés’, and they have been so, not for the short period of post-war chauvinism which is now passing, but for at least a hundred years; and I do not believe that any amount of commercial pressure, which, it is sometimes assumed, would bring them to their senses, will ever have much effect with them in questions of this kind. They are not a commercial people (as can be seen from the way they are now mismanaging their commerce and finance) and they would rather loose [*sic*] a million pounds of trade than a square mile of territory.

Mr. Huxley’s proposals, it seems to me, involve far too large a cession of territory to make them acceptable to a nation in this state of mind; and as it is, after all, the Poles who are at present in possession of the territory in dispute, it is their state of mind, rather than that of the Germans, which we must primarily take into account in making plans for a *peaceful* solution of the question. If Polish requirements and German requirements are found to be incompatible, then there will be no peaceful solution at all, but we must in any case discover the Polish minimum before we can be certain of this.

Mr. Huxley, I see, says that this minimum is ‘that no Polish population shall be subject to the denationalisation etc., which was the lot of Poles under German sovereignty in the past; and that Poland as a whole shall receive that “free and secure access to the sea” promised her by the Allies’; but though that was the Polish minimum at the time of the Peace settlement, I am convinced that the Peace settlement itself has caused that minimum to be seriously increased in any future negotiations, the increase being the stipulation that as little as possible of what is now Polish territory shall return to Germany—in fact, I think most Poles would say that no Polish territory at all should return to Germany.

On the other hand, I think that with time and careful management the Poles might be brought to agree to the transfer, not to Germany, but to the Free City of Danzig, of the very small piece of Polish territory extending to the sea between Danzig and Pomerania—say from north of the town of Berent. I have always regarded the transfer of this little strip of territory to Poland as the worst mistake of the Peace settlement in those regions. It is true that it is shown as a mainly Polish district on the ethnographical maps,⁴ but what those maps habitually omit is the comparative density of the

⁴ *Note in original:* ‘In any case, ethnographical considerations were not the sole criterion of the settlement. For instance, the town of Konitz, a little further south, though German and contiguous to German territory, was given to Poland merely because it was a railway junction.’

population. In the case of this particular territory, the density is very thin indeed; the country consisting mainly of a large 'heide'⁵ with a few scattered farms, inhabited by Kassubians, a race who speak a separate dialect of Polish and are reliably reported to have no love for the present Polish administration. If this territory were transferred to Danzig, its few thousand inhabitants would make little odds to the racial position of the Danzig territory, & there would be no danger of an amorphous, half-German, half-Polish state, which has been the chief objection to other schemes for combining Danzig with parts of the Polish territory around it.

A settlement on these lines would secure that Germany and East Prussia would not be separated by any Polish territory, and individual Germans would be able to pass from one part of Germany to the other without crossing the Polish frontier; while, on the other hand, Poland would still have her access to the sea through Danzig.

It is true that the most direct route between Germany and East Prussia does not lie through this territory, but further south. If, however, there were proper arrangements for through transit, this southern route could be used without inconvenience for the main goods traffic, the northern route, via Stettin, being used for such passengers as preferred it for sentimental reasons. It is to be hoped that these would not be numerous, and in any case the settlement would not be made on their account, but for the psychological reasons above mentioned.

It is equally true that on the Polish side there would no doubt be objections to giving up the dream of an entirely Polish port at Putzig (Gdynia) on which a good deal of money has now been spent. But, in the opinion of the most competent observers, this money is wasted, and Poland's chief outlet will always be through Danzig.

In order that each side should secure equal advantages from the settlement, the status of Danzig would have to be slightly modified so as to make it a purely independent State instead of, as now, partly under Polish control. But this was the original intention of the Peace Conference, which proclaimed Danzig to be a sovereign State, and has only been altered through various ill-advised decisions of the League of Nations on small points, and in particular, by a provision of the Peace Treaty, which has since been regretted by its own authors, putting the foreign relations of Danzig into the hands of Poland. It is not to be supposed, of course, that Poland would relish a return to complete sovereignty for Danzig; but she would much more readily agree to that, than to Mr. Huxley's suggestion that Danzig and the rest of the Corridor should be made two separate states under German sovereignty.

Under this scheme, Danzig would be a sort of carfax, through which would run at right angles the Polish route to the sea and the German route to East Prussia. Neither would have any advantage over the other, and both would be as free as treaties and conventions could possibly make them. The other advantages of the scheme are that it entails the minimum of territorial

⁵ Heath.

change and the minimum of administrative complication, whereas I fear that Mr. Huxley's scheme involves a good deal of both.⁶

L. COLLIER

⁶ Mr. Headlam-Morley, Historical Adviser to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Lampson minuted as follows on this document:

'I note that all these minutes deal exclusively with Danzig. It is to be remembered that of the two great German grievances Upper Silesia is in reality much the more important. It may not appeal so much to popular imagination in Germany but we should probably find that the German Government cares much more about it. They also have in it a strong case for the League of Nations decision [of October 12, 1921: cf. First Series, Volume XVI, Chapter II] was I think indefensible. Moreover, a revision of the Upper Silesia award would not be a revision of the Treaty of Versailles but only a revision of a decision of the League of Nations.

'However I see nothing to alter the opinion which I have already expressed, that at any rate as regards Danzig we cannot at present do anything, and certainly should not initiate anything or in any way suggest that the present settlement should be disturbed. What we have to do is to use our whole influence with the League of Nations to see that both sides get justice and I agree with Mr. Collier's observation that the action of the League has in some cases not been well advised. What I fear is that when the new High Commissioner comes into office the Poles will redouble their efforts to make the present arrangement unworkable, and if what we have been told about M. v. Hamel [League of Nations High Commissioner designate at Danzig] is true, and if the Germans are in the League, then there will be serious trouble. The immediate thing to do is, therefore, to use every effort not only at Warsaw and Berlin, but also at Geneva, to keep things straight.

'Mr. Huxley's suggestions are interesting but I fear they would not work. It would take too long to discuss them in detail. Among other things they would involve a change in the German constitution—a scheme of this sort could not be settled merely by international arrangement.

'I am inclined to agree with Mr. Collier's suggestion about the Kassubian district. On the other hand, I think his comparison with Czechoslovakia is not quite fair to Poland. Bohemia never had and never could have a seaport, but we must remember that Danzig was originally a German colonial settlement in the middle of a Slav district, just as much as Riga or Reval, and that Danzig was Polish to the end of the 18th century.

'J. W. H.-M. 31. 12. 25.'

[*Marginal note by Mr. Collier:* 'My comparison with Czechoslovakia was in respect of the material reasons for an outlet to the sea. I quite agree that the Poles have strong historical and sentimental claims to such an outlet, but they are, after all, sentimental, and no more (or less) valid than the similar German claim to a territorial connection with East Prussia. L. C., Jan. 5th.']

'This discussion, though academically very interesting & instructive, might now be allowed to lapse. Whatever the actual merits of the case for a revision of the existing territorial *status quo* I am absolutely certain that it would be the gravest political error to take the matter up in any way now. M. Briand told us at Locarno that when he formed a ministry—& he had been called upon to form not a few in his day—he always reserved one portfolio for *Time*. Let us follow his example in this question of German-Polish relations: & I may add that I am less pessimistic about the final outcome than some of the writers of the preceding minutes appear to be.

'M. W. LAMPSON, 2/1/26.'

No. 160

Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received December 26, 5.5 p.m.)
No. 510 Telegraphic [Germany 24/10]

BERLIN, December 26, 1925, 3 p.m.

Your telegram No. 256.¹

I have spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of your instructions. His Excellency replied that he knew nothing about course of negotiations in Paris, and therefore did not know on what precise point German proposals were unsatisfactory. He would, however, ascertain from German delegates what the position was and would then speak with me again. In any case, he promised to exercise his influence in the sense desired.

¹ See No. 156, note 4.

No. 161

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received December 29)
*No. 2788 [C 16537/117/18]**

PARIS, December 28, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 509¹ of the 23rd December and to previous correspondence regarding the negotiations on the subject of German aviation, I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of a note received from the French Government, containing a full statement of their attitude and views on this question. I also enclose herein a memorandum drawn up by the British representatives on the Mixed Commission on German aviation. Besides attempting to summarise the position of these negotiations up to date, the memorandum contains observations on the French note, with which I am in agreement.

2. I am anxious to draw your special attention to point 3 in the French note, and to the relevant comments in the memorandum. It is clear that the French Government attach great importance to the inclusion in the forthcoming agreement of some provision for the furnishing of periodical lists to the League of Nations as they feel that without such a provision League 'surveillance' of German aviation would be vague and unpractical. Moreover, now that the French Government are willing to accept, in such a provision, a clause safeguarding the liberty of the League of Nations to decide ultimately upon the methods by which such 'surveillance' shall be exercised, it may not

¹ Not printed. This telegram stated: 'German delegates left for Berlin last night after an informal conversation with one of the French delegates, as a result of which it was agreed that matters were not sufficiently far advanced to make a further meeting of all the delegates possible at present. German delegates return 6th January.'

seem to be going too far to authorise the British delegates to agree, in the last resort, to some formula within the limits indicated in the memorandum. I therefore support the recommendation made in the memorandum on this point, and more particularly so as I feel that now that the French Government have modified their attitude in regard to the rules of quality, a refusal to meet them on this point may prejudice the issue of the negotiations.

3. I may mention that at one of my recent conversations with M. Briand on another matter, I spoke to his Excellency of these negotiations and was impressed by the firmness of his manner and by his reluctance to make any concessions to Germany which could possibly be avoided. There is, in fact, an increasingly strong undercurrent of distrust of Germany in official circles here, an undercurrent which has gathered strength since and in spite of the Locarno Conference.

4. I think that it would be advisable for my air attaché and Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen to proceed to London for discussion and consultation with your Department and the Air Ministry after you have considered the present despatch and before the resumption of negotiations with the Germans. If, therefore, you will let me know when they should proceed to London I will give them instructions accordingly.

I have, &c.,
CREWE

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 161

*Note received from French Government regarding the German Aviation
Negotiations*

Le 24 décembre 1925

Le Gouvernement français a pris connaissance du résultat des premières négociations engagées entre la Conférence des Ambassadeurs et le Gouvernement allemand au sujet de la revision des règles à imposer à l'aviation allemande.

Il a été également informé des échanges de vues auxquels ces négociations ont donné lieu entre les délégations alliées.

Ce n'est pas sans un vif regret que le Gouvernement français a été ainsi amené à constater l'opposition de principe faite par le Gouvernement britannique au maintien des règles 4 à 7, dites 'règles de qualité.'

Pour des raisons que les experts français ont eu l'occasion d'exposer au cours des négociations, le Gouvernement français attribue, en effet, au maintien de ces règles une importance considérable et ce n'est pas sans appréhension qu'il en envisage la suppression.

Convaincu, cependant, qu'un accord étroit entre les délégations alliées peut, seul, permettre de mener à bonne fin la négociation engagée avec l'Allemagne, le Gouvernement français est résolu, en ce qui le concerne, à faire tout son possible pour réaliser cet accord; il est donc prêt à renoncer, en ce qui concerne les règles de qualité, aux demandes qu'il avait précédemment formulées, si, d'autre part, le concours de la délégation britannique

lui est acquis sans réserve pour faire accepter par les délégués allemands un certain nombre de garanties qu'il considère comme essentielles.

I. La première de ces garanties concerne l'aviation de chasse. Le Gouvernement français croit qu'aucune raison décisive ne peut être donnée pour légitimer les demandes que formuleraient les Allemands en vue de posséder une telle aviation.

Les avions de chasse ne se prêtant à aucun usage dans l'aviation civile, l'Allemagne n'en posséderait que pour former des pilotes de chasse ou pour se mettre en mesure de fabriquer éventuellement, en série, de tels appareils. A ce double point de vue, la possession d'avions de chasse présente exclusivement pour les Allemands un intérêt militaire. Il y a donc lieu de demander l'insertion, dans la loi allemande envisagée, d'une disposition ayant pour effet l'interdiction de cette catégorie d'avions.

II. Au cours des négociations qui viennent d'avoir lieu, la délégation allemande a réservé son adhésion au principe posé par les représentants alliés que défense absolue devait être faite aux membres de la Reichswehr, de la marine ou de la police, de piloter des avions.

Le Gouvernement français estime qu'une telle interdiction constitue une condition essentielle de l'accord à intervenir. On ne peut justifier par aucune raison les réserves formulées à cet égard par la délégation allemande. Si le traité² interdit à l'Allemagne de posséder une aviation militaire et bien que les discussions actuelles prouvent combien il est difficile de définir ces termes, il est impossible de ne pas concevoir qu'une des premières conditions à réaliser pour que l'article 198 du traité soit observé, c'est que les militaires allemands ne fassent pas d'aviation.

Le Gouvernement français espère que dans cette question primordiale, l'appui de la délégation britannique ne lui manquera pas.

III. En ce qui concerne les communications de registres de matériel et de personnel à faire par l'Allemagne à la Société des Nations, il apparaît au Gouvernement français qu'il est indispensable de prévoir, sous réserve des décisions que pourra ultérieurement prendre la Société des Nations, la communication annuelle des ces registres.

IV. Enfin, quoique le Gouvernement français soit entièrement d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique sur l'opportunité qu'il y a à mettre fin le plus vite possible à la mission du Comité de Garantie, il verrait, néanmoins, avec la plus sérieuse appréhension, la disparition de ce comité si, d'autre part, la certitude n'existait pas que la Société des Nations pourra exercer, sans se heurter à l'opposition de l'Allemagne, le droit d'investigation prévu à l'article 213.

Or, les conversations de Locarno ont prouvé que le Gouvernement allemand, dès qu'il sera devenu membre de la Société des Nations, cherchera à obtenir des modifications au règlement d'investigation tel qu'il a été préparé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations. Si, par conséquent, le Comité de Garantie était retiré avant que l'accord n'existât avec l'Allemagne, au sein de la Société des Nations, sur les conditions d'exercice du droit d'investiga-

² The Treaty of Versailles.

tion, l'Allemagne se trouverait soustraite, pendant une période indéterminée, à tout contrôle dans le domaine aéronautique, puisqu'elle échapperait à la fois au contrôle allié, qui aurait pris fin, et aux investigations de la Société des Nations, qui ne pourraient pas commencer.

M. Briand, pour cette raison, estime que le Comité de Garantie ne peut disparaître que lorsque nous aurons la certitude que, dans le domaine aéronautique, au moins, le droit d'investigation ne rencontrera pas d'opposition de l'Allemagne, soit que le Gouvernement allemand fasse, dès maintenant, à ce sujet, des déclarations expresses, soit que, en l'absence de telles déclarations, la Conférence des Ambassadeurs fasse savoir à l'Allemagne que le départ du Comité de Garantie sera subordonné à la réalisation de la condition ci-dessus indiquée.

Telles sont les conditions qui, aux yeux du Gouvernement français, constituent le minimum indispensable auquel doit être subordonné l'abandon des règles de qualité.

M. Briand serait reconnaissant à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre d'attirer, d'une façon toute particulière, l'attention de Mr. [sic] Chamberlain sur l'importance que revêtent, à ses yeux, les considérations ci-dessus développées. Il ne doute pas que, rapprochant ces légitimes demandes de l'importance des concessions accordées au Gouvernement allemand, qui obtiendra, par la conclusion de l'accord en préparation, une liberté complète pour son aviation commerciale, le Gouvernement britannique, appréciant l'effort de conciliation fait par le Gouvernement français dans une question qui intéresse directement la sécurité nationale et sur laquelle l'opinion se montre à bon droit si sensible, voudra bien donner à ses représentants les instructions nécessaires pour leur permettre d'appuyer, dans les prochaines négociations, le point de vue français tel qu'il est ci-dessus exposé.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 161

Memorandum on German Aviation by the British Representatives on the Mixed Commission

Summary of Position of Negotiations on December 28, 1925

(A) German Position

The Germans are prepared to pass the law in the form of the draft given to the Allied delegates on the 18th December (see Lord Crewe's despatch No. 2723³ of the 18th December). It is not yet possible to forecast the extent to which they will expand that law as a result of their consultations in Berlin and of Lord D'Abernon's action on Foreign Office telegram No. 256,⁴ but the British delegates do not anticipate that the Germans will be prepared to go very much further as far as the *law* is concerned. On the other hand, they will agree to put more into the exchange of notes. It is anticipated that they will include in their note the following points:—

³ See No. 152, note 2.

⁴ See Nos. 156, note 4, and 160.

1. A guarantee against subsidies for the training of pilots other than those absolutely required for commercial lines.
2. A guarantee against an excessive number of high-power single-seater machines.
3. They will also possibly agree to insert a guarantee against a superfluity of any type of machine; this, however, is not certain.
4. They may also possibly agree to some prohibition of the training of Reichswehr, naval and police personnel, and they may accept rule 2 of the existing nine rules (pilotless machines). The Germans have made great opposition to our suggestions that they should prohibit flying by the personnel of the Reichswehr and naval and police forces, pointing out that to do so would be a slight on the honour of the officer class, but it is just possible that with strong pressure they may be brought to accept something designed to prohibit such training except at officer's own expense and during normal leave. This point, however, is very near the margin of what they will absolutely not agree to.

As regards what the Germans absolutely refuse to accept, it must be borne in mind that Dr. Nord's original proposals were based upon the abolition of the nine rules and of the Committee of Guarantee. As regards the nine rules, it is anticipated that the Germans will absolutely refuse to accept any rules of quality or quantity laying down set figures. They will no doubt press also for the abolition of the Committee of Guarantee, although an arrangement on this point may not present serious difficulty.

(B) *French Position*

Up to the 23rd December the French had remained absolutely uncompromising as to the necessity of retaining the rules of quality (rules 4-7 in the nine rules). The French note of the 24th December (enclosed in this despatch) shows that they have modified their position. They are now prepared to abandon their insistence on rules 4-7, but they make this sacrifice conditional upon their being met by His Majesty's Government on four points enumerated in their note. Only one of these points, however, appears to present a real difficulty. The following observations on each of these four points are given as indications as to how far it is considered necessary for His Majesty's Government in fact to go in order to reach an agreement with the French Government:—

1. '*Avion[s] de Chasse*' (single-seater fighters)

The British delegates have been given to understand privately that, in the last resort, the French will accept their proposals, namely, to allow Germany to maintain a small quantity of sporting machines for advertisement and for racing purposes. The Germans have intimated unofficially to the air attaché that they also will accept this proposal. There should therefore be no difficulty in securing the formula already authorised by the Air Ministry, namely, that a normal but not extravagant number of high-powered racing

machines for taking part in racing and for advertisement, and a normal number of school and sports machines, may be maintained.

2. *Training in Aviation for Personnel of Reichswehr, Navy and Police*

As stated above, the Germans regard it as a point of honour not to include any prohibition of training by the officer class. On the other hand, the French insist on such a prohibition. This is one of the most dangerous points in the negotiations. The British delegates have suggested to the French delegates that the only possible course is to press the Germans to agree that no subsidies, extra leave or special opportunities shall be given to this personnel for aviation training, and that any member of these forces learning to fly should do so at his own expense or during his normal leave. It is, however, by no means certain how far the Germans would go to accept this. The British delegates suggest (a) that the best course will be to leave this question to be discussed between the French and German delegates on the latter's return, the British delegates using such moderating influence as they can, and (b) that it might be useful if His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin were instructed to mention this point to the German Government. The French view is quite clear, viz., that to allow military, naval or police officers to train would be a breach of article 198. If Lord D'Abernon could take up this individual point with the Germans with a view to inducing them to propose some formula which is in keeping with the terms of the treaty, or at least with a view to ascertaining how far the Germans will go, it would be of great assistance.

3. *Communication of Lists to the League of Nations*

This is the most difficult outstanding point between the British and French delegations. The British view (as stated in Foreign Office telegram No. 357,⁵ last paragraph) is that to stipulate for periodical communication of lists would (a) prejudice the liberty of the League, which alone should decide this point; (b) be hardly consonant with article 213 of the Versailles Treaty or with undertakings given at Locarno; (c) place the League in the position of an Allied police organ; and (d) be unnecessarily galling to Germany, who would be the only Power on whom such a duty would be imposed, at all events unless and until some provision for lists were included in a general disarmament scheme applicable to all members of the League.

As regards this last point (d), the French have taken exactly the contrary view, namely, that it would be far more aggravating to Germany to be liable to sudden demands from the League to produce lists than for her to furnish them automatically and as a matter of course every year, in much the same way as mandatory Powers furnish reports on their mandates. As regards points (b) and (c) of the British view, the French attitude is very definite. They hold that under article 213 the League is bound to undertake the task of investigation in Germany, but that article 213 cannot be fully applied in practice until the method of its application has been agreed

⁵ No. 145.

upon at discussions in the Council of the League after Germany has become a member. Therefore, if the Committee of Guarantee is to go, some provision must be made as regards aviation to provide that League investigation is possible in practice in the *intermediate* period between now and the time when the final League scheme is ready for application. The French anticipate that a very long time will elapse before the final League scheme is ready, as they expect that Germany will drag out the discussions in the League as long as possible; they refuse, therefore, to leave unprovided for the period up to the application of the final League scheme, and hold that either the Committee of Guarantee must remain until that time, or the League must enter upon its functions at once as regards aviation. A provision for periodical lists is, in French eyes, a factor essential to enable the League to exercise such functions. Incidentally, it will be seen that the French view of article 213 goes very much further than that of His Majesty's Government as regards the extent to which, in spite of Locarno, the League is endowed with police functions. As regards point (a) of the Foreign Office view, however, it will be seen that the French have now suggested a formula which should avoid prejudicing the League's decision as to the ultimate method of furnishing lists. They insert the words 'sous réserve des décisions que pourra ultérieurement prendre la Société des Nations' before 'la communication annuelle de ces registres.' It would appear that this formula subjects the whole question of periodical lists to an ultimate decision of the League, in whose power it would remain to abolish 'périodicité' altogether. In order, however, to ascertain whether the French delegates were prepared to go further to meet the British view, one of the British representatives called on M. Laroche again on the 26th December and reiterated the British objections to any form of periodical lists, explaining that in view of these objections he seriously doubted the utility of forwarding to the Foreign Office any formula which contained any suggestion of 'périodicité' whatever. M. Laroche maintained the French insistence on some form of 'périodicité' in principle. It appeared, however, as a result of some conversation, that the French would be prepared to accept some formula within the following limits:—

The German Government might be asked to furnish a complete list, possibly by an agreed date. If the Committee of Guarantee were still in Berlin at that date, the list could be given to the committee, who might check it and pass it on to the League of Nations. If the committee had already been withdrawn the list should be presented to the League. After this, subject to any later decision by the League ('sous réserve des décisions que pourra prendre ultérieurement la Société des Nations'), Germany should hold the lists at the disposal of the League in such manner as the League might require, and should communicate annually to the League the modifications which may have been introduced into the lists.

It is recommended that the British delegates be given authority to agree in the last resort to some formula within the above limits in the event of it proving absolutely impossible to induce the French to depart from their

insistence on 'périodicité.' Such a formula need not embody all the points mentioned in the preceding paragraph. It might possibly include a provision that a list should be furnished at a stated date to the Committee of Guarantee and that no further period should be set for the production of subsequent lists unless the general League scheme were not ready for application within a year of the presentation of the first list, in which case a further list, or modifications of the first list, should be furnished to the Ambassadors' Conference. If the British delegates could have authority within these limits it would appear advantageous, as this is certainly a point on which an absolute refusal to meet the French might well endanger the whole negotiations.

4. *Retention of Committee of Guarantee*

The French view is fully set forth in the note enclosed herein. Briefly, it is that the committee should be retained until some other effective method of investigation has been established. If this can only be done as a result of the general discussions on League investigations, after Germany has joined the League, then the committee should stay till that time. If, on the other hand, the present negotiations produce some method of investigation in aviation matters which the League can exercise in practice at once, then the committee can be withdrawn at an earlier date. But there must be no hiatus between committee investigation and League investigation.

Satisfaction for the French on this point really depends on the success of the present negotiations, and should result automatically therefrom. If a water-tight arrangement can be reached with the Germans which is proof against evasions and which provides an effective method of 'surveillance,' there should be no difficulty about the withdrawal of the Committee of Guarantee.

No. 162

*Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received December 30, 10 p.m.)
No. 511 Telegraphic [C 16715/51/18]*

BERLIN, December 30, 1925, 8.40 p.m.

Your despatch No. 2262.¹

The German government have replied that it does not appear opportune to proceed to signature of agreement whilst the future basis of German

¹ Not printed. This despatch of December 18 transmitted the English text of a proposed agreement to regulate Anglo-German civil air traffic, and of a draft note to be exchanged by Lord D'Abernon against a similar note signed by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. The draft note stated in particular that the two Governments were agreed that 'so long as the restrictions on German aircraft construction have not been modified in a sense acceptable to the German Government, the agreement will only affect air traffic between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Germany, but not air traffic over German territory. Further, in pursuance of article 4 of the ordinance of the 5th May, 1922, every British aircraft entering Germany by air must be provided with a certificate from His Britannic Majesty's Government, showing that the aircraft is designed for commercial use only and is not of a military type.'

civil aviation and consequently of Germany's air traffic relations with foreign countries is under discussion. It is, therefore, preferable in German government's view that the signature be postponed till after the conclusion of the present conversations.

With regard to the provisions of the last sentence of the protocol to the agreement of May 2nd, 1925² the German government declare their readiness, in view of the altered circumstances, to extend permission granted to existing British air lines to Germany for a further period of three months i.e. to March 31st.³

² This agreement which was concluded by representatives of the Air Ministry in Berlin is untraced in Foreign Office archives; cf. *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 183, col. 1183, for a statement by Sir S. Hoare, Secretary of State for Air, on May 7, 1925.

³ Mr. Baxter of the Central Department minuted on December 31: 'The Germans evidently are going to be unpleasant to our civil aviation after March 31, if the conversations regarding aeronautical control prove unsuccessful.'

No. 163

Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. Addison (Berlin)

No. 259 Telegraphic [C 16687/117/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 31, 1925, 1.15 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 510¹ (of the 26th December: aeronautical control in Germany).

A copy of a despatch from Paris No. 2788² of December 28th went to you last night showing position up to date of negotiations on aeronautical control in Paris.

There are two aspects of this question:—

First the technical aspect, viz. the terms of the law and guarantees that are to take the place of the present nine rules. The first essential is obviously to reach agreement on this, and it is greatly to be hoped that, as a result of your representations, the German delegates will, on their return to Paris on January 6th, bring with them detailed proposals of a nature that will ensure progress. The French lay special emphasis on the question of training members of the Reichswehr navy and police in aeronautical matters, to which they raise the strongest objection. On this question, as well as on that of the possession of high-powered fighting aircraft, His Majesty's Government are in full agreement with them, and you should impress upon the German government the particular importance of submitting satisfactory proposals on these two points.

Secondly there is the question of procedure. Neither the French nor we are prepared to accept any hiatus between the cessation of present allied control and future League investigations under article 213 of the treaty. This is only logical. The general plan of the treaty was that the disarmament

¹ No. 160.

² No. 161.

of Germany should be carried out under the supervision of allied commissions and that when these were withdrawn, it should devolve upon the League of Nations under article 213 to ensure by investigation Germany's continued observance of the military limitations laid down. Clearly then as soon as the Aeronautical Committee is withdrawn, the Council must be in a position to take up its duties under article 213.

No difficulty would have arisen but for what passed at Locarno when the German delegation challenged the whole scheme of League investigation of September 27th 1924. The German government cannot however expect that we can agree to be left without a guarantee of any kind, whether in existing form or under the League scheme, that Germany's obligations as regards air disarmament under article 198 will be respected.

In other words if the German government wish to see the Committee of Guarantee and the nine rules withdrawn forthwith, it behoves them not only to pass satisfactory legislation but also to agree to the application by the Council of the League scheme of September 1924 pending a discussion of whole question of League investigation when Germany enters the League. Alternatively it is up to them to submit some other scheme which will equally bridge the hiatus.

Please see Dr. Stresemann personally without delay and explain the situation to him on the above lines. We feel confident that he will recognise our attitude as both logical and reasonable, and that he will do what he can to achieve a settlement of a particularly involved question. You should point out that His Majesty's Government have every desire to reach a solution of this question with the least possible delay, but that they are bound to insist, in conjunction with the French and Belgian governments, that some system of investigation as provided by the treaty must be ready for application before the present system can be withdrawn. It is therefore essential that the German delegates should come to Paris on January 6th next, armed with proposals offering a reasonable basis for continued negotiations both on the technical issues and on that of procedure. Otherwise continued negotiations are clearly useless.

Repeated to Paris³ No. 363 (by bag); copy to Brussels (by bag) and Rome (by bag).

³ With reference to the present telegram Sir W. Tyrrell, in Foreign Office despatch No. 8 to Paris of January 1, 1926, in reply to No. 161, informed Lord Crewe: 'In regard to the question of the communication of periodical lists of pilots, machines, &c., it seems undesirable to authorise you to agree with the French in urging the German Government to supply the League of Nations with such lists. If the German Government come forward with some such proposal on their own, or if they can be induced to put one forward, it is a different matter; but any discussion of the method in which the League of Nations will carry out its rights of investigation is clearly for the Council itself to decide. On the other hand, there is certainly no intrinsic objection to the British representatives in the last resort agreeing to some compromise such as they suggest in the enclosure to your Lordship's despatch under reply, viz., that a list should be furnished on a stated date to the Committee of Guarantee, and that no further period should be set for the production of subsequent lists unless the general League scheme were not ready for application within a year of the presentation of the first list, in which case a further list, or modification of the first list,

should be furnished to the Ambassadors' Conference. It is, of course, clear that the necessity for any provision in respect of such lists is contingent on there being a hiatus between Allied control and League supervision. If League supervision comes into force at once, the question of lists does not arise, as there is no such provision in the League scheme as at present drawn up.' The despatch further stated that Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen and Wing Commander Smyth-Pigott should come to London to discuss the question of aeronautical control: cf. No. 170, note 1.

No. 164

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 2, 1926, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 516 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/5]

PARIS, December 31, 1925

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the presidency of Monsieur Jules Cambon; I was present as well as the Italian Ambassador. The Belgian Ambassador and representatives of the Japanese and United States Embassy were also present.

The questions considered were as follows:— . . .¹

6. *Entry of German police into evacuated Rhineland zone.*

The conference considered the Versailles Committee's report of November 28th (see my despatch No. 2571² of December 3rd). In accordance with the authority contained in your despatch No. 4096³ (C. 15866/2/18) of December 15th, I agreed to a communication being sent to the Rhineland High Commission to the following effect:—

'La Conférence des Ambassadeurs invite les autorités alliées d'occupation à régler, par entente avec les autorités allemandes, l'installation dans la zone de Cologne d'une force de police de 5,500 hommes environ, chiffre arrêté au cours de la réunion interalliée du 27 Août 1925, en attendant que la Commission Militaire de Contrôle ait fixé définitivement la répartition détaillée de l'effectif total des 10,000 policiers attribués à l'ensemble des territoires occupés, d'accord avec le gouvernement allemand, ainsi que le prévoit l'instruction du 27 Novembre 1925.⁴

'A cet effet la date d'entrée et l'effectif de chaque détachement entrant dans la zone à évacuer devront être fixés à l'avance entre les autorités alliées d'occupation et les autorités allemandes.' . . .¹

¹ The omitted sections related to other matters.

² See No. 147, note 1.

³ No. 147.

⁴ Untraced in Foreign Office archives. See, however, No. 115, note 9, for a reference to draft instructions of November 23.

No. 165

Mr. Eyres¹ (Durazzo) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 11, 1926)

No. 193 [C 391/391/90]*

Confidential

DURAZZO, December 31, 1925

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the President to-day informed me confidentially that the principal object of the visit of Signor Lessona [Lessona] that Italian Deputy on whose activities Mr. Parr reported in his despatch No. 110 of the 8th [29th] August last,² was to attempt to persuade his Excellency that it would be well for Albania to give her assent to the formula which was adopted by the Ambassadors' Conference in November 1921³ with regard to the right of Italy to protect Albania in case she should appeal to the League of Nations for protection against attack.

2. The President told me, however, that he had no intention whatever of acceding to this request (nor indeed of allowing Italy to obtain any preponderating political influence in Albania), but he had informed Signor Lessona that he was ready to sign a treaty of friendship whenever Italy so desired. Ahmed Bey also said that Signor Lessona's mission was connected with an offer to construct the port of Durazzo, with regard to which no decision has been taken.⁴

3. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, &c.,

H. C. A. EYRES

¹ H.M. Minister at Durazzo.

² Not printed. Mr. Parr, H.M. Vice-Consul at Durazzo, was then acting as Chargé d'Affaires. For Signor Lessona's mission to Albania cf. *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Settima Serie, vol. iv, pp. 48 and 114-15.

³ See No. 129, note 14.

⁴ In Durazzo despatch No. 22 of January 30, 1926, Mr. Parr reported that his American, French and Yugoslav colleagues were uneasy regarding Italian economic policy towards Albania, and that Ahmed Bey's 'great concern is the possibility of Italy having to resort to military action in the event of his standing out against her demands'. Sir A. Chamberlain replied on February 18 in his despatch No. 38 to Durazzo: 'You should always bear in mind that the policy of His Majesty's Government in Albania is one of non-interference, and that if Albania becomes involved in international difficulties her proper and obvious course is to appeal at once to the League of Nations.'

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received January 4)

No. 4 [C 77/77/22]

ROME, January 1, 1926

Sir,

I notice from the despatch of His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade No. 467¹ of the 16th ultimo and from other reports a recurrence of the rumours, always emanating from the same sources, regarding the dangers to be apprehended from Italian foreign policy. Monsieur Nincic seems to be genuinely alarmed and foreshadows the possibility of an Italo-Russian understanding.

2. In regard to the general assertion that Italy is preparing for some 'dangerous adventure' I can only repeat my opinion already previously expressed to you that I do not believe for one moment that Signor Mussolini contemplates anything of the kind. It is my conviction that his aim is to re-make and consolidate his country and that he is fully aware that for the completion of his task a further, if not a prolonged period of peace is essential.

3. It is of course true that a section of the press and especially of the Government press displays at times an arrogant, even a threatening attitude, which furnishes grounds for suspicion. Nor is Signor Mussolini's own language in his speeches to Fascist gatherings altogether reassuring. In Opposition circles here this attitude is the object of considerable comment. The suggestion is made that Signor Mussolini does intend in the near future to adventure upon some great hazard with the object of consolidating Italy's position in the world and of enlarging her territories. Opposition leaders, when asked in what direction such adventures would proceed, have even gone so far as to foretell an early war against France. To the suggestion that such an enterprise would be disastrous for Italy the answer is given that Signor Mussolini is not sane, or that he counts upon German support (which would perhaps come to the same thing). Certainly if Signor Mussolini contemplates any such idea serious doubts as to his sanity would be justified. My own opinion from personal observation is that his frame of mind in foreign affairs is eminently sane and reasonable. You, Sir, have had a recent opportunity of forming your own judgment in the matter.²

¹ Not printed. In this despatch Mr. Kennard reported a conversation on December 16, 1925, with M. Nincich, who spoke as indicated below and also expressed the view that the moment was not ripe for a Balkan pact.

² On December 29, 1925, Signor Mussolini had visited Rapallo and called on Sir A. Chamberlain, whose only record of this conversation, a private letter to Sir W. Tyrrell, is untraced in Foreign Office archives. Sir A. Chamberlain subsequently stated that 'his conversation with M. Mussolini at Rapallo had been so general in character as not to call for a special record', and that he had advocated that the negotiations for the settlement of the Italian war debt to H.M. Government (see No. 179) should be conducted between Count Volpi, Italian Minister of Finance, and Mr. Churchill, Chancellor of the Exchequer: 'there had been no suggestion of a political bargain of any sort or kind'. Sir A. Chamberlain also stated that 'his impression had been that the Italian Prime Minister was inclining more and more to a League of Nations policy and to a general attitude similar to that of Great Britain'. See also *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Settima Serie, vol. iv, p. 159.

4. I think it is clear that the Opposition which, for the moment, no longer exists as an active element in Italian political life, does all it can after its failure in internal affairs to make our flesh creep by emphasizing the dangers of Fascist foreign policy. The chief weapon left to them is propaganda of this kind. I believe that the alarmist rumours current abroad might often be traced to Opposition inspiration.

5. But as I have already admitted above, the assertions of Fascism are at times of a somewhat alarming nature and the question arises why, if Signor Mussolini's intentions are in fact pacific, he allows such assertions to be made.

6. I can at once offer two reasons for this. One is that Signor Mussolini is no great believer in a prolonged period of European peace and considers that the spirit of the Italian military, naval and air forces should be kept in fighting trim. He has concentrated their direction in his own hands and is doing everything that he can to promote their efficiency. It is evidently not detrimental to the fighting spirit of the services to believe that a war with somebody—France, Jugo-Slavia or whoever it may be—is not an impossible contingency. The second reason is that the small section of ultra violent Fascisti who believe in an Italian empire over the Mediterranean, etc., etc., are his most devoted adherents, ready to sacrifice their lives for him at any moment and although he perhaps laughs at them he recognises their value and does not wish to discourage them too much. Signor Mussolini's methods may seem dangerous and perhaps are dangerous unless he can always feel himself strong enough to apply the necessary brake. But I am convinced that they do not signify any immediate, or indeed early action of a bellicose nature. The often repeated suggestion that such action is likely to be begun in order to create a diversion from internal embarrassments may be dismissed as devoid of all foundation. At the present moment Signor Mussolini is singularly free from any embarrassments of the kind. The Opposition groups are entirely discredited; if free elections were held tomorrow he would undoubtedly sweep the country and any serious troubles appear remote. They will come again in time, no doubt, but for the moment there is nothing of the kind to suggest the necessity or advisability of the doubtful panacea of foreign adventure.

7. Among the dangers indicated by Monsieur Nincic is that of an Italo-Russian understanding. The possibility of such an understanding must always be reckoned with for reasons which were set forth at some length in my despatch No. 631³ of July 23rd. But I do not believe that any far-reaching agreement is imminent or that it would have the immediate result suggested by Monsieur Nincic, though it is possible that Italy might disinterest herself in Bessarabia in order to obtain support for territorial ambitions in regard to Turkey. In this connection the Greek Minister assures me that the conclusion of the recent Russo-Turkish agreement has caused great disappointment and annoyance here. It may have done so in certain circles and that it shou[ld] have would not be unnatural. There is

³ Not printed.

little to be gathered from the press though some papers are perturbed over the suggestion that Asia may attempt to organise against Europe and others are indignant over the report that Turkey was suspicious of Italian intentions. In the meantime Senator Contarini assures me that the Italian Government view the Russo-Turkish agreement with equanimity and attach little importance to it.

8. The real possibilities in regard to an Italian understanding with Russia are difficult to estimate. In certain Fascist quarters the desire for further agreement and closer collaboration is strong. A few days ago I received from a source that is often valuable an account of Signor de Stefani⁴ having expressed himself as favourable to a close cooperation and my informant seemed to think that something was in the air. This was before the announcement of the Russo-Turkish agreement made in Paris and it may be that certain expectations were nipped before they flowered. My own impression is that Signor Mussolini attaches importance to cooperation with Russia particularly from a commercial point of view, and that in any case he is not in a hurry with regard to any further problems in which Russian cooperation might be useful.⁵

I have, &c.,
R. GRAHAM

⁴ Professor de Stefani had resigned as Italian Minister of Finance in July 1925.

⁵ Sir R. Graham further stated in a letter of January 8 to Mr. Lampson that he had discussed the situation with his French colleague who attached no importance to the 'rather wild Fascist talk'. M. Besnard said that it was 'perfectly obvious that Italy could not embark on any adventure unless supported either by Germany, France or Great Britain. The first of these could not, and the two others would not, afford any such support.' Sir R. Graham concluded his letter by expressing his agreement with these views but he also pointed out that 'the 400,000 annual Italian babies do constitute a danger for the future, as Italy will be absolutely compelled sooner or later to find some outlet for her surplus population'.

No. 167

Mr. Peters (Moscow) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received January 11)

No. 3 [N 121/53/38]

MOSCOW, *January 1, 1926*

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 889¹ of December 19th last, I have the honour to report that the Fourteenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party began in Moscow on December 18th and ended on December 31st.

2. The proceedings of the Congress have shown clearly that there is a definite split in the party, or at least in the small clique which runs the party. It is probable that much will be said abroad regarding these party quarrels. I shall endeavour in the present despatch to give an estimate of the importance of what has happened, but must in fairness say that this estimate is based

¹ Not printed.

practically entirely on press accounts of the debates, accounts which bear signs of careful pruning before publication.

3. The question resolves itself into four parts

- (i) What has happened?
- (ii) Why has it happened?
- (iii) What effect will the party quarrel have in the Soviet Union?
- (iv) What effect will the party quarrel have on the relations of foreign countries with the Soviet Union?

4. To answer (iv) first, I consider that there will be no change in Soviet foreign policy. There is no indication that any criticism was directed against it. M. Chicherin addressed the Congress, but no report of his speech has yet been published. I transmit with another despatch² the portion of M. Stalin's report on the work of the Central Committee of the Party which dealt with foreign politics. Nothing new was said: the attention of the Congress was devoted to internal affairs.

5. I turn to an account of what happened. The Congress opened as usual with reports on the work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party—by M. Stalin (political report) and M. Molotov³ (report on party organisation). On this occasion forty-three members of the Congress demanded that an opportunity should be given for the presentation of an alternative report,—(by Party statutes any forty members have the right to demand this)—and nominated M. Zinovyev as their spokesman. In the course of the discussion it became clear that the 'opposition' consisted of (a) the Leningrad delegation to the Congress *en bloc*, headed by M. Zinovyev and (b) a few other prominent leaders, viz MM. Kamenev, Sokolnikov, Lashevich, and Madame Krupskaya.⁴ The final voting on the report of the Central Committee of the Party was 559 for and 65 against, the latter number including some 60 members of the Leningrad delegation.

6. It will be seen that the opposition includes two out of seven members of the Politbureau, besides the Commissary of Finance, who is an influential member of the Central Committee, the Assistant Commissary for War and M. Lenin's widow.

7. The question naturally arises as to the points on which the views of these five and their followers differ from the policy proclaimed by the Central Committee. Yet an analysis of the speeches of the opposition will show that they constantly proclaim full accord with all previous resolutions on party policy and with the general line of policy laid down as recently as October at the plenary session of the Central Committee.

² Moscow despatch No. 2 of January 1 is not printed. For extracts from the speech on December 18, 1925, by M. Stalin, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the U.S.S.R., see Jane Degras, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 69–76.

³ Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the U.S.S.R.

⁴ M. Kamenev was a Vice-President of the Council of People's Commissars and President of the Council for Labour and Defence; M. Sokolnikov was Commissar for Finance; M. Lashevich was Assistant Commissar for War; Madame Krupskaya was the widow of M. Lenin, who had been President of the Council of People's Commissars from 1917 to 1924.

8. True, the two sides accused each other of 'anti-Leninism' on various points which had already come up for discussion at the party conferences preceding the Congress. M. Zinovyev and his followers were accused of 'underestimating the importance of the moderately well-to-do peasant', and replied by declaring that their opponents 'underestimated the danger of the kulak (the wealthy peasant exploiting his poorer brethren)'. The question of State capitalism was debated at length, with huge quotations from M. Lenin's works on both sides. The question of admitting large numbers of workers into the party was another on which discussion raged.

9. It would, however, be true to say that no indication was given that if the opposition minority to-morrow became the governing majority, there would be any break in policy. The opposition put forward no programme of practical measures.

10. The differences between the two parties can therefore only be based on

- (a) general considerations
- or (b) personal grounds.

11. I believe that the differences are largely personal, and would therefore answer in that sense the second of the questions posed in paragraph 3.

12. My opinion, which is based on numerous veiled allusions in the course of the debates, is that M. Stalin has since M. Lenin died been busily engaged in strengthening his position as the dominant figure in the Party. He is a member of the Politbureau of seven, but he is more than that: he is the general secretary of the party and as such wields immense power. He has no post in the Government. He rarely appears in public. He never allows himself to be interviewed. He thus gains the reputation of the 'strong stern silent man'.

13. Apparently there have been divergences of view inside the Politbureau ever since the Trotski discussion.⁵ MM. Zinovyev and Kamenev were in favour of stern disciplinary party measures against M. Trotski, but M. Stalin after apparently agreeing with them finally took the opposite view. MM. Zinovyev and Kamenev felt that they were being delicately shelved. Friction continued, but an agreement was reached some time ago that there should be no open dispute at the Party Congress. This agreement was observed until the Moscow Party Conference adopted a long 'Address to the Leningrad Organisation' after a debate in which speeches clearly directed against M. Zinovyev and M. Kamenev were made. This 'Address' was practically an assertion that the Leningrad Party Organisation was working against the Central Committee of the Party, and was made on the motion of M. Rikov.⁶ The result of this was to precipitate action. The agreement to abstain from 'discussion' at the Congress could no longer be observed.

⁵ M. Trotsky had resigned as Commissar for War in January 1925. In May 1925 he was appointed a member of the Supreme Council of National Economy and Chairman of its Concessions Committee, its Board of Electrotechnical Development and its Industrial Technological Commission. He had recently been re-elected to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the U.S.S.R.

⁶ President of the Council of People's Commissars.

14. It may be taken for granted that whether MM. Zinovyev and Kamenev are re-elected to the Politbureau or not, their position in the party will be severely shaken. To this extent M. Stalin will have succeeded in his designs.

15. There remains the third question as to the importance of this quarrel for the Soviet Union in general. In the course of the discussion the opposition accused the majority of 'idealising' the new economic policy (NEP) and of tending to forget the last part of M. Lenin's statement that 'NEP was entered upon seriously, for a long period, *but not for ever*'. There may therefore be a tendency to regard the opposition as 'left' and as representing vaguely a return to military communism of the pre-NEP period. Yet both M. Zinovyev and M. Kamenev would be the first to deny any desire to do away with NEP.

16. I am inclined to think that M. Zinovyev is in part influenced by his position as President of the Communist International. Foreign communists visiting the Soviet Union have found there a state of affairs very different from communism or even socialism. They have been told by the Communist International that NEP is a stage through which all countries have to pass. Any attempt therefore to describe the present state of affairs in the Soviet Union as something final would obviously have a 'damping' effect on the enthusiasm of foreign communists, who might begin to have doubts as to whether it was worth while to have a revolution if merely NEP were the result. M. Kamenev again, in his work as President of the Council of Labour and Defence—the supreme organ of the Soviet State in matters economical—must have come face to face with the fact that there is little socialist spirit in Soviet State industry or Soviet trade. M. Sokolnikov, too, must appreciate, as Commissary of Finance, the realities of the position. General considerations would thus reinforce the personal motives to which reference has been made above.

17. I believe that the country—call it Russia or the Soviet Union—is developing along a line of its own and that the Communist Party and the Soviet Government alike are unable to alter this line of development. For this reason I cannot attach extreme importance to the present dispute in the Communist Party so far as the general life of the country is concerned. There is no reason to suppose that the split will have any immediate effect on the position of the Soviet Government. Since M. Lenin died there has been no single directing force in the Party or in the Government, and more mistakes are being made. But the effect of these mistakes is cumulative and not immediate. The Party and the Government are determined to remain in power and so long as this is so no considerations as to whether the measures they take are socialistic or otherwise will prevent them from making any concession which they see is necessary to enable them to retain their position.

18. To sum up, I consider that

(A) a serious split has occurred, chiefly on personal grounds, but supported by a feeling in the minds of sections of the party that NEP is something which has many undesirable sides which should not be glossed over.

(B) M. Stalin's position in the Party will be strengthened for the time being.

(C) No big question of policy is at stake. It is not even a fight between 'right' and 'left'.

(D) The position of the Party as a whole will be slightly weakened. It is impossible to imagine that there will be no friction even after the opposition has in obedience to party discipline accepted the verdict of the supreme party authority—the Party Congress.

(E) No question of foreign policy is at stake, if we except the fact that M. Sokolnikov is charged with having advocated the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. I enclose a résumé of M. Sokolnikov's speech and of comments thereon.⁷

(F) There is no reason to suppose that the country as a whole will be affected in any considerable degree by the party split.

To these points I should add information derived from other sources to the effect that

(G) M. Trotski has come to some agreement with M. Stalin and will be gradually 'promoted' by the latter. In other words M. Trotski's personality and prestige will be mobilised for Soviet purposes while M. Stalin will remain in the Party background.

19. I would again emphasise that the above conclusions are founded on what may prove to be insufficiently full data, and may therefore require revision as further information becomes available.

I have, &c.,
WILLIAM PETERS

⁷ Not printed.

No. 168

Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 3, 9 a.m.)
No. 1 Telegraphic [C 60/24/18]

BERLIN, January 2, 1926, 9.35 p.m.

Your telegram No. 259.¹

I have had a long interview with Stresemann and discussed at length the whole position.

I said that apart from a satisfactory solution of any other points there were three subjects which I had been instructed to bring to his attention, viz:—

1. Training of members of Reichswehr in aeronautical matters;
2. Possession of high powered fighting aircraft;
3. Necessity that before committee of guarantee and nine rules were withdrawn, German government should have agreed to application of League scheme of supervision of September 1924 pending discussion of the whole question of League supervision when Germany shall have entered the League.

¹ No. 163.

It was absolutely essential that on these three points a settlement should be achieved which would meet with our approval and it was of no use for German delegates to go to Paris with any proposals which fell short of this requirement.

Stresemann who confessed that he had been unable to discuss the matter fully with anybody since no one has been working for the last week, appeared to me personally to incline to our point of view and merely raised the objection that it was extremely difficult for him to overcome resistance of Reichswehr ministry.

I replied that I hoped that here as in England the Cabinet had power to override objections of technical advisers who were there to advise but not to command.

Stresemann took a careful note of what had been said and promised to enter into (?necessary) discussions at once. I am to see him on Tuesday January 5th when he will let me know result. He said he hoped it would be satisfactory but it was a tiresome and up-hill task to argue with other government departments and with men who had absolutely no political sense.

No. 169

Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 6, 9 a.m.)

No. 2 Telegraphic [C 209/24/18]

BERLIN, January 5, 1926, 9.58 p.m.

My telegram No. 1.¹

I have had another long and satisfactory interview with Stresemann who said that German experts had left for Paris with the following instructions.

1. Possession of high powered fighting aircraft. They will settle in manner desired, that is they will require no fighting aircraft as such, but only a certain number of machines for racing purposes.

2. They will agree that on withdrawal of the committee of guarantee and of the 9 Rules, League of Nations shall immediately be entitled to exercise their power of supervision under Article 213.

With regard to training of members of Reichswehr in aeronautical matters Stresemann said that he could not yet give me an answer as he intended to bring the question up in the Cabinet on the 8th instant. He could not do it before that date as the Chancellor was away and the Presidency in the Chancellor's absence would devolve on Dr. Gessler. Stresemann said he was confident he would get the Cabinet to agree to prohibition of such training or in any case to some slight compromise to military sense of dignity in direction of strict limitation of such voluntary training to a very small number of officers and men say twenty all told. But, he repeated, he meant to insist on total prohibition and was almost certain he would succeed.

¹ No. 168.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 7, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 2 Telegraphic: by bag [C 219/24/18]

PARIS, January 6, 1926

Your despatch No. 41¹ of January 5th. German aviation.
British delegates met French delegates this afternoon and informed them

¹ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. This despatch transmitted the record of a meeting at the Foreign Office on January 4 to discuss the attitude to be adopted by the British delegation in the negotiations on aeronautical control. The meeting was attended by Sir William Tyrrell, Mr. Lampson, Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Mr. Troutbeck, and Mr. Baxter of the Foreign Office, Air Vice-Marshal Steel and Major Don of the Air Ministry and Wing Commander Smyth-Pigott.

The following points, in particular, were discussed:

(1) "that subsidies should not be made by the Reich or by any public body to pilots in excess of those required for normal commercial flying;"

'It was agreed that this point must be insisted upon.

(2) "that the number of uneconomic high-powered racing machines should be limited to what is required for racing and advertisement;" . . . it was agreed that we should let the French go ahead and demand total prohibition; if and when a deadlock was reached, we should come forward with our proposal.

(3) "that the number of school and sports machines should be similarly limited;"

Commander Smyth-Pigott said that the French attached less importance to this point, and it was agreed that it was of less consequence than point (2).

(4) "that pilotless machines should be prohibited;" . . . it was agreed that we should insist on this point.

(5) "that all pilots, machines, companies, etc., should be registered;"

'The Germans having declared that existing laws already provided for registration, it was clear that we were not asking for very much on this point.'

(Point (6) was subsequently redrafted by the Air Ministry in the light of discussion at the meeting to read: "(6). That any Ministry engaged in the organisation and administration of a combatant force shall have no liaison whatever with aviation of any kind. That all Aerial Training will be carried out on Civil, as opposed to Military, lines.")

(7) "that members of the Reichswehr, navy and police should not receive aeronautical training;"

'Mr. Lampson expressed the view that here the French were right, and Sir W. Tyrrell agreed. He (Sir W. Tyrrell) deprecated offering the less stringent proposal suggested by our own Delegation. The point was one upon which it was within our strict treaty rights to insist to the full. He understood that it would be imposing no hardship upon the Germans (Vice Marshal Steel assented). . . . It was agreed that we should hold out for complete satisfaction on this question and accept no compromise. If it came to breaking point, we could reconsider the matter. . . .

'Mr. Lampson reminded the meeting that we had agreed that no hiatus was possible between allied control and League investigation. . . .

'Commander Smyth-Pigott said he thought it quite possible that the French would be content with the furnishing of lists to the Ambassadors' Conference and, if they got that, would not press for any control or investigations at all pending the applicability of the League scheme. . . .

'It was agreed that if the French could be induced to accept an arrangement on the lines of the preceding paragraph, it would be the best solution of all. In fact it brought us back to what we had originally aimed at—viz. to get the Committee of Guarantee withdrawn

of the result of discussions in London. Your telegram No. 1² arrived during the meeting, and French delegates were informed of its contents.

Agreement was reached on all the technical and political points at issue. As regards uneconomic high-powered machines French insist on pressing in the first instance for complete prohibition. British delegates agreed to follow this course, but made it clear that they could not risk a rupture with Germans on this point. French then agreed that, if necessary, they themselves would propose compromise in the sense of allowing a limited number of such machines for racing and advertisement purposes.

As regards the training of Reichswehr etc. personnel, in view of the last paragraph of your telegram No. 1 it was agreed that the expert delegates should impress upon the Germans the absolute insistence of the Allies upon total prohibition in order that Dr. Nord should be able to inform his government before the Cabinet meets on January 8th. French are similarly telegraphing to French Ambassador in Berlin to press this point, and suggested that His Majesty's Ambassador should continue to do likewise.³

As regards procedure, it had already been agreed before receipt of your telegram No. 1, that the best course would be to ask the Germans what proposals they had to make, and if necessary to suggest that they should agree to the provisional application of the scheme of September 1924 pending a final decision as to League investigation. This seems to accord with point 2 in your telegram No. 1.

In reply to enquiries French stated that their negotiations on the question of 'survol' are proceeding smoothly.

French asked that no pressure should be used on Germans at present to join the Air Convention, as French public opinion is still against unrestricted flight by German machines over France. French Government prefer, therefore, agreements between Germany and individual countries.

First meeting with Germans is to take place tomorrow morning when only technical delegates will be present.

Please inform Air Ministry. Air Attaché is not reporting separately.

as soon as we had agreed with the German government on a satisfactory substitute for the present Nine Rules. The furnishing of lists to the Ambassadors' Conference pending the applicability of League investigation would harm nobody, though it was felt that annual lists would be enough, and that we should oppose anything in the way of monthly lists. It was therefore agreed that nothing should be said to the French for the moment of our alternative idea of retaining the Committee of Guarantee while scrapping the Nine Rules.'

² No. 169 was repeated to Paris as Foreign Office telegram No. 1.

³ The preceding portion of the present telegram was summarized in Foreign Office telegram No. 1 to Berlin of January 7, which instructed Mr. Addison 'to impress upon Dr. Stresemann once again before the Cabinet meets the importance with which His Majesty's Government regard this point'.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 8, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 4 Telegraphic: by bag [C 245/24/18]

PARIS, January 7, 1926

My telegram No. 2¹ of yesterday.

A meeting of the Allied and German air experts took place to-day. General Desticker [was] in the chair.

The chairman opened the discussion by asking the Germans whether they could now put forward more comprehensive proposals. Germans replied that they were still in the dark as to full allied requirements. General Desticker then replied that the following were the *technical* requirements of the allies. (Political requirements were reserved for discussion at a full meeting later on.)

- (a) No aerial training of personnel belonging to the Reichswehr, navy or the police.
- (b) Prohibition of subsidies from the Reich, States, and public bodies, for training of pilots beyond normal commercial requirements.
- (c) List of pilots, factories, aeroplanes, etc., to be kept by the German government.
- (d) No liaison allowed between any Ministry engaged in the organisation or administration of a combatant force and civil aviation of any kind.
- (e) All aerial training to be on civil lines.
- (f) Prohibition of pilotless machines and 'avions de chasse.'
- (g) The existing German *Projet de Loi*.

Herr Fisch then replied that he understood that the object of the meeting was to discuss the replacement of the Nine Rules by a law and sufficient guarantees in a Note. Prohibition of pilotless machines and 'avions de chasse' clearly meant that two of the Nine Rules were to be maintained. In view of the absence of his technical expert, he asked that these two questions should be further discussed at the next meeting. He also requested that the question of Reichswehr, etc., training and the question of lists should be discussed by the full Mixed Committee.

The German government agreed generally to prohibit subsidies for training of pilots, but Herr Fisch pointed out that at the present moment there were considerable legal difficulties in prohibiting municipalities, communes, etc., from paying subsidies. He concluded, however, that these difficulties might be overcome.

As regards point (f), it should be noted that prohibition on 'avions de chasse' will not be adhered to by the French in the last resort, and that they are prepared to accept the British proposal on this point. However, they consider that the term 'high powered uneconomic machine' is too vague, and suggest that in the German Guarantee such an aeroplane might be described

¹ No. 170.

as follows: 'aeroplanes whose "poids mort" divided by horse power of the engine is less than 3·5'.

A further discussion by German and Allied experts will take place on Monday² as regards 'avions de chasse' and 'pilotless machines'.

As regards training of Reichswehr personnel, Dr. Nord has promised to put forward a formula.

Please inform Air Ministry; Air Attaché is not reporting separately.

² January 11, 1926.

No. 172

Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 9, 9 a.m.)
No. 3 Telegraphic [Germany 24/11]

BERLIN, January 8, 1926, 9.20 p.m.

Your telegram No. 1.¹

In the absence of Minister for Foreign Affairs I saw Secretary of State this morning and impressed on him once more the importance which His Majesty's Government attach to question of total prohibition of training Reichswehr, &c., in aeronautical matters.

His Excellency promised to bring these renewed representations to the notice of Herr Stresemann.²

The Cabinet meets to-morrow at 5 o'clock, and Secretary of State promised to inform me at once of result of their deliberations.³

¹ See No. 170, note 3.

² In a letter of January 8 (docket only preserved in Foreign Office archives) Berlin Chancery explained 'why question of training of police not formerly alluded to in conversation between Mr. Addison and Dr. Stresemann has since been made subject of conversation in interview between Mr. Addison and Herr von Schubert on 8th January'.

³ Mr. Addison subsequently reported in Berlin telegram No. 5 of January 10 that the German Cabinet had adjourned without reaching a definite decision.

No. 173

Letter from Mr. Addison (Berlin) to Mr. Lampson (Received January 12)
[C 454/142/18]

BERLIN, January 9, 1926

My dear Miles,

Schubert gave to me to-day the enclosed 'Heads of Agreement for the interpretation of clauses 1 and 2 of the protocol to the Commercial Treaty'.¹

He put forward the suggestion that we should accept them as they stand

¹ The Anglo-German Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and attached Protocol of December 2, 1924, with relevant documents, are printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 119, pp. 369-89.

in this draft, i.e. with the elimination of the word 'maintain' before 'support' in paragraph 5.

He also remarked with regard to paragraph 8, that the promised customs alleviations have not all been made in England, notably in regard to the freedom from duty of samples.

As a matter of fact Thelwall² had before leaving Berlin already received the same document from Hemmen³ with the small discrepancy that Hemmen appears to have suggested that we should retain either of the words 'maintain' or 'support' at our choice.

We did not then report the matter as Thelwall was to see Fountain⁴ on January 4th and discuss it fully with him.

Your's ever,
JOSEPH ADDISON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 173

As a result of discussions in London between representatives of His Majesty's Government and the German Government on certain points arising out of the Protocol to the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty in regard to such customs duties as have been introduced or reintroduced since the signature of the Treaty and to future customs duties, agreement was reached on the following points:

1. Clauses 1 and 2 of the Protocol should be read together, their object being to establish that the principle of the most-favoured-nation should be given the widest possible interpretation and that the two parties should have due regard to reciprocity.

2. Whilst 'discrimination against the trade of the other party' in clause 1 of the Protocol is understood to mean primarily the selection by one party of particular articles of the other party for differential treatment either by rates of duty or by classification, it is recognised that discrimination may, in fact, also arise from the imposition of duties or the adoption of classification which while general in their theoretical scope, apply in practice exclusively, or mainly, to the goods of the other party.

3. With reference to the words in clause 2 of the Protocol 'Each party agrees not to impose, reimpose, or prolong any duties or charges which are specially injurious to the other party' it is agreed that these are to be interpreted as relating to any such duty or charge as, either because of its exceptional rate or because of its exceptional influence on trade, taking all circumstances and facts of the particular case together, has proved or is proving particularly harmful to the trade of the other party, even though not introduced or specially directed against that trade.

4. The mere fact that Germany has a predominating share of the imports into the United Kingdom of a particular class of goods or vice versa, is,

² Commercial Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Berlin.

³ A Counsellor in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Mr. H. Fountain, Principal Assistant Secretary to the Board of Trade.

generally speaking, not to be regarded as sufficient evidence that a duty on such goods should be considered to be 'specially injurious' in the sense of paragraph 3 above. It would, however, afford prima facie evidence that such a duty 'specially affects' the trade between the two countries within the meaning of the second sentence of clause 2 of the Protocol so that in regard to any such duties, considerations of reciprocity should be taken into account and due regard given to the development on fair and equitable terms of the commerce of the two countries.

5. The British Government should be well satisfied that the principles laid down in paragraph[s] 3 and 4 above have been adhered to before imposing a duty on the recommendation of a Safeguarding Committee as against German goods, except where 'the right to take appropriate measures to preserve their own industries' in § 1 of the Protocol is invoked. This phrase extends to those exceptional cases, where, after due investigation a preservation-duty as distinct from a duty which is designed to support, foster, or even develop an industry, appears unavoidable to prevent the particular industry from an immediate deterioration.

6. As long as Germany is extending to British Goods, all customs concessions which she has granted and is still further granting in her commercial treaties with other nations, H.M. Government recognise that equity and the principle of the Commercial Treaty Protocol require

- (1) that wherever the question of German competition is investigated under the Safeguarding procedure, the particular circumstances prevailing in Germany should be taken into full consideration, i.e. the disappearance of any export bounty which may formerly have resulted from the depreciation of German currency and any other relevant circumstances;
- (2) That the German case should be given a full hearing before the Committee, and therefore no restriction be imposed on any person, who represents a German firm in this country, acting in either capacity as a party, witness or expert before such committee.

7. It is recognised that the various finance duties introduced or reintroduced in the United Kingdom by the Finance Act, 1925, cannot usefully be discussed until there has been more experience with regard to their actual influence on trade between the two countries.

8. Certain other matters relating to the customs treatment in each country of the products of the other have been agreed to whilst others are still under the consideration of the respective Governments.

London.

Despatch from M. Briand to M. de Fleuriau (Communicated by French Ambassador, January 14)

[C 522/436/18]*

PARIS, le 11 janvier, 1926

Malgré les adoucissements consentis par les Gouvernements alliés, l'Allemagne tarde à achever d'exécuter les clauses de désarmement du Traité de Versailles. Le tableau sommaire ci-joint vous édifiera à cet égard; sur nombre de points au sujet desquels l'accord de principe était acquis, des difficultés d'application ont surgi entre la Commission de Contrôle et les représentants du Reich; dans la question de la police, en particulier, le Gouvernement allemand ne se résigne pas à reconnaître qu'il ne peut plus obtenir aucune concession supplémentaire, et il vient encore de tenter d'arracher au Comité militaire allié de Versailles de nouveaux adoucissements.

Ainsi, le retrait de la Commission de Contrôle n'apparaît pas imminent; mais il faut, cependant, prévoir le cas où l'on se déciderait à Berlin à accélérer l'exécution des derniers redressements que nous demandons; dans cette éventualité, le Gouvernement allemand pourra être en situation, à très bref délai, de nous demander de mettre fin à la mission de l'organisme de contrôle. Or, il n'est pas certain qu'à cette date la Société des Nations soit en mesure d'exercer le droit d'investigation prévu par l'article 213 du Traité de Paix.

Vous n'ignorez pas, en effet, que, dans les conversations que MM. Luther et Stresemann ont eues à Locarno avec Mr. Chamberlain, M. Vandervelde et moi, les délégués allemands ont soulevé cette question du droit d'investigation et qu'ils ont, en particulier, cherché à remettre en discussion le règlement des investigations, tel qu'il a été arrêté par le Conseil de la Société des Nations dans la session de septembre 1924. Nous n'avons pas accepté de débattre avec les délégués allemands une affaire qui relève de la seule compétence du Conseil; mais nous n'avons pu nous refuser à admettre que l'Allemagne pourrait défendre son point de vue devant le Conseil après son admission dans la Société.

Il résulte de cette situation de fait que, aussi longtemps que cette discussion n'aura pas eu lieu et qu'elle n'aura pas abouti à un accord avec les délégués du Reich au sein du Conseil, le droit d'investigation prévu par l'article 213 ne pourra pas s'exercer. Or, nous ne sommes pas encore certains que l'Allemagne entre à la Société des Nations au mois de mars prochain et rien ne nous garantit, d'autre part, que l'entente se réalisera facilement avec elle sur les conditions d'application de l'article 213. Si aucune précaution n'est prise, la Commission de Contrôle risquerait ainsi d'être retirée avant que l'exercice du droit d'investigation soit assuré et nous nous trouverions dépourvus de tout moyen légal de constater éventuellement la violation des clauses militaires du traité. Il y aurait là, pour les autorités militaires du Reich, qui échappent bien souvent à l'action du Gouvernement, une tentation

dont il n'est pas certain qu'elles ne profiteraient pas. Ainsi il serait imprudent, et l'opinion publique s'en inquiéterait certainement, que le contrôle interallié prît complètement fin avant que l'exercice du droit d'investigation par la Société des Nations ne fût assuré.

Les Alliés ont dit, dans leur note du 22 [29] septembre 1922,¹ et ils ont répété depuis, que la Commission de Contrôle serait retirée dès que l'exécution des clauses encore en suspens serait 'parvenue à un état d'avancement de nature à en assurer le règlement définitif'; la note du 4 juin dernier a précisé que 'ce retrait serait notifié au Conseil de la Société des Nations à l'effet d'appliquer les mesures arrêtées [décidées] par lui en vue de l'exécution de l'article 213.'² Encore faut-il que ces mesures soient arrêtées et j'ai indiqué plus haut pourquoi elles risquent de ne pas l'être.

Je vous prie d'attirer sur cette situation l'attention du Gouvernement britannique. Nous désirons aussi vivement que lui mettre fin au contrôle interallié, mais il ne faut pas que le départ de la Commission de Contrôle se fasse dans des conditions telles que certaines autorités militaires croient avoir désormais le champ libre. Les négociations qui se poursuivent actuellement ici pour aboutir à un accord sur le régime de l'aviation ont fait apparaître la nécessité de prendre certaines précautions du même ordre lors du retrait du Comité de Garantie aéronautique et nous allons demander aux Allemands l'engagement de ne pas faire obstacle à l'application de l'article 213, sous réserve des modifications que la Société des Nations pourrait ultérieurement introduire dans le règlement arrêté par elle. Il sera peut-être utile de prendre, au point de vue militaire, une précaution analogue.

Je vous prie d'attirer sur ces considérations l'attention du Foreign Office: il ne s'agit pas, pour le moment, de prendre à cet égard des décisions fermes, mais il convient de réfléchir à l'éventualité qui peut se présenter et de nous mettre d'accord sur la solution qu'il conviendrait d'envisager.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 174

État d'Exécution au 22 Décembre 1925 des Redressements figurant sur les Quatre Listes annexées à la Note allemande du 23 Octobre 1925

(N.B.—Les redressements dont l'exécution est achevée sont soulignés en trait plein,³ ceux dont le redressement est en cours sont soulignés en pointillé,⁴ ceux qui ne sont pas effectués ne sont pas soulignés.⁵)

PREMIÈRE LISTE

Demandes exécutées

POLICE⁶

1. Suppression des corps de police auxiliaire et des volontaires. (Rien de fait.)

¹ For the text of this note, see *Materialen zur Entwaffnungsnote*, vol. i, pp. 58–60.

² See Cmd. 2429 of 1925, p. 4.

³ Here indicated by an asterisk (*).

⁴ Here indicated by a dagger (†).

⁵ Having neither * nor †.

⁶ Thus on filed copy. This heading evidently applied to item No. 1 below.

2. Deutsche Werke, Spandau.*
3. Deutsche Werke, Hanau.*
4. Deutsche Werke, Haselhorst.† (En cours d'exécution.)
5. Krupp†: Destruction de onze presses* et destruction d'un stock de munitions.† (Destruction très avancée.)
6. Polte à Magdebourg.*
7. Acceptation des prescriptions relatives à la confection des vérificateurs.*
8. Ateliers de Wehrkreis de Desching.*
9. Avant-trains de Minenwerfer ou véhicules analogues.*
10. Confection et consommation de cartouches à blanc.*
11. École d'artillerie de côte à Wilhelmshaven.*
12. Servitudes militaires.† (Exécution avancée.)
13. Prestations de guerre.*
14. Livraison des pièces de rechange de l'artillerie de la forteresse de Königsberg.*

DEUXIÈME LISTE

Demandes qui seront exécutées jusqu'au 15 Novembre

POLICE⁶

1. Livraison des sous-stations de T.S.F. portatives et distribution des postes fixes de T.S.F. (Rien de fait.)
2. Bayerische Sprengstoff A.G. à Thansau.*
3. Pulverfabrik Walsrode à Dömitz.*
4. Krupp, soumission à la C[ommission] M[ilitaire] I[nteralliée de] C[ontrôle] du plan de fabrication pour les fournitures autorisées en matériel de guerre. (En discussion. Plan de fabrication doit être remis à C.M.I.C. dans huit jours.)
5. Ehrhardt (Rheinmetall). (En discussion.)
6. Soumission à C.M.I.C. des listes des usines désignées à la fabrication de diverses pièces d'équipement pour l'armée et la marine.† (En bonne voie d'exécution.)
7. Artillerie, dépôts autorisés pour les fortifications côtières. (En discussion.)
8. Pièces de rechange pour armes portatives.† (En bonne voie d'exécution.)
9. Pièces de rechange pour Minenwerfer.† (Dotations acceptées; livraison en cours.)
10. Pièces de rechange pour mitrailleuses.† (Dotations acceptées; livraisons importantes exécutées.)
11. Pièces de rechange pour bouches à feu et véhicules de l'artillerie de campagne.† (Fait pour les batteries. En cours pour les Zeugämter.)
12. Ferrure.
13. Outils de pionniers.† (Livraison en cours.)
14. Engins de signalisation et éclairants.*

15. Matériel ayant rapport aux explosifs.*
16. Harnachements (selles, bricoles et bâts).† (En bonne voie d'exécution.)
17. Boggies de Wilhelmshaven.*
18. Masques à gaz.† (Exécution commencée; fin annoncée dans quatre mois.)
19. Incorporations illégales.
20. Interdiction de l'instruction des officiers de réserve. (Mesures prises jugées insuffisantes.)

TROISIÈME LISTE

Demandes dont l'Exécution sera assurée jusqu'au 15 Novembre

POLICE⁶

1. Diminution des effectifs à 150,000 hommes; suppression de l'instruction militaire. (Aucune mesure d'exécution n'a été prise.)
2. Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken, Karlsruhe.† (Fin de la dispersion promise pour le 1^{er} janvier.)
3. Mauser à Oberndorf.†
4. Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken à Wittenau.*
5. Sächsische Gusstahlfabrik à Döhlen-Deuben (Saxe). (En discussion.)
6. Krupp.* (Destruction des machines non autorisées de l'atelier No. 10.*)
7. Simson à Suhl. (Propositions allemandes en cours d'examen.)
8. Dortmunder Union. (Plan de fabrication allemand considéré comme satisfaisant.)
9. Wasag⁷ à Reinsdorf. (En discussion; aucune transformation exécutée; certaines annoncées demanderont deux ans pour être terminées.)
10. Transformation des anciens établissements militaires.† (41 sur 62 terminées; 20 en territoires occupés ne pourront être transformés qu'après remise aux autorités allemandes par les forces alliées.)
11. Zeugamt de Königsberg. (La discussion se poursuit sans résultat.)
12. Gasschutslage[r] de Hanovre.† (Suppression envisagée vers 15 janvier.)
13. Ateliers des corps de troupe.† (En voie d'exécution.)
14. Police: ateliers; armement. (Aucun progrès.)
15. Stocks d'habillement et d'équipement.*
16. État-major général. (Accord sur le principe, mesures d'exécution à l'étude.)
17. Organisation militaire du réseau ferré. (Mesures d'exécution insuffisantes.)
18. Effectifs. (Mesures d'exécution insuffisantes.)
19. Services: Personnel.† (Accord.)
Établissements administratifs en excédent; vivres de réserve.
(En discussion.)

⁷ Westphälische-Anhaltische-Sprengstoff-Aktien-Gesellschaft.

20. Importation et exportation du matériel de guerre. (Soumis à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs.)
21. Détention, trafic, fabrication illicite du matériel de guerre. (Soumis à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs.)
22. Défenses côtières.† (Exécution terminée sauf pour quatre batteries.)
23. Livraison des croquis de diverses fortifications. (Livraisons en bonne voie d'exécution.)

QUATRIÈME LISTE

Demandes dont l'Exécution se heurte à des Difficultés particulières

POLICE⁶

1. Assimilation des grades de police aux grades militaires.
Statut du personnel.
Logement dans les casernes.
2. Le Haut-Commandement.
3. Interdiction de l'instruction dans l'emploi de certaines armes.
4. L'artillerie de la forteresse de Königsberg.
5. Associations.

Les engagements pris par le Gouvernement allemand sur ces cinq points, au cours des réunions qui se sont tenues à Paris en novembre 1925, n'ont été, jusqu'à présent, suivis d'aucune exécution.

No. 175

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 13, 9 a.m.)
No. 6 Telegraphic [C 446/446/18]

BERLIN, January 12, 1926, 9 p.m.

At the request of the Chancellor, Secretary of State has asked Mr. Addison to draw your attention to the following.

(1) His Majesty's Secretary of State had promised Dr. Luther in London that he would do his best to see that British army of occupation should be reduced to 8,000. Dr. Luther had heard from many sides that the army was being maintained at 9,000.

(2) Innumerable complaints were being received as to excessive requisitioning of quarters for the British army, particularly at Königstein.

Mr. Addison pointed out that this last question in particular had been already raised in London but Secretary of State requested that I should telegraph notwithstanding.

No. 176

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 13, 9 a.m.)
No. 7 Telegraphic [C 447/24/18]

BERLIN, January 12, 1926, 9 p.m.

My telegram No. 5.¹

Secretary of State has informed Mr. Addison that German delegates have been instructed to negotiate on following basis.

1. There will be no service (Dienstlich) training of members of Reich[s]-wehr.

2. No official support of any kind will be given to officers or men desiring to learn to fly privately for purposes of sport.

Secretary of State said that in practice this would mean that no member of Reich[s]wehr would fly since he could not do so without facilities such as leave which would not be granted.

He added that legal experts had reported against total prohibition as being neither laid down in treaty of Versailles [n]or compatible with German constitution.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Repeated to Paris.

¹ See No. 172, note 3.

No. 177

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 13, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 8 Telegraphic: by bag [C 434/24/18]

PARIS, January 12, 1926

My telegram No. 4.¹

2. A meeting took place between the Allied and German experts this morning, with General Desticker in the chair.

3. The Chairman asked the Germans whether they could now bring forward their proposals with reference to (a) *avions de chasse*, and (b) pilotless machines.

4. The Germans accordingly handed to all the delegates typewritten copies of their proposals as follows:—

a. 'Le Gouvernement allemand fera le nécessaire pour que les écoles d'aviation allemandes, à l'exception de la Deutsche Verkehrsfliegerschule G[esellschaft] m[it] b[eschränkter] H[aftung]² ne disposent pas d'avions monoplace d'une puissance nominale supérieure à 300 c[heval] v[apeur].'

b. 'Le Gouvernement allemand fera le nécessaire pour que des avions pouvant voler sans pilote ne soient construits et utilisés que pour des buts scientifiques et d'essais et pour que la construction en série de ces

¹ No. 171.

² German Transport-Pilots' School Ltd.

avions ne soit pas réalisée aussi longtemps que leur utilisation pour la navigation aérienne commerciale ne sera pas assurée.'

5. The Allied experts then withdrew and held a separate discussion at which Air Attaché strongly urged the French to drop the total prohibition of *avions de chasse* and to fall into line with the British proposals. He also strongly resisted the definition of *avions de chasse* by a technical formula. General Desticker then said that he was authorised by the French [? Government] to agree with the British proposal, viz. that a limited number of *avions de chasse* should be allowed for racing purposes. He also stated that though he was prepared to withdraw the technical formula reported in my telegram No. 4 of January 7th he could not yet agree entirely with the new British definition, viz., 'high speed aircraft of a type which is not required for *bona fide* commercial aviation, but which is only suitable for trophy racing or advertisement or of which the performance is similar to that of fighting aircraft in air forces of other countries'.

6. It was agreed, however, that the Germans should be called upon to produce further guarantees.

7. As regards pilotless machines, it was agreed that complete prohibition should be insisted upon.

8. The meeting with the Germans was then resumed when General Desticker informed them that the Allies were now prepared to allow Germany a limited number of *avions de chasse* for racing purposes in return for which he called upon them to produce some very strong guarantees which would prevent Germany having an unnecessarily large number of them.

9. Herr Fisch, the head German delegate, replied that he hoped to find a suitable formula by next Thursday.³

10. General Desticker then informed the Germans that the Allies maintained their original demand that pilotless machines should be definitely prohibited. Herr Fisch replied that this decision would annoy the whole scientific world, and that it would create morally speaking a very bad effect in Germany; however, he would refer the matter to his Government. He hoped to be able to find a formula more suitable to the Allies, but he did not think that it could be based on a total prohibition. The meeting then closed.

11. A further meeting of allied air experts takes place to-morrow with a view to reaching an agreement upon the definition of an *avion de chasse*.⁴

12. At a full meeting of Allied delegates this evening Belgian delegates complained that the concession made to Germans as regards *avions de chasse* as mentioned above went beyond what they were authorised to agree to.

13. Please inform Air Ministry. Air Attaché not reporting separately.⁵

³ January 14, 1926.

⁴ This meeting was reported in Paris telegram No. 9 (not printed). The French proposals there discussed were further revised on January 19 and the agreed proposals are printed in No. 190.

⁵ On January 13 Air Vice-Marshal Steel commented on this telegram in a letter to Wing Commander Smyth-Pigott in which he stated in particular:

'I think the German proposal for dealing with the *avions de chasse* is thoroughly unsatis-

factory and I should have expected the French to take strong exception to it. As I understand the proposal, it is that except at one particular school, which is to all intents and purposes a camouflaged military establishment, the Germans guarantee that they will prohibit single-seater aeroplanes exceeding 300 nominal h[orse] p[ower].

'I have no objection to this one particular school having a few aeroplanes of this type which exceed 300 h.p. but what I do object to is that all the other schools in Germany are to be allowed to have an unlimited number of this type up to 300 h.p.

'There is something to be said for the Germans having a few high-powered aircraft of this type for racing, and they would naturally be a great deal more than 300 h.p. but there is no excuse whatever for any of the other schools to have aircraft of this type having engines of anything like this horse power. They are not required for racing purposes, there is no commercial use for them and it is quite outside the requirement of any Sports Club.

'I might also mention that no other country requires aircraft of this type with anything like engines of 300 h.p. for anything but military purposes. . . .

'With reference to pilotless aircraft, you must not give way. There is no possible excuse for Germany to have them. . . .

'As for the training of naval, military and police officers, the Germans are likely to put forward some sort of compromise. I see no excuse for these people learning to fly and if we give way, it will be the thin end of the wedge and we would have no check whatever on the numbers. If the French insist on prohibiting it altogether, you must support them and give all the reasons you can for doing so.

'I presume that you are going to deal with the question of military training in schools. There is no doubt whatever that the present syllabus carried out in many of these German schools is far in excess of anything that is required for legitimate commercial aviation, both from the point of view of the length of time under training and of the sort of subjects taught at the schools. The military atmosphere, the length of training, the variety of subjects taught and the fact that special pupils are selected to go through the course can only lead to the conclusion that the school referred to in paragraph 4A of Lord Crewe's telegram No. 8 is a first class military Flying Training School. . . .

'The German representatives seem very reluctant to put in any proposals for dealing with supervision.

'I will be interested to see what they propose. It seems to me that up to date the Germans have asked for and obtained very large concessions indeed from the Allies, which [*sic* ? and] show little sign of giving anything satisfactory in return.'

No. 178

Sir W. Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 119 [C 254/254/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 12, 1926*

My Lord,

In the Military Attaché's report No. 5923¹ of January 5th, copies of which were enclosed in your despatch No. 35¹ (85/1/1925) of the 7th January, it is stated that the strength of the French forces in the Rhineland on the 30th January next is expected to be about fifty-eight thousand (ration strength). Your Lordship will recollect that the reduction to sixty thousand had been decided on many weeks ago, and the German delegation in London on the 1st December were very insistent that some further reductions would be made. Monsieur Briand assured them that he would take up the matter

¹ Not printed.

at once on his return to Paris and see what could be done to meet the wishes of the German Government. Reference is invited in this connection to my despatch No. 4001² of the 4th December 1925.

2. I shall be glad if you will ascertain in any way you see fit whether Monsieur Briand has failed in his attempt to move the French military authorities and, if so, whether the present strength is to be permanent.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

² Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. This despatch transmitted to Paris a copy of the record printed as No. 122.

No. 179

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 13, 8.30 p.m.)

Unnumbered Telegraphic [C 521/7/62]

ROME, January 13, 1926, 6.30 p.m.

Following for Sir W. Tyrrell:—

Private and Personal.

I note that under outward show of optimism official circles here are feeling rather serious anxiety regarding debt negotiation.¹ The figures and arguments furnished by the Treasury² and forwarded to me in Mr. Lampson's

¹ Count Volpi arrived in London on January 13 for negotiations with Mr. Winston Churchill regarding the Italian war debt to Great Britain. These negotiations arose from a British note to debtor governments dated June 26, 1925, which was summarized in a Foreign Office memorandum of October 27, 1925, as 'asking them to submit "at an early date definite proposals for cash payments in respect of their debt, if not under a permanent funding scheme, at least provisionally"'. Emphasis was laid upon the two points: (1) that we adhered to the principles of the Balfour note [of August 1, 1922, to debtor governments: see Cmd. 1737 of 1922], viz. that we must obtain enough from the ex-enemies and allies together to cover our annual payments to America; (2) that "in the event of any payments being made by the Italian government to other creditor governments on account of war indebtedness, payments not less in amount (due regard being had to the proportionate amount of the debts due in each case) shall simultaneously be made to this country".'

Subsequent proposals made by the Italian financial expert, Signor Pirelli, in negotiations in July 1925 with Sir O. Niemeyer, Controller of Finance in H.M. Treasury, had not been acceptable. The Foreign Office memorandum stated in this connexion: 'Two further points should be noted:—(1) M. Pirelli refused to admit the British thesis that we must receive payment *pari passu* with America. (2) He argued that in 1923 the British government had practically offered to cancel the whole Italian debt in exchange for Italy's support during the Ruhr operations and that they could not go back on that now without a breach of faith.' In a note of September 23, 1925, H.M. Government (a) had rejected the Italian proposition that the Italian war debt to Great Britain was on a different footing from that to the United States because British financial assistance had been given as part of the price of Italy's entry into the war in 1915; (b) had refused to be bound by the proposals of 1923 in the conditions of 1925.

² Not printed. These lengthy arguments were in criticism of the Italian plea for special treatment on grounds of national poverty.

letter of the 6th³ are generally convincing and will be very useful to me, but the tendency to consider that whereas the Italian debt negotiation with America⁴ had a strong political side the negotiations with ourselves must remain a purely business transaction causes me some misgivings. There seems further a tendency to regard many of Italian arguments as tendentious not to say futile which they no doubt are and question of gold deposit⁵ as settled beyond all discussion. This spirit if applied too drastically may produce a difficult situation.

In preparing the annual report for last year we cannot help being struck by the way in which the Italians have in practically all important questions agreed with and supported us. You know how prone these people are to jump from one extreme to the other and in their present frame of mind inclining towards megalomania they will be more likely to do so than ever. Failure or even temporary breakdown of negotiations might have a grave effect on Anglo-Italian relations. I trust, therefore, that the Foreign Office will not cease to keep an eye on the progress of the negotiations from this point of view.⁶

³ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

⁴ For these negotiations and the text of the agreement signed in Washington on November 14, 1925, cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1925*, vol. i, p. 164, note 51.

⁵ British advances of £182 million to Italy in 1915 had been partly covered by gold shipments to Great Britain amounting to £22,200,000. H.M. Government contended that this gold should not be returned to Italy until the whole of the Italian war debt had been repaid.

⁶ A copy of this telegram was sent by Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. Churchill under cover of a letter of January 15 in which he stated: 'I am sure that you will absolve me from having any desire to "butt in" to the negotiations with the Italian Delegation, and I am sure that the considerations mentioned by Graham are already present to you; in fact I am carrying coals to Newcastle! At the same time I feel that much may depend upon the way in which the Italians are handled. It is not suggested for a moment that we should give way in any material point to the Italians, but you know as well as I do how susceptible they are to tact and flattery. Graham knows his Italians very well and this I think is the point which he wishes to stress and it is chiefly for this reason that I pass on his telegram to you. There is no doubt that the Secretary of State is very anxious to get a settlement with the Italians if he can, and from the political point of view a settlement is now more than ever desirable in view of the happy personal relations which he has established with Mussolini and which have already yielded a good harvest in the case of Locarno and Mosul.'

No. 180

Sir W. Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 4 Telegraphic: by bag [C 447/24/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 13, 1926*

Berlin telegram No. 7¹ (of the 12th January. Aeronautical control in Germany).

The offer which the German delegates are now instructed to make seems

¹ No. 176.

largely similar to the solution at one time suggested by the British delegates (see your despatch No. 2788).² It was decided however at the meeting held in the Foreign Office on January 4th that we should support the French in insisting upon complete prohibition of the training of members of the Reichswehr, and should in fact take the point as a test of German good faith.

There is no reason to depart from that line now and, when the question comes to be discussed with the German delegates, the British delegates should fall in line with the French. If the result is complete deadlock we can consider later whether any compromise is possible.

Repeated to Berlin (in cypher) No. 2.

² No. 161.

No. 181

Letter from Mr. Peters (Moscow) to Mr. Mounsey

[N 387/387/38]

MOSCOW, January 14, 1926, 8 p.m.

Dear Mounsey,

I have just got back from an official reception at which I had a talk with M. Chicherin—the first time I have seen him since he got back from his ‘cure’ in Europe. I am jotting down in this note a few points from the conversation: the bag is closed but I’ll arrange that the courier should take this letter and put it in the bag at Riga.

(1) Chicherin is looking well and declares he has benefited tremendously from his cure.

(2) I made some remark about his not having crossed the Channel. He at once remarked that he was not wanted, no one wanted to see him there. I said he was surely misinformed: I felt sure that if he had gone to London he would have been courteously received. A little later what I might describe as wounded pride made itself evident when he said that Chamberlain told someone. ‘All right! Let Chicherin come to London. Sir William Tyrrell can talk to him.’ I could not gather what the source of this information was.

(3) He proceeded to say that there was nothing to talk about and no chance of anything being done at present. When Rakovski saw Chamberlain the latter said to him: ‘...’ But before negotiations you must give us a guarantee of your good faith.’ It was no use negotiating with persons who started off by doubting the good faith of the other party.

(4) He then said that Chamberlain thought he could bring the Soviet Union round by looking the other way, by affecting to ignore her. This was a definite policy of his (Chamberlain’s). He thought that if he looked the other way long enough the Soviet Union would come asking to be looked at and talked to. He was wrong.

¹ Punctuation as in original.

(5) I am writing this immediately after returning and as I am at home in the flat have no opportunity of having it typed or of keeping a copy.

I don't think I have made mistakes as to what he said but the wording of his remarks may have been a little different. The remark regarding Tyrrell is exactly as he gave it: the sense of the other remarks is correctly given.

I am in a tremendous hurry as I have to get the courier to take this and have another engagement in 10 minutes.

Will you take this instead of a despatch—not that there is really much in it to write about.

Sorry to trouble you to read this scrawl.

Yours ever,
WILLIAM PETERS

Hodgson will be back next week; I had a telegram from him to-day.
W. P.

No. 182

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 15, 9 a.m.)
No. 10 Telegraphic [C 524/234/18]

BERLIN, January 14, 1926, 8.25 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

The situation is undoubtedly critical. The decision of Socialist party not to join a big coalition diminishes compactness and fighting capacity of forces in favour of Locarno. The new government will be essentially a minority government compelled to seek support from case to case from one wing or the other.

The opposition has seized the opportunity to commence a series of violent press attacks not only against Locarno but against Dawes report, attributing Germany's financial troubles and ruin of the middle class to effects of Dawes agreement and burden of Dawes payments. The 'Lokal Anzeiger' and other organs under Hugenberg's² influence evidently intend to carry on a full blast campaign against the Luther-Stresemann combination and all that it stands for.

I do not think that this campaign will succeed but Luther and Stresemann require all the assistance which can be given them.³

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 10. Repeated to Paris.

¹ No. 183. These telegrams were despatched in reverse order.

² Herr Hugenberg was a member of the German National People's Party in the Reichstag and a prominent industrialist.

³ Lord D'Abernon stated in his immediately following telegram, No. 11 of January 16, that 'the rise in the stock market and lowering of discount rate . . . have turned the public mind from contemplation of impending disaster to optimistic speculation as to the future. . . . The result of this change is that attack from Right and from Hugenberg press—though not to be regarded too lightly—is less dangerous than it would have been if made sooner.'

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 15, 9 a.m.)

No. 9 Telegraphic [C 523/446/18]

BERLIN, January 14, 1926, 8.35 p.m.

Since my return to Berlin three days ago I have been laid up and have not seen Dr. Stresemann.

This morning I received from him a confidential letter¹ of which following is summary.

The report appearing in 'Daily Telegraph' according to which sub-committee of Conference of Ambassadors had decided to fix the strength of army of occupation in second and third zones at 75,000 men has brought matters to such a head that Dr. Stresemann considers continuation of Locarno policy in Germany to be endangered.

He concludes that number of 75,000 refers merely to troops and does not comprise the ordinary additional elements necessary for occupation which would bring total number to about 81,000. According to German Government's information the number has been, up to the present 81,950, thus the total relief to be accorded would amount to only 1,000 men instead of the 'considerable reduction approaching normal numbers' which had been promised.²

Dr. Stresemann expects vigorous cross-questioning on this subject in committee of Reichstag and he feels that if Ambassadors Conference endorse the decision of the sub-committee the foreign policy of German Government will be in gravest danger. The Chancellor on learning sub-committee's decision hesitated to undertake the formation of a Government³ and was only induced to accept by Dr. Stresemann's pointing out that this had not yet been confirmed by the Conference itself.

Dr. Stresemann nevertheless finds himself in a most difficult position. He had counted on a considerable reduction of troops of occupation, and in this confident hope he had been able to defend himself against Nationalist agitation which accuses him of hoodwinking Germany about result of Locarno reaction. He can no longer conscientiously maintain this defence, if in spite of security of Franco-German frontier which has been assured by Locarno it is found necessary to maintain so strong a force in occupied territory. He comprehends that His Majesty's Government who are already so weakly represented may wish to maintain a certain force and he appreciates the

¹ For this letter of January 13, see *Gustav Stresemann, op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 404-6.

² Cf. the extracts from the fifth and seventh paragraphs of the note of November 14, 1925, from the Conference of Ambassadors to the German Ambassador at Paris cited in No. 191.

³ Lord D'Abernon had reported in Berlin telegram No. 8 of January 13 that President von Hindenburg had entrusted Dr. Luther with the formation of a Government. In the new German Government formed by Dr. Luther on January 19 Dr. Stresemann remained in his post as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

great reduction made by Belgium, but it is quite impossible to admit the maintenance by France of four divisions in the two zones. If this decision is maintained Dr. Stresemann will no longer have the support even of Government parties and will be obliged to offer his resignation, and explain to the President that he had formed a false idea of the extent of alleviations to be granted. The Chancellor has stated that he will act in the same manner. This would no doubt mean a triumph of Nationalists and complete collapse of our united work.

Dr. Stresemann has received from French Embassy an assurance that profession of Monsieur Briand⁴ that he will continue to press for a reduction of troops but this will not be enough to offer parliament. Most violent attacks have been started in the Nationalist press against Dr. Stresemann's person, his policy, the Locarno agreement and the Dawes plan. These, he is confident that he can overcome if he has the necessary weapons but he feels that if decision of the sub-committee is persisted in, implying as it does that a strong army is needed on the Rhine as a defence against eventuality of German attacks, it can only mean an end of Locarno policy in Germany. In conclusion he states that his former optimism cannot stand before such a decision and begs me to use all my influence to avert it.

Addressed to Foreign Office, No. 9, repeated to Paris, No. 3.

⁴ Another text of this telegram here read: 'an assurance from Monsieur Briand'.

No. 184

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 16, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 14 Telegraphic: by bag [Germany 24/11]

PARIS, January 15, 1926

Berlin telegrams Nos. 9 and 10¹ of 14th January.

2. No committee of Ambassadors' Conference is considering reductions in armies of occupation, matter being reserved for Governments.

3. I have therefore no information respecting British and Belgian reductions. But, as explained in my despatch No. 100² of to-night, French are reducing to 58,253 ration or actual strength, which, it is argued here, is below figure promised by M. Briand in London. I do not understand what is meant by phrase in fourth paragraph of Berlin telegram No. 3 [9],³ 'ordinary addition of elements necessary for occupation.' French War Office informed military attaché that 58,253 was total ration strength of all ranks.

(Repeated to Berlin in cypher.)

¹ Nos. 183 and 182 respectively.

² Not printed. This despatch, in reply to No. 178, stated that the French military authorities considered themselves justly proud of the reduced figure cited below, and that Lord Crewe did not therefore think it appropriate to approach M. Briand again.

³ See No. 183 where the cited phrase read: 'ordinary additional elements', &c.

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with Dr. Sthamer
[C 681/681/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 15, 1926*

The German Ambassador called this afternoon and left with me the attached copy of a letter which the German government had addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations on January 12. This letter explains the German position in regard to the scheme of League investigation under article 213 of the treaty¹ to which the German Delegation took exception during the Locarno negotiations.

His Excellency wished to explain that the German government had made this communication to Sir Eric Drummond² not in any spirit of controversy but in order to show that they were acting in a perfectly loyal way; in short, they were not trying to be obstructive but to be helpful. He was instructed by his government to emphasise this. And he went on to say that he thought when we read the note we would certainly not be dissatisfied with its contents.

I said that we would study the note in due course, but meantime there was a general observation I should like to make. We had recently found ourselves in a position of some difficulty owing to what had passed at Locarno. This difficulty had arisen in connection with the present air negotiations going on in Paris. The question with which we had found ourselves faced was: How we were to avoid a hiatus between the cessation of Inter-allied control and the initiation of League investigation—if, as we understood, the German government challenged the scheme already adopted by the Council of the League? We had thought the matter over very carefully and the conclusion had seemed to us inevitable that Germany must have either one or the other, and that as we, the ex-Allies, could not tinker with the League scheme, which was not a purely Inter-allied document, if Inter-allied air control were withdrawn then the League scheme must apply, possibly only provisionally until Germany entered the League and was able to discuss all these matters herself at the Council table. I hastened to add that I had only interposed this observation in order to make clear to His Excellency the inconveniences which were inevitably entailed by the German challenge of the League scheme of September 27, 1924.¹

His Excellency seemed to recognise the logic of our point of view; but he repeated that he thought we should not be displeased with his government's note when we had had time to read it.

M. W. LAMPSON

¹ Of Versailles. For this scheme cf. No. 125, note 8.

² Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Letter from Dr. Stresemann to Sir E. Drummond

Translation

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BERLIN, January 12, 1926

Sir,

The German Government have carefully examined the resolutions of the Council of the League and other material relative to the execution of article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles, which were transmitted in your notes of the 19th March³ and the 10th June⁴ last.

The German Government are prepared, in accordance with article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles, to submit to any inspection which the Council of the League by a majority decision regard as necessary. They are also ready to facilitate in every respect the carrying out of such inspection within the limits of the treaty provisions. On the other hand, the possibility of such an inspection affords to themselves a certain protection against unjustified accusations.

The resolutions and material transmitted give occasion, however, for the following observations:—

1. By its working and context, article 213 can only contemplate an investigation as cases arise, that is, when definite circumstances exist which justify the assumption of a default by Germany in regard to the armament questions here at issue, but not a permanent or regularly recurring control. The German Government assume that this view also forms the basis of the resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, the comprehensive programme of the proposed commissions of investigation and the high rank of their personnel might give rise to the idea that it was intended to convert the inspection prescribed in article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles into a permanent control.

2. The provisions relative to the establishment of permanent organs in the demilitarised zones, which are laid down in Chapter V of the resolutions of the League Council dated the 27th September, 1924, cannot be applied to the demilitarised territory on the Rhine. The rights of the League of Nations under article 213 are confined to the provisions in Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and are not applicable in so far as Part III of that treaty contains stipulations of a further-reaching nature in regard to the above-mentioned territory. Moreover, it is relevant in this connection that an inspection as provided for in article 213 is inconsistent in the abst[r]act with the establishment of a permanent organ of control.

3. The German Government are prepared to grant to the members of the League commission of investigation every facility necessary for the fulfilment

³ This note was evidently sent in accordance with the report and resolution adopted by the Council on March 14, 1925: see *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1925, pp. 489 and 608–11.

⁴ For the draft of this letter, as approved by the Council on June 10, 1925, see *op. cit.*, July 1925, p. 864.

of their duties. Some of the powers contemplated for the League organs of control *vis-à-vis* the German authorities and private individuals, however, substantially exceed what is compatible with the German view and what is necessary for the achievement of the end aspired to. I presume that an understanding regarding these points will not be difficult to reach and venture to reserve to a later date the communication of proposals relative thereto.

I have, &c.,

STRESEMANN

No. 186

Sir W. Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 172 [C 221/215/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 15, 1926*

My Lord,

With reference to your despatch No. 33¹ of the 6th January, I have to inform you that the fullest consideration has now been given to the points raised by the French Government in regard to the amnesty proposals submitted by the Rhineland High Commission for the approval of the Ambassadors' Conference on the 24th December last.²

2. Certain of these points need cause little difficulty. The whole question of importance indeed turns upon the form of undertaking to be given by the

¹ Not printed. This despatch transmitted a lengthy French note of January 4 to the Conference of Ambassadors which put forward the views discussed below.

² Not printed. These draft proposals which formed the annexes to a letter of December 24, 1925, from the High Commission to the Conference of Ambassadors had been drawn up by the legal advisers to the High Commission and German legal experts at meetings at Coblenz, December 7-10, 1925, and comprised: (I) a protocol providing for an amnesty; (II) a letter from the Allied delegation; and (III) a letter from the German delegation. These drafts were summarized as follows in the British High Commissioner's Annual Report for 1926 on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission: 'According to these documents, the German Government declared themselves ready to do all in their power to prevent direct or indirect reprisals against any persons by reason of their relations with the occupying authorities from the beginning of the occupation till the 10th January, 1923, and from the 1st September, 1924, till the 1st December, 1925. This declaration would also hold good for the future in the territories remaining occupied. It did not hold good for persons, however, who had committed acts of treason or espionage. On their side, the Governments represented on the High Commission declared that they would hand over to the German authorities all persons of German nationality confined in prisons in the occupied territories and sentenced for acts committed in the territories of the Ruhr, the Duisburg, Ruhrort and Düsseldorf bridge-heads, or the Cologne zone, the only exceptions being persons having committed acts of espionage or crimes against life resulting in the death of the victim. They would grant a complete amnesty for all offences committed in the occupied territories from the beginning of the occupation till the 1st December, 1925, with the exception of offences against ordinary law or offences of espionage. Requests put forward by the German Government in respect of persons not falling under the above categories would be favourably considered. It was agreed on both sides that difficulties arising out of the application of the amnesty should be settled by amicable negotiations.'

German Government, and in this regard I transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a despatch³ from Lord Kilmarnock giving his views why the form of guarantee should be accepted as agreed upon with the German delegates at Coblenz. Your Lordship will further have observed that the French and Belgian High Commissioners are also satisfied with the proposed arrangement, and that General Du Cane has no further objection to offer provided that the note which the German Government will address to the Powers represented on the High Commission includes an undertaking sufficient to protect such persons as conscientious inhabitants and police officials who have been of assistance to the armies, from persecution after the evacuation of the Cologne zone.

3. While therefore His Majesty's Government readily comprehend the anxiety of the French Government at the reluctance of the German delegates to agree to the submission of the amnesty to the Reichstag as a law, they would be reluctant on that account to reopen the discussion of an arrangement which has the unanimous approval of the three High Commissioners. The latter are on the spot and must be in the best position to judge as to what is necessary and possible.

4. Further, the French Government, in desiring to replace the proposed wording of the German undertaking by the wording of the London Agreement, seem to forget that the latter can hardly be cited as a precedent to-day. In 1924 it was necessary to arrange for the liquidation of a complicated situation produced by the occupation of the Ruhr and the resulting passive resistance. Such a liquidation naturally involved the submission of the arrangements made to the Reichstag, the passing of laws, &c. In the present case all that is proposed is to make certain arrangements of minor importance, and the intention throughout has been, so far as His Majesty's Government are aware, that this should be done by administrative action and that nothing involving legislation was required. In these circumstances it would be difficult to ask the German Government to do more than they undertook to do by article 1 of the draft protocol, and the result would surely be more satisfactory with an undertaking in that form, which it might be assumed the Germans would carry out with reasonably good faith, than with a more definite obligation which they would be unwilling to accept and probably would not carry out with any enthusiasm. Not only that, but if the French Government insist upon modifications being introduced into the draft protocol on the lines they wish, they must run the very grave risk of obtaining no amnesty arrangement at all, a result which would probably cause less embarrassment to the German Government than to themselves, and in any case could not fail to have a deplorable effect upon the good relations between the ex-Allied Governments and Germany.

5. A final argument against attempting to introduce important alterations into the proposed arrangement is the question of time. There is now only

³ Coblenz despatch No. 440 of December 24, 1925, is not printed. Lord Kilmarnock stated, in particular, therein: 'I am advised that the terms of the draft protocol, as qualified by Annex III [see note 2 above], cover the class of person which it is desired to protect.'

a fortnight before the Cologne zone will be finally evacuated, and it is most desirable, as Lord Kilmarnock points out in a telegram of which a copy is enclosed herein,⁴ that the question be settled before that date.

6. His Majesty's Government therefore feel that in all the circumstances it is very desirable to leave the draft protocol as it stands and to concentrate upon getting any further guarantees that are thought essential inserted in the note that the German Government will address to the Powers represented on the High Commission. It is observed that the High Commission suggest, in their letter⁵ to the Ambassadors' Conference of the 24th December, that the latter should invite the German Government to make a written declaration as to their interpretation of the terms 'espionage' and 'treason.' The declaration would, however, in the view of His Majesty's Government, better be included in the note which forms Annex III to the High Commission's proposals, and the exchange of notes would naturally be between the Rhineland High Commission and the Reichskommissar rather than between the Ambassadors' Conference and the German Ambassador in Paris.

7. In regard to the contents of the proposed German note, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that it should be wide enough to cover the giving of any information to the Allied authorities of any act which constituted a breach of the legislation which Germany had enacted to comply with the Treaty of Versailles or of the ordinances of the High Commission.

8. It is observed that in the third point of their note the French Government suggest that the wording of the proposed German note might be referred to the Legal Committee of the Ambassadors' Conference for advice. In view of the short time available, however, it would seem preferable that the Ambassadors' Conference should inform the Rhineland High Commission of what is desired, and that it should be left to the latter to draft the note in co-operation with the German delegates. It will always be possible (and His Majesty's Government for their part consider it essential) for each High Commissioner to consult his own Government before finally agreeing to the terms of the note.

9. In regard to the other points raised by the French Government, His Majesty's Government have no objection to the Rhineland High Commission inserting in their note to the Reichskommissar, rather than in the protocol itself, their undertaking to examine favourably all cases put forward by the German Government not falling within the specific terms of the amnesty.

10. His Majesty's Government again wholly concur in the view of the French Government that any difficulties arising out of the working of the amnesty should be referred to special mixed commissions rather than to the permanent conciliation commissions contemplated by the Locarno treaties, which would obviously be unsuitable bodies for dealing with such questions.

11. Lastly, in regard to the protective ordinances, His Majesty's Govern-

⁴ Coblenz telegram No. 1 of January 11 is not printed.

⁵ See note 2 above.

ment are happy to observe that the French Government have no objection to their being abolished on the conditions suggested by the Rhineland High Commission if precise undertakings are obtained from the German Government in their place. His Majesty's Government venture to hope that the French Government will consider it unnecessary to raise any objections to the High Commission's proposals in this respect. His Majesty's Government, as the French Government are doubtless aware, hoped that the protective ordinances might all have been abolished at the time of the general revision of ordinances after the London Agreement, since they had long felt some doubts as to their validity. The signature of the Locarno treaties is, as the High Commission point out, a further powerful argument in favour of their abolition. Also the French Government will recollect that in the communiqué issued by the Rhineland High Commission to the Rhenish press on the 17th November it was stated that 'the stipulations which provide, in respect of certain persons having rendered services to the authorities of occupation, for unilateral decisions on the part of the Allied authorities will be repealed, and amicable or arbitral procedures are in contemplation.' In view of this clear declaration it seems impossible to delay bringing the present situation respecting the protective ordinances to an end.

12. I request that you will bring the above considerations before the Ambassadors' Conference without delay, stressing the point that the Germans appear to His Majesty's Government to be unlikely to accept any new formula and that, if the French insist, the result may well be that the amnesty will be lost. You should suggest that the High Commission should accordingly be instructed to negotiate with the German authorities with a view to stiffen up the note which the latter will address to the High Commission.⁶

13. Immediately on the receipt of this despatch and before the meeting of the conference it might be well for you to take up the matter personally with M. Briand, explain to him our reasons for the attitude adopted and express the hope that he will agree.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN⁷

⁶ Lord Crewe carried out the preceding instructions in a memorandum of January 18 to the Conference of Ambassadors (copy received in the Foreign Office under Paris despatch No. 111: not preserved in Foreign Office archives).

⁷ Thus on filed copy.

No. 187

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 18, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 17 Telegraphic: by bag [W 367/78/98]

PARIS, January 17, 1926

Following from Sir Eric Drummond.

Understand Briand Scialoja agreed desirability adjournment disarmament

preparatory committee because of German¹ and Russian situation² but neither wishes to take responsibility making request.

They intend to consult you on return from Rapallo through Paris. May I urge that any decision should be taken as soon as possible as so many countries involved whose representatives already making plans.

It would be awkward for instance if any delegate or expert left America and request then made. As economic preparatory committee³ meets April 15th if postponement decided on beginning or middle of May would seem suitable date Secretariat point of view.

¹ Sir W. Tyrrell recorded in this connexion that on January 22 the French Ambassador explained to him that in the view of the French Government a most important objection to the Preparatory Commission's meeting on February 15 was 'the absence of Germany from the League of Nations'.

² The reference was possibly to the note of January 16 from the Soviet Government to the President of the Council of the League of Nations accepting the invitation to be represented on the Preparatory Commission provided that the Commission did not meet in Switzerland. See *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1926, pp. 635-6.

³ For the decision of the Council of the League of Nations on December 15, 1925, to set up a Technical Preparatory Committee for an International Economic Conference see *op. cit.*, February 1926, pp. 185-7.

No. 188

Letter from Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received January 20)

[C 778/778/18]

Private & Confidential

BRUSSELS, January 18, 1926

My dear Tyrrell:—

I paid a visit to Vandervelde this morning and he told me that he had met Berthelot at luncheon in Paris on January 2. After luncheon, Berthelot had had a long conversation with him of a private character—'à bâtons rompus', Vandervelde called it.

2. This conversation had made a considerable impression on him for, in the course of it, Berthelot had started the subject of shortening the delays for the evacuation of the whole Rhineland. He had mentioned that there had originally been three ostensible reasons for the occupation, namely to ensure that Germany carried out her engagements as regards:—(a) trial of war criminals, (b) reparations and (c) security. As regards (a), the question had been allowed to lapse completely; (b) a settlement had been reached by the Dawes plan, etc., and (c) the Locarno Treaties had provided for security.

3. Berthelot incidentally observed, with regard to the occupation of the Rhineland, that it could be argued, and indeed was argued that, from the point of view of security, the occupation of these German regions would be rather a source of weakness than of strength if war should break out again. He further indicated that if a big financial operation could be brought about which would entail '*la mobilisation des obligations de l'Allemagne*' under the

Dawes scheme, it would be worth while to France, in his opinion, to hasten the time when the Rhineland could be evacuated. He added that he believed that this financial operation was feasible and was bound to come about sooner or later.

4. I enquired of Vandervelde whether Berthelot had said that Briand shared his views. He replied that Berthelot had not mentioned Briand's name in this connection, but that he felt sure that Berthelot's language was in harmony with Briand's well-known wishes to bring about a real pacification of Europe.

5. Vandervelde then went on to say that personally he was entirely of the same way of thinking as Briand; but that, if negotiations were to take place of some such kind as Berthelot had foreshadowed, Belgium would have to participate in them and would naturally have to uphold her own interests. There was, for instance, the question of the five milliard marks left behind by the Germans in Belgium after the Armistice. He here interpolated the observation that there had been some unauthorised talk about a real plebiscite of the population of Eupen and Malmédy, but that all this was a most delicate subject.

6. I remarked that the question of the marks left behind in Belgium had arisen previous to the signature of the Treaty of Versailles and was not one of the reasons which had been given for the occupation of the Rhineland. Vandervelde said that he knew this but that, if a general negotiation were to take place, he was obliged to think of his own country.

7. He then went on to tell me that the German Ambassador in Paris had complained that the 'density' of the French military occupation in the Rhineland had not, since the evacuation of the first zone, been proportionately reduced; and the German Minister here had recently come to him to make a similar complaint and had expressed the hope that the Belgian Government would be able to say something in Paris with a view to inducing the French Government to reduce their forces as Great Britain and Belgium had done.

8. Vandervelde observed, in this connection, that he thought that, if the French Government were really considering seriously what had been said to him privately by Berthelot, they would not be anxious to lighten too much the burden of occupation so that they should have in hand a strong lever in the event of future negotiations.¹

Yours very truly,
GEORGE GRAHAME

¹ Mr. Lampson sent a copy of this letter to Sir O. Niemeyer at the Treasury. Sir Otto wrote to Sir W. Tyrrell on February 3 stating in particular: 'I have nothing to say against acceleration of the evacuation of Germany: but we should have to proceed very warily with any French attempt to trade this off against a mobilisation of the German railway bonds etc. . . . I know that both Gilbert [Agent General for Reparation Payments] and responsible American banking opinion consider that the moment for such mobilisation has certainly not come yet and are quite opposed to Delacroix's [M. Delacroix was Belgian delegate to the Reparation Commission and a Trustee of the German Railway Bonds, and had been Belgian Prime Minister 1918-20] visions. We here are entirely of the same opinion.'

Letter from Herr von Schubert (Berlin) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received January 20)

[C 794/446/18]*

Translation

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BERLIN, January 18, 1926

Dear Sir William,

During our last conversation in London you suggested that in special cases I might address myself directly to you. I should like already to make use of this friendly offer in a matter whose position at the moment causes me very grave anxiety. It is the question of the reduction of the troops in occupation on the Rhine. Although M. Sthamer has recently spoken fully to Mr. Lampson on the subject,¹ I think it important that I myself should represent quite frankly to you once more from the view-point of the entire situation, as it is regarded in political circles here, the difficulties arising from the attitude hitherto adopted by the occupying Powers.

As seen from abroad, it is certainly not easy to estimate correctly the importance which still continues to be attributed here in Germany to the question of the so-called 'reactions of Locarno.' Nevertheless, I am convinced that you, Sir William, have an accurate perception of political causes and relations, and that as far as you are concerned it is not necessary first to dispel the idea that the German Government are unnecessarily exaggerating the question of the reactions in order to exploit the general international interest in our great treaty achievement for securing unfair advantages in certain individual matters. It is in fact daily borne in upon me afresh that the great policy of broad publicity pursued by us can only be understood if its effects become manifest on the things which are obvious to everyone.

I would now ask you to visualise how the question of the reduction of the occupation troops presents itself to the German nation from this aspect. In the note from the Ambassadors' Conference of the 16th [14th] November last, a 'réduction sensible se rapprochant des chiffres normaux'² was promised. Naturally, the German Government have utilised this very promise with special emphasis in the debates in Parliament and the press, because it referred to a point which even to the man in the street was readily comprehensible.

It now transpires that, compared with their strength at the time of the Conference of Locarno—and these figures must obviously be taken as the starting-point in any comparison—the troops in the second and third zones have not yet been subjected to any appreciable reduction at all. In consequence, it is cast in the face of the German Government that this is a formal promise which is plainly not being fulfilled. A glance at the German press will show to what extent the Opposition here make use of this state of affairs.

¹ Mr. Lampson's record of this conversation on January 15, when Dr. Sthamer spoke along lines similar to those of Dr. Stresemann in No. 183, is not printed.

² See No. 183, note 2.

The German Government have, I think, adequately proved that they do not allow themselves to be diverted from pursuing their course even by a numerically strong Opposition. On the question of the reduction of the occupation troops, however, the position is such that even the parties at the back of the Government have become to some extent perplexed, or at least have been greatly embarrassed by the arguments of the Opposition. Thus, for instance, a few days ago the discussion in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag took a highly precarious turn.³

It is therefore not a sign of petty impatience or of faulty judgment of the general political situation when we are so insistent on this question. You may in particular rest assured that we here fully understand the internal conditions in France. The urgency of the matter is, however, a result of the now admitted fact that a formal promise of the Ambassadors' Conference exists, and that the German Government have to answer before Parliament and to the public the question what attitude they intend to adopt with regard to the non-fulfilment of this promise. It would not be more disagreeable for anyone than for the German Government themselves if the question were definitely put to them in the concrete form whether the German Government proposed to apply for admission to the League of Nations before the pledge has been fulfilled.

You will perceive from these brief outlines in what a serious dilemma the German Government might be placed. I venture, therefore, to urge you to consider the matter once more, and with all the means at your command bring about as soon as possible the commencement of the reduction of the occupying troops. Owing to the great importance of the question I have thought it well to write in the same tenor to M. Berthelot.⁴

With the assurance, &c.,

VON SCHUBERT

³ Lord D'Abernon had reported in Berlin telegram No. 12 of January 16 that Dr. Stresemann had informed him that on January 15 in the Foreign Affairs Committee a 'resolution was passed with 2 dissentients insisting upon a satisfactory solution of reduction of troops in occupied area, as a condition precedent to Germany entering the league. The two dissentients were a German national and a communist who both wanted a more violent wording than that adopted.'

⁴ In his reply to Herr von Schubert on January 28 Sir W. Tyrrell stated that until Sir A. Chamberlain returned to London on January 29 'it is impossible for me to say anything definite as to the measure in which it has been found possible to meet your desires'.

No. 190

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 20, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 22 Telegraphic: by bag [C 723/24/18]

PARIS, January 19, 1926

Following are proposals unanimously approved by allied air experts for limiting avions de chasse in Germany.

1. Sous la réserve des dérogations prévues aux paragraphes suivants le gouvernement allemand s'engage à ne pas permettre la construction et l'importation d'avions dont les caractéristiques (rapport du poids mort à la puissance motrice) ou les performances (vitesse et plafond) seraient sans objet pratique pour une aviation commerciale *bona fide* et qui s'appliqueraient spécialement à l'aviation de chasse.

2. Toutefois la construction d'avions exclusivement destinés à prendre part à des courses ou compétitions internationales annoncées publiquement et à des records contrôlés officiellement, sera autorisée par dérogation avec l'article ci-dessus, même si ces avions présentaient les caractéristiques ou les performances interdites par ledit article.

3. Le nombre des avions bénéficiant de la dérogation précédente et des pilotes pouvant les conduire sera strictement limité de façon que l'effectif total des avions (comprenant à la fois les avions en construction et les avions maintenus en service) et l'effectif des pilotes ne dépassent à aucun moment chacun le nombre de 15.

Les avions et les pilotes précités seront nommément déclarés dans une rubrique spéciale à la S[ociété] d[es] N[ations] dans les conditions prévues par la note. . . .¹

4. Aucun avion de cette catégorie ne sera en particulier autorisé dans les Écoles d'Aviation, quelles qu'elles soient.²

¹ Punctuation as in original.

² Lord Crewe had reported in Paris telegram No. 20 of January 19 that these proposals had been communicated that afternoon to the German representative who 'strongly objected to the limitation of "avions de chasse" and special pilots to a definite number'. Previously, the Allied air experts had unanimously rejected the German proposals on the same subject which were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris telegram No. 21 (not printed).

No. 191

Sir W. Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 203 [C 703/446/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 19, 1926*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 193¹ of the 18th January, I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter from the War Office on the subject of the strength of the Allied armies of occupation in the Rhineland.²

¹ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. This despatch transmitted to Paris a copy of the record referred to in No. 189, note 1.

² Not printed. This letter of January 18 gave approximate figures regarding the strengths of the Allied forces in the Rhineland as follows: (a) on September 1, 1925: British 9,000, French 72,400, Belgian 16,600, totalling 98,000, of which 64,200 were stationed in the second and third zones; (b) after the evacuation of the Cologne zone: British 8,000, French 58,300, Belgian 7,500, making a total of 73,800 to be stationed in the second and third zones. Thus although the total strength of the Allied armies of occupation would be reduced by 24,200, the number of troops in the last two zones would be increased by 9,600.

Your Excellency will recollect that this question was one of the points raised by the German delegation at Locarno, who asked that the numbers should be brought at least as low as those maintained in the Rhineland by Germany before the war, viz., 46,000 men. While the Allied delegates never admitted that particular thesis, yet M. Briand did undoubtedly give his personal though no doubt informal assurance that the evacuation of the Cologne zone would not lead to an increase of troops in the remaining two zones. Here I would refer your Lordship to my despatch No. 3425³ of the 19th October last, enclosing an unofficial record of a meeting between the heads of delegations at Locarno on the 12th October.

2. The measures which the Allied Governments found it possible to carry out by way of Locarno reactions were conveyed to the German Government in a note from the Ambassadors' Conference of the 14th November.⁴ As regards reduction of troops, it was said that 'the measures contemplated by the Governments represented on the High Commission . . .⁵ will have a two-fold purpose; in the first place the number of the troops of occupation will be considerably reduced.' Again, 'thus the reduction in the number of troops to a figure approaching the normal will make it possible to place at the disposal of the administrations or the population certain public buildings. . . .'⁶ Actually, as was subsequently established, the reductions contemplated were—

For the French to 60,000.

For the British to 8,000.

For the Belgians to 7,000.

3. The question was again raised by the German delegation in London on the 1st December as both M. Briand and M. Berthelot will no doubt remember; after enquiring in what length of time the promised reductions would take place, they again urged that the number should be reduced to that of the German pre-war garrison, viz., 46,000. They claimed that the reduction contemplated by the Ambassadors' Conference note of the 14th November must be something quite apart from the automatic reductions following upon the evacuation of Cologne, and they were not satisfied with the contemplated reduction of the French troops to 60,000. M. Briand promised that as soon as he returned to Paris he would see what more could be done. Again I would refer your Lordship to my despatch No. 40[0]¹⁶ of the 4th December last enclosing a rough unofficial British note of the conversation. As this was not communicated to or checked by the French delegation it should not be referred to textually.

4. It now appears from the War Office letter of the 18th January (enclosed herein) that not only have the French Government [not] introduced any appreciable reduction in the French army of occupation below the 60,000

³ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives: the enclosed record is not printed.

⁴ See No. 103, note 4.

⁵ Punctuation as in original quotation.

⁶ See No. 178, note 2.

originally contemplated, but that the present figures do not tally with what was said to the German delegation at Locarno. For it is clear, if the War Office figures are correct, as no doubt they are, that as a result of the evacuation of Cologne the total number of troops occupying the second and third zones has increased by nearly 10,000.

5. There is a further point to which I would draw your Excellency's attention. It appears from your telegram No. 14⁷ of the 15th January that the French military authorities are under the impression that all M. Briand undertook in London on the 1st December was that the French troops should be reduced to 60,000 men. This was not the impression left upon the British representatives present at the meeting, who understood both M. Briand and M. Berthelot to say that they would do their best on their return to Paris to have reductions made below the number of 60,000. Indeed, the retention of French troops to a number of 60,000 would obviously render the realisation of M. Briand's statement at Locarno only possible by reducing the combined British and Belgian forces to about 4,000, as will be realised from a perusal of the War Office letter enclosed herein.

6. In view of the great discrepancy of numbers between the French army, on the one hand, and the British and Belgian armies on the other, it would be inequitable that the British and Belgian Governments should be asked to make any further reductions in their forces; this might indeed be physically impossible in view of their already reduced numbers. What, in fact, is required, therefore, in order not to run counter to what was said by M. Briand at Locarno is that the French forces should be reduced by at least another 10,000 men.

7. It seems hardly possible that M. Briand can realise the position that has thus arisen. His Majesty's Government are far from advocating that every point made by the German Government should automatically be acceded to, regardless of the facts of the case, but in the present instance they are seriously disturbed lest the German Government should be placed in a position to bring a well-founded charge of bad faith against the occupying Powers. This would be most undesirable. Apart, therefore, altogether from the false position in which Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann may be placed in the eyes of the German public—a factor, however, that is not without its international importance—I feel that M. Briand could hardly resent it if His Majesty's Government were to call his attention to this very serious matter. I therefore request that you will take an early opportunity to speak to M. Briand personally on this question. You should make it clear that His Majesty's Government have no wish to press the French Government unduly, and that they are fully aware of the difficulties with which M. Briand is doubtless meeting from the French military authorities. On the other hand, they feel that in this particular case the German Government are justified in their complaint. They were certainly led to believe that the evacuation of the Cologne zone would not result in increasing the number of troops occupying the second and third zones. Yet actually the number

⁷ No. 184.

of troops for these two zones has been, or is in process of being, increased by 10,000.

I am, &c.,
[MILES W. LAMPSON]

No. 192

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with Dr. Sthamer

[C 821/446/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 20, 1926*

The German Ambassador is becoming rather tiresome over this question of the number of troops in the occupied territories. He called again to-day and referred to our conversation on this subject of January 15.

Today's conversation was of a distinctly argumentative character and I found myself obliged on one or two occasions to beg His Excellency to remember the wisdom of adhering to actualities, and not striving after un-realizable theories.

As expounded by His Excellency the German contention may be divided into three parts (this sub-division is my own and not his):—

(a) There shall be no more troops in the second and third zones after the evacuation of Cologne than there were before:

(b) The troops in the second and third zones should be reduced to the number of German troops stationed in those zones before the war.

(c) The new areas of occupation assigned to the Belgian and British troops are too small, resulting in the demand for more accommodation than hitherto and imposing corresponding inconvenience and hardship upon the inhabitants.

I told His Excellency that I wished to make myself as clear as possible on these points. As regards (a) the position seemed to me pretty clear. The matter had been discussed at Locarno and my own view was that there should be no increase in the numbers of troops in the second and third zones of occupation. As regards (b), that was quite another question, and having been present at all the conversations which had taken place I could state positively that nothing had been said at any time which could be regarded by the German government as in any shape or form a definite assurance that the German request would be met. As to (c), I really had nothing special to say beyond informing him that it was one thing for His Excellency to sit in the armchair in my room and suggest that the British troops should have a larger area at Wiesbaden than they actually had—and quite another for us to get it.

His Excellency said that from the way I spoke he felt that I was not prepared to recommend any representations to the French on these questions. I said that he might infer what he liked from what I said, but in actual fact I had said nothing definite one way or the other beyond making it clear,

or endeavouring to make it clear, that the first and second questions were entirely distinct from one another. And as to the second, I would like to add that there was an obvious difference between the position of an occupying force in someone else's country and an indigenous force occupying its own territory; I was no soldier and had no knowledge of such matters, but anyone could see that there was a fundamental difference between the two. And as to exactly how many troops were required for safety in occupied territory, I certainly was not going to commit myself to any opinion whatsoever; that was for the military authorities to say.

The Ambassador left with me the attached map¹ showing in detail the distribution of troops in the second and third zones and the actual reductions which have taken place. He said that this had been compiled with great care and we could rely upon the figures. Simultaneously he produced a table showing the totals of these troops and wished to lead me on to a discussion based upon the assumption that they were accurate; but I refused to follow him, saying that though his figures were doubtless correct I could not be expected to accept them forthwith or without checking as such, or even to discuss them. This somewhat piqued him, I fancy, for he hurriedly put the list back into his pocket, and said that in that case he preferred not to communicate it to me.

Our conversation ended on a rather more friendly note when I asked him whether he had heard anything further regarding Germany's application to join the League of Nations. He said that he had not. I reminded him that we had discussed this matter quite informally the last time I saw him and said that since then I had been looking up the actual time-table to see how long it would take from the date of the receipt of Germany's application at Geneva until she could be formally admitted to the League; according to that time-table it would take a minimum of 5 weeks; now from last Monday (January 18) until March 8 (the date of the meeting of the Council) there were only 7 weeks ahead of us, so if Germany wished to be in before then she would have to act with speed. The Ambassador repeated that although he took a general interest in this question he was not competent to discuss it. It was being dealt with entirely at Berlin.²

M. W. LAMPSON

¹ Not reproduced.

² A copy of this record was sent to Paris in Foreign Office despatch No. 214 of January 20 (not preserved in Foreign Office archives). On the same day Mr. Lampson wrote to Mr. Phipps in Paris, giving the French text corresponding to the passages from the note of November 14, 1925, cited in No. 191, and enquiring: 'What do those passages mean? Do they imply, as the German Government now maintain, that the number of troops in the second and third zones not only shall be no greater than they were before Cologne was evacuated, but shall actually be reduced? At first sight that seems to me to be a not unreasonable interpretation to place upon them, but what was in your minds when you wrote those words? What did the French Government wish them to imply? I am all against being browbeaten by the German; in fact I was a good deal more outspoken with Sthamer this afternoon than the record of my conversation might lead you to think, but I have an uneasy feeling that there is some foundation for their arguments in this particular case, and I am sure that you in Paris are just as anxious as we here in London are, that we should not give the

Germans *just* cause for a substantial grievance as to the way in which we are fulfilling our pledges to them in the note of November 14th.'

Mr. Phipps replied in a letter of January 22 to Mr. Lampson that his 'question has already been answered in Lord Crewe's despatch No. 137 [No. 196] of last evening. But I have spoken to Wigram with reference to your letter, and he says that nothing was present in his mind at the time other than the reasonableness of giving the Germans some vague indication of approaching reductions in the effectives of the occupation. So far as he remembers it was the French themselves who first proposed talking about the reduction of effectives. At any rate, he remembers Laroche telling him at the time that the French were ready to make extensive reductions and that they were expecting a similar gesture from the British and Belgians.' Mr. Phipps then gave further details regarding the drafting of the notes of November 14 and 16, 1925.

No. 193

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received January 25)

No. 31 [C 960/482/18]

BERLIN, *January 20, 1926*

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a memorandum of exceptional interest by Mr. Breen¹ on the position of the patriotic associations and the relations subsisting between them and the Communists.

2. There is a considerable amount of evidence which goes to confirm the facts as set forth in this memorandum.

3. There can be no doubt that during Chicherin's visit to Berlin last autumn close intercourse was developed between the Russian Embassy and the leaders of some of the patriotic associations. Both the extreme Right in Germany and the Communists would appear to have come to the conclusion that the urgent task of the moment was to destroy the power of the democratic bourgeoisie. What happens afterwards is of less immediate concern. The Right think that having destroyed the German democrats they can easily deal with the Communists, while the Communists think that they can easily deal with the German conservatives once they have destroyed the power of democracy.

4. There are several sidelights which go to show that the German right and the Communists are to-day working in harmony. It was very noticeable last November at the reception given at the Russian Embassy how many ex-officers were present, apparently on friendly terms with the Russian representatives. The recent press campaign against the Dawes Plan initiated by the 'Lokal Anzeiger' is being run on arguments which have a distinctly communistic origin:—the alleged ruin of different sections of the German population through foreign exploitation, the asserted sacrifice of national interests to further capitalistic aims are themes common to all communistic propaganda. Without prompting from Russia a bourgeois paper like the 'Lokal Anzeiger' would hardly have preached the gospel of general ruin or

¹ Press Officer in H.M. Embassy at Berlin.

have published article after article hostile to the financial interests of many of its readers.

5. The further working of this alliance between the extreme Right and the extreme Left will require careful watching. While it may be difficult for them to act together harmoniously for long both parties are so reckless that they are capable of any excess in order to achieve a temporary victory over their common enemy, the Centre, and the Parties close to it.

I have, &c.,
D'ABERNON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 193

Memorandum by Mr. Breen

BERLIN, *January 16, 1926*

Baron Reibnitz² came to see me to-day to solicit my help in connection with a mortgage which his friend Fürst Stolberg wished to obtain on his extensive woods and forests in the Harz. In the course of our conversations he gave me some interesting information on the subject, on which he is always well informed and up to date, viz., the activities of patriotic associations. Reibnitz devotes most of his time and his small fortune to furthering the cause of the Jung-Deutsche Orden. Owing to the scarcity of money at the present moment, most of his financial supporters, including Stolberg, have no ready money to contribute to political funds, and he hoped that if Stolberg succeeded in obtaining a mortgage a subscription would be forthcoming to enable him to publish newspaper articles and print pamphlets not only for his own association, but for the Stahlhelm and the Kyffhäuser Bund.

On enquiry I elicited the following from him:—

The cardinal fact in the general situation of all the patriotic associations was acute shortage of funds at a moment when, in his opinion, extensive propaganda was more necessary than ever.

The patriotic associations were tending more and more to pursue divergent aims. While the Stahlhelm were inclined as a general rule to acquiesce in, if not to actively support, every political act of President von Hindenburg, the local leaders were inclined to adopt another policy, partly out of self-interest and partly out of a misguided allegiance to Ludendorff.³ His own association, the Jung-Deutsche Orden, was strongly in favour of the Hindenburg-Stresemann policy—the Locarno Agreement, entry into the League, the Dawes scheme—in other words, an understanding with France and the Western Powers.

Now Chicherin not only came to Berlin personally last autumn but employed every channel to bring pressure to bear on the German Government

² Presumably Freiherr Kurt von Reibnitz, a member of the Social Democratic Party, who had been Staatsminister in Mecklenburg-Strelitz 1919–23.

³ General E. Ludendorff, First Quartermaster of the German Army during the First World War, was a member of the Reichstag and closely associated with the National Socialist party.

to abandon the Locarno policy in time. He had failed, but the Russians were not easily discouraged. They had recently invited Ludendorff's henchman, Bauer,⁴ to visit Russia again and survey the position for himself. Bauer, who, in the old days, was the stoutest supporter of the Ludendorff-Hoffmann plan⁴ to restore the monarchy or at any rate overthrow the Soviet system as a necessary preliminary to a Russian-German alliance and the restoration of Germany to her place in Europe, had now returned from Russia convinced that this idea was hopelessly out of date and impractical. The idea of restoring Germany to her old position, of annulling the Treaty of Versailles, and regaining the old frontiers was one of the cherished illusions of all the patriotic associations. After the peace of Tilsit⁵ the position of Germany was hopeless, but the Tauroggen agreement⁵ with Russia restored Germany's independence. Bauer and Ludendorff were now convinced that their plan of Russian aid still held good, only it must be carried into effect with the aid of the present Russian Government. A friendly understanding with the Soviet Government meant that the Communist party in Germany would also support their plans. Chicherin was strongly in favour of the new plan, and the Russians were already providing financial support and propaganda for the rank and file of the Stahlhelm and the other patriotic associations. Unfortunately, the local secretaries and wire-pullers who depended on the funds of the associations for a livelihood were inclined to further this propaganda and dismiss any scruples which they entertained. So far the Jung-Deutsche Orden and the majority of the rank and file in the Stahlhelm remained loyal to the Hindenburg policy, but to ensure continued support propaganda by brochure and leaflet was necessary. Owing to the falling-off in subscriptions, funds were very scarce at a time when the Russians disposed of adequate funds. It was, of course, clear that neither the Communists nor the Ludendorff-Bauer party were acting in good faith. Ludendorff deluded himself into thinking that revolution in Germany with the aid of the Communists would reverse the Treaty of Versailles, after which the reactionary party would re-establish themselves. The Communists, on their side, imagined that Bolshevism, once established in Germany with the aid of the patriotic associations and the neutrality of the Reichswehr, would be a permanent institution.⁶

⁴ The reference was presumably to Colonel M. Bauer. For his connexion with the Kapp Putsch of March 1920, and for the activities at that time of Generals Ludendorff and Hoffmann, see First Series, Volume IX, Nos. 30, 31, 81 and 223 and Chapter II, *passim*.

⁵ The peace of Tilsit of July 9, 1807, concluded between France and Prussia, is printed in G. F. de Martens, *Supplément au Recueil des Principaux Traités* (Gottingue, 1802), tome iv, pp. 444-51. The Convention of Tauroggen of December 30, 1812, concluded between Russia and Prussia, is printed in G. F. de Martens, *Nouveau Recueil de Traités* (Gottingue, 1817), tome i, pp. 556-7.

⁶ In connexion with the German attitude to Russia, Sir E. Howard transmitted under cover of Washington despatch No. 197 of February 5 a record of a conversation held in January by Group Captain Christie, Air Attaché to H.M. Embassy at Washington, with Prince Bismarck, a Nationalist Deputy to the Reichstag. On Group Captain Christie's raising the question of 'a Bolshevist menace in Germany, Bismarck replied that that had been one of Germany's few really successful bluffs and that it had prevented cooperative action in the

To sum up, Bauer and Ludendorff, who proposed to de-bolshevis Russia and form a military alliance with the new Russia, were now in favour of bolshevising Germany and Western Europe, after which they hoped to de-bolshevis Germany and restore her to her former position. The Russians considered that a Germany impoverished by the Dawes plan and weakened by deflation and economic hardship would be a permanent Soviet acquisition.

Reibnitz was unable to give actual figures from memory, but declared that the membership of all the associations had declined, as members were no longer able to afford their subscriptions, small as they were.

Ruhr between England and France which, had it eventuated, would have been a very difficult problem for Germany. Discussing the future, B. felt that German policy must consist of aiming at (1) a working agreement culminating in an alliance with Russia (the old Bismarckian tactics) and (2) peaceful penetration of French industries and politics leading up to the gradual control of France and the ultimate absorption of its colonies. Bismarck admitted that despite individual amity he could see no possible means of a *modus operandi* between the English and the German people and felt that the two countries must naturally clash in economic war resulting later in hostilities. Germany's present game was to lull other European nations into quietude and gradually, by bargaining at every opportunity and utilising every favourable diplomatic situation, effect a reduction of its debt and a gradual release from the Versailles Treaty.'

No. 194

Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. London (Geneva)

No. 2 Telegraphic [W 367/78/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 21, 1926, 3.30 p.m.*

Please deliver following message¹ to Sir E. Drummond from Sir W. Tyrrell.

In the absence of the Secretary of State I have consulted Lord Cecil.² His view is that any postponement would have a deplorable effect on public opinion especially in the United States and in Germany, where it would be exploited with possibly disastrous results by parties of reaction. A further objection is that it would lend colour to recent rumours in the Geneva press to the effect that there is disagreement amongst the Powers.

On these grounds he much deprecates any postponement of the meeting. If others desire it, let them take the full responsibility of asking for it.

Prime Minister concurs.³

¹ In reply to the message in No. 187.

² Lord Cecil had been designated as H.M. Representative on the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

³ Sir A. Chamberlain subsequently informed Sir E. Drummond on February 1 that His Majesty's Government would not raise any objection in connexion with a joint request from the Governments of France, Italy, Japan, Czechoslovakia and Uruguay that the meeting of the Preparatory Commission should be deferred until a date to be fixed by the Council of the League of Nations at its session in March. On March 18 the Council agreed that this date should be May 18, 1926: see *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1926, pp. 534-5.

No. 195

*Sir W. Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)*¹

No. 218 [C 764/738/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 21, 1926*

My Lord,

I transmit to you herewith copy of correspondence with the War Office relative to the evacuation of the British zone at Cologne.

2. I request that your Lordship will inform the French Government that the British military authorities propose to complete the evacuation of the British zone by the 31st January, as it has been found possible to complete the arrangements by that date.

3. Similar instructions are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Brussels.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 195

Letter from War Office to Foreign Office

WAR OFFICE, *January 20, 1926*

Sir,

With reference to cipher telegram No. 50061² dated the 18th instant from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Rhine Army, (a copy² of which is attached for convenience of reference) I am commanded by the Army Council to state that they would greatly prefer to see the evacuation of Cologne completed by the 31st January according to present plans.

The Council consider that in view of the fact that the Cologne area, which is the centre of the Five Years Zone, is essentially British, it is important that the British troops should evacuate the area and that the British flag should be hauled down by the date anticipated, if we are to avoid the appearance of breaking our contract. They consider further that the action of the British should not be affected by that of the French and Belgian troops, which after all only occupy outlying portions of the Five Years Zone.

In view, however, of the possibility of the French and Belgians being unable to complete their withdrawal from the Five Years Zone by the 31st January, the Council would be glad to know whether, on political grounds, Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain considers it necessary to wait for a simultaneous completion of evacuation.

It will be necessary to send an early answer to General du Cane's question as his programme is nearing completion.

I am, &c.,

H. J. CREEDY³

¹ Also to Sir G. Grahame, Brussels, No. 65, *mutatis mutandis*.

² Not printed.

³ Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 195

Letter from Foreign Office to War Office

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 21, 1926*

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 20th January, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to state that he concurs in the view of the Army Council that the British forces should complete the evacuation of the Cologne zone by the end of this month without waiting for the final movement of the French and Belgian troops.

2. In this connection I am to request that the Secretary of State's congratulations may be conveyed to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief at Cologne on the success of his efforts to fulfil the undertaking contained in the Ambassadors' Conference note of the 16th November, to the effect that, unless serious material difficulties arose, evacuation should be completed during the course of the month of January.

I am, &c.,

MILES W. LAMPSON

No. 196

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 22)

No. 137 [C 822/446/18]

PARIS, *January 21, 1926*

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 203¹ (C.703/446/18) I have the honour to inform you that, as requested in Paragraph 7, I asked M. Briand to see me personally on the subject. I found, however, that during the throes of the present political crisis,² which are of uncertain duration, the Foreign Secretary was unable to name any hour at which he could see me this week, and I understand that for the moment he is giving no interviews. I therefore saw M. Berthelot this afternoon and, as you are aware, his exceptional authority as permanent head of the office insures the giving of full consideration to any representations which are made personally.

2. I handed M. Berthelot an *aide-mémoire* containing the figures supplied to you by the War Office in their letter³ of the 18th January, and also the general sense of the comments made on them in your despatch under notice. M. Berthelot was quite unwilling to admit that anything in the nature of an engagement not to increase somewhat the total of the occupying force in the two zones remaining after the evacuation of Cologne had been made either

¹ No. 191.

² Consideration in the Finance Commission of the Chamber of Deputies of the proposals of M. Doumer, Minister of Finance in M. Briand's Government, for surmounting the French financial crisis, was suspended in favour of proposals put forward by the Commission.

³ See No. 191, note 2.

at Locarno or in London. He would not go beyond the admission that a strong hope had been expressed by M. Briand subject to consultation with the military authorities, and I think it is clear that the view taken at the Quai d'Orsay of the extent to which German hopes can fairly be built on the foundation of the French observations differs from that which would be held by an English reader of the notes taken at Locarno in October, and in London at the beginning of December.

3. I told M. Berthelot that the German Ambassador, in speaking to me, had complained particularly of the presence in these zones of the headquarters of three French Corps d'Armée. This he said was one of the German inaccuracies, the correct number being two, not three. A French Army Corps consists of two Divisions of 10,000 men; these with 10,000 cavalry, and 10,000 representing administration, Army Service Corps, etc., made up the figure of 60,000. In the course of his conversation with Herr von Hoesch he had pointed out the futility of the demand for these reductions. The only change which would be of value to Germany would be evacuation of all the zones,—what good in the world would a reduction of 5,000 or 10,000 men be to anybody? I asked what the Ambassador had replied, and was told that he had received the question with a laugh, but had not committed himself to any form of reply.

4. M. Berthelot said that both he and M. Briand will be very glad if some further reduction can be made, and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs is going to consult with General Guillaumat, hoping that he will be able to do something to show his goodwill in the matter, and his desire to meet the German wish for some further alleviation.

5. I took the opportunity of mentioning the further German contention, that the strength of the occupying force ought not to exceed that of the pre-war German garrison, a contention which M. Berthelot agreed was based on altogether irrelevant considerations the conditions being entirely changed from the time when Germany was occupying Alsace and Lorraine in great force. I called his attention, however, to some sentences in the letter written by the Ambassadors' Conference to the German Ambassador on the 14th of November last. I must take my share of responsibility for the wording of that communication, but on reflection the phrase in the 7th paragraph about normal figures for the occupying force seemed to me dangerous from its vagueness, there being no recognisable standard of normality. M. Berthelot agreed that the phrase was imprudent, but he evidently did not think we need be troubled by the interpretation which the Germans might choose to give to it.

6. I mentioned that there had been also German complaints about the inadequacy of the areas allotted to the British and Belgian troops respectively, but M. Berthelot shared my view that this was a purely military matter, which it was not useful for us to discuss as it must be decided by soldiers on the spot.

I have, &c.,
CREWE

No. 197

Letter from Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received January 25)

[C 973/436/18]

Private

BERLIN, January 21, 1926

My dear Tyrrell,

I enclose letter I have received from General Wauchope which puts the position regarding Disarmament in the clearest light. From conversations with General Wauchope I gather that, if the points he mentions are settled on the lines suggested, the work of the Commission can be brought to an end in April.

It would be necessary for General Walch to be clearly informed from Paris that he must interpret [*sic*] previous instructions from Paris in the spirit of the Treaty of Locarno. I believe that good will on his part is not lacking, but French officers are very timid about taking responsibility.

Yours sincerely,
D'ABERNON

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 197

Letter from General Wauchope to Lord D'Abernon

BERLIN, January 20, 1926

Dear Lord D'Abernon,

During the last few months the progress as regards Armaments has been satisfactory.

As regards Effectives (Personnel of Army and Police), the progress has been slow.

This is due to two main causes:

- (1) The Versailles Committee decided last October that they would deal direct with the German Government on four outstanding questions.¹ Final settlement on these four questions has not yet been reached, though the prospects are now more hopeful.
- (2) Although I have persuaded my colleagues to grant reasonable concessions regarding Armament questions, they have hesitated to make similar concessions over Effective questions, because they consider they are still bound to exact all the demands made in the Allied Note of the 4th of June, 1925.

Progress could be made more rapidly if General Walch was very clearly informed from Paris that he need not be bound strictly by the Allied Note

¹ The reference would appear to be to the negotiations with German experts in Paris in November 1925. These negotiations resulted in the agreement regarding the five points in list 4 attached to the German note of October 23: four of these points related to effectives. Cf. No. 106, note 1.

of the 4th of June, 1925, in considering what concessions might be made to the Germans, as that Note must now be read in the spirit of the Treaty of Locarno.

During the last week, five concessions which I proposed should be made were rejected by this Council and referred to the Versailles Committee for final decision.

If the Versailles Committee accept the concessions which I advise, two results will follow:

- (i) Settlement, I believe, will be arrived at with the German Government on these 5 questions.
- (ii) My hands will be strengthened in arranging an agreement between this Commission and the German Government on the remaining outstanding points.

I enclose:

- (A) A copy of some remarks made by me at our Council Meeting held on the 12th of January.²
- (B) A short Résumé on the 5 concessions which I proposed, and which have now been referred to the Versailles Committee.

I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

A. G. WAUCHOPE

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 197

B

*Five Concessions proposed by General Wauchope
which have been referred to the Versailles Committee for decision*

1. *Illegal Enlistments, and Training of Reserve Officers*

The Council demands that legislative measures should be passed dealing with these subjects. I consider that a decree signed by the Reichs President would be sufficient.

2. *Training of General Staff officers*

The Council were not satisfied with the proposals put forward by General von Pawelsz. In my opinion they are thoroughly satisfactory.

3. *Aviation*

The Council demands the abolition of the section in the Reichswehr-ministerium dealing with Aviation. I agree with this but consider that Army officers should be allowed to deal with anti-aircraft protective measures.³

² Not printed.

³ Mr. Troutbeck minuted on January 26 that Colonel Heywood, assistant Military Attaché in H.M. Embassy at Paris, had informed the Foreign Office that day that the Allied Military Committee of Versailles had upheld General Wauchope's views on the preceding three points.

4. *Lufrat*

The Council demands that no officer should belong to the Lufrat—a German aviation society. I maintain that we have no right to make this demand, as we have no proof of its connection with the Reichswehrministerium, and General von Pawelsz has informed us officially that it is a sporting and in no sense a military society.

5. *Fitted railway trucks*

The Germans have consented to reduce the total number of these from 210,000 to 50,000. The Council demands that the number should be reduced to 35,000. I consider a concession should be made on this point.⁴

⁴ Sir W. Tyrrell stated in his telegram No. 17 to Paris of January 26 that although His Majesty's Government would prefer to allow the German Government 50,000 trucks 'on the general ground that we value General Wauchope's advice and are guided by it' Lord Crewe was authorized to accept 35,000 if his colleagues pressed the matter.

No. 198

Lord Kilmarnock (Coblentz) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 22, 9 p.m.)
No. 5 Telegraphic [C 868/738/18]

COBLENZ, January 22, 1926, 7.25 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Liquidation in British area will not be completed by January 30th, but General Du Cane who is averse from leaving small isolated bodies of troops behind after main force has left proposes effecting this by sending back officers in plain clothes under arrangements to be made by High Commission with German Commissioner.

Although engagements entered into by the allies do not bind them to complete evacuation before February 20th, it would doubtless be helpful to Herr Stresemann if this date were anticipated and it seems a pity that matters should be held up by the Belgians alone. The French High Commissioner was at first inclined to agree to my proposal that High Commission should recommend evacuation on February 7th, but yielded to the Belgians' arguments in favour of February 20th. Finally as a compromise it was agreed to make no recommendation as to date.

I feel that pressure by His Majesty's Government through Conference of Ambassadors might obtain agreement to earlier date. There seems no reason why the Belgians should not make arrangements for liquidation similar to ours.

¹ Not printed. This telegram of January 22 gave information regarding the evacuation of the northern zone similar to that in No. 204, and reported that the High Commission had requested the Conference of Ambassadors 'to fix a date when zone as a whole should be considered from legal aspect as evacuated'.

Only real arguments in favour of later date are that negotiations now in course in regard to amnesty and delimitation of boundary of second zone will probably not have been completed by February 7th.

No. 199

Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell to M. de Fleuriau

[C 522/436/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 23, 1926*

My dear Ambassador,

I have read with great interest the copy of M. Briand's despatch of the 11th January¹ which your Excellency was good enough to leave with me on the 14th January, indicating the anxieties felt by the French Government lest there should be a hiatus between the control of the Allied Military Commission at present functioning in Germany and the investigations by the League of Nations under article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles.

As M. Briand points out, the matter is not at the moment one of great urgency on which a definite decision is required, and I observe that the views expressed in his despatch are intended rather to indicate certain considerations which have suggested themselves to the French Government than to be any final expression of opinion on their part. Similarly, I must beg you to regard the views I am now about to express not as a final statement of opinion on the part of His Majesty's Government, but merely as a preliminary outline of the way in which the question strikes us at the moment. Clearly, future events may necessitate a complete reconsideration of our respective views.

In the first place, may I say quite frankly that the legal situation, as it appears to us, does not entirely tally with the view of your Government on the matter? To our minds the note addressed by the Ambassadors' Conference to the German Government on the 16th November last was quite definite when it said that 'the commission . . .² will be completely withdrawn as soon as it has brought to a satisfactory conclusion the task that remains for it to accomplish.'³ So far as the withdrawal of the commission is concerned, we should not feel able to appeal to the terms of previous notes written in different circumstances and, in our view, undoubtedly superseded by the note of the 16th November.

On the other hand this need not, as we see it, have the disturbing effect that the French Government seem to contemplate. The French Government point out that circumstances may conceivably arise in which Germany will have completed the execution of our disarmament requirements either before she has joined the League or while the reconsideration of the League scheme of investigation of 1924 promised at Locarno is still in progress. She may then demand the withdrawal of the Control Commission, and we should

¹ No. 174.

² Punctuation as in original quotation.

³ See No. 106, note 2.

for an indefinite period be precluded by what passed at Locarno from any investigation by the League under the existing scheme. The result would be a hiatus when no form of supervision would be possible at all.

To our mind, however, the above picture of the situation does not fully represent what actually took place at Locarno. Is not the position rather as follows? The German delegation at Locarno declared at the unofficial meeting on the 15th October that Germany would not be able to join the League until she was assured that in doing so she was not implicitly accepting the League scheme of investigation as it at present stands. The heads of the French and British delegations replied that Germany's difficulties would best be discussed in the Council itself when Germany had become a member, and gave the German delegation to understand that in the meantime, the scheme of the 24th [27th] September [1924] would not be applied.

Now, this undertaking was given with the one express purpose of removing the last obstacle felt by Germany to entering the League. If, however, Germany still prefers not to apply for membership, the undertaking is materially affected and League investigations under the existing scheme cannot reasonably be held up indefinitely. In any case, it is beyond dispute that the other members of the Council can at any time, after the League has assumed its duties under article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles, decide to take action under the present scheme or any other scheme which the Council may unanimously adopt. No individual or joint commitment by the British, French and Belgian members can bind the Council as a whole. In other words, Germany cannot have it both ways. Either she joins the League and the League scheme can then be rediscussed, or she remains outside and the present scheme holds good.

To turn now to the other contingency contemplated in M. Briand's despatch of the 11th January—viz. that investigations will not be practicable while the scheme is being rediscussed—here again we feel it is possible to exaggerate the dangers. The position surely is that a League scheme exists, having been approved by the Council, and that if Germany sees objections to it, it will be for her to persuade the rest of the Council that it ought to be altered and to induce them, by a unanimous vote, to adopt such modifications. If she fails to do this, the scheme as already adopted will stand. She cannot expect the Council to refrain from ordering an investigation indefinitely, if, at a given moment, a clear case for an investigation meanwhile arises.

I hope M. Briand will feel to some extent reassured by the above expression of our purely preliminary view. But I must beg your Excellency once again to make it clear to him beyond all possibility of subsequent misunderstanding that they are only our tentative ideas and in no sense necessarily express the final views of His Majesty's Government. Our desire is, of course, that Germany should join the League at the earliest possible moment and thereby render *pro tanto* easier the problem to which you have invited our attention.

Believe me, &c.,
W. TYRRELL

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received January 29)

No. 38 [C 1154/6/18]

BERLIN, *January 23, 1926*

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I dined with Dr Schacht last night at the Reichsbank and had a long conversation with him after dinner. Dr Schacht, through the success of his currency reform and the ability he has shown as President of the Reichsbank, is to-day the leading authority in Germany on all matters of finance and industry.

2. Broadly speaking he is very optimistic, sharing the view that the worst of the financial crisis is now probably past (see my telegram No. 11).¹

3. He said that since the signature of the Locarno Pact the position of the Reichsbank had become stronger every week and was now thoroughly satisfactory.

4. If the Locarno Pact had not been signed he believes that the financial crisis in Germany might have become very serious. Up to the time of Locarno the Reichsbank was losing gold week by week. He had been seriously apprehensive about the drain on its resources. But since Locarno the tide had turned, confidence both abroad and in Germany had increased and he was very hopeful as to the future. The black spot was the increase of unemployment, but against this might be set a return of confidence in industrial circles, marked progress in the direction of the amalgamation of the larger concerns, notably in the steel and chemical industries.

5. Dr Schacht has returned from the United States profoundly impressed by the industrial development in that country and by its gigantic financial strength. As regards industry, he is convinced that the American system of amalgamation, of mass production and of adjustment of production to consuming power over a vast area must be adopted by Europe if Europe is to survive against American competition. He is a convinced advocate of the horizontal cartel system and of control over production of such a nature as to prevent destructive competition and the flooding of markets beyond their consuming capacity. He said 'Europe has got to re-organise its industry on these lines. Here we are quite prepared to follow England's lead and to accept England's leadership. The English are easy and agreeable to work with provided you do not question their position and hegemony and there would be no hesitation here in accepting the financial guidance of the City of London. Only we must feel convinced that a serious re-organisation of industry on broad lines is contemplated. The old system of innumerable small firms competing with one another and producing goods which are not required by the market has got to be modified. Here in Germany we have made considerable progress. During the last week steel interests have come together—the chemical interests are already amalgamated. The potash

¹ See No. 182, note 3.

industry has saved itself by fusion and amalgamation. But more remains to be done. What is the use of 38 small automobile firms competing against one another and producing at extravagant cost?''

6. Outside the question of the re-organisation of industry, Dr Schacht appeared to attach great importance to Germany having some colonial outlet. This, in his view, need not necessarily be under the German flag: Germany required territories from which she could obtain raw material and to which she could send human elements which might be dangerous if they were confined to Germany. He appeared further to attach extreme importance to a development of Germany's colonial interests as a means of maintaining stability of her currency. But I was not able to follow precisely his train of argument on this subject as, if one makes an impartial survey of what German colonies did for German trade and German currency before the war, the conclusion is reached that their effect was more moral than material.

7. While in the United States Dr Schacht appears to have discussed in private conversation the scheme that a German-American chartered company should be formed which would lease or purchase some of the Portuguese colonies such as Angola.

8. Regarding German finance, Dr Schacht was curious to learn what the policy of the new Finance Minister² was likely to be. In his judgment, the requisite qualities for a finance minister here are energy and will. 'We do not want a clever man we want a strong and determined man. He must reduce expenditure whether he understands the reason for it or not. I would much sooner see resolution than intellect'.

9. Dr Schacht is a keen supporter of Locarno. Not only does he think that without Locarno German finance would have fallen into a catastrophic position, but he believes that a Locarno solution can be extended, without long delay, to some arrangement regarding the problems of Germany's eastern frontier. He is so permeated with the conviction that the existing corridor arrangement is unworkable and that the Upper Silesian award is iniquitous that he appears considerably to underrate the difficulty of inducing any Polish Government to abandon their present position. However, I found in him, as I have found in other German statesmen of late, an increased disposition to regard the settlement of difficulties with Poland a matter of urgent moment to Germany; a matter for a satisfactory solution of which it would be good policy on the part of Germany to make considerable concessions, whether of a financial or commercial nature.³

I have, &c.,
D'ABERNON

² Dr. Reinhold.

³ A similar report of this conversation is printed in Lord D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 218-21.

Letter from Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Paris) to Mr. Lampson
(Received January 25)
[C 979/24/18]

PARIS, January 23, 1926

My dear Lampson,

Yesterday the German delegates came forward with a formula regarding the application of Article 213. The formula is as follows:—

‘Dès le rappel du Comité de Garantie aéronautique les dispositions de l'article 213 du Traité de Versailles s'appliqueront aux engagements ci-dessus mentionnés et pris par le Gouvernement allemand en exécution des articles 177, 178 et 198 du Traité, sauf le règlement des questions soulevées par le Gouvernement allemand auprès de la Société des Nations au sujet des résolutions du Conseil de la Société des Nations relatives à l'exercice du droit d'investigation’.

This formula was produced in a conversation with Massigli; the other delegates were not present. Massigli at once indicated that, without prejudice to the views of the other delegations and subject to a careful examination of the German text, it seemed to meet the requirements of the allies.

I should be grateful for the views of the Foreign Office upon it. It seems to me to be acceptable if you have no objection to the wording of the reservation beginning ‘sauf le règlement . . .’¹ which I presume is quite reasonable in view of what was said at Locarno.

The negotiations are moving forward a bit now, and Smyth-Pigott and I hope that in a day or two we may be able to send an official report.²

Yours ever,

HUGHE KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN

¹ Punctuation as in original.

² This letter was minuted as follows by Mr. Lampson, Sir W. Tyrrell, and Sir A. Chamberlain:

‘I am not sure that this [a proposal in previous minutes on this paper to intimate disagreement with the reservation suggested in the German formula] is wise. We were careful to say in our letter of Jan. 23 to the French ambassador [No. 199] that it was merely our *preliminary* view. And my general feeling is that if the French are ready to accept anything the Germans want, it is not for us to refuse, that is in a case of this kind. *We* don't really care very much one way or the other. We know in our heart of hearts that League investigation under art. 213 is never going to be really effective: in short that short of force (which we are certainly not prepared to employ) you cannot keep a nation of over 60,000,000 inhabitants permanently subject to foreign tutelage in this matter of her armaments. And, though with a view to getting things on a way to settlement we are ready to agree with France on getting a show on paper of maintaining our rights, yet we do so to some degree with our tongues in our cheeks. Consequently it is not our policy to be harder than the French on insisting on those rights.

‘It follows that I should tell Mr. Hugessen that he can agree to the present French formula.

M. W. Lampson 30/1/26.’
[footnote continued overleaf.

'I agree with Mr. Lampson *in thinking that we need not be more French than the French.* W. T. 1/2'

*This is a safe line for us in all such questions. A. C. 1. 2.'

On February 2 Mr. Howard Smith wrote to Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen: 'We are prepared to agree to this formula provided that the French agree to it.'

No. 202

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 24, 8.30 p.m.)

No. 19 Telegraphic [C 875/446/18]

BERLIN, January 24, 1926, 7.10 p.m.

I have received following letter from Herr Stresemann. Begins:—

With reference to our conversation on the subject of occupying forces I take the liberty of once again formulating points on which I consider it indispensable to make an immediate declaration in Parliament.

1. Contrary to certain press reports the occupying forces have not yet come to any decision that strength of garrison of second and third zones will consist of 75,000 men or some such figure.

2. The occupying powers abide by assurance contained in note of conference of ambassadors of November 14th, 1925, to the effect that they will take in hand a reduction of effectives to a level corresponding to the 'chiffres normales'. Consequently they will reduce these troops in second and third zones as soon as treaties of Locarno are in force with the object of bringing numbers near level of German garrison quartered there before the war.

I renew my urgent request that you will as soon as possible inform me whether I can consider myself authorized to make a declaration in this sense.

I have addressed same request to French Ambassador and to Belgian Minister.

No. 203

Letter from Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Lampson (Received January 25)

[C 1107/446/18]

PARIS, January 24, 1926

My dear Lampson,

Your letter of January 22nd¹ (C. 794/446/18).

I told Berthelot yesterday evening that Tyrrell had received a long letter from Schubert on the reduction of troops question.² Berthelot said that he too had received a letter from Schubert on the subject. I told him that we had given good advice to Sthamer in the matter, but we felt all the same that

¹ Not printed.

² No. 189.

we were not on quite firm ground. I therefore earnestly urged Berthelot to do something to meet the Germans in the way of reducing the French troops of occupation. Berthelot grumbled a good deal and made out that the Germans were hopeless to deal with. They had not yet applied for admission to the League, they had not complied with our demands in regard to police, aviation, etc., and then when they found one single point on which they did not get entire satisfaction they squealed like rabbits. Berthelot, however, promised in the end that Briand would study the question carefully with a view to giving satisfaction to the Germans in so far as might be possible.

Since the receipt of your letter under reply Wigram has discussed further with Massigli the circumstances attending the despatch of the Conference note on November 14th. This discussion has elicited the fact that certain of the circumstances outlined in my letter of January 22nd³ related not to the note of the 14th, but to that of the 16th. As regards the note of the 14th it appears that the original draft was a French draft and was sent to us on the evening of the 12th and forwarded to you that night. You approved it with certain minor modifications, and it contained the words 'sensiblement réduits' but no reference to 'chiffres normaux'⁴. The reference to 'chiffres normaux' was inserted on the 14th to meet the wishes of von Hoesch. The latter had been shown the draft and had asked for a certain number of alterations, *including a statement that the allies would reduce to the pre-war figures*. This request, Massigli tells Wigram, was specifically refused by the French. But the words 'chiffres normaux' were inserted, because von Hoesch said that they would, as he could get nothing better, suffice to calm German scruples, and because the French thought them sufficiently vague, considering that they can be interpreted to mean troops necessary for a normal situation.⁵

Blum⁶ tells me that von Hoesch has been lobbying him on the subject. Blum hopes and believes that Briand will go some way to meet the Germans in the matter.

Yours ever,
ERIC PHIPPS

³ See No. 192, note 2.

⁴ See No. 92, note 5, and No. 98.

⁵ Paris despatch No. 203 (not preserved in Foreign Office archives) transmitted a record by Colonel Heywood of a conversation on January 28 with General Desticker who, in particular, informed him that the phrase 'se rapprochant des chiffres normaux' was intended to refer to effectives before the despatch of French troops to Morocco in July 1925. Colonel Heywood calculated that on this basis French normal strength in the second and third zones would be about 80,000 men.

⁶ M. Léon Blum was Deputy for the Seine and leader of the Socialist group in the Chamber of Deputies.

No. 204

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 26, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 30 Telegraphic: by bag [C 974/738/18]

Urgent

PARIS, January 25, 1926

Your despatch No. 218.¹

2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs state this evening that Belgian government declares it will not be ready to evacuate Cologne zone until February 19th. Ministry of Foreign Affairs say French government will be ready on January 31st, but that, in view of Belgian statement, the French Ambassador in London has been instructed to propose postponement of British and French evacuation until February 5th. Every pressure will then be brought on the Belgians to induce them to complete evacuation by that date.

3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs state also that Belgian Ambassador will propose at Ambassadors' Conference on January 27th that a joint notification of date of completion of evacuation be made by the conference to the German government.

4. I should be glad of your instructions by return bag on both these points.

¹ No. 195.

No. 205

Memorandum by Mr. Troutbeck

[C 996/681/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 25, 1926

Memorandum prepared for the British representative on the Council regarding the German government's note of January 12, 1926,¹ to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations respecting the League's right of investigation under article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding articles of the other Treaties of Peace.²

¹ See Annex to No. 185.

² A memorandum of November 20, 1925, by Mr. Troutbeck, which had given a fuller historical account of the scheme for investigation of German disarmament by the League of Nations, commenced as follows:

'I.—Plan of the Treaty of Versailles.

'1. The general plan of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles (military, naval and air clauses) was that the disarmament of Germany should be carried out under the supervision of Allied commissions, and that when these were withdrawn and their mission completed, it should devolve upon the League of Nations to ensure, by investigation, Germany's continued observance of the military statute laid down. At the same time the disarmament of Germany was designed to be only a first step in a general disarmament by all nations. [The Admiralty subsequently commented in a letter of December 3 to the Foreign Office

The German government's note of January 12, 1926, is in reply to communications from the Secretary-General notifying them of the various decisions of the Council respecting the League's right of investigation. It will be recollected that on the 27th September, 1924, the Council approved a scheme to organise its right of investigation, and on March 14, 1925, adopted a report by a Mixed Com^{tee}. of Jurists and representatives of the Permanent Advisory Com^{tee}. to determine the ways and means of ensuring the execution of the duties entrusted to investigating commissions. At the same time, i.e. in March 1925, the Secretary-General was authorised to notify to Germany and the other ex-enemy Powers both the scheme and the report, which had both been drawn up independently of those States.³

2. The German government had before this shown some anxiety as to what might be brewing, and had informed H.M. Government more than once that they would never consent to permanent resident commissions being set up by the League as part of its right of investigation. They raised the question again at Locarno on the 15th October in an informal meeting with the British, French and Belgian delegations, and declared that Germany would be unable to apply for membership of the League until she was assured that in so doing she was not implicitly accepting the existing League scheme of investigation. The two points to which the German delegation drew particular attention were the right apparently contemplated of setting up permanent commissions and the question of 'general surveillance', by which was presumably meant the powers conferred upon commissions of investigation by the report of March 14, 1925. The British and French delegations pointed out that these questions would best be discussed in the Council itself when Germany had become a member, and, after considerable discussion, the German delegation appeared reassured. There the matter was left, with the unspoken assurance that, so far as the British, French and Belgian governments were concerned, no action would be taken under the League scheme of September 1924 until it had been re-discussed in the Council in the presence of Germany's own representative.

that the preceding sentence "seems to add nothing to the context and argument" and should be deleted "particularly in view of the specific provisions of the Peace Settlements with regard to the initiation of general disarmament which are given in another part of the Versailles Treaty (i.e. the Covenant) not being quoted".] . . .

'II.—Scheme of Investigation.

'2. It was evidently contemplated by the framers of the treaty that only a few months would be required before Germany's disarmament would be complete and the League would enter upon its right of investigation. This proved, in the event, very far from the mark. It was not till 1924 that any serious step was taken by the League of Nations to organise a scheme for exercising its right of investigation, and even then the step was taken with a view to the other ex-enemy Powers, and not to Germany, though it was agreed that the scheme, when ready, should apply to Germany as well. In June 1924 the Permanent Advisory Commission was instructed to prepare a scheme. This was discussed by the Council in September, and finally approved on the 27th September [cf. No. 125, note 8]'. . .

³ For this report and the resolution of adoption see No. 185, note 3.

3. The German government's note now under consideration raises three points:—

- I. Permanent commissions.
- II. The right of investigation under the demilitarisation clauses of the Treaty.
- III. Powers of investigating commissions.

I. *Permanent commissions.* The German government maintain that article 213 cannot cover permanent or regularly recurring control.

4. Chapter V of the scheme of September 27th, 1924, reads:—

'Demilitarised Zones. Within the period fixed by the Council and with its approval, the president of a commission of investigation may detach groups to remain at points in the demilitarised zones where continuity of investigation is required.'⁴

This, however, did not go far enough for the French, at whose instigation the Council, at its meeting in December 1924, adopted a resolution instructing the Permanent Advisory Committee to study the application of Chapters I and V of the scheme to the demilitarised zone in the Rhineland.⁵

5. Considerable doubts were felt by H.M. Government as to the legality of the French proposal, so after the Council meeting they referred the matter to the Law Officers of the Crown, whose advice they requested on the following points:—

- (a) Is it possible, under the Treaty of Versailles, to comply with the desire of the French government, for the establishment by the Council of the League of 'un organisme fonctionnant sur place' in the zone permanently demilitarised by articles 42–44 of the Treaty of Versailles, or
- (b) Are the rights of the Council confined to ad hoc investigations carried out from time to time by commissions of enquiry of a non-resident character?

The Law Officers' reply, given on the 16th January [1925], was to the effect that it was not possible under the Treaty of Versailles for the Council of the League of Nations to establish the permanent resident organisation which the French Govt. desired, but that the rights of the Council were confined to the institution of specific investigations carried out from time to time by commissions of enquiry employed for the purpose. The British representatives on the P.A.C. were accordingly instructed to agree to no suggestion which contravened the opinion of the Law Officers.

⁴ *Note in original:* 'The words are very ambiguous; they were based (like the whole scheme) on a draft submitted to the P[ermanent] A[dvisory] C[ommission] by the French and British delegates; the original draft of Chapter V was exactly the same as it stands at present except that it did not originally include the words 'in the demilitarised zones' in the text as well as at the heading of the Chapter. The whole scheme was worked out at Geneva without reference to the F.O. and it will not be easy to say what this particular chapter does mean if it is challenged by the German government.'

⁵ For this resolution, see *League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1925, p. 143.

6. When the P.A.C. met in February 1925 to consider the question, they found themselves unable to agree. The British representatives had instructions to agree to no suggestion that contravened the opinion of the Law Officers. Finally, on the 10th February, the P.A.C. submitted a majority report, from which the British and Swedish members abstained. The report argued that investigations in the demilitarised zone must be such as to prevent the Council being faced with serious *faits accomplis*. For this, continuous supervision was essential, and this supervision should be entrusted to a permanently established organ of investigation. The report then proceeded to deal with the duties, powers, organisation and composition of the organ of investigation proposed.

7. This report was placed on the agenda of the Council in March 1925, and the British delegate went to the meeting prepared with a statement expounding the view that H.M. Government, both on legal and on general political grounds, could agree to no form of permanent resident control by the League. As it turned out, the British delegate did not find it necessary to read his statement. The question came before the Council in secret session, and the Swedish delegate produced a copy of a letter written in 1919 by M. Poincaré to M. Clemenceau, which showed that M. Poincaré himself had realised that no right of permanent control was conferred upon the League by article 213. Faced with this overwhelming document the French delegate (M. Briand) tacitly let the question drop, observing that if Germany joined the League it might be possible to discuss the matter under other and more favourable circumstances in the Council. The Council accordingly adopted a resolution⁶ deciding to adjourn the matter to a subsequent session. The matter was placed on the agenda again in June 1925, and it was then agreed at a private sitting not to discuss it. The question formed no part of the agenda in September, and thus still remains undecided. The Secretary of State informed the German delegates at Locarno frankly of the views of H.M. Government on this question.

8. Thus clearly H.M. Government cannot agree to any form of permanent control, and, so long as they hold out, it cannot of course receive the unanimous vote of the Council which would be necessary to bring it into effect.

9. The further question arises whether we should also uphold the German government's contention in rejecting 'regularly recurring control'. The statement prepared for the British delegate at the Council meeting in March 1925 contained the statement that 'The right of the Council is clearly confined to the institution of such specific investigations as may in its judgment be called for in regard to particular matters from time to time'. This, it is submitted, should remain the view of H.M.G. to-day, and the contention of the German government as regards regularly recurring control should accordingly be supported.

II. *Demilitarisation clauses.* The German government maintain that Chapter V of the League scheme cannot apply to the Rhineland, since the rights

⁶ Cf. note 3 above.

of the League under article 213 are applicable only to Part V of the Treaty (disarmament) and not to articles 42 to 44.

10. So far as article 42 (fortifications) is concerned, its terms are reproduced in article 180, one of the disarmament clauses, and so there is no question of investigations not covering article 42. The only matter of doubt is whether they can cover article 43 which is not reproduced among the disarmament clauses, and forbids the maintenance and assembly of armed forces, military manoeuvres and the upkeep of permanent works for mobilisation in the demilitarised zone. Chapter I of the League scheme of September 1924 reads that 'The investigations . . .⁷ shall, when the Council so decides, cover such demilitarisation of territory as may be laid down in the said treaties, and any or all the military, naval and air clauses of the said treaties. . . .'⁷ Are the German government justified in claiming that these words go beyond the terms of article 213?

11. It is submitted that the question is in point of fact academic. Article 4 of the Treaty of Locarno reads:

'1. If one of the high contracting parties alleges that a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.

'2. As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present treaty. . . .'⁷

The Treaty of Locarno thus contemplates the League making an investigation into any breach of articles 42 or 43 alleged by one of the contracting parties.⁸ The only difference between this and a similar investigation as contemplated by the League scheme of 1924 is that in the latter case the Council may decide upon an investigation on the suggestion of any member of the League (Chapter II of the scheme), whereas in the former case one of the contracting parties to the Treaty of Locarno must raise the question. In either case the Council would act by majority vote, for not only does article 213 provide for majority decisions but article 5 of the Covenant also provides for majority decisions in respect of 'the appointment of committees

⁷ Punctuation as in original quotation.

⁸ In a revised version of this memorandum dated February 18, the preceding sentence was replaced by the following passage: 'The parties to the Treaty of Locarno would thus seem to have impliedly conferred upon the Council of the League all necessary powers to satisfy itself by investigation as to the accuracy of an allegation that a violation of article 42 or 43 has been or is being committed. Unless the Council were prepared to conduct the investigation itself, some other mode of investigation, such as the appointment of a committee, must be adopted. The decision on this point would be a pure question of procedure and could therefore be taken by majority vote in accordance with article 5 of the Covenant, which provides for majority decisions in respect of "the appointment of committees to investigate particular matters." It is reasonably regarded as a question of procedure, because the report of the committee would not itself be a binding document; the committee could only make recommendations to the Council, and it is on the Council's decisions alone that any action that were taken must be based.'

to investigate particular matters'.⁹ This point in the German government's note therefore seems of no practical consequence.

III. *Powers of Investigating Commissions.* The German government contend that some of the powers contemplated for investigating commissions vis-à-vis the German authorities and private individuals are too great.

12. The reference here is to the report of March 14, 1925, to which the German delegation also made reference at Locarno (see paragraph 2 above). The specific passages in the report to which objection is taken would seem to be the following:

'The government shall issue instructions to all provincial governments, military and naval commanders, railway, aerodrome and dock authorities, municipal authorities, owners, managers and heads of factories and local police authorities, enjoining them to comply at once with any request of the commission for the purpose of conducting its investigation . . .'⁷

'The commission or any sub-commission or group thereof may, in the course of any such inspection, enter or search any building or locality (whether belonging to the State or to any local or other authority, civilian or military, or to a private individual) . . .'⁷

The jurist members of the mixed committee who drew up the scheme of the 14th March recorded their opinion that it did not go beyond the powers conferred upon the Council by article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles and the similar articles of the other treaties. A further report by the director of the legal section of the League Secretariat (submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General on the 1st June, 1925) recorded the view that the States subject to investigation were bound to bring their legislation, if necessary, into harmony with their obligations under article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles and the similar articles of the other treaties.¹⁰

13. Legally, then, the German contention could be resisted, but on general grounds it is obviously desirable that consideration should be given to German susceptibilities; for, apart from everything else, the practical working of any investigation must depend upon the goodwill of the German government.

⁹ The preceding sentence was not included in the revised memorandum.

¹⁰ The memorandum by the director of the legal section was referred to in the report which Viscount Ishii, Japanese Ambassador at Paris and Delegate to the Council of the League of Nations, read to the Council on June 10, 1925; see *op. cit.*, July 1925, pp. 863-4.

No. 206

Sir W. Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris) and Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)

No. 11¹ Telegraphic [C 875/446/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 26, 1926, 1.17 p.m.*

Berlin telegram No. 19² (of the 24th January. Armies of occupation in the Rhineland).

¹ No. 11 to Paris; No. 5 to Brussels.

² No. 202.

Please enquire urgently of the French (Belgian) government if they agree to an identic reply being made to Dr. Stresemann that (1) the occupying powers have made no such declaration in the press as that alleged; (2) they will of course abide by the terms of the note of November 14th, but that cannot be taken as meaning that they regard the German pre-war garrison as normal in present conditions.

Please repeat your reply to Berlin.

Repeated to Berlin No. 6.

No. 207

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 26, 4.15 p.m.)

No. 20 Telegraphic [C 1016/446/18]

BERLIN, January 26, 1926, 2.50 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to come and see him this morning on a very urgent matter.

I found that Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs had been considering whether they had not better resign, as they feared hostile vote in Reichstag over question of number of occupying troops. The right is hostile and left not a very reliable support.

Herr Stresemann fully realises that question in itself is not one commanding importance, but public opinion here has become so excited about it that it will not be reasonable. Minister for Foreign Affairs is however confident that if ex-allied powers answer 'yes' to his letter given in my telegram No. 19,¹ the (? German government) can meet its opponents and will obtain a majority which would permit of immediate action regarding entry into League of Nations.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 20, repeated to Paris No. 6.

¹ No. 202.

No. 208

Sir W. Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 12 Telegraphic: by bag [C 974/738/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 26, 1926, 6.30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 30¹ (of the 25th January: evacuation of Cologne zone).

Our strong feeling is that formal notification should be made by the Ambassadors' Conference to the German government of the date or dates of completion of evacuation. It is clearly very desirable that conference should be able to say that all three armies will be out by January 31st as was certainly

¹ No. 204.

implied in the note from Ambassadors' Conference of November 16th. Seeing that we undertook in that note to complete evacuation by the end of January if it was physically possible, we are clear in our own minds that the final evacuation of the French and British armies should not be held up beyond that date merely because the Belgians profess to be unable to conform. In that event the best solution would be that proposed by the French High Commissioner (Coblenz telegram No. 7)² namely that the evacuation of the French and British areas should be fixed definitely for January 30th and the Belgian area for some later date. That is however admittedly an unsatisfactory solution and you should press Belgian Ambassador, with all the force at your command, to urge upon his government the desirability of their coming into line. This is the line that was taken discreetly with Belgian Ambassador here on January 25th, though that should not be quoted. Please point out that in any case there can be no object in holding up the evacuation for liquidation purposes seeing that (1) the High Commission has already been authorised to arrange with the German authorities to send back officers to the evacuated areas to clear up outstanding matters if necessary (your telegram No. 412,³ paragraph 3(b)); and (2) it is very doubtful whether liquidation could in any case be completed by February 19th.

Addressed to Paris No. 12, repeated to Brussels No. 7, by bag, and Coblenz No. 6 in R.

² Not printed. This telegram of January 25 reported the French proposal as here indicated. Lord Kilmarnock added that the Belgian troops would be withdrawn by February 4 with the exception of 117 men who would be left behind for liquidation purposes.

³ No. 71.

No. 209

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 27, 9 a.m.)

Unnumbered Telegraphic [C 1073/7/62]

Private and Personal

ROME, January 26, 1926, 9.45 p.m.

Secretary-General has informed me privately of terms of debt settlement¹ and said that Italian government were very pleased. So they ought to be

¹ This agreement, signed on January 27, 1926, is printed in Cmd. 2580 of 1926. Mr. Perowne minuted that day:

'The Italians are getting off lightly indeed.

'They owe us 610,840,000£.

'All they are going to pay is 263,250,000£, and they will get their gold back too. 22,000,000£.

'This generosity or weakness as the two extremes will call it, is, I suppose, preferable to getting nothing at all.

'The U.S., by Mr. Mellon [U.S. Secretary of the Treasury], have declared their principle in the debt settlement with each Power to have been for the debtor to repay *at least the total principal of the loan*.

'H.M.G. are to be content with far less than that standard, only 43% of the total war

as conditions seem extremely favourable to Italians although personally I hardly expected that you would extract more than five millions a year from them. Political effect here ought to be considerable and should make up in some measure for pecuniary sacrifice involved. But if British press writes disagreeable articles on lines of those from 'Manchester Guardian' and 'Spectator' telegraphed out here Italian press is likely to re-act and we may lose both money and good effect.

Could you not inspire an article in the 'Times' if possible pointing out generosity of terms accorded, more favourable than those given by America who could so much better afford to be generous but that we do not grudge them in the interest of Anglo-Italian friendship?² Opinion here is particularly susceptible to this sort of thing and would certainly respond.

debt in fact. This result will doubtless encourage the Portuguese to hope for similar treatment—they only owe us 22,000,000£ or so, & are coming shortly to discuss ways & means.'

'J. V. Perowne 27/1'

² In a note to Sir W. Tyrrell dated January 28, Sir A. Willert, Head of the News Department, reported that 'the political advantages of the Italian Debt settlement' had been put before leading London and provincial papers on January 27.

No. 210

Lord Kilmarnock (Coblentz) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 27, 9 a.m.)

No. 9 Telegraphic [C 1069/738/18]

COBLENZ, January 26, 1926, 11.50 p.m.

High Commission decided to-day following telegram should be sent by each High Commissioner to his government.

1. High Commissioner is informed that negotiations are proceeding between governments for fixing of a definite date for evacuation of Belgian British and French sectors of northern zone.

Dates contemplated up to now by general officers commanding are as follows:—January 30th for British troops. January 31st (or February 2nd) for French troops. February 4th (midnight) for Belgian troops.

Even if a common date cannot be fixed for evacuation by troops of three areas of zone High Commission is of the opinion that from *local* point of view there would be no objection to *de jure* occupation ending simultaneously in all three areas at midnight February 4th. British and French commanders-in-chief are in agreement on this point.

2. It should be stipulated in any case that personnel left behind in evacuated areas for the purpose of liquidation are to retain their privileges as regards billets, circulation, etc.

3. High Commission considers it desirable that effort made by armies to evacuate northern zone at earliest possible date should be pointed out to German government since it should have politically good effect on negotiations which Ambassadors' Conference has charged High Commission to

carry out regarding amnesty, the communications through evacuated zone, and delimitation of northern boundary of second zone.

German government should instruct their representative at Coblenz to adopt a conciliatory attitude on these matters.

On the other hand High Commission asks that attention of German government be called to delay caused by Reichsvermögensverwaltung¹ to commencement of work of assessment commissions.

4. For similar reasons and in conformity with precedents followed at the time of evacuation of the Ruhr and of towns evacuated last year the German government should give their representatives in the northern zone necessary instructions with a view to avoidance of all regrettable demonstrations after withdrawal of allied troops.

¹ Administration of Reich Property.

No. 211

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 27, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 33 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1028/24/18]

PARIS, January 26, 1926

My telegrams Nos. 20,¹ 21¹ and 22².

2. This evening the German representatives communicated to Air Attaché the revised German proposals regarding 'avions de chasse'. These are contained in my telegram No. 34.³

3. With reference to paragraph 2 of these proposals, Air Attaché pointed out to the Germans that the phrase 'à des cour[se]s et à des records contrôlés officiellement' would enable Germany to inaugurate a very large number of unnecessary competitions in order to foster the growth of 'avions de chasse' in Germany. German delegate stated that they would communicate with Berlin to-night with a view to changing this paragraph by erasing the three words 'à des cour[se]s' and substituting after the word 'participation' 'à des concours et des compétitions intern[ation]aux et à des records contrôlés officiellement'. Air Attaché then informed German delegate that the ex-Allies had come to an unanimous decision as to the advisability of a limitation of numbers and that he did not think that the German proposals could, therefore, be accepted. The German representatives then said that an Allied refusal would be extremely grave, and that the German Government simply could not accept any limitation to a specified number. They maintained that if these proposals were carefully studied, it must be seen that they provided adequate safeguards.

4. British delegates will endeavour to promote a *rapprochement* between French and German points of view on this question.

¹ See No. 190, note 2.

² No. 190.

³ No. 212.

No. 212

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 27, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 34 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1029/24/18]

PARIS, January 26, 1926

My telegram No. 33.¹ 'Avions de chasse'.

Following are revised German proposals:—

1° 'Le Gouvernement allemand subordonnera à une autorisation spéciale la construction et l'importation d'avions qui seront sans objet pratique pour l'aviation civil[e] et qui en outre posséderont les caractéristiques techniques d'avions de chasse modernes en ce qui concerne le rapport du poids mort et de la puissance du moteur, le poids mort lui-même, l'arrangement des sièges, la sécurité de construction, la vélocité d'ascendance, la vitesse et le plafond.

2° 'Le Gouvernement allemand admettra la circulation de tels avions exclusivement dans le but de permettre la participation à des concours internationaux, à des courses et à des records contrôlés officiellement ainsi que pour les préparatifs que nécessite cette participation.

3° 'Le Gouvernement allemand prendra des mesures appropriées pour que le nombre des pilotes, qui devront piloter de tels avions, n'excède pas le cadre des besoins définis au chiffre 2.'

¹ No. 211.

No. 213

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 27)

No. 166 [C 1020/778/18]

Confidential. Immediate

PARIS, January 26, 1926

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 214¹ of the 20th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, copies of memoranda by Mr. Phipps recording conversations which he had (a) last night with Monsieur Paul-Boncour and Monsieur Léon Blum, and (b) this morning with the Counsellor of the German Embassy at Paris respecting the question of the reduction of ex-allied troops in the second and third zones of occupied territory in the Rhineland.²

I have, &c.,
CREWE

¹ See No. 192, note 2.

² Not printed. Mr. Phipps stated in particular that Herr Rieth had 'developed practically the same arguments used by the German Ambassador in his conversation with Mr. Lampson on January 20th' (see No. 192).

Record by Mr. Phipps of conversation with MM. Paul-Boncour and Blum

Confidential

PARIS, January 26, 1926

I met at dinner last night Monsieur Paul-Boncour and Monsieur Léon Blum, with each of whom in turn I had some private conversation.

2. Monsieur Paul-Boncour expressed the opinion that it would be advisable to postpone the Disarmament Committee until, say, the middle of April for it would in every way be more convenient that the Germans should be in the League of Nations before it was held.

3. Monsieur Paul-Boncour, who cannot be accused of undue tenderness for the Germans, thinks nevertheless that it would be highly desirable for the French Government to go some way to meet them in the matter of the reduction of the troops in the Rhineland. Speaking confidentially, he even went so far as to declare that, in his personal opinion, *all* the troops might well be withdrawn from the second and third zones before the dates specified in the Treaty of Versailles. Monsieur Paul-Boncour added that he would very much favour their entire and early withdrawal, provided that the Germans in return consented to the maintenance of a *permanent* League of Nations body in the demilitarized zone, which would satisfy French public opinion that no movements of troops, etc., were being carried out there. Such a body need only consist of a few civilians, neutral and ex-Allied. I enquired whether public opinion in France would in that event accept the early withdrawal of the troops and Monsieur Paul-Boncour answered by a decided affirmative.

4. Monsieur Paul-Boncour was not in any mood of unreasonable optimism for he declared that he was not at all easy in regard to German mentality as displayed at present. He also feels grave misgivings in regard to the violent anglophobia of the Soviets as shown in recent conversations which he has had with various Russians, and in regard to Italy's too rapidly increasing population and consequent desire for expansion which, in his opinion, must soon lead to an explosion.

5. Monsieur Blum subsequently went even further than Monsieur Paul-Boncour and assured me that he was convinced that Monsieur Briand and Monsieur Berthelot would, so far as they were concerned, both readily agree to an early evacuation of the second and third zones in the Rhineland. Monsieur Blum said that the change in French public opinion was definitive and that even in the unlikely event of the electoral pendulum swinging back in favour of the Bloc National and the subsequent return to power of Monsieur Poincaré, the latter would himself be unable to switch the French locomotive off the Locarno rails.

6. I then enquired why the French Government seemed to be so reluctant to agree to the reduction of French troops in the Rhineland, and Monsieur Blum replied that he was convinced that their reluctance must be entirely due to pressure exercised by their military advisers.

ERIC PHIPPS

No. 214

Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 27, 2.10 p.m.)

No. 6 Telegraphic [C 1074/446/18]

Urgent

BRUSSELS, January 27, 1926, 11.17 a.m.

Your telegram No. 5.¹

Belgian government agree to terms of proposed identic note to German government.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 6. Repeated to Berlin No. 1.

¹ No. 206. In a minute of January 28 Mr. Troutbeck wrote, 'It may be noted that the French gov[ernment] have never replied to our invitation as to a reply to Dr. Stresemann's questions as reported in Berlin tel[egram] No. 19'; cf., however, No. 216.

No. 215

Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 27, 2.30 p.m.)

No. 7 Telegraphic [C 1080/446/18]

Confidential

BRUSSELS, January 27, 1926, 1.12 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is inclined to think Herr Stresemann somewhat exaggerates his internal difficulties but at the same time considers that Germans have a certain grievance and that French government could and should make some reduction in numbers of their occupying troops.

Belgian Ambassador will be told to bear this view in mind in any discussion at Ambassadors' Conference.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been informed that French President of the Council would really be willing to make a reduction but Marshal Foch and soldiers oppose it.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 7, repeated to Paris No. 1.

No. 216

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 27, 4.20 p.m.)

No. 23 Telegraphic [C 1083/446/18]

BERLIN, January 27, 1926, 3 p.m.

German government have received following answer from Monsieur Briand to Herr Stresemann indirectly¹ (reported in my telegram No. 19).²

Occupying powers and especially France remain in the same frame of

¹ It is possible that the text here is corrupt and should read 'Herr Stresemann's letter'.

² No. 202.

mind as last autumn. They have always intended after a profound study of military necessities to reduce to a strict minimum burden of occupation on Rhenish population.

In Herr Stresemann's opinion this assurance cannot be used in debate.³ It is much too indefinite. He demanded urgently something of a more practical character (see my immediately following telegram).⁴

³ Lord D'Abernon reported on the debate on January 28 in the Reichstag on a no-confidence motion brought by the German National People's Party in his telegrams Nos. 26 and 27 of January 28 and 29 respectively. The German Government obtained 160 votes, with 150 against the motion of confidence, but as the Social Democratic Party announced that they were abstaining for reasons of internal politics, though they supported the Government's foreign policy, Lord D'Abernon believed there was in effect a large majority in favour of the Government's foreign policy. In the course of his speech in the debate Dr. Stresemann 'read out declaration of occupying Powers regarding execution of engagements taken by Ambassadors' Conference on 14th November. This produced considerable effect.' This declaration, which was largely on the lines suggested in No. 206, is included in the extract from Dr. Stresemann's speech printed in *Gustav Stresemann, op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 407-8.

⁴ No. 217.

No. 217

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 27, 6.15 p.m.)

No. 24 Telegraphic [C 1084/446/18]

BERLIN, January 27, 1926, 5.20 p.m.

Number of occupying force.

My own view is that it is a mistake for German government to go on pressing about 'chiffres normaux'.

Nobody knows what these words mean and in any case they are not relevant to present circumstances.

On November 14th the Conference of Ambassadors said that measures contemplated would have two objects.

A. That number of troops of occupation should be *pro rata* reduced.

B. That further buildings lodgings and ground sites should be returned to German authorities and population.

These engagements have obviously to be kept, and if they are kept faithfully the German government will get approximately what they desire.

Some confusion has arisen from fact that while the total of occupying forces in second and third zones last autumn was 64,200, the German government believe it to have been 86,000. They have consequently presented their case on wrong lines.

It should be enough for occupying governments to declare categorically that all engagements taken by the Conference of Ambassadors on November 14th will be fulfilled punctually. No reference to 'chiffres normaux' is required, as it only confuses the issue.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 24. Repeated to Paris.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 28, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 36 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1087/24/18]

PARIS, January 27, 1926

My telegram No. 33.¹

German representatives handed to Air Attaché this morning a revised copy of their 'avions de chasse' proposals (these are given in my telegram No. 37.)²

These proposals were subsequently discussed at a meeting between the British and French delegates, it being doubtful whether the French would agree to the omission in the German draft of any provision for limiting 'avions de chasse' to a definite number. The French, however, agreed to drop this point, and new proposals were then drawn up by the French and British delegates (see my telegram No. 38).³ These revised proposals were afterwards handed by the Air Attaché to the German delegates, and from the discussion which then took place it seems not improbable that German delegates will receive instructions to accept them.

German delegation have also put forward unofficially a formula regarding training of Reichswehr personnel and participation of such personnel in aviation. This formula is given in my telegram No. 39.⁴ This formula has not so far been discussed with other allied delegates. Air Attaché is, however, of the opinion that Germans will not agree to absolute prohibition and also that the French, rather than break off negotiations, will accept something short of absolute prohibition.

In the possible eventuality of the French modifying their attitude in regard to absolute prohibition of Reichswehr training, I should be glad of instructions for British delegates. I recommend that they should be allowed to follow the French in any modifications which the latter may adopt. In any case attempt will be made to ensure that naval and police personnel are covered as well as Reichswehr personnel.

Please inform Air Ministry. Air Attaché is not reporting separately.

¹ No. 211.

² Not printed. The revised German proposals were the same as those in No. 212 except that paragraph 2 read: '... la participation à des courses ou compétitions internationales annoncées publiquement et à des records. ...'

³ Not printed. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of these proposals were the same as paragraphs 1 and 3 of No. 212. Paragraph 2 read as follows:

'Le Gouvernement allemand accordera l'autorisation spéciale visée ci-dessus exclusivement pour participer à des courses ou compétitions internationales annoncées publiquement ou à des records contrôlés officiellement ainsi que pour les préparatifs que nécessite cette participation. En aucun cas ces préparatifs ne pourront comporter d'exercices dans les Ecoles.'

'Le nombre d'avions de cette nature (comprenant à la fois les avions en construction et les avions maintenus en service) sera ainsi en Allemagne comme d'ailleurs dans les autres Pays limité à quelques échantillons.'

⁴ No. 219.

No. 219

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 28, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 39 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1090/24/18]

PARIS, January 27, 1926

My telegram No. 36.¹

2. Following are German proposals referred to therein in regard to training, etc., of Reichswehr personnel:—

'Le Gouvernement allemand s'engage:

- (1) à interdire l'instruction des membres de la Reichswehr dans le pilotage militaire.
- (2) à interdire une instruction systématique et organisée des membres de la Reichswehr dans le pilotage sportif.
- (3) à prendre les mesures appropriées pour que les autorités militaires s'abstiennent d'accorder des facilités à des membres isolés de la Reichswehr qui auraient l'intention de se faire instruire à titre privé dans le pilotage sportif.'

¹ No. 218.

No. 220

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 28, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 40 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1091/738/18]

Immediate

PARIS, January 27, 1926

Evacuation of Cologne zone.

Your telegram No. 12¹ of January 26th.

2. The Ambassadors' Conference this morning adopted the notification to the German Government, the text of which is contained in my despatch No. 170² of to-day.

3. This evening, however, Secretariat of Conference received Rhineland Commission's decision text of which is contained in Coblenz telegram No. 9.³

4. Secretariat accordingly in a memorandum circulated this evening (see my despatch No. 170) proposed certain modifications in notification.

5. I have accepted these modifications, and notification will go to German Government⁴ accordingly.

¹ No. 208.

² Not printed.

³ No. 210.

⁴ A copy of this note of January 28 from M. Briand, on behalf of the Conference of Ambassadors, to Herr von Hoesch was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 193 of January 30 (not printed). The first paragraph of M. Briand's note conveyed the decision of the Allied Governments to evacuate the first zone on January 31. The second and fourth paragraphs were on the lines proposed in paragraphs 2 and 3 respectively of No. 210. The third paragraph reserved allied rights under the Treaty of Versailles, especially articles 42-44 and 430 thereof.

6. Rhineland High Commission will be informed direct by Secretariat of Conference. Will you instruct His Majesty's Ambassador, Berlin, to take action with his French and Belgian colleagues in sense of last paragraph of Secretariat's memorandum.⁵

⁵ See No. 224.

No. 221

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 29, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 41 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/II]

PARIS, January 27, 1926

The Ambassadors' Conference met to-day under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon. I was present as well as the Italian and Japanese Ambassadors. The Belgian Ambassador and a representative of the United States Embassy also attended. The matters considered were as follows:—

1. *Date of evacuation of Cologne zone*

The decision reached by the conference on this matter is dealt with in my telegram No. 40¹ and my despatch No. 170² of January 27th.

2. *Hungarian Control*

The conference had under its consideration the Hungarian note of January 5th (see your despatch No. 109³ of January 11th) and my memorandum of January 19th (see my despatch No. 124⁴ of January 19th).

¹ No. 220.

² See No. 220, note 2.

³ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. The Hungarian note of January 5, 1926, in reply to the Allied note of December 18, 1925 (see No. 137, note 4), requested that the Governments of the Principal Allied Powers should make known 'l'espace de temps exactement déterminé, et aussi court que possible, qu'ils jugent nécessaire à l'achèvement des opérations finales du contrôle. Cet espace de temps serait, selon l'avis du Gouvernement hongrois, à compter du jour où le Gouvernement royal sera tombé d'accord avec la Commission militaire interalliée de Contrôle sur l'exécution de l'Annexe 2, Partie II [of the note of December 18, 1925: i.e. the execution of articles 103, 105-7, 109-10, 113-15, 117, and 135 of the Treaty of Trianon], sous condition, bien entendu, que le Gouvernement hongrois aura exécuté jusqu'à l'expiration de cet espace de temps les mesures concertées avec la commission. Le Gouvernement royal ne peut que réitérer ses assurances qu'il est décidé d'aller jusqu'aux limites extrêmes sur la voie de la conciliation. . .'

⁴ Not printed. Lord Crewe's memorandum, in execution of instructions in Foreign Office despatch No. 163 of January 15, stated that H.M. Government considered that the Hungarian reply was generally satisfactory, but that the requested time limit was undesirable. The memorandum pointed out that the Interallied Military Commission of Control could not be withdrawn until the question of the single state factory for armaments (see article 115 of the Treaty of Trianon) had been settled, and therefore proposed that the Hungarian Government should be informed that the Allied Governments approved of the partition of the State Factory into four separate installations provided that the Hungarian

The French delegation, as I had anticipated, announced that it could not, in the changed circumstances brought about by the forgeries,⁵ agree to a reference to the single state factory being inserted in the reply to the Hungarian note in the sense you desire. The French contention was that, whether or not your proposal represented a concession to Hungary, it would certainly be agreeable to her, and especially having regard to the fact that the Hungarian government, whatever might be its intentions, had done nothing in execution of the allied note of December 18th, the French government saw no reason to be agreeable to it.

I pressed your point of view (see your telegram No. 16⁶ of January 26th) as strongly as I could, but the French delegation was adamant and, in these circumstances, I had to consider whether, by adhering to the letter of your instructions, I should prevent the possibility of any progress on control for the time being.

M. Cambon suggested that, in order to avoid such a very undesirable situation arising, he should be authorized to speak to the Hungarian Minister in general terms and let him know that, whilst, as regards the questions dealt with in the allied note of December 18th, the withdrawal of the commission really depended on the Hungarian government alone, a communication had still to be made in the matter of the single-state factory.

I accepted M. Cambon's proposal, considering that an oral communication from him would lead to better results than would a conference letter, and the text of the resolution actually adopted is contained in my despatch No. 1807 of to-day.

I think M. Cambon may be relied upon to let the Hungarian Minister understand the reason for the delay in the presentation of the communication respecting the single-state factory.

3. *Aviation hangars at Bochum*

The conference agreed to the Belgian request of January 12th (see my despatch No. 101⁸ of January 16th) and also that the removal of these sheds Government undertook that they themselves would pay in cash the estimated £25,000 required.

⁵ For developments resulting from the arrest in the Netherlands of a Hungarian courier found in possession of forged French banknotes and for an account of earlier forgeries of Czechoslovak currency see *Survey of International Affairs* 1926, pp. 178-90.

⁶ Not printed. In this telegram Sir W. Tyrrell had stated that 'the policy of the allies as regards military control and the state factory was virtually decided before the forgeries scandal came into prominence' and that 'the forgeries affair, whatever its political significance, affords no justification for any departure from that policy. . . . If therefore the French government are determined to postpone the factory question until the forgeries scandal has been liquidated you should refuse to agree to any reply being returned to the Hungarian note pending further instructions.'

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Not printed. This despatch transmitted a Belgian note requesting that the Conference of Ambassadors should confirm that five hangars at Bochum, in the area to be evacuated by Belgian troops, were Belgian property in accordance with article 202 of the Treaty of Versailles.

might begin at once. The Belgian Ambassador explained that this would facilitate evacuation of Belgian troops by January 31st, evacuation by that date was indeed dependent upon this. In view of considerations advanced in my telegram No. 19,⁹ I was at first reluctant to agree to immediate commencement of removal of sheds in case this might prejudice question of attitude to be adopted in regard to Bickendorf and 'terrains de secours'. However, on receiving assurance that Germans had already expressed to Belgian government their acceptance of Belgian point of view, I withdrew my objection.

Please inform Air Ministry.

4. *German war material*

The Versailles committee's report of January [*sic*] 19th¹⁰ (see my despatch No. 2515¹¹ of November 26th and your despatch No. 51¹¹ of January 6th) was approved¹². . . .¹³

8. *Amnesty in the Rhineland*

The Conference had before it the French delegation's memorandum of January 4th (see my despatch No. 33¹⁴ of January 6th) and my memorandum of January 18th (see my despatch No. 111¹⁵ of January 18th).

In accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 172¹⁶ of January 15th I had already discussed and settled with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the small divergences between these two documents.

There was accordingly no difficulty in agreeing at the Conference the communication to the Rhineland Commission, the text of which is contained in my despatch No. 181.¹⁷ This has today been telegraphed to Coblenz by the Secretariat. . . .¹³

⁹ Not printed. In this telegram of January 18 Lord Crewe pointed out that this question had a bearing on that regarding Bickendorf (cf. No. 144) and suggested that he should support the Belgian request in view of probable strong French objections to too many 'installations permanentes' being permitted in the neutral zone.

¹⁰ See No. 115, note 4, for the Committee's report of November 19, 1925.

¹¹ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

¹² According to the official text of this resolution (copy received in the Foreign Office on February 8) the Conference also decided 'd'inviter la Commission Militaire Interalliée de Contrôle à dresser une liste additionnelle des articles contenus dans la liste de la Commission de Contrôle qui ne figurent pas dans la nomenclature de la Convention de Genève du 17 Juin 1925, en vue d'une communication éventuelle de ladite liste additionnelle à la Société des Nations'.

¹³ The omitted sections related to other matters.

¹⁴ See No. 186, note 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, note 6.

¹⁶ No. 186.

¹⁷ Not printed. In a minute of January 29 Mr. Troutbeck stated: 'Our points have been met quite satisfactorily, for (1) the draft protocol itself is not to be materially altered; (2) on the other hand the German government are to give adequate assurances as to the protection of persons who have given any information to the allied authorities of any act which constituted a breach of the legislation which Germany had enacted to comply with the Treaty of Versailles or with the ordinances of the High Commission; (3) the protective ordinances are to be withdrawn as soon as the German government have carried out their

part of the bargain.' Negotiations between representatives of the High Commission and of the German Government were reopened on February 4 and adjourned on March 10. When they were resumed on May 6 the main point at issue was German unwillingness to enter into a binding engagement regarding the future prevention of reprisals. Cf. Volume II, No. 158.

No. 222

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the German Ambassador
[W 667/78/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 27, 1926*

The German Ambassador called to-day in connection with other matters and I took the opportunity to give him the substance of the second paragraph of the attached draft. I went on to say that we were chary of returning a written reply to His Excellency's enquiry of the 15th January¹ (which incidentally was a verbal one) because we had no desire to be regarded as a go-between between the German government and the League. I imagined that the invitation from the League to Germany had reached the German government direct from the Secretary-General, or at least from Geneva, and it seemed to me if I might say so knowing very little of the subject that Germany might quite legitimately put forward her request in answering that invitation, or, if she had already answered, with reference to it. The Ambassador expressed his thanks for the sympathetic attitude of His Majesty's Government as explained to him verbally.

M. W. LAMPSON

ANNEX TO No. 222

Draft letter to the German Ambassador

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January , 1926*

Your Excellency:—

You recently enquired whether arrangements could be made to enable the German Government to participate in the work of the Permanent Advisory Commission and the Joint Commission, who will advise the Preparatory Committee on Disarmament on military and economic questions respectively.

2. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the reasons which prompt the enquiry of the German Government and they agree that it is desirable that Germany shall be enabled to participate in the work of the two advisory bodies. The matter was actually considered by H.M.G. before Your Excellency's representations were received, and their examination of the question leads them to believe that no difficulty will be found in meeting the wishes of the German Government.

¹ This enquiry was as indicated in the first paragraph of the annex below.

Record by Mr. Phipps (Paris) of a conversation with M. Berthelot¹
[C 1302/446/18]

PARIS, January 27, 1926

Secretary of State

I saw Monsieur Berthelot for a few moments this morning. He told me that Monsieur Briand would speak to you on the following subjects:—

(1) *Postponement of the meeting of the Preparatory Committee on Disarmament*

Monsieur Berthelot repeated what Monsieur Paul-Boncour said to me the day before yesterday, viz., that the French Government strongly favoured postponement until the 15th April, for they consider it essential that Germany should be in the League before the meeting of the committee.

(2) *The Sarre*

Monsieur Berthelot expressed the earnest hope that Great Britain would go hand in hand with France over this question, which was of such vital interest to her. Two matters will be referred to by Monsieur Briand, viz., (a) the question of the presidency of the Sarre governing commission, and (b) the presence of French troops in the Sarre.²

In regard to (a), Monsieur Berthelot spoke to me with the utmost freedom and confidence. He frankly admitted that the ideal solution for France would be that the presidency of the commission should devolve upon Colonel Lambert, the Belgian member, and that solution would, I gather, take place automatically in March were no other president to be appointed before then, Colonel Lambert being the senior member of the commission. Monsieur Berthelot, however, well realises our objections to Colonel Lambert. He suggests, therefore, that instead of appointing some such neutral as

¹ This record was received in the Foreign Office on January 28 under cover of a letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrrell. In this letter Sir A. Chamberlain outlined the instructions which he wished Lord D'Abernon to receive: see No. 231.

² (a) The appointments of M. Rault, the French Chairman of the Saar Basin Governing Commission, and of the other members of the Commission were due to expire in March 1926. (b) In a note communicated to Sir W. Tyrrell on January 25 M. de Fleuriau had stated: 'l'accroissement de l'effectif de la gendarmerie sarroise déterminera probablement le Conseil de la Société des Nations à demander le retrait des troupes françaises en garnison dans le bassin. Or le maintien de l'ordre dans la Sarre présente pour les Alliés un intérêt primordial en raison du rôle que jouent les voies ferrées de ce pays en ce qui concerne les communications des troupes du Rhin. Le Gouvernement français ne pourrait donc s'en remettre aux gendarmes sarrois pour garantir la sécurité des transports par chemin de fer. La Commission de Gouvernement de la Sarre devrait donc se voir formellement reconnaître le droit de faire appel, en cas de besoin, aux forces françaises stationnées près de la frontière. En outre, il serait nécessaire de maintenir, après le départ des troupes du territoire, une Commission technique de réseau (auprès de laquelle pourrait être détaché un Officier britannique) et un contingent militaire franco-anglais qui surveillerait la sécurité des voies de communication.'

General Laidoner,³ as has been proposed, we should take the bull by the horns and appoint a British chairman, great care being taken that a person favourably disposed towards France should be selected. Monsieur Berthelot threw out as a personal idea of his own the possibility of approaching Mr. Wickham Steed⁴ for this purpose.

In regard to (b), Monsieur Berthelot expressed the hope that a small Franco-British body should remain on Sarre territory after the departure of the troops to look after the security of the lines of communication, which, after all, interested Great Britain as well as France.

(3) *Effectives of the troops of occupation in the 2nd and 3rd zones of the Rhineland*

Monsieur Berthelot informed me that he had only last night told the German Ambassador in Paris quite privately and confidentially that Monsieur Briand would in all probability give orders for the French effectives to be reduced by 10,000 or even possibly 15,000 men. Monsieur Berthelot is annoyed at the exaggerated fuss the Germans have made over this question, but considers that in view of the way in which public opinion in Germany has been worked up over it, it will be strongly advisable to reduce the French effectives by the above-mentioned figures. He therefore confidentially begged that you would urge Monsieur Briand strongly to give immediate orders to the French military authorities to proceed to make these reductions without delay. Monsieur Berthelot found that Monsieur Briand was inclined to shilly-shally over the matter and to wish to put off giving the necessary orders until the finance debate in the Chamber is over, but this Monsieur Berthelot considers would be a grave error. He is convinced that if you put pressure on Monsieur Briand he will fall in with your views in this matter. Please see in this connection the attached papers⁵ giving an account of a conversation which I had the night before last on the subject with Monsieur Paul-Boncour and Monsieur Léon Blum.

(4) *The Hungarian forgeries*

The French are very much up in the air over this question, and Monsieur Berthelot told me again this morning that they are convinced that Count Bethlen is trying to hush up the matter. He said that he had just heard from Budapest that Prince Windisch-Graetz's private secretary, who gave signs of being disposed to turn King's evidence, had been brutally beaten by the Hungarian police with a view to preventing this. Monsieur Berthelot has induced Monsieur Briand to address a very strong note to the Hungarian Government, but not so strong, he assured me, as to render any snub from the latter likely, such as a refusal to allow any measures to be taken calculated to infringe Hungarian sovereignty. Monsieur Berthelot is inclined to bring

³ Former Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian Army, and Head of the League of Nations Commission which had recently reported on the question of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq (see No. 552, note 1).

⁴ Editor of the *Review of Reviews* and a former editor of *The Times*.

⁵ See No. 213.

the whole matter before the League of Nations, in which case he said the Little Entente would be at France's side. He mentioned the possibility of getting the League to insist on universal suffrage with a secret ballot being re-established in Hungary, in which case he thinks that the present régime would be put into a hopeless minority.

(5) *Poland on the Council of the League*

France, Monsieur Berthelot said, attached almost equal importance to the presence of Spain and Poland on the Council of the League, and he looks to Great Britain to support France in this matter, as he does over the question of the Sarre.

(6) *Abyssinia*

Monsieur Berthelot is quite ready to support us over the Lake Tsana scheme⁶ if we declare that it is a vital question for us. He a little regrets our having come to a cut and dried arrangement with the Italians, thus presenting France with a fait accompli, and he is evidently sorry to see the Italians given a free hand in their sphere of influence in Abyssinia. He told me confidentially that of course the French Government would expect the Italians in return to come round to the French point of view in regard to (a) Tangier and (b) Tunis.⁷

⁶ For this scheme for the conservation in Abyssinian territory of water from the Blue Nile cf. the Appendix, paragraph 104, and also, for related political developments, *Survey of International Affairs 1929*, pp. 218-32. In this connexion notes were exchanged between the British and Italian Governments in December 1925, and were communicated to M. Briand on January 18, 1926. The terms of the agreement were outlined to the Abyssinian Government on January 21. In interviews with Mr. Wigram on January 22 and 29, M. Ponsot, Sous-Directeur d'Afrique at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the Italian demands amounted to 'partition d'un membre de la Société des Nations'. Subsequently, on February 9, M. Ponsot was assured by Mr. Wigram and Mr. Murray, Head of the Egyptian Department of the Foreign Office, that Italian demands for 'exclusive economic influence' in western Abyssinia and the territory to be crossed by a proposed railway from Eritrea to Italian Somaliland did not affect the commercial rights of any country except Great Britain and did not imply the eventual political absorption of the area by Italy.

With a view to meeting French and Abyssinian susceptibilities the texts of the British and Italian notes of December 14 and 20, 1925, were slightly modified prior to communication to the Abyssinian Government on June 9, 1926. These revised notes are printed as Cmd. 2680 of 1926, *Notes exchanged between the United Kingdom and Italy respecting Lake Tsana, Rome, December 14-20, 1925*. For the Abyssinian reference of this question to the League of Nations on June 19, 1926, see Cmd. 2792 of 1927, *Correspondence respecting the Agreement between the United Kingdom and Italy of December 14-20, 1925, in regard to Lake Tsana, and League of Nations Official Journal*, November, 1926, pp. 1517-27. See also *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 198, cols. 1200, 1690-1, 2721-51, and *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Settima Serie, vol. iv, *passim*.

⁷ For the Convention of December 1923 regarding the Organisation of the statute of the Tangier Zone (Cmd. 2203 of 1924) and Italian opposition thereto, cf. the Appendix, paragraphs 28-31 and *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, vol. i, pp. 169-74. For the question of the status of the Italian settlers in Tunisia, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 181-4.

(7) *Malevolent reports of Reuter's agency about Syrian affairs*

Monsieur Berthelot states that frequently news coming through Reuters about Syria was very hostile to France. He admitted that the French had committed numerous 'gaffes' in Syria, and said that they probably would commit many more, but they hoped that their friends would not trumpet them abroad too openly.⁸

ERIC PHIPPS

⁸ Sir W. Tyrrell minuted on February 4 on this paragraph: 'I see no harm in Sir A. Willert asking Reuters to be careful not to give an anti-French tendency to the Syrian telegrams.'

No. 224

Sir W. Tyrrell to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 7 Telegraphic [C 1091/738/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 28, 1926, 4.55 p.m.*

Ambassadors' Conference has formally notified German government that Cologne zone will be evacuated by January 31st but for a few liquidating elements. Conference suggests that verbal representations should be made to the German government by the Ambassadors of the occupying powers in Berlin to prevent regrettable demonstrations taking place after withdrawal of allied troops.

Please concert with your French and Belgian colleagues to take action accordingly.¹

¹ On February 4 Sir A. Chamberlain transmitted in Foreign Office despatch No. 170 to Berlin a copy of the note of January 28 from the Conference of Ambassadors to Herr von Hoesch (see No. 220, note 4). Lord D'Abernon was instructed to use his 'best endeavours to persuade the German Government to respond favourably to the points raised in the fourth paragraph of this note. His Majesty's Government indeed feel that the German Government's reply will be a test of their good will and sincerity.' No reply from Berlin to Foreign Office despatch No. 170 has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

No. 225

Lord Kilmarnock (Coblentz) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received February 1)

No. 20 [C 1221/215/18]

COBLENZ, *January 28, 1926*

Sir,

I have the honour to knowledge receipt of your despatch No. 51¹ of January 25th in which you asked to be informed of the position reached on the questions of military justice and the codification of the Ordinances.

2. As the result of a meeting which took place at the end of November last between my legal adviser and the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the British Army of the Rhine a list of offences was drawn up which General

¹ Not printed.

DuCane is prepared to hand over for trial to the German Courts with certain reservations in cases [? in] which it may be necessary to safeguard the dignity or interests of the Army. This list, of which I attach a copy,¹ is in my opinion satisfactory and if adopted will transfer to the German Courts a considerable proportion of the cases now tried by the Military Courts of the Armies of Occupation.

No further progress on this question has been made owing to the fact that the French High Commissioner has not yet reached an agreement with the French Military Authorities. I understand, however, that an agreement is likely to be arrived at within the next few days. If this is so the High Commission will be in a position to deal with the question next week.

I have made arrangements with General DuCane to discuss with him the proposals of the High Commission before any definite decision is taken.

3. A Committee consisting of the Deputy High Commissioners assisted by the technical experts of the three departments has been engaged on the codification of the ordinances since the middle of last month. The work is nearing completion and will probably be ready for submission to the High Commission at the end of next week. After the views of the Armies have been obtained and the new ordinances have been approved by the High Commission, it is proposed that they should be referred to the German Commissioner for any observations he may have to make.

The new ordinances in their present form are seven in number.

Apart from any change that it may become desirable to make as a result of the observations of the German Commissioner there are three questions in regard to which the High Commission is at present unable to take a decision. These are:—

(a) The flight of German aircraft over the Occupied Territories

Until a decision of principle has been taken by the Conference of Ambassadors it seems impossible to change the existing provisions in regard to this matter. If no decision, therefore, has been taken by the Conference of Ambassadors before the codification is completed, it is proposed to re-enact the text of Ordinance No. 80 as portion of one of the new ordinances.

(b) The Ordinance relative to the Railways

As early as November last the German Railway Company requested a meeting with the High Commission to discuss the provisions of the new ordinance on this subject. The High Commission replied that before fixing a date for the meeting, it would be glad to know the German desiderata.

No reply has been received as yet from the Germans.

The proposed new ordinance on this subject is short and deals only with principles. It is intended to incorporate the detailed provisions of the old ordinance in an Annex to the new ordinance. If it is found possible to accede to the German desires when eventually received, this can be done by modifying the Annex before or after publication as the case may be.

(c) *The Protective Ordinances*

These are bound up to a certain extent with the question of amnesty, and cannot be finally disposed of until this matter is settled.

In connection with the question of these ordinances I consider that the epithet applied to them by the Commissioner General for the Occupied Territories² was not a happy one. It is true that certain Separatists in the past have benefited by their provisions but experience has also shown that these ordinances have served a useful purpose in preventing reprisals on persons who have rendered legitimate services to the Occupation. The annulment of these ordinances (which according to the official German statement are to protect Separatists) will lead to the obvious deduction that Separatists are no longer protected and will not improbably be the cause of further unfortunate outbreaks such as took place recently at Rudesheim.³

I propose to direct the attention of the German Commissioner to this aspect of the question when the negotiations in regard to the protective ordinances take place.

I have, &c.,
KILMARNOCK

² Foreign Office despatch No. 51 had cited a report from *The Times* of January 23 that the German Commissioner-General had stated in the Reichstag 'that the immediate tasks were to obtain annulment of the ordinance for the protection of the Separatists, to remodel the administration of military justice and to codify the ordinances'.

³ Lord Kilmarnock had reported in Coblenz despatch No. 9 of January 14 that at Rudesheim on New Year's Eve the houses of four Separatists known to have had relations with the French authorities had been attacked. On January 8 Colonel Ryan made representations to the Reichskommissariat as to the bad impression caused by this incident which occurred immediately after the withdrawal of the delegates of the High Commission and the transfer of the area from the French to the British zone.

No. 226

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 29, 9 p.m.)

No. 28 Telegraphic [C 1175/738/18]

BERLIN, January 29, 1926, 8.30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 7.¹

I have made communication to Secretary of State who promised to take the necessary measures.

French Ambassador is making similar representations.

Belgian Ambassador has not yet received instructions.

¹ No. 224.

No. 227

Sir W. Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 22 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1087/24/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 29, 1926*

Your telegram No. 36¹ (of the 27th January. German aviation negotiations).

As regards training of Reichswehr personnel you may agree to any solution that the French are prepared to accept. On the other hand any restrictions on members of the Reichswehr must also cover naval and police personnel.

¹ No. 218.

No. 228

Lord Kilmarnock (Coblenz) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 31, 5.45 p.m.)

No. 11 Telegraphic [Telegrams 45]

COBLENZ, *January 31, 1926, 4.20 p.m.*

Ceremony of hauling down Union Jack from general headquarters building, Cologne, took place without incident at 3 p.m. yesterday. Last British troops left Cologne by train at 4.45 p.m. same day.

CHAPTER III

The deferment of Germany's entry into the League of Nations

February 1–March 31, 1926

No. 229

Sir A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 9 Telegraphic [C 1302/446/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 1, 1926, 1.25 p.m.*

'Times' of January 29th reports Dr. Stresemann as having said in the Reichstag on January 28th that not a foot of German territory had been renounced at Locarno. What does this mean and how does it apply to Alsace-Lorraine? Please send full translation of the speech and any relevant comments.

As I read it, the statement is irreconcilable with the assurances given by Stresemann and repeated by me to Parliament¹ after communication of the first proposals for a pact that Germany was prepared to renounce not only any attempt to change the western frontiers by force but any desire to change them at all. Not even Sthamer challenged this when he disputed other parts of my statement.² How then am I to interpret Stresemann's present declaration? It looks very like a complete breach of faith. It certainly plays straight into the hands of the anti-Locarnist party in France. It shows how determined Briand is to make Locarno succeed that in order not to increase the difficulties of the German government he has refrained from any open and public protests. I doubt whether any other French Minister would or could have refrained. The Germans fill the air with shouts of broken faith without any such justification.³

¹ On March 24, 1925: see *Parl. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C.*, vol. 182, cols. 317–19.

² Cf. Sir Charles Petrie, *The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain*, vol. ii, pp. 270–1.

³ Foreign Office telegram No. 11 to Berlin of 4.30 p.m. on the same day instructed Lord D'Abernon to suspend action on the present telegram which had been prematurely despatched. In Berlin telegram No. 31 of February 2 (docket only preserved in Foreign Office archives) Lord D'Abernon stated that Dr. Stresemann's remarks had been misinterpreted. Dr. Stresemann fully realized that Alsace-Lorraine was dangerous ground on which to make a public statement. Cf. also Lord D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 222.

No. 230

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 1, 10 p.m.)

No. 30 Telegraphic [C 1315/738/18]

BERLIN, February 1, 1926, 2.9 p.m.

Time and manner of withdrawal of British troops from Cologne have caused much favourable comment in government circles. This is reflected in the press.

No. 231

Sir A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)
No. 8 Telegraphic [C 1302/446/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 1, 1926, 3.15 p.m.

During my holiday I have watched with some anxiety the course of events in Germany as recorded in the newspapers. Now that I have had an opportunity of making myself summarily acquainted with the latest official information I think it necessary to invite your attention to the general course of events since Locarno. What all who were present at Locarno chiefly hoped for as its permanent result was the continuation of the spirit of mutual confidence and co-operation between Germany and the ex-allied powers which had so happily manifested itself at the conference. How has the new spirit so far borne fruit? First take the case of the ex-allies. Without waiting for Germany to complete our disarmament requirements but relying on her word that the outstanding matters would be shortly cleared off, we at once proceeded to the evacuation of Cologne which we undertook to finish if it was physically possible by the end of January. Thanks to the untiring efforts of the Commanders on the spot our purpose has been achieved and the evacuation is practically complete. In the Rhineland the whole régime of occupation has been fundamentally modified; the German Commissioner has been welcomed back to Coblenz, the delegate system has been abolished, negotiations are in progress for an amnesty, the ordinances have been overhauled and they will shortly be reduced to a very small number. In regard to disarmament the points which caused the German government special difficulty were carefully re-considered, further concessions were made by us and agreement was reached with German delegates as to their settlement. Again the German proposal for the abolition of allied air control was warmly welcomed and it has only been the reluctance of the German government themselves to provide adequate safeguards in its place that has prevented the Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee and the nine rules from having been withdrawn already. On every side in fact we have done our part to wipe out the war spirit and to co-operate with Germany in building up in common a new Europe on truly pacific lines.

What has been Germany's reply? In hardly a single point have the German government come forward with any offer to meet our desires. In disarmament no progress is reported on such important points as the High Command and patriotic associations. This is not in accordance with their language at Locarno. The police question has made equally little advance and we hear that the German government are about to ask for another 5,000 men over and above those that their own delegates agreed to in Paris last November. In the air negotiations some progress has indeed been reported in the last few days, but it is now over two months since the German government came forward with their original suggestion and we are still far from a complete settlement. So far as His Majesty's Government are themselves concerned, it has been disturbing to find the German government refusing to sign an air agreement with this country which had been negotiated last year with a view to signature before December 31st, and again to find the German railway administration making exorbitant [*sic*] financial demands for the provision of reasonable facilities for our new lines of communication with Wiesbaden.

Nor is that all: for not only have the German government taken no practical steps to meet us, but they have so far as is apparent made no attempt to check the vituperative abuse with which German statesmen and the German press have greeted our every endeavour to act up to the Locarno spirit. The only reply to each measure of conciliation on our part is an angry complaint that more has not been granted. Today neither German public opinion nor the German government seem to have any regard for what *has* been done in the Rhineland; all they look at is what has not been done, and now they are clamouring for a further reduction of troops which there would probably have been little difficulty in getting M. Briand to grant if only the Germans had shown any wisdom. Cannot Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann realise that M. Briand no less than themselves has a public opinion to deal with?

We do not under-estimate the difficult position and indeed the weakness of the present German government but the conviction is inevitable that that weakness has been, and is being, deliberately used to squeeze concessions out of the Western Powers.

You should take an immediate opportunity to speak to Dr. Stresemann with the utmost gravity quoting the actual language of this telegram, saying that this is how matters strike me on my return from abroad. British policy is unchanged, but Locarno implied mutual concessions. It requires reciprocity from Germany for its development and cannot be worked by one side only; nor can it be developed by means of threats. The Germans must show the goodwill which they expect us to show them; but in their debates and resolutions no sign is to be found of the Locarno spirit, nothing but ever-growing demands put forward almost as ultimatums. How can Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann expect us to go any further before they have made any progress at all, before any advance has been made towards compliance with the amended and reduced terms in regard to police and

High Command, and while it is still uncertain whether Germany will join the League? Her joining the League is becoming more and more the test of her sincerity and loyalty to Locarno.

Addressed to Berlin No. 8, repeated to Paris No. 25 (by bag), Brussels No. 11, Rome No. 19 and Coblenz No. 9.

No. 232

Sir A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 10 Telegraphic [C 1302/446/18]

Secret

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 1, 1926, 3.45 p.m.

My telegram No. 8.¹

Instructions for this telegram were given by me after reading latest Foreign Office papers but before I saw Briand.

I found him admirably calm and patient, resolved to carry out in full the Locarno policy, preparing further considerable reduction of troops and thinking out other means of developing the policy of reconciliation.²

I desire you in giving effect to my instructions to make a personal appeal from me to Chancellor and Foreign Minister as colleagues and friends with whom I worked at Locarno to show an equal courage and good faith and thus to make possible the realisation of our common hopes. French ministries are unstable. It is impossible to say how long the men who met at Locarno will continue to direct the foreign policy of their respective countries. It is unlikely that any other combination would offer such favourable chances of success as the present or that ministers who were not at Locarno would have the same passionate belief in that policy and an equal determination to draw from it the utmost possible advantages. I fear that Germany is letting slip a golden opportunity and cannot conceal from you my disappointment and my anxiety.

¹ No. 231.

² No complete record of Sir A. Chamberlain's conversation on January 28 with M. Briand has been traced in Foreign Office archives. In his despatch No. 338 to Paris of February 1 Sir A. Chamberlain recorded that he had told the French Ambassador, who had called that afternoon to enquire about the conversation with M. Briand, that 'we had taken no decisions, but we had convinced ourselves that there were no serious obstacles to the continuation of that close co-operation which has existed between us both before and since Locarno' and that 'we had touched on most of the problems of the day, including the position in the Balkans and Central Europe, but the point to which I had perhaps attached most importance and on which I had taken the opportunity of speaking not only to Monsieur Briand himself but also to Monsieur Berthelot was that of the relations of our two countries with Italy in view of Italy's position as a guarantor with Great Britain of the Treaty of Locarno. In this connection I had spoken particularly of the situation at Tangier.' Sir A. Chamberlain subsequently stated on February 3 that M. Briand had adopted a reasonable attitude regarding the Salonica-Ghevgeli Railway (see *Survey of International Affairs 1926*, pp. 167 f.), the Hungarian forgeries, and policy towards Soviet Russia. See further Nos. 233, 236, and 246.

*Memorandum by Sir A. Chamberlain respecting Poland and the
Council of the League¹*

[W 802/223/98]

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 1, 1926

In the course of my conversation with Monsieur Briand in Paris, he raised again the question of Poland's claim to a permanent seat on the Council. I told him that, having been absent from home for nearly seven weeks, I could not pledge my Government until I had had an opportunity of again discussing the question with them, but that I should be glad to know, in order that I might report them to my colleagues, what were the grounds on which France based Poland's claim.

Monsieur Briand replied that it was certain that Germany and Poland would still have many subjects of difference which would come before the Council, whether in regard to minorities or to the Polish corridor and Danzig; that obviously there was much that was intolerable in the present situation; and that one could not look at the map of East Prussia without feeling that sooner or later some accommodation must be discovered. He repeated the regret which he had previously expressed to me about the manner in which the Vilna and Memel questions² had been handled or mishandled, and he seemed vaguely to hope that Memel might yet in some way be found to be the key to a solution. In any case he had begged Count Skrzynski not to lose sight of the practical or to live exclusively in the ideal and not to close his mind to any possibility of an arrangement.

Actuated by this desire to bring Germany and Poland together and to find some kind of compromise between them, Monsieur Briand argued that they were far more likely to settle their grievances in an amicable and reasonable way if they met on an equality at the Council. They would then come under the influence of the Council spirit of friendliness and conciliation and the other powers sitting round the table could give words of advice or urge moderation as might be opportune. If on the other hand Germany were admitted and Poland were excluded, both parties might be less reasonable; Poland certainly would be less accommodating and would suffer under a sense of inequality and injustice.

Secondly, Monsieur Briand observed that, if Poland were a member of the

¹ This memorandum was circulated to the Cabinet.

² For the Vilna question see No. 83, note 2. For consideration by the Council of the League of Nations of the Lithuanian occupation of Memel in January 1923, see *League of Nations Official Journal*, January 1924, pp. 121-61, February 1924 *passim*, April 1924 *passim*; for the Convention signed in May 1924 by Lithuania, and France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan whereby the territory of Memel obtained autonomous status under Lithuanian sovereignty, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 119, pp. 502-15; for difficulties arising out of the question of Polish economic and political rights in the port of Memel and the River Niemen, see *League of Nations Official Journal*, March 1925, pp. 316-22, and also *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, vol. ii, p. 231.

Council, she would plead her own case. If Poland were not a member of the Council, France must necessarily be her *porte-parole* and advocate at every moment. France had her own difficulties to settle with Germany; he did not wish to add to them and complicate their solution by becoming the spokesman of Poland. That would be a position which would be very disagreeable to him and hampering to his policy of reconciliation.

Monsieur Briand added some minor reasons. Belgium must retire almost at the same moment as Germany entered. This would be disagreeable to French opinion though it was inevitable.³ The admission of another ex-Ally would take the sting out of Belgium's withdrawal, and there would be nothing more to be said. Further, from the point of view of the development of the Locarno spirit in Poland, there could be no doubt that, if Poland were not elected, it would greatly shake Count Skrzynski's position and lend strength to his critics, whereas if he could show that by the policy of moderation which he had there pursued he had won a seat for Poland at the Council, his authority would be strengthened and it would be easier for him to make further concessions.

Personally I feel that there is great force in the first two arguments and that some importance attaches to the last. As regards the first, namely the inequality arising when of two parties to a dispute before the Council one is a member of the Council for all purposes and the other merely invited to the table for that particular discussion, Monsieur Briand's contention seems to me greatly strengthened by what I observed during the fortnight I spent in Geneva in December when the question of Mosul was under discussion. I could not help feeling that our position was invidious, that we could more easily have come to an agreement with the Turk if his representative and ours had been on exactly the same footing and that independent members of the Council themselves felt the *gêne* of this inequality and were less ready to decide in our favour because they felt suspect of partiality to the power which was their colleague as against the power which was a stranger to the Council. My own disposition, therefore, weighing all the circumstances, is to support the claim of Poland. I think that by so doing we shall best serve the cause of peace and, as far as I can judge from the opinion of the other powers represented on the Council, we shall be acting in accordance with the general wish. We might find ourselves isolated if we adopted an attitude of opposition.

A. C.

P.S. Since this note was dictated the Italian Ambassador has informed me that Italy attaches importance to the election of Poland to a permanent seat.

A. C.

³ Sir G. Grahame had reported in Brussels despatch No. 86 of January 28 that on the previous day M. Vandervelde had conveyed to him that the Belgian Government might consider putting forward Belgian candidature for a permanent seat. Sir A. Chamberlain minuted on this despatch: 'Noted. I can give no encouragement to this claim. A. C. 4.2.' Lord Crewe subsequently reported in Paris telegram No. 62 of February 11 that MM. Briand and Berthelot had 'stood firm' when M. Vandervelde urged them to 'reconsider the proposal for Belgium to disappear from the Council of the League of Nations'.

Minute by Mr. Campbell¹

[W 888/78/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 1, 1926

The position,² I think, is as follows:

The success of the proposed disarmament conference will necessarily be impaired by the absence of Russia who, at the moment, constitutes the most serious military menace in Europe. Her presence is therefore desirable. How far the Powers should go to secure that end, or to what extent any further attempt might be successful, is another matter. The Soviet government have uttered professions of sympathy with the aims of the conference. Are they sincere, or are they merely using their squabble with the Swiss government³ as the pretext for keeping out of the conference and thus preserving their liberty of action in the matter of disarmament?

We have heard nothing officially from Geneva of the answer of the Soviet government to the invitation to participate in the conference. But it was reported from Geneva, in the 'Times' of January 16th, that the Soviets had refused in view of the seat of the conference being at Geneva and of their failure hitherto to obtain satisfaction as a result of the Vorovsky incident.⁴ Since then the assurances given by the Swiss government to the Secretary General, reported in a letter from Sir E. Drummond (Flag A)⁴ have been made public. Further, according to this morning's 'Times', the Swiss Federal Council are ready to go a long way to meet the Soviet demands. Finally, though perhaps we cannot mention this, there seems to be some sort of mediation going on under the good offices of the French government (see Mr. Sperling's despatch in N. 358—Flag B).⁵

For the moment, therefore, everything possible is being done to secure Soviet participation. If their professions of sympathy with the aims of the conference are sincere, they should be in a position now to revise their decision without loss of face. The League can hardly be expected to diminish its prestige by offering, on its own initiative, to transfer the seat of the conference from Geneva to some other capital. It would be a pity, at all events for the moment, to intervene in the negotiations which are proceeding and which may, for aught we know, terminate successfully. There is plenty of time now in view of the postponement of the meeting of the Preparatory Committee.

R. H. CAMPBELL

¹ A member of the Western, General and League of Nations department of the Foreign Office.

² Regarding Soviet participation in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

³ Cf. No. 74, paragraph 10, and No. 187, note 2.

⁴ The reference was probably to a letter of December 31, 1925, to Mr. Cadogan from Mr. Frank Walters, an assistant to Sir E. Drummond, which cited the greater part of the letter of December 30 from M. Motta, Vice-President of the Swiss Federal Council, to Sir E. Drummond, printed in *League of Nations Official Journal*, March 1926, p. 488.

⁵ Despatch No. 15 of January 23 from H.M. Minister at Berne is not printed.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 3, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 46 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1362/24/18]

PARIS, February 2, 1926

My telegrams Nos. 36,¹ 37² and 38³.

1. Yesterday evening the German delegates had an interview with the British delegates and handed the latter their latest proposals as to 'avions de chasse' and pilotless machines (see my telegrams Nos. 47³ and 48⁴). To-day a meeting took place of the Allied Air experts of the Mixed Commission. The German proposals with reference to 'avions de chasse' were considered satisfactory, subject to the following amendment in the last sentence of paragraph 2. In lieu of 'Le nombre d'avions de cette nature se tiendra dans les limites du nombre des avions de la même nature dans les autres pays', substitute: 'Le nombre d'avions de cette nature se tiendra dans les limites du nombre des avions de la même nature employés dans les autres pays dans les buts indiqués ci-dessus.' Air attaché subsequently communicated above to German delegates who have since accepted it subject to definite approval from Berlin.

2. With reference to the German proposals with regard to pilotless machines (see my telegram No. 48), the French delegates have been instructed that, provided they obtain satisfaction regarding 'avions de chasse', they need not insist upon complete prohibition of pilotless machines, and that they should be prepared to accept proposals somewhat similar to those reported in my telegram No. 48. The Belgian delegate, however, stated that, in accordance with his instructions he must at present insist upon complete prohibition. Air attaché stated that his instructions also were to insist upon complete prohibition, but he was certain that his Government would fall into line with the French delegates if it were seen that the Germans would flatly refuse to accept complete prohibition.

3. Your telegram No. 21.⁵

Questions of 'sur-vol', 'terrains de secours', &c., were then examined. As regards 'sur-vol', the French point of view is as follows: 'that the Rhineland

¹ No. 218.

² See No. 218, notes 2 and 3 respectively.

³ Not printed. The text in this telegram was largely the same as that in note 3 to No. 218 except that the last sentence of paragraph 2 read as cited below.

⁴ Not printed. The German Government proposed to build a few specimens of pilotless planes for scientific purposes.

⁵ Not printed. This telegram of January 27 referred to Paris telegram No. 19 (see No. 221, note 9) and agreed that the hangars at Bochum should be allocated to Belgium. With regard to discussions with the German delegates on German air rights in the Rhineland the telegram urged in particular that the restrictions on German overflying should be rescinded and that Bickendorf aerodrome should be handed back unconditionally. The telegram further expressed views generally in accordance with those recorded in paragraphs 6 and 9 below.

Commission should have sufficient power in occupied territory to enable it to prevent unfortunate incidents, such as the following (a) insults to Allied troops by German machines and pilots flying low over troops drilling, headquarters, &c., (b) propaganda in the form of dropping leaflets from the air likely to incite the population against the occupation.

4. The French have no wish to prevent commercial aviation or even sport aviation. Their proposals are contained in my despatch No. 215.⁶

5. The British delegate stated that he would submit these proposals to his Government.

6. *Terrains de Secours*. The French consider that it would be preferable to countenance an infraction of Article 43⁷ by allowing the Germans to have three or four permanent aerodromes in the Rhineland, open to civil aviation, whose whereabouts would be known to the Allies, than a very large number of 'terrains de secours'.

7. It was decided, therefore, that the Mixed Commission should attempt to come to some agreement with the Germans in the above sense. This will entail the retention of Bickendorf. The French at first considered that only one or two hangars at the most should be left at this aerodrome, but after considerable discussion and though no definite arrangement was come to, it is not considered that the French will insist on the demolition of any of the hangars.

8. A further point arose as to the use of military aerodromes by civil machines in territory still occupied by Allied troops. The Conference of Ambassadors, following an Avis of the Aerial Clauses Committee, decided on June 15th, 1922, that as soon as Germany entered the League of Nations or became a party to the Air Navigation Convention, civil aeroplanes could use certain hangars on military aerodromes as long as these latter existed. The French delegates expressed the view that before the Mixed Commission came to a decision on this subject, the Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Rhineland should be asked to give his opinion as to whether it would be advisable for civil machines to land on military aerodromes. This was unanimously agreed to, and no decision will be come to until an answer is received from General Guillaumat.

9. *Hangars reserved for International Civil Aviation in Germany*. It was decided that these should be handed back unconditionally to Germany. Finally,

10. *Friedrichshafen Hangar and Dirigeables*. It was decided that the hangar of Friedrichshafen should be handed back to Germany, and that there should be no restrictions whatsoever on airships.

Please inform Air Ministry, Air Attaché not reporting separately.

⁶ Not printed. The French proposal was that the resolution of the Conference of Ambassadors of December 15, 1920 (see No. 12, note 2), should be annulled, that German overflying of the occupied territories should no longer be forbidden and that the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission should make such regulations regarding all overflying of these territories as were necessary for the safety of the armies of occupation.

⁷ Of the Treaty of Versailles.

Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

[F.O. 800/259]

Private and Personal

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 2, 1926

My dear D'Abernon,

Your letter of the 31st¹ reached me this morning.

The telegrams which I sent you yesterday² will have shown you the impression produced upon me by the course of events since Locarno. I do feel most strongly that Germany has not done her share towards confirmation of the new relationships. I try to make all allowances for the difficulties of the Government and I do not attempt to apportion blame, but if you exonerate the Government it can only be at the expense of the German nation or at least of German political parties. It is very difficult for a foreigner to feel any of that satisfaction which you describe as felt by the Chancellor and Stresemann at the recent vote. Even more serious in some ways is the delay in carrying out the reforms in the Police and High Command. You know how much we conceded after Locarno in the endeavour to make the task of the Government easy and these seem to me to be matters in which the Government ought to have been able to act whatever their parliamentary difficulties in regard to the entry of Germany into the League.

I confess that I rather dreaded my interview with Briand lest he should burst out with a general denunciation of German delays and the lack of reciprocal good-will. As I said in my confidential telegram,³ I was agreeably surprised. All accounts report him as having a passionate belief in Locarno

¹ Not printed. In this letter Lord D'Abernon stated in particular: 'I had a long talk yesterday with the Secretary of State about Germany's application to be admitted to the League and found him anxious to push on with all rapidity. As you will have seen from my telegram of to-day [Berlin telegram No. 29: not printed], there is a certain amount of doubt as to the constitutional power of the Government. They have been authorised to apply for admission and, at the same time, told not to exercise this authority except under special conditions. They hold that these special conditions have been fulfilled and that they can act without further parley. On the other hand, they are anxious not to arouse any opposition if it can be avoided by showing that the Locarno "reactions" have been faithfully executed by France and England.

'There is no doubt that the alleviations in the Rhineland, particularly the abolition of the delegate system, have made an excellent impression here. On the other hand, it is no doubt true that the German is apt to forget what has been granted him and to concentrate discussion upon the balance unfulfilled. However, there is reason to anticipate that all the necessary formalities will be completed in the course of the next ten days and that the German application will be duly sent. . . .

'The improvement in the financial market here, which I reported a fortnight ago, continues. It has a very great political importance. . . . The vacuum to be filled in Germany through the blotting out of available capital is so large that it is quite conceivable that the inflowing transfers from foreign investors will more than counterbalance the outgoing transfers under the Dawes scheme. This point has not been adequately considered by financial writers, but it appears to me the dominant consideration.'

² Nos. 229, 231, and 232.³ No. 232.

and every sign I get of the workings of his mind shows me that he is desirous of interpreting our agreement in the largest and broadest spirit. No other French Minister could do as much as he can do; no other French Minister is as deeply committed to the policy of Locarno, has a more profound conviction in the wisdom of that policy or can be relied upon to bring more courage and parliamentary skill to its development. When I told him that I was not at all satisfied with the present numbers of the occupying forces in the second and third zones and, with some hesitation as to how he would receive my suggestion, ventured upon the observation that I thought we ought to make a further reduction of 15,000 men, he answered in two words '15,000 at least'. Apart from this concrete proposition which he is preparing, he has in mind the possibility of reducing the length of the occupation of those two zones and even of curtailing the occupation of the Saar. He welcomed a suggestion from me that he might at a proper time enter upon conversations with the German Ambassador to see whether in return for concessions of this kind and as part of a large agreement Germany could not be induced voluntarily to concede the establishment of some permanent organ of civilian observation under the League of Nations to satisfy French opinion that the demilitarisation of the Rhineland was observed. It had seemed to me possible that Germany might be willing voluntarily to concede something in this respect where she would oppose—and in the opinion of my Government with justice—any attempt by the League to assert the *right* to establish such a permanent organisation. Whether anything can come of this or not remains to be seen. I agree with Monsieur Briand that the time is not opportune for entering on such large issues, and that Germany must first become a member of the League and fulfil other outstanding conditions, but what is of interest is the attitude of mind disclosed by Briand and that it was not merely said for my benefit is I think confirmed by the account which Phipps gave of a conversation which he had had with Paul Boncour,⁴ which seemed to me to indicate clearly that Briand had said something of the same kind to him. It would, I think, be most unwise to give any hint of these ideas to the German Ministers at present. I speak of them in such detail to you only in order that you may see as clearly as I see myself what large possibilities are open if the Germans act wisely, swiftly and loyally. How long Briand may retain power no man can say. If he falls, having been Prime Minister, he may be unwilling or unable to remain Foreign Minister. It cannot be expected that any other Frenchman would have both the strength and the wish to go so far. Some would have neither. Any movement towards the Right must make the policy of conciliation more difficult, but any movement towards the Left might have the same result, for the further Left the basis of the Government, the greater suspicion there will be of any concessions made by it, the less power it would have to take such decisions as Briand vaguely meditates, and the more likely we should be to find ourselves face to face with a Foreign Minister like Herriot, who had plenty of good-will, but who feared the responsibility of a decision. For

⁴ Cf. No. 213, enclosure A.

Heaven's sake therefore do all you can to persuade the German Ministers to make hay while the sun is shining. If they want to gather a full harvest, now is their best opportunity, but in order to make that possible they must do their share of the bargain and not leave Briand and me exposed to the taunt that we are their dupes and that we are surrendering piecemeal all we have to give without the German Government making any advance in return.

I have entirely got over my attack of 'flu, though the pleasure of my holiday was very much spoilt by the way in which it attacked every member of the family in turn. I am sorry that you also should have fallen a victim during your visit in Rome. I heard from somebody—perhaps Graham—that you had found a delightful apartment, but Lady D'Abernon will find it difficult to make anything more attractive than the Palazzo which she had at Venice.

Yours sincerely,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 237

Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

[W 639/78/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 2, 1926*

My dear D'Abernon

I am much obliged to you for your two letters¹ in which you point to the opportunity, should we wish to take it, of influencing the German representatives on the Preparatory Committee on Disarmament.

I think we must be wary. There was sharp contrast in the Council between the British and French points of view. We, alone, advocated the restriction of the programme of the Committee to such lines of enquiry as seemed to give promise of some practical result, while the French, supported by the remainder of the Council, pressed for the inclusion of a number of abstruse theoretical problems such as can only add to the difficulties of a task which is already formidable enough. One of these was the dangerous thesis that, for purposes of comparison, the criterion should be not the peace-time, or mobilisable, strength of each state, but its potential war-strength, that is to say, its maximum ultimate strength based on its industrial, economic and financial resources, as well as on the measure of assistance which it may expect to receive under article 16 of the Covenant. The advantage of this in French eyes is obvious when we consider its application to Germany.

We received no support, and there consequently was no alternative but to defer to the majority and make the best of a bad job. The situation, however, presents a golden opportunity for the Germans to fish in troubled waters by playing us off against the French—a game which it seems vain to

¹ These short letters of January 19 and 22, enclosing copies of reports to the War Office from Lieutenant Hume, the officer attached to H.M. Embassy at Berlin, are not printed.

expect them ever to renounce and which they are even now hoping to play in Morocco, as you may have seen from the report in the 'Münchener Neueste Nachrichten' of January 9th of a recent meeting of the Alldeutscher Verband.²

In point of fact the issue is virtually *chose jugée* in the light of the decisions which were taken by the Council, and which constitute the terms of reference of the Committee.³ How far, therefore, it may be possible to mitigate the evils of the French plan is uncertain. If opportunity offers, we shall take it. In that case the Germans, who very naturally prefer the British plan, have only to support us openly in the Committee.

Meanwhile we shall be well advised to fight shy of anything which might lend itself to misrepresentation. If the meeting of the Committee is postponed, as seems now likely, the need for caution is all the greater.

Yours sincerely,
W. TYRRELL

² This report sent by Mr. Clive, H.M. Consul-General at Tangier, is not printed. The report stated that at this meeting the lecturer spoke on 'the fighting in Morocco [by French and Spanish troops against the Rif tribes: cf. *Survey of International Affairs* 1925, vol. i, pp. 105-63] and its importance for Germany's future' and alleged that British support was given to the rebels.

³ See No. 139, note 2.

No. 238

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received February 4, 9 a.m.)

No. 33 Telegraphic [C 1403/71/18]

BERLIN, February 3, 1926, 9.10 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

I have just seen Herr Stresemann² who is elated at his success in getting entry into the League of Nations through today with Foreign Affairs Committee. The opposition made desperate endeavours to achieve postponement.

Herr Stresemann informs me that a meeting of representatives of states has been called for February 7th to approve of entry.³ The Cabinet will meet at 10 a.m. on Monday under chairmanship of President and will proceed to final decision.

¹ Not printed. This telegram reported that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag had decided by eighteen votes to eight in favour of Germany's entering the League of Nations. In his telegram No. 36 of February 4 Lord D'Abernon added that the Government's majority was larger than expected and that Dr. Stresemann's speech was 'reported to have been unusually vigorous'.

² Cf. *Gustav Stresemann, op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 408-9, for Dr. Stresemann's account of this conversation.

³ This meeting was reported in Berlin telegram No. 40 of February 7, which stated that 'some hesitation about Germany's joining League was expressed by certain states. In the end it was unanimously agreed that in the event of Reich government deciding to enter, the states would do all in their power to strengthen her position as a member.'

Measures are being taken to have Germany's application to join the League of Nations delivered in Geneva on Monday afternoon or evening.⁴

⁴ This letter of February 8, 1926, is printed in *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1926, p. 636.

No. 239

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 4, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 50 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1391/24/18]

PARIS, February 3, 1926

Your telegram No. 22.¹

Further discussion took place today between British and German delegates. A deadlock was reached on the question of Reichswehr training, British delegates insisting on total prohibition and on inclusion of navy and police. German delegates stated that total prohibition was absolutely out of the question, and that the formula which they had put forward (see my telegram No. 39)² was the result of a careful study of our requirements.

They were prepared to include the navy. As regards police, they would submit a formula but required first to know whether, as regards Reichswehr and navy, formula in my telegram No. 39 was acceptable.

British delegates insisted that formula was unacceptable, and that in any case they must see German proposals as regards police.

After the meeting, Germans undertook to produce a formula as regards police at once. This formula has now been received and is given in my telegram No. 51.³

I presume attitude of British delegates as regards this formula is governed by your telegram No. 22.

Please inform Air Ministry: Air Attaché is not reporting separately.

¹ No. 227.

² No. 219.

³ No. 240.

No. 240

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 4, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 51 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1394/24/18]

PARIS, February 3, 1926

My telegram No. 50.¹

Following is formula submitted by German delegates for police:

'Conformément à l'engagement pris par le Gouvernement allemand selon la note de la C[ommission] I[nteralliée de] C[ontrôle] du 12 mai 1925² et

¹ No. 239.

² Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

stipulant que l'Allemagne ne doit pas entretenir des formations de pilotes policiers, le Gouvernement allemand, d'accord avec les Pays allemands, a empêché jusqu'à ce jour toute instruction d'employés de police dans le pilotage militaire ainsi que toute instruction systématique et organisée de ces employés dans le pilotage sportif. Au nom des Pays allemands il se déclare prêt à maintenir ce principe également à l'avenir. En outre, il se déclare prêt au nom des Pays de prendre les mesures appropriées pour qu'aucune autorité n'accorde des facilités à des employés de police isolés qui aurait l'intention de se faire instruire à titre privé dans le pilotage sportif.

'En tant que les Pays allemands, afin de pouvoir exécuter, dans les limites de leur compétence, les mesures d'administration policière dans le domaine [domaine] du trafic aérien, ont besoin de quelques employés de police ayant une instruction de pilotes d'aviation, il est entendu que leur nombre sera restreint aux besoins les plus strictes selon la tâche spéciale et d'ordre technique qui leur incombe. Il en est de même en ce qui concerne l'instruction dans le pilotage de ces quelques employés de police, instruction qui d'ailleurs aura lieu exclusivement dans les écoles générales de pilotage. Les noms des employés de police instruits ainsi dans le pilotage seront publiés continuellement par les journaux officiels de l'administration intérieure des Pays.'

The Germans have explained that this formula is only submitted at present as a personal suggestion. They have also explained that they are unwilling to include it in the exchange of notes regarding aviation, for the reason that the position of the police was utterly different from that of the Reichswehr and the Navy and that it would be invidious to include them in the same clause with the two latter. They suggested, therefore, that the formula should be included in the agreement which is under discussion on the general question of police in Germany.

Please inform Air Ministry.

No. 241

Lord Kilmarnock (Coblenz) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received February 8)

No. 27 [C 1561/1461/18]

COBLENZ, February 3, 1926

Sir,

It may be useful (and I trust not impertinent) if I make some respectful comments from the local point of view on your telegram No. 8 to Berlin.¹ The general impression that the Germans have not played up to the spirit of Locarno is confirmed to a considerable extent by my experience since my return to Coblenz, but I cannot say that their attitude has been sufficiently overt to warrant any definite protest on my part. Recently evidence of a lack of reciprocity on the part of the Germans seemed to be accumulating and I, therefore, sent for the Reichskommissar last Friday² and spoke to him seriously and frankly on the subject.

¹ No. 231.

² January 29, 1926.

I began by repeating the warning which had been given in writing by the High Commission as to the importance of avoiding anything like hostile demonstrations on the occasion of the evacuation of the first zone. I pointed out the danger of some incident, and said that it seemed to me regrettable that such precipitancy had been shown in making arrangements for a big demonstration in Cologne on the night of the 31st ultimo. We discussed the question amicably and he made the point that it was natural that the population should wish to celebrate the occasion and that it was impossible for the local authorities to ignore it. It was, indeed, he said, better to give the people this safety valve, rather than to run the risk of unorganised celebrations which it would be more difficult to control. He promised to impress on the German Government and on Dr. Adenauer³ the importance of avoiding anything which might give offence to the Allies. In this I think he was successful as the ceremony of hauling down the Union Jack passed off without incident (all the eye-witnesses I have questioned deny the truth of the 'Times' report as to booing) whilst Dr. Adenauer's speech was perfectly correct and free from offence. We could scarcely expect more. Only those will be disappointed who may have cherished the illusion that our departure from Cologne would be a subject for affectionate regret on the part of the Germans. In this matter then I think we have no cause for complaint.

I next drew the Reichskommissar's attention to the bad impression produced by the fact that the originators of the attacks on the Separatists (reported in my despatch No. 9⁴ of January 14th) had not been brought to book, though I could scarcely believe that their identity was not known to the authorities. Baron Langwerth said he quite agreed with my point of view, and that he would press the matter in Berlin, whither he was proceeding in a few days time. Finally I attacked him on the question of our communications through Cologne and said that a note⁵ from him which had reached the High Commission that day and which seemed to me to be very far from showing any spirit of accommodation had caused me some perturbation. I was not speaking officially as the matter had not yet been examined by the Expert Committee, nor had it been discussed by the High Commission as a whole, but I could assure him that the note would make a deplorable impression. He said the matter was one which had been settled in Berlin, and that if I would let him have a definite statement of our requirements he would see what could be done. He assured me that there was no wish to be obstructive but that his Government were very anxious to leave no opening for incidents.

In the course of our conversation Baron Langwerth several times begged me to have patience. He explained that he had but recently entered into his office and that it would take him a little time to explore the whole ground and get things in working order. He deprecated 'undue nervousity' on the part of the Allies and particularly of the French. I told him that it would also be desirable if a little less 'nervosity' were displayed by the Germans, and that

³ Chief Burgomaster of Cologne.

⁴ See No. 225, note 3.

⁵ Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

I trusted the negotiations on which we were engaged would not be carried on in a spirit of petty horse coping (Kuhhandel).

Altogether our interview was very friendly but before coming to a final verdict as to whether the spirit of Locarno is being applied by the Germans to affairs in the Rhineland, it will be necessary to see whether any tangible results are forthcoming from the representations which I have made and from similar action which has been and is being taken by my colleagues.

Up to the present the policy of the Governments of the Occupying Powers, and, therefore that of the High Commission, has been to make large concessions without waiting to obtain any material advantage in exchange: in fact in the matter of the evacuation of Cologne, the Allies definitely surrendered a certain advantage of position before several questions of great local importance could be settled by negotiation. Unless, therefore, the Germans now show a spirit of practical reciprocity with regard to our reasonable demands, it will be a matter for serious consideration whether in future the satisfaction of our essential needs should not precede the granting of any further concessions which we may decide to make.

The Reichskommissar also spoke to me with regard to the number of troops in the second and third zones, and said there was real disappointment among the people that no reductions had taken place, but that in some instances the burdens had been increased. He proceeded to quote figures, but I told him I could not accept them as accurate, as they did not correspond with those I had seen. He referred to the British zone and said that the requirements of our troops seemed to be greater than those of the French. I explained that this was probably due to the greater proportion of married men in our ranks owing to the longer period of service. I fear that the use of the word 'normal' by the Ambassadors Conference has raised hopes among the population which it will be difficult to fulfil. However little justification there may be for the outcry raised in the Press and in political circles in Berlin, it is a fact that the man in the street has got the idea into his head that a promise was given that the number of troops would be reduced almost immediately to that of the German pre-war garrison, and when he finds that such is not the case he is naturally resentful.

I have, &c.,
KILMARNOCK

No. 242

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received February 4, 3.10 p.m.)

No. 34 Telegraphic [C 1442/112/18]

BERLIN, February 4, 1926, 2.20 p.m.

I gave Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs message contained in your telegram No. 10.¹

¹ No. 232.

They replied as follows:—

Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann beg to thank Sir Austen Chamberlain sincerely for his personal message of February 2nd. They appreciate confidence shown them and share desire to see prosecution of policy of Locarno entrusted to the hands of those statesmen who launched it so successfully in October last.

Sir Austen Chamberlain can rest assured that Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann fully realise position of their French colleague, and are endeavouring so far as is at all possible to take it into account. At the same time the difficulties with which they themselves have to contend are no less serious. Hence they appeal to him to continue his support to their determined efforts to overcome these difficulties.

No. 243

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 4, 6.30 p.m.)

No. 35 Telegraphic [C 1444/234/18]

BERLIN, February 4, 1926, 5.48 p.m.

Now that essential question of Germany's entry into the League has been settled satisfactorily German government express the confident hope that subordinate questions in which Germany is interested will be brought to a rapid conclusion. They urge specially that work of commission of control should be terminated with the least possible delay and that definite instructions to commission should be given for that purpose. Nothing will be wanted on German side.

They further hope that reduction of garrison of second and third zones will be effected rapidly and in such a manner as to be evident to population.

Public opinion in Germany is nervous and anxious on these two points. Their settlement would serve to enhance the excellent impression made by evacuation of Cologne on January 31st.

No. 244

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 31 Telegraphic: by bag [C 1391/24/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 4, 1926

Your telegrams Nos. 50 and 51¹ (of February 3rd. Aeronautical restrictions in Germany).

1. Training of Reichswehr and Navy. The deadlock which we anticipated seems now to have been reached. The best plan will be to discuss the question

¹ Nos. 239 and 240 respectively.

privately with the French representatives and seek some formula which, while saving the face of the Germans, will give us the substance of what we want. We do not want to wreck the negotiations.

2. Training of police. There seems to be some force in the German contention that the position of the police is different from that of the Reichswehr. On the other hand the question is obviously a part of the general aeronautical questions on which a settlement is now being negotiated in Paris, and for that reason we find it difficult to understand why the German delegates object to a clause on the point being included in the agreement which we hope will shortly be reached. However the last thing we want is to hold matters up by a technical point of the kind, and, if the Germans prefer it, we see no objection to the conference in Paris coming to an agreement with the German delegates on a formula and then handing the question over to the Military Control Commission, who will be able to regularise matters with the German government in connection with the other outstanding police questions. But obviously the formula must be settled in Paris and not by the Control Commission who have not the technical aeronautical knowledge to discuss the question with the Germans.

No. 245

Sir A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 176 [C 1473/446/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 4, 1926*

My Lord,

I invited the German Ambassador to call upon me to-day, partly in order to renew relations as soon as possible after my return to duty and partly in order that I might press upon him the necessity for progress in the execution of the Locarno agreements and their consequences. I spoke to him on the lines on which I have already addressed your Lordship, pressing particularly that the German Government should get on with its share of the work in order that we might use to the full the opportunity offered by the fact that all the Ministers who signed the Treaty of Locarno were still in office in their respective countries. The Ambassador replied that he was not able to enter into any details as to the subjects which I had particularly mentioned (they were the outstanding questions in regard to the control of the police and the High Command), but that he was in a position to say that it was the determination of his Government to carry out the policy of Locarno in the spirit and the letter. He added there was one matter which he knew had presented great difficulty to the German Ministers and caused them a profound disappointment. It was the number of troops still maintained in the remaining zones of occupation. I told the Ambassador that this was just one of those questions which I believed would be easily and quickly settled as soon as Germany had made her application to the League and had carried out the

agreement which we had already reached on the other points which I had mentioned. I would tell him quite frankly that I did not consider that it was compatible with the expectations which we had held out in Locarno that we should maintain a force of 70,000 or something more than 70,000 men in those two zones. But I must warn him, since he had referred to the German pre-war normal number, that it was not reasonable to expect that our normal figure for troops, which were troops of occupation and our most advanced posts, should be no greater than the German figure when it was a case of their own troops within their own territory and when those troops were covered by very strong forces in Alsace-Lorraine. The Ambassador said that he was very glad to receive this expression of my view and would have great satisfaction in reporting it to his Government.

Dr. Sthamer then enquired whether there was any prospect of a larger area being allocated to the British troops. He admitted that this was a question between the French and British Governments in which Germany had no *locus standi*, but Wiesbaden was a small town compared with Cologne, and the concentration of the British forces in so small an area did place a heavy burden on the population. I replied that I had no information on this point and was not aware that the question had been raised, since the French had complied with our original proposals.¹ I would, however, enquire how the matter stood; he would agree with me that the reduction in the total numbers was far more important and urgent than any rearrangement of spheres.

The Ambassador then passed to an entirely different question. He enquired whether the statement which I made at the 37th session of the Council of the League of Nations on the Minorities Treaties was to be regarded as merely a personal expression of my views as a member of the Council or as a statement of the policy of His Majesty's Government. I sent for the report of my words (page 7, confidential print, 'League of Nations,' the 14th December, 1925, section 1²), which I accepted as accurate; and, whilst telling him that it was not a matter on which I had felt it necessary to ask for special instructions, I said that he might certainly regard it as expressing the policy of His Majesty's Government. This led to an exchange of views in the course of which I more fully explained my attitude and my hopes. Laying particular stress upon the extent to which the readiness of any Government to accord generous treatment to a minority and the power of the League itself in case of necessity to intervene for the protection of that

¹ Bingen and a small area around the town had been transferred from the French to the new British zone.

² i.e. the record of Sir A. Chamberlain's statement of December 9, 1925, as printed by the Foreign Office for official use. Sir A. Chamberlain then stated in particular that it was not the intention of those who devised the system of minorities treaties 'to establish in the midst of nations a community which would remain permanently estranged from the national life. The object of the minority treaties, and of the Council in discharging its duties under them, was . . . to secure for the minorities that measure of protection and justice which would gradually prepare them to be merged in the national community to which they belonged.' The statement was reported in *League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1926, p. 144.

minority might be helped or hampered by the attitude adopted by the Government and the nation to which the minority racially belonged, I observed that the Council of the League had no more difficult and delicate task than the administration of the Minorities Treaties; that in my opinion, expressed on every suitable occasion to whomever it might concern, it was the interest and duty of the Government of the State of which such a minority were citizens to treat them not merely with justice but with generosity so as

- to leave them without any good reason for appealing to the League; it was equally the interest and the duty of the minority to try and settle its differences directly with the Government to which it owed allegiance and only to come to the League in the last resort and when all attempts at direct negotiation had failed. But I pointed out that, if the nation to which the minority belonged by race and of which it had formerly been citizens used this minority to create a feeling of uncertainty about the political settlement and treated it as an instrument for some future revolution, the first victims of this policy must be the members of the minority and that such conduct not only justified and indeed compelled a policy of suspicion and repression on the part of the Government immediately concerned, but that it necessarily paralysed the action of the League itself. I told the Ambassador that I felt that one of the greatest difficulties which would confront Germany on her entry into the Council would arise out of this problem. There were minorities which had been former subjects of the German Empire in which Germany would feel a special interest, but it was inevitable that her former allies should seek to use Germany for their own ends and as their advocate in connection with the minorities of Hungarian or Austrian race in other lands. I earnestly hoped that the German Government and German representative would proceed with great caution in this matter; that they would not allow their own position to be prejudiced by importunate or unreasonable demands on the part of their former allies, and I expressed my conviction that, if the German representative avoided, as far as possible, the raising of contentious questions when he first took his place at the Council, and if he sought rather to co-operate with us in subjects in which no such acute differences arose and thus made good his position and established the same personal relationship with the other members of the Council as prevailed amongst them, he would find that he was met in a spirit of real goodwill and conciliation, that he would have his proper influence, and that when he did feel it necessary to take up a contentious point he would do so with all the greater prospects of success.

I had said something of this kind to the Chancellor at Locarno, and I took an opportunity of repeating it to Dr. Stresemann when he was in London. It is inevitable that the entry of Germany into the League should create some difficulties, but much will depend upon the way in which the early discussions are conducted. If we can avoid sharp antagonisms in the early days and prevent anything approaching the division of the Council into two camps, we shall achieve a result of immense consequence for the League itself and of no less consequence for Germany. I believe from what he said to me that Dr. Stresemann is fully conscious of the great importance

which attaches to the personality of the first German representative and the character of the instructions given to him.

I am, &c.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 246

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 393 [C 1488/514/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 5, 1926*

The French Ambassador referred to-day to what had passed between M. Briand and me in Paris in reference to the Commission of the Saar. Your Lordship will remember that M. Briand at first revived the proposal that M. Lambert should be nominated to succeed M. Rault as president of the commission, but on my observing that this would be an arrangement which it would be impossible for me to support and which would be regarded by British public opinion as a mere subterfuge, if not an actual breach of faith, he had at once substituted the name of Mr. Stephens, the Canadian representative on the commission, and had proposed his election for one year and the re-election of the other members, with the exception of M. Rault, whose place, in accordance with the treaty provisions, would be taken by another Frenchman. I had reserved my opinion on this proposal until I could examine it at the Foreign Office. The Ambassador was now instructed to ask whether I was able to give a decision. I told his Excellency that I was prepared to support this arrangement,¹ all the more so because M. Briand had indicated to me that he was considering the whole position in the Saar, and that, before the year was out, it might be that he would have wider proposals to make.

I reminded the Ambassador that M. Briand had promised me a technical memorandum, such as I could submit to our military advisers, on the military reasons for the proposals the French Government had made in regard to railway administration in the Saar, and I asked the Ambassador to remind M. Briand of his promise so that I might have the French argument properly considered and be in a position to express an opinion upon it.

M. de Fleuriau then gave me his personal impression of the attitude of French public opinion to the Locarno Treaty as derived by him from many conversations, some of them with opponents of the treaty, which he had held when in France in the month of December. The general result was favourable. Among the peasants in particular he thought there was strong support for the policy. They were strongly pacifist, and supporters of M. Poincaré's policy had told him that it was the fear that that policy was preparing a new

¹ Mr. Stephens was appointed Chairman of the Saar Basin Governing Commission on March 18, 1926; see *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1926, p. 531.

war which had been the most influential factor in deciding their votes at the last election. It was, however, important for the effect on French public opinion that the entry of Germany into the League should not be longer delayed. I told the Ambassador that I fully shared this view and that I had already made representations to the German Government through Lord D'Abernon to urge the speedy fulfilment of that part of the Locarno arrangements and understandings which depended on them, pointing out to them that only when these matters were settled could we consider further developments of the policy, and that we should never have a more favourable juncture for such developments than was the case now, when all the Ministers who had met at Locarno still held the direction of the foreign policy of their respective countries.

I am, &c.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 247

Letter from Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
[F.O. 800/259]

Private and Personal

BERLIN, February 5, 1926

Dear Secretary of State,

I am indebted for your letter of February 2nd.¹

It is very satisfactory to hear the views expressed by M. Briand. I yield to no-one in my admiration for the breadth and courage with which he has directed the foreign affairs of France during the last few months. This admiration is, I am convinced, shared by Luther and Stresemann in so far as their own difficulties allow them time to admire anything or anybody.

These difficulties have been considerable. They only got their majority on the vote of confidence by a bare margin and any slip or any action provocative to the opposition might easily have converted the majority into a minority. When I rally them on their slackness in carrying out German obligations, the answer is fairly effective. 'If we had attempted more we should not be here.' Even as it is, the violence of the hostility felt against them by the extreme Right is such that it would never astonish me to hear of an attempted assassination.

The evacuation of Cologne on January 31st was an immense success. It was admirably carried out—it came as a surprise to the German Ministers and was a much greater surprise to their opponents. The satisfactory issue regarding the League of Nations is in large part to be attributed to our action in this matter. The soldiers deserve to be congratulated upon the way they performed their task.

Turning to your suggestion that, in return for some concession regarding the occupation of the two zones and perhaps a curtailment of the occupation of the Saar, the German Government might be induced voluntarily to

¹ No. 236.

concede the establishment of some permanent organisation of civilian observation under the League of Nations to satisfy French opinion that the demilitarisation of the Rhineland was observed, I am convinced that a negotiation of this nature would have a good chance of success here. I shall not, of course, mention the idea to anyone. But once Germany is in the League of Nations I see no local reason for delay. The reduction of the period of the occupation of the second and third zones is a prize for which the German Government could afford to pay a good price.

I hope that the final decision of Germany to enter the League of Nations will be regarded at its true worth. In my opinion it is a fact of immeasurable importance to the future of Europe. It should be decisive as regards the danger of a German-Russian combination.

Yours very sincerely,
D'ABERNON

No. 248

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 6, 2.30 p.m.)

No. 38 Telegraphic [C 1514/1461/18]

BERLIN, February 6, 1926, 12.16 p.m.

I have had a detailed conversation with Secretary of State on points mentioned in your telegram No. 8¹ and have urged upon German government that it is to their evident interest to clear up all these outstanding questions without further delay.

Dealing with the different subjects mentioned in your telegram Secretary of State said:—

High Command. The Ordinance, in form agreed upon in November with Conference of Ambassadors, regulating this question has since been issued.

Associations. Ordinance forbidding military activities of associations will be issued shortly.

Police. German government's request for an increase of 5,000 men is not in contradiction to agreement of November. It arises in connection with question (undecided in November) of the inclusion of certain categories of police in the total of 150,000 allowed for occupied [*sic*] territory. According to our information negotiations in Paris with Ambassadors' Conference are likely to lead to rapid agreement. As soon as this agreement has been reached it will be possible to carry out re-organisation of police as preliminary arrangements to this end have already been made.

Air. It is true that negotiations in Paris dragged on longer than was

¹ No. 231. See also Lord D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 223, for Herr von Schubert's remarks to Lord D'Abernon on February 3.

expected. But German government are not responsible for the delay. They place great value on early agreement and instructions in this sense have been given to German negotiators. The principal delay is that technical problems have constantly arisen. In the meantime the negotiations are nearing last stage and conclusion seems imminent.

As regards German-English air convention German government did, it is true, propose postponement of signature of agreement because Paris negotiations, which were going on, seemed to promise settlement on a broader basis. The postponement in itself was not so serious as requirements of British air service were taken into account by prolongation of provisional agreement until March 31st.

Railways. German government have pointed out to railway authorities urgent necessity of meeting wishes of British occupation authorities. They cannot give orders to railway authorities who enjoy autonomy under Dawes agreement.

The accusation that German government have not appreciated actions of occupying Powers in Rhineland question is unfounded. Since Locarno whole German policy has been based on fact that the two responsible delegates, the Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, have full confidence in other contracting parties. Steps taken by the latter to alter régime in Rhineland have been appreciated by German government and made known to the public in all detail. Otherwise the German government would not have been able to obtain parliamentary sanction for those decisions necessary for the prosecution of Locarno policy. If some dissatisfaction has been expressed in the press it is due mainly to erroneous English press reports indicating that promise of Ambassadors' Conference to reduce the garrison might not be kept.

As regards reduction of garrison in second and third zones the Secretary of State said unofficially: 'if troops were reduced immediately to 60,000, and were further reduced by 5,000 when Germany has entered League of Nations, this reduction would put German government right with public opinion. Surely this request must be considered very moderate in view of engagement of Ambassadors' Conference last November.'

At the close of our interview Secretary of State said that he was fully convinced that it was to Germany's interest to settle up these points without delay. He promised to do everything in his power to achieve the desired result. According to his information questions still unsettled were of no great practical importance and agreement about them should present no insuperable difficulty. Compared with the distance already traversed towards agreement, the distance that remained was almost insignificant. I replied that this appeared to me an additional reason not to dally.

No. 249

*Mr. Gaisford*¹ (*Munich*) to *Sir A. Chamberlain* (*Received February 7, 9 a.m.*)
No. 1 Telegraphic [C 1509/112/18]

MUNICH, *February 6, 1926, 8.20 p.m.*

Yesterday Prime Minister² made a speech in Parliament in which he denounced treaty of Locarno and violently attacked France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.

My Italian colleague who is very excitable has telegraphed to Rome suggesting that representatives of the three governments concerned should make collective protest at Berlin with a view to repudiation of Dr. Held by Reich. My Czechoslovak colleague is *d'accord* but French Chargé d'Affaires whilst agreeing that Prime Minister's utterance is most deplorable does not attribute to it dangerous significance entertained by my Italian colleague.

All three came to see me to-day and I undertook to report by telegraph to you on the subject but I did not anticipate that His Majesty's Government, who are not directly concerned, would do more than associate themselves with other signatories of the treaty in impressing on Berlin government necessity for Dr. Held being induced to restrain his language.³

Sent to Foreign Office; repeated to Berlin.

¹ H.M. Consul-General at Munich.

² Dr. Held, Prime Minister of Bavaria.

³ It was decided in the Foreign Office 'to do nothing until we are definitely approached either by France or Italy'.

No. 250

Sir A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (*Berlin*)
No. 15 Telegraphic [C 1444/234/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 7, 1926, 7.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 35¹ (of February 4th. German entry into League of Nations).

As you well know, it has long been our policy to get military control wound up with all possible speed, and I observe with pleasure that the German government say that nothing will now be wanted on their side. On the other hand in asking that definite instructions should be given to the Control Commission to terminate its work with the least possible delay, they seem to ignore certain essential factors in the situation. In the first place they ask for this further concession as a counterpart to their application for entry into the League. They appear to forget that we had already fulfilled our part of the bargain in this respect at Locarno. The German delegation there took the line that before Germany could enter the League she must have satisfaction in respect of article 16 of the Covenant. They received that satisfac-

¹ No. 243.

tion in the note addressed to them by the signatory powers on December 1st. Again, they asked for certain assurances in respect of general disarmament, and in response to their representations a statement was included in the final protocol of the Conference that the contracting parties undertook 'to give their sincere co-operation to the work relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of Nations and to seek the realisation thereof in a general agreement'. The necessary preliminaries to a general conference have already been taken in hand and the German government have been invited to take part in the preparatory discussions. Lastly when it was believed that all difficulties had been overcome, the German delegation at the last moment objected that Germany could not join the League unless she was assured that in so doing she was not implicitly accepting the present League scheme of military investigation. Once again everything possible was done to meet their difficulties, and they were informed by me that I held that if Germany joined the League these questions could be re-discussed by the Council in the presence of German representatives.

Thus clearly we have already done all that was required of us, and it is hardly for the German government to ask for further concessions now that they are about to implement their part of the bargain.

Moreover, in asking for these instructions to be sent to the Commission of Control they ignore the fact that as regards the most important of the five points which were discussed last November—viz., police, high command and associations—they have hitherto taken no steps to carry out the agreement reached in Paris last November. As soon as they show signs of fulfilling that agreement, they will not find us behind them in expediting the withdrawal of the Control Commission.

Please put these considerations before Dr. Stresemann.

No. 251

Sir A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 16 Telegraphic [C 1444/234/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 7, 1926, 7.45 p.m.*

My No. 15.¹ Reference penultimate paragraph. I have just seen your No. 38² but have not yet had time to examine it.

¹ No. 250.

² No. 248.

No. 252

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)

No. 75 [W 1020/223/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 8, 1926*

Sir,

The Polish Minister called this afternoon to speak about Poland's desire for a permanent seat on the Council of the League. There was nothing new

to be said on either side as Sir William Tyrrell had had a conversation on the same subject with him only a few days ago.¹ I told him that my sympathies inclined towards compliance with the Polish request, not merely because I knew how much importance Count Skrzynski attached to it, but because I saw also a certain general interest in that solution. He could, however, see by the articles in the 'Times' and the 'Manchester Guardian', to which he had alluded, that there was much opposition in this country, and that not to the admission of Poland as Poland, but to the reconstitution and enlargement of the Council which it would entail. If it were merely a question of giving a temporary seat to Poland, there would be, so far as I could see, no objection even from these quarters. In reply to a direct question, I informed M. Skirmunt that I had not yet consulted my colleagues and could make no statement as to their attitude.

M. Skirmunt then informed me of certain fresh negotiations proceeding between the Polish Government and the Governor of the Bank of England, and invited my assistance with the bank. I replied that the matters in question seemed to be of a purely financial and business character, in which it would be unwise for me to intervene. If, however, at some later point difficulties arose of a political character he could speak to me upon the subject again.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ On February 3.

No. 253

Memorandum by Viscount Cecil on the composition of the Council of the League of Nations

[F.O. 800/259]

February 8, 1926

The memorandum¹ circulated by the Foreign Secretary on the proposed admission of Poland as a permanent member of the Council of the League raises the whole question of the constitution of that body, and I therefore venture to trouble my colleagues with a few observations on the subject.

The Council at present consists of four permanent and six non-permanent members. The four permanent members are the four of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the war who agreed to join the League. They are unquestionably four of the Great Powers of the world, belonging to a quite definite class as such. Even so, there is a considerable under-current of international opinion which views with jealousy their privileged position in the Council. But it is recognised that they really are in a different position to other countries and that they have such large responsibilities that practically they are interested in every international question that arises. If Germany comes into the League, or the United States, or more doubtfully Russia,

¹ No. 233.

each of these countries would be generally accepted as belonging to the class of Great Powers. If the list of permanent members is extended beyond the Great Powers there does not seem any clear limit to their numbers. It can no doubt be argued that Spain was till comparatively recently generally considered a Great Power; that she has a great history; that her language, her commerce, her culture are very widely diffused, and that though Spain is no longer materially a very powerful country she has very wide moral and intellectual interests quite exceptional in their character. So, too, in the case of Brazil it may be said that she is unquestionably the largest both in territory and population of the South American States; that she, as the one Portuguese State, stands in a special position and that exceptional treatment of her, too, may in that way be justified. With regard to Poland there seems very little ground for suggesting that she has world interests beyond those of other European States. She has a considerable population and a large territory, but she has no colonies, scarcely even a sea-board, nor any very considerable amount of external commerce. It is true that, owing partly to her geographical position and partly to the way in which she has conducted her external relations she has now, or has recently had, quarrels with all her neighbours—with Russia on the east, with Germany on the west, with Czecho-Slovakia on the south, and with most of all Lithuania on the north—not to speak of her perennial disputes with Danzig. But the fact that she has been unable to live at peace with her neighbours does not seem a very good ground for making her a permanent member of the Council of the League. Indeed her past policy has been such that so far she has been unable to secure election as a non-permanent member though she has tried for it on more than one occasion. It must also be remembered that she has been in dispute with the League more often probably than any other country in the world, and that in some cases—notably in that of Lithuania—she has simply defied the recommendations of the League, and has remained in the position which she occupied by these means.² It is true that the present Prime Minister of Poland has pursued a much more reasonable policy, but his position is by no means secure, and it is quite uncertain whether his successor will follow in his footsteps. It is urged by the French that Poland has so many differences with Germany that she ought to be a member of the Council in order to maintain her point of view. This seems a dangerous argument. Suppose the differences between the Serbians and the Italians became again as acute as they were a few months ago, would that be a good reason for making Serbia a permanent member of the Council? And is Turkey to be put in that position because of her controversies with ourselves? I venture to urge that it would be most dangerous to substitute this new test of fitness for the Council for that of the old one, namely, acknowledged pre-eminence as one of the Great Powers of the world.

Apart from the special considerations which attach to Spain, Brazil or Poland, it is a matter for consideration whether it is wise to enlarge greatly the numbers of the Council. At present there are four permanent members

² The reference was to the question of Vilna: cf. No. 83, note 2.

and six non-permanent. If, as is suggested, it were agreed to add four more permanent members it would be impossible to resist the claim that the non-permanent members should be increased to eight. That will make a Council of sixteen. If in the course of the next few years the United States and Russia come into the League, as is probable, they will have to be permanent members and that, with two more non-permanent members will make the Council twenty in number. It seems very doubtful whether a Council of twenty could possibly work, at any rate in the same kind of way, that the present Council of ten transacts its business. Moreover, a Council of twenty selected from an Assembly of less than sixty would make it very little different from one of the ordinary Committees of the Assembly. These bodies do their work excellently, but it is of quite a different character to the work done and the atmosphere prevailing in the Council. They are smaller editions of the Assembly, and that is what I fear a Council of twenty would become. Now the Assembly is a most valuable body for the purposes for which it exists, namely, as a focus for international public opinion, and for international discussion of a public character. But for anything like executive action it is quite unfitted. The consequence would inevitably be that you would have either formal or informal small Committees of the Council formed with all the dangers of cliques and parties which such an organisation might bring to pass. Even if this forecast be deemed too alarmist I venture very respectfully to urge that before so large a change in the constitution of the Council as is now contemplated is made, there ought to be searching examination into its probable effects. It is the practice of the Council when any difficult question is brought before it to nominate a sub-Committee to consider it. I venture to suggest that that is what ought to be done in the present case. Let the special meeting of the Assembly be confined to the admission of Germany, and let a Committee be appointed to examine what changes ought to be made in the constitution of the Council both now and in the future. If, for any reason, this procedure is deemed impracticable, then I do venture to urge as strongly as I can that the new permanent members shall be confined to Germany and Spain; that to meet the claim of Brazil it shall be agreed that there shall always be one of the so-called A. B. C.³ South American States on the Council; and that Poland should be offered the energetic support of England and France in her candidature for a non-permanent seat on the Council which ought to meet any difficulties that she may acutely feel about the early years of membership of Germany in that body.

R. C.

³ Argentina, Brazil, Chile.

No. 254

Lord D' Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received February 10, 9 a.m.)
No. 44 Telegraphic [C 1695/847/22]

BERLIN, February 9, 1926, 8.45 p.m.

My telegram No. 43.¹

Press are telegraphing full report of Stresemann's speech.²

He spoke entirely from written notes without emphasis or rhetorical gesture. Speech lasted three quarters of an hour and was received well. The passages concerning League of Nations and proof that speeches such as Mussolini's afford of the wisdom of joining League of Nations were applauded by Left and Centre. Other passages were cheered by all parties, notably contention that Austria was concerned with Brenner more than Germany who has no common frontier with Italy.

¹ Not printed. This telegram of February 8 referred to the speech delivered by Signor Mussolini to the Italian Chamber of Deputies on February 6, and stated in particular: 'In official circles present opinion is that Germany should maintain a reserved attitude allowing Mussolini's attack to fall by its own unwisdom. Stresemann will speak tomorrow. The tone of the press is on the whole moderate.' The full text of Signor Mussolini's speech is printed in B. Mussolini, *Discorsi del 1926* (Milan, 1927), pp. 25-38: see also *The Times* of February 8, 1926, p. 7, and *Survey of International Affairs 1927*, pp. 197-8. For Sir R. Graham's comments on points from this speech see No. 261.

² For Dr. Stresemann's speech see *Gustav Stresemann, op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 447-57.

No. 255

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir A. Grant Duff¹ (Stockholm)
No. 26 [W 1021/223/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 9, 1926

Sir,

The Swedish Minister called this morning to lay before me the views of his Government on the claims which are now being pressed for additional permanent seats on the Council of the League. Briefly, Sweden was opposed to the creation of any additional seat, except the one which it had been agreed to accord to Germany. He added that he had reason to know that Belgium and Switzerland took the same view.²

I replied that I must ask him to treat the communication which I was going to make to him as very confidential, since I proposed to explain my personal views before I had consulted my colleagues on the subject. I felt that I must do this in courtesy to M. Unden,³ who was my colleague on the

¹ H.M. Minister at Stockholm.

² On February 25 the Norwegian Minister informed Sir W. Tyrrell that his government agreed with that of Sweden and on the following day the Netherland Minister stated that his government did not desire to enlarge the Council. Lord Granville, H.M. Minister at Copenhagen, had reported in his despatch No. 28 that similar views had been expressed to him by the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs on February 18.

³ Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Council. I said that I should speak with equal frankness to the Belgian Ambassador,⁴ who was coming to see me immediately afterwards and for the same reason, but that I should not be prepared to talk thus openly of my personal views to the Swiss Minister or, indeed, to other diplomats who were not the representatives of colleagues on the Council.

I then explained that I had personally always felt that the present position of Spain, coupled with her history, justified the attribution to her of a permanent seat, and, having regard to the network of arrangements in which so many of the nations of Europe were engaged, I thought that the permanent addition of Spain might easily in conceivable circumstances be found of great consequence to the Council and a real addition to its influence. As regards Poland, the claim stood on an entirely different footing, and I had at first been opposed to it, but, with the larger experience which I had obtained of European affairs and on mature consideration, I personally felt that it would be in the interest of European peace that Poland should be placed on the Council in a position of equality with Germany. I did not know whether this view would be taken by His Majesty's Government, and whether they would or would not approve the suggestion which I should make to them, but I hoped that they would allow me a certain discretion to act as I might think best in the interests of the League and of the Council when we met in March, and when I should have had an opportunity of discussing these matters with the members of the Council. I begged him to report this conversation confidentially to M. Uden, and I hoped that M. Uden also would be able to reserve a certain discretion to himself to act in the way that he might think best when the matter was discussed at Geneva. If the representatives of the nations at Geneva all went to the Council or the Assembly with rigid instructions, the very purpose of those meetings would be defeated, the possibility of conciliation and agreement would disappear, and we might just as well revert to the old system of diplomatic correspondence between the capitals.⁵

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁴ In his despatch No. 116 to Brussels of February 9, Sir A. Chamberlain sent an account in terms very similar to those in the present document of his conversation with Baron Moncheur, whose view was recorded *mutatis mutandis* as in the second sentence of the present despatch.

⁵ The Swedish Minister called again at the Foreign Office on February 15 and delivered to Mr. Selby a message from M. Uden to Sir A. Chamberlain that in the light of unanimous resolutions by Delegations of both Swedish Houses of Parliament 'the Swedish Government would be compelled to oppose any proposal for an increase in the permanent membership of the Council, even to the extent of finding themselves alone in the minority'. Mr. Selby noted that, as Baron Palmstierna pointed out, this 'destroyed any prospect of the admission of either Spain or Poland as permanent members'.

Sir A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 195 [N 455/228/55]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 9, 1926*

My Lord,

I desire to draw Your Lordship's special attention to the despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Warsaw No. 51 of January 25th last, regarding the negotiations for the Polish-German Commercial Treaty,¹ a copy of which has been transmitted to you by Sir W. Max Muller.

2. The insatiability of the German Government in demanding ever fresh concessions, often in extraneous matters, before they will conclude and carry out an agreement on any particular subject, has been a disagreeable feature of their recent dealings with the Western Powers. The same tendency is revealed in their negotiations with the Polish Government, the course of which only confirms the feeling that unreasonableness and obstinacy are faults with them rather than with their neighbours.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

C. W. ORDE²

¹ Not printed. In this despatch Sir W. Max Muller had reported that the Polish Prime Minister had complained to him of 'the repeated delays that had taken place during the past few months, and was inclined in every case to attribute the blame to the Germans. He spoke of the various concessions which he had made to his opponents, first, in withdrawing the order for the expulsion of the optants [see No. 24, note 1] and, secondly, in promising to suspend the liquidation of properties belonging to Germans in Poland, and added that nothing seemed to satisfy the German Government; the more they got the more they wanted'. He further reported that the German Government were 'not content to confine their demands to purely commercial questions. On the contrary, they have put forward several of a purely political nature. The principal of these is their demand that Germans should have most-favoured-nation treatment in regard to the right of residence in Poland'. In conclusion Sir W. Max Muller stated that he understood that, 'as a result of the improvement of the trade balance during the last four months of the year, the Polish commercial world is no longer so anxious for the conclusion of a treaty with Germany, and that the opinion is now freely expressed that, unless the treaty can be concluded on a basis of complete equity, without making any special political sacrifices, it is better to await future developments. Personally I sincerely trust that this may not be true, as I have not changed the opinion which I have expressed more than once during the past six months that the re-establishment of normal trade relations between Poland and Germany is essential to the restoration of the financial and economic situation in the former country.'

² A member of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office.

Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount Cecil

[F.O. 800/259]

*Private and Confidential**February 9, 1926*

My dear Bob,

I received your memorandum¹ on the composition of the Council on my return to London yesterday morning. My memorandum² has, of course, been circulated, but I do not propose to discuss it before Wednesday week³. In the meantime will you look at the enclosed letter from Eric Drummond and at Tyrrell's comment?⁴ I hope that they may cause you to modify your opinion. The case of Spain is of course already decided as far as we are concerned, and my course of action approved by the Cabinet. As regards other applicants, the Cabinet left me a discretion but as I was not obliged to act upon it in December, I thought it right to bring the matter to the Cabinet's notice again, so as to give any colleague like yourself who took a different view the opportunity of raising a discussion if he wished to do so. But before you decide to oppose my proposal, do consider very carefully where opposition to Poland's claim would lead us. The group of Locarno treaties, though they have not placed peace in Eastern Europe on the same footing as in the West, have undoubtedly rendered it less insecure. I think I may say that this result was achieved mainly owing to British diplomacy, and that too in spite of the fact that we could offer no such guarantees or assistance in regard to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak frontiers as we offered in regard to those of France and Belgium. But I could never have brought this about if I had antagonised Poland. Indeed I could not have brought it about unless I had won Skrzynski's confidence. If I now place myself in opposition to Skrzynski's demand, I shall lose that confidence and my power of influencing him: I shall antagonise the whole Polish nation and I shall make it certainly more difficult and very probably impossible to draw any further results from Locarno in that part of the world. I have no doubt that under cover of my opposition, Sweden would take the same line. It is possible that Brazil would act with us if she be refused satisfaction, but of what use will either Sweden or Brazil be to us in maintaining the peace of Europe or in supporting any British interest in any quarter of the world? I shall have quarrelled with all our friends without gaining the goodwill of anyone else.

More than this. The more I think the question over, the more certain I am that the presence of Poland at the Council on an equality with Germany is the best means, if not the necessary means of promoting peace between the two. This view, as you will see, is strongly held by Tyrrell. I do not think that I could bring myself to take another line. At any rate I shall have to

¹ No. 253.² No. 233.³ February 17, 1926.⁴ This letter of February 3 and Sir W. Tyrrell's minute of February 6 are not printed. Both argued in favour of a permanent seat for Poland.

use whatever influence my position gives me with the Cabinet to get a favourable decision from them. I do hope they will feel the force of the arguments which we have used and which have convinced Eric Drummond and that you will not think it necessary to oppose me.

You will see that Drummond forwards a paper by Salter⁵ who takes the opposite view. His arguments leave my decision unaffected. In fact while I think him admirable in his own special task at the League, I have never found his judgment good on general League problems, but it is only fair to you that I should send his letter with the other papers.

Please return my enclosures.

Yours ever,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁵ This paper of February 3 by Sir Arthur Salter, Director of the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations, is not printed.

No. 258

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 10, 4.30 p.m.)
No. 58 Telegraphic [C 1714/24/18]

PARIS, February 10, 1926, 1.52 p.m.

German aviation negotiations.

As a result of conversations held last week by British and French delegates with German delegates it had been arranged that a plenary meeting of all delegates should take place on February 8th. At the request of Italian delegates this meeting was put off until February 12th.¹ Italian delegates state that at the end of last week they referred to Rome the draft notes as they stood at that time and that they have as yet received no instructions.

French are inclined to attribute this delay to general attitude towards Germany depicted in Mussolini's speech. I have no reason to share this view but it might be well if His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome could induce Italian government to expedite instructions as this delay at a moment when matters were coming to a head is unfortunate. Until February 8th attitude of Italian delegates had been entirely passive.

Please inform Air Ministry.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 58, repeated to Rome No. 2.

¹ A letter of February 11 from the Chancery in H.M. Embassy at Paris explained that the preceding passage should have read: '... meeting was put off till February 10th; it has now been put off till February 12th.'

No. 259

Sir A. Chamberlain to H.M. Representatives at Paris, Rome, and Brussels

No. 36¹ Telegraphic [C 1654/71/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 10, 1926, 5.40 p.m.*

My telegram to Geneva No. 4.²

Please inform the French (Italian) (Belgian) government of the terms of my telegram to Sir Eric Drummond and say that in view of the fact that the president of the Council has taken the initiative in summoning a special Council meeting, no action in that respect seems required on the part of the powers signatory of the treaty of Locarno.³

¹ No. 36 to Paris; No. 33 to Rome; No. 15 to Brussels.

² Not printed. This telegram of February 10 transmitted a message to Sir E. Drummond agreeing to the summoning of a special meeting of the Council on February 12 in connexion with the German request for membership of the League of Nations, and expressing the views on the date and agenda of a special meeting of the Assembly recorded more fully in No. 260.

³ Lord Crewe and Sir R. Graham replied on February 11 in Paris telegram No. 61 and Rome telegram No. 30 respectively, that the French/Italian government agreed. Sir G. Grahame reported in Brussels telegram No. 10 of February 12 that M. Vandervelde had agreed but had expressed views similar to those of Baron Moncheur (see No. 255, note 4).

No. 260

Sir A. Chamberlain to Mr. Sperling (Berne)

No. 2 Telegraphic [C 1654/71/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 10, 1926, 6.30 p.m.*

My telegram to Geneva No. 4,¹ and Mr. Lampson's letter of February 1st.²

You are hereby appointed British representative at the special Council meeting to be held at Geneva on Friday, 12th February, to consider the necessary formalities in connection with Germany's application for membership of the League.

We understand from Geneva that the business of the special Council will include the following items:—

(a) Calling of a special meeting of the Assembly to consider Germany's application. Three alternative dates have been suggested (i) March 4th or thereabouts, i.e. a few days before the regular Council meeting on March 8th. As, however, it will be necessary for the Council to meet again simultaneously with the special Assembly, this course would necessitate calling a special Council before the regular Council and would doubtless be personally inconvenient to many of the individual delegates. (ii) March 15th, so as to

¹ See No. 259, note 2.

² Not printed. This letter foreshadowed Mr. Sperling's appointment as made below.

coincide with the end of the regular Council meeting; this, however, would have the disadvantage of excluding Germany from participating in the March session of the Council. (iii) March 8th, the regular date of the Council meeting. This would seem most suitable as avoiding the disadvantages of the two previous alternatives, and is consequently the date which we should prefer, and you should make this clear should there be any question about it.

(b) To draw up the agenda of the special Assembly. We suggest that this should be strictly limited to (i) Germany's request for admission to the League; (ii) decisions (if any) to be taken by the Assembly in application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 4 of the Covenant; (iii) budgetary questions.

A further formality in the case of application of other states for membership of the League has been to instruct the Permanent Advisory Committee to report on the regulations to be prescribed for the country concerned under article 1 of the Covenant as regards armaments. A similar course may be suggested in the present case. In that event you should raise no objection if the proposal is supported by a majority of the Council; on the other hand you should carefully refrain from any initiative in suggesting it yourself; it seems to us a somewhat unnecessary formality, and in any case one to be decided upon by the special Assembly rather than by the Council, and you are at liberty to say this if the matter is discussed.

Finally it is always possible that some member of the Council may raise other points of a political nature either as affecting Germany herself or as affecting the position of the Council in the event of Germany becoming a permanent member. It is essential that any such matters should be reserved for discussion during the March Council meeting and special Assembly, and if they are raised, you should firmly decline to discuss them, saying that your instructions only cover the formal questions which require the summoning of a special meeting of the Council, and that matters of such importance as those I have indicated must be reserved for a meeting where the foreign ministers themselves are present.

You are at liberty to inform Sir E. Drummond of the contents of this telegram.

No. 261

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 11, 9 a.m.)

No. 23 Telegraphic [C 1736/847/22]

Confidential

ROME, February 10, 1926, 9.40 p.m.

My telegram No. 22.¹

German Ambassador told me this morning that although situation was very disagreeable, he refuses to regard it as serious. The whole thing could

¹ Not printed. Sir R. Graham stated in this telegram of February 9 that there was in Rome 'an atmosphere of some excitement but of unanimous approval of terms used' by Signor Mussolini in his speech on February 6 (cf. No. 254, note 1).

only end in smoke. For the last few months he had been pointing out to Dr. Stresemann that anti-Italian campaign regarding Southern Tyrol in German press was foolish and dangerous and ought to be stopped. The Germans there had no real grievance except in one respect, that of education. The Italian government had actually prohibited all instruction in German either in schools or in private. He had been discussing the question with Secretary General² and had been led to hope that regulations would not be strictly applied. In the meantime he had received text of a speech in moderate terms about to be delivered by Dr. Stresemann which would have tendency to clear the situation. Speech of Bavarian Prime Minister had come as a bombshell although its full text showed that it was not nearly so offensive as had at first sight appeared. Signor Mussolini had preferred not to wait for authentic text before delivering his answer on abbreviated and garbled version taken from press or received from Italian representative at Munich. Signor Mussolini's violent speech had altered the whole situation and had rendered any moderate reply from Dr. Stresemann in his present weak political position impossible. He had indeed been as moderate as he could. Ambassador said that he did not intend to see Signor Mussolini before the latter made his further statement in the Senate this afternoon³ but he would later tell him that in his last speech he had spoken rather as leader of Fascist[i] than as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He made every allowance for President of the Council's difficult position with the more ardent wing of his party which had no doubt driven him on in present instance. The trouble in the Tyrol was due more to Signor Federzoni⁴ than to anyone else. Ambassador had found him extremely intractable in the question. Future course of events would depend on President of the Council's forthcoming declaration but Ambassador refused to be pessimistic on the subject although feeling in Germany was even more excited than here. He added that President of the Council had threatened to meet any German boycott of Italian goods by an official boycott of German merchandise.

Later in the morning I saw Secretary General who said that Signor Mussolini had been carried away by irritation caused over Herr Held's speech and indignation which it had provoked in extreme Fascist circles. He could assure me however that Signor Mussolini had not intended to say anything against Locarno or to impede entry of Germany into League of Nations. I am reporting Secretary General's private remarks separately.⁵

It is not easy to diagnose Italian attitude but my own impression is that it is principally due to fear of Anschluss.

² Of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ For Signor Mussolini's speech in the Senate on February 10 see B. Mussolini, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-54, also *The Times* of February 11, 1926, p. 14. In Rome telegram No. 27 of February 10, Sir R. Graham stated that Signor Mussolini's statement 'was not so aggressive as his previous speech but could not be called conciliatory. He reaffirmed spirit and letter of what he had then said but explained his allusion to Italian tricolor on Brenner as being interpreted by Italians to mean that Italy would never suffer any violation of treaties of peace which guaranteed her frontiers.'

⁴ Italian Minister of the Interior.

⁵ See No. 262.

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 11, 9 a.m.)

No. 24 Telegraphic [C 1775/847/22]

Private and Secret

ROME, February 10, 1926, 9.40 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

I found Secretary General in a very perturbed state of mind . . .² (? reception of) Mussolini's speech which he deplored. He said that while some firm declaration had been necessary Mussolini had been overborne not only by his own resentment at what he considered studied insult to Italy but also by pressure of extreme Fascists. The two (? Nationalist) Ministers Federzoni and Rocco³ who were (? attacked) (? and) expressly taunted with lukewarmness had been most extreme in their advice. Secretary General declared that he found himself alone in endeavouring to stem tide of violence of Fascism which would end by sweeping Mussolini off his feet and constituted a real danger. He was doing all he could to promote moderation.

I expressed regret at being unable to see Mussolini before he delivered his . . .² in Senate this afternoon. I had received no intimation of your views on the subject but trend of public opinion in England was clear from press and avidity with which anti-Fascist organs had seized on speech was significant. I should have spoken to him as a friend of Italy and a personal friend and admirer of his own. It was time that he should take (? public) pulse. It was easy for him with his immense personal prestige in Italy and his strong political position to be moderate whereas Stresemann was in very different case. If Mussolini now made a further aggressive declaration where would situation end? Stresemann was bound to reply in a similar strain. Logical outcome would be Italian advance into Germany which was unthinkable. Otherwise Italian government would end by looking ridiculous. Alternatives were therefore either dangerous or absurd. While admitting fictitious nature of German press campaign and provocation of Herr Held's speech I should have besought Mussolini to turn weather-glass from stormy to fair by some conciliatory utterance. There were passages in Stresemann's speech which afforded him opportunity for doing so. I should possibly have exceeded my prerogative in speaking thus to Mussolini but I did not believe he would have resented it and I should have based my remarks on respect which I knew Ministers entertained for Locarno agreement and spirit, both of them somewhat affected by his recent speech.

Senator Contarini said he would see M. Mussolini at once and deliver this message to him. It supported all that he himself had advocated. He believed that if M. Mussolini's statements were to have been made tomorrow such arguments would have had an effect upon him but it took place to-day and in His Excellency's actual state of mind he was not too sure. Nor am I

¹ No. 261.

² The text is here uncertain.

³ Italian Minister of Justice and Cultural Affairs.

but in any case my expression of opinion can do no harm and I know His Excellency will not resent it.

No. 263

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

*No. 455 [C 1747/1618/62]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 10, 1926*

My Lord,

The French Ambassador left with me to-day a note explanatory of the proposals made by M. Briand for future control of railway administration in the Saar¹ and another note drawn up by M. Fromageot dealing with the position of Germany in the preparatory commission of the Armaments Conference.² M. Briand had undertaken to supply this information to me in the course of the conversation which I held with him in Paris. I am having them examined by the competent authorities.

The Ambassador then reminded me that, when M. Briand was last Prime Minister,³ negotiations for a treaty between France and Yugoslavia were already in progress. They had continued, very slowly and intermittently, during the administrations of his successors, and when the present French Minister was appointed to Belgrade M. Herriot had given him instructions to take them up again. They had lately been resumed by M. Briand in a rather different form. The original scheme had been for a treaty of the old-fashioned kind; the new proposal was to follow the model of Locarno and to be submitted in the same way to the League of Nations, and on this occasion, instead of the negotiations being confined to the two countries originally interested, Italy had been invited by M. Briand to become a party to the treaty. Its object would be to fortify the territorial settlement in Eastern and Central Europe, to provide for the settlement of disputes by arbitration and to preserve peace in the Balkans against the danger of war which might arise from a divergence of policy between Italy and France. Both the Yugoslav and Italian Governments had accepted the proposal in principle and Signor Mussolini had requested that the French Government would submit a draft embodying their ideas of the form which such a treaty might take. It was hoped that the treaty would also regulate various differences which had arisen on the one side or the other between the Italian and French Governments. M. Briand had instructed him to make this communication to me and to say that he hoped that, if I were consulted by Signor Mussolini, I should give encouragement to the idea.

I replied that, just as I had in conversation urged upon M. Briand the importance of doing everything to remove any causes of difficulty between France and Italy and to consolidate their friendship, so I had used analogous language in speaking to Signor Mussolini. I was not, however, quite clear

¹ Not printed.

² No. 264.

³ January 1921 to January 1922.

from his communication what the exact nature of these treaties would be. He had said that it was now proposed to give them a different character to that which had been originally intended in order to bring them into harmony with the system established at Locarno and to place them under the guardianship of the League. Did this mean that, just as the Treaty of Locarno embraced not merely France, Belgium and ourselves, but also Germany, so the project under discussion between the French, Italian and Yugoslav Governments was intended to embrace the ex-enemy Powers of Central Europe or the Balkans and have the same mutual character, or was it to be confined to the three Powers specifically named?

M. de Fleuriau said that he himself had no information except that contained in the passage which he had just read to me. I asked him therefore to read it again. I believe that I have accurately summarised its contents; if so, it would appear to be a defensive alliance of the three Powers, and I am at present unable to understand the analogy which is drawn between it and the Treaty of Locarno.

I took the opportunity of asking M. Fleuriau if he had any information about the progress of the negotiations between Yugoslavia and Greece, more particularly in regard to the Salonica-Ghevgheli Railway, which M. Briand had appeared to think were on the eve of a satisfactory settlement. He replied that Mr. Kennard had had a conversation on this subject with the French Minister at Belgrade, and had suggested that France, Italy and ourselves might advise the two Governments immediately concerned to refer the question to the Transport Committee of the League of Nations. M. Briand had instructed him to deprecate this suggestion. He thought that the Greek Government were less conciliatory than they had been and were perhaps relying upon support from Italy or Great Britain. I told the Ambassador that instructions had already been issued to your Lordship to make the same proposal to M. Briand at the time when I was in Paris and simultaneously to Sir R. Graham to make a similar suggestion to Signor Mussolini in Rome, but that, on hearing from M. Briand that the parties were likely to come to terms, I had cancelled these instructions. I was content to wait as M. Briand suggested if there was a chance of an arrangement being come to, but the present situation was dangerous and if other proposals for a settlement failed, we might have to revert to this suggestion. In the meantime I could tell him that I had certainly given no encouragement to Greece to refuse any reasonable settlement or to expect British interference. I must observe, however, that the claims at one time put forward by Yugoslavia, comprising as they did the working of the line by Serbian officials who were to enjoy extra-territoriality in Greek territory, appeared to me quite preposterous. M. de Fleuriau expressed his complete agreement. He was inclined himself to think that the real obstacle to the settlement of the railway question had been the emergence of the problem of what were called the 'Slavophone' minorities together with a suspicion on the part of Yugoslavia that the late Greek Government, as has since proved to be the case, was so unstable as to make negotiations with them useless.

The Ambassador having exhausted what he had to say to me, I took the opportunity of telling him the substance of my conversations yesterday with the Swedish Minister and the Belgian Ambassador⁴ and what they had said as to the attitude of their Governments towards any increase in the number of permanent seats on the Council of the League of Nations except the one promised to Germany. I called the Ambassador's attention to the opposition which was showing itself in English newspapers of very divergent political views, and said that I did not know what view my Government would take, but in the meantime I thought that M. Briand should know what was the attitude of the Governments which I had named, and in particular that of Belgium. Even if Great Britain as well as France supported the Polish claim, it might be impossible to secure the unanimous assent of the Council, and in that case it might be well for the friends of Poland to consider whether her interests would not be better served by concentrating on obtaining for her a temporary seat than by putting forward a claim to a permanent seat which was doomed to defeat. As far as this country was concerned, I did not believe that there would be in any quarter serious opposition to the election of Poland as a temporary member, and I myself thought it of such consequence that she should have a seat at the Council at the present time that I should not like to lose the certainty of the temporary seat by contending for a permanent one if we found that the latter demand aroused widespread hostility in the Council or Assembly.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁴ See No. 255.

No. 264

Note communicated by the French Ambassador on February 10, 1926

[W 1075/78/98]

Rôle de l'Allemagne à la Commission préparatoire de la Conférence du désarmement

Une des questions les plus délicates que rencontrera, dès le début de ses travaux, la Commission préparatoire de la Conférence pour la limitation et la réduction des armements, sera celle du rôle de la Délégation allemande à la Commission. Pour déterminer ce rôle, il importe de rechercher dans quelles conditions juridiques, l'Allemagne peut intervenir dans la question des armements.

Développant une thèse qui a déjà été esquissée à plusieurs reprises, la Délégation allemande s'appuiera certainement sur le préambule de la Partie V du Traité de paix (clauses militaires) pour soutenir que le statut militaire à adopter par les États membres de la Société des Nations, doit être proportionné à celui qui est imposé à l'Allemagne par les Traités. M. Stresemann, à Locarno, a déjà esquissé cette thèse. A Locarno également, M.

Briand l'a combattue en se refusant à prendre d'autres engagements que ceux qui résultent, pour les Membres de la Société des Nations, de l'article 8 du Pacte et en se référant, d'autre part, aux travaux poursuivis à Genève. De son côté, Sir Austen Chamberlain, au cours de la sixième Séance de la Conférence, a dit à M. Stresemann qu'il ne pouvait être question d'un désarmement proportionnel, comme le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Reich le prétendait.

1) A en croire la thèse allemande, les signataires du Traité de Versailles auraient contracté, vis-à-vis du Gouvernement allemand, en matière de désarmement, un engagement qui permettrait à l'Allemagne, si cet engagement n'était pas tenu, de réclamer la révision de son statut militaire.

Telle n'est pas la situation exacte et le préambule de la Partie V du Traité, sur lequel s'appuient les prétentions allemandes, n'a pas le caractère qu'on lui attribue du côté allemand. Dans le texte français, il ne vise que '*la préparation*' d'une limitation générale du désarmement; il est vrai que le texte anglais envisage '*the initiation*' (le commencement) d'un tel désarmement, ce qui va plus loin que l'expression française. Mais cela encore n'est pas assez pour appuyer la prétention allemande.

En effet, la question a déjà été agitée dans les échanges de Notes qui ont précédé la signature du Traité de Versailles.

La Note alliée du 16 Juin 1919,¹ dit que les clauses militaires et navales du Traité 'constituent le premier pas vers la réduction et la limitation générale des armements que lesdites Puissances cherchent à réaliser comme l'un des meilleurs moyens de prévenir la guerre'; la note ajoute: 'qu'il est juste, comme il est nécessaire, de commencer obligatoirement la limitation des armements par la nation qui porte la responsabilité de leur extension', et que: 'c'est seulement lorsque l'agresseur a montré le chemin, que ceux qui ont été attaqués peuvent, en toute sécurité, en faire autant'.

Ce sont les textes que les Allemands invoquent, mais ils oublient de citer une autre phrase qui est essentielle et d'après laquelle 'l'Allemagne doit consentir, sans conditions, à un désarmement précédant celui des Puissances alliées et associées'. Les mots 'sans conditions' répondent précisément aux demandes formulées par la Note allemande du 29 Mai 1919,² dans laquelle les Délégués du Reich déclaraient que leur Gouvernement acceptait, en matière militaire, les conditions des Alliés, s'il était stipulé que ces conditions constitueraient le commencement d'une réduction générale des armements de toutes les nations et si '*deux ans au plus tard après la conclusion de la paix*' les autres États procédaient à cette limitation et abolissaient le service militaire obligatoire. C'est cette prétention qui a été écartée: les Alliés n'ont admis qu'un désarmement sans conditions.

2) En invitant l'Allemagne à la Commission préparatoire, les autres Gouvernements n'ont pas implicitement admis le bien-fondé de sa thèse. Il est vrai que l'Allemagne a été invitée alors qu'elle ne faisait pas partie de

¹ See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 112, pp. 274-5.

² See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. vi, pp. 795-901.

la Société des Nations, mais, à ce moment, son admission dans la Société était déjà escomptée. Sa situation n'est donc pas la même que celle des États-Unis et de la Russie qui sont appelés à participer à la Conférence parce que, sans leur collaboration, il n'y a pas de désarmement possible.

3) Si l'on admettait d'ailleurs la prétention allemande, il faudrait admettre qu'elle vaut, non seulement pour les armements militaires, mais aussi pour les armements navals. Or, à Washington, lorsqu'il a été procédé à une première tentative de réduction des armements navals,³ on ne s'est, à aucun moment, référé aux clauses navales du Traité de Versailles, et l'on a cherché à réaliser cette réduction par une méthode à laquelle l'Allemagne est restée étrangère. Accepter la thèse allemande en matière d'armements terrestres, ce serait, en ce qui concerne les signataires du Traité de Versailles, s'obliger à l'accepter aussi en matière d'armements navals et à fixer les armements navals des autres Puissances, en fonction des clauses navales du Traité de Versailles.

4) Enfin, les termes de l'article 8 du Pacte sont incompatibles avec la thèse allemande. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations, aux termes de l'article 8 'prépare les plans de la réduction des armements, en vue de l'examen et de la décision des divers Gouvernements'. Ce n'est que par 'l'adoption' des plans par les Gouvernements, que ces plans deviennent définitifs; dès lors, la limite des armements ainsi adoptée ne peut être dépassée sans le consentement du Conseil.

Le cas de l'Allemagne est tout différent. Elle est obligée, dès maintenant:

a) à observer le statut militaire qui lui a été fixé;
b) si une modification doit y être introduite, elle ne peut l'être, aux termes de l'article 164 du Traité, que par le Conseil de la Société des Nations. C'est dire que l'Allemagne a aliéné définitivement sa liberté en ces matières.

5) D'ailleurs l'Allemagne ne saurait prétendre imposer sa thèse aux États tels que la Russie et les États-Unis qui ne sont pas liés par le Traité de Versailles et qui ne sont pas Membres de la Société des Nations non plus qu'à la Suède, Norvège, Espagne, Pays-bas, etc. . . .⁴ qui, Membres de la Société des Nations ne sont pas davantage liés par ce Traité.

Ce n'est pas à dire toutefois que l'Allemagne n'ait aucun rôle à jouer à Genève dans ce débat. L'Allemagne sera présente comme un grand État, membre de la Société des Nations, qui est intéressé à la réalisation du programme fixé à la Société par l'article 8 du Pacte et qui est également intéressé à la détermination du statut militaire qui sera donné à l'Europe et au monde. La réorganisation militaire à laquelle le Traité l'a obligée à procéder a, d'ailleurs, été l'occasion pour elle d'expériences sur lesquelles elle pourra attirer l'attention des autres États représentés.

L'Allemagne est aussi à Genève, parce que, comme M. Briand l'avait

³ For the treaty for the limitation of naval armaments, signed at Washington on February 6, 1922, by Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States, printed as item No. 1 in Cmd. 1627 of 1922, *Conference on Limitation of Armament: Washington, 1921-22*, see First Series, Volume XIV, Chapter VI.

⁴ Punctuation as in original.

marqué à Locarno, la question du désarmement n'est guère séparable de celle de l'application de l'article 16 du Pacte et que l'attitude de l'Allemagne, concernant cette application, aura une grande importance en ce qui concerne l'état d'armement que ses voisins, en particulier, pourraient accepter. Mais l'Allemagne n'est pas à Genève comme une Puissance qui a des réclamations à soutenir et un droit à faire valoir pour imposer aux Membres de la Société tel ou tel statut.

Il est à prévoir qu'à Genève il sera nécessaire dès le début de s'expliquer avec une très grande clarté sur ces points essentiels. L'explication n'ira pas sans débat, mais celui-ci sera réduit au minimum s'il apparaît tout de suite que les Délégués britannique et français sont en plein accord sur ces importantes questions.⁵

⁵ Sir A. Chamberlain minuted as follows on this document: 'This paper requires no answer. It was supplied to me in answer to my request to be informed of the grounds on which M. Fromageot had urged the postponement of the preparatory conference until after Germany entered.

'On merits I would observe

- i. that the German contention that we must disarm *proportionately* is preposterous.
- ii. that their disarmament was "sans conditions".
- iii. that the real argument to address to the French privately is that law or no law, treaty or no treaty, no power on earth can keep Germany so disarmed indefinitely unless a measure of general disarmament follows.

'I add

(a) France can't keep a *white* army without conscription. It is not to our interest to see her defenceless but to have her strong enough on land to prevent her weakness inviting attack. (b) the U.S.A. will couple abolition of submarines (if they support it at all) with abolition of capture at sea. We can't accept that & unless we are careful we shall be in a minority of one.

'The handling of this whole question requires the closest correlation with our general policy. Lord Cecil must be kept in the fullest possession of the political no less than the military aspects.

'A. C. 20.2.'

No. 265

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 11, 6.10 p.m.)
No. 48 Telegraphic [C 1763/436/18]

BERLIN, February 11, 1926, 1.12 p.m.

Your telegram No. 17.¹

I have discussed the position with the German government.

As regards the three principal points referred to viz: High Command, associations, police, they state that (1) The High Command question has been settled. (2) Associations. Their draft law which they believe will meet requirements of Commission of Control is now before Reichsrath² and will be communicated to Commission this week. (3) Police. They have made a new

¹ This reference was corrected on the filed copy to read '15', i.e. No. 250.

² The ensuing decree was dated February 12, 1926.

proposal to Commission.³ As this proposal is stated to be based upon views held by the Ambassadors' Conference and Commission of Control, the German government are confident that it will prove acceptable.

General Wauchope is less optimistic than German government on police question but believes rapid progress to be possible if Commission of Control are told by Ambassadors' Conference that treaty of Locarno renders it unnecessary to adhere rigidly to text of note of June 4th 1925. Provided that essential safeguards are executed, concessions should be made on non-essentials.

My own information is that unless Commission of Control receives clear instructions of this nature they will linger here until the day of judgment.

³ These German proposals of February 8, together with an *avis* of February 27 from the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, were received in the Foreign Office under cover of Paris despatch No. 413 of March 2 (not printed). For summaries of the proposals and *avis* see No. 339.

No. 266

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 37 Telegraphic [C 1714/24/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 11, 1926, 1.15 p.m.*

Paris telegram No. 58¹ (of February 10th: German aviation negotiations).

Please approach Italian government in such manner as you think best. We are anxious to bring these negotiations to a close as soon as possible and thus clear the ground, before Germany's entry to the League.²

¹ No. 258.

² No reply to this telegram has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

No. 267

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received February 11, 5.10 p.m.)

No. 49 Telegraphic [C 1764/436/18]

Urgent

BERLIN, *February 11, 1926, 4.50 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

There are four minor points which have been referred by Commission of Control to Ambassadors' Conference through Allied Military Committee at Versailles.

General Wauchope considers it essential to progress, that the reasonable concessions proposed by him should be approved. These concessions have been approved by the War Office.

¹ No. 265.

No. 268

Sir A. Chamberlain to Lord Kilmarnock (Coblenz)

No. 84 [C 1561/1461/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 11, 1926*

My Lord,

I have received your despatch No. 27¹ of the 3rd February, and I approve the language which you used in conversation with the Reichskommissar on the general situation in the Rhineland as affected by the signing of the Locarno treaties. While I wish to avoid anything in the nature of nagging and recrimination in our relations with the German Government, nevertheless they must be brought to realise that what is called the Locarno spirit is simply mutual trust and loyalty, and co-operation. The occupying Powers have done their part generously up to this time and have not waited to see that the Germans advanced a step with every step they took; but I have been concerned at the widening gap as we advanced and the Germans held back. It takes two to make a friendship though one to make a quarrel.

2. While your Lordship will naturally not seek to make grievances, I shall be glad if you will continue to keep me fully informed of developments in the Rhineland as they take place.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ No. 241.

No. 269

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received February 15, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 63 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/II]

PARIS, *February 12, 1926*

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon. I was present, as well as the Italian and Japanese Ambassadors. The Belgian Ambassador and a representative of the United States Embassy were also present.

1.A. *Military rolling stock in Germany*

It was decided to approve the Versailles Committee's report of January 30th (see my despatch No. 249¹ of February 9th). I did not succeed in persuading my colleagues to concede any number greater than the 35,000 trucks recommended by the committee (see your telegram No. 17² of January 26th).

¹ Not printed.

² See No. 197, note 4.

1.B. *Alienation of unauthorised military administrative establishments*

It was decided to approve the Versailles Committee's report of January 30th (see my despatch No. 241³ of February 8th). . . .⁴

³ Not printed. This report proposed that the 'Conférence des Ambassadeurs invite le Gouvernement allemand à prendre, sans tarder, les mesures nécessaires pour aliéner définitivement les établissements administratifs de l'Armée en excédent, en lui faisant remarquer que, d'après sa lettre du 23 Octobre 1925, il s'était engagé à assurer l'exécution de ce point pour le 15 Novembre 1925.' In accordance with the present decision of the Conference of Ambassadors M. Briand addressed a letter to Herr von Hoesch on March 5, 1926.

⁴ The remainder of the telegram related to other matters.

No. 270

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 13)

No. 282 [C 1822/7/62]

Confidential. Immediate

PARIS, February 12, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, a memorandum by Mr. Phipps giving an account of a conversation which he had to-day with Monsieur Caillaux.

I have, &c.,
CREWE

ENCLOSURE IN No. 270

Memorandum by Mr. Phipps

PARIS, February 12, 1926

A message was conveyed to me recently through a common friend to the effect that Monsieur Caillaux was anxious to see me. I replied that I should be only too delighted and that I hoped Monsieur Caillaux would give me the pleasure of coming to luncheon with me. This he did to-day, and we were quite alone. Monsieur Caillaux, as usual, was perfectly charming and most entertaining. During the hour and three-quarters which we spent together boredom, at least so far as I was concerned, never had the slightest chance of making itself felt. Monsieur Caillaux's breezy and stimulating conversation ranged over every kind of subject, and the following can only pretend to be but a very bald précis of what he said:—

1. *Interallied Debts*

Monsieur Caillaux's arms made a windmill motion as he sat down when referring to the recent Anglo-Italian agreement, which, he declared, placed him in a very awkward position in regard to the provisional Anglo-French

agreement.¹ I was at pains to convince him that the agreement with Italy contained no secret clause assuring Great Britain of Italy's political support. The result of that agreement was, he said, that His Majesty's Government would be compelled to scale down the terms of the projected settlement with France. Unless they were prepared to do that it would be waste of time for Monsieur Doumer to go to England. Monsieur Caillaux afterwards admitted, however, that the payment of £12,500,000 annually might still conceivably be made provided the 'safeguard' clause were granted, and in that event he is quite easy in his mind, for he is convinced that the Dawes scheme must inevitably break down before long.² In this connection he is convinced, like Monsieur Seydoux³ (see my letter⁴ to Sir W. Tyrrell of yesterday) that a large and comprehensive Financial and Economic Conference, with or without American participation, is inevitable in the near future—an economic Locarno as he described it. I found that Monsieur Caillaux was not in favour of a hasty stabilisation of the franc, for such stabilisation, unless very cautiously produced, would cause a serious industrial crisis, the present sagging in the French currency constituting a premium on exports. In this connection Monsieur Caillaux sounded a warning note and urged that, in the interests of British industry, we should not press the French too hard over the debt question.⁵ However, he observed with a shrug of the shoulders, it was ever our policy to favour British finance at the expense of British industry. He begged me to believe, however, that he did not for a moment desire French currency to collapse like the German had done, only great caution would have to be shown in the stabilising process, which could only be brought to a successful conclusion as the result of the 'economic Locarno' referred to above.

2. *Locarno*

I observed that I had seen with pleasure but without surprise that Monsieur Caillaux had recently spoken strongly in favour of Locarno. Monsieur Caillaux replied that Locarno was a vital necessity, and there was no other alternative. Only by the Locarno spirit could the next dangerous fifteen years be bridged over, by which time it was to be hoped that the present fire-eating nationalists would have disappeared and a new and more peaceably inclined generation grown up. Monsieur Caillaux heard only yesterday from Monsieur Briand that Locarno will come up for discussion in Parliament directly after the present finance debate and before the question of electoral reform. Monsieur Briand would, if still in power then, gain a great personal victory

¹ Cf. No. 428.

² The preceding words were sidelined by Mr. Churchill to whom this memorandum was communicated. It was also seen by the Prime Minister.

³ Deputy Director of Political and Commercial Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Mr. Churchill wrote in the margin against the preceding sentences: 'To leave us the sole power to pay the U.S. without receiving anything from Europe? W.S.C.'

over Locarno and would pulverise his chief opponents—Monsieur Louis Marin⁶ in the Chamber and Monsieur Poincaré in the Senate. Monsieur Caillaux admitted, however, that perhaps as many as 100 deputies might vote against Locarno in the Chamber. This tallies with what I heard last night from a deputy of Monsieur Marin's group. This deputy, who has a great personal admiration for Monsieur Marin, assured me that he would nevertheless vote for Locarno, or at the worst abstain, in spite of the objurgations of his chief and the attitude of his electors, who were short-sighted enough to be anti-Locarno; indeed, it seems that Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber, is very hostile. Monsieur Caillaux thinks that Monsieur Briand will, as a result of the Locarno debates, so much increase his personal prestige that he will be able to carry the 'scrutin d'arrondissement' by making it a question of confidence, but this comes more properly under the heading of

3. *Internal Situation*

Monsieur Caillaux thinks Monsieur Briand is in imminent danger of falling within the next days over the financial question. Here I was perhaps undiplomatic, but I unhesitatingly expressed the opinion that that would be unfortunate from the international point of view. Monsieur Caillaux, on the other hand, was diplomatic enough to assent. He remarked, however, that Monsieur Briand had been 'roublard' enough to get himself appointed, or rather to appoint himself permanent French representative on the League in succession to the late Monsieur Léon Bourgeois. Monsieur Briand had therefore become a species of permanent super-Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which capacity he would soar, for the rest of his natural life, in a position of greater freedom and less responsibility, above the Quai d'Orsay, when he was not actually in occupation thereof. I expressed satisfaction at the prospective permanency of this beneficent presence, and Monsieur Caillaux again was good enough to concur. I inquired whether Monsieur Briand would not perhaps on the whole prefer to confine himself to the Quai d'Orsay, leaving the more thankless task of the Presidency of the Council to younger and broader shoulders, and Monsieur Caillaux nodded assent with a pleased alacrity which led me to suppose that he himself would be only too willing to assume the thankless task referred to.

Monsieur Caillaux scouted the possibility of any lasting dictatorship in France, though he thinks some temporary infringement of the present discredited parliamentary régime possible. Socialism is on the down grade, he declares, and Communism is dead. The Centre will rule France in the coming years as it has done in those gone by. The pendulum may swing, but never very far. Anti-clericalism still exists, but as mild as it is permanent. It merely consists in the natural desire of the French peasant and workman that the priests should remain in their churches and should not mix themselves up in the affairs of the private individual. Monsieur Herriot had in this

⁶ Deputy for Meurthe et Moselle and President of the Union Républicaine Démocratique.

respect completely misjudged the situation and had made a colossal mistake in his anti-Vatican policy.

4. *Italy and Spain*

I found Monsieur Caillaux obsessed by what psycho-analysts would describe as the 'Mussolini complex', but this is an obsession which nearly all Frenchmen seem to share. Monsieur Caillaux is convinced that Mussolini's internal position is considerably less sound than it was and that, therefore, he will inevitably seek to create a diversion by some mad foreign adventure. I assured Monsieur Caillaux that this did not tally with the news which we receive from Rome, where it seemed as though Mussolini's internal position was more or less as strong as ever. Monsieur Caillaux then proceeded to tell me that only yesterday he had been at a luncheon party with Señor Alba, former Spanish Prime [Foreign] Minister, Monsieur Malvy⁷ and General Denvignes, former French Military Attaché at Madrid. Señor Alba said that when Mussolini first came into power he had made an official offer to the Spanish Government for an offensive and defensive alliance against France, Italy to take Nice and Savoy, Spain to get Sardinia. This offer had been refused. Monsieur Malvy thereupon remarked that he had reason to believe that a similar offer had again been made by Mussolini quite recently.

Monsieur Caillaux thinks that the position of General Primo de Rivera⁸ is very much weakened. The General is, he declares, most unpopular, even with the Army, and he considers that his disappearance as Dictator or even his assassination cannot be far distant.

Referring to the recent Mussolini-Stresemann controversy, Monsieur Caillaux expressed the opinion that the latter came out of it with flying colours, whilst the former had certainly not increased his reputation for statesmanship.

5. *Germany and the League*

Monsieur Caillaux expressed the devout hope without much conviction, however, that Germany would make a tactful début in the League and would postpone for a reasonable time the raising of all controversial questions. In this connection, Monsieur Caillaux said that it was clear that the régime of the so-called Polish corridor would eventually have to be revised.

6. *Mosul*

Monsieur Caillaux twice asked rather anxiously whether I considered the possession of Mosul to be vital for the British Empire. I twice replied that I did not consider it to be vital for the British Empire, but that it was certainly vital for the Kingdom of Irak, for whose welfare Great Britain, as mandatory of the League, was responsible.

ERIC PHIPPS

⁷ President of the Finance Commission of the French Chamber of Deputies.

⁸ President of the Spanish Council of Ministers.

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received February 15)

No. 137 [C 1927/847/22]

ROME, February 12, 1926

Sir,

In the telegrams which I have had the honour to address to you during the past few days I have indicated the circumstances which led to Signor Mussolini's speech on the subject of the German propaganda relative to the Upper Adige. There are however certain other points which are of some interest in considering the way in which the present situation has arisen.

2. As mentioned in my despatch No. 67¹ of the 22nd ultimo, the Prime Minister had for some little time intended to take up the challenge of the German press on the whole question. It would be more in accordance with his character to treat such a matter in a public declaration rather than by means of diplomatic representations, but his speech would in all probability have been of a less violent character had it not been for the unfortunate intervention of the Bavarian Premier in the controversy, a development which caused intense irritation throughout Italy, and personal exasperation to Signor Mussolini himself.

3. The acrimony with which the discussion was opened by Signor Mussolini was thus due in part to fortuitous circumstances, but a strong declaration would in any case have been inevitable. In Italian interests it was essential, both from the local and the general political point of view, that the German campaign should not be suffered to continue unchecked. The situation in the Alto Adige is seen by Italian eyes somewhat as follows:—After the transfer of the area to Italian sovereignty the German elements of the population received a very complete measure of toleration. In return for this Italy saw the formation of the 'Deutsche Verband',² whose policy was directed from abroad, while its leaders did everything to resist any Italianisation of the province. Cases are recalled, for instance, of patriotic demonstrations being forbidden by local officials of German birth, of refusals to teach Italian in schools and to replace Austrian emblems by Italian and of demands for the grant of an autonomous status.

4. With the advent of the present Government conditions were changed, but it was long before a policy of Italianisation was avowedly adopted. It was only as a result of continued agitation and obstruction on the part of certain German elements that this policy was instituted. It has since been pursued, at first slowly, but, as it appears, more energetically during recent months. The same German minority that had abused the freedom accorded by previous Governments resented the general tightening up of the administration and the violent press campaign which developed first in Austria and then in Germany was the result.

5. This is the case as it would probably present itself to the ordinary

¹ Not printed.

² German Union.

Italian. It is difficult to say to what extent the situation in the Upper Adige has been embittered by the local fascist organisations, but these have no doubt influenced the position to a considerable extent. The process of the Italianisation of education is another question of great local importance, and was indicated to me by the German Ambassador as the one substantial grievance, but attacks from abroad can only render any concession on this point more difficult.

6. I have already referred in my telegrams to the wider considerations which have probably influenced the Prime Minister. The intervention of Germany was calculated to call up visions of the Anschluss, and a firm stand against German pretensions to the guardianship of all persons of German race may well have seemed necessary, especially at a moment when Germany's admission to the League of Nations was imminent. The Prime Minister was also influenced by a feeling of strong resentment at Italy's being the first country to be singled out by the German press and public as a suitable object for a general attack.

7. Signor Mussolini's two speeches have been reported at length in the English press, but I enclose full summaries¹ of both for convenience of reference.

8. The language used by His Excellency has met with enthusiastic support throughout Italy both from the press and public. But it is generally recognised in moderate circles that certain passages in the first speech were of a somewhat violent or unnecessarily offensive character and might well have been omitted.

9. Three points are singled out for criticism: the threat that the Italian flag might be carried beyond the Brenner, the language used in referring to 'the spirit of Locarno', and the attack upon the costumes of the German tourists. The Brenner threat is judged as a grave mistake by many convinced supporters of the Government. A well-known banker said to a member of my staff that this would certainly be regarded with uneasiness abroad. He himself was quite sure that there was no danger of war, nor any intention of it in Signor Mussolini's mind, but it was obvious that the phrase did suggest war. The reference to the 'Locarno spirit' is also thought to be capable of misinterpretation and is therefore to be regretted. In regard to the third point, there is a feeling that the Duce's language was not in good taste, though many who have been offended by the sight of German tourists in costumes more suited to the football field than to a church or even a street, have a certain sympathy with Signor Mussolini's strictures. Certain members of the opposition deplore the whole tone of the speech and compare it unfavourably with Herr Stresemann's reply.

10. To the speech in the Senate although its tone could not be called conciliatory, nor was it meant to be, no serious exception can be taken. Senator Contarini informed me last night that the German Ambassador had just called upon him and had said that he hoped that the present unfortunate example of 'open diplomacy' might now cease and that Herr Stresemann did not intend to make any further statement on the subject. This is confirmed

in the press of this morning. In the meantime Signor Mussolini has sent me a message to the effect that he had said his last word on the question and did not intend to return to it. Unless, therefore, the threatened boycott in Germany against Italian goods is continued or developed and leads to Italian reprisals of a similar nature, the incident may be considered as closed. But it has left a disagreeable taste behind it which cannot fail to affect Italo-German relations both political and personal for some time to come.

I have, &c.,

R. GRAHAM

P.S. Mr. Carpenter, the Commercial Secretary to this Embassy, paid a visit to the Trentino in the summer of 1922, and was much impressed by the conditions which prevailed at that time, by the stubborn and even menacing attitude of a section of the German Austrians and of the German visitors. I asked him to give me a memorandum, which I send under separate cover.¹

No. 272

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received February 16)
No. 68 [N 718/718/38]

BERLIN, February 13, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a memorandum by Mr Finlayson¹ on Russo-German trade relations. Although the attempts that have hitherto been made to open up this branch of international activity have met with poor success, there exists a feeling among certain sections of the German community that trading relations should be encouraged.

2. It will be observed that negotiations are taking place here in regard to the granting of a credit of 300 million R.M. (£15,000,000) to the Russian Trade Delegation. Concrete proposals have not yet been published.

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 272

Russo-German Trade Relations

Great expectations were raised in Germany as a result of the Treaty of Rapallo with Soviet Russia but it must be confessed that the results, as reflected in the volume of trade between the two countries, reveal a very poor measure of success. German statistics show that the volume of trade with Russia in 1913 was:

¹ Financial Adviser to H.M. Embassy.

Imports	1,424·6 Mill. R[eichs] M[arks]	(£71,230,000)
Exports	880·2 „ „ „	(£44,010,000) (including, of course, the former Russian Poland, Finland, The Baltic States & Bessarabia)

whereas the figures for the first nine months of 1925 were:

Imports	149·2 Mill. R.M.	(£7,460,000)
Exports	161 „ „	(£8,050,000)

as compared with the volume of German-Polish trade during the same period as under:

Imports	359·9 Mill. R.M.	(£17,995,000)
Exports	297·4 „ „	(£14,870,000)

2. In spite of this there still persists a strong feeling in Germany that Russia is the land of the future and that it is well worth while to encourage this branch of foreign trade. The enclosed circular² issued by the German Industrial Union of the East may be taken as typical of this feeling.

3. In the circumstances it might be considered desirable to consider what progress has already been made in the establishment of more intensive Russo-German trade relations, and in particular, what steps have been taken to finance this branch of industrial activity, for credit has naturally played a preponderant rôle.

4. One of the first German organisations to do business on the credit basis was the 'Deutsche Industrie-Vereinigung für den Osten',³ the so-called 'DIVO'. This organisation was originally composed of 40 firms belonging to different branches of trade⁴ and it was successful in bringing about an agreement between the Banks of the State of Baden (to which was affiliated the State Badische Bank) and the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin. This agreement provided for a revolving-credit of 20 Million R.M. (£1,000,000) on the condition that it should be used only for the purchase of goods by firms in the State of Baden.

5. So too the Deutsche Bank, always a great champion of Russian interests, arranged for a consortium of German firms (which were later amalgamated under the name of the 'Ausfuhrvereinigung Ost',⁵ the so-called 'AUVO') to which the Deutsche Bank gave special facilities in the matter of discounting Russian bills. In this way those firms were able to grant long credits to the Russians.

6. The next development was the credit for 100 Million R.M. (£5,000,000) arranged last October (cf. Lord D'Abernon's despatch No. 570⁶ of the 10th of October) in which the 'Reichskreditgesellschaft'⁷ and the 'Deutsche Bank' participated *with funds granted by the Reich*. In accordance with the terms of

² Not printed.

³ German Industrial Union for the East.

⁴ *Note in original:* 'I gather that it is now intended to limit their activities to certain specified groups of trade.'

⁵ Eastern Export Union.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Reich credit company.

that agreement the Russians were given a credit for goods to the amount of 100 Million R.M. with the proviso that the 'Deutsche Bank' undertake the obligation of paying the German sellers 50% in cash of the total sum purchased and to accept Russian bills for discount for a further 25%. The remaining 25% was left to be arranged on a free basis between the contracting parties. It was found that the credits (3-5 months) were too short-dated and only 80% was taken up.

7. In the chemical industry a sales organisation has been formed among the various firms of the 'Interessen-Gemeinschaft der Anilin [Anilin]-Fabriken'⁸ (the I.G.). This organisation, which goes by the name of the 'Igerusska', accepts Russian bills under mutual guarantee of the participating firms.

8. So much for what has been done; what are the plans for the future? At the present moment negotiations are taking place between the large Berlin banks and the big Rhenish-Westphalian Industries in regard to export credits, in which the Reich is apparently to participate in the matter of assuring the money. Nothing has yet been definitely settled, but the sum of 300 Million R.M. (£15,000,000) has been mentioned.

9. In conclusion, it should be observed that the feeling is growing up in Germany that Russian business contains no greater risk than the present financing of home or foreign transactions, and that some effort should be made to open up this trade to the ordinary middlesized firm, for hitherto the business has been confined to such undertakings as the A.E.G.⁹ and the I.G. which are strongly backed by the D. Banks.

Berlin, 10th February, 1926.

⁸ Consortium of aniline factories.

⁹ Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft, i.e. General Electricity Company.

No. 273

Mr. Sperling (Berne) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received February 15)

No. 45 [C 1965/71/18]

BERNE, February 13, 1926

Sir,

With reference to your telegram No. 2¹ of the 10th inst., I have the honour to report that I attended the Council of the League of Nations yesterday when an agenda for the Assembly meeting on March 8 was drawn up as recorded in my telegram² of yesterday sent through His Majesty's Consul at Geneva. While item 2 was under discussion the Brazilian representative said that in his opinion the correct interpretation of Art. 4 of the Covenant

¹ No. 260.

² i.e. Geneva telegrams Nos. 3 and 4: not printed. The first three items of the agenda were those listed in paragraph (b) of No. 260. For the official record of this meeting of the Council see *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1926, pp. 497-8.

was that the initiative in the nomination of additional members of the Council rested with the Council itself, not the Assembly. After some conversation among the members nearest to the Brazilian representative, the Secretary-General agreed that this view was correct and item 2 of the agenda was then drafted as already recorded. The rest of the Council took no part in the conversation.

2. On my way back to Berne I found that the Swedish representative was much elated at what he regarded as a formal decision of the Council with regard to the interpretation of Art. 4. I said that I had not so regarded it. If I had I should have had to reserve the opinion of His Majesty's Government. I have since ascertained that Sir E. Drummond does not consider that any formal decision was taken, although in his opinion there can be no possible doubt as to the meaning of Art. 4. No suggestion was made by any member that the Permanent Advisory Committee should be instructed to report, nor were any other points of a political nature raised.

3. I enclose for formal record the letter³ from the German Government as circulated to the Council by the Secretariat.

I have, &c.,
R. SPERLING

³ Not printed: see No. 238, note 4.

No. 274

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 15, 10.10 p.m.)
No. 51 Telegraphic [C 1998/71/18]

BERLIN, February 15, 1926, 8.38 p.m.

Sir E. Drummond arrived in Berlin this morning and has had long conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State.

He considers results of these conversations as quite satisfactory: I will telegraph further details tomorrow.

It would seem that Germany's objections to adding Spain as a permanent member of Council are somewhat less vehement than in the case of Poland.

No. 275

Sir A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)
No. 215 [C 2017/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 15, 1926

My Lord,

The German Ambassador sought an interview with me to-day for the purpose of speaking to me about the questions which had arisen in regard to the composition of the Council of the League of Nations.

He stated that a discussion on foreign affairs would take place in the Reichstag in a few days and that the German Government felt that a very serious situation had arisen. He supported this view by three arguments. In the first place, the permanent seats were at present held by four Great Powers. Germany had understood that she was to enter as a Great Power. To admit any other Power not being the United States of America or Russia (for whom it had always understood that permanent seats were to be reserved) would be to derogate from the position accorded to Germany. Secondly, he observed that the character of my statement in the House of Commons last week¹ added to the seriousness of the situation, for I had not spoken of the possibility of permanent seats being allotted to other claimants as part of a natural evolution of the Council, but had spoken of Germany's entry as the reason for it, which seemed to imply that it was intended to create an equipoise against Germany or to render her influence in the Council less. Lastly, this matter had never been mentioned at or before Locarno.

I replied to the last observation that, whilst the Germans had always insisted as a condition of their entering the League that they should receive a permanent seat upon the Council, neither at Locarno nor in the discussions which had preceded the meetings there had they ever so much as hinted that it was equally a condition that no other change should be made in the composition of the Council; that Germany's position as a Great Power could not be affected by the election or non-election to the Council of any other State; that a nation like Germany was a Great Power even on the morrow of defeat and would always be a Great Power in whatever assembly she took a part. She had no more reason to feel that her position was affected by anything that might be done for another nation than had the British Empire. Finally as regards my statement, he had completely misunderstood my meaning. It was not because Germany in particular was about to enter the League and to be given a permanent seat on the Council that the question of the composition of the Council arose, but because any proposal to alter or add to the Council necessarily raised the whole question. As to the idea that the entry of other Powers might in some way fortify the Council against Germany, this showed a complete misconception of the character of the Council. Since in all important matters unanimity was required, the mere fact that there was a majority on one side or the other had little or no importance. The Council had to seek and did seek agreement, for it was only when there was agreement that the Council could take a decision.

The Ambassador then contended that to admit anyone else would be 'contrary to Locarno', if not to a verbal agreement at any rate to the spirit of what was there done, and if it had been in the mind of any of the Powers there represented to make any addition except Germany, the onus was on that Power to inform Germany of her intention. I replied that I was wholly unable to accept this statement. If the German negotiators had given me the least ground for suspecting that any alteration in the Council beyond the

¹ For Mr. Chamberlain's reply on February 11 to a question by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 191, col. 1242.

admission of Germany was a factor in the decision which they had to take, I should at once have made clear to them that, whilst authorised on behalf of His Majesty's Government to use all our influence to secure the admission of Germany, I was unable to come under a negative obligation not to support or to oppose anyone else.

The Ambassador then enquired why if the question was to be raised at all it should be raised now. Why could it not be left until after Germany was a member of the League? To this I replied that he must address his question to one of the Powers who raised the issue. It was not raised by His Majesty's Government and, left to ourselves, we should not have raised it.

Finally the Ambassador enquired whether His Majesty's Government had come under any obligation to any Government. When I referred him to the declaration that I had made in the House of Commons last week, he observed that I preferred to give no answer to his question, but that no reply was often an answer. Upon his saying this, I advised him not to draw an inference from my words which might be incorrect. My Government had not yet given me instructions and would probably not make up their mind as to the best course to pursue until immediately before my departure for Geneva. Personally I recognised the force of the objections to any of the proposed changes, but I was obliged to recognise that there was a good deal to be said upon the other side. I hoped that the German Government would not conclude that nothing but prejudice or anti-German feeling could induce anyone to support the claim of another Power. Obviously the Council must not be made too large, but were its present numbers sufficient for its present task? Under the Treaty of Locarno and the network of treaties connected with it, it might well be that, if the case arose where the massing of troops in the demilitarised territories brought about a clash of arms and where nevertheless the treaty provided that the case should be referred to the Council and the parties to the treaty undertook to abide by and execute the Council's decision, that decision would under present circumstances have to be given by only four members, for six members of the present Council, if Germany were included in it, would be excluded from the vote as interested parties. Did he think that the votes of four out of ten would carry sufficient authority to stop a war which had already broken out? This was indeed a weak point in the Treaty of Locarno. Dr. Sthamer agreed, and admitted that the authority of four out of ten was insufficient to carry so great a burden.

Then I spoke to him of what in my opinion ought to be the guiding factor in the decision of His Majesty's Government and of all other interested parties, namely, how would the interests of peace best be served and the authority of the League strengthened. I told him of the strong impression made upon me during the fortnight of last December when the position of Irak was before the Council, that we should have been in a better position to secure a friendly arrangement with Turkey, and should more easily have obtained a judgment on the merits from the Council if Turkey had been, like ourselves, a regular member of the Council. Lastly, I asked him to consider whether it was really in the interests of Germany that her relations with

France should be complicated by putting France in the position where she would have to be the exponent of the Polish case.

I need not say that none of these arguments convinced the Ambassador, who ended the conversation, as most of his conversations do end, with the observation that he could only repeat what he had said at the beginning. I replied that I had already given my answer on those points which I summarised again for him as he was repeating it to me not quite accurately; that, in regard to Poland, my Government had taken no decision and that in what I have said both as regards the need for an increase in the Council numbers and in favour of the Polish claim I was not pretending to speak their mind, but only to lay before him some of the reasons which made it impossible for me to say *ab initio* that any such proposals were out of the question and to urge that they should be considered on their merits.²

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

² On February 16 the French Ambassador left a note at the Foreign Office regarding a similar *démarche* that had been made on the previous day by the German Ambassador at Paris. M. de Fleuriau was informed of Sir A. Chamberlain's reply to Dr. Sthamer.

No. 276

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 17, 9 a.m.)

No. 52 Telegraphic [C 2052/71/18]

BERLIN, February 16, 1926, 8.15 p.m.

Sir E. Drummond has had further interviews today with representatives of German government. The smaller points and formal questions of procedure have been settled without difficulty.

Regarding enlargement of Council at March meeting, he found Chancellor less conciliatory than Dr. Stresemann as regards Spain. This opposition is not to be attributed to any hostility to Spain but to apprehension as regards principle of increase at present moment and also to feeling that no idea of increase in Council was mentioned at Locarno.

German government are anxious that formal deposit of Locarno ratifications should take place at Geneva on morning of March 9th before Germany is admitted.

I am sending by bag full records of Sir E. Drummond's conversations.¹

¹ Berlin despatches Nos. 75-78 of February 17 are not printed. Mr. Troutbeck stated in particular in a minute thereon of February 20: 'A considerable portion of these conversations dealt with purely Secretariat matters which do not much concern us. It will be seen that Germany is to have one under Secretary General and various lesser posts. The German government, with the possible exception of Dr. Stresemann, attach importance to this question. Herr von Schubert's request for Germans to be put on the minorities and mandates

sections of the Secretariat is not without significance. Both were turned down by Sir E. Drummond.

'Other points which deserve mention are the following:—

'(1) The views of the German government about other Powers being made permanent members of the Council simultaneously with Germany are well known, and there is nothing new about it in these papers. It will be observed that all the Powers represented on the Council are, according to Sir E. Drummond, pledged to support Germany's candidature. We had never received copies of the replies of all the governments concerned to the German government's note of September 28, 1924 [see *League of Nations Official Journal*, March 1925, pp. 325–6], on the subject, and it is useful to have this information.

'(2) Dr. Stresemann is anxious to avoid making a statement that Germany gives effective guarantees to fulfil her international obligations. He apparently thinks that in such an event he would have to raise war guilt. Sir E. Drummond suggests that Germany's application for membership, having alluded to Article 1 of the Covenant, might suffice in itself.

'(3) Sir E. Drummond told Herr von Schubert that if the Council refer to the P[ermanent] A[dvisory] C[ommission] about military regulations, it will be a pure formality.

'(4) Sir E. Drummond made no mention of the possibility of the Assembly asking the Ambassadors' Conference for a report on Germany's observance of her obligations up to date, so let us hope that that may be avoided.'

No. 277

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 507 [C 2016/436/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 16, 1926*

My Lord,

You will have observed that in my telegrams Nos. 8¹ and 15² of the 1st and 7th February respectively I instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin to express to the German Government my disappointment at the apparent lack of goodwill they have shown in the execution of the agreement reached in Paris last November in regard to disarmament. Lord D'Abernon was instructed to add that as soon as they showed signs of fulfilling that agreement they would not find us behind them in expediting the withdrawal of the Commission of Control. Subsequent telegrams from Lord D'Abernon lead me to believe that these representations have not been without effect, and it now appears that in the three important outstanding points in respect of 'effectives' we may be on the eve of progress. The German Government say³ they have now issued an ordinance to regulate the question of the High Command in the form agreed upon last November; that they will shortly submit to the Control Commission a draft law regarding military associations which they believe will meet our requirements, and that they have made a further proposal to the Control Commission regarding the police which they hope we shall have no difficulty in accepting. It would clearly be unwise at this stage to make any comments on these matters, as none of the new German proposals have yet been seen by our military advisers; but you meantime will observe from the War Office letter of the 11th February, of which

¹ No. 231.

² No. 250.

³ See No. 248.

a copy is enclosed herein, that the Army Council are of opinion that an increase in the police of 5,000, or even 10,000, men should not be allowed to stand in the way of a settlement of the police question, though the total number as finally fixed should not exclude any category.

2. It is thus not unreasonable to hope that an advance is in prospect in regard to the major outstanding questions. On the other hand, considerable, and as it seems to me unnecessary, difficulties have arisen over minor points. I would refer, in the first place, to your Lordship's despatch No. 243⁴ of the 8th February, enclosing a copy of a German note challenging the validity of certain demands made by the Control Commission in respect of (a) the issue of a decree fixing definitely and for always the effectives of all units of the army; (b) the rendering of nominal rolls of officers; and (c) fixing the maximum effectives of non-commissioned officers. I transmit to you herewith a copy of a further letter from the War Office,⁵ from which you will observe that in all three points the Control Commission have, according to our interpretation, been making demands beyond the terms of the treaty. The Army Council are of opinion that the German note should be referred, in the first instance, to the Versailles Committee for an opinion, and I request that you will propose this step to your colleagues on the Ambassadors' Conference. At the same time, the matter affords confirmation of what I have for some time feared, viz., that the Control Commission are not doing all they might to clear up outstanding matters, and seem indisposed to bring control to an end.

3. A further example is afforded in what has arisen over certain other minor points which were referred by the Control Commission to the Versailles Committee in the middle of last month, dealing with recruitment in the German army and certain matters appertaining to the General Staff. The Versailles Committee on the 30th January gave the Control Commission a clear lead in writing for the adoption of a conciliatory solution of each case, adding at the same time that, if the Control Commission were unable to agree among themselves as to following this lead, they should refer the matter back to Paris, when it would be brought before the Ambassadors' Conference. That, I understand, has now happened. The Control Commission have, by majority and against the advice of the British representative, rejected the conciliatory suggestions of the Versailles Committee, and the Ambassadors' Conference will now have to decide on the instructions to be issued. This appears to me a striking example of unhelpfulness on the part of the majority of the Control Commission, and when the matter comes before the conference you should press strongly that the Versailles Committee's recommendations should be upheld and the requisite instructions issued to the commission.

4. It is unfortunately evident that General Wauchope was right when, on his last visit to England, he urged that the situation calls for definite instruc-

⁴ Not printed. The enclosed German note, No. A. 391 of February 2 to the President of the Conference of Ambassadors, was as here indicated.

⁵ Not printed. This letter of February 11 and enclosed memorandum by the General Staff are summarized below.

tions to be issued to them as to their future handling of the questions under their supervision. You will recollect that on the 6th August last they were instructed to do all in their power to hasten the execution of the Allied disarmament demands; since then I have assured Dr. Stresemann that we, for our part, will do all that lies with us to bring control to an end as soon as possible. I am therefore strongly of opinion that the commission should now be reminded of those instructions, and their attention at the same time called to the new situation that has arisen in the relations with Germany as a result of the signature of the Locarno treaties. They should be made to realise that, so far as disarmament is concerned, our policy must be to clear off all outstanding questions as soon as we properly can, and that long discussions over details of only relative importance should not be allowed to obscure the issue and retard the completion of control. The commission should, in short, concentrate on the satisfactory execution of the important points and be prepared to make reasonable concessions to reach agreement over matters of lesser moment. That the necessity for such instructions is a real one is confirmed by two telegrams from Lord D'Abernon, of which I also enclose copies herein.⁶ I accordingly request that you will propose instructions being issued on these lines to the Control Commission without further delay.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN No. 277

Letter from War Office to Foreign Office

Secret

WAR OFFICE, *February 11, 1926*

Sir,

I am commanded by the Army Council to refer to Lord D'Abernon's telegram No. 387 dated 6th February, 1926, regarding outstanding military questions.

2. I am to offer the following observations on the different points.

Higher Command. This would appear satisfactory, but no considered opinion can be given until the Commission of Control report whether Ordinance in question is satisfactory.

Associations. No remarks.

Police. The Army Council is unaware that any question regarding the inclusion or exclusion of certain categories of police was left undecided in the agreement reached in November between the Allies and the German Government. The total of 150,000 was fixed and was to include all categories of police, vide Conference of Ambassadors' resolution No. C.A. 290 (VIII) dated 26th November, 1925.⁸ Dr. Nord has approached certain members of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles unofficially, with a view to getting concessions on this subject, but on each occasion he has been informed

⁶ Nos. 265 and 267.

⁷ No. 248.

⁸ Not printed: see No. 115, paragraph 8.

that the Allied Military Committee of Versailles have no power to alter a decision of the Conference of Ambassadors and that if the Germans desire to ask for further concessions they must do so through diplomatic channels to the Conference of Ambassadors.

The Army Council consider that it would be bad policy to exclude any categories of Police from the total number allowed, but, on the other hand they feel that an increase of 5,000 or even 10,000 should not be allowed to stand in the way of a settlement of the police question.

Railways. An agreement has been reached for a period of 7 months, under which the German railways have made considerable reductions in their original demands.

I am, &c.,
B. B. CUBITT⁹

⁹ Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the War Office.

No. 278

Memorandum by Sir A. Chamberlain¹

[N 640/640/38]

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 16, 1926

The attached memorandum on the foreign policy of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was prepared by Mr. C. W. Orde,² of this Office, at my request and for my own information, but it seems to me of sufficient interest for circulation.

The policy which, with the sanction of the Cabinet, I have followed in regard to the Soviet Government has been to avoid a breach of the diplomatic relations established before we took office, and neither to court nor to show fear of that Government, but to leave them alone in the expectation that sooner or later they would discover that they have more need of us than we have of them.

This policy has been successful. Indeed, if anything, it has been too successful, for, whilst showing the Soviet Government that we were independent of them and not to be intimidated by their attempts to foment revolution here or elsewhere, it appears to have so frightened M. Chicherin as to have upset altogether his judgment. From the very frank reports of his conversation which I have received from Count Skrzynski, Dr. Stresemann and M. Briand, it is clear that he has misunderstood this negative attitude, and that it has become an obsession with him that the whole policy of Great Britain is directed to the isolation of Russia, and even to the formation of an actively anti-Soviet *bloc*. This is foolish, but it is also dangerous, and I would venture to repeat my opinion that, whilst dealing as we think proper with Com-

¹ This memorandum was prepared for circulation to the Cabinet.

² A member of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office.

munist agitation in this country, we should avoid denunciations of the Soviet Government and its members, which only confirm Chicherin in his obsession. I believe that the wiser members of the Soviet Government are beginning to see the necessity for a change of policy. They thought at one time that revolution was imminent in France or Great Britain or both. They used to believe that it was easy to play off one Great Power against another and to make each of them believe in turn that, unless it accepted the Soviet terms at once, a rival would do so. If there was ever any danger of this policy proving effective, I think that that danger has disappeared and that the object of their manœuvres is now well understood in all the capitals of Europe. We can watch without jealousy and without fear the negotiations which are now about to begin in Paris. I doubt their being successful, but if they do succeed, they would probably open the way to us through the concessions of principle which the Soviet Government would have had to make.

Mr. Orde in his memorandum makes an observation the truth of which has been steadily impressed upon me. The Soviet Government in foreign policy becomes more and more like the unregenerate Czardom. They have discovered that Communist propaganda has no market in the Far East. They have therefore devoted themselves to arousing national feeling, but it is becoming gradually plain to the nations among whom they are working that the national independence and the revolt against *bourgeois* Imperialism which they preach is only the old policy of absorption by Russia in a new guise. Thus, in the East also our patience is being rewarded, but the situation is full of dangerous possibilities, and I think it desirable to avoid anything which gives colour to the idea that we are irreconcilable enemies of the Soviet Government and that we should be unwilling to listen to any overtures if such were made.

A. C.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 278

Memorandum by Mr. Orde respecting the Foreign Policy of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 10, 1926

It is hard to trace a consistent line in Soviet foreign policy save in the outward expression of antagonism to the British Empire. While signs of a growing reasonableness in minor matters are not wanting, M. Tchicherin remains the victim of the obsession that His Majesty's Government are engaged in plotting against the Soviet Government, and assurances to the contrary, no matter from what quarter, make apparently no impression on him. He regards the Locarno settlement as directed against Russia, the League of Nations as an association of the former Allies to keep their enemies in the dust and Russia herself in check, and the entry of Germany into this western system as a final surrender of her independence. He made desperate efforts to prevent this consummation, and his complete failure has

stimulated him into fantastic schemes, in the sincerest form of flattery, for a pact on Locarno lines between the Soviet Union, China, Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey, Poland, and even Jugoslavia. Efforts are being made to promote touch between Afghanistan and China by means of the mutual accrediting of diplomatic representatives. Japan does not figure in the picture as we have had opportunity to observe it, but it is proposed to make a surface pretence of the desirability of co-operation between Russia, China and Japan to consolidate the peace of the Far East, and hopes are even entertained of securing a certain collaboration from the United States of America in that region. More serious is the contemplated intensification of propaganda in the East, on which more is said below.

At the same time we see, in the last few weeks, simultaneous displays of truculence in China, Afghanistan and Persia. The Bolshevik manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway risks a quarrel with the anti-Bolshevist General Chang Tso-lin over a question of payment for the transport of troops. His challenge results in his prompt arrest; a peremptory demand from Moscow for reparation and compliance, amounting to a threat of invasion if satisfaction is not given, produces not only clear hints from Japan, but also an indignant reaction in China, and has virtually to be withdrawn in impotence.

In Afghanistan, an island in the frontier River Oxus, the legal ownership of which is in doubt but which has been in undisturbed occupation by the Afghans for twenty years, is suddenly seized, and blood is shed, by Soviet troops, at a time when the Afghan authorities are occupied in dealing with local unrest. After some weeks of negotiation the Soviet, evidently impressed by signs of warlike determination on the part of the Afghans, agree to evacuate the island and allow the Afghans to re-occupy it pending a decision by a mixed commission as to its permanent ownership.

In Persia, the Russians suddenly announce the prohibition from a given date of all imports from Persia into the Union with the exception of cotton. This step may be due to disappointment at the scant prospects of securing acceptance by the Mejlis of an onerous agreement regarding fisheries in the Caspian for which they had obtained the Shah's unguarded approval, or it may have been prompted by economic necessity. A similar measure has been reported in the press as having been inflicted without any warning on Turkish imports, and we know that the failure of ill-grounded hopes of a large exportable surplus of wheat has led to drastic curtailment of licences for the importation of German goods. But, whatever the motive, the suddenness and violence of the decision, which spells ruin for many in North Persia, has naturally aroused great indignation and resentment in Persia. The reaction in Turkey is not yet visible; we have, indeed, no confirmation of the report affecting her.³

Efforts at economic penetration doubtless continue, but these are now seriously hampered by an internal economic crisis and by the limits imposed

³ In January the Soviet Government had prohibited the import of Turkish oranges, lemons, nuts, dried fruits, and other commodities. For documents regarding Soviet-Persian relations see Chapter V.

by a new orthodoxy in currency policy. The selling of motor spirit at a loss in Afghanistan need not cause us undue alarm, though such indications must be carefully watched. It may be doubted whether danger is to be feared from the schemes for oil development in Afghanistan; little progress is being made with them and the Afghans are likely to be even more cautious and obstructive in the future than they have already been. There is more likelihood of progress in constructing the proposed Herat-Kandahar-Kabul telegraph line. As against the moral effect of success in that project may be set our own efforts, which are in a fair way to bear fruit, to improve and retrace the Kabul-Kyber road.

The proposed railway in Persia will have an alignment (Mohammerah-Tehran-Caspian) which is not the most desirable in British interests, but there is nothing to show that Russian influence is responsible for it: in fact, the Russians are reported to regard it as a danger to their interests.

The Third International

The reports to the recent Communist Party Congress on the progress of propaganda abroad during the past year must have provided rather poor comfort to their hearers. Zinoviev naturally makes as much as he can of his work and achievements, but in Stalin's report on foreign affairs⁴ in general there is a significant absence of boasting in regard to the results obtained by the International. Encouragement is derived rather from a highly artificial and distorted analysis of world conditions and exaggerated deductions from real or supposed divergences of views and interests among the Great Powers.

At the same time there is ample evidence of great activity, though motives of prudence or policy and limited funds restrict the area in which it is chiefly displayed. That area is now the East, and the watchword is 'assistance to the oppressed peoples.' As the result of experience, communism has been replaced as slogan by the idea of nationality, but the machinery is the same as before. China, Syria, and also Morocco, are reported on excellent authority to be the countries which are to receive the greatest amount of attention; they are to be kept in a state of disturbance, new propaganda centres are to be formed and greater activity is to be shown than hitherto. The sum of £5 million, as we hear from unimpeachable sources, has been allocated to work in China alone, including Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan, but excluding Canton, on which an additional, unspecified, sum will be spent; this is a large increase on the sum expended in 1925. In Korea, India and Egypt work is to be confined to preparatory measures and premature disturbances are not to be created. In Persia, Indo-China and Japan the present Bolshevik organisations are to be extended, communist cells formed and the foundations of revolutionary agencies laid.

General Outlook

Much has been made in the press of recent dissensions in the Communist Party. Such dissensions have often occurred in the past, but the latest have

⁴ See No. 167, note 2.

been more violent, or at any rate more obvious to outsiders, than any previously observed. The dissentients seem to be divisible into two groups, to the left and the right respectively of the main body which carried off the victory at the recent party congress. On the left, Zinoviev and the Leningrad branch which he dominates pressed for an intensification of communist effort to the disregard of possible difficulties at home from the peasants and abroad from other countries. On the right, Sokolnikov seems to have advocated a franker acceptance of capitalist methods and assistance from abroad, extending even to the abolition of the State monopoly of foreign trade. Sokolnikov, however, since he is one of the purest blooded Communists, probably argued, as few but Russians could, that this was the speediest way of arriving at the Communist millennium—it was this, we may assume, that caused his opposition to be bracketed with that of Zinoviev: both desired the same end, though they differed radically as to means.

It is tempting to exaggerate the significance of these dissensions and of the reshuffling of posts in the Soviet Government and the various executives which to some extent reflects them. Probably they were due at least as much to personal factors as to considerations of principle and hinged on internal more than on external questions. More impressive is the display of party discipline which followed the victory of the central party under Stalin. Zinoviev was silenced and forbidden to express his views in writing or by word of mouth; his press organ at Leningrad, which had been filled with articles from his pen, turned at the word of command and poured contumely on his ideas. From the other defeated minority, likewise, no word of protest seems to have been heard. Strict discipline in the party appears indeed to be a necessity to the maintenance of its power by an organisation numbering only a million in a population of 130 millions, the greater part of which has no interest at all in communism, and detests in its practical effects any application to itself of communist or socialist principles. The composition of the party and the advantages of membership facilitate moreover the maintenance of this discipline. Membership is not only strictly limited and obtained only after lengthy probation, but carries with it valuable political and material privileges; there is no other party in the Union, and no one but a member of the party can take any real part in the political life or in the government of the country. To be an official has always been a ruling passion outside the ranks of the peasants and it is small wonder that the Communist Party's waiting list is overflowing, though the majority of the applicants may dislike the system.

Zinoviev was defeated, but no change of principle in foreign policy is to be anticipated on that account. As is shown above, propaganda abroad is far from being abandoned or relaxed save in certain directions where its results have not been commensurate with the efforts expended (Bessarabia⁵ appears

⁵ In this connexion Sir W. Max Muller reported in Warsaw despatch No. 74 of February 13 (received February 22) that the Polish Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Morawski, had informed him that Count Skrzynski had 'ascertained that the Soviet Government, although they refused to recognise the cession of Bessarabia to Rou-

to come under this heading), or where lack of funds or tactical reasons suggest such a course. If the hope of universal revolution is disappearing the weapon of propaganda will continue to be used to maintain party enthusiasm, to weaken foreign enemies and to further imperialist aims. Propaganda seems however to have encountered a natural resistance where pre-existing conditions or unrest were not present, as they were in China, and high-handed and oppressive acts, such as those already mentioned, have made resistance in some quarters active rather than passive. As already stated, the leaders have found little to boast of in the achievements of the Third International and our own reports fail to show that its obstinate activity has been rewarded during the past year by any really substantial gains. It may perhaps not be rash to conjecture that propaganda as an effective instrument will tend to wither and Soviet policy become more and more an up-to-date version of Tsarist policy. This raises the question of the military value of the Soviet army. It is undoubtedly better equipped now than it has been and the army budget has been increased by 50% to over £60,000,000. It may perhaps be regarded as having a certain value for enterprises in Asia, but it may be doubted whether it is capable of undertaking any major offensive operation with success.

In Soviet policy towards the West signs of development are to be detected. It is fairly clear that Russia's dependence on the outside world is more keenly realised than ever before. The peasants must be satisfied, and their demand for manufactured goods in exchange for their produce cannot be supplied without machinery and raw material; these can be paid for only by exports. These exports, though steadily increasing, fall at best far short of the value necessary to pay for the imports required; and therefore, though grain in itself is by no means the largest single export,⁶ yet the failure to provide an exportable surplus of corn has compelled recourse to a drastic curtailment of imports; the vicious circle is complete, and progress is impossible or at best extremely slow without foreign credits, which demand honesty, fair dealing and confidence. Efforts are now to be made to settle with France and it is possible that concessions will be made in regard to the recognition of pre-Soviet debts. Rakowsky is said to have been authorised to offer recognition to the extent of 25 to 30 per cent. on a gold franc basis, in return for a five years moratorium, and long-term credits for French goods. It remains to be seen whether impossible conditions will be attached to this offer if made. An attempt is apparently also to be made to reach a settlement with the United States and it has been decided if necessary to recognise in principle, in return for official recognition of the Soviet Government, the debt incurred by the Provisional Government which preceded the Soviet régime.

There is perhaps warrant for regarding this line of development as the more mania, had not the slightest intention of employing force to recover that province, and would bide their time until a favourable moment arrived for a pacific settlement of the dispute'.

⁶ *Note in original:* 'The principal exports (October 1924-June 1925) in order of value are flax, oil, seed-cakes, timber, eggs and butter, grain, manganese.'

stable and promising. Russia's effort in the East seems to be imperfectly correlated with it, and in some of its manifestations gives an impression of hysteria and impotence. The fact that the commissariat for foreign affairs counsels moderation to the extremists when dealing with Europe and yet works hand in glove with these same extremists in the East is partly due to more or less temporary causes: Tchicherin's anti-British obsession, which will not be a governing factor for ever; a revolutionary energy diverted from Western objectives, which is likely, for reasons indicated above, to wither as time passes; and a desire, which will vary in intensity according to circumstances, to put pressure on the outside Powers, notably the British Empire, which are felt to be antagonistic to the Soviet Union. Partly it is the product of something more permanent; not only have there been immemorial relations between the inhabitants of Russia and Central Asia (indeed it is an ethnographical problem of the first order to discriminate between their respective stocks) but since Skobelev laid down in 1872 the axiom that 'we must revive the Empire of Timurlane'⁷ there has been an active school of thought directed to this end; and this school seems to have survived every change of government and every disaster—including the Russo-Japanese war and the October revolution. It has learnt some wisdom in Central Asian politics and recent reports show that Soviet policy there is now achieving some measure of success among the nomadic and warlike tribes who have ever regarded merchants as legitimate prey; but farther East, where the people are settled, where merchants are held in esteem, and where culture is not despised, it will surely be slow to overcome and may, as in past centuries never overcome the natural resistance it is already encountering.

Even within the limits of the Union the allegiance of the subject eastern peoples is not complete, though it is less shaky than it was; outside those limits the rulers of Russia are incapable of undertaking military enterprises of any importance. They have inspired widespread suspicion and are encountering a healthy resistance. This is true even in China, where all is in the melting-pot and the future is dark; Afghanistan has had a revelation of Russian methods and realises the value of British friendship; Persia has had a similar revelation and seems determined to meet the situation with firmness and dignity. Turkey has learnt that Russia has no solid support to give her.

In the West, we have still to see whether anything practical will emerge from the reported willingness of the Soviet Government to recognise in principle their predecessors' debts. If they have really reached this point, developments will perhaps be rapid; trade will be encouraged, its benefits appreciated, the hampering factors in the Soviet system modified, intercourse will increase, the hollowness will be exposed of the advocacy abroad of a

⁷ The reference would appear to be to a statement made by General M. D. Skobelev, a prominent Russian military commander in Central Asia, in a project for the invasion of India dated 1877 and published in the Russian *Monthly Historical Review* for December 1883: cf. H. Sutherland Edwards, *Russian Projects against India from the Czar Peter to General Skobelev* (London, 1885), p. 281. The empire of Timur at the time of his death in 1405 included territories corresponding to modern Iran, Russian Turkestan, W. Pakistan, the Punjab, Iraq, Asiatic Turkey, and Syria.

communism which is not really practised at home, and communist propaganda will die of its own manifest insincerity. In proportion as the revolutionary ardour and influence of the Comunist International declines we may expect greater efforts on the part of Red Trade Unions to disintegrate the existing Unions affiliated to the Second International and to organise a united trade union front on extremist lines. Such activities are however outside the scope of this memorandum. The important point is that it will be easier to discriminate between them and Soviet foreign policy than it is to distinguish that policy from the aims of the Third International.

The general conclusion is that the policy of patience, expectancy and non-interference which has now for some time been followed by His Majesty's Government should still be pursued and is that which promises most for the future. Such a policy need not of course debar us from action at any particular point where Soviet foreign policy may seem at a given moment to affect a special British interest. In the nature of things such special action must depend on the particular circumstances in each case and no general principle can be laid down beforehand defining the character which it should assume.

C. W. ORDE

No. 279

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 18, 9 a.m.)

No. 53 Telegraphic [C 2087/71/18]

BERLIN, February 17, 1926, 8.50 p.m.

Sir E. Drummond had further interview with Stresemann this morning.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed him that Cabinet had met and that German Ambassador in Paris had been instructed to see Monsieur Briand personally and to inform him that if France proceeded with proposal of admission of Poland to be a permanent member of the Council at March meeting, the German application for entry into League of Nations would have to be reconsidered or even withdrawn.

Germany was not opposed, once on the Council to consideration of additional permanent or non-permanent members, but she felt that her admission to a permanent seat must come first.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was anxiously awaiting reply from German Ambassador in Paris.

He added that communication to Paris was entirely confidential. He hoped that nothing would appear in the press.

Sir E. Drummond is not quite clear whether German communication refers to Poland alone, or to any increase whatever of permanent members.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was somewhat excited.

Viscount Chilton¹ (Vienna) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received February 22)
No. 56 [C 2207/2207/3]

VIENNA, February 17, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to report that when the Main Parliamentary Committee met this morning to discuss foreign affairs, the Chancellor made a long statement on the general position of Austria with special reference to the recent speech of the Italian Prime Minister, which caused some sensation here on account of the passage in which Signor Mussolini said he would if necessary carry the tricolour beyond the Brenner.

2. Dr. Ramek began by an important statement concerning Austro-Italian relations. In his opinion the Treaty of St. Germain, by allowing to Italy the Brenner frontier was in contradiction to Point 9 of the Wilson programme in giving to Italy a purely German minority of 225,000. (This, Dr. Ramek said, was the Italian census figure of 1921.) Upon the Austrian Peace Delegation protesting, the answer had been a note laying stress on Italy's promise to treat the German minorities fairly and liberally.² It was known that the Fascist Government had failed to carry out these and other promises, and a systematic italianisation of the German population in South Tyrol had been attempted. This treatment of the German minorities had aroused the utmost feeling and resentment in Austria and in all German-speaking Europe. In Italy, on the other hand, it was declared that the whole of the bitter feeling was artificially inspired by the Pan-Germanists. This was not true: it was the Italian measures that had aroused it. Dr. Ramek declared categorically that as far as Austria was concerned the idea of serious enmity towards Italy or any dream of a recovery of the lost province was a pure myth. Austria might consider the frontier drawn by the Treaty of St. Germain to be unfair in many respects, but she had signed and would abide by it. The Austrian Government and people desired nothing else than to live in friendship with Italy as well as with all other peoples. The Austrian Government greatly regretted that certain Austrian newspapers had shown an undeniable emotion in commenting on these matters. Also the Government had naturally nothing to do with the boycott movement of the last few weeks.

3. As regards Signor Mussolini's speech itself, Austria was not actually mentioned, but any reference concerning vitally the German people, its customs and its culture, must of necessity concern all the German race from the Danube to the Oder, from the Elbe to the Rhine. As to the last passage of the speech concerning the Brenner frontier, the Austrian Government

¹ Mr. Akers-Douglas had recently succeeded to this title.

² The references were to passages in the note of the Austrian Delegation of August 6, 1919, and in the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers of September 2, 1919, printed respectively in *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Deutschösterreichischen Friedensdelegation in St. Germain-en-Laye* (Vienna, 1919), vol. ii, pp. 107-11 and 323.

found it hard to believe that in the eighth year after the war, a few months after the conclusion of the Locarno Pact, and a few weeks before the commencement of the Disarmament Conference the head of a Great Power should threaten to attack a disarmed neighbour whose territorial integrity had actually been twice guaranteed by this very Power. The Austrian Minister to the Vatican³ had therefore been instructed to seek from Signor Mussolini an explanation of the precise meaning of this passage in his speech. The latter had said that he had in no way intended to threaten or disturb Austria; his words were only intended to show that Italy would never tolerate the 'Anschluss'. There was absolutely no question of an Italian attack on Tyrol and no single combatant would ever cross the Brenner. In view of this explanation the Austrian Government had decided not to refer the matter to the League of Nations (in accordance with Articles 10 & 11 of the Pact⁴), although until now they had seriously considered the question of calling attention to the threat to Austrian integrity (not to the conditions of the German minority in the Italian Tyrol). At the same time Dr. Ramek made an appeal to both sides to view the matter calmly and dispassionately. He called upon Austrians to remember that it was after all an affair of a foreign State and extremely important neighbour, and he condemned all Press campaigns, and hoped that the Fascist Press in particular, would now become more reasonable.

4. Another matter to which the Chancellor referred was the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, an event wholeheartedly welcomed by Austria as showing that the country so closely bound to Austria by ties of blood ('Unser stammesgleiches Bruderreich'), had at last come into her proper place in the comity of Nations. While talking of Germany, Dr. Ramek mentioned the fact that he proposed to visit Berlin, the date being not yet fixed. This visit, he declared, was purely one of courtesy since Chancellors Marx and Stresemann had already visited Vienna. He therefore hoped there would be no fantastic talk and ideas about such a visit, and again reiterated his statement that Austria meant to abide loyally by the Treaty of St. Germain. The Government was well aware what serious consequences might be caused by any appearance of departure from this principle.

5. Lastly, the Chancellor mentioned the fact that Austria was negotiating a very complete arbitration Treaty with Czechoslovakia which would shortly be concluded. He was gratified at the thought that this Treaty would prove once more that the idea of settlement by arbitration was becoming more and more usual; and to celebrate the event the Austrian Government intended that the signature of the said Treaty should be made a solemn event. He would be very glad if Dr. Benes would come to Vienna for it. A similar Treaty was also being negotiated with Sweden.⁵ The Chancellor regretted

³ It was suggested on the filed copy that this reference should be to the Austrian Minister to Italy.

⁴ i.e. of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

⁵ The Austrian-Czechoslovak treaty of March 5, 1926, and the Austrian-Swedish treaty of May 28, 1926, are printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 125, pp. 103-6 and 180-6

that commercial agreements with Germany, Switzerland, and Hungary had not been reached in the past year. However, there was every expectation of the agreement with Switzerland being ratified shortly.⁶ As regards Hungary, too, the worst difficulties had now been overcome; and pourparlers for additional Conventions had been begun with Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France and Belgium. These agreements were mostly concerned on the one hand with the alterations (see Mr. Leeper's Despatch No. 25⁷ of the 19th ultimo) in some of the duties of the Austrian general tariff, and on the other hand to take into account the increases since made in certain foreign tariffs; also to profit by the experience gained from the Treaties at present in force, the main endeavour being to increase Austria's export trade.

I have, &c.,
CHILSTON

respectively. Dr. Benes visited Vienna to sign the Austrian-Czechoslovak treaty from March 4 to 5.

⁶ The Austrian-Swiss conciliation treaty of October 11, 1924, is printed *op. cit.*, vol. 120, pp. 40-43.

⁷ Not printed. Mr. Leeper was First Secretary in H.M. Legation in Vienna.

No. 281

Minute by Mr. Wigram on Ratification of the Locarno Treaties¹

[C 2192/112/18]

PARIS, February 17, 1926

Mr. Phipps:

You asked me this morning to tell you anything Monsieur Bardoux² said at lunch about Locarno. It was not necessary for me to ask him any question, as, after lunch, he told Monsieur Léger³ that he was going to give a lecture on Locarno and that he wanted a point cleared up.

Monsieur Bardoux said that he thought Monsieur Marin and others like him had been unfair to Monsieur Briand, in refusing to recognize the importance of the work accomplished in knitting into the Locarno treaty system the Polish and Czecho-Slovak guarantees. Monsieur Briand deserved great credit for this. The only detailed objection Monsieur Bardoux entertained to Locarno was the weakening and indeed the 'doctoring' of article 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, which it implied. Under article 44 Great Britain was obliged to march immediately the neutral zone was invaded.⁴ Locarno weakened the force of this by providing for preliminary discussion upon such an eventuality. The action of Great Britain would not accordingly be so

¹ This minute was communicated to the Foreign Office by H.M. Embassy at Paris.

² Professor at the École Libre des Sciences Politiques.

³ Chef de Cabinet to M. Briand and head of the Far Eastern Department of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Sir A. Chamberlain noted against this sentence: 'I held very nearly this view & I made the most of it, but No; she had the right to treat it as a hostile act. Hurst held that under the Covenant we should not have been *entitled* thereby to go to war automatically.'

immediate. This is exactly the same point, as Monsieur Klotz and Monsieur Chaumeix⁵ have already made in conversation with me. It is of interest to note that Monsieur Bardoux to-day claimed that Sir Austen Chamberlain had confirmed his interpretation of the point in a statement made in the House of Commons. Sir Austen Chamberlain was alleged to have said that, in respect of article 44, Locarno had diminished British military commitments.⁶

Monsieur Léger answered Monsieur Bardoux by saying that Locarno had not had this effect at all. It had provided only an opportunity for insuring that no one was forced into war on a frivolous pretext.

Monsieur Bardoux said that he objected to Locarno on two other wider grounds. In the first place he thought that, from the standpoint of Anglo-French relations, Locarno might easily be misinterpreted, since it appeared to regard Germany and France as equally dangerous and equally liable to break the peace. Secondly Monsieur Bardoux thought that such a theory constituted a practical and political danger. For, whilst France had her own reasons for being afraid of Germany, British policy, was, so far as he knew, based on the maintenance of the balance of power; and to the maintenance of that balance it was Germany and not France, which was the danger.

Monsieur Léger then rather upset Monsieur Bardoux's arguments by telling him—what he did not apparently already know—that, when the Locarno treaties were discussed the other day by the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, Monsieur Poincaré had come down with a whole bagful of prepared questions and had examined Monsieur Briand for three hours. Monsieur Briand had answered everything Monsieur Poincaré had asked, and the latter had, at the end, declared himself to be entirely satisfied.

It is perhaps not without interest to add that Monsieur Léger again to-day emphasised strongly the great part which, to his knowledge, had been played at Locarno by the sympathy between Monsieur Briand and Sir Austen Chamberlain. Monsieur Léger, in speaking to us of this some days ago, said that in the view of a man like himself who realised how little understanding there was at bottom between England and France, this sympathy had alone made possible the agreement. England did not and never would understand France. Nor did France, knowing this, understand England. There were, indeed, a few people in Paris who affected to be anglophil. And there were in the provinces perhaps also, to a certain extent, the soldiers, who had fought with England in the war. But the mass of Frenchmen were utterly indifferent to England and distrustful of her—active hate they did not feel, for that was reserved for the colonial party and the people who came in contact with the English exploitation of the Riviera and Montmartre.

A fortiori we were not obliged. And Frenchmen who believed that every British Govt. would act on this supposed right don't know Britain. A. C.'

⁵ M. Klotz had been French Minister of Finance 1917-20 and M. Chaumeix was director of the *Revue de Paris*.

⁶ For a reference to this article by Sir A. Chamberlain on November 18, 1925, see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 188, col. 428.

Indifference and a vague distrust were, however, universal. It was against this indifference and distrust that Monsieur Briand had triumphed.⁷

R. F. WIGRAM

⁷ This document was initialled without comment by Sir W. Tyrrell on February 19. Sir A. Chamberlain minuted as follows: 'Too true & very sad.'

'Indifference &, where not indifference, something more than "a vague distrust" are the corresponding factors here. Pray heaven govts. may be wise enough & strong enough to keep the peace. A. C. 19.2.'

No. 282

Sir A. Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 22 Telegraphic [C 2087/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 18, 1926, 7 p.m.*

Your No. 53.¹

The attitude of the German government as reported by Drummond disturbs me. His Majesty's Government have not yet decided what attitude they will adopt on question of future composition of League Council, but shall we advance matters or promote friendly cooperation by serving threatening communications on one another? I won't is apt to provoke the answer I will. Would it not be much better for the Germans having sufficiently indicated their point of view to reserve discussion until the Locarnites can meet at Geneva for a round table discussion of the real Locarno kind? It is so that I should act if I were in their position. If we all go with our minds closed against argument how shall we reach agreement on anything? You might suggest this to Stresemann. I assume that they will arrive with the rest of us on the morning of the 7th or at latest the 8th.²

¹ No. 279.

² Lord D'Abernon replied in Berlin telegram No. 58 of February 20: 'Stresemann is away in the Rhineland and will only return on Tuesday [February 23]. I have however taken steps to communicate to him contents of your message.' Sir A. Chamberlain referred to his present telegram in a letter of February 19 to Lord D'Abernon, wherein he argued in favour of a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations for Poland, and stated in particular: 'But I do not believe that there is the slightest chance of this solution being adopted by the Council, whose unanimity is required, nor does it seem to me very probable that Poland would secure the necessary majority in the Assembly even if the Council had agreed. I regard Poland's claim, therefore, as certain to be rejected, and for this very reason I feel that it is doubly foolish of the Germans to put themselves forward as protagonists against it. Why cannot they leave Sweden to take the action which she has announced she will take [see No. 255, note 5]? Why should they at their very entry into the League and even before they have entered begin to threaten that, unless they have their way, they won't play.'

No. 283

*Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 19, 9 a.m.)*

No. 54 Telegraphic [C 2116/71/18]

BERLIN, February 18, 1926, 9.20 p.m.

My telegram No. 53.¹

I saw Dr. Stresemann last night and discussed position with him. He informed me that Hoesch's mission to Monsieur Briand² was in the main informatory to ascertain position. Its purpose was not to make declaration as to what action German government might be compelled to take in given contingencies. That would come later.

At the same time Minister for Foreign Affairs had not concealed from Hoesch his opinion if proposal to make Poland a standing member was pressed now, German government would be obliged to consider the whole of the negotiations for Germany's entry into the League as invalid as having proceeded on a false basis and under a misunderstanding. This opinion was for Hoesch's guidance not for formal communication.

¹ No. 279.

² See No. 286.

No. 284

Mr. Kennard (Belgrade) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received February 22)

No. 72 [C 2268/1618/62]

BELGRADE, February 18, 1926

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 53,¹ I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted to-day in vague terms that negotiations had been in progress for the conclusion of an agreement to meet the 'Anschluss' danger. M. Nincić added that he was extremely relieved to notice that the Italian Government had modified their attitude towards Germany as he had always feared the possibility of an agreement between Italy, Germany and Russia. He demonstrated on the map the danger to Italy of any such agreement and expressed the view that such a policy would have ended in the penetration of Germany to the Adriatic and towards Salonica.

2. M. Nincić further expressed his satisfaction at the close understanding between His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government which he believed to have resulted from recent conversations and negotiations, as it

¹ Not printed. In this despatch of February 8, Mr. Kennard reported on conversations with some of his colleagues at Belgrade regarding the negotiations between France, Italy, and Yugoslavia.

would place a check on any ag[g]ressive adventure which Fascist extremists might contemplate in the near future.

I have, &c.,
H. W. KENNARD

No. 285

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 19, 9 a.m.)

No. 11 Telegraphic [C 2144/71/18]

WARSAW, February 19, 1926, 12.20 a.m.

President of the Council sent for me this morning¹ to discuss question of Poland's admission to Council of League of Nations.

He began by asking me to convey to you his sincere thanks for your loyal support and for your sympathetic understanding of Polish claim. Nevertheless he felt issue at stake was of such vital importance not only for Poland but for Europe generally that he begged me to telegraph to you again on the subject. He had, he assured me, not the slightest intention of employing threats. On the contrary he proposed to submit instruments signed by him in London for ratification on February 25th and would on that occasion speak in support of Locarno agreements and he hoped that Diet would ratify, but mere ratification was of little use if confidence in efficacy of agreements was absent. As to Poland leaving the League, so far as he was concerned there was no idea of that.

He begged me to believe that he was actuated by no feeling of prestige; if Poland were in the secure position of Belgium question of representation on Council would be a matter of indifference to him. But quite aside from size and importance of Poland there was incontestable fact that she was, owing to her geographical position, in the very centre of the dangers that most threatened the peace of Europe; she was, as he put it, the foundation stone of Locarno policy in this part of the world. In all of these dangers Germany was Poland's potential adversary and it would require utmost conciliation on both sides to overcome them by peaceful means. It was on this ground that he based his demand for admission to Council on equal terms with Germany for he was convinced that it was only in atmosphere of Council that a solution could be found for the many points of difference which were sure to arise between the two countries. His own experience had shown him that it was not the same thing for a country to have a permanent representative on the Council and to be summoned to send a representative to deal with a special question.

If Poland met with rebuff his whole policy of the past two years would fall to the ground; people would say that he had been deceived at Locarno, that he had sacrificed interests of Poland to a dream without obtaining in return

¹ This telegram was drafted on February 18.

any security from the dangers that threatened her, and that at the same time France's powers of defence against German aggression had been diminished.

Feeling of respect for League which he had been at pains to inculcate in Poles would vanish and give place to a sense of grievance similar to that which existed before his advent to office when Poles looked on League as an unsympathetic school mistress who was always taking them to task, often to their minds without just cause. His own departure, which would follow would be matter of comparatively little importance were there anyone to continue his policy. Instead there would be a succession of inexperienced foreign ministers none of whom would have the authority to check chauvinistic and irresponsible outbursts to which as I knew so well Poles were too prone. There would be no fixed foreign policy except in one respect and that was one which was certainly not in interests of Europe namely a close rapprochement with (? Czechoslovakia)² who was only too anxious for such a development.

Finally President of the Council said that he could not understand argument that admission of Poland implied a modification of League of Nations' covenant, as such a modification was already entailed in admission of Germany and he resented fact that Germany who until meeting at Locarno had been regarded as outside the pale of the League should take upon herself to dictate who should be admitted and point to Poland as the enemy of peace. He also referred to fact that under present arrangement the vast Slav population of Europe had no permanent representative on the Council and that Germany would be only one for whole of central and eastern Europe.

I sent a despatch on this subject by yesterday's bag.³

² It was suggested on the filed copy that this word should read 'Russia'.

³ Warsaw despatch No. 80 of February 16 is not printed.

No. 286

Lord D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 19, 1.30 p.m.)

No. 55 Telegraphic [C 2147/71/18]

BERLIN, February 19, 1926, 11.50 a.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

I have just seen Secretary of State who told me interview between Herr Hoesch and M. Briand yesterday² had not brought question any nearer a solution. M. Briand had insisted that idea of bringing Poland in was an old one. France had promised long since to support Poland's claim. It was far better that Poland should make her own case and be her own defender rather than rely upon France's protection and advocacy. It was desirable that Brazil should be in as a representative of the American continent.

¹ No. 283.

² It would appear that this interview took place on February 17.

Herr Hoesch obtained the impression that M. Briand was more or less pledged to support Poland, Brazil and Spain, but M. Briand discussed the matter without any heat or passion.

Herr Hoesch replied with the well-known arguments insisting that once rule was broken that only great powers should be represented on council there was no reason to draw the line anywhere. The reasons adduced today as regards Poland, Spain and Brazil could be invoked with certainly equal force at a later date for other powers. In this way compact efficiency of council would be destroyed.

This contention appeared to have a certain effect.

The conversation between M. Briand and Herr Hoesch ended without definite result but without any aggravation of dispute.

German government are doubtful what their next step should be and have not yet come to any decision.

Secretary of State however insisted that this discussion was not a matter of goodwill of Luther and Stresemann. They were practically powerless; they have obtained consent of Reichstag for Germany to enter into the League on a definite basis. If that basis was now changed they had no option but to go back to Reichstag. If they proposed to Reichstag to enter League on new basis there would be unanimous vote against them.

I pressed him closely on this point but he asserted with vigour that there could be no doubt as to whole country being unanimous. He did not consider any compromise solution could be found.³

³ Lord D'Abernon reported in Berlin telegram No. 57 of February 20 that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag had, on February 19, passed resolutions to the effect that Germany, and no other Power, must be given a permanent seat on the Council concurrently with her entry into the League. The adherence of the German National representatives to these resolutions was 'in some quarters regarded as first step towards collaboration in Locarno policy . . . it is certain that several of the German National leaders realise increasingly mistake they made in resigning from government over Locarno'.

No. 287

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon¹ (Berlin)

No. 26 Telegraphic [C 2144/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 21, 1926, 1 p.m.*

Warsaw telegram No. 11 (February 19th; reconstruction of League Council), repeated to you No. 24.²

I watch with great anxiety the progress of the controversy on this subject in the press of different countries. There is great danger that the entry of Germany into the League may revive and intensify old quarrels instead of marking a further advance to peace and assisting reconciliation. I am con-

¹ Letters patent granting a Viscountcy to Lord D'Abernon had been issued on February 20.

² No. 285, which was also repeated to Rome and Brussels, and to Paris with other important telegrams circulated weekly to H.M. Representatives abroad.

fidant that by friendly personal discussion at Geneva *before* the subject is formally discussed at Council we could and should reach a working agreement. I earnestly press suggestion in my telegram No. 22³ (conference among Locarnites).⁴

Repeated to Brussels No. 19 and Rome No. 48.⁵

³ No. 282, which was repeated as above and also to Warsaw.

⁴ The present telegram was repeated to Lord Crewe in Foreign Office telegram No. 45 to Paris of February 21 with the instruction: 'Please speak in this sense to M. Briand personally. Inform M. Quiñones confidentially what I am doing. It is the only way to help him.' Señor Quiñones de Leon was Spanish Ambassador at Paris and delegate to the League of Nations.

⁵ Sir G. Grahame and Sir R. Graham were instructed respectively in Foreign Office telegrams Nos. 21 to Brussels and 50 to Rome to speak to M. Vandervelde and Signor Mussolini in the sense of No. 282 and the present telegram. Mr. Millington-Drake, First Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Brussels, reported in his telegram No. 13 of February 22 that M. Vandervelde entirely shared Sir A. Chamberlain's view.

No. 288

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)

No. 9 Telegraphic [C 2144/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 21, 1926, 3 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 11.¹ (Reconstruction of League Council).

Thank President of Council for his message. I am endeavouring to reserve the whole question for personal discussion at Geneva before the Council enters publicly upon it.

For your guidance but not for communication I repeat my telegram No. 22 to Berlin.²

¹ No. 285.

² No. 282.

No. 289

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 75 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2280/71/18]

PARIS, *February 22, 1926*

Your telegram No. 45.¹ Reconstruction of League Council.

I saw M. Briand this afternoon and gave him the general sense of this telegram and of your telegram No. 22 to Berlin². He told me that he had pointed out to the German Ambassador here the uselessness of carrying on a public polemic on the question of possible additions to the Council, on which everybody has a right to his own opinion. Germany, however, had no right to treat it as a condition of her joining the League, because it is not

¹ See No. 287, note 4.

² No. 282.

a new subject arising out of her accession, but one that has been maturing for some time past. Belgium and Spain had been temporary members for seven years, and other powers had by now a claim to protest against their receiving fresh invitations for temporary membership. He had begged, therefore, that public declarations by German statesmen committing them to definite opposition to any proposals that might be made would cease, so that the whole question might be coolly considered at Geneva.

M. Briand was quite in favour of a private conversation on the lines of Locarno before the difficulty has to be considered by the Council. He regards this as an example of the practice which has been found useful before when delicate matters are coming up for consideration, whereby inconvenient public differences can be avoided.

No. 290

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 23, 5.10 p.m.)
No. 42 Telegraphic [C 2321/71/18]

ROME, February 23, 1926, 3.35 p.m.

Your telegram No. 50.¹

I spoke to Prime Minister last night in the sense of your instructions. M. Mussolini declared that he entirely agreed with your point of view. I suggested that he should instruct Italian representatives in capitals concerned accordingly. He said that he had sent for them all to come to Rome at once and he would take this opportunity of so instructing them. He would also give corresponding instructions to Scialoja.

Mussolini said that when Polish Minister had approached him he had expressed his personal sympathy with Polish claims without committing himself too far. In his opinion Poland certainly had first claim if there were any addition to permanent seats on League Council much more so than Spain which had for a long time past withdrawn herself from participation in European affairs or than Brazil which traded on fact of having been ally during the war although she had contributed no material assistance.

His Excellency desired to draw your special attention to danger of alienating Poland and driving her into the arms of Soviet government. Chicherin was working diligently for such an object.

But he thought that Germans might feel legitimate grievance if Poland were admitted to the Council at the same time as themselves and Polish claim might well be satisfied at some later date, say in September. He suggested that Germans might be asked for private pledge not to oppose Polish claim when it came up at a later date. But he agreed that this with other

¹ See No. 287, note 5.

points might be reserved for friendly personal discussion at Geneva on March 8th.²

² With reference to the present telegram Sir R. Graham reported in his despatch No. 197 of March 5 that 'the press comments upon the discussions regarding the proposed additional seats on the Council of the League of Nations are marked by a very strong anti-German tendency. . . . Very strong language has been used in the extreme Fascist newspapers.'

No. 291

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 23, 9 p.m.)

No. 44 Telegraphic [C 2358/1618/62]

Confidential

ROME, February 23, 1926, 6.40 p.m.

My telegram No. 26¹ confidential.

Prime Minister asked me last night whether I had reported his message and what you thought about it. The more he considered French proposal the less he liked it. The suggested argument² seemed to him absolutely contrary to the Locarno spirit and what would the Germans say? It would be more in accordance with that spirit to propose for instance an arbitration agreement between Yugoslavia and Hungary, to be guaranteed by Italy. He had replied accordingly to French Ambassador and hoped to discuss question with Nincic who was arriving in Rome on 25th for a holiday³ with him. I replied that I had no indication of your opinion but my impression was that you would understand and sympathise with his point of view.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 44, repeated to Belgrade.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram of February 10 Sir R. Graham stated that he had received a message from Signor Mussolini expressing views similar to those reported below regarding the proposed Franco-Italian-Yugoslav agreement.

² This word was amended on the filed copy to read 'agreement'.

³ This word was later amended to read 'conversation'. For a note by Signor Mussolini regarding his conversations with M. Nincich, see *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Settima Serie, vol. iv, pp. 192-4.

No. 292

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received March 1)

No. 168 [C 2565/847/22]

ROME, February 23, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to report that, according to a communiqué published by the Stefani Agency, the Italian Prime Minister, after reading the full text of the speech delivered by Dr. Ramek, the Austrian Chancellor, on February 17th¹ instructed the Italian Minister at Vienna to ask for explanations in

¹ See No. 280.

regard to various passages. It is stated in the Press that Signor Mussolini took particular exception to a reference made by the Austrian Chancellor to representations alleged to have been made by the Austrian Minister to the Italian Government on the occasion of his speech in the Chamber on the question of the Tyrol.²

2. It is now officially stated that the Prime Minister has received the required explanations from Dr. Ramek and that the incident may therefore be considered as closed. His Excellency confirmed this to me yesterday when I took the opportunity of conveying to him the message in your telegram No. 43³ of February 14th regarding Dr. Held's speech. Signor Mussolini expressed his gratitude for this communication.

I have, &c.,
R. GRAHAM

² See *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 176-7.

³ Not printed. In this telegram Sir A. Chamberlain approved Sir R. Graham's language as reported in No. 262 and instructed him to 'say how much I regretted the provocative language used by Held and the German press that I can only hope that by this time they will have seen their mistake and that they will show greater discretion in future'.

No. 293

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 24, 9.50 p.m.)

No. 59 Telegraphic [C 2389/71/18]

BERLIN, February 24, 1926, 9.10 a.m.

I have had a long conversation with Stresemann on basis of your telegrams Nos. 22¹ and 26,² having previously discussed question with Secretary of State.

In reply to my representations that Germany might follow the advice given in your telegram No. 22 the Minister for Foreign Affairs made following statement.

Luther and Stresemann propose to arrive at Ouchy on March 6th so that there will be ample time for private talks before official meeting. If it is certain that through Sweden's adverse vote there is no possibility of further increase of Council at March meeting, then there will be no special urgency for preliminary private conversation on this particular question as Germany is quite open minded as regards an increase of Council at a later date. Her opposition to an increase on the present occasion proceeds in part from suddenness of proposal, which was made without previous contact or converse with her.³

¹ No. 282.

² No. 287.

³ Lord D'Abernon further reported in Berlin telegram No. 63 of February 27 (amended text): 'Secretary of State yesterday renewed assurance that German government will approach question of development of Council at later date without prejudice or prepossession. German government assume that no precise assurance regarding exact method

Stresemann added that while therefore private talks before official meeting may not be necessary on particular question of increase of Council, German Ministers would be glad to have an opportunity of discussing other matters on March 6th and 7th in spirit of Locarno if this suggestion is agreeable to the other 'Locarnites'.

It is apparent from Stresemann's conversation that in his view essential point is certainty regarding Swedish attitude at Geneva. If he is sure of this, there is no further difficulty.

of increase of Council will be asked from their delegates at Geneva in March. It is clear that no such assurance could be given without it becoming public and in this case the position might easily be misunderstood by public opinion.'

No. 294

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 29 Telegraphic [C 2416/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 24, 1926, 10 p.m.*

Following information may be useful to you.

German government appear to think that claims to additional permanent seats on Council are now made for the first time and only because Germany is coming in.

This is a complete misapprehension. For example claims of both Brazil and Spain were pressed on Council as far back as 1921 and proposal made by Lord Balfour¹ to give Spain a permanent seat was strongly pressed by him and nearly carried being only defeated by opposition of Brazil after rejection of her claim.

¹ Lord Balfour, Lord President of the Council, had at that time been British delegate to the League of Nations.

No. 295

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 25, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 78 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2387/24/18]

PARIS, *February 24, 1926*

Although negotiations have been continuing during the last few days in regard to German aviation, there has been no special progress to report. Points of difference have, of course, been those relating to Reichswehr, Navy and Police as well [?] as 'avions sans pilote'.

2. The position this evening is that differences have been considerably narrowed down. It seems likely that Germans will accept total prohibition of 'avions sans pilote'. As regards Reichswehr, allied delegates today discussed an amended formula which will be given to German delegate this evening.

German delegate has resolutely maintained refusal to agree to absolute prohibition. Formula drawn up by allies today is given in my telegram No. 79¹. British delegates do not anticipate serious difficulty in reaching an arrangement regarding the police. Other points in German draft note² are now practically agreed upon. As regards survol and aerodromes in the Rhineland, German proposals are still awaited.

3. Please inform Air Ministry, Air Attaché not reporting separately.

¹ No. 296.

² i.e. the draft (not printed) of a note from the German Ambassador at Paris to the Conference of Ambassadors which was intended as a principal document in the proposed agreement on German aviation.

No. 296

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 25, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 79 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2388/24/18]

PARIS, February 24, 1926

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Following is revised allied formula regarding Reichswehr and Navy.

Le Gouvernement allemand prendra les mesures nécessaires —

(a) pour que soit interdit toute instruction et tout entraînement dans l'aviation ayant un caractère ou un but militaire, contrairement aux engagements visés à l'article 198 du Traité de Versailles;

(b) pour interdire, à toute administration publique ou à son personnel, s'occupant de l'organisation ou de l'administration d'une force armée, d'entretenir, dans un but militaire, contrairement aux engagements visés à l'article 198 du Traité de Versailles, des rapports quelconques avec l'aviation, quelle qu'en soit la catégorie. Il reste entendu que les dispositions ci-dessus visées ne concernent pas les mesures qui seraient nécessaires pour assurer la défense anti-aérienne à terre, en Allemagne;

(c) 1. Pour interdire, conformément au § (a) ci-dessus, aux membres de la Reichswehr et de la Marine toute instruction, et tout entraînement aérien ayant un caractère ou un but militaire;

2. Pour interdire toute instruction et toute activité systématiques et organisées dans l'aviation quelle qu'en soit la catégorie des membres de la Reichswehr et de la Marine, isolés ou en groupes;

3. à titre exceptionnel et en ce qui concerne l'aviation de sport seule, les membres de la Reichswehr ou de la Marine qui en feront la demande pourront être autorisés, à titre privé, à apprendre à piloter ou à piloter pendant leurs congés réglementaires et à leurs propres frais; il ne leur sera accordé à cet égard par les autorités allemandes aucun avantage de carrière ni aucune facilité d'aucune sorte, notamment en ce qui concerne l'octroi de congés, la

¹ No. 295.

mise en disponibilité, etc. . . .² Les noms des bénéficiaires de ces autorisations, dont le nombre global ne dépassera pas . . .² seront portés sur des listes constamment tenues à jour.

² Punctuation as in original.

No. 297

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

*No. 603 [C 2296/24/18]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 24, 1926*

My Lord,

With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 69¹ of the 17th February relative to civil aviation in the Rhineland, I am advised that since the lapse of Part XI of the Treaty of Versailles on the 1st January, 1923, the ex-Allied Governments have lost the right to fly their civil aircraft over any German territory except by authorisation of the German Government. This applies to occupied as much as to unoccupied Germany, and German sovereignty in that respect is therefore complete. On the other hand, it is necessarily limited, in respect of the right of German civil aircraft to fly over the Rhineland, by the terms of the Rhineland Agreement, which empowers the Rhineland High Commission to issue ordinances so far as may be necessary to secure the maintenance, safety and requirements of the Allied and Associated forces, and to adapt the German civil administration to the needs and circumstances of military occupation. There can be no doubt that reasonable restrictions with this object upon the flight of civil aircraft in the occupied territories would be within the rights of the High Commission.

2. The difference between Dr. Nord's suggestions and the French proposals put forward in your despatch No. 215² of the 3rd February seems to be that whereas Dr. Nord considers that the High Commission should merely retain the right to a veto, the semi-official French proposals contemplate that every flight should receive the authorisation of the High Commission. The Army Council consider that, subject to the approval of the Rhineland High Commission and the armies of occupation, the proposal put forward by Dr. Nord can be accepted. If, therefore, the High Commission, whose opinion has, I observe, been asked, are prepared to accept Dr. Nord's proposal in this

¹ Not printed. This telegram reported that on February 17 the Allied delegates had decided to ask the views of their Governments and of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission on the claim put forward by Dr. Nord 'that it was necessary that in future German sovereignty in this [aviation] as in other matters should be recognised for the occupied territories, certain restrictions being reserved to cover the security of the occupying forces. Dr. Nord had also pointed out that in principle permission to fly over the Rhineland territory should be accorded by the German government subject to a veto of the Rhineland High Commission. Conversely, allied civil aeroplanes should not be allowed to fly over the occupied territories except with German authorisation, the High Commission reserving a right of veto.'

² See No. 235, note 6.

respect, the British representatives at the aeronautical negotiations should advocate its acceptance. If, on the other hand, the commission consider it necessary for the security of the occupying forces that they should retain the power to authorise each particular flight, the British representatives should support the French proposals.³

3. A copy of this correspondence has been sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Coblenz, as it will, of course, be for the High Commission to draw up the actual terms of the new ordinance when its general lines have been indicated as a result of the discussions in Paris, and after the Ambassadors' Conference has annulled its decision of 1920.

I am, &c.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

³ Lord Crewe transmitted the High Commission's letter of February 25 in this connexion under cover of Paris despatch No. 389 (not preserved in Foreign Office archives). The High Commission admitted the principle of German sovereignty in the field of aviation but maintained that its exercise was limited by the Rhineland agreement of 1919. The High Commission wished to retain a right of 'contrôle' over overflying of the occupied territories.

No. 298

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 25, 3.30 p.m.)
No. 61 Telegraphic [N 894/718/38]

BERLIN, February 25, 1926, 2.50 p.m.

Credits for development of trade with Russia.

Minister of Finance has promised that German government should provide guarantees for 15 or 20 million sterling for the purpose of facilit[at]ing trade with Russia.

I have discussed this question with Minister for Foreign Affairs who said that in his judgment scheme was not likely to lead to anything very practical as German banks demanded extremely high terms and would only accept signatures of largest firms.

His personal view was that it was essential in dealing with Russia on trade questions that England, France and Germany should act together. It had been suggested to him that an international corporation should be composed of English, French and German elements to develop trade with government trade monopoly in Russia. Unless the three powers acted together it seemed probable that Russians would get the better of each individual power in turn as each would be afraid of being cut out by the other, a feeling Russians would know well how to exploit.

An international organization under something like government inspiration was not unacceptable to Soviet theories and might conceivably do better business in Russia than any purely private organization or than any power individually.

The above must be considered as the private opinion of Minister for Foreign Affairs not as a government decision.¹

¹ Mr. Maxse of the Northern Department stated in a minute of February 26 on this telegram that 'such common action would be useless without that of the United States', and 'it is a somewhat surprising action on the part of the German Govt. who were the first to break the united front by signing the Treaty of Rapallo'.

No. 299

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 58 Telegraphic [C 2321/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 25, 1926, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 42¹ (of February 23rd. Reconstruction of League Council).

I fully appreciate M. Mussolini's argument about Poland. I repeat to you my No. 29² of 24th February to Berlin (past attitude of Great Britain to Spanish claim). I think it may be useful that M. Mussolini should be reminded of this. I am more than ever convinced that only hope of concord lies in personal discussion before Council takes up the question. Scialoja will I am confident be able to give great help.

¹ No. 290.

² No. 294.

No. 300

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 59 Telegraphic [C 2358/1618/62]

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 26, 1926, 6.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 44.¹

Prime Minister's query frankly places me in somewhat of a quandary. For the last thing which we want is in any way to accentuate any differences of opinion that exist in this or indeed any other matter between Italian and French governments.

From the record of my conversation with French Ambassador on February 10th,² (of which a copy has gone to you in print—see South Eastern Europe February 10, section 1) you will have realised that my feelings are distinctly lukewarm to French conception of these arrangements so far as I could gather their outline from Monsieur de Fleuriau, and that they certainly do not impress me as being in consonance with Locarno principles. And I make no disguise that if the treaty which Monsieur Mussolini has in mind between Serbia and Hungary were on the right model, i.e. if its obligations were mutual and the guarantee by third parties were to both the signatories in the same terms (as in the treaty of Locarno), I should be inclined to give it my

¹ No. 291.

² See No. 263.

blessing. But whether it would be right or wise for me to say as much to Monsieur Mussolini at this stage I am inclined to doubt, for it might merely serve to make bad blood between him and Monsieur Briand.

Consequently I am disposed to avoid giving any direct reply to Monsieur Mussolini for the moment, but if he reverts to the question I should prefer that you should say that whilst his proposals strike me *prima facie* as based on the right principles, yet I trust he will not misunderstand me if I do not express any very definite opinion for the moment: that I am on the eve of leaving for the Council meeting at Geneva where there should be ample opportunity of discussing the general European situation both with Monsieur Briand and Monsieur Scialoja: that I note that Monsieur Mussolini has already explained his views to the French Ambassador at Rome who has doubtless reported fully to the French government: and that it is thus reasonable to suppose that Monsieur Briand will arrive at Geneva fully aware of the views of Monsieur Mussolini. That being so, I can conceive a conversation taking place between Monsieur Scialoja, Monsieur Briand and myself which would dispel any possibility of misunderstanding and lead to a complete agreement between the French and Italian governments on this most important question.

From the above paragraph you will have gathered my frame of mind. I think Monsieur Mussolini is on the right lines and that the French government probably are not: but the very last thing I desire is that I should be brought in between them and be considered to be taking sides against one or the other. My role is much more to bring them together—if possible on the Mussolini lines of thought. But for that I must be given time and opportunity. A premature expression of view might well prejudice matters and even have a repercussion on other affairs.

I wish that the Italian and French governments would arrange somehow for a really frank discussion between representatives carrying the confidence and authority of their respective governments. As far as I can make out neither discloses its mind freely to the other and this breeds suspicion on both sides. If I can give help as the friend of both parties I shall be glad to do so but I have no intention of taking sides.

Addressed to Rome No. 59. Repeated to Paris No. 49 (*By Bag*) and Belgrade 13 'for confidential information only'.

No. 301

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)

No. 11 Telegraphic [C 2465/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 26, 1926, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 18¹ (of February 25th. Presentation of Locarno treaties to Polish diet).

¹ Not printed. This telegram reported on a conversation with Count Skrzynski regarding

I have read Count Skrzynski's exposition of his policy with great pleasure and appreciation of his sincere desire to continue the work of appeasement and reconciliation.

My own object has been to keep and to persuade others to keep the question of the composition of the Council open for friendly discussion at Geneva. It is impossible to say what success will attend this effort. The public discussion of the question in our own and the foreign press has excited opinion here as well as abroad and at present public opinion here is very hostile to the consideration at the forthcoming meeting of any claim except Germany's. His Majesty's Government are reserving their decision.

Repeated to Berlin No. 30.

his speech presenting the Locarno agreements to the Diet on February 25: see *The Times*, February 26, 1926, p. 16.

No. 302

Sir A. Chamberlain to Mr. Ramsay¹ (Rio de Janeiro)

No. 51 [C 2524/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 26, 1926*

Sir,

The Brazilian Ambassador asked me to receive him to-day. He had come in consequence of repeated messages from his Government pressing him to speak to me about Brazil's claim to a permanent seat on the Council of the League. He had refrained from troubling me until this moment as he knew that I was already in full possession, through M. de Mello Franco's memorandum,² of the arguments by which it was supported; and he had informed his Government that it would be, not only useless to repeat his arguments, but perhaps irritating to me. Now, however, he was obliged to come as Brazilian opinion was very much agitated. The press had taken up the matter and his Minister was evidently in difficulty in view of the excited state of public opinion.

He had reported to his Government the substance of my recent speeches and of my answers in the House of Commons. He enquired whether I could add anything to them. I replied that I was not in a position to go beyond these statements. There would probably be a discussion in the House of Commons towards the end of next week after the Cabinet had taken their decision, when I might make some further declaration on the subject. In the meantime all that I could authorise him to say to his Government was that the object of my speeches had been to make it possible to reserve the question for friendly discussion at Geneva and to prevent such resolutions

¹ Counsellor in charge of H.M. Embassy at Rio de Janeiro in the absence of H.M. Ambassador, Sir B. Alston.

² The reference was evidently to the Brazilian confidential memorandum communicated to the members of the Council of the League of Nations in July 1925 and published in Geneva in 1926: cf. J. C. de Macedo Soares, *Brazil and the League of Nations* (Paris, 1928), pp. 92, 93, 115. M. de Mello-Franco was Brazilian Delegate to the League of Nations.

being taken in the different countries as would make any agreement impossible when we met together.

In the course of our short conversation a phrase dropped from him which I understood to hint a threat that, as Brazil's assent to the entry of Germany had been given on the assumption that her own claim could be considered at the same time, it might be necessary for her to reconsider that assent if she found that consideration of her claim was excluded.³ When I began to allude to this subject the Ambassador at once explained that he had been speaking of what was written in the Brazilian press and not of the attitude of his Government, and that he knew exactly what I was going to say to him. I thought it well to say it nevertheless. It was that any withdrawal of Brazil's promise to support Germany if or because her own claim was not admitted at the same time would place Brazil in the wrong in the opinion of the whole world, and, if she had any chance of ever being elected to a permanent seat, would destroy that prospect.⁴ The Ambassador said that he entirely agreed with me and had already cabled to his Government to that effect—from which it is perhaps not unreasonable to infer that the idea had at least crossed the mind of the Brazilian Government and had in fact been broached by them to the Ambassador.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

³ Lord D'Abernon reported in Berlin telegram No. 62 of February 26: 'German Minister at Rio has received declaration from Brazilian government that Brazil cannot fully maintain her engagement under her note of December 1st 1924, regarding acceptance of Germany as permanent member of the Council. The attitude of Germany practically destroys old claim of Brazil to a permanent seat. Brazil must therefore reserve her freedom of action for meeting on March 8th. German government have made a detailed reply holding Brazil to her declaration of December.' The relevant portion of the Brazilian reply of December 1924 to the German note communicated on September 29, 1924 (see No. 276, note 1), was cited by M. de Mello-Franco in his speech to the Special Assembly of the League of Nations on March 17, 1926: see Cmd. 2648 of 1926, pp. 7-8. For the full text of the Brazilian note of December 1, 1924, and for Brazilian-German correspondence of February-March 1926 see *Relatorio do Ministerio das Relações Exteriores 1925-1926*, vol. i (Rio de Janeiro, 1927), Anexo A, pp. 119-20 and 122-8 respectively.

⁴ In his telegram No. 13 to Rio of February 28 giving a brief account of this interview, Sir A. Chamberlain also referred to British public opinion on the controversy and added that his remarks were not to be read by Mr. Ramsay as a 'conditional promise of future support to Brazil. I can give no such promise.'

No. 303

Sir E. Howard (Washington) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received March 6)

No. 309 [C 2912/71/18]

Confidential

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1926

Sir:

The Secretary of State in conversation yesterday asked me if I could enlighten him about the difficulty that has arisen in the League of Nations

with regard to new permanent seats in the Council of the League of Nations for Poland, Spain and Brazil. I said I only knew what I had read in the papers, that all these countries were asking for permanent seats and that Germany, at any rate, strongly opposed the admission of Poland to this privilege. As far as Spain was concerned, the request was nothing new since, during all the four and a half years that I spent at Madrid,¹ almost every Minister of Foreign Affairs—and there were many—had spoken to me about it.

2. Mr. Kellogg, while disclaiming any direct interest in the matter, seemed not altogether without some feeling of *schadenfreude*² in discussing the difficulties which the League might have to face in dealing with this question. He let drop, however, one remark which is worth considering. Of the permanent seats on the council when Germany comes in, he said, four will belong to European Powers and only one, that of Japan, to a Power outside Europe. If now two more European seats are added without giving one to South America, the latter continent will have good cause for a grievance. Brazil is the only South American country, he added, which both wanted a seat and, by her size and influence, might be entitled to one. I asked. How about Argentina? He gave me to understand that Argentina was not anxious for the honour and that Chile, the last of the A.B.C. countries, was hardly in a position to expect it.

I have, &c.,
ESME HOWARD

¹ Sir E. Howard had been H.M. Ambassador at Madrid, 1919–24.

² Malicious delight.

No. 304

Sir T. Vaughan (Riga) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received March 8)

No. 62 [N 1074/124/59]

RIGA, February 26, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit, herewith, a memorandum by Mr. Carr¹ recording a conversation he held with the Counsellor of the German Legation here on the subject of a possible 'Eastern Locarno.'

I have, &c.,
J. C. T. VAUGHAN

ENCLOSURE IN No. 304

Record by Mr. Carr of a conversation with Herr Riesser

Confidential

RIGA, February 21, 1926

The Counsellor of the German Legation told me yesterday that he wanted to talk to me, quite privately, about the question of an 'eastern Locarno.'

¹ Second Secretary in H.M. Legation at Riga.

Poland was, he declared, working very actively just now in this matter. As I knew, Poland had been trying for the past three or four years to bring about some sort of alliance with Latvia, Esthonia and Finland, but had had no success. The conclusion of the Locarno pact and the visit of M. Chicherin to Warsaw last autumn had inspired the Poles with wider ambitions. They had approached M. Chicherin with a proposal for a security pact between Poland, Soviet Russia and the Baltic States, but had received a discouraging answer. Latvia and Esthonia had given evasive replies. Nothing daunted, the Poles had, in December last, made a *démarche* to the Swedish Government, but the latter had categorically refused to engage with Poland in any kind of security pact, with or without Soviet Russia. The Finnish answer had been almost as categorical. Now he understood that Poland was, through indirect channels, taking up the matter again with the Soviet Government.

Mr. Riesser added that the German Government took the greatest interest in this question and that the various activities of the Polish Government had produced a flood of telegraphic correspondence between Berlin and Riga during the last few months; and he asked what was the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards these proposals for an eastern Locarno. Bearing in mind Foreign Office despatch No. 29² of 29th January, I said that while His Majesty's Government were interested in any proposals for maintaining and increasing security in any part of Europe, I felt sure they would not be prepared to offer any advice regarding the form of any eastern European pact or the powers who should participate in it. Mr. Riesser said he understood this; but surely His Majesty's Government must have studied the question and made up their minds on the principal points, e.g. whether Poland's present initiation [*sic* ? initiative] should be encouraged: whether an eastern pact should include or exclude Soviet Russia etc. etc.? I replied that I very much doubted whether His Majesty's Government had reached any conclusion whatever on these points; if so, I did not know what it was and therefore could not enlighten him. Mr. Riesser probably thought me either insincere or ill-informed, but did not pursue the question. I then asked him what was the view of the German Government—which was evidently what he wanted to tell me.

Mr. Riesser replied, with somewhat unexpected frankness and emphasis, that the sole aim and object of German policy in the Baltic was to defeat Polish attempts to form any sort of pact or bloc with the Baltic States, whether Soviet Russia was included or not. Any such combination must be inimical to German interests, particularly in the League of Nations where even the smallest State had a vote.

In reply to a question what sort of 'eastern Locarno' the German Government had in mind, he replied without hesitation that the German Government would like to have a pact between Soviet Russia, the Baltic States and Germany. I said that this idea looked to me more like an application of the

² Not printed. This despatch recorded a conversation on January 22 between the First Secretary in the Latvian Legation in London and Mr. Orde, who had spoken in terms similar to those employed below by Mr. Carr.

old-fashioned policy of encirclement—directed against Poland—than of the ‘Locarno spirit’, and this policy would not, in my opinion meet with much support or approval in western Europe. Why should Poland be left out of such a pact?

Mr. Riesser said—and repeated several times—that any pact between Germany and Poland was unthinkable so long as the present eastern frontiers of Germany were unrevised. The conclusion of our talk seemed to be that no form of ‘eastern Locarno’ was practical politics at the present.

I have recorded these remarks, not because I think that any of the hypothetical combinations referred to have any prospect of being realised, but because the conversation may help to throw some light on the mentality of the German Government and on its eastern European policy.

E. H. CARR

No. 305

Sir J. Tilley¹ (Tokyo) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 27, 12.30 p.m.)

No. 34 Telegraphic [C 2527/71/18]

TOKYO, February 27, 1926, 3.30 p.m.

Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that Polish, Spanish, Brazilian, and Chinese representatives were all urging Japanese government to support claims of their respective countries to permanent seats on the Council of the League. Polish Minister was particularly pressing and had quoted you as supporting Polish claim.

Vice Minister said that Japanese government were in principle opposed to increase in number of permanent members otherwise than by addition of Germany and eventually Soviet Union.

¹ H.M. Ambassador at Tokyo.

No. 306

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir H. Rumbold (Madrid)

No. 13 Telegraphic [C 2518/71/18]

Secret

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 28, 1926, 11.30 p.m.

My telegrams Nos. 11 and 12.¹

If you have any hint from government or press sufficient for you to act upon that Spanish government contemplates a like course,² inform them of

¹ Berlin telegram No. 62 and Foreign Office telegram No. 13 to Rio (see No. 302, notes 3 and 4) were repeated on February 28 as Foreign Office telegrams Nos. 11 and 12 to Madrid respectively.

² On February 23 Sir E. Drummond had sent to Sir A. Chamberlain a record of a conversation two days earlier with Señor Quiñones de Leon who had told him that he had had

the views I have expressed to Brazil and ask them to support me at Rio by offering similar advice.

I have private reasons for thinking that such a hint may be needed in very high quarters if it can be given tactfully and naturally.

very clear instructions 'to the effect that he was to refuse to vote for the granting to any Power of a permanency on the Council unless the consent of the Council were obtained to a permanency for Spain'. Señor Quiñones further informed Sir E. Drummond of his government's intention to withdraw from the Council and other League organizations if Spain received a refusal from the Council, and asked him to make the situation clear to Sir A. Chamberlain.

No. 307

*The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 2)*

No. 85 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2639/71/18]

PARIS, March 1, 1926

Your telegram No. 52.¹

2. Mr. Phipps informed M. Berthelot to-day of the substance of your telegram No. 11 to Warsaw.²

3. M. Berthelot said that a compromise must be reached over the Council question. It would be deplorable if Germany were to gain a sensational diplomatic victory before she had even joined the League. His idea is, and he is convinced that it will be shared by M. Briand, that Germany must be prevailed upon to consent (a) to the immediate nomination of Spain to a permanent seat on the Council, and (b) to Poland being given a temporary seat now, with an assurance that she will be received as a permanent member at the September Council.

4. Brazil, Mr. Phipps gathered, will go to the wall. He expressed doubt as to whether Germany would agree to the solution outlined above, but M. Berthelot assured him that his impression, derived from conversations here with Herr von Hoesch and at Berlin between M. de Margerie and Herr Stresemann, was that she would eventually consent to some such compromise. M. Berthelot has impressed its necessity on Herr von Hoesch, and has pointed out how desirable, in Germany's own interests, it is that Poland should be included amongst the permanent members of the Council and become impregnated with its atmosphere of peace and conciliation.

5. M. Briand proposes to travel with you to Geneva on the night of March 6th, and it seems that Herr Stresemann will be at Montreux on March 5th.

¹ This telegram of February 28 instructed Lord Crewe to inform M. Briand of No. 301 which was repeated to Paris.

² No. 301.

Note from Sir A. Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau
[C 2110/1616/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 1, 1926

Your Excellency,

In your memorandum¹ of the 25th January you referred to the arrangements which, in the opinion of the French Government, would have to be made in the Saar Basin after the withdrawal of the French troops, with a view to ensuring the security of the lines of communication of the Allied armies of occupation in the Rhineland; and, as your Excellency will remember, you handed to me on the 10th February a further note² drawn up on the instructions of M. Briand to show in greater detail the proposals advanced by the French Government in this connection.

2. I now have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government entirely concur in the view that the Saar Governing Commission should be empowered to call in the French troops stationed near the frontier in case of emergency. His Majesty's Government are, however, more doubtful as to the necessity and propriety of the further proposals of the French Government. As stated in your note, the French Government are of opinion that a military detachment and a technical railway commission should be permanently established in the territory after the withdrawal of the French troops, and be held at the disposal of the armies of occupation in the Rhineland. His Majesty's Government are, however, advised that, while the treaty³ does indeed impose a duty upon the Governing Commission to provide in all cases for the protection of persons and property in the Saar Basin, yet it would be inconsistent with the treaty that a military detachment should be quartered in the Saar to serve the purely external interests of the armies of occupation in the Rhineland under the orders of those armies. Further, provided that the Governing Commission has the right to call in French troops in case of emergency, the presence in the territory of a permanent military detachment is, so His Majesty's Government are informed by their military advisers, unnecessary from the purely military point of view.

3. In placing these considerations before the French Government, His Majesty's Government venture to hope that they will feel able to share their view of the question and agree with them that it would be undesirable to put forward to the League Council any suggestion which is not legally justifiable by the terms of the treaty.

4. At the same time, His Majesty's Government would not feel the same objection to the temporary establishment under the orders of the Saar Governing Commission of a small Franco-British railway commission, strictly limited as to numbers, to work in liaison with the Inter-Allied Rhineland Railway Commission and to deal with technical railway questions only. This

¹ See No. 223, note 2.

² Not printed.

³ Of Versailles.

commission would necessarily have to comply with any orders or regulations issued by the Governing Commission, upon whose permission their existence would be dependent. It should be the object that when the new lines of communication have been thoroughly established, and working smoothly for several months, this commission shall be reduced to a single officer attached to the Saar Governing Commission.⁴

I have, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁴ On March 18 the question of the development of the local gendarmerie and the presence of French troops in the Saar Basin came before the Council of the League of Nations, which agreed to ask the Governing Commission to submit proposals to the Council on the fulfilment of its responsibilities for the maintenance of freedom of transport and transit over the railways of the territory pending the withdrawal, as requested by the Commission, of a battalion of French infantry and in the light of the Commission's decision not to increase the local gendarmerie beyond 1,005 men. See Cmd. 2646, pp. 7-8, and *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1926, pp. 527-8. Cf. further Sir A. Chamberlain's parliamentary reply of April 21 printed in *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 194, col. 1225.

No. 309

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received March 2, 9 a.m.)

No. 51 Telegraphic [C 2686/1618/62]

Confidential

ROME, March 2, 1926, 2 a.m.

Your telegram No. 59.¹

As I was unable to see Prime Minister at once I spoke to Secretary-General in the sense of your instructions. He said that he assured me that Italian Ambassador in Paris who was now here would receive instructions before he left to open conversations with French government in the sense suggested. But general attitude of French government rendered situation difficult.

Later in the evening² Signor Mussolini received me and I repeated my statement to him. He listened in silence and said that while he was perfectly ready to open conversations with French and to give to Italian Ambassador in Paris instructions, suggested friendly overtures must not come from Italian side of the negotiations. Present French attitude principally inspired he believed by Italophobia of Monsieur Berthelot rendered situation extremely difficult. He had desired to see me in order to impress upon me seriousness of position created by French insistence on Pact. French government had originally proposed at Belgrade a dual Pact. But Yugoslav government whose attitude had throughout been most correct had insisted that Italian government should be consulted and included. It was only after Italian government knew of this proposed dual Pact that they had suggested extension of existing Pact between Italy and Yugoslavia³ Signor Mussolini for reasons already indicated to me could not accept triple Pact proposed by French

¹ No. 300.

² This telegram was drafted on March 1.

³ Another text of the telegram here included a full stop.

government which was in his opinion absolutely contrary to spirit of Locarno. Under that instrument Italy guaranteed both France and Germany but if she gained⁴ such a Pact what would her guarantee of latter be worth? His Excellency was anxious to know your views on the subject and was evidently disappointed with guarded indication with which I had to content him. He continued that France failing triple Pact was now insisting on a dual Pact with Jugoslavia. He regarded such a Pact with grave dislike and misgiving. It would be considered throughout Italy as directed against this country, it would produce a storm in the press and would do more than lose to France the sympathies which recent events had gained for her. He had informed Nincic that if such a Pact were concluded he saw no object in renewing existing Pact between Italy and Jugoslavia far less of extending it. Monsieur Nincic had been much disturbed and was not himself favourable to dual Pact but when pressure would be brought to bear upon him in Paris he would not be strong enough to resist it especially in view of secret agreement between French and Jugoslav general staffs which had existed since the armistice. His Excellency declared that if such a dual Pact were concluded a serious deadlock would arise and relations between France and Italy must inevitably be affected for sometime to come. I was impressed by seriousness and vehemence with which he spoke and fear that if dual Pact is concluded there may be trouble. I shall see French Ambassador tomorrow morning and inform him privately of my impressions.⁵

Addressed to Foreign Office, No. 51, repeated to Belgrade.

⁴ In another text of the telegram this word read 'signed'.

⁵ In his despatch No. 349 to Rome of March 5 Sir A. Chamberlain informed Sir R. Graham of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador. Sir A. Chamberlain had commented to Marquis della Torretta that the Italian description of the proposed pact as a treaty of alliance and the French description of it as a pact of non-aggression and arbitration were contradictory. Sir A. Chamberlain then expressed views similar to those in No. 300, with the additional suggestion that Senator Contarini should come to Geneva. For Marquis della Torretta's report on this conversation see *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Settima Serie, vol. iv, pp. 189-90.

No. 310

Sir H. Rumbold (Madrid) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 2, 7.40 p.m.)

Nos. 14, 15, and 16 Telegraphic [C 2746/71/18]

MADRID, March 2, 1926, 5.45 p.m.

Your telegram No. 13.¹

No member of government has for a long time past mentioned to me the question of an increase in permanent membership of League Council or of Spain's wishes for a permanent post nor have I seen anything in the press to indicate that Spanish government contemplate following the example of

¹ No. 306.

Brazil. One paper which often reflects views of government stated last night that its 'desire was that events should develop in such a way that Spanish government would be able with all honour to give every kind of facility for concession to Germany of a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations' this might instead² be read as a veiled threat.

Before receipt of your telegrams I had happened to discuss controversy over the increase in permanent membership of Council with my Swedish colleague. He expressed the view confidentially that his government had made a mistake in categorically stating some time before meeting of Council that Sweden would veto all candidatures for permanent posts except that of Germany. He had had a few words with Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject and my Swedish colleague wondered whether, in certain circumstances, Spain might not take a leaf out of Sweden's book.

Public opinion here is anyhow very elated and excited by recent successful trans-atlantic flight, has been and is being worked up by press on the question of Spain's 'just' claim to a permanent seat on the Council. The Minister for Foreign Affairs evidently took this state of feeling into account when he recently declared publicly that Spain's claim to a seat on the Council could not be relegated to a subsequent meeting seeing that problem which now presented itself was that of amplifying Council and this problem must be solved integrally as it affected structure of Council (please see my despatch No. 75³).

The Minister seems, therefore, to have committed himself rather deeply and if, when Council meets next week, it becomes clear that Spain must either withdraw or postpone her claim, the possibility cannot be excluded that she may take an unwise step.

For above reasons and having regard to last sentence of your telegram under reference I thought it well to take advantage of visit which I had anyhow to pay to Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday in absence of Minister for Foreign Affairs to mention line taken by Brazil. I said that I had carefully read articles in Spanish press, recent statement made by Minister for Foreign Affairs and proceedings of association for promotion of League of Nations with regard to claim of Spain to a permanent post on the Council. I enquired whether he had any indication as to attitude of Brazil in the matter of increase of permanent posts. He replied that Brazil was the only country as to whose attitude Spanish government were ignorant. I informed him then of line taken by Brazil and of views you had expressed at Rio. I could see Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs took the hint at once and I derived the impression it was not misplaced.

I asked him to pass on what I had said to Minister for Foreign Affairs and also to the King, as I had known for some time past that His Majesty is deeply interested in claim of his country to a permanent seat.

² Another text of this telegram included a semicolon after 'Nations' and read 'indeed' for 'instead'.

³ Not printed. This despatch of February 26 reported more fully on this statement by Señor de Yanguas which was published that day in the *Nacion*.

I then asked Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what impression German attitude as defined in German press had made on Spanish.⁴ He said that opposition of Germany to admission of any countries except herself to permanent posts was really directed against Poland whom Germany did not wish to mention by name. He understood that you were sympathetic to Spanish claim but that large influential section of British press was opposed at present to admitting any countries except Germany to permanent membership. He promised to ascertain and let me know whether Minister for Foreign Affairs would back up advice you had given at Rio. I will telegraph again on hearing from him.⁵

⁴ Another text of this telegram here included 'Government'.

⁵ Sir H. Rumbold added in his immediately following telegram of the same day that he had just been informed that the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not consider that Spain could properly attempt to influence Brazil.

No. 311

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 3, 9 a.m.)

No. 27 Telegraphic [C 2747/71/18]

WARSAW, March 2, 1926, 8.16 p.m.

Copy by bag to Berlin.

German Minister who was suddenly recalled from leave came to see me this morning. He said he had discussed question of Poland's entry into Council with both Minister for Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State in Berlin and could tell me that German government was determined not to admit any change in composition of Council in March beyond that entailed by admission of Germany¹ but they recognised necessity of doing something to meet Poland's claim and would be prepared to discuss acceptable compromise.² I ventured to make purely personal suggestion that Germany would gain great credit for herself and also further the cause of peace by proposing election of Poland at a later meeting.

¹ In his telegram No. 66 of March 2 Lord D'Abernon had transmitted a liberal translation of extracts from a speech at Hamburg that day by Dr. Luther, who had maintained the preceding point of view and had stated in particular: 'it is incomprehensible to me that by rejection of this our standpoint in the question of Council seats a development could be permitted that destroys the great achievements of policy of last year and that prospects which the co-operation of Germany in the League holds out should be annihilated at the last moment.'

² Lord D'Abernon reported in Berlin telegrams Nos. 67 and 68 of March 3 that 'there are some indications that movement for better understanding with Poland is gathering strength'. He cited an article from the *Germania* in favour of a temporary seat on the Council for Poland as being significant in coming from the official organ of the Centre Party.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 3, 3.45 p.m.)

No. 89 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 2755/24/18]

My telegram No. 88.¹

PARIS, March 3, 1926

Throughout negotiations regarding German aviation allied delegates have on every occasion made the largest possible concession to German point of view compatible with safeguarding really essential points. They have in particular always been careful to avoid anything likely to wound German amour propre. This is typified especially by their attitude as regards avions de chasse and training of Reichswehr, navy and police.

As regards this last point the allied delegates after having stated their insistence on the principles of absolute prohibition have nevertheless agreed to modification admitting flying by a limited number of police officers, and are also prepared to agree that very limited number of Reichswehr and naval personnel may fly at their own expense and in their own time. This latter concession is due to strong German representations that prohibition of such private flying would be inconsistent with amour propre. Formula contained in my telegram No. 79² was put forward by French delegate as a personal suggestion which he was prepared to recommend to his colleagues if assured that German government would accept it. German representative has now put forward text contained in my telegram No. 88 which is obviously quite unacceptable. The proposed number of two hundred is far too high and the formula does not contain adequate safeguards against official encouragement or assistance to officers learning to fly privately. German proposal in fact shows desire of German delegates to avoid all precision and amounts to an absolute contradiction of the old principle maintained by the allies on this point. The attitude of German delegates in putting this forward at this late hour has created an exceedingly bad impression.

Quai d'Orsay are telegraphing in above sense to Berlin and instructing French Ambassador to inform Herr Stresemann that allied delegates are all of the opinion that no further concessions can be made beyond text contained in my telegram No. 79 and that if German delegates are not prepared to accept that text principle of absolute prohibition will have to be rigidly maintained.

As regards total figure of personnel allowed to fly allied delegates would be prepared to admit a figure of fifteen for Reichswehr and navy but number of 200 is utterly impossible.

I should be most grateful if Lord d'Abernon would support his French colleague with all possible force.

Other allied representatives are telegraphing similarly to their governments.

Repeated to Berlin.

¹ No. 313.

² No. 296.

No. 313

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 3, 4 p.m.)

No. 88 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 2754/24/18]

Urgent

PARIS, March 3, 1926

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 88, repeated to Berlin No. 2.

My telegram No. 79,¹ last paragraph, German aviation.

German delegate yesterday proposed following text in substitution for point C. 3.

'A titre exceptionnel et en ce qui concerne l'aviation de sport seule, les membres de la Reichswehr ou de la Marine qui en feront la demande pourront être autorisés, à titre privé, à apprendre à piloter ou à piloter. Il ne leur sera accordé à cet effet par les autorités allemandes aucune facilité spéciale. Le Reichswehrministerium prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que le nombre global des membres de la Reichswehr qui apprendront à piloter ou piloteront (officiers, sous-officiers et soldats) ne dépassera pas deux cents [*sic*]; les noms des bénéficiaires de ces autorisations seront portés sur des listes constamment tenues à jour.'

¹ No. 296.

No. 314

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard (Washington)

No. 41 Telegraphic [W 1697/78/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 3, 1926, 5.50 p.m.

The American Ambassador has discussed with Lord Cecil¹ the possibility of the British and American representatives on the Disarmament Preparatory Committee working together. The Ambassador enquired what meaning His Majesty's Government attached to the word 'disarmament', in what way they thought aircraft could be dealt with, and whether there was any relation between naval and military disarmament. The Ambassador appeared vague in regard to these questions, and seemed to desire to prove that the British and American points of view were altogether divergent. He also asserted as a well-known fact that in drawing up the agenda for the Preparatory Committee the French had a majority which they had used as they liked.

These illusions probably proceed from the fact, as His Excellency frankly told Lord Cecil, that he had been strongly opposed to American participation in the Committee. Lord Cecil endeavoured to assure His Excellency that there was no irreconcilable difference between English and American thought on the subject, but he is not sure whether he succeeded.

¹ On February 26. For a conversation that day between Mr. Houghton and Sir A. Chamberlain, whereof no record has been traced in Foreign Office archives, see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1926*, vol. i, p. 57.

No. 315

Mr. Ramsay (Rio de Janeiro) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 4, 10 a.m.)

No. 9 Telegraphic [C 2808/71/18]

RIO DE JANEIRO, March 3, 1926, 9.30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 13.¹

Minister for Foreign Affairs requests me to assure you that Brazilian government place welfare of League of Nations before any considerations of Brazil's prestige therein.

Brazilian government intend to support Germany's admission to League and claim to a permanent seat on the council.²

Minister for Foreign Affairs objects to German pretension that promise to support her claim implied exclusion of claim of any other power and was the ground for Brazil's opposition to Spanish claim in the past. He is gratified to learn that M. Briand supports his view.

¹ See No. 302, note 4.

² The corresponding passage in Rio despatch No. 53 of March 4 (received March 23) which gave a fuller account of Mr. Ramsay's conversation with M. Pacheco here read: 'His Excellency requested me to assure you that Brazil would vote for Germany both in the Council and Assembly, even in the event of her failing to realise her own claim to a permanent seat.' On March 30 Sir W. Tyrrell wrote to Sir B. Alston that the Secretary of State was 'somewhat disturbed' that Mr. Ramsay's telegraphic report omitted 'this very categorical assurance', knowledge of which might have given him 'an almost decisive weapon in his efforts to prevent Brazil exercising her right of veto'. Sir B. Alston replied on April 29 enclosing a note by Mr. Ramsay who there explained that he had been doubtful of the binding value of M. Pacheco's verbal assurance on the Brazilian Government as M. Pacheco carried little weight with the President. Sir B. Alston commented that he was 'convinced that no efforts either at Geneva or here to bind the Brazilian Government to assurances of Pacheco's would have served any other purpose than to embitter our relations, especially mine, here'. Previously, on March 2, Sir W. Tyrrell had mentioned to the Brazilian Ambassador in London the rumour that Brazil might qualify her pledged support for German candidature. Foreign Office despatch No. 55 to Rio of March 3 stated that: 'This opening provoked the most unqualified denial on the part of the Ambassador, followed by an expression of his hope that we would never hesitate to quote him as an authority in discrediting such a report.'

No. 316

Mr. Ramsay (Rio de Janeiro) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 5, 10 a.m.)

No. 10 Telegraphic [C 2861/71/18]

RIO DE JANEIRO, March 3, 1926, 9.30 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Minister for Foreign Affairs is favourably impressed with official com-

¹ No. 315.

munication of your speech on March 1st² relative to future composition of Council especially as to freedom of action reserved by you for negotiation at Geneva and your remark that Germany and all permanent members except Japan might be regarded as interested parties not qualified to vote on questions arising out of treaty of Locarno.

His Excellency wishes to assure you that His Majesty's Government can rely on disinterested impartiality of Brazil in all questions coming before League in order to maintain and enhance its prestige and Brazilian government would be very glad if you could see your way to support their candidature for a permanent seat on Council. He states he can count on support of France, Italy and Japan and probably Sweden and perhaps Canada. Brazil if she obtains permanent seat would be glad to yield her place eventually to United States of America and support her joining even with reservations.

He thinks that it was a mistake to defer question of increase in permanent membership of Council until entry of Germany as it has elicited Polish claim which he regards as out of place. If question be again deferred it is bound to encourage ambitions of numerous states with little claim either as original founders of League or from point of view of responsibilities.

Minister for Foreign Affairs scouted the idea of Brazil's withdrawing from League if denied a seat as has been suggested in opposition press here.

His Excellency spoke in most eulogistic terms of your statesmanship and prestige in international politics and considers that question of composition of Council and future fate of League will practically lie in your hands at Geneva and he trusts that between now and then you will become convinced that impartiality and universality of League of Nations will be best served by supporting Brazil's claims to permanent seat, which has the support of other permanent members.

² To the League of Nations Parliamentary Committee; see *The Times* of March 2, 1926, p. 16.

No. 317

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 56 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2766/436/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 3, 1926*

My despatch No. 507¹ (of the 16th February. Outstanding questions in German military control).

A copy of the War Office letter to General Clive of March 3rd² has gone

¹ No. 277.

² Not printed. This letter commented on the following reports of February 27 by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles which referred respectively to the questions of the German police (No. 100/1: cf. Nos. 265, note 3, and 339), German army effectives (No. 101/1), and German recruiting and the training of officers of the General Staff (No. 99/1), and were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatches Nos. 413, 414,

to you by tonight's bag, dealing with the recommendations of the Versailles Committee on certain outstanding points in German military control which will come before the Ambassadors' Conference tomorrow. We concur generally in the War Office views, by which you should accordingly be guided, subject to the proviso that where the Committee's recommendations go beyond what we hold to be strict treaty rights (e.g. proportion of non-commissioned officers to men, in which connection see paragraph 2 of my

and 438 (not printed). Report No. 101/1 on German army effectives proposed the action authorised by the Conference of Ambassadors on March 4 (see No. 322, § 6). Report No. 99/1 stated: (i) as regards army recruiting, that the organisation of reserve cadres was contrary to the Treaty of Versailles and that 'Le C.M.A.V. à l'unanimité, estime que, pour assurer les redressements prévus par la Note Collective du 4 Juin, en ce qui concerne "le recrutement de l'Armée" et "l'interdiction de préparer des cadres de complément", il n'y a pas lieu d'insister pour obtenir du Gouvernement allemand qu'il édicte des Lois spéciales interdisant ce qui l'est déjà par le Traité. Mais, pour que l'observation des dispositions ci-dessus soit assurée dans tout le territoire allemand, sans contestation possible, le Gouvernement allemand devra fournir comme garantie l'insertion dans sa législation (comme addition à la loi militaire, ou ailleurs), d'une disposition prévoyant des sanctions contre quiconque organisera ou participera à l'organisation d'une force militaire sous quelque dénomination que ce soit et non prévue par les Lois en vigueur. Le texte de cette disposition sera établi avec la C.M.I.C.; (ii) as regards the training of staff officers: 'A l'unanimité, le C.M.A.V. estime qu'il y a lieu de rappeler le Gouvernement allemand à la stricte observation du redressement figurant dans la Note du 4 Juin, précisant que: 1°) l'instruction des Officiers d'État-Major doit se faire uniquement dans les États-Majors autorisés par le Traité de Versailles . . . sans que les Officiers, pour recevoir cette instruction, puissent être groupés dans un cours commun par Wehrk[r]eis. De même, il ne peut y avoir, au Kriegsministerium, de[s] cours complémentaires pour les Officiers étrangers à cet organe: 2) Ces officiers doivent être compris dans les effectifs fixés par le Traité pour les États-Majors intéressés.'

In the War Office letter to General Clive, General Burnett-Stuart expressed the following views in particular:

'(a) *Illegal enlistments*. I have no objection to M. Fromageot's suggestion that a scale of penalties should be introduced somewhere in German legislation.

'(b) *Police Effectives*. The A.M.C.V. Avis, which is definitely against any increase in effectives of the Police, appears to take us back to the situation of November 1925. It is unlikely that it will be accepted by the German Government without further argument as they must have gained the impression from various unofficial conversations in Paris that the Allies would agree to some increase in Effectives. I recognize that the German delay in putting forward their proposals officially is largely to blame for the nature of the Avis, but I understood that the Allies were all agreed that the settlement of the Police question was not to be held up by refusal of some concession as regards increase of effectives. If this is so, would it not be possible for the Conference of Ambassadors to notify the German Government that, while refusing to agree to the German proposal to exclude "les gardes-champêtres et veilleurs de nuit (15,000 men)" from the total of Police effectives, they are prepared, as a concession and in order to reach a solution of the question, to agree to an increase in effectives of 7,500. The Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control do not appear to be opposed in principle to such an increase.

'(c) *Proportion of Non-commissioned officers to men*. The Treaty gives us no right to lay down proportion of Non-Commissioned Officers or senior officers, but as apparently the German Government are prepared to agree to a 25 percentage of N.C.Os. I have no objection to this stipulation. The fixing of proportions between senior and junior officers is, as you say, a new suggestion and, as all new suggestions and demands delay the final settlement, I am on principle opposed to it, but it is not of sufficient importance to fight our Allies over.'

despatch No. 507) they should be presented to the German government as matters for negotiation rather than as demands.

2. It should thus now be possible for the conference to reply to the German Ambassador's note of the 2nd February enclosed in your despatch No. 243,³ to give the Military Commission of Control definite instructions on the questions of recruitment, complementary cadres, and instruction of General Staff Officers, and to take a decision on the question of the total number of police to be allowed to Germany. As to this War Office state definitely that increase of 7,500 has no military importance: and that being so we certainly feel that settlement should not be delayed by meticulous insistence on letter of our original demands.

3. You will no doubt bear in mind the instructions contained in paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 507, that the Control Commission's attention should be drawn to the new situation that has arisen as the result of Locarno.

³ See No. 277, note 4.

No. 318

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 4, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 91 Telegraphic: by bag [C 2760/24/18]

Immediate

PARIS, March 3, 1926

My telegram No. 89.¹

A further meeting took place this afternoon with German Delegates. French, British, Italian, Belgian and Japanese Delegates were present. Allied point of view on German proposal contained in my telegram No. 88² was explained to German delegates who showed very little inclination to modify their attitude. On learning of intended Allied *démarche* at Berlin German Delegates stated that the matter would have to be settled at Berlin and that they saw no use in continuing discussions.

Please inform Air Ministry.

¹ No. 312.

² No. 313.

No. 319

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 37 Telegraphic [C 2755/24/18]

Immediate

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 4, 1926, 12.15 p.m.

Paris telegram No. 89¹ (of the 3rd March. German aviation negotiations).

Please support French representations. At the same time you might profitably remind the German government of your conversation with Herr von Schubert last month (your telegram No. 38)² when he declared that

¹ No. 312.

² No. 248.

German government placed great value on early agreement in the air negotiations and that instructions in that sense had been given to the German negotiators. I was further led to understand from your telegram No. 2³ (of January 5th) that Dr. Stresemann himself was in favour of total prohibition of training of Reichswehr and navy personnel.

It is not unnatural that the worst possible impression has been caused by the German delegates producing this obviously unacceptable proposal at the last moment, just before Germany is to be admitted to the League of Nations.⁴

Repeated to Paris (by bag) No. 57.

³ No. 169.

⁴ Lord D'Abernon replied in Berlin telegram No. 70 of March 5: 'I am supporting French representations. Cabinet will discuss question this afternoon.'

No. 320

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 59 Telegraphic [C 2811/71/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 4, 1926, 2.5 p.m.*

Please inform Count Skrzynski (who is now on his way through Paris) that I have received his message sent through Polish Minister.¹

The Minister President is wholly mistaken in his appreciation of reasons for attitude taken by British Press. Dominant motive here is desire for fair play and anxiety lest work of Locarno should be undone. Grounds on which portion of French press has supported Polish claim have done more than anything to prejudice British opinion against it and to create this public feeling here.

I look to friendly conversations at Geneva as only possible means of reaching agreement.²

Repeated to Warsaw No. 14.

¹ Not printed. This message was left on March 4 with Sir W. Tyrrell who described it as 'pointing out the necessity for this country to prevent Germany blackmailing everybody by her entry into the League of Nations'. Count Skrzynski referred in particular to 'l'intensité du travail allemand dans la presse anglaise' and suggested, in connexion with German policy towards the League of Nations, that 'la politique de Moscou serait la seule à en profiter'.

² Lord Crewe reported in Paris telegram No. 98 of March 5 that he had that afternoon conveyed this message to Count Skrzynski, who maintained Poland's claim to a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations, and expressed views similar to those indicated in note 1 above while assuring Lord Crewe that 'he did not think that English opinion was hostile'.

No. 321

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 58 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 2832/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 4, 1926, 5 p.m.*

German Ambassador has just informed me that his government attached highest importance to having a full and frank conversation with Monsieur Briand and me before any discussions in Council. If we agreed German representatives would reach Geneva at noon on Sunday¹ so that conversation could take place that afternoon. Similar communication was being made in Paris only. They would think it natural that Italy and Belgium should also be present but left decision to us.

I replied that I should be most glad to meet them. I had always thought such a conversation with them vital and had directed Lord d'Abernon to inform German government of my desire for it and had also communicated my hope to other governments named by the Ambassador.² I believed that they shared this wish for a frank interchange of opinion. I should be prepared to attend such a meeting on Sunday afternoon. The hour could be arranged at Geneva.

Ambassador laid stress on fact that this request must not be assumed to indicate any change in German attitude. I replied nobody's attitude would change before we met.

Repeated to Rome No. 69, Brussels No. 26, Berlin No. 38.

¹ March 7, 1926.

² See No. 287 and notes 3, 4, and 5 thereto.

No. 322

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 6, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 95 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/II]

PARIS, *March 4, 1926*

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the presidency of Monsieur Jules Cambon. I was present with the Japanese Ambassador and a representative of the Italian Embassy. The Belgian Ambassador was also present as well as a member of the United States Embassy. The following matters were considered:—

1. *Instructions to Control Commission in Germany*

In accordance with paragraph 4 of your despatch No. 507¹ (C 2016/436/18) of February 16th and paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 56² of March 3rd, I made the following statement to the conference:—

¹ No. 277.

² No. 317.

'Items Nos. 5, 6 and 7 (see below) which we are about to discuss, dealing with German disarmament, will doubtless form the subject of instructions to the commission of control, in Berlin.

'I hope that in issuing these instructions, it will be conveyed to the commission very clearly that the conference wishes the settlement of these and any other outstanding points to be arrived at with the utmost despatch, in order that the withdrawal of the commission may be possible at an early date'.

This was accepted, though, as I had anticipated, the general opinion of the conference was that the German authorities and not the control commission were really to blame for the existing situation. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that an attempt to secure the issue of more categorical instructions would have been of no avail.

2. *German aviation*

Monsieur Massigli explained the position in regard to the German aviation negotiations as given in my telegrams Nos. 89 and 91.³

3. *Ambassadors' Conference declaration for Assembly of League of Nations respecting state of execution of Germany's disarmament obligations.*

This matter was dealt with in my despatch No. 434⁴ of March 4th. . . .⁵

5. *German Police*

The Versailles Committee's report of February 27th (see my despatch No. 413⁶ of March 2nd) was before the Conference. In view of the instructions contained in your despatch No. 507 and your telegram No. 56, I read to the Conference the statement contained in my despatch No. 441⁷ of

³ Nos. 312 and 318 respectively.

⁴ No. 323.

⁵ The omitted sections related to other matters.

⁶ See No. 317, note 2.

⁷ Not printed. Lord Crewe's statement read as follows: 'The demand for an increase of some 10,000 police over and above the 150,000 allowed under the Boulogne note of June 1920, is the result of the decision of this Conference in November 1925, which laid down that this figure included the police required, or to be required on evacuation, in the Occupied Territories.

'The German Government had interpreted the Boulogne note differently, and this point was not explicitly referred to in our letter of the 4th June, and the Germans allowed the different States to organise their police on a basis which excluded the Occupied Territories from any share in this total.

'What we are asked to do in effect is to reverse our decision as to the interpretation of the Boulogne note.

'The British Military Authorities, after full consideration, are of opinion that the matter does not involve a question of principle sufficiently important to justify delay in the finishing of the work of the Control Commission.

'If we refuse to grant it, it might be open to the German Government to raise the question of the interpretation of the Boulogne note before the Council of the League of Nations, and make use of this re-opening of the matter to delay still further the reduction of the police force.

'Inasmuch as the apportioning of the police is a matter to which each German State has to agree as far as its own proportion is concerned, and since the fixing of the total is only the

to-day's date. The Italian representative also read a statement (see again my despatch No. 441). The Belgian Ambassador said that he was instructed to concede an increase of 10,000 state police provided that a corresponding reduction was effected in communal police and provided that the total of both categories did not exceed 150,000. Monsieur Cambon said that there were no technical reasons for an increase, and that he had rigid and personal instructions from Monsieur Briand to make no further concessions.

After a long discussion, it was agreed that the German Ambassador should be asked to state what technical reasons there were in support of the German government's contention.

6. *German effectives*

The Versailles Committee's report of February 27th (see my despatch No. 414⁶ of March 2nd) was approved.⁸

7. *German recruiting and General Staff*

The Versailles Committee's report of February 27th (see my despatch No. 438⁶ of to-day's date) was approved. . . .⁵

first step, on which all the state arrangements for their police organisation must subsequently depend, I think it is expedient that the Conference should allow the increase demanded, on the understanding that this settles the police strength for the whole of Germany once and for all.'

The Italian Ambassador's statement, also enclosed in Paris despatch No. 441, concluded: 'En résumé la Délégation italienne est d'avis que si la Conférence des Ambassadeurs accorde cette augmentation elle doit demander l'engagement formel de la part du Gouvernement allemand qu'aucune autre augmentation ne sera demandée lorsqu'on evacuera la deuxième et la troisième zone.'

⁸ The relevant resolution of the Conference declared that the German Embassy at Paris should be informed in reply to their note No. A. 391 (see No. 277, note 4): '1° — que les Gouvernements alliés acceptent que les effectifs des unités constitutives de l'armée allemande soient fixés annuellement par les Tableaux budgétaires votés par le Reichstag et dûment promulgués, sous réserve que le Gouvernement allemand prenne les engagements suivants:

- '1) ces effectifs ne dépasseront pas les effectifs maxima fixés par le Traité de Versailles pour chacune des unités énumérées dans le Tableau N° 1 annexé au Chapitre I à la Partie V de ce Traité;
- '2) la proportion des officiers, dans chaque grade, ne dépassera pas sensiblement celle qui existe normalement dans les unités correspondantes des Armées de métier des autres Etats d'Europe, soit:

Officiers supérieurs	20%	} du nombre total
Officiers subalternes	80%	} des officiers.
- '3) la proportion des sous-officiers ne dépassera pas 25% de l'effectif maximum des hommes de troupe (96.000).

'Les Tableaux budgétaires annuels, votés par le Reichstag, devront sous le régime actuel de contrôle, être portés à la connaissance de la Commission Militaire Interalliée de Contrôle, et, ultérieurement, de la Société des Nations.

'2° — que les Gouvernements alliés acceptent la proposition du Gouvernement allemand (PP II de la lettre N° A. 391) de fournir un relevé de tous les changements provoqués dans l'armée allemande, à la suite des modifications résultant de la mise à exécution de la Note collective du 4 Juin 1925, en indiquant le nombre et les grades des officiers en question, et n'insistent pas pour obtenir la liste nominative des officiers ayant été l'objet de mutations.'

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received March 5)
No. 434 [C 2824/71/18]

Immediate

PARIS, March 4, 1926

Sir,

With reference to Mr. Lampson's letter to Mr. Wigram of February 26th¹ (C 2466/71/18) I have the honour to inform you that, at the Ambassadors' Conference this morning the French delegation submitted the draft of a notification (copy enclosed) which could be made to the Assembly of the League of Nations should the latter ask the Ambassadors' Conference for a statement of the situation as regards the disarmament of Germany.

2. As this draft seemed entirely innocuous, I accepted it and the Secretary General of the Conference will take it with him to Geneva, where it will be available, should it be required.

3. As the French delegation raised this question at the Conference on its own initiative, I presume that similar action will be taken on the Reparation Commission, and I have sent a copy of this despatch to the British delegate for his information.

I have, &c.,
CREWE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 323

Projet de Notification à la Société des Nations

4 mars 1926

La Conférence des Ambassadeurs constate, en ce qui la concerne, qu'à sa connaissance, l'Allemagne donne actuellement des garanties effectives de son intention sincère d'observer les engagements qui résultent pour elle du Traité de Paix du 28 Juin 1919 et des actes connexes.

En ce qui concerne particulièrement l'état des armements militaires, navals et aériens de l'Allemagne tel qu'il a été stipulé par le Traité de paix:

Clauses militaires: Les conditions dans lesquelles l'exécution desdites clauses doit être achevée, ont fait l'objet, entre les Puissances signataires intéressées, d'un accord actuellement en voie de réalisation.

Clauses navales: Ces clauses sont actuellement exécutées et le rapport final de la Commission de Contrôle naval a été transmis à la S.D.N. à la date du. . .²

Clauses aériennes: Il ne reste plus qu'à achever l'élaboration de certains dispositions propres à assurer à l'avenir l'observation générale du Traité en cette matière.

¹ Not printed. This letter warned Mr. Wigram that the Conference of Ambassadors might be asked by the Assembly of the League of Nations for a report on the state of execution of Germany's international obligations, and stressed the importance of a reply being sent as quickly as possible.

² Punctuation as in filed copy. The omitted date was January 6, 1925.

No. 324

Sir H. Rumbold (Madrid) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 5, 10 p.m.)

No. 23 Telegraphic [C 2932/71/18]

MADRID, March 5, 1926, 8.30 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹
Confidential.

French Ambassador informs me that in response to representations made by him to President of the Council on instructions from French Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to attitude of Spain at Geneva as reported by Spanish Ambassador at Paris, President of the Council has given assurance that Spanish delegation will act in accordance with wishes of French government and His Majesty's Government. He wished, however, that this undertaking should be known only to yourself and Monsieur Briand.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram of March 4 Sir H. Rumbold reported that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed him that 'Spain would in connection with second item on agenda of the meeting [of the League of Nations] demand that her candidature for a permanent seat should be considered before that of Germany because Spain's candidature was far anterior in date. Spain would also demand that acceptance or rejection of her candidature for a permanent seat should be settled at forthcoming council meeting and not deferred to a subsequent meeting. He said that Spanish government were very firm on this point.'

No. 325

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 6, 9 a.m.)

No. 71 Telegraphic [C 2930/24/18]

BERLIN, March 5, 1926, 11.15 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that German government will make the following proposal in Paris¹ on question of instruction in 'sporting' aviation of Germany's armed forces, military and naval. They would accept limitation of members of armed forces who could be instructed each year to a maximum of twelve. The other limitations to remain approximately as in French proposal² but without clause restricting officers from learning only during their regular leave. As regular leave in German army is one month a year maintenance of this restriction would in practice nullify entirely the concession made to Germany.

German government hope that in view of their acceptance of limitation to

¹ Lord D'Abernon subsequently reported in his telegram No. 72 of March 6 that the German proposals would be made in Geneva.

² See No. 296, paragraph (c) 3.

such a small number as twelve per annum the whole negotiations may be brought to a rapid conclusion.³

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 71, repeated to Paris No. 14.

³ For Dr. Stresemann's account of this conversation see *Les Papiers de Stresemann*, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 294-5.

No. 326

Memorandum by Viscount Cecil on German obligation to disarm¹

[W 1075/78/98]

March 5, 1926

1. By the Treaty of Versailles the Germans are bound to carry out a drastic scheme of disarmament. That they have substantially done, according to the view of the British experts. They were also bound by the Treaty to maintain their condition of disarmament. Is that second obligation perpetual and unconditional, or does it depend upon the fulfilment of the promises made by the Allies before the signing of the Treaty, and in its clauses, that they, too, would carry out a scheme of disarmament?

2. By the Preamble to the disarmament clauses of the Treaty they are described as the first step towards world disarmament. The actual words are as follows:—

‘In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.’

It is contended that all the succeeding clauses must be read subject to this initial declaration and that in consequence although the Germans were bound to carry out the measures of disarmament indicated, the Allies were also bound to carry out a measure of disarmament after the German disarmament had been effected, or otherwise the Treaty would have provided that the Germans should be for ever kept in a condition of inferiority to the other nations of Europe.

3. Before accepting these obligations Germany wrote the letter of the 29th May, 1919, in which she offered to accept her own disarmament and even to carry it rather further than was asked provided she were immediately

¹ This memorandum was written by Lord Cecil in amplification of a previous minute in which he had stated in particular: ‘The Germans are entitled to say that under several international documents the last of which is the Protocol to the Treaties of Locarno we & the French & others have bound ourselves to promote a general scheme of disarmament. They can further rightly contend that unless we do something genuine in that direction their obligations to disarm under the Versailles treaty are no longer binding.’ Sir A. Chamberlain had not concurred in this view, though he stated: ‘That we must make a real effort is common ground to Lord Cecil & me. That if it all comes to nothing we shall be unable to keep Germany disarmed indefinitely is also common ground. Germany will in that case rearm some day & we shall not be able to prevent it *but she will have broken the treaty*’.

admitted to the League of Nations and further that within two years 'the other States also in accordance with Article 8 of the enemy Covenant of the League of Nations, undertake to reduce their armaments and to abolish universal military service'. It was in reply to that suggestion that the Allies wrote:—²

'The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.

They must point out, however, that the colossal growth in armaments of the last few decades was forced upon the nations of Europe by Germany. As Germany increased her power, her neighbours had to follow suit unless they were to become impotent to resist German dictation or the German sword. It is therefore right, as it is necessary, that the process of limitation of armaments should begin with the nation which has been responsible for their expansion. It is not until the aggressor has led the way that the attacked can safely afford to follow suit.

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot agree to any alteration in principle of the conditions laid down in Articles 159-180, 203-208 and 211-213 of the Treaty.

Germany must consent unconditionally to disarm in advance of the Allied and Associated Powers; she must agree to immediate abolition of universal military service, a definite organisation and scale of armament must be enforced. It is essential that she should be subjected to special control as regards the reduction of her armies and armaments, the dismantling of her fortifications, and the reduction, conversion or destruction of her military establishments.'

It will be noticed that in this reply the Germans are required to 'consent unconditionally to disarm in advance of the Allies.' The German contention will be that they have disarmed, and that they have done it in advance of the Allies, that that is all they were required to do unconditionally. The remainder of their obligation, the obligation to remain disarmed was undertaken in consideration of the express assurances that their disarmament was the 'first step towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which the Allies seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war.' There is always a difficulty where the two parties to a negotiation have each given undertakings with respect to a particular matter to say whether those undertakings are dependent on one another or not. It seems to me fairly clear that morally they are: legally the point may be more doubtful. But I believe that many international discussions have taken place on similar points arising out of previous Treaties. Since the question is likely to be raised

² In their note of June 16, 1919; cf. No. 264.

in the disarmament discussions I suggest that it would be well that the matter should be carefully considered from a legal point of view.

R. C.

No. 327

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 8, 9 a.m.)

No. 1 Telegraphic [C 3016/71/18]

GENEVA, March 7, 1926, 11.30 p.m.

Following from Sir A. Chamberlain.

Representatives of five Locarno powers met in my room 3 p.m. today. Meeting lasted three and a half hours. Tone throughout most friendly as at Locarno. Opened with statement by M. Briand explanatory of how question of other candidature[s] came to be raised now. This explanation supported by Scialoja, M. Vandervelde and me removed I think German misconceptions but did not alter German position which is that whilst not taking objection in principle to future enlargement of Council or to claims of particular nations they had throughout argued the case for Locarno in Germany on the footing that no change would be made before or at their entry. Case for particular claimants was put to them by different speakers. They admitted the force of arguments but expressed inability to change their position. They could only successfully recommend additions to German public opinion when they could speak with experience of Council work and authority of a member. Scialoja pressed difficulties that might arise with other states on the Council and urged that our endeavour to satisfy them was for the protection of Germany. Germans admitted difficulties but said they could offer no solution. Finally they suggested they should be admitted alone at this meeting, that on their admission they should make a declaration showing clearly that they were not in principle opposed to changes and were prepared to discuss them in a spirit of loyal co-operation next September. Ground might be prepared meanwhile by a committee of the Council on which they would be represented.

M. Briand then suggested adjournment in order that we might consult other interested parties and members of Council after which we will meet again. M. Briand suggested that Boncour could take his place but I think it important M. Briand himself should be present and shall, if possible, postpone decision until after his return which he leads us to hope may be in two or three days at the outside.¹

¹ M. Briand's government had fallen on March 6. Following his return to Paris, he formed a new administration on March 10.

No. 328

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 9, 9 a.m.)

No. 7 Telegraphic [C 3029/71/18]

GENEVA, March 8, 1926, 10 p.m.

Following from Mr. Cadogan:—

Council this morning in private session decided in accordance with precedent to refer to Permanent Advisory Committee in connection with Germany's admission.¹

At subsequent secret session Italians proposed that draft statement of Ambassadors' Conference (see Paris despatch No. 434² of March 4th) should be communicated to Permanent Advisory Committee. British delegate opposed this on the ground that it was contrary to precedent and that Permanent Advisory Committee were asked a simple question to which they had always given a formal reply in the case of other ex-enemy states, simply to the effect that scale of their armaments was laid down in the peace treaty. After some discussion it was agreed that this was the proper course to pursue. Permanent Advisory Committee will meet tomorrow morning.

It was agreed that statement of Ambassadors' Conference might be circulated privately to members of the Council and might be produced if required by Assembly Committee.³

¹ See *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1926, p. 500. See also Cmd. 2646 of 1926, *League of Nations: Thirty-ninth Session of the Council: Report by the Rt. Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, K.G., M.P.*, for an account of the work of this session.

² No. 323. The final version of this statement had been communicated to Sir E. Drummond under cover of a letter of March 6 from M. Massigli: see *League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 42*, p. 47.

³ For the appointment of the First Committee on the 'Request of the German Government for admission to the League of Nations' under the chairmanship of Sir A. Chamberlain, see the minutes of the meeting of the Assembly on March 8 printed, *op. cit.*, *Special Supplement No. 42*, pp. 15–18. See also Cmd. 2648 of 1926, *League of Nations: Special Assembly; Geneva, March 8/17, 1926; Report of the British Delegates, London, April 19, 1926*.

No. 329

Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell

[F.O. 800/259]

Private and Personal. Strictly confidential

GENEVA, March 9, 1926

My dear Tyrrell,

We live in a mad world and the present relations between France and Italy form one of the maddest incidents in it. Briand asked me to receive him on Sunday¹ morning and I thought that he was coming to talk about the line which we should take when we met the Germans; but, not at all. He begged me to keep an eye on Mussolini. He told me in great secrecy that he

¹ March 7, 1926.

had it from Stresemann that at the time of the occupation of the Ruhr, Mussolini had offered arms and ammunition to the Germans if they were prepared to fight the French and that before Locarno he was actively engaged in attempting a combination of Germany, Poland, Russia and Italy. He now suspected him of intending [*sic*] to break out in some other quarter, very probably Albania. He was making every sort of difficulty for France: then came a reference to the Franco-Italian negotiations in regard to the treaty with Yugo-Slavia, about which by this time you know as much as I do; an allusion to the difficulties which Mussolini was creating in regard to the large Italian immigration into South-Eastern France and to the number of questions open between the two countries in which France could obtain no sort of satisfaction.

I attempted to apply some sweet syrup. No doubt Mussolini sometimes acted on impulse and was capable on slight provocation of a *coup de tête*, but I believed that he attached real importance to the new position which Italy had obtained since the war, and particularly to the new links with Great Britain which arose through their common guarantee of the Treaty of Locarno. England and Italy had some common interests in Albanian oil and I did not believe that Italy which had once burnt her fingers in Albania had any intention of making trouble there. No doubt the rate of increase of her population and the difficulty of disposing of it set her on the look-out for some opening, but if ever the time came for action, I should expect the effort of Italy would be devoted to Asia Minor, rather than to the Balkans.

On this, Briand remarked that he regarded the present régime in Turkey as moving fast towards its fall and Turkey herself as moribund. It had to him all the appearance of a ship loaded with explosives and on fire whilst the officers found nothing better to do than *faire la noce sur le pont*. I then again pressed on Briand the necessity for a frank explanation with the Italians. He had told me in Paris that he had made to Mussolini the same proposal that I had suggested to Torretta last Friday in London,² namely that Contarini should come to Geneva to discuss the situation with him, but Mussolini had declined. He once again assured me that the Pact which he had submitted to the Italians was entirely anodyne and in the spirit of Locarno and the Covenant; (I have since examined it and cannot say that I share his view) and that the proposal to bring in Italy emanated from him, but he alleged that Mussolini had asked him for a direct treaty of alliance and guarantee between France and Italy; that he had told Mussolini that this was impossible, and entirely contrary to the new ideas embodied in Locarno and the League, and that in consequence of this refusal Mussolini had now swung right round and was objecting to any arrangement at all. He himself had found excuses for not fulfilling, or at any rate postponing, the promises made by his predecessors to Yugo-Slavia and he had decided now that the matter must wait until he could make another effort to come to an arrangement with Italy.³

² See No. 309, note 5.

³ It would appear that on March 12-13 Signor Scialoja and Signor Grandi spoke to

When leaving he repeated to me that de Jouvenel's Angora treaty⁴ was initialled only *ad referendum*; that de Jouvenel had had the strictest instructions to observe loyally France's engagements to us and to do nothing that could be interpreted by us as unfriendly; that he would ratify no treaty which did not fulfil these conditions and that he would communicate the text to us before a decision was taken by the French Government.

Yrs. sincerely,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

Sir A. Chamberlain on the proposed Franco-Yugoslav pact: see *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Settima Serie, vol. iv, p. 199. No record of these conversations has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

⁴ For the Convention of Friendship and Neighbourship between France, acting as Mandatory for Syria and Lebanon, and Turkey, signed at Angora on May 30, 1926, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 125, pp. 651 f. M. Henry de Jouvenel was French High Commissioner for Syria and the Lebanon from November 1925 to August 1926.

No. 330

Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell

[F.O. 800/259]

Private

GENEVA, March 9, 1926

My dear Tyrrell,

My telegram¹ told you all there was to say about the meeting of the Locarnites. You will have seen that we were no nearer an agreement at the end than at the beginning and I doubt whether it is possible for the Germans to yield anything for the sake of compromise. I think it unlikely that any State on the Council will take the responsibility of using its veto against Germany, but if Germany comes in without any means having been found to conciliate other opinion, her entry will be received with a shout of triumph by the German press and public and with a corresponding cry of anger in other quarters. In other words, the moment which ought to be one of conciliation and to mark an advance in international relationship will be full of bitterness and contention and will render the situation of Germany inside the Council doubly difficult.

It is, of course, the last straw for an overburdened camel that the French Government should have fallen at this moment, that Briand should be in Paris instead of Geneva and that there should be no one in a position to speak with authority in the name of France; and, to my horror, both Boncour and Loucheur² tell me that the crisis is likely to last several days. I have not attempted to carry matters further with them and I am not sure that Boncour would take the responsibility of a decision in Briand's absence. He is, of course, much less of a 'European' than Briand and though, I suppose, he

¹ No. 327.

² M. Loucheur had been French Minister for Finance, November–December 1925.

believes himself to be more of a pacifist, his pacifism is *à la mode française* and pre-supposes that France has her own way.

I have asked Luther and Stresemann to dine with me tomorrow night and have put Quiñones in my dinner and the Greek Foreign Minister as an acknowledgment of the many courtesies shown to my wife in Greece; but the real object was to bring Luther and Quiñones together on neutral ground. I think of going to see Luther this afternoon in order to find out whether after reflection upon our conversation he sees any possibility of advancing beyond the position taken up in Berlin; but I am not hopeful, for the German representatives are the prisoners not only of an uncompromising Nationalist opinion in Germany, but of the support which German *intransigence* has received in other quarters and notably in England. If all the world except Germany had asked for a reasonable compromise in order to maintain an atmosphere of friendship and goodwill, I am confident that their own inclinations would have led Luther and Stresemann to do their utmost to meet the general view and that they might have overcome their home opinion. As it is the support received from elsewhere has united the more liberal sections of opinion with the Nationalists in their opposition, and the German representatives are the victims of the situation which has been created. The only satisfactory features of the conversation in my room were in the first place that it was conducted easily and in the right spirit and secondly that Luther has now developed what he himself described as an almost 'passionate' belief in the League as the sole chance of preserving peace and avoiding a repetition of past horrors. It is curious to see how his German campaign in support of the entry into the League has reacted upon his own mind. Whilst at Locarno he was doubtful and hesitating: he now speaks with conviction: he is to me a very sympathetic figure. On this occasion he took the weight of the argument on his own shoulders.

I have told Briand the exact limits within which I can work for any compromise.³ I have made our position as regards Spain and the limits within which we can support the Spanish claim equally clear to Quiñones; and I told Skrzynski, whom I saw on Sunday⁴ evening, that I could not support Poland's claim to a permanent seat but that I should be glad if a way could

³ In a speech in the House of Commons on March 23, Sir A. Chamberlain stated that his instructions had been as follows: 'Subject to my discretion to make the best arrangements I could, in accordance with the development of the situation, our policy should be based on the following principles:

'No change in the Council can be admitted which would have the effect of preventing or delaying the entry of Germany. It would be best that Germany should, as a member of the Council, have full responsibility for any further change in the Council beyond her own admission.

'The rule that only Great Powers should be permanent members of the Council should, in principle, be maintained. Spain is in a special position, and may require exceptional treatment.

'Neither Poland nor Brazil should be made permanent members at present, but Poland should be given a non-permanent seat as soon as possible.' See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 193, cols. 1079-80.

⁴ March 7, 1926.

be found to give her a temporary seat on the Council, provided that nothing endangered the entry of Germany at this session. Skrzynski talked to me very sadly and with considerable emotion, but I am bound to say with great moderation and reasonableness. He pleaded that he had been fighting a desperate battle in his own Parliament on behalf of Locarno; that he had accepted on the advice of Briand and myself a policy which his public disapproved and about which he himself felt great doubts, for the Germans were unchanged and continued openly to preach revenge against Poland. Nevertheless he had kept his word not to make trouble, but he could not say what would happen if the Polish claim were refused. It would certainly be the end of him and his government, as Pilsudski⁵ and the Militarists on the one side and the Communists on the other would unite against him. Europe, he said, and Great Britain in particular, did not realise how necessary Poland was to them or what service it was rendering to them as a barrier against Bolshevism. He had done his best, but he would now be powerless and Poland might easily be thrown into the arms of the Soviet.

I tried to cheer him up, saying that in any case he had rendered a great service to his country by his whole attitude during the last months, and by the treaty which he had signed at Locarno he had greatly strengthened the position of Poland and added to her security and though we had our ups and downs in popular favour, history would surely record his name as one who had deserved well of his country. We carried the conversation no further, but he thanked me with feeling for the sympathy I had shown to Poland and the effort I had made to help him.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁵ Marshal Pilsudski had been provisional President of Poland from November 1918 to December 1922.

No. 331

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 10, 9 a.m.)

No. 10 Telegraphic [C 3092/71/18]

GENEVA, March 10, 1926, 12.30 a.m.

Following from Sir A. Chamberlain for the Cabinet.

Very confidential.

I have just¹ returned from conversation lasting an hour and a half with Luther and Stresemann. My first object was to arrange for continuation of Sunday's conversation amongst signatories of Treaty of Locarno.² This is now fixed for 10.30 tomorrow morning. Monsieur Briand has told Boncour to take his place and desired the conversations to continue in his absence. My second object was to see whether there was any way in which I could obviate a lot of difficulty and in particular whether there was any action

¹ This telegram was drafted on Tuesday, March 9, 1926.

² See No. 327.

which I might take which would render possible for Germany an advance upon Sunday's position. Our discussion was of friendly kind and perfectly frank on both sides, I told them in the course of it that if Germany maintained position that she would withdraw her application if a single other claim were admitted now, I should still vote for Germany and should be forced to vote even against claim of Spain, but I should be equally obliged to explain for what reason I was obliged to withdraw the support which His Majesty's Government had previously accorded to Spanish claim, and I asked whether it was really in the interests of Germany to put British Government in that position and to create hitches at the moment of her entry. As they had expressed impossibility for Germany of choosing amongst claims and had pointed out that to admit one claim was in effect to take responsibility of rejecting others, I asked if it would help them if I engaged myself to them to vote against everything except a permanent seat for Spain and a temporary seat for Poland, so that no responsibility would rest on them for rejection of other claims and their only responsibility would be for not making the admission of Spain to a permanent seat a reason for withdrawing their application: I even indicated my willingness to compromise on the question of time but result was entirely negative. They said that they had been wholly unprepared for the emergence of these claims and that it was not possible for them to alter in any way the attitude which they had adopted at our first meeting which was based on a defence of principle and not on opposition to any particular country.

It is clear therefore that tomorrow's conversation will be fruitless and unless some new hope or some new difficulty arises I presume that sub-committee³ will report on claim tomorrow afternoon and that matter will come before the Council and Assembly on Thursday or Friday.

I have asked Germans to consider my conversation and suggestions which I threw out at it, as strictly confidential and indeed as not having been made since they led to no result.

³ For the appointment of this subcommittee by the First Committee on March 9 see *League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 42*, p. 43.

No. 332

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 10, 7.30 p.m.)

No. 14 Telegraphic [C 3101/71/18]

Very confidential

GENEVA, March 10, 1926, 6.50 p.m.

Following from Sir A. Chamberlain for Cabinet:—

Locarno signatories met in my room this morning and continued discussion begun on Sunday.¹ Some new arguments were produced and old arguments restated. It was abundantly clear that Germans thoroughly disliked position

¹ March 7: see No. 327.

in which they stand and that French have been impressed by nature and extent of opposition in other quarters to Polish claim to permanent seat. Indeed principal preoccupation of French appeared to be to avoid ranging France and Germany in opposite camps. I suggested that if Germany withdrew all opposition to other claims and left Council and Assembly unfettered result would still be that no one else would be in fact admitted and Germany's object would be secured without any of the responsibility resting on her, without her relations with any of the other claimants being embittered. Why take upon herself whole odium when if she withdrew opposition the same result would be obtained by action of Sweden and others.

French approved but Germans could only reply: We won German assent on statement that Council would remain unchanged. We cannot alter basis of our whole argument here. If others are admitted we can only reply that a new situation has arisen and a new decision must be taken.

We are going to inform other members of the Council at a private tea party this afternoon.

French made it clear that their support of Germany was unconditional.

Sub-committee has reported favourably to-day. Committee will probably adopt their report tomorrow.²

I have held meeting of Empire delegation and have given them full particulars in regard to present situation.

² For this report and its adoption by the First Committee on March 11, see *League of Nations Official Journal*, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-48 and 44. The First Committee resolved unanimously in favour of the admission of Germany to the League of Nations.

No. 333

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 11)¹

No. 16 Telegraphic [Germany 24/11]

Most secret

GENEVA, March 10, 1926¹

Members of the Council met unofficially this afternoon to receive report of our conversations with Germans. In the course of discussion which followed, M. Unden declared that he must oppose any alteration in Council except admission of Germany. Signor Scialoja then asked whether in these circumstances it was certain that Germany would be admitted with unanimity, and suggested that it was not fair to allow Germany to enter the League without knowing whether her demand to be given permanent seat was accepted by Council. Upon this I² stated that my instructions were to get Germany in at any cost. MM. Guani,³ Benes and Vandervelde took the same position. France said that she would fulfil her promise to Germany, but with despair in her heart that she could not at the same time fulfil other promises.

¹ The times of despatch and receipt of this telegram are not recorded.

² Sir A. Chamberlain.

³ Uruguayan delegate to the Council of the League of Nations.

Signor Scialoja then stated that his instructions did not provide for the situation which had arisen, and he could not say what action Italy would take. Senhor Mello Franco said that he had instructions from President not to admit any other claim if Brazilian application was refused. Spanish attitude not declared. Situation is therefore most . . .⁴; Council members will meet again to-morrow to continue this informal discussion, and bureau of the Assembly will be asked to postpone Assembly discussion until we are able to inform Germans whether or not their entry can be made in view of demands by them.

Please inform Prime Minister, who will read to Cabinet if he thinks desirable.

⁴ The text is here uncertain.

No. 334

*Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 12)*¹

No. 22 Telegraphic [Germany 24/11]

Most secret

GENEVA, March 11, 1926¹

Following from Sir A. Chamberlain:—

'Unofficial meeting of members of Council resumed this afternoon. No agreement was possible. M. Quiñones declared that Spain would vote for Germany unconditionally, but would insist that her claim be also considered. At a later stage he repudiated with warmth M. Uden's suggestion that he had used threats. He had used none. He had made no declaration as to Spain's attitude; if her claim were rejected that concerned her alone. Signor Scialoja said he had received fresh instructions in the last resort to vote for Germany alone, but not "in a way to afford triumph to Germany." Senhor Mello Franco demanded twenty-four hours' delay to consult his Government. At present his instructions were formal, not to vote for Germany if Brazil's claim were not admitted. In excuse of this attitude I ought to say Brazil gave no such promise to Germany as rest of us have done, but reserved question for consideration in Council and Assembly. I urged Spain not to press her candidature in circumstances in which some of her supporters would be unable to vote for her. I pressed even more strongly upon Brazilian wrong she would do herself as well as the League if she used her right of veto, and informed him of definite assurances given me by Brazilian Ambassador in London that she would not adopt that attitude and of his request that if I heard it imputed to Brazil in any quarter I should deny it on his authority. I made more than one urgent appeal to Swede to join his colleagues in seeking some solidarity that would avert what might be complete deadlock and could not be otherwise than a catastrophe. I had hoped against hope that he would help us to find solution which would give satisfaction in substance to Germany and save her face without humiliating others and making her

¹ The times of despatch and receipt of this telegram are not recorded.

entry the cause of new dissensions which would weaken League and sharply arrest work of conciliation. He was absolutely unmovable. He showed no appreciation of possible consequences, and declared that he refused to consider even the least alteration in Council at present sitting. Situation is therefore most grave. I do not anticipate that Brazil will persevere in her veto. I suppose, therefore, that entry of Germany will be secured, though that is not yet certain, having regard to the attitude of Italy as well as Brazil, but if made it will be made in conditions that would be dangerous to European peace and damaging to the whole spirit of Council and League. M. Boncour has been with Germans this afternoon. I have summoned signatories of Locarno to meet in my room to-morrow morning.'²

² On March 12 Mr. Ramsay reported in Rio despatch No. 62 to the Foreign Office (received April 6) that he had that day called on the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 'Monsieur Pacheco at once opened the conversation on the subject of the crisis at Geneva, and it was evident that he had shifted his attitude considerably both as regards the German candidature and that of Brazil for permanent seats.' When Mr. Ramsay enquired regarding M. de Mello Franco's instructions, 'Monsieur Pacheco's reply was in effect contradictory; it was that the Brazilian Government still desired the election of Germany and would vote for it, but they would stand firm against the condition excluding other candidates for permanent seats. If Sweden were obdurate in her determination to use her veto, why should not Brazil exercise her right of veto against Germany's exclusive election. If the result would damage the League the responsibility would lie entirely with Sweden.' M. Pacheco further stated that 'he was convinced that if Spain failed to get a permanent seat she would withdraw from the League. I asked if he meant that Brazil would do likewise in event of failure. His Excellency evaded a definite answer saying that that question would have to be considered when it arose. . . .'

No. 335

Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell to Sir A. Chamberlain (Geneva)

Copy

[F.O. 800/259]

Private and personal

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 11, 1926

My dear Chief,

Very many thanks for your two very interesting but depressing letters,¹ which I have shown to the Prime Minister. I need not tell you how much he sympathises with you in the part you are called upon to play, or, rather, not to play. Owing to the successful agitation promoted by the League of Nations here, both you and Luther have been sent to Geneva for the purpose of registering a decision. The result, of course, of this is that if any constructive work is to be done you will both go out of the picture. How much the League will benefit by such sterilization remains to be seen.

I have just come back from the Prime Minister, to whom I have shown your most secret telegram² of today, which confirms the apprehension I have always felt that it would be Brazil that would stand in the way of the unconditional admission of Germany. I don't know how far France will choose to

¹ Nos. 329 and 330.

² The reference is probably to No. 333.

exercise her influence to modify the Brazilian attitude, but the danger is that if the net result of your present meeting at Geneva is the solitary triumph of Germany, Briand will be exposed to a very effective attack in his own country. But such a triumph will not benefit the League and France, and the French may be tempted not to use any powers of persuasion with Brazil, and create a situation in which the unbending Unden may be persuaded by the fanatical supporters of the League to do a deal with Brazil. After all Brazil is the one power aspiring to a permanent seat on the League who can successfully blackmail the league by threatening it with a Latin-American secession. If this took place Germany would become a member of the European group of the League and the League would be dead. This might suit the United States of America very well, who would gladly promote an American League of Nations, but I doubt whether such a prospect appeals to Unden. I notice, by the way, that Leo Kennedy, the special correspondent of *The Times* at Geneva and . . .,³ is becoming a protagonist of Unden, whose performance over Mosul seems to be forgotten.

As regards Italy and France, I abound in your sense that both parties appear to have gone mad, but the French seem to me madder than the Italians. This, I think, is largely due to Berthelot's influence and distorted views about Italy. It is an influence which apparently has induced Briand to rely on German evidence in order to prove Mussolini's villainy. I think it very difficult to believe the story about the Ruhr, but there is one thing I should like to say to Berthelot, which is this, that nothing could suit Berlin better than a quarrel between Paris and Rome and that Berthelot's Balkan policy will certainly lead to such an estrangement. However, all you can do is to pour oil⁴ should not be exhausted, as everybody at Geneva at present is making a heavy call upon it.

After the three weeks League of Nations Union debauch, people here are beginning to rub their eyes and to ask themselves whether they have not been carried too far in their zeal for the League, and whether it was desirable to send you out tied hand and foot to Germany. It has been one of the most ill-informed and mischievous ramps that I have ever seen in the domain of foreign affairs, and I only hope that its repercussions will not be beyond repair. But I am not sure.

I have written very seriously to George Lloyd⁵ and warned him how anxious you are that he should hold his hand in Egypt⁶ for the present, as far as circumstances will allow him, and I have entreated him to copy faithfully the attitude of his neighbour the great sphinx.

Yours sincerely,
W. T.

³ A personal reference is here omitted.

⁴ The text here appears to be incomplete.

⁵ Lord Lloyd, H.M. High Commissioner at Cairo.

⁶ The reference was to a possible modification of Anglo-Egyptian relations, then based on the declaration made by His Majesty's Government on February 28, 1922, printed in Cmd. 1592 of 1922, *Correspondence respecting Affairs in Egypt*, pp. 29-30.

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 12, 8 p.m.)

No. 28 Telegraphic [C 3226/71/18]

Secret

GENEVA, March 12, 1926, 4.50 p.m.

Following from Sir A. Chamberlain.

Locarno signatories met in my room this morning, Lord Cecil, Boncour and Monsieur Louche[u]r were also present. Proceedings opened with statement by Monsieur Briand of proposal which he had just made in private conversation with Chancellor namely (1) that as it had become clear that any addition to permanent seats raised question of constitutional importance which we had not foreseen, only addition to [*sic* ? additional] permanent seat to be created on this occasion should be that for Germany and that the whole question of the future composition of Council should be relegated to a commission which would report before the September Assembly and in time for action to be taken if need be in regard to Brazil and Spain before their temporary mandates expired: (2) that Council should recommend immediate creation of additional temporary seat in favour of Poland. I¹ explained that this proposal was unacceptable to Germany, Monsieur Vandervelde made a passionate appeal to Germans not to persist in this uncompromising attitude. Herr Stresemann repeated Luther's objections. After further conversation I intervened with suggestion made to me by Lord Cecil based on League procedure in such cases: (1) that France, Belgium and ourselves undertook that only Germany's permanent seat should be created at this Assembly. Germans would be thus absolved from all responsibility of rejecting these claims² whilst admitting Poland. (2) that Council, when recommending to Assembly creation of additional seat for Germany, should recommend creation of additional temporary seat to preserve proportion between the two classes. Acting on Lord Cecil's suggestion I pointed out that whilst Council when recommending additional permanent seat had to recommend nation for which it was intended in the case of additional temporary seat,³ Council recommended only the seat and was precluded from nominating candidate. Choice of candidate would rest with Assembly. We would of course do our utmost to secure election of Poland, but if Poland were chosen it would be by the Assembly and not by the Council. I added that if it made proposal more acceptable to Germany recommendation for additional temporary seat could be delayed until after her entry into Council but that it would certainly be more agreeable to Assembly to have the two propositions submitted to it at the same time.

This suggestion appeared to make great impression on Germans. They

¹ It would appear from the French delegation's notes of this meeting that the reference should be to Dr. Luther.

² The reference was presumably to the claims of Spain and Brazil to a permanent seat on the Council.

³ This comma should probably have been placed after 'intended' in the line above.

eagerly accepted my proposal that they should withdraw to another room to talk it over. On their return in ten minutes they asked for further time for reflection on a proposal which was quite novel. It is, I think, clear that they wished to telegraph to Berlin. We of course agreed and adjourned conversations. All members of conference seemed more hopeful. Monsieur Vandervelde and Signor Scialoja both said to me that if Germany refused this concession she would be putting herself in the wrong in public estimation. Anybody but a German would accept it. I hope the Germans will.

No. 337

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 13, 9 a.m.)

No. 32 Telegraphic [C 3227/71/18]

Most secret

GENEVA, March 12, 1926, 11.55 p.m.

Following from Sir A. Chamberlain.

This evening Luther arrived for private interview in which he informed me that Germans were unable to accept our proposal of this morning. He based his refusal upon the old ground that they could not consent to any alteration in the constitution of the Council as it was at the time of Locarno agreements. His view was that in effect proposals I made were simply another way of giving a seat to Poland. I pointed out to him that that was not so since it was left to the Assembly to say whether they would or would not elect Poland but I failed to move him. I then went to see Monsieur Briand and in his room informed him and other Locarno powers except Germany of Luther's communication. Monsieur Briand was in despair. Earlier in the day Ishii¹ had informed me that Unden had suggested to him as a possible solution that if Germany accepted our proposal, he should ask his government whether it might not prefer that Sweden should resign from Council and be replaced by Poland and he seems to have made same suggestion to Monsieur Vandervelde. Monsieur Vandervelde offered that Belgium should do the same but French rejected that as a solution which would only make things a great deal worse. Scialoja converted me by argument that coming from our side Germans would regard this as an (? outstanding) tribute. French and the rest thought Unden's solution just possible. I had asked Ishii to await result of our conversation with Germans. I have now told him that these conversations have been fruitless and are ended. He will now see Unden to ascertain whether he will act on his suggestion or whether it too will be vetoed by Germans. It would be a very unfortunate result but it is at least better than a (? deadlock) here.

¹ President of, and Japanese delegate to, the Council of the League of Nations.

No. 338

The British Delegate (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 15)

No. 12 L.N.C. [C 3322/681/18]

GENEVA, March 12, 1926

The British Delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments and has the honour to transmit copies of the under-mentioned papers.

<i>No. and date</i>	<i>Subject</i>
March 10th, 1926.	Right of investigation in Germany by the
Mr. Lampson—Minute—	League of Nations under Article 213 of the
Letter to Monsieur Briand.	Treaty of Versailles.

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 338

Minutes by Mr. Lampson and Sir A. Chamberlain

M. Paul-Boncour this afternoon raised with Mr. Cadogan and me a point regarding the procedure in the First Committee in connection with Germany's admission to the League. It related to the position in paragraph 2 of article 1 of the Covenant that every new member 'shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations'. He reminded us that in point of fact the German Government had, in a formal letter addressed to the Secretary General on January 12th last,¹ made express reservations as regards 2 points in the scheme of investigation under article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles as approved by the Council on September 27th, 1924, and one point in the report of the Mixed Jurists and Military Commission on the powers of the Commissions of investigation of March 10th, 1925. He seemed to apprehend that there might appear to be a conflict between Germany's unconditional acceptance of her obligations, and her previous reservation regarding these particular resolutions of the Council. What he therefore wished to find was some occasion for mentioning in the procès verbal of the Full Committee that, in spite of this reservation of January 12, the validity of the Council scheme remains for the moment unimpaired. We argued that it was difficult to see how such procedure would improve the situation because, as he knew, we and the French were agreed that, pending any modification of the Council, the scheme must in fact remain valid. And on the other hand might it not be dangerous to raise the topic at all? M. Boncour then left us with Colonel Requin and Captain Deleuze,² who continued the discussion. In the end they seemed to accept the suggestion I made to them that their point would be met if we were definitely to confirm that we shared their view as to the validity of the League scheme, which at present they only have in the form of a semi-official letter

¹ See No. 185, annex.

² French military and naval experts respectively.

from Sir W. Tyrrell (of January 23)³ and volunteered to submit this as an alternative to M. Briand, with whom, they said, the decision must rest.

We made it quite clear that we thought this alternative infinitely preferable on every ground, and I submit that it would be most undesirable to raise this question on the Committee when many members may not seize all its implications and may ask awkward questions, and might ultimately merely seem to give the Germans a loophole to raise the question.

M. W. LAMPSON

10.3

M. Boncour spoke to me later *without* mentioning his conversation with you. I strongly deprecated raising the question. The Council decision stands till it is changed. At Locarno we told the Germans that the only place where it could be discussed was in the Council and we invited them (so I put it to M. Boncour) to discuss it in the Council if discussion was needed.

Incidentally it may in consequence of the Treaty of Locarno become a question for the [Hague] Court.

A. C. 10.3

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 338

Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to M. Briand

GENEVA, March 12, 1926

Dear Monsieur Briand,

I understand that you would be glad to have official confirmation of the views expressed in the letter from Sir William Tyrrell to Monsieur de Fleuriau on January 23rd last relating to the validity of the scheme adopted by the Council of the League of Nations for investigations under article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles.

I have much pleasure in assuring you that that letter represents the view of His Majesty's Government on this point.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

³ No. 199.

No. 339

Memorandum regarding the Strength of the German Police Forces

[C 3208/436/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 12, 1926

The Boulogne Note of June 1920 instructed Germany to disband the Sicherheitspolizei, the nature and organisation of which was essentially military, and permitted the re-enforcement of the old police force, known as the Ordnungspolizei, from 92,000 to 150,000.

This permission was made subject to certain conditions, and the following extract refers to the police in the neutral zone and the left bank of the Rhine:—

‘It must, moreover, be clearly understood that the effective strength of 150,000 men of the *Ordnungspolizei* includes the 10,000 men authorised by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control for policing the neutral zone.

‘The increase of the Ordnungspolizei, moreover, will not affect either the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, where the Rhineland High Commission alone is competent to fix the necessary effectives, or the plebiscite areas, except at the express request of the Inter-Allied Governing and Plebiscite Commissions.’

The words underlined¹ are, apparently, intended to safeguard the rights of the Rhineland High Commission under article 1 of the Rhineland Agreement to determine the strength of the police forces in the occupied territories. They do not make it clear whether the fixed total of 150,000 was to include the occupied territories, or whether, on the other hand, that total would have to be increased on the evacuation of each of the three zones of occupation.

2. The allied note of the 4th June, 1925, showed that the effective strength of the police was at that moment approximately 180,000 men instead of 150,000 as authorised by the Boulogne note. The German government were required to disband the 30,000 police in excess of the establishment laid down.

3. The words ‘Police. Reduction of strength to 150,000’ appeared in the third list attached to the German note of October 23rd, 1925. The German government, therefore, undertook that the execution of this allied demand would be assured by November 15th, 1925.

4. The questions included in the fourth list of this German note were discussed in Paris between the German and allied experts and agreement was reached on all points on November 14th. Many questions of police were dealt with in these discussions, e.g. the questions of the titles of the higher police officials, the rules for personnel, and the number of police in barracks; but the Germans raised no difficulty at this time about the reduction to 150,000 men, and the question was not discussed at all.

5. On the 23rd November the Versailles Committee submitted to the Ambassadors’ Conference a report² suggesting that the total strength of the German police in the occupied territory after evacuation should be fixed at 10,000 men, and that no increase should be made, on the evacuation of the Rhineland, in the total number of 150,000 fixed for the whole of Germany. They argued that the statement in the Boulogne note that the increase would not affect the territories on the left bank of the Rhine or the plebiscite areas was a provisional reserve which in no way affected the total of 150,000 men. Since the date of the Boulogne note the plebiscite territories had in part been taken away from Germany, but, though the size of Germany had thereby been reduced, there had been no question of reducing the figure of 150,000.

¹ Here italicized.

² Cf. No. 115, paragraph 8.

There could, therefore, be no question now of increasing the figure of 150,000 on the evacuation of the Cologne zone.

6. This report was approved by the Ambassadors' Conference on the 26th November.²

7. The Germans soon afterwards put forward a semi-official proposal through Dr. Nord to the Versailles Committee whereby

- (a) the total should be increased from 150,000 to 155,000;
- (b) the police in the Hanse towns who were not in barracks (about 5,000), and who had hitherto been included in the 100,000 state police, should be counted as communal police.

The Versailles Committee refused to consider this proposal, for which no reasons had been given.

8. On the 8th February, 1926, the Germans put forward proposals officially to the Control Commission which may be summarised as follows:

- (a) The German government would accept the Ambassadors' Conference decision of the 26th November, 1925 (see paragraph 6 above).
- (b) The forest guards and night watchmen (15,000 men), counted by certain states in their police effectives, should not be included in the 150,000 men.
- (c) The number of state police should be increased from 100,000 to 110,000 men.
- (d) 2,500 communal police should if possible be disbanded shortly.

The net result of these proposals is that the Germans would obtain an increase of 7,500 police.

9. The War Office views, given before receipt of the details of these proposals, are that an increase of 5,000, or even 10,000 men, should not be allowed to stand in the way of a settlement of the police question, but the total number as finally fixed should not exclude any category of police.

10. On the 26th [27th] February the Versailles Committee submitted a report on these proposals to the effect that:

- (a) No reason was given by the Germans to justify their proposals for modifying the composition of the Police.
- (b) The Germans had given no technical reason to justify an increase in the police, and the Committee therefore saw no sufficient technical reason to modify its previous opinion on the subject.
- (c) It was necessary to settle once and for all the total number of police, in order that on the withdrawal of the Control Commission the League of Nations should be faced with a clearly defined situation.

11. The question was discussed by the Ambassadors' Conference on the 4th March.³ The British and Italian representatives took the line that the

² See fn. p. 509.

³ See No. 322.

increase requested by the Germans might be granted. The Belgian representative suggested that an increase of 10,000 state police might be granted provided that a corresponding reduction was effected in the communal police and provided that the total of both categories did not exceed 150,000. The French representative, however, said that he had rigid and personal instructions from M. Briand to make no further concessions in the matter.

It was eventually agreed to ask the German Ambassador to state what technical reasons there were in support of the German government's contention.

12. On the 5th March the German Ambassador in Paris addressed a note⁴ to the Ambassadors' Conference on the subject, making the following proposals and giving the following reasons for them:

He suggested that the strength of the state police should be increased from 100,000 to 105,000. The German government had always interpreted the Boulogne note as meaning that the increase to 150,000 men did not apply to the occupied territories, that is to say, that when these territories were evacuated, the increase in the police necessary for these territories would be granted. The German government considered that it could not have been the intention of the allied governments to grant Germany in 1920 police effectives more than those necessary for unoccupied territory, and including a reserve for occupied territory. The German government had therefore allotted to the various states concerned their shares of the total on this assumption. On the evacuation of the occupied territory, Prussia, Bavaria and Hesse would insist on a very large increase in the number of police allotted to them. If no increase were allowed in the number of police allowed for the whole of Germany, it would be necessary for the other states to disband their police in order that these three states might have sufficient to police the Rhineland. But the other states would certainly refuse to decrease their police forces further.

Further, the German government considered that 5,000 police, hitherto regarded as state police, in the Hanse towns should in future be regarded as communal police. All the other German states disposed of both a state and a communal police force. If all the police in the Hanse towns had to be included in the figure allowed for state police, this would necessarily prejudice the position of all the other states.

The German government proposed that the 15,000 forest guards and night watchmen should no longer be counted as police, since in the opinion even of the Military Control Commission at Berlin these people were certainly not police officials properly so-called. The fact was that in the figures taken for the basis of the Boulogne note some states had included their forest guards and night watchmen, whilst some had not. As a result of this Germany to-day could not have in practice 150,000 police, but only 135,000.

The German Ambassador ended with a request that the Ambassadors' Conference should approve these proposals at the earliest possible date, in

⁴ This note was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 448 of March 8 (not printed).

order to permit them to proceed with the settlement of the police question as soon as possible. Any further information required would be given orally by MM. Nord and Wagner at Paris.⁵

⁵ On March 12 Mr. Wigram sent a letter to Mr. Lampson at Geneva (copy received in the Foreign Office next day under cover of Paris despatch No. 481) in which he stated: 'We are having a very difficult and unsatisfactory negotiation here regarding the German police.' Unofficial Anglo-French conversations had brought out 'more clearly that Briand, having already been heckled in the Chamber on the subject of the Conference note of last November and being afraid of being heckled again, was personally insisting on the production in writing of good technical reasons (which he could use in the Chamber) for the justification of an increase being supplied by the Germans. To our argument that an increase of 5,000 men wasn't worth bothering about now, Massigli and Outrey [of the European section of the Quai d'Orsay] replied that, even if this further increase was conceded and undertakings were obtained from the Germans that it was the last, it in practice would not be the last, and the Conference Governments would be forced to go on making concessions *ad infinitum*.'

In conclusion Mr. Wigram suggested that it might be possible to discuss the question with French representatives at Geneva and commented 'we cannot at this stage afford to have this question discussed on the lines that the German word cannot be trusted.'

Mr. Lampson replied in a letter of March 13 that he considered the moment inopportune to raise the question at Geneva where things 'are going just as badly as they can'.

No. 340

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 13, 2.45 p.m.)

No. 33 Telegraphic [C 3228/71/18]

GENEVA, March 13, 1926, 1.5 p.m.

Following from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for Cabinet, Dominions and India.

At a meeting with Dominion representatives late last night to discuss latest developments and very serious situation with which we are now confronted Lord Cecil intervened with following extremely valuable appreciation of German attitude as he read it.

He had been watching proceedings very carefully at morning conference of Locarnites in my room (see my telegram No. 28)¹ and had gained the impression that Luther was in favour of my compromise suggestion but that Streasemann [*sic*] for his part was putting into practice the 'realpolitik' which he had praised a few moments before and which he defined as never allowing one's heart to interfere with one's head. It looked as though Stresemann felt he had all the cards in his hand and was therefore opposed to any concession or to allowing anyone to save their faces.

This statement by Lord Cecil undoubtedly greatly interested Dominion representatives.

I may add that until Lord Cecil made it I had not drawn same inference from general bearing of Stresemann but on thinking it over I believe Lord Cecil is right in his estimate and that in consequence of difference of views

¹ No. 336.

between Stresemann and Luther the question was referred to Berlin probably to the German President himself and that the latter decided against any concession whatever.

This belief is to some extent strengthened by my recollection of roles played by these two statesmen at Locarno where Stresemann always seemed unyielding and Luther generally to come in at the end with some conciliatory suggestion leading to ultimate compromise.

No. 341

*Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 13, 6.25 p.m.)
No. 34 Telegraphic [C 3229/71/18]*

Most confidential

GENEVA, March 13, 1926, 4.40 p.m.

Your telegram No. 16.¹

Following from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for Cabinet, Dominions and India.

Since my arrival in Geneva I have been using utmost endeavours by means of private talks and conferences to bring about solution which would be acceptable to all parties and which will ensure entry of Germany into the League in conditions which will be common cause of satisfaction and with minimum friction. My talks with representatives of Locarno powers have been throughout of a most friendly and cordial character though the first two conversations did not offer any prospect of solution. These talks were followed by most private informal conversations with other members of Council at which apparent deadlock was produced by attitude of representatives of various powers. Representative of Brazil declared he had instructions to vote against Germany unless Brazilian claim to permanent seat were admitted. It is to be observed that Brazilian reply to German note did not, like replies of other powers, commit her to unconditional support of German claim which she was for discussing in Council. Representative of Spain stated that whilst Spain would fulfil her undertaking to vote for Germany, she would insist that her claim be also considered, though he made no declaration as to Spanish attitude if her claim were rejected. Italian representative's instructions did not cover the situation and Italy's decision was uncertain. Swedish representative rigidly maintained attitude adopted by Sweden before Council meeting, that he would vote for Germany but for no other state and refused to join in any effort to compose conflicting claims.

At second private meeting of Council members situation was eased to extent that there seemed some prospect that Spain and Italy would not

¹ Not printed. This telegram transmitted a message from the Dominions Office to Mr. Batterbee, an Assistant Secretary in that office and a member of the British Delegation at Geneva, regarding a possible message from Sir A. Chamberlain to the Dominion Governments.

press their views . . .² though position of Sweden and Brazil remained unaltered. Brazilian representative stated that he would ask for further instructions but meanwhile deadlock continued. Though I had personally at that time no fear that entry of Germany into the League would not eventually be secured, I feared that entry would take place in conditions which would appear triumph for one side and humiliation for the other. Such a result would again range Europe into separate camps and would undo all the work of conciliation which had been proceeding during the last few months.

Further meetings of Locarno powers took place in my room morning of March 12th in hope of finding some way out of deadlock. Following on proposal made by French delegate which was itself immense advance on all previous proposals, I intervened with suggestion made to me by Lord Cecil that French, Belgian and British delegates should undertake that permanent seat should be accorded to Germany only at present Assembly, and that Council when recommending to Assembly creation of additional permanent seat to Germany should recommend creation of one new temporary seat, occupant of which would, in accordance with rules of procedure, be chosen by Assembly. French, Belgian and British delegates would of course do their best to secure election of Poland to this temporary seat but nominations would and could be made only in Assembly itself. French and Belgian delegates at once accepted this suggestion. There is no doubt it would have received support of Italy. It was directed to meeting in largest possible measure German conditions whilst giving just that satisfaction to points of view of other delegations represented at meeting which was required to secure their whole-hearted support and to prevent disastrous division between German and other points of view.

Position assumed throughout by Germans has been twofold: (1) that in perfect good faith they argued the case for joining the League on assumption that no other change would be made to Council at present time but that they were not in principle adverse to change after they had become member of the Council and gained experience and were ready to join in appointing commission to study the question; (2) that this attitude was not directed against claim of any particular power but that they could not admit claim of one power without appearing to take side against others.

I pointed out that by my proposal

I. Great Britain, France and Belgium would take upon themselves the responsibility of postponement of all other claims to permanent seat.

II. That it would certainly be felt to be satisfactory by Assembly and especially by the smaller powers that proportion of permanent to temporary seats should be maintained by simultaneous addition of temporary seat.

III. That only decision required of Germany would be concurrence in additional temporary seat, nomination to which could not under rule be made by Council but must be left to the free act of Assembly.

IV. That whilst we should do our best to secure election of Poland, it was not certain that choice of Assembly would fall on her and I myself if explaining

² The text is here uncertain.

this decision to Polish representatives would be bound to say I could not guarantee Polish election.

This suggestion appeared to make great impression on Germans who asked for time for reflection. Conversation adjourned. Members of conference were more hopeful.

However in the afternoon German Chancellor informed me that proposal was unacceptable as he could not consider solution involving any change in the Council at present session beyond admission of Germany. Other Locarno powers when this answer was communicated to them agreed that further discussion among Locarno powers could only be painful and must be without result and that matter was now in the hands of the Council with whom the next step rests. Message to this effect was conveyed to President of Council.

I cannot make any forecast at this moment of probable result. At first meeting with Monsieur Briand I disclosed to him confidentially tenour of my instructions. I similarly informed Spanish representative that if support of Spanish claim endangered the entry of Germany I would be obliged to withdraw it and I told Polish representative that I could not in any circumstance countenance claim of Poland to a permanent seat. I have not publicly declared my attitude towards Brazil as Brazilian claim is largely based on right of Latin America to have permanent seat. If all Latin America were agreed on this proposal and on choice of Brazil to occupy seat, League would probably find it impossible and inexpedient to resist a demand so influentially supported,³ more especially as information leads me to suppose that no such unanimity exists and that when put to the test Brazil would be unable to make good her claim. If therefore agreement had been reached amongst all Locarno powers, I believe Brazil would not have persisted in opposition. Spanish representative had declared that in any circumstances Spain would fulfil her promise though it is common knowledge here that if Germany is admitted and Spanish claim rejected he has formal instructions to withdraw at once. Attitude of Sweden would still have been doubtful but I believe even Sweden would have accepted so modest a change if Germans had agreed to it⁴ and even at the worst if proposal had been defeated by either Brazil or Spain, opposition from those quarters would not have had same disastrous effect on European powers and progress of reconciliation with Germany as may now be feared. French delegation say in confidence they do not believe Senate will in such conditions ratify treaty of Locarno. In any case it is to be feared that bitter feeling will have arisen both in Poland and France which will arrest work of conciliation for an indefinite period. Germany will be regarded as having won great victory but cost will fall upon her shoulders.

As no agreement has been reached I fear Brazil may feel encouraged to use her veto, and attitude of Italian government appears doubtful. I will of course continue to use every effort to secure Germany's admission but I regard situation with great apprehension and feel that refusal of Germany

³ It is possible that the text here is incomplete.

⁴ In Geneva telegram No. 37 of March 13 Sir A. Chamberlain stated that this belief was confirmed by secret information from an absolutely sure source.

to make any concession whatever to opposite point of view is a misfortune for the League, a disaster for Germany and a grave peril to the policy of reconciliation for which I have so earnestly striven.

I have kept Dominion and Indian representatives fully and constantly informed of all the phases of the situation and have greatly valued their expressions of sympathy and support in efforts which I am making to find a way out of present deadlock.

No. 342

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 13, 7.50 p.m.)

No. 35 Telegraphic [C 3230/71/18]

GENEVA, March 13, 1926, 7.30 p.m.

Following from Sir Austen Chamberlain for Cabinet, Dominions and India.

Nansen¹ who had heard of Lord Cecil's proposal told him he considered Germans ought to have accepted it. Nansen had understood creation of extra temporary seat was to be provisional and subject to revision on report of action of commission. Lord Cecil explained that this had not been our intention but that if our proposal would be acceptable on that basis, it might afford solution. Nansen pressed proposal on Germans but has just informed Lord Cecil that they refuse any concession.

¹ Norwegian Delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations.

No. 343

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 14, 3 p.m.)

No. 38 Telegraphic [C 3233/71/18]

Urgent. Most confidential

GENEVA, March 14, 1926, 1.15 p.m.

Following from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for Cabinet, Dominions and India.

In pursuance of engagement made two days ago my wife and I lunched with German delegation yesterday. After luncheon I again made a most earnest appeal to Germans to make some slight concession to meet French who had surrendered nine tenths of their first claim. Germans were unmoveable, Schubert said he could not conceive why French attached so much importance to what after all was mere question of months. Were they really going to break on difference between March and September? I asked, 'may I then tell French that in September you will support Polish claim to temporary seat?' Luther intervened to say that this was impossible as they could not carry German opinion. At Locarno they took the responsibility of acting contrary to instructions because they felt that on return they could neverthe-

less win acceptance. This time they could not take responsibility of deviating from instructions because public opinion would not support them. I am now certain in my own mind that both Luther and Stresemann would have accepted if they could have secured German President's support as they did at Locarno but that he has refused it and without it they feel powerless. This is the real difference between now and Locarno.

(To be continued).

No. 344

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 14, 5 p.m.)

No. 38 Telegraphic [C 3237/71/18]

GENEVA, March 14, 1926, 3.35 p.m.

Part 2.¹

At 5 o'clock members of Council met again informally. I reported failure of Locarnite conversations and rejection of even Lord Cecil's and Nansen's compromise by Germans.

Monsieur Briand said that if Germans would make no compromise his position was impossible, Senate would not ratify treaty of Locarno, his whole policy of conciliation fell to the ground and he himself could not remain Minister. He was forced to doubt Germans' good faith. Having received benefit of Locarno in Cologne and Rhineland were they not now seeking pretext to withdraw from treaty? In any case this uncompromising attitude was most ominous for their future attitude in the Council. Briand laid great stress on concluding words of French reply² to German enquiry regarding permanent seat. In promising support for that claim France had replied as regards only other condition then raised that Germany's entry 'Ne droit [*sic*] comporter ni conditions ni réserves ni additions'. (There is phrase to the same effect in Ramsay MacDonald's note³ and in Council's reply last March).⁴ Germany was now raising fresh conditions and in so doing breaking her word. Ishii said that his government, impressed by arguments used, was ready to modify its attitude for the sake of unity. He submitted draft resolution to the effect that Council:—

- I. recommends seat for Germany,
- II. thinks it necessary to introduce certain modifications in its constitution,
- III. remits question to committee of whole Council to report in June,
- IV. decision of Council on this report to be circulated to all members of the Assembly with a view to action in September.

(To be continued).

¹ It would appear from the docket that this heading should read Parts 2 and 3.

² For an English quotation of the relevant section of the French note of October 6, 1924, see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 193, col. 1076.

³ For the relevant section of Mr. MacDonald's note of October 8, 1924, see *ibid.*

⁴ For this memorandum of March 14, 1925, see *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1925, pp. 490-1.

No. 345

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 14, 7 p.m.)

No. 38 Telegraphic [C 3238/71/18]

GENEVA, March 14, 1926, 4.45 p.m.

Part 4. (Continuation of Part 3).¹

To my surprise this proposal which seemed to me to give everything they asked to Germany was declared unacceptable not only by Briand but also by Unden. Vandervelde had urged that Council should take decision disregarding Germany. Our dependence on German behests and prolonged negotiations with them was bringing Council into contempt, anything was better than failure to reach a decision. We might (1) accept Ishii's proposal (2) present Council's own proposals to Assembly if Council could agree on any proposals or lastly (3) a state occupying temporary seat might resign it in the Assembly in favour of Poland.

Unden replied that it was impossible to leave out of account Germany's attitude. Personally he would prefer adjournment of the whole question including Germany's entry till September.

Vandervelde, Briand, I and others said that adjournment would be fatal if Germany did not enter now she would never enter.

I appealed to Unden, like him I could not disregard Germany. He had admitted that he was in some sort bound to Germany but I had the impression that Germans felt in like manner bound to him. Would he not join in our appeal to Germany to accept Lord Cecil's proposals? Appeal from him might be decisive coming on top of Nansen's appeal and give Germans just the excuse they needed to justify concession in German eyes. Unden declined on the ground that situation would be even worse if Germany still refused after withdrawal of Swedish opposition. After close of meeting I explained my proposal in greater detail to Unden and I think convinced him. He cannot act effectively without new instructions but after this explanation I think he will put case to his government.

To be concluded in due course.

¹ See No. 344, note 1.

No. 346

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 14, 8 p.m.)

No. 38 Telegraphic [C 3263/71/18]

Urgent

GENEVA, March 14, 1926, 6.20 p.m.

Part V.

During session Briand received message that Stresemann wished to see him. Briand's attitude is that he has given up almost everything, he is still ready to seek accommodation, and will go to the utmost limit of concession but

without *some* concession on the side of Germany *cannot* secure ratification or remain Minister.

We agreed that we must soon bring private conversations to an end.

If agreement was not reached we must summon Assembly for Tuesday¹ at the latest and there in public discussion each define our position and reasons for breakdown. Brazilian when asked his position stated that he had just received instructions from the President including personal message for me which he had not yet been able to give me and courtesy required that he should convey it to me before making statement. I have just got it.² President has repeated his formal instructions to use veto although Mello Franco telegraphing substance of my strong appeal to him had urged neutrality. Mello Franco wished me to send personal message to the President through Brazilian Ambassador in London who is now here with some assurance of our support for her in June. This is out of the question but if the rest of the Council and the Germans were agreed on any course Brazil in my opinion could not use her veto for fear of execration and exclusion from Council in September election but lack of agreement encourages her. This is one argument I used to Uden. At the worst adjournment of Germany's entry until September because now opposed for selfish reasons—a solution actively or passively accepted by all the rest—would not have the disastrous effect which must follow direct conflict between Sweden acting for Germany, and France. I told Mello Franco my country would never forgive nation which, preventing Germany's entry, brought all our labours to nought and destroyed prospect of European peace.

I am sending for Oliveira³ and shall speak strongly to him.

There are some slight signs that Germans who as Lord Cecil said felt that they had all the cards in their hands are becoming uneasy. Opinion is turning against them. Ends.

¹ March 16, 1926.

² This message was communicated to the Foreign Office in Geneva despatch No. 7 L.N.A. (not printed). M. Bernardes expressed his regret that he could not accede to Sir A. Chamberlain's appeal not to veto the proposal for Germany's permanent seat on the Council; cf. No. 334.

³ Brazilian Ambassador in London. Sir A. Chamberlain recorded in Geneva telegram No. 1 to Rio (4 L.N.A. to the Foreign Office) his conversation on March 14 with M. Oliveira to whom he represented his 'deep regret and well-nigh dismay' at M. de Mello-Franco's instructions, and the deplorable effect which a Brazilian veto would produce on British public opinion. Sir A. Chamberlain continued with similar arguments to those used to Señor Yanguas (see No. 347) and concluded by asking whether any power, even the greatest, could afford to disinterest herself in the work of the League of Nations. 'It was becoming more powerful than the most powerful amongst us, and for a nation to cut itself off from the League would be its own suicide in international life.'

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir H. Rumbold (Madrid)

No. 1 Telegraphic [C 3320/71/18]

GENEVA, March 14, 1926, 7.50 p.m.¹

Addressed to Madrid No. 1.

Following from Sir A. Chamberlain.

Your telegram No. 75 (*sic*).²

I had conversation with Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs at Sir E. Drummond's reception last Wednesday³ in which I urged him most strongly to beg his government to reconsider decision to withdraw if Spanish claim to permanent seat was not accepted at this Council's session.

I knew privately from Quiñones de Leon that he had imperative instructions to take such action and information was confirmed by Minister for Foreign Affairs. I pointed out that turn which discussions had taken in the last few weeks and especially here in Geneva had given new aspect to the question and raised first class constitutional questions for the League. To insist on pressing Spanish claim now was to take the vote in circumstances unfavourable to Spain in which some of those who desired to support her would yet be obliged to vote against her. Further it was evident that until the ground had been prepared by a commission, opinion of the Assembly would be against addition. Proposed commission would have to consider more particularly claims which had been long before the Council. If favourable to Spain it would greatly strengthen her position; in any case proposal was for simple adjournment of decision without prejudice to Spanish claim. If Spain were to withdraw she would give judgment against herself in her own cause before the court had taken any decision. Later I remarked that it was the immediate end to avoid possible death grapple over claim six months hence. Why anticipate possible ultimate refusal by immediate withdrawal? Such withdrawal would be a great misfortune for the League but in any case League would survive it and go on gathering strength. It could not be supposed that if Spain withdrew, her claim would be ever again considered favourably. It was much easier to withdraw than to find a dignified and opportune occasion for re-entry. Her best friends hoped that Spain would not take this course and I had the right to speak as the representative of a friendly country which had desired to support her. I asked Minister

¹ Time of repetition as No. 39 to the Foreign Office (received at 10 p.m. on March 14).

² It was suggested on the filed copy that the reference should have been to Madrid telegram No. 25 of March 13, in which Sir H. Rumbold reported that on March 12 the King of Spain had hinted that Spain might withdraw from the League. Sir H. Rumbold added that the King sometimes made impulsive statements. In his following telegram to Geneva (repeated as No. 26 to the Foreign Office) Sir H. Rumbold reported that he had replied to a similar hint from King Alfonso on March 14, that it was 'unthinkable' that Spain should leave the League after all the good work she had done in it, and that dignified acceptance of not obtaining a permanent seat 'would greatly strengthen her position in the eyes of the world'.

³ March 10, 1926.

to convey my appeal to his government. Please speak to them in the same sense and make most urgent appeal for a prudent conciliatory attitude in circumstances of immense international difficulty and importance.⁴

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 39.

⁴ Sir H. Rumbold replied on March 15 in Madrid telegram No. 3 to Geneva (27 to the Foreign Office) that he had that afternoon spoken as instructed to the President of the Council, who said he would reflect on the matter.

No. 348

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 15, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 114 Telegraphic: by bag [C 3240/24/18]

PARIS, March 14, 1926

Berlin telegram No. 71.¹

Herr von Schubert handed a proposal (see my telegram No. 115)² to Monsieur Massigli at Geneva in connection with the training of Reichswehr personnel and informed him that it had been drawn up at a Cabinet meeting after considerable discussion. Monsieur Massigli forwarded this proposal to the Mixed Committee in Paris and asked for an opinion thereon. The Mixed Committee met yesterday and drew up a counter proposal (see my telegram No. 116)³ agreed to by the French, Belgian, Italian and Japanese delegates.

I should be grateful if I might receive instructions as to whether the British delegates may give their approval to this latter proposal by telephone tomorrow in time for the meeting of the Mixed Committee which takes place at 3 p.m.

¹ No. 325.

² Not printed. The German proposal was as indicated in No. 325.

³ Not printed. The first two paragraphs of the counter-proposal in this telegram of March 14 were generally the same as the text cited in No. 352, but the last paragraph read as follows: 'Les noms des bénéficia[i]res de ces autorisations dont le nombre ne dépassera pas 3 par an seront portés sur des listes constamment tenues à jour.' Foreign Office telegram No. 70 of March 15 to Paris approved this counter-proposal in principle.

No. 349

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 15, 12.20 p.m.)

No. 44 Telegraphic [C 3341/71/18]

Most urgent
Part 1.

GENEVA, March 15, 1926, 11.30 a.m.

Following from Sir A. Chamberlain for Prime Minister:—

It would seem that following solution would unite all votes except ours and be agreeable to Germans.

- (1). Germany enters now without other addition to Council.
- (2). Sweden and Czechoslovakia resign their seats which are then at disposition of Assembly. Neither presents itself as candidate.
- (3). Probable election of Poland and Norway.
- (4). Council decides to recommend creation of two new permanent seats in September in favour of Spain and Brazil. Assembly of course would have the right to reject this proposal, but it would satisfy Spain and Brazil and prevent trouble with them.

My instructions cover the first three points but would oblige me to reject the fourth. May we accept if all others agree?

Reply most urgent.

To be continued.

No. 350

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 15, 11.25 a.m.)
No. 44 Telegraphic [C 3341/71/18]

Very urgent

GENEVA, March 15, 1926, 11.40 a.m.

Part II.

I should only use this authority if necessary to secure agreement but I am bound to add that Lord Cecil doubts if promise to create two new permanent seats in September is necessary and would prefer to wait until after public sitting of Assembly has discussed the whole matter.

Personally I should be most reluctant to appeal from Council to Assembly if I were the only obstacle to union. Ends.

No. 351

Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. London (Geneva)
No. 19 Telegraphic [C 3341/71/18]

Most urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 15, 1926, 5.45 p.m.

Following for Sir Austen Chamberlain.

Cabinet would much prefer a solution which does not include the creation of any new permanent seats; but we feel that some solution of the present deadlock is essential and if you are obliged as a last resort to adopt the proposed clause (4) the Cabinet will support you. We assume of course that you carry with you the substantial concurrence of the Dominions representatives at Geneva.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 16, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 119 Telegraphic: by bag [C 3344/24/18]

PARIS, March 15, 1926

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Following is text of letter addressed to Monsieur Massigli:—

‘Les Représentants alliés réunis le 15 Mars pour examiner les propositions allemandes sur la Reichswehr, communiquées par le Secrétariat de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs le 10 Mars, ont établi à l’unanimité le texte suivant:

A titre exceptionnel, les Membres de la Reichswehr et de la Marine qui en feront la demande pourront être autorisés à titre privé et en ce qui concerne l’aviation de sport seule à piloter à leurs propres frais.

Il ne leur sera accordé à cet effet, par les Autorités allemandes, aucune facilité de service, aucune subvention ni congés spéciaux.

Les autorisations ainsi délivrées ne seront valables que pour un an et leur nombre ne dépassera pas le chiffre de (12). Les noms des bénéficiaires seront portés sur une liste établie au début de chaque année.

Ce texte donne lieu aux observations suivantes:

1) les Représentants alliés ont été d’avis de supprimer du texte proposé par les Allemands la phrase “apprendre à piloter” et à maintenir le mot “piloter” du texte primitif.² On veut éviter de la sorte que les anciens pilotes ne puissent piloter sans contrôle.

2) ils ont considéré nécessaire d’ajouter les mots “congés spéciaux” pour maintenir l’idée du texte allié primitif² “octroi de congé”. Ce point a pour eux une importance capitale.

3) nombre des autorisations.

Les Délégués ont envisagé successivement deux solutions:

a) fixer à 3 par an le nombre des autorisations, les bénéficiaires ayant le droit de piloter pendant tout le temps de leur carrière militaire. Cette solution donnerait théoriquement, au bout de quinze ans, 45 aviateurs toujours entraînés.

Cette solution n’a pas été retenue.

b) fixer à 12 le nombre des autorisations, mais en spécifiant qu’elles ne seraient valables que pour une année seulement.

Cette solution a été adoptée.

Les Alliés l’ont considérée plus avantageuse, car elle rendait difficile la formation de pilotes très entraînés, limitait leur nombre et présentait aussi l’avantage de donner un chiffre semblable à celui proposé par les Allemands.

Mais les Délégués estiment que ce chiffre 12 est un maximum, si des dis-

¹ Not printed. This telegram of March 15 gave a brief indication of the letter below.

² See No. 296.

cussions étaient à prévoir, il serait nécessaire de commencer par leur offrir un chiffre notablement inférieur.

4) les Représentants alliés sont désireux que l'attention du juriste français, M. Fromageot, soit appelée sur le point suivant: la phrase "et en ce qui concerne l'aviation de sport *seule*" ne pourrait-elle pas être interprétée comme une autorisation tacite de piloter dans les autres branches de l'aviation, même en tenant compte du texte § c 2)² "*pour interdire dans l'aviation, quelle qu'en soit la catégorie [sic], toute instruction et toute activité systématiques et organisées des Membres de la Reichswehr et de la Marine isolés ou en groupes*".

Si cette crainte n'est pas justifiée, les Représentants alliés sont unanimement d'avis de maintenir le membre de phrase en question. Si par contre elle l'est, il y aurait lieu d'introduire dans le texte de nouvelles précisions.'

No. 353

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 16, 1.50 p.m.)

No. 50 Telegraphic [C 3406/71/18]

GENEVA, March 16, 1926, 1.5 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Following for Cabinet, Dominions and India.²

Following is summary of discussion at private meeting of Council morning of March 15th.

Swedish representative began by explaining what his suggestions to Stresemann had been namely retirement of a present non-permanent member in order to make room for Poland; that either he or Monsieur Benes might be ready to make this sacrifice. That as a result of this idea German delegation had said that they could not for sentimental reasons agree to Sweden's withdrawal alone but that if it were coupled with withdrawal of another temporary member say Czechoslovakia that might be possible basis of compromise.

Monsieur Briand then informed meeting of course of two interviews he had had with Stresemann from which it had been clear to him that Germany was as determined as he himself to avoid rupture. Stresemann's mind had in fact quite clearly seemed to have turned to compromise. Monsieur Briand had brought out and urged afresh (and he thought with some effect) all the arguments to show that there had been in fact no undertaking in advance by Council members to elect Germany and no one else. Stresemann had agreed that Lord Cecil's formula was perhaps the best but said that unfortunately he could not adopt it without first returning to Berlin and that that was obviously impossible. Conversation had then turned to question of Spain

¹ Not printed. This telegram from Sir A. Chamberlain reported that he had discussed the situation with the representatives of the Dominions who were prepared to support proposals (2) and (3) in No. 349.

² This message (see also Nos. 354-5) was evidently from Sir A. Chamberlain.

and Brazil but it had been agreed that this was not vital question so far as Germany was concerned. Neither Monsieur Briand nor Stresemann wished that withdrawal of member to make room for Poland should be in any sense a personal matter. It was for that reason that withdrawal of two members seemed preferable.

Monsieur Benes then stated that so far as he was concerned he would be ready to fall in with suggestion that he should retire but as Czechoslovakia represented little entente his government would have of course to consult Serbia and Roumania.

Unden said that if Sweden resigned which she was ready to do she had no wish to offer herself later for re-election.

To be continued.

No. 354

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 16, 6 p.m.)

No. 50 Telegraphic [C 3408/71/18]

GENEVA, March 16, 1926, 3.45 p.m.

Part II of telegram No. 50.

Here M. Briand somewhat changed line of discussion; he said that all this really raised large constitutional question—that of ultimate composition of Council and of whole relation of Council to Assembly. Original constitution was really out of date. It had been framed when the world was divided into camps. We had since got away from that conception and we had quite recently got the treaties of Locarno. Only real difficulty so far as Germany's entry was concerned was Poland's candidature and that seemed on a fair way to settlement. But he thought that as matter had now come to a head the whole problem of Council's constitution should be examined now—not for immediate but for future settlement: what was wanted now was some assurance that it would ultimately be settled.

Here I intervened to remind them that in giving my vote for numbers of Council I had to remember that title by which I sat was that of representative of British Empire: they would understand bearing of that observation and I need not insist further on it. But in the Assembly British Empire had seven votes and it did not follow necessarily that because there was unanimity in the Empire vote for numbers of Council there would necessarily be similar unanimity on votes in the Assembly upon consequent issues¹ of the first vote. I was, however, ready to vote² numbers of Council for a reference to a commission which should acknowledge that an increase of some kind in Council was necessary; and to show spirit of liberty with which I would approach that question I would not exclude from field of commission's deliberations even question of an abolition of all permanent seats. I added that of course it must not be understood that what I was saying authorised even a tacit

¹ Another text of the telegram here read: 'upon consequences of issues'.

² The text here appears to be incomplete.

expectation that I was in favour or would vote for abolition. I was only showing meeting that I was doing all in my power to solve present deadlock.

Part III following.

No. 355

*Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 16, 7.10 p.m.)
No. 50 Telegraphic [C 3443/71/18]*

GENEVA, March 16, 1926, 5.30 p.m.

Part 3.

Scialoja at once declared he could not accept even this guarded reference to a possible modification of system of permanent seats and non-permanent seats and that he would have to resist so wide a reference. Indeed if abolition of permanent seats or of rule of unanimity were approved he would have to advise his government to withdraw altogether.

Discussion continued for some time on these lines Vandervelde and Uruguayan delegate taking part; latter said that in principle South American governments would prefer that unanimity principle should be applied throughout i.e. that there should be no permanent seats at all but this was not the moment to discuss that question. In principle therefore they would be opposed to creation of new permanent seats but if Europe were to receive additional permanent seats then Uruguay might claim an additional permanent seat or seats for Latin America.

Mello Franco again raised question of Brazil's claim to a permanent seat quoting fact that his instructions 'up to the present moment' remained to insist on one.

Position thus is that so far as Polish side of the question is concerned there seems to be reasonable prospect of solution. As to Spain, Brazil and other candidates, Lord Cecil undertook whilst I consulted Dominions (see my immediately preceding telegram)¹ to join some members of the Council in trying to find formula of future action which would enable Brazil to withdraw her veto and Spain to reconsider her intention to absent herself from the Council and Assembly (not as I understand to resign). This endeavour has unfortunately proved fruitless Mello Franco producing elaborate argument to show that United States still had judicially a right to a permanent seat on the Council as soon as they chose to ratify treaty,² that therefore seat was actually in existence and that by giving it to South America now we should not be enlarging Council whilst it would require creation of only one additional seat to satisfy Spain. Lord Cecil replied that even admitting that this argument was sound (which he did not) it really would not affect question for it was undoubtedly³ that if Spain and Brazil were admitted now there would certainly be an increase in number of permanent members. He developed further convincing arguments against Brazilian thesis, but sug-

¹ See No. 353, note 1.

² Of Versailles.

³ In another text of the telegram this word read 'undoubted'.

gested that possibly 'directive . . .⁴' might be given active commission of enquiry to give attentive consideration to these two claims: further than that it seemed impossible to go. Full note of discussion goes to you by bag today (my despatch No. 6).⁵ It was evident that Quinones was anxious to support Brazil believing that if latter's claim were met Spain must be given a permanent seat also. But he did not repeat threat to leave the League though Monsieur Briand referred to it.

Later in the afternoon as this was repeated at a secret meeting of the Council I took the same line as Lord Cecil though I had not in point of fact at that time heard from him what he had said earlier. In addition to above difficulties a still further problem has presented itself. Early this afternoon⁶ Monsieur Loucheur urged on me that of two seats vacated by Sweden and Czechoslovakia, that not filled by Poland should go to Roumania as representing the Little Entente. I at once saw Little Entente representative[s] and dealt with this suggestion summarily for reasons which will be obvious to you. Later Monsieur Briand told me he was much distressed at my attitude: he had had indications that some even of the Scandinavian states would accept such a proposal and were quite content to . . .⁴ for a vacancy later for one of themselves. He asked what my position would be if proposal obtained majority in the Assembly. I said that if Germany and Sweden agreed to it I myself would accept proposal in the Assembly speaking in the name of His Majesty's Government alone but I must be satisfied that neither Germans nor Unden would consider themselves tricked. Ends.

⁴ The text is here uncertain.

⁵ Not printed. It would appear from this despatch that the sense of Lord Cecil's suggestion in the previous sentence should be that the Commission which was being appointed to decide the question of the constitution of the Council should be given a direction to give attentive consideration to the claims of Spain and Brazil.

⁶ From records made by Mr. Lampson it would appear that the date in question was March 15.

No. 356

Sir H. Rumbold (Madrid) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Geneva)

No. 4 Telegraphic [C 3459/71/18]

Very urgent

MADRID, March 16, 1926, 6.45 p.m.¹

Addressed to Geneva No. 4.

Confidential.

Your telegram No. 4.²

The King received me this morning and I communicated your telegrams Nos. 1³ and 2⁴ to His Majesty.

¹ Time of repetition as No. 29 to the Foreign Office (received at 9.10 p.m. on March 16).

² Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

³ No. 347.

⁴ Not printed. This telegram of March 15, in reply to Madrid telegram No. 26 (see No. 347, note 2), instructed Sir H. Rumbold to put before King Alfonso the considerations urged in No. 347.

Following is upshot of conversation which lasted one hour and a quarter.

The King told me that President of the Council had been much impressed by arguments contained in your telegram No. 1 and had greatly appreciated friendly form in which you had presented those arguments. But news which had subsequently arrived of proposal to give Poland non-permanent seat which was to be vacated by Sweden had altered the whole situation for the worse. Spanish government now felt injured and did not consider they could stay in the League any longer with dignity. I combatted this view and said that allocation of non-permanent seat to one country which had been vacated by another was a very different matter to grant of permanent seat on the Council.

The King said that the various representatives at Geneva had had to consider public opinion of their different countries. It was also necessary to take Spanish public opinion into account and it had never been more unanimous. He went over old ground and asserted that for many years past nothing had been done for Spain. This country was in any case getting tired of having its claim to permanent seat always deferred for consideration at a subsequent meeting of the Council. He must have something with which to satisfy Spanish public opinion. Matters would have been better if Germany alone had been admitted at this session of the Council, claims of Spain, Poland and Brazil being reserved for consideration at September meeting.

In reply to my question as to whether Spain would have remained in the League on basis of partial compromise His Majesty could not give me categorical answer.

The King then suggested that you and French President of the Council might agree to give Spain a five-year mandate over Tangier zone. Affairs of the town and zone of Tangier could be administered by an international commission on which each country which had been asked to adhere to the statute could have one or two representatives. There could also be an international municipality. Experience already showed that present statute was proving a failure and he quoted in support of his argument opinion of the 'Times' correspondent at Tangier who could not be considered a friend of Spain. The King asked me what chance there was of this proposal commending itself to you. Its acceptance would entirely alter the aspect of affairs for Spain.

I replied that in my personal view there was very little chance of his proposal being accepted and that for several reasons. First, the present régime had not had a sufficiently long trial; secondly, His Majesty's proposal had no connection with League matters, and thirdly, it seemed to me contrary to the spirit of the League that attitude of countries represented on it should be determined by extraneous bargains of nature which he had proposed. The King then spontaneously admitted that his proposal rather savoured of blackmail.

At this point a letter came from President of the Council containing the proposed reply of Spanish government to representations which both the French Ambassador and I had made yesterday. Whilst asking me to treat

the communication as purely personal the King read out this reply which whilst expressing appreciation of your attitude and that of French Prime Minister and stating definitely that Spain would—in fulfilment of her engagement—vote for entry of Germany into the League with a permanent seat on the Council, maintains decision to leave the League as being the simplest way of avoiding difficulties for all concerned.

I said this was a most regrettable decision. The King volunteered to try to get President of the Council to hold up communication of this answer to me until I had had time to telegraph to you again. I thanked His Majesty and begged him to act as suggested. Finally he charged me to thank you for your telegram and for terms in which you had referred to him. The King has just telephoned to say he hopes to induce President of the Council to hold up his answer till tomorrow morning.

I am communicating your telegram No. 2 to President of the Council but it is evident to me both from what the King said and from tone . . .⁵ press that reported intention to admit Poland to non-permanent seat on Council whilst relegating claim of Spain to decision of September meeting has been the last straw.⁶

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 29.

⁵ The text is here uncertain.

⁶ Sir Horace Rumbold summarized, in his telegram No. 5 to Geneva (30 to the Foreign Office) of March 17, General Primo de Rivera's reply of that morning, which was as indicated above. Sir Horace added, however, that he had subsequently been informed by the Under Secretary of State that 'since *status quo* [regarding membership of the Council] had not been altered there would now presumably be no necessity for Spanish delegation to read declaration announcing their withdrawal from League of Nations'.

No. 357

Sir B. Alston (Petropolis) to Mr. London (Geneva)

*(Received March 17, 9.30 p.m.)*¹

No. 1 Telegraphic [C 3861/71/18]

PETROPOLIS, March 16, 1926, 9.45 p.m.

Following for Sir A. Chamberlain Telegram No. 1.

Your telegrams Nos. 1² and 2³ received late last night.

This morning French Ambassador telephoned that he had received instructions to make joint representations to President of Republic with me in regard to situation at Geneva and enquired whether I had received similar instructions. Having received more [*sic*]⁴ I asked for an audience

¹ A copy of this telegram was received in the Foreign Office on March 26.

² See No. 346, note 3.

³ Not printed. This telegram of March 14 instructed Sir B. Alston to use his 'utmost efforts in same direction' as Sir A. Chamberlain's conversation with M. Oliveira and pointed out that the 'effect [of a Brazilian veto] on City of London which desires peace above all things would be disastrous'.

⁴ In his subsequent despatch No. 64 of March 17 (not printed) Sir B. Alston stated that

of the President for myself and on my way to the Palace called on French Ambassador. His Excellency showed me his instructions terms of which were almost all identical with those contained in your telegram No. 2. I informed him that I was about to see President by myself but that I saw no reason why he should not join me at the Palace after a short time, and we might together endeavour to move President from attitude which his government had taken up.

I regret to inform you that after two hours interview during which my French colleague and I used every possible argument including those used in your telegram No. 1 President while agreeing to think it over said it would be useless to do so because having gone so far he was quite unable on account of public opinion to retreat from position taken up. He said he knew passions of his people and they would never forgive him if he sacrificed their honour. We in vain urged Brazil would gain infinitely more honour and prestige by sacrificing her amour propre to assist her friends out of a difficulty.

At his request French Ambassador drew up on the spot a memorandum of purport of our representations.

Sir A. Chamberlain's instructions (see note 3 above) had arrived in a corrupt form and had not been completely decyphered when the French Ambassador telephoned.

No. 358

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 17, 9 a.m.)

No. 54 Telegraphic [C 3444/71/18]

GENEVA, March 16, 1926, 11 p.m.

Following from Sir A. Chamberlain.

I saw Dominion representatives this morning and narrated to them events of yesterday. I read to them my telegram (? No. 44)¹ and Foreign Office reply No. 19.² I explained to them that there now seemed no prospect that unanimity could be obtained for proposal in clause 4 and that therefore there appeared to be no chance of my becoming sole obstacle to agreement on those lines, but I asked their views in case, contrary to my expectation, proposal again came forward. They all declared their dislike of proposal but expressed their willingness that if all other Powers concerned concurred in accepting such a solution, I should act in the Council as I thought best in the interests of our common policy as regards entry of Germany, Dominion representatives reserving their full rights in the Assembly.

As regards the two seats to be vacated by Sweden and Czechoslovakia all representatives approved my attitude as explained in last paragraph of my telegram No. 50.³ I informed delegates I had just sent Mr. Lampson to convey personal message to M. Briand from me that the more I thought of proposal the more objectionable it seemed from every point of view and that I made strongest possible personal appeal not to press it.

¹ Nos. 349-50.

² No. 351.

³ See No. 355.

As a result of this M. Briand visited me immediately after Dominion representatives left and said that in view of what I had said proposal might be regarded as dropped.

No. 359

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 17, 9 a.m.)

No. 55 Telegraphic [C 3445/71/18]

GENEVA, March 16, 1926, 11.55 p.m.

Following from Sir A. Chamberlain for Cabinet, Dominions, and India:—

As it appears to be a physical impossibility that Brazilian delegate should receive instructions in time Monsieur Briand and myself discussed position with Chancellor and Dr. Stresemann earnestly this afternoon. It was agreed that communiqué contained in my immediately following telegram¹ should be issued this evening.

Assembly will meet tomorrow at 10 a.m. Acting as *rapporteur* for first committee I will explain why report of this committee (to the effect that Germany should be admitted as a member to League) should not be adopted and I will develop on lines of above mentioned press communiqué. Monsieur Briand will follow associating himself with me and proposing to assembly that a resolution should be adopted expressing regret and hope that problem will be solved by ordinary assembly in September.

German delegates have agreed to this procedure and attach importance to above mentioned resolution and to avoiding any incidents such as speeches abusing Brazil. It is thus hoped that no withdrawals from the League, such as that of Spain or Brazil, will take place and ratification of Locarno treaties will proceed in a normal manner.

Confidential. For reason of internal policy German delegates do not wish to state publicly that their application to the League is maintained but they observe that as it is not withdrawn, *ipso facto* it remains though in abeyance.

¹ No. 360. It would appear that this communiqué and the procedure outlined below were also discussed at a private meeting of the members of the Council of the League of Nations: see Sir Charles Petrie, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 300–1.

No. 360

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 17, 9 a.m.)

No. 56 Telegraphic [C 3446/71/18]

GENEVA, March 16, 1926, 11.55 p.m.

Following from Secretary of State.

Following is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram¹ of joint communiqué issued to press to-night.

¹ No. 359.

'The representatives of Germany, France, Belgium, Great Britain and Italy met to examine situation resulting from difficulties which have arisen and which hinder accomplishment of their common wishes. They take note of the fact that they have reached agreement and have overcome obstacles which had at one moment arisen between them. If, as there seems reason to fear, the above difficulties persist, the representatives of the 7 powers who signed protocol of Locarno would regret not to be able at this moment to reach goal which they had in view but they are happy to recognise that work of peace which they had realised at Locarno and which exists in all its value and all its force remains intact. They remain attached to it today as yesterday and are firmly resolved to work together to maintain and develop it. They are convinced that on the occasion of next session of assembly difficulties which exist at this moment will be surmounted and that agreement which was reached in regard to conditions for entry of Germany into League of Nations will be realised.'²

² This communiqué is printed in a slightly variant text in Lord D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 232-3.

No. 361

Sir A. Chamberlain (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 18)

No. 9 L.N.A. [C 3475/71/18]

GENEVA, March 16, 1926

The British delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments and has the honour to transmit copy of a memorandum by Mr. Lampson, recording a conversation with M. Massigli and subsequent interview with Herr von Schubert, regarding the French suggestion that the seat on the Council vacated by Czechoslovakia should be filled by the election of another member of the Little Entente.¹

¹ Not printed. This memorandum of March 16 by Mr. Lampson recorded his conversations that morning with M. Massigli in accordance with Sir A. Chamberlain's instructions as indicated in No. 358, and with Herr von Schubert who informed him that the suggested election of Roumania to the Council in place of Czechoslovakia was not acceptable to Germany. Herr von Schubert and M. Loucheur had thereupon agreed on the following statement to be laid before M. Briand as from the German Delegation.

'(1) Immediate election of Holland in the place of Sweden.

'(2) Question of the seat of the Little Entente

(a) on our part (Germany's) no actual engagement for a supplementary seat; on the other hand no opposition in principle against the creation of such a seat; on the contrary the programme of the committee which we (Germany) have proposed contemplates precisely the possibility of the creation of new elective seats:

(b) no engagement on our part for the election of a member of the Little Entente in September, but no opposition in principle to such election.'

Also filed with the present despatch were records by Mr. Lampson of conversations with M. Massigli (see the enclosure below) and Herr von Schubert (not printed) on March 14. Herr von Schubert had informed Mr. Lampson of M. Uden's proposal and the German attitude thereto as recorded in No. 353. He had particularly emphasized that 'Germany's relations with Czecho-Slovakia were becoming fairly good, & he was especially anxious

GENEVA, *March 14, 1926*

In accordance with the Secretary of State's instructions² I this afternoon saw M. Massigli.

I began by saying that Sir Austen Chamberlain wished to impress on M. Briand the very critical attitude of the press both at home and in the Dominions regarding the present controversy. I went on to say, as instructed, that if Germany were not to enter the League and the Treaty of Locarno were thereby to fall through, then France would never get from us guarantees similar to those we gave her at Locarno. Neither the Secretary of State nor any other British Minister would be able to obtain for France any guarantee equivalent to that she now holds. I continued that Sir Austen Chamberlain had already put as great a strain on British public opinion, in order to reach an agreed settlement, as he dared do; and I referred M. Massigli to the attitude of General Smuts and to that consistently adopted by certain press organs having a large circulation both at home and in the Dominions which were frankly inimical to Locarno. Finally, I said that the Secretary of State fully endorsed all that I had already said to M. Massigli on two or three occasions regarding the folly of any action by France which might weaken the position of the Secretary of State, their best friend. If things went wrong as the result of their action here in Geneva, the whole policy towards France initiated and implemented at Locarno might well be wrecked.

M. Massigli listened with great attention to what I said and made a written note of it to lay before M. Briand. I impressed on him that this communication was made on direct instructions from the Secretary of State but with the friendliest intentions, in fact as a solemn warning in her own interests, of the perils which France would inevitably run if she were too unyielding.

M. Massigli said that as a matter of fact M. Briand fully realised the truth of this and that he would at once speak to M. Briand. After a few minutes he returned to say that M. Briand would go over and see Sir Austen Chamberlain in about an hour's time.

MILES W. LAMPSON

that Czecho-Slovakia should have no reason to suppose it was Germany who had made this suggestion [for Czechoslovakia's resignation from the Council]'.²

² In this connexion Sir A. Chamberlain minuted as follows on a submission by Mr. Lampson: 'For the sake of *the future* I attach great importance to France's not feeling humiliated by the settlement. A. C. 10 p.m. 14/3.'

No. 362

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received March 17, 6.15 p.m.)

No. 59 Telegraphic [C 3458/71/18]

GENEVA, *March 17, 1926, 4.5 p.m.*

Following from Mr. Lampson on behalf of Secretary of State for Cabinet, Dominions and India.

Late last night report reached Secretary General that at this morning's Assembly Brazilian delegate intended immediately after Secretary General had presented report to first commission and move in general terms¹ adjournment of Germany's application till September, to make declaration that present impasse was not due to Brazil.

Meanwhile to make position here quite clear, you should know that all the other South American representatives had addressed formal letter to Brazilian representative yesterday urging strongly that present was not time at which Latin America should stand in the way of a settlement.

As soon as Secretary of State heard of intentions of Brazilian delegate as recorded in first paragraph, he caused a special private meeting of the Council to be called for this morning immediately before Assembly meeting. At this he declared that he could not go to Tribune in uncertainty as to what Brazilian delegate intended to say nor could he do otherwise than support proposal which had just reached him from Norwegian representative, namely that Assembly should be adjourned for 3 days in order to allow normal League machinery to be set to work and in hope that Brazil might in the interval receive fresh instructions. After short discussion Mello Franco declared his instructions were irrevocable and definite and that he had not asked and could not ask for reconsideration of them.

Consequently when Assembly met Secretary of State opened proceedings by saying that Brazilian delegate wished to make a statement and that he, Sir A. Chamberlain, would reserve his remarks until after Brazilian delegate had spoken.

Rough summary of debate follows in my immediately following telegram.²

¹ In another text of this telegram the preceding passage read: 'report of First Commission and supported in general terms'.

² Not printed. The official minutes of this meeting on March 17 are printed in *League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 42*, pp. 25-34, and in the annex to Cmd. 2648. In his speech to this meeting Viscount Ishii, President of the Council, stated that he would propose to the Council the appointment of a committee to study the problems connected with the composition of the Council and the number and the method of election of its members. Viscount Ishii so reported on March 18 to the Council which adopted a resolution to the above effect. The resolution further provided that Germany should be included among the members of this committee. For the proceedings of the Council on March 18 see *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1926, pp. 527-39.

No. 363

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 17, 10 p.m.)

No. 75 Telegraphic [C 3461/71/18]

BERLIN, March 17, 1926, 8.50 p.m.

The news from Geneva last night caused great excitement. The only quarters in which failure of negotiations for entry of Germany into League of

Nations gave genuine pleasure were those of Volkische and Communist. The organs of these parties declare loudly that whole Locarno policy has broken down.

Among the more moderate papers of the Right main impression appears to be satisfaction that no blame can be attributed to Germany for the failure. Political circles at first thought that Luther-Stresemann government would have to resign but this view has been modified by publication of communiqué from Locarno powers and by speeches of yourself and M. Briand in council [Assembly] today.

In business circles tendency is to assert that negotiations of last week have proved that while five powers can work together as at Locarno, it is impossible to work with fifty powers. It is anticipated that as protocol was replaced by Pact¹ so will action by League of Nations be replaced for practical purposes by a narrower association of Locarno powers. The opinion expressed by papers of the Left is one of satisfaction that Locarno powers have held together. They regard it as grotesque that a country like Brazil should hold up the whole of Europe; they attribute the Brazilian attitude to some sinister influence, probably Mussolini. The non-participation of Italian delegates in today's debate has aroused comment.

'Boersen Kourier', while expressing satisfaction at communiqué, regrets that Locarno powers did not go further and declare that Rhineland pact would come into force immediately, the condition regarding Germany's entry into League of Nations being abrogated or suspended.

¹ The Geneva Protocol; the Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

No. 364

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 18, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 121 Telegraphic: by bag [C 3464/24/18]

PARIS, March 17, 1926

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

2. Following is text of Mixed Committee's reply to M. Massigli.

3. Les experts alliés pensent qu'il est nécessaire de rappeler que les Puissances alliées n'ont pas cessé depuis le début des négociations en cours au sujet de l'aviation de faire preuve de l'esprit le plus conciliant.

4. Si les dispositions sur lesquelles un accord semble dès maintenant acquis entrain[en]t aujourd'hui en vigueur, l'aviation allemande bénéficierait d'une liberté presque entière. Cette liberté, résultat de l'esprit de Locarno, avait comme contre partie, aux yeux des Alliés l'interdiction absolue de la pratique de l'aviation pour les membres de la Reichswehr et de la Marine.

¹ Not printed. This telegram of March 17 reported that in reply to No. 352 M. Massigli had enquired 'whether the Mixed Committee was prepared to offer more liberal terms to the Germans'.

5. Même sur ce point, une ultime concession vient d'être consentie, concession traduite dans la dernière formule communiquée au Secrétariat de la Conférence.²

6. Il ne paraît pas possible de se montrer plus libéral sans ouvrir la porte à la reconstitution de l'aviation militaire allemande, sauf toutefois à porter le chiffre de 12 au maximum de 15; ou à revenir à la première solution mentionnée dans notre communication du 15 Mars, de 3 pilotes par an, mais avec 12 comme chiffre de début et 36 comme chiffre global maximum. Pour l'une et l'autre formule les modalités d'application seraient à préciser ultérieurement.

7. La Délégation allemande a du reste, au début des négociations, spontanément et à plusieurs reprises indiqué que la question de l'autorisation de piloter pour les membres de la Reichswehr et de la Marine ne présente pour le Gouvernement allemand *aucun intérêt pratique*, mais qu'elle a seulement un caractère moral, et que le Gouvernement allemand ne l'a soulevée que pour éviter de frapper les membres de la Reichswehr et de la Marine [d']une interdiction qui ne vise pas les autres citoyens allemands.

² See No. 352.

No. 365

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 18)

No. 515 [C 3516/1134/18]*

PARIS, March 18, 1926

His Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the German Embassy, Paris, of the 3rd March, 1926, respecting export of war material from Germany.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 365

M. von Hoesch to M. Briand

Traduction

PARIS, le 3 mars 1926

M. le Président,

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence ce qui suit:

Par lettre¹ du 12 février 1926, la Commission militaire interalliée de Contrôle a fait savoir au Gouvernement allemand que la Conférence des Ambassadeurs ne se rallie pas à l'opinion du Gouvernement allemand, selon laquelle l'interprétation du terme 'matériel de guerre', fixée dans l'accord

¹ Untraced in Foreign Office archives. This letter was sent in pursuance of the resolution of the Conference of Ambassadors on January 27: see No. 221, § 4.

de Genève du 17 juin 1925 concernant le contrôle international du commerce des armes, devra être applicable en même temps aux articles 170 et 192 du Traité de Versailles. En invoquant la note collective des Gouvernements alliés du 4 juin 1925, la Commission militaire interalliée de Contrôle a invité le Gouvernement allemand, dans une nouvelle lettre² du 16 février 1926, à soumettre bientôt à son examen les lois et ordonnances entrant en considération concernant le matériel de guerre. En même temps, elle a communiqué une liste, établie par elle, qui devra servir de règle pour l'interprétation future de ce terme.

Il n'est pas dans les intentions du Gouvernement allemand d'entrer, pour le moment, dans la discussion de la question de savoir si l'énumération du matériel de guerre, contenue dans cette liste, est acceptable pour lui. Il tient à se borner à faire ressortir que, par les mesures législatives prises dès 1921, il a créé une réglementation qui tient compte des obligations de désarmement qui lui sont imposées sous ce rapport par le Traité de Versailles.

Toutefois, le terme 'matériel de guerre' a acquis depuis une importance particulière du point de vue du problème du désarmement général. Il est apparu que ce terme ne saurait être apprécié seulement du point de vue militaire, mais qu'à ce sujet des points de vue économique et politique se trouvent au premier plan. En limitant ce terme pour l'avenir, il convient de tenir particulièrement compte de ce que les intérêts pacifiques des peuples dans le domaine de la production et du commerce ne soient pas préjudiciés d'une manière constituant pour eux une charge insupportable. Par ailleurs, la solution du problème de créer ici une compensation n'intéresse non seulement les États qui ont été soumis au désarmement en vertu des traités spéciaux, mais d'une manière égale tous les peuples coopérant à la réalisation de l'idée du désarmement général. En partant de cette notion, des corps internationaux les plus divers se sont occupés, au cours des dernières années, de l'étude de cette question; la Société des Nations elle-même s'en est saisie et a institué des comptes spéciaux chargés de cette étude. A cette occasion, il est apparu que pour l'appréciation des graves problèmes que cette question implique, sont seuls compétents des experts intimement au courant de toutes les questions de l'activité économique internationale.

En présence de cet état de choses, le Gouvernement allemand croit qu'il est inadmissible de développer encore sa législation d'une manière qui ne correspond pas au caractère international de la question. Il espère que, dans le traitement ultérieur de la question, la Conférence des Ambassadeurs se laissera guider par les mêmes considérations et avisera en ce sens la Commission militaire interalliée de Contrôle.

Veuillez agréer, &c.,
HOESCH

² Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

Record by Mr. Lampson (Geneva) of a conversation with Dr. Benes¹
 [C 3712/1618/62]

GENEVA, March 18, 1926

I have just had a very hurried conversation with Dr. Benes, who had asked to see me before I left.

He began by referring to the recent arbitration treaty which he had concluded with Austria. He said that he thought we would agree that this was in entire consonance with the policy of conciliation which he knew we favoured in Central and South Eastern Europe. He said that the Treaty had already had its effect upon the public opinion of Austria and his own country, and he thought we should see a great improvement in their relations.

He then turned to the question of Germany. He said that there was a marked improvement already in their relations. Only yesterday Dr. Luther and Dr. Stresemann had lunched with him, and they had covered the whole field of politics. He had found them very well disposed, and he said that his offer to resign his seat on the Council in order to help the Germans out of their difficulties had made a most favourable impression.

It had even had its repercussion in Czechoslovakia itself, where it had to some extent under-mined the attitude of hostility adopted towards the Czech Government by the Deutsch-Bohmen. He confessed with a smile that this was one of the reasons why he had made the proposal.

He then turned to Hungary, where, as he said, relations were far from good. He ran over the old ground of the forgeries, and ended by stating that although he had proof that Count Bethlen had at least known of these Czech forgeries as long ago as 1923, yet he (Dr. Benes) had no intention of provoking an incident with Hungary or of trying to drive Count Bethlen from power. He realised that Bethlen was in fact the best man at the moment. He went on to say that he had hoped that by this time he might have been able to initiate some policy of conciliation with Hungary also, but he found that now next to impossible. He was afraid it would have to wait a while yet.

I interposed that I was sure he was right. I had seen Count Bethlen, and the latter had said to me that anxious as he was to be friendly with all his neighbours, opinion in Hungary was at the moment at such white heat that he was afraid there was no possibility of anything of that sort with the Czechs. Dr. Benes said there were certain things he did wish he could get the Hungarians to settle with him. Once that was done he might endeavour to start some definite move for conciliation. I pressed him as to what the particular matters in dispute were. He said they referred to such things as the surrender by the Hungarian authorities of the archives of the ceded territories and other small matters of that kind. I told him that our policy was to encourage conciliation wherever possible. When the excitement caused by the forgery scandals had subsided perhaps something might be done about it; but it

¹ A copy of this record was received in the Foreign Office on March 22.

seemed fairly clear that at the present moment it would be unwise to make any such suggestion. Dr. Benes then alluded quite cursorily to all these suggestions for international agreements in Central and South Eastern Europe, but he added nothing of any material importance.

Finally, he told me for the information of the Secretary of State that when in Vienna he had seen Dr. Ramek, with whom he had discussed the question of the Anschluss, and he was glad to say that Dr. Ramek had stated quite positively—and it was recorded in the official minutes of the meeting—that there was no question whatever of the Anschluss. Dr. Benes, for his part, had assured Dr. Ramek that his attitude was based entirely on the Geneva protocol for the Austrian loan² and the provisions of the peace treaty bearing on the question. He wished me to mention this to Sir Austen Chamberlain. He added that the Anschluss had undoubtedly gained all the importance that it had from the excessive fears and talk of those countries who were afraid of it.

He ended by saying that if at any moment we had any confidential message of a personal character or any line which we wished to suggest to him, we could feel confidence in telling M. Masaryk, the Czech Minister in London, who was a thoroughly reliable person.

M. W. LAMPSON

² The Protocols of October 4, 1922, are printed in Cmd. 1765 of 1922.

No. 367

Letter from Mr. Lampson (Geneva) to Mr. Howard Smith
(Received March 22)
[C 3608/24/18]

GENEVA, March 18, 1926

Dear Howard Smith,

In my letter of March 17¹ (see pages 3 and 4) I mentioned that Massigli, Schubert and I had had a few words together on that very dull question, aviation. Since then there have been important developments. It appears that when Stresemann was saying Good-bye to Briand last night, he made an appeal to him not to be too rigid regarding the subject and Briand practically assured him that he would give instructions for the matter to be settled forthwith. Massigli told me this at once. I said I was delighted, for really it was very unedifying that we should be haggling with the Germans whether they should have the right for 6 or 12 members of the Reichswehr to learn to fly per annum. It savoured, to my mind, of bargaining in an Oriental bazaar. Shortly afterwards I saw the Secretary of State and he then told me that he fully agreed; I cannot remember at the moment whether he said that Stresemann had mentioned it to him or not, but in any case he fully agreed that we should do all we can finally to dispose of this ridiculous wrangle with the Germans.

¹ Not printed. Mr. Lampson recorded that he, M. Massigli and Herr von Schubert had 'agreed that both sides would make a serious attempt to get this matter [aviation] finally disposed of'.

At the Council meeting this morning I had a few words with Massigli when bidding him Good-bye, and reminded him that he was going to have this question tidied up without further delay. He undertook that he would do so. I said that anything acceptable to the Germans which the French could evolve would receive our concurrence, and that if it were necessary I would undertake to square our Air Ministry at home.

We also had a few words about the question of German police in the Rhineland and Massigli agreed without hesitation that it was of practically no importance whether Germany had an extra 5,000 there or not. He felt pretty certain that M. Briand also would take that view and he would bring the matter before him as soon as he could after his return to Paris.²

I have sent a copy of this letter to Hugessen in Paris.

Yours ever,

MILES W. LAMPSON

² On March 19 Mr. Lampson recorded a conversation in Paris that afternoon with M. Léger who was 'strongly of the opinion that the improvement of relations between France and Germany there [at Geneva] achieved would prove of real benefit to both countries. Basing myself on that remark I said that in that case it might perhaps be wise to be not over rigid in the matter of Germany's request for a few thousand extra police in the Rhineland.' M. Léger said he would speak to M. Briand on the matter.

No. 368

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received March 22)

No. 248 [C 3633/71/18]

Confidential

ROME, March 19, 1926

Sir,

In a brief conversation which I had with the Prime Minister last night, Signor Mussolini referred to the course of recent events at Geneva and expressed his regret at a result which he had however regarded as inevitable. A postponement of the questions at issue until September was the only possible solution and at least the Locarno agreement had been saved, which was important, although the League of Nations had suffered a severe blow. But that organisation had, he declared, inherent defects which were bound to render it subject to such failures. It was ridiculous that great powers might find themselves exposed to having their policy controlled or even negatived by a combination of Central American or other exotic and insignificant States.

2. The insinuations in the foreign press that the Brazilian attitude owed its inflexibility to the support of a great power—Italy being clearly indicated—has [*sic*] aroused considerable indignation in the Italian newspapers. But rumours to this effect are current in various Italian circles also and a connection has even been mooted between the resignation of Senator Contarini¹

¹ In this connexion Sir R. Graham had reported in his telegram No. 75 of March 17 that Senator Contarini had informed him 'that while nothing could exceed his personal

and the question. I confess that I cannot altogether account for this resignation, which Signor Mussolini has so far refused to accept, or for the evident 'malaise' that reigns at present in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I asked Signor Mussolini whether Monsieur Souza Dantas (see my despatch No. 186² of the 27th ultimo) had in his conversations here given any indication of the attitude that the Brazilian Government had subsequently adopted. Signor Mussolini replied in the negative, stating that he had nothing to add to what he had already told me on the subject. Monsieur Souza Dantas had asked for Italian support for the Brazilian claim to a permanent seat on the Council. Signor Mussolini had replied that if new permanent seats were created Italy would not be found in opposition to the Brazilian claim, but he had gone no further than this. Possibly your experience at Geneva may have enabled you to form some more definite conclusion as regards the Italian attitude in connection with that of Brazil.

I have, &c.,
R. GRAHAM

devotion and admiration for Mussolini he finds his own position almost untenable owing to various currents that surround Prime Minister. He is evidently out of sympathy with certain trends of Mussolini's policy but was reticent on this head. My impression is that he thinks Mussolini is going too far in an anti-German sense and in attempting to establish predominant Italian influence in Central Europe.'

² Not printed. M. Souza Dantas, Brazilian Ambassador at Paris and delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations, had had conversations on February 26 with Signor Grandi and Signor Mussolini.

No. 369

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 23, 9 a.m.)

No. 79 Telegraphic [C 3755/71/18]

BERLIN, March 22, 1926, 10.5 p.m.

Dr. Stresemann opened the debate on foreign policy to-day with a review of the negotiations at Geneva.¹ He concluded with an outline of Germany's future policy.² His principal points were: (1) Germany did not try to force her way into the League. The other Powers made Germany's entry into the League a pre-condition for Locarno agreements. Accordingly, it was their duty to facilitate Germany's entry in every way. Hence Germany's astonishment on learning that changes were contemplated at Geneva tantamount to reconstruction of the Council.

(2) At an early stage of the Geneva negotiations the English attitude was that, if Germany adhered to her standpoint, England would vote for her

¹ Cf. Lord D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 240, for Lord D'Abernon's account of a conversation on this subject with Dr. Stresemann on March 21.

² An incomplete English version of this speech is printed in *Gustav Stresemann, op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 509-26; see also *The Times*, March 23, 1926, p. 15.

alone, and against other claimants. Incidentally, Sir A. Chamberlain and M. Briand stated on March 4th [7th]³ that there was no obligation binding on the constitutional authorities of their respective countries to support any other claimants.

(3) Germany's refusal to accept the proposal to establish one extra non-permanent seat threatened alienation of world opinion, hitherto favourable to her.

(4) Sweden's sacrifice was made without any interference on Germany's part and led to a very difficult position. By obtaining a double change within the Council which restored balance of forces, the German delegation won a great success.

(5) As regards Brazil's veto, there was some justification for the excuse that Brazil was opposed to the Europeanization of the League. The Plenary Assembly had to wait ten days before it was convened as the attitude of the Locarno Powers was complicated by personal promises made to certain states.

(6) Germany welcomed the agreement between the Locarno Powers that the policy of Locarno was to be continued.

(7) It was decided at Geneva that Germany's application to enter the League should not be withdrawn. Germany was faced with the decision whether she should change her attitude to the League, or not. Was the Geneva episode to be regarded as a defeat for Germany, or not? It was not a defeat. The mere fact that a policy encountered difficulties was not a proof that that policy was wrong.

Before the war, and during the war, Germany underestimated the factor of public opinion in the world. She must not do so again. She must not expose herself to the charge of responsibility for the breakdown at Geneva.

(8) Immense importance was to be attached to certificate given by commission of the League that Germany had fulfilled her international obligations.

(9) As regards the proposed commission of investigation, the Cabinet had not yet come to a decision, as no official invitation had arrived. What would public opinion in Germany have said if the proposed commission had been so constituted as not to include Germany?

(10) Germany's position was in no way weakened. All the Locarno Powers were agreed as to the maintenance and continuance of the Locarno policy.

(11) It would be stupid to turn one's back on the League because the mechanism of the League had failed. The League was indispensable for the re-establishment of economic relations between the peoples.

(12) Was not the crisis in the League caused by the fact that the League was ceasing to be a victor organisation?

(13) Their main task had been to rescue the Locarno policy. German opinion laid too much stress on so-called 'reactions'. It would be illogical to continue the occupation of the second and third zones permanently.

³ See *Gustav Stresemann, op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 514, for this reference to the meeting recorded in No. 327.

M. Briand, in the Chamber, admitted that his (Stresemann's) reading of article 431 of the treaty of Versailles was justified.⁴

(14) German extremists had jeered at French promises, yet the Cologne zone was evacuated.

The general line of foreign policy since 1919 was justified by events, especially the evacuation of the first zone. The German government were determined to continue their foreign policy.

The speech was received with loud applause by the Coalition and Social Democrat parties, and generally regarded as an outstanding success.

⁴ Cf. No. 438, paragraph 18.

No. 370

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 23, 9 a.m.)

No. 80 Telegraphic [C 3736/71/18]

BERLIN, March 22, 1926, 10.5 p.m.

It was noticeable in Stresemann's speech today that he avoided all criticism of the position of Spain and Brazil and studiously refrained from any expression of offence to Poland. The speech was apparently designed not to arouse opposition to Germany's subsequent election. He made a flattering reference to military achievement of certain Balkan states and criticised German public opinion for having frequently under-rated the power of smaller countries.

No. 371

Lord Kilmaarnock (Coblentz) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received March 26)

No. 59 [C 3878/738/18]

COBLENZ, March 23, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to report that President von Hindenburg visited Cologne on the 21st instant to attend the ceremonies which took place in celebration of the freeing of the first zone from occupation.

The local spokesman was the Chief Burgermeister Dr. Adenauer, who distinguished himself by indulging in a speech which can scarcely be called conciliatory. He went back to the beginning of the occupation, and described in lyrical vein the departure of the last German regiment from Cologne, and the arrival of the British troops. His language was, I regret to say, calculated to revive bitter memories, and seemed singularly out of place at the present moment. Such phrases as 'the pride of the victors was unbearable'; 'unbearable was the triumphant blare of their regimental music' are samples of the tone of his speech. A grudging admission that 'we do not wish to deny

the honourable attitude of many of our opponents' is followed by a reference to the 'hard fist of the victor', to the 'unbearable burdens and mental martyrdom of countless families' and 'many hundred years imprisonment awarded by British courts', and finally a tribute to the names of 'no small number of men women and children who lost their lives under the British occupation'.

All the above goes to show what the real feelings of many influential Germans are, for Doctor Adenauer would scarcely have indulged in these diatribes had he not been convinced that they were acceptable to his audience. The cynicism of his attitude is increased by the well known fact that he himself telegraphed to General Plumer¹ asking him to hasten his arrival in Cologne owing to the fear of disturbances on the part of Communists. The only other recognition of the conciliatory spirit shown by the British Army, is the grudging statement that 'in the course of years when the English got to know us better, the conditions of the occupation gradually changed, but they remained heavy enough'. The speaker tried to excuse himself for the tone of his speech by saying 'why do I speak of all this at this time?, not to incite or to revile, but because we owe it to history at this historical moment to speak openly and with truth, so that the whole world should recognise that an occupation by a foreign power is never an instrument of peace and of understanding . . .² away with this source of unrest, away with the whole Rhenish occupation'. The hypocrisy of this pretext recalls the well known device of those writers who seek to justify the publication of offensive literature on the ground that they hope thereby to bring about the remedy of the abuses which they describe with gusto.

Doctor Adenauer concluded, it is true, with a somewhat perfunctory eulogy of Locarno, viewed solely from the standpoint of German interests and expectations. He was followed by the Prussian Minister of the Interior, Herr Severing, whose speech was perfectly reasonable and discreet.

President von Hindenberg [*sic*] confined himself chiefly to historical enthusiasm for the Rhine, and his reference to foreign occupation did not exceed the bounds of discretion.³

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

¹ Units of the Second British Army, commanded by General Sir H. Plumer, occupied Cologne on December 6, 1918.

² Punctuation as in original quotation.

³ On March 29 in Berlin despatch No. 169 Lord D'Abernon transmitted to the Foreign Office Cologne despatch No. 6 to Berlin of March 24, in which H.M. Consul-General, Mr. Dunn, reported on President von Hindenburg's visit. Mr. Dunn stated in particular 'without the attraction of the central figure of the President, whose popularity is undoubted, it is improbable that a celebration of the event of the freeing of the Zone would have aroused so much enthusiasm, especially at this time of depression in trade and industry.' In his covering despatch Lord D'Abernon stated that the President's 'strictly constitutional attitude and restraint upon this occasion are deserving of praise and are in keeping with the sense of honour and impartiality he has exhibited since assuming his high office. While the speeches and proceedings were adequately reported in the German Press, no widespread interest appeared to be aroused, nor was there any comment worthy of note. This may be

attributed to the fact that public interest was still concentrated on the outcome of the Geneva negotiations and the pending debates in the Reichstag, House of Commons and elsewhere.¹

No. 372

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir H. Rumbold (Madrid)

No. 145 [C 3824/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 24, 1926*

Sir,

The Spanish Ambassador called to-day to bid me farewell before going on leave.

We had a little conversation about events at Geneva, and the Ambassador asked if he had rightly understood the Prime Minister's declaration in the House of Commons last night as meaning that His Majesty's Government could not now undertake to continue their support of Spain's claim to a permanent seat on the Council of the League.¹ I replied that we felt that events at Geneva had created a new situation. It was not now a question of one or perhaps two additional permanent seats, but of half a dozen. In these circumstances we must enter the proposed commission with a clean slate free of any promise or commitment whatsoever. I did not conceal my own opinion that the Assembly had been scared by this outcrop of demands, and that it was now less likely than before that unanimity would be secured in the Council for any addition except Germany, and even if such unanimity were reached in Council, unlikely that the Assembly would give its assent.²

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ For Mr. Baldwin's statement on March 23 see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 193, cols. 1170-6.

² In his despatch No. 3825 to Paris of March 24 Sir A. Chamberlain recorded that he had spoken similarly to the French Ambassador, and had 'further observed that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, it was essential that the rule of unanimity should be maintained even though we deplored the use or abuse which Brazil had made of her right'.

No. 373

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received March 26, 9.30 a.m.)

No. 84 Telegraphic [C 3872/71/18]

BERLIN, *March 25, 1926, 7.25 p.m.*

Wolff publishes text of Brazilian reply of December 1st 1924 on Germany's entry into League of Nations and together with this a text of a long semi-official commentary arguing that Brazilian reply did not justify doubt or suspicion as to Brazilian attitude on German admission question.¹

¹ See *The Times*, March 25, 1926, p. 15, and March 26, p. 13; cf. No. 302, note 3.

In connection with above, Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call on him yesterday evening.

I found His Excellency in a state of considerable nervous excitement.

He said:

(1) That your speech,² giving only a portion of Brazilian reply, was unfair and gave an incorrect impression.

(2) That your deduction that German government ought to have scented danger was quite unjustified, if whole tone and tenour of Brazilian reply was considered.

(3) That German government would be placed in a most difficult position by your speech; the opposition would take advantage of what you said and refuse to vote for Foreign Office estimate in third reading.

Minister for Foreign Affairs wanted me to telegraph at once a repudiation by German government of accusation made of want of care and foresight.

In reply I pointed out that general tone of your speech had been not only fair to Germany but complimentary. Before taking definite action or making any remonstrance I advised waiting till he had full English text.

This course, Minister for Foreign Affairs after some difficulty and with considerable reluctance decided to adopt.

I shall see him again this evening.

Full text³ of Wolff publication by bag.

² For Sir A. Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons on March 23 see *Parl. Debts.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 193, cols. 1069-85.

³ Not printed.

No. 374

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 25, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 85 Telegraphic [C 3871/71/18]

BERLIN, March 25, 1926, 8.10 p.m.

My telegram No. 84.¹

Minister for Foreign Affairs was in far serener mood today as there has been no sign in the press of any serious attack on government based upon your speech. I went through your speech with him and convinced him that there was little ground for his apprehension.

He is particularly anxious that you should take opportunity of repeating the denial that at Locarno any definite promise was given by you regarding a permanent seat to any power. The thesis of the opposition here is that at Locarno while England was negotiating with simple minded German delegates she was entering upon secret engagements with other powers to the detriment of Germany. It is of high importance to nail this lie to the counter.

¹ No. 373.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 27, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 132 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/11]

PARIS, March 25, 1926

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the Presidency of Monsieur Jules Cambon. I was present as well as the Italian and Japanese Ambassadors. The Belgian Ambassador and a representative of the United States Embassy also attended. The following questions were considered: . . .¹

2. *Speech by German Minister for War respecting German Budget.*² The conference approved a proposal by the Versailles committee (see my despatch No. 561³ of today) that the German government should be informed that the fact that the Control Commission had made no observations on the German Budget, did not imply its approval thereof. The commission had not been authorised to comment to the German government on its budget since June 4th, 1925.

3. *List of war material not contained in the Geneva Convention of June 17th, 1925.* The Versailles committee's report of March 18th (see my despatch No. 560)⁴ was approved and a reference was accordingly made to the naval advisers. It was also decided, under my reserve, to authorise the Secretariat-General to prepare a reply to the German Embassy's note of March 3rd (see my despatch No. 515⁵ of March 18th) maintaining the conference decision of November last.⁶ This reply will be sent to you in draft form as soon as it is ready. . . .¹

¹ The omitted sections related to other matters.

² The reference was presumably to Dr. Gessler's speech to the Reichstag on March 3 regarding the Reichswehr estimates. For figures regarding German military and naval expenditure from 1919 to 1926 see *Parl. Deb.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 192, col. 750. These figures showed estimated increases in expenditure for 1926, as compared with 1925, of 68 million marks for the army and 48 million marks for the navy.

³ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives.

⁴ Not printed. This report transmitted a table indicating 57 items contained in the Control Commission's list of war material which were not in the Geneva Convention of 1925, and proposed that the naval experts should examine those items in the table which concerned naval material.

⁵ No. 365.

⁶ See No. 115.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 26)

No. 555 [C 3832/24/18]

PARIS, March 25, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to report that Dr. Nord returned from Berlin yesterday and that a conversation took place between him and Monsieur Massigli on the subject of the future of German aviation.

2. Dr. Nord appeared to have brought no fresh instructions in regard to the question of flying by the personnel of the Reichswehr and Navy, at all events he made no suggestion that he was in possession of such instructions. He pointed out, however, to Monsieur Massigli that a new difficulty existed, viz., that there were actually 35 Reichswehr officers flying at the present time and that there were in existence at present no regulations to prevent such flying. It would, therefore, be almost impossible to take steps to prevent them from doing in future what they were allowed to do at present. The Mixed Committee after some discussion took the view that it would be advisable in the circumstances, for Monsieur Massigli to inform Dr. Nord that they were willing to agree that a maximum of 35 personnel of the Reichswehr and Navy should be allowed in future to fly at their own expense and in their own time without special leave. The names of such personnel should be maintained on a list. Not more than three changes per annum should be allowed in this list, including replacements in consequence of accidents, etc., or for any other reason. This would effectually prevent Germany from building up a reserve Air Force.

3. Dr. Nord communicated to Monsieur Massigli the two memoranda,¹ copies of which are enclosed herein. Enclosure 1 gives an explanation of the German reasons for requiring aviation training for a certain number of members of their police force. Subject to the general limitations and conditions already outlined in the draft proposals dealing with this question, the Mixed Committee consider that the number of 50 asked for by the Germans would appear to be reasonable.

4. The second memorandum dealt with the question of flying and aerodromes in the Rhineland. As far as flying over the occupied territory is concerned, this would appear to be a matter for the Rhineland High Commission to settle in the first instance. As regards aerodromes in the Rhineland it would seem that the British delegates should agree to any solution acceptable to the French and German delegates.²

¹ Not printed.

² Sir A. Chamberlain replied on April 1 in Foreign Office despatch No. 1040 to Paris. As regards flight over the Rhineland, he referred to No. 297, and authorized Lord Crewe to fall in with any arrangement agreeable to the other delegations. 'The chief thing is that this question should not be allowed to hold up the whole aeronautical settlement.' As regards aerodromes in the Rhineland Lord Crewe was authorized to agree to any solution

5. I should be grateful if a copy of this despatch could be communicated to the Air Ministry.

I have, &c.,
CREWE

acceptable to the French Government, though the Air Ministry hoped that aerodromes for international air transport could be maintained at Cologne and Frankfurt.

No. 377

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received March 29)

No. 265 [C 4002/77/22]

ROME, March 25, 1926

Sir,

Since the advent of Signor Mussolini's Government to power one of the favourite expressions, both of the Duce himself and of the other spokesmen of the party, has been the 'Fascist State', the foundation of which has been a principal item in the Government programme. The series of laws recently passed, or certain to be adopted, indicates the lines on which the Government is working towards the realisation of this ideal and it may be of interest to examine shortly the system which is being built up. The laws themselves have already formed the subject of despatches from this Embassy, and I do not therefore propose again to describe them in detail, or to consider them from points of view other than that indicated above.

2. In the first place it will be remarked that the system will provide for the enrolment of children at an early age in the Fascist ranks, and that the children who have been brought up as members of the 'Balilla' organisation will naturally pass on into the national militia and later into the Fascist unions or possibly the Fascist association of employers. The 'Balilla' members are to be given preferential treatment in connexion with their military service—a preference which may very probably be justified in practice by the training they have received—and membership of the organisation should thus have a considerable attraction, and it should be possible to select applicants so as to secure the type of material desired.

3. When at a later stage the young man begins his industrial life, the new labour legislation is so designed that there is every advantage in membership of the party unions, forming part of the Confederation of Fascist Corporations, as compared with the old 'tolerated' unions. The effect of the new law relative to the recognition of syndicates, combined with the agreement between the General Confederation of Industry and the Confederation of Fascist Corporations, is to place exclusively in the hands of the Fascist unions the power of negotiating respecting conditions of labour, while the other unions will apparently afford their members but little benefit in return for their subscription. It is perhaps too soon to say whether this legislation, forbidding as it does any recourse to strikes or lockouts, will survive any

severe and prolonged industrial slump, but so long as it remains on the statute book it forms a strong inducement to joining the party in power.

4. There is of course an element of possible weakness in the very fact that membership of the party is now of considerable practical advantage to persons in all walks of life. Announcements have been made on several occasions that applications from new entrants are to be scrutinised with special care, but there can be little doubt that the party now includes in its ranks a number of members who have joined rather for their private convenience than from conviction.

5. Recent legislation is also designed to improve the processes of administration and to strengthen the hands of the Government, and the laws for the institution of 'Podestà'¹ instead of elected mayors in the smaller communes, to increase the powers of the prefects, and to define the functions of the Prime Minister, are of importance from this point of view. The Prime Minister is now responsible to the King alone, and can, through his power of veto over the questions to be included in the order of the day, exercise a remarkable degree of control over the procedure of parliament. The Podestà will replace the mayor in all communes of under 5,000 inhabitants and, in certain circumstances, also in larger communities. The elected representatives of the commune will have simply an advisory capacity, and the new system should result in making the power and policy of the Government more directly felt in large areas of the country.

6. There is one further point to which attention may be drawn in connexion with the 'Podestà' law; and that is the introduction of a system of functional representation in the advisory councils. This system also reappears in the council which advises the new Governor of Rome, and in this case provides for the election of members representing various professions, educational bodies and similar institutions. At Rome the largest number of members is to be elected by the Federation of Fascist Syndical Corporations, and the further development of this method of election and its introduction into other fields, is not unlikely.

7. The general effect of this legislation is thus two-fold: it directly strengthens the position of the Central Government, and it also favours the influence and authority of the party by according a preference in labour and other questions to the Fascist organisations.

8. While the position which is thus being established is sufficiently formidable, the question of defending it from Opposition attacks has not been overlooked. Press criticism of internal affairs has been for all practical purposes suppressed, and the use recently made of the law providing penalties for 'offences against the Prime Minister, either by word or deed' show[s] that this act will by no means be allowed to remain a dead letter. Reports have begun to appear relative to the operation of the law providing for the loss of Italian citizenship and other penalties incurred by émigrés who attack the Government, but, though this law is likely to be made full use of, no decisions in any such cases have as yet been announced. Parliamentary criticism is

¹ A mayor appointed by royal decree.

also negligible [*sic*] at present, but the absence of the Aventine Opposition² must be ascribed in large measure to the mistaken policy of its leaders, and it is too early to say to what extent parliamentary discussions on ordinary lines will reappear as part of Italian life.

9. There still remains one point—the use of violence—which cannot be ignored even in the briefest sketch of the present theory of Fascism. The speeches condoning³ the use of force which have been made by the party leaders have never been so worded as to imply the complete abandonment of this method. What they condemn is sporadic and unauthorized acts of violence, but the recourse to the strong arm, in cases which appear to the leaders to be suitable, has always been safeguarded. The temptation to employ violent methods has naturally constantly decreased with the strengthening of the Government and the disappearance of opposition, but the threat is still present.

10. The total result of the recent legislation has been to place Signor Mussolini and his party in a position which seems almost unassailable, so far as Italian internal politics are concerned. In many respects the methods employed are, as has so often been said, reminiscent of Communist policy in Russia, and the parties have perhaps a further point in common in the necessity for a discipline, strict enough to avoid the only obvious danger which must always exist, that of an internal split.

I have, &c.,
R. GRAHAM

² In June 1924, following the assassination of Signor Giacomo Matteotti, Secretary of the Unitary Socialist Party, about 150 members of the Socialist, Popular, Republican, and Constitutional Democratic parties had withdrawn from the Chamber of Deputies.

³ It was suggested on the filed copy that this word should read 'condemning'.

No. 378

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 26, 9 a.m.)

No. 86 Telegraphic [C 3888/234/18]

BERLIN, March 26, 1926, 1.20 a.m.

Following is my view of general position here.

Although Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs are nervous and sensitive about criticism of their action at Geneva the whole course of recent debate in Reichstag constituted a great success for government. Both Ministers took their stand firmly upon further prosecution of policy of Locarno. They made Locarno the central plank of Germany's foreign policy.

This attitude has received general approbation and even speakers of the Right have made no serious attack upon it. Such criticism as has been made was destitute of serious argument and no speaker put forward any new policy. Indeed it is probable that in their hearts, no one regretted delay in securing Germany's entry into League of Nations more than German national

party. While they attacked proposal to join League of Nations, they are anxious for nothing so much as to get question settled and out of the way so as to render possible their re-entry into government.

If Locarno reactions can be pushed on rapidly there is no reason why Geneva and the subsequent debates on it should not come to be regarded here as having confirmed and strengthened Locarno basis.

By Locarno reactions I mean reduction of Rhineland troops, settlement of air convention and conclusion of disarmament. As regards two latter, outstanding differences can hardly be considered important by either side.

As regards former, rapid decision would do more than anything to strengthen position of German government and give them the authority necessary to accept sensible compromise on subjects of disarmament and air.

Would it not be possible to treat these two questions together, arriving at rapid joint solution?

Special reason for speed is that government here while commanding a strong majority on foreign policy are threatened by possible criticism on internal finance and taxation.

No. 379

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 26, 12 noon)

No. 87 Telegraphic [W 2559/223/98]

BERLIN, March 26, 1926, 10.32 a.m.

Germany's representation on commission of League of Nations.

Invitation to take part in this commission¹ has now been received by German government but no decision has yet been taken and considerable hesitation is felt.

German government appear inclined to send a representative but question whether he could vote before Germany is a member of League. They fear that on legal grounds such participation of a non-member might invalidate legality of commission's findings.

Above reaches me from a confidential source and is not in any way official.

¹ Cf. No. 362, note 2.

No. 380

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received March 27, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 133 Telegraphic: by bag [C 3909/24/18]

PARIS, March 26, 1926

My despatch No. 555¹ of March 25th. (German Aviation).

2. Dr. Nord had a further conversation with Monsieur Massigli on

¹ No. 376.

March 25th. Monsieur Massigli suggested to him a maximum of 36 as the number of personnel of Reichswehr and Navy which would be allowed to fly. German Delegates protested vigorously at this figure which they asserted to be contrary to conversations which had taken place at Geneva between Herr Stresemann, Monsieur Briand and yourself.

3. Finally the German Delegates proposed the following formula, provisionally and on their own responsibility.

‘A titre exceptionnel, les membres de la Reichswehr et de la Marine, qui en feront la demande, pourront être autorisés à piloter à titre privé, mais en ce qui concerne l’aviation de sport seule et à leurs propres frais, et il ne leur sera accordé, à cet effet, par les autorités [*sic*] allemandes, aucune subvention ni congé spéciaux.’

‘Le nombre global des autorisations qui seront délivrées me [*sic*] dépassera pas le chiffre de 100, ce chiffre ne pouvant pas être atteint avant une période de 10 ans.’

4. It was understood that the German proposal meant that the 36 Reichswehr officers now flying should be allowed to continue and that this number should be increased annually by 6 until a maximum of 100 had been reached.

5. I am not yet aware of the final views of the French Government upon this proposal although they appear most unfavourable to it. As far as the British delegates are concerned, I assume that no objection need be raised if the French agree. It would seem, however, important to secure that the Germans cannot set up a system whereby officers on the list of those allowed to fly are passed rapidly to the reserve and their places filled by others. It is worth noting that the German formula provides against special leave for flying and retains the expression: à leur propres frais.

6. As regards aerodromes, the German Delegates handed in a list of those which the Reich desired to use permanently in the occupied territory and in the demilitarized zone. This list is as follows: (a) in occupied territory, Coblenz, Aix la Chapelle, Mayence, Treves: (b) demilitarized zone: Fribourg, Carlsruhe, Mannheim, Darmstadt, Francfort, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Essen, Crefeld, Elberfeld Barmen.

7. Asked why the lists mentioned permanent aerodromes only and made no mention of ‘terrains de secours’, Dr. Nord replied that the latter ‘were not worth the trouble’. As regards aerodromes, etc., I presume that British delegates can fall in with views of French Government.

8. Please inform Air Ministry.

No. 381

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D’Abernon (Berlin)

No. 43 Telegraphic [C 3871/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 27, 1926, 5.55 p.m.

Your No. 85.¹

My speech last Tuesday² should have made it perfectly clear to Stresemann

¹ No. 374.

² See No. 373, note 2.

that we had no engagement with any nation except Spain and that engagement we made subject to getting Germany into League.

Did not Sthamer report my denial of our having given any pledge to Poland? See my despatch on the subject,³ concluding paragraph.

³ No. 275.

No. 382

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 44 Telegraphic [W 2559/223/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 27, 1926, 5.55 p.m.*

Your No. 87.¹

You may inform German Gov[ernmen]t that it was the hope of all the Powers represented on the Council that Germany would take part in the Com[missio]n. It is of course intended that Germany should have equal right of vote & speech with every other member of the Commission. I should not have been a party to an invitation on any other terms.

¹ No. 379.

No. 383

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received March 31, 9 a.m.)

No. 91 Telegraphic [C 4123/234/18]

BERLIN, *March 30, 1926, 9.4 p.m.*

I had a conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon previous to his departure for Easter holidays. He expects to be absent about a fortnight probably in Switzerland. He does not anticipate any events of political importance here during the next few weeks. Reichstag has adjourned until April 27th.

His programme is to make an earnest endeavour to get negotiations settled in spirit of Locarno on various outstanding matters so that when Reichstag meets again he can come before it and say 'Notwithstanding check at Geneva, England, France and Germany have pushed forward along the Locarno line and have settled several important questions'.

Referring to your criticism that when concessions were made to Germany in order to bring about agreement there is no recognition on German side, he said 'That is because concessions are made piecemeal. If we could settle a packet of questions together it would make a far greater effect and we could express our recognition in a more striking manner'.

Discussing Russian attitude towards Germany as it has developed after Locarno and Geneva, Dr. Stresemann said 'of course the Russians grin with delight over Geneva. They declare that they foretold failure of our endeavour to come to terms with League of Nations. However, notwithstanding their

pleasure at this set-back I find that since Locarno they have altogether modified their attitude. Before, they threatened and endeavoured to bully: now they sing very small and try to obtain a guarantee from us that we will not attack them'. I said 'attack with what?' Dr. Stresemann replied 'with troops'. They have the idea that western powers still nourish the idea of making a military invasion of Russia. Of course the folly of the conception is unspeakable.

Dr. Stresemann continued 'The key to the Russian position is want of money. Their industry is going very badly. Nations are roughly like individuals; if their business circumstances are in a bad way they have no courage to pursue large schemes.

'Outside money, what Russians now want is to conclude arbitration treaties with border states, not, of course, with Poland but with border states. I believe they would be willing to conclude an arbitration treaty with us, although such a treaty would not be very consonant with their theories.' Regarding Serbia, here Stresemann appeared to have devoted little attention to negotiations for a treaty between Serbia, Italy and France. He said that he could not understand what precisely was being arrived at. Newspapers said it was an agreement to prevent 'anschluss' but on the other hand M. Nincic had declared to him that he would not enter upon any combination hostile to Germany.¹

As regards relations between Germany and Italy there had been a certain improvement, but one . . .² that might not exhibit much cordiality. Number of German tourists who had given up intended journeys to Italy was considerable. Dr. Stresemann's view is that Signor Mussolini himself is now being driven forward against his will by extreme Fascist element. Regarding German participation in League Commission, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that cabinet was going to discuss question tomorrow. He thought it probable that Germany would participate.³

¹ A marginal note by Mr. Sargent, who was to succeed Mr. Lampson as head of the Central Department, here read: 'He rather gives himself away by describing an agreement to prevent the anschluss as a combination hostile to Germany.'

² The text is here uncertain.

³ For Dr. Stresemann's record of this conversation see *Gustav Stresemann, op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 527-8. Cf. also Lord D'Abernon's note of March 27 regarding remarks by Dr. Stresemann printed in Lord D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 241.

No. 384

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 6)

No. 175 [C 4185/234/18]

BERLIN, *March 30, 1926*

Sir,

It may be of interest to place on record a broad appreciation of the effect of the Geneva meeting upon the position here both as regards internal and external politics.

2. First as regards the former. There is no doubt that the German National party looked forward with confidence to the entry of Germany into the League of Nations as an event which would enable them to reconsider their position as regards joining the Government. A considerable amount of private conversation is known to have taken place between the Chancellor and the German Nationals, the object of these conversations being to sound the former as to some combination after Geneva which would eliminate Stresemann from the Government and substitute for him a German National representative. The event at Geneva has upset these calculations.

3. For some reason which is not yet apparent, the German Nationals are for the moment even more hostile to Luther than they are to Stresemann. Their speeches in the Reichstag are evidence of this. Moreover, it is rumoured, with a certain show of authority, that they are now engaged in discussing some new combination under which Stresemann would become Chancellor, while Luther would be relegated to an inferior post. In this event one German National would be appointed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and another to the Ministry of the Interior. I do not believe that the combination has any chance of success, but the fact of its being discussed shows how considerably things have changed during the last month.

4. In the realm of foreign politics also the recent meeting of the League has brought about considerable confusion. Before Geneva there was a vague intention to give Russia some sort of consolation for her failure to prevent Germany's entry into the League of Nations. The idea is reported to have been discussed in various forms—one being a Treaty of Neutrality—but nothing very concrete was decided upon. The object in view was to maintain the approximate balance between east and west which is such an essential feature of German policy. Germany being still outside the League, it is now thought that the signature of a neutrality treaty with Russia would incline the balance too much to the east, the desire in dominant circles still being to maintain a certain preponderance of the western inclination without undue alienation of the eastern counterpoise.

5. It is consequently said to be probable that the proposal to conclude some compensation agreement with Russia will be postponed, provided that nothing occurs to render 're-insurance' in that direction specially urgent.¹

I have, &c.,

D'ABERNON

¹ The foregoing is printed in a slightly variant text in Lord D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 238-9.

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels)

No. 254 [C 3579/112/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 30, 1926*

Sir,

I transmit to Your Excellency herewith a copy of a note which was left with the British delegation at Geneva on the 17th March by a representative of the Government of Luxemburg asking the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the participation of Luxemburg in the work of Locarno. A copy of my reply is also enclosed herein.

2. I request that you will cause the Minister of State of the Grand Duchy to be informed that His Majesty's Government are studying the question.¹

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 385

Note handed by M. Wehrer, Representative of the Luxembourg Government, to the British Delegation at Geneva on March 17, 1926

Note du Gouvernement grand-ducal luxembourgeois

GENÈVE, *le 17 mars 1926*

Le gouvernement grand-ducal envisage de participer, sous une forme à déterminer, à l'œuvre de Locarno dont il apprécie hautement les effets heureux dans l'intérêt de la paix générale. Il serait bien aise d'apprendre s'il peut être dans les intentions du gouvernement britannique d'entrer en relations avec lui à l'effet d'examiner de quelle façon un accord dans cet ordre d'idées pourrait être réalisé entre les gouvernements de la Grande-Bretagne et du grand-duché de Luxembourg.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 385

Sir A. Chamberlain to M. Pierre Pruem, President of the Grand Ducal Government

GENEVA, *March 17, 1926*

Sir Austen Chamberlain has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which his Excellency the Prime Minister of Luxemburg was good enough to communicate to him to-day. In this note the Grand Ducal Government states that it has under consideration the question of the participation of Luxemburg in the work of Locarno, and enquires whether His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared to enter upon an examination of the manner in which such an agreement might be reached between the Governments of Great Britain and of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

¹ Sir G. Grahame acted on these instructions in a note of April 9 to the Minister of State of Luxemburg.

Sir Austen Chamberlain regrets that he is so fully occupied at this moment with the work of the Council that he must postpone the consideration of this important question until after his return to London, when he will have the honour to address a further communication to his Excellency M. Pruem.

No. 386

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 76 Telegraphic: by bag [C 3888/234/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 31, 1926, 5 p.m.*

Lord d'Abernon's telegram No. 86¹ of March 26th. Relations with Germany.

As you will be seeing M. Briand on my telegram No. 77² of to-day (aviation negotiations) I should be glad if you will take the opportunity to give him substance of Lord d'Abernon's telegram. This brings out my point still further.

It comes to this. In the matter of aviation M. Briand has, as I understand it, already committed himself in a general way to Stresemann (see my immediately following telegram²). As to disarmament, one of the outstanding points has been the German request for an increase of about 5,000 police for use in the Rhineland. Now as our military advisers tell us that this is not a matter of substantial military importance it seems to me just one of those points on which we might properly meet the Germans. It would please Stresemann and would do no harm to us.

I now come to the question of reduction of troops in the Rhineland to which Lord d'Abernon also refers. Here I am aware that we are on delicate ground, and I am especially anxious not to add to M. Briand's existing troubles by re-opening another tiresome question. But he himself has always declared it to be his policy to make further reductions and I know that he is no less anxious than I that there shall be no justification whatever for the suspicion that the work of conciliation and appeasement has been in any degree checked as a result of Geneva. I have never made any secret of my feeling that the Germans are entitled to expect in view of Locarno that the total number of troops in the second and third zones shall be reduced below their pre-Locarno standard. I do not want to embarrass M. Briand by pressing that unduly upon him but I beg him to remember that public support for our policy of close and continuous co-operation with France cannot be obtained unless that policy bears fruit in improved relations with Germany. Anglo-French understanding as the basis of our common reconciliation with Germany is the winning motto here.

You may, if you think fit, read this telegram textually to M. Briand.

Addressed to Paris No. 76, repeated to Berlin No. 45.

¹ No. 378.

² No. 387.

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 77 Telegraphic: by bag [C 3909/24/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 31, 1926

Your telegram No. 133¹ (of the 26th March. German aircraft).

It is time these negotiations came to an end, and I am tempted to wonder if Monsieur Briand is kept *au courant* with developments. My understanding is that at his last interview with Dr. Stresemann at Geneva on the afternoon of Wednesday, March 17th, Monsieur Briand gave some form of general assurance that the negotiations would be speedily concluded without further haggling over details.

I need not say that I most cordially welcomed this information, for the negotiations have dragged on interminably and it has become pretty clear that if left solely to the experts an end will never be achieved.

Both Monsieur Briand and I wish to keep on that footing of cordial relationship with the Germans which we established at Geneva, and I cannot believe that he has any desire now to go back on his general assurance to Stresemann regarding aviation. In short it seems to me that the time has come when politics rather than technicalities must be the deciding factor, and I request that you will see Monsieur Briand and put the matter to him personally more or less on the above lines, making it clear that my belief is that he does not perhaps know that matters are still dragging on. You may add that I have in point of fact had the latest German formula (your telegram No. 133) considered by our experts here and that they feel it is quite acceptable subject to the addition of a paragraph to prevent the possibility of building up a reserve of flying personnel. But even that I should personally be prepared to waive if it meant holding up an otherwise agreed settlement with Germany.

Paragraph they have in mind would come at end of German formula and would run more or less as follows:—

‘The total number of 100 authorisations issued to individuals may be reached by annual additions not exceeding X in number. They will include the existing 35 and will all be registered as provided for by article 6 of the present agreement’.

I am loth to trouble Monsieur Briand at a time when he must be particularly preoccupied with other matters, but I feel that this is just one of those occasions when I am justified in doing so. We weathered the threatening storm between France and Germany at Geneva: it would be a thousand pities if now, over a matter of minor importance, the relations there established should be marred.

Addressed to Paris No. 77, repeated to Berlin No. 46.

¹ No. 380.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 1, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 140 Telegraphic: by bag [C 4127/24/18]

PARIS, March 31, 1926

My telegram No. 133¹ of March 26th: German aviation.

2. After an inter-allied discussion of proposals put forward by Dr. Nord, as reported in my above-mentioned telegram and in my despatch No. 555,² Monsieur Massagli [*sic*] had a further conversation yesterday with Dr. Nord on the following points.

(1) *Flying by personnel of Reichswehr and navy.*

Monsieur Massigli stated that the figure of 36 was a maximum. Germans protested strongly, but never suggested a rupture. They seem prepared for further discussion and Monsieur Massigli gained the impression that they might give way further.

(2) *Flight over Rhineland territory.*

Monsieur Massigli explained that proposals enclosed in my despatch No. 555, were not acceptable and went too much into detail as far as negotiations in Paris were concerned. He expressed the opinion that it would be necessary to confine ourselves to a declaration of a general nature which would preserve to the High Commission the right to take such decisions as it may consider necessary. Dr. Nord asked that at least the principle in question should be very clearly defined in any such general formula.

(3) *Aerodromes in the occupied territories and in the demilitarised zone.*

As regards occupied territories Monsieur Massigli asked whether the German delegates intended to make use of military aerodromes in existence or to construct new aerodromes. The German delegates replied that they envisaged the eventual use of the military aerodromes if the allies agree, but if not they propose to set up aerodromes at the places named.³ (The French delegates at previous inter-allied meeting expressed themselves as definitely opposed to German use of military aerodromes.)

As regards demilitarised zone Monsieur Massigli stated that he was not in a position to reply to the German proposals.

(4) *Subventions.*

As stated in the memorandum⁴ enclosed in Mr. Hugessen's letter⁴ of March 3rd to Mr. Troutbeck allied delegates were still awaiting final German text of article 4. Germans have now produced the following text:—

¹ No. 380.

² No. 376.

³ See No. 380.

⁴ Not printed. The memorandum included draft documents intended to form an agreement on aviation between the Conference of Ambassadors and the German Government.

'Le gouvernement allemand fera le nécessaire pour que les autorités du Reich et des Pays (Länder) n'accordent pas de subventions d'aucune sorte aux organisations, sociétés ou individus dont l'activité aurait pour objet, à titre principal ou accessoire, l'instruction ou l'entraînement d'él[è]ves-pilotes ou de pilotes dans l'aviation de sport ni aux personnes qui auraient l'intention de se faire instruire ou s'entraîner dans cette aviation.

'Le gouvernement allemand prendra les mesures appropriées pour que de telles subventions ne soient pas non plus accordées par aucune autre administration publique ayant la gestion de deniers publics y compris les administrations municipales. La susdite obligation ne vise pas les subventions qui seraient accordées à des compétitions.'

This text will be subjected to further examination by the allied delegates.

3. Please inform Air Ministry.

No. 389

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 6)

No. 178 [C 4187/232/18]

BERLIN, *March 31, 1926*

His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report of a conversation between the officer attached to this Embassy and Oberstleutnant von Bonin, chief of the Organisation Section (T. 2) in the Ministry of Defence.

2. Paragraph 3 of this report is especially interesting, in that it shows that, though it would at first appear that the small size of the German Army should leave ample scope for the selection of suitable recruits, the prospects offered to such recruits are not sufficiently attractive to fill the ranks with the class of man required and that a certain amount of difficulty is being experienced in this respect.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 389

Secret

BERLIN, *March 26, 1926*

1. I to-day, at lunch with the American Assistant Military Attaché, had a conversation with Oberstleutnant von Bonin, chief of the Organisation Section (T. 2) in the Ministry of Defence. We discussed the questions of uniform and recruiting, with both of which he is officially concerned.

2. On the subject of uniform he said that too large a proportion of the present Officers Corps lived in the past, inasmuch as they insisted on the wearing of uniform on every possible occasion. He, v. Bonin was a member of a numerically small school of thought headed by Generaloberst von Seeckt and consisting mainly of staff officers of progressive tendencies who realised the differences which obviously existed between the old army and the new

and who were in favour of granting the maximum latitude to officers as regards the wearing of plain clothes. v. Seeckt had however so far been unable to establish this point of view owing to the opposition of the great majority of the officers corps. Present regulations on the subject were vague, since they laid down that the question was to be settled locally at the discretion of Garrison commandants 'taking into account the general conditions prevailing in the garrison town'. In Berlin an officer was permitted to wear plain clothes to a far greater extent than in any other garrison. Nevertheless he himself, in order to appease public opinion in the officers' corps went daily to his office in the Ministry of Defence in plain clothes, changed into uniform for the period of his work there and, in the evening, changed back into plain clothes before returning home. The field-grey uniform was, for officers, impossible as a 'Society Dress' (Gesellschaftsanzug). A civil engineer might just as well go to a party in his overalls. His objection would however be considerably weakened were full dress uniform to be reintroduced, a measure which he designated as 'absolutely essential' (unbedingt notwendig) for many reasons including that of recruiting.

3. As regards recruiting he said that as far as members and physique of candidates was concerned there could be no complaints. The chief problem with which he had to contend was that of the intelligence of recruits for the ranks. The supply of suitable candidates for commissions was, with the army at its present strength, almost inexhaustible. On the other hand, the task which had been set to him and to other staff officers of the Reichsheer was that of forming not only an officers corps but an entire army of leaders 'for future emergencies'. For this purpose the normal stamp of recruit from the labouring and artisan class was not so suitable as the son of the yeoman farmer or the 'Petit Bourgeois' (Kleinbürger). Every effort was being made by his section to secure as large a proportion as possible of recruits of the latter type, but so far these efforts had met with little success. The army as a career had not been made sufficiently alluring to attract this type of recruit. Pay was low, the uniform was unattractive and unless the recruit happened to be included in the comparatively small percentage of 'Other Ranks' who were permitted to embark on the 'N.C.Os. Career' (Unteroffizierslaufbahn) prospects were bad. At the end of six years service the recruit who did not adopt the N.C.Os. career became an 'Obergefreiter'¹ and for the remainder of his 12 years service had nothing to look forward to but an honourable dismissal and, in the present industrial situation, eventual inclusion in the ranks of the unemployed.

Although officially much was done for the training of soldiers for civilian employment other means would have to be found to attract the right type of recruit. He hoped that the suggested increase in the pay scales would help to do so.

The present territorial system of recruiting on a company, battery, etc., basis also made it more difficult to obtain the intelligent, educated type of recruit. Company Commanders were, as recruiting officers, much more con-

¹ Corporal.

cerned in keeping their companies 'in the family' by accepting the brothers, cousins and friends of soldiers already serving, than in advancing the principle of the 'Army of Leaders' by admitting more educated recruits who, although they might not at first mix easily with their comrades would probably in the end become the dominant type in the army.

R. V. HUME,
Lieut., R.A.

No. 390

Viscount Chilston (Vienna) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 6)

No. 91 [C 4241/246/3]

VIENNA, *March 31, 1926*

Sir,

A very significant notice from the Vienna Chamber of Commerce has just appeared in the Vienna papers. It states that the Austrian Chambers of Commerce have for some time been closely studying questions connected with the possibility of creating a greater economic area, and they have now appointed the late Austrian Minister at Berlin, Dr. Riedl, 'as their plenipotentiary delegate to enter into touch with economic circles in the countries which will be affected.'

2. While this notice is drafted with careful ambiguity it can only have one meaning to those who know anything about Dr. Riedl, originally Secretary of the Vienna Chamber of Commerce, then permanent head of the Ministry of Commerce and until recently Austrian Minister at Berlin. He has always been a most pronounced Pan-German and since the war an energetic champion of the 'Anschluss'. This appointment, therefore, really means that he has been entrusted by the Chambers of Commerce, which are here maintained from public funds, with the congenial task of preparing the way for the 'Anschluss', at least in the economic sphere. The feeling in business circles on this question is more divided than among politicians¹ and the public generally, but of late there have been signs that some of those financiers and manufacturers who were formerly strongly opposed to the idea of incorporation with Germany are beginning to regard it with more favour; this is indeed an inevitable result of the extreme protectionist policy of the other Succession States and of the failure of the scheme for preferential duties among them.

3. There has been considerable discussion in the Press on the economic side of this question. Owing to the political difficulties in the way of the

¹ In his despatch No. 73 of March 14 Lord Chilston had quoted from an article, reproduced in the Vienna press, by the former Austrian Chancellor, Monsignor Seipel, 'in which the writer appears to express himself clearly as favouring the "Anschluss", or at least the entry of Austria into some combination of States'. Lord Chilston pointed out that Monsignor Seipel exercised 'great influence in Dr. Ramek's Government'. He added that in a speech in Vienna on March 13 Monsignor Seipel had said that the Christian Socialist party would not commit itself prematurely to any definite foreign policy.

'Anschluss' it is now suggested in some quarters that it might be confined at first to the economic sphere, and a Customs Union with Germany is proposed as the first step to political amalgamation. In an interesting article in the 'Oesterreichische Volkswirt' by the well known economist Dr. Friedrich Hertz the question is discussed whether a Customs Union or preferential arrangements with Germany would be contrary to the international obligations entered into by Austria. He holds that the Peace Treaty would clearly not be an obstacle, but thinks the First Geneva Protocol of 1922 might perhaps be interpreted by some in this sense because in it Austria binds herself not to give such special advantages to another State that it would endanger its economic independence. Dr. Hertz points out the great and manifold difficulties in the way of such an arrangement with Germany, but as a free trader is on the whole of the opinion that it would in the long run be advantageous for both sides. He also points out that there are other possibilities for an economic approximation between the two countries; thus arrangements might be made to order in Germany the foreign goods required for public authorities.

4. The disadvantages of the 'Anschluss' from the point of view of British trade which were pointed out in my Despatch No. 128² of the 19th May last, would also arise in the case of a Customs Union between the two countries.

5. The Chancellor has returned from his visits to Berlin and Prague³ and expresses himself as very pleased with his reception there and with the talks which he had with the German and Czech statesmen. The Press naturally has devoted considerable space to recording the visit to Berlin: the comments are, however, of little interest, being confined generally to expressions of satisfaction with the closer contact established between the 'brother peoples' and the hope that an intimate economic understanding may be developed. There is an absence of political reference to the 'Anschluss', as is also remarked in the utterances of Dr. Ramek at Berlin.

I have, &c.,
CHILSTON

² Not printed.

³ Dr. Ramek visited Berlin from March 27 to 29 and Prague on March 30.

CHAPTER IV

Reactions of the Locarno Powers to the German-Soviet Agreement of April 24, 1926: Agreement regarding German Civil Aviation

April 1–May 17, 1926

No. 391

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 1, 12.30 p.m.)

No. 93 Telegraphic [N 1489/718/38]

Urgent

BERLIN, April 1, 1926, 10.50 a.m.

Late yesterday I had an interview with Secretary of State who made me a detailed statement on the position between Germany and Russia.¹ He declared that his communication was of a most confidential and secret nature; he had not said anything on this matter to any other power. He proposed to write to German Ambassador at Paris, with a view to communication of information to M. Briand personally—not to Quai d'Orsay.

Secretary of State's statement was:

Before Locarno Russians had threatened and bullied in the most insolent manner. Chicherin, on his passage through Berlin to Wiesbaden, had accused Germans of deserting Russia and of going altogether to the other side. On his return journey Chicherin had been somewhat milder, but had told German Ministers that if German delegates went to Geneva they would be isolated and insulted. He urged upon German government desirability of concluding with Russia an unrestricted treaty of neutrality. Russian government would regard this as a minimum, but would agree to it in default of something better. They were prepared to go further and to conclude an alliance. Chicherin added, 'if you refuse to make a treaty of neutrality with us, it is that you intend to abandon entirely Russian connection'.

German government every time told Russians that an unrestricted treaty of neutrality was out of the question. German government would agree to convention containing formula of a friendly character, but they could not go beyond this, except to say that Germany would not take part in an aggressive combination² against Russia. Germany had always made it clear

¹ For Herr von Schubert's account of this conversation cf. Kurt Rosenbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 210–11.

² The preceding passage was subsequently amended to read: 'would not join in any aggressive economic combination'.

to western powers, and particularly to England, that she could not take part in any aggression against Russia.

Formula proposed by Germany at that time was rejected by Russia as being insufficient in scope and not adequately binding. Russian comment was 'Your expressions of friendship are welcome, but we must have some kind of security. Your formula is mere words'.

This, then, was the position to the end of 1925.

In January, 1926, after Locarno, Russians reduced their pretensions, having realised that Germany would never make an unrestricted treaty of neutrality. All this year they have been coming down further in the extent of their claim.

(Continuation in my immediately following telegram).³

³ No. 392.

No. 392

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 1, 3 p.m.)

No. 93 Telegraphic [N 1489/718/38]

BERLIN, April 1, 1926, 2.40 p.m.

Part 2

Tuesday evening last a new development occurred. Russian Ambassador had a long interview with Secretary of State.¹ From this it resulted that Russia is now disposed to accept something very near German formula.

The suggested convention would be on the following lines.

1. Germany would not support military aggression against Russia if Russia was attacked unprovokedly.

2. In peace time Germany would not join in deliberate repression of² economic combination against Russia.

3. When Germany entered League of Nations she would be bound by article 16: but she would in a communication to Russia refer to assurance regarding article 16 which had been received from other powers on December 1st 1925.

Secretary of State said that while Russians were not satisfied with the above basis, he had the impression from Krestinski's attitude that they would now accept it. He could not say why they had come round to reduced demands: perhaps signature on March 26th of treaty between Poland and Roumania³ had rendered an agreement between Russia and Poland more difficult.

¹ For this interview of March 30 and the German draft agreement cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 206-10.

² It was suggested on the filed copy that this word should read 'or' or 'by'.

³ See No. 401.

Secretary of State added that 'final agreement as to drafting has not yet been arrived at between us, there are still several points under discussion. We shall not sign anything which will not be compatible with covenant of League of Nations or with obligations of our policy at Locarno'.

In discussing information which had been given to me I pointed out that signature of a convention such as that proposed might make an unfavourable impression in Europe and be regarded as a departure from Locarno basis. The danger of misinterpretation was greater owing to recent events at Geneva. 'What were specific advantages which Germany would derive from agreement contemplated?'

Secretary of State replied 'I cannot say that advantages are very definite but such a convention would prevent Russia going right away from us and would keep her within bounds. Russia, at a loose end, might take certain courses which would be extremely disagreeable to Germany. Consider what she might make⁴ Poland'.

'We have debated the question of whether we could safely postpone negotiation with Russia until after September but in our opinion such postponement is too dangerous. We believe that we have pushed reluctance and resistance to extreme limit and that it would be perilous to go further. Now that Russians have reduced their demands so considerably and are inclined to accept our formula I do not think we can delay much longer'.⁵

⁴ This word was amended on the filed copy to read 'concert with'.

⁵ Mr. Lampson initialled, and Mr. Maxse, Mr. Gregory, Sir W. Tyrrell, and Sir A. Chamberlain minuted as follows on No. 391 and the present document:

'I cannot see that we have any valid objection to the conclusion of this convention, if it contains nothing but what is herein reported. It will probably help rather than hinder the pacification of Eastern Europe, and although it will probably not be liked in France or in the border states, yet the assurance given to Lord D'Abernon is very definite. Moreover the conclusion of such a convention would create an additional link between Russia and Western Europe, thus bringing the Soviet Government one stage nearer to full membership of the comity of Europe.

'It is not part of our policy to wage military, political or economic war against Russia, and though we may not altogether like the German-Russian connection it is an old standing association, which we are in no position to break, and which may as well turn out to [? our] advantage as to our disadvantage in the long run.

'One cannot, however, escape the thought that if ever the Balance of Power theory again dominates European diplomacy, then this combination may be but the first step to yet another partition of Poland. Against this far distant danger we can only watch, for any opposition offered by us to the signature of this convention would almost certainly be useless and quite certainly strengthen the hands of the extremists (right and left) in Germany and play straight into the hands of the Soviet Government. The latter is a very present danger—the other dangers have at least a time element which may enable us to stave them off.

'F. Maxse 5.4.26.'

'M. W. L. 15/4/26.'

'The immediate analysis of this development appears to be as follows:—

'(i) Stresemann (assuming his sincerity), if not actually reluctant to ride two horses, is apologetic in the face of its apparent necessity. Possibly he had hoped that it could be postponed till after September. The immediate motive may be conditioned by the negotiations, intermittently in progress, for a Russian-Polish rapprochement, and the need of forestalling a Slav bloc. But he is not repeating (and to some extent deserves credit for not

repeating) the methods of the Rapallo episode, and to all intents and purposes is acting above board:

'(ii) As at present conceived, the suggested Convention hardly bears the character of a Bismarkian reinsurance treaty:

'(iii) It is susceptible of interpretation as a defensive instrument and not necessarily pointed against a particular country, i.e., Poland. If Stresemann is genuinely in no haste to conclude it, this may well be so:

'(iv) Russia's anxiety to conclude something at once may be due to nothing more than her *bona fide* fear of a Western combination against her. But it may be assumed that Chicherin is playing his usual double game (one eye on Germany, the other perhaps now on Italy), and is making a last throw to defeat Locarno:

'(v) The immediate danger to be apprehended from a Russian-German agreement is obviously (a) alarm in various sections of opinion, not merely die-hard, in France and Poland, leading to a hardening of the now somewhat relaxed ties between the two countries: (b) an increased encouragement to Mussolini's policy of asserting Italian predominance [*sic*] in S.E. Europe and a considerable access of strength to his position of manœuvre: both results unfavourable to a consolidation of Locarnoism.

'On the face of it the action required both here and in Paris is not to place obstacles in the way of a Russian-German agreement, but to intensify existing policy and encompass Germany with every incentive and motive for entrenching herself more solidly under the Locarno shelter and let nothing deflect us from our present methods for attaining a final September settlement by working in close co-operation with Germany. Any direct attempt to prevent or sabotage the conclusion of the Russian-German agreement may easily play into the hands of Chicherin and Mussolini.

'J. D. G. 5.4.26.

'(The French Chargé d'Affaires has instructions to come and speak to me about this, and I should be grateful for a line before I see him.)'

'Whatever the motives may be, it would be a mistake on our part not to accept this as a "fait accompli" and make the best of it, as Mr. Gregory suggests, by intensifying our present policy of encouraging Germany to look West and not East.

'The probable motives for this policy are (1) a desire to have some kind of reinsurance against France (2) distrust and suspicion of Poland, and (3) to promote the economic relations between Germany and Russia.

'In view of the negotiations between the French and the Russians which are about to start in Paris, it would be a mistake on the part of the former to object: if they were so ill-advised as to do so, they would considerably strengthen German suspicions of the recent rapprochement between Paris and Moscow and possibly drive Berlin further in the latter direction than they are prepared to go if left to themselves; in fact, whether they like it or not, the best policy for the French to adopt is to "faire bonne mine à mauvais jeu".

'W. T. 6/4.'

'I agree with Sir William's minute.

'I attach telegram to Lord D'Abernon [No. 400].

'Verify the number of the article to which I refer. Is it 15 or 17?

'A. C. 6.4.'

No. 393

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 6)

No. 610 [C 4176/6/18]

PARIS, April 1, 1926

Sir,

With reference to section 2 of my telegram No. 132¹ of March 25th I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the draft of a note to the German

¹ No. 375.

Ambassador in Paris in regard to a statement by the German Minister for War on the German budget.

2. I should be glad to know whether you approve the terms of this draft. I should myself have preferred to secure in paragraph 2 of this draft the omission of the words 'regrette vivement . . . ² la fragilité' and the substitution therefor of the words 'doit signaler que'. In paragraph 3 I should have preferred to omit the whole of the sentence beginning 'et la Conférence des Ambassadeurs' and I would have omitted also paragraph 4.

3. As the French delegation is pressing for these insertions, I have thought it best to refer to you.

I have, &c.,
CREWE

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 393

Projet de lettre à Monsieur l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne

31 Mars 1926

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Au cours des débats qui ont eu lieu au Reichstag le 3 Mars 1926 lors de la discussion du budget de la Reichswehr, M. le Docteur Gessler, Ministre de la Reichswehr, pour répondre aux critiques formulées sur l'importance des dépenses prévues au budget de la Reichswehr, a cru devoir invoquer l'attitude de la Commission militaire interalliée de contrôle et se prévaloir du silence observé par elle dans cette question pour soutenir que les dépenses budgétaires prévues n'avaient rien d'anormal.

La Conférence des Ambassadeurs regrette vivement que M. le Docteur Gessler ait cru devoir recourir à un semblable argument dont il peut, mieux que personne, apprécier la fragilité. Si la C[ommission] M[ilitaire] I[n]teralliée de] C[ontrôle] s'est abstenue de toute remarque au sujet du projet de budget de la Reichswehr, c'est qu'elle désirait se tenir strictement dans les termes de la Note du 4 Juin 1925 qui est muette à cet égard.

La Commission de contrôle a estimé que, dans ces conditions, elle n'avait à formuler aucune appréciation sur les dépenses inscrites au projet de budget, et la Conférence des Ambassadeurs doit regretter que le Ministre de la Reichswehr ait cru pouvoir donner à son silence, un sens qu'il n'avait manifestement pas.

La question budgétaire étant ainsi soulevée par le Gouvernement allemand lui-même, les Gouvernements alliés ne peuvent lui cacher les préoccupations que leur cause l'exagération manifeste des dépenses inscrites dans certains chapitres, dont le chiffre paraît difficilement conciliable, soit avec les tableaux d'armements qui figurent dans le Traité de paix, soit avec la situation de fait reconnue par la Commission comme devant faire l'objet de redressements. Ces exagérations sont telles que la Commission de contrôle pourrait être fondée à se demander si, en ce qui concerne certaines questions d'armements

² Punctuation as in original quotation.

ou d'approvisionnement, la situation véritable est bien conforme à celle que la Commission de contrôle a pu constater avec les moyens dont elle dispose.

No. 394

Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

[N 1775/563/38]

Private and secret

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 1, 1926

My dear D'Abernon,

The Home Secretary¹ was approached yesterday by Sir Henri Deterding,² who is probably well known to you both by name and reputation as one of our oil magnates.

Sir Henri is firmly convinced that the bolshevists are coming to the end of their cash, and he fully expects that by the end of the year they will either have to proclaim their bankruptcy or so change and adapt their policy as to be able to obtain foreign credits. He says that no man is better informed about Russia than General Hoffmann who signed the peace of Brest-Litovsk.³ The latter is also very strongly opposed to bolshevism, partly no doubt because he introduced it into Russia, and is ready to do anything and co-operate with anybody to destroy it.

Sir Henri told Sir William Joynson-Hicks that the General would be willing to come to London and supply us with all the information in his possession, and Sir William asked me who the General should see if we encouraged him to come here. My reply, which has the approval of Sir Austen, was that I should deprecate the General coming here, but that if he wished to give us information Sir Henri Deterding should suggest to him that he should get into touch with you, which would give you the opportunity either of seeing him yourself or deputing somebody else you may select for the purpose.

Sir Austen therefore wishes me to write to you so as to prepare you for any *démarche* General Hoffmann may make on the suggestion of Sir Henri Deterding.

I am glad Geneva ended as it did. It might have been worse but it might also have been better, if the Germans had shown the same statesmanship at the beginning of the meeting which they showed towards the end. I think they were stupid at the beginning when they showed signs of insisting too much upon their pound of flesh, but I felt sure they would only maintain that decision up to the moment when Briand would make them realise that they had nothing to gain and a great deal to lose by killing him.

¹ Sir William Joynson-Hicks.

² Director-General of the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company.

³ For the treaty of peace between Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany and Turkey, and Russia, signed at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 123, pp. 740-4.

Perhaps, therefore, the German plenipotentiaries [*sic*] equally suffered from the absence of a free hand, like our chief, and found Hindenburg less helpful at Geneva than he was at Locarno.⁴

Yours sincerely,
W. TYRRELL

⁴ Lord D'Abernon replied on April 7 expressing views generally in agreement with those of Sir W. Tyrrell.

No. 395

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received April 3, 11.45 a.m.)¹

No. 144 Telegraphic [C 4169/436/18]

PARIS, April 3, 1926, 3 p.m.¹

Your telegram No. 76.²

I was able to see Monsieur Briand yesterday evening on various points raised by you by above and by your telegram No. 77³ with which I deal in my immediately following telegram.⁴

On question of 5,000 police Monsieur Briand seemed to me to hold a strong personal objection, dwelling on the large additions that have been granted already and the formidable total reached by entire force. He promised to examine question again after I had pointed out smallness of this concession but said that it would only be a prelude to other demands.⁵ His personal conviction seems so strong that I doubt his being persuaded to agree.

On the other hand regarding Rhineland troops I am sure he is anxious to do all he can but finds military opposition and parliamentary difficulties formidable. He claims that reduction of 4,000 has taken place in the last two months and means to proceed with gradual diminution so far as possible

¹ There would appear to be some confusion regarding the times of receipt and despatch of this telegram.

² No. 386.

³ No. 387.

⁴ No. 396.

⁵ It was suggested in a memorandum prepared by the Central Department on April 10 that it would be interesting to know what M. Briand was specifically thinking of and that he might not be thinking only of disarmament questions. So far as disarmament was concerned, the present situation, as explained by the War Office, could be summarized as follows:

'(a) On two points a deadlock has been reached—the police and the definition of war material.

'(b) On certain other points no progress is reported—viz. the alienation of the Deutsche Werke at Haselhorst, prohibition of illegal enlistments, and of the instruction of reserve officers, the work to be completed in factories at Karlsruhe, Oberndorf and Wittenau.

'(c) Other points not yet completed but on which progress is continuing, are: surrender of gas masks, work to be completed in factories at Döhlen-Deuben, Suhl, Dortmund and Hanover; the conversion of former military establishments; the reduction of the dépôt at Königsberg; the reduction of workshops; reductions in the military administration; high command; prohibition of instruction in aviation; associations.

'(d) All the other points are either completed or their execution may be considered as assured.'

bearing in mind what you say of standard before Locarno. I read your telegram No. 76 textually and he expressed cordial agreement with last paragraph.

No. 396

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 3, 4.45 p.m.)

No. 145 Telegraphic [C 4168/24/18]

PARIS, April 3, 1926, 2.6 p.m.

Your telegram No. 77.¹

I saw Monsieur Briand yesterday on this. He believes discussion taking place here will terminate by an agreement next week, and this view is confirmed by my advisers taking part in it. Monsieur Briand held that figure [? of] 100 authorisations is too high, while agreeing to some annual additions to existing 35. He was inclined to think Pear could be cut in half which on proposed lines seems to mean a figure between 50 and 60 at a given time. He seems determined and confident that this matter will be satisfactorily concluded.

¹ No. 387.

No. 397

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 6, 9.56 p.m.)

No. 99 Telegraphic [N 1554/718/38]

BERLIN, April 6, 1926, 9.10 p.m.

My telegrams Nos. 93 and 94.¹

French Ambassador last night communicated to me the statement which the German Ambassador at Paris had made to the French government. This statement coincided with details given in my telegrams under reference, except in one particular. In communication to French government Germany was reported to have said that new convention included 'un engagement général pour concerter sur toutes les affaires communes'.²

I sought an interview with Secretary of State this afternoon³ in order to ascertain whether this version was correct. He informed me that the real purport of project[ed] clause was materially different. It would run approximately as follows:—'the two governments will remain in friendly contact, in order to arrive at an understanding on the question of mutual economic and

¹ The reference is presumably to Nos. 391 and 392.

² Cf. No. 410. For Lord D'Abernon's conversation with M. de Margerie see Lord D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 245-8.

³ For Lord D'Abernon's conversation with Herr von Schubert cf. Kurt Rosenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 212: cf. *ibid.*, p. 211, for remarks made by Lord D'Abernon on April 3.

political interest'. In further conversation with Secretary of State, he said that there were still four or five points unsettled. He added that signature could only take place after Dr. Stresemann's return, which would not occur until April 20th. Even after Dr. Stresemann's return there would have to be special Cabinet on the subject.

No. 398

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 7, 9 a.m.)

No. 100 Telegraphic [C 4317/112/18]

BERLIN, April 6, 1926, 9.14 p.m.

In the course of our conversation this afternoon the Secretary of State said that the proposed Russian convention should be regarded as the complement and completion of Locarno. Germany intended nothing contrary to Locarno in whole of that convention, and would deplore it if other Locarno Powers misunderstood her action or the reasons for it, which he had previously explained. As far as Germany was concerned, Locarno Pact and its implications remained in full force.

No. 399

Memorandum by Viscount Cecil respecting the Re-organisation of the League Council¹

[W 2959/233/98]

April 6, 1926

I venture to put forward the following observations as a contribution to the formation of a policy in connection with the position of the Council of the League of Nations.

There are two quite distinct problems in connection with the Council of the League of Nations. The first is whether the permanent members of the Council shall be increased and, if so, on what principle. This is mainly a problem of Spain and Brazil. Both these Powers have been members of the Council since its foundation: both are Powers of considerable importance, though not in the first rank. Each may claim a special position in the world. Spain by reason of her history and the wide extension of the Spanish language: Brazil because she has a vast extent of territory and is the only Portug[u]ese speaking country in South America. Spain may further claim that she has deserved well of the League both because she was the first of the neutral Powers to ask to join it, and her adhesion at that moment was of considerable value in establishing the idea of the League, and secondly because she has

¹ This memorandum was circulated to the Cabinet.

been represented from the outset by an individual of great diplomatic attainments which he has used in the interest not so much of his own country as of the League at large. It is also true that Spain on many occasions, and particularly on the Mosul question, has shewn herself friendly to British views on the Council, though this is a consideration which should not have too much weight attached to it. On the other hand, if Spain and Brazil were admitted it would be very difficult to draw the line against Poland, Yugo-Slavia, Roumania and so through a descending scale of Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland etc. At present the category of Great Powers is clear and defined. No one has ever doubted that the four existing permanent members, together with Germany, Russia and the United States, are in a class by themselves, who may truly be said to have such world-wide interests that their presence on the Council for almost every question is clearly desirable. Unless therefore some equally defined principle can be discovered which would justify the admission of other Powers to be permanent members, it is to be hoped that no extension of the permanent members will take place.

The second problem concerns the non-permanent members. At present there is a tendency to re-elect the same six non-permanent members, not because it is thought that they are pre-eminently qualified to sit on the Council, but because there is no principle or rule by which their successors should be chosen. On the other hand there is the gravest discontent amongst the great bulk of the States which are not members of the Council on the ground that they have no share in what is, in many ways, the most important part of the work of the League. This indignation has always existed, and it has steadily grown year by year. Last September it was very marked, and shewed itself not only in a demand for a new form of election, but in a distrust of the Council and its leadership, which might become serious. The suggestion which has most usually been made to meet this demand is that there should be a rotation amongst the non-permanent members under which they should not hold office for more than three years, and two should go out every year. I cannot think that this would be a satisfactory solution. There are some forty-eight members of the League, apart from the permanent members of the Council. Under the proposed regulation, and assuming that it applied to the whole forty-eight, each Power would only have an opportunity of serving on the Council once in twenty-four years, though its term of office would then last for three years. In other words, it would be most unlikely that any individual would ever serve on the Council more than once. That might be a quite adequate arrangement for some of the very small Powers: indeed it might be excessive. There is no reason in the world why Luxembourg or Panama or Siam should ever sit upon the Council. On the other hand it would be fantastic that Poland or Spain should sit there only every twenty-four years. Nor would it be satisfactory that countries like Switzerland or Sweden should be so long absent from the Council table. A proposal, which has found a great deal of favour, to mitigate this difficulty is that seats should be allotted to definite groups, but it is very doubtful if the groups are sufficiently well formed for such a purpose at

present. The Little Entente is a group of the kind, but it consists of only three States, and if it were enlarged by admitting Hungary or Greece or Bulgaria or Turkey or even Poland, it is doubtful if the members of such a group would really feel satisfied to be represented by one another. Something might perhaps be done for this group idea by providing that the elected members of the Council should be chosen by proportional representation, but even that would go very little way to meet the difficulties I have tried to describe. The truth is that an attempt to provide representation on the basis of the equality of all States outside the Great Powers is based on a disregard of realities. It is absurd to treat Spain and Luxembourg as equal, or even Poland and Denmark. There are, in fact, three categories of States outside the Great Powers, though the boundaries between the categories are not clearly defined. There are the States like Spain and Poland which, without being Great Powers, are of great importance in the world. Then there are at the other end the tiny States like Luxembourg and Siam and several of the central American Republics, not to speak of Abyssinia, which have no claim in reason to a seat on the Council. And then there are the large class of intermediate States which ought to be on the Council from time to time, but need not be there very often or very long. Unfortunately it would be quite impossible to draw up categories of these States. Indeed the attempt to do so would almost certainly destroy the League. But it might perhaps be possible to allow the Assembly itself at the time of election to make a distinction between those States which it thought ought to have prolonged representation on the Council, those which ought to be there for a briefer period, and those which should not be there at all. I suggest therefore that the non-permanent members of the Council should be enlarged to nine. Of this number, three might be regarded as semi-permanent seats. States occupying them would retain their seats for three or five years, and be re-eligible at the end of their term of office. The remaining six would be tenable for only one year, and would not be re-eligible for five years after that. Candidates for the three semi-permanent seats might be recommended by a majority vote of the Council and accepted by a majority vote of the Assembly, on the same lines as the Judges of the Hague Court. The six non-permanent seats would be filled by proportional representation. No doubt this would tend to the formation of groups for the purposes of selecting the non-permanent members, but I do not know that that would be in all respects a bad thing. It might be claimed that if all the Balkan States had to combine every year in order to settle who their representative should be on the Council, it might perhaps help them to combine for other purposes. So, too, proportional representation would tend to give geographical areas proper representation, a matter which has often been pressed on the Assembly by China, and to which the Assembly has in principle assented on more than one occasion. On the other hand it would probably be necessary to have a gentlemen's agreement limiting the number of representatives of particular districts. For instance it would have to be understood that no more than three of the nine elective seats should be occupied by South American States.

It would be a question also whether the British Empire should seek an elective, as well as a permanent, seat, at any rate for the present.

If Spain were given a semi-permanent seat that ought to satisfy her. It would no doubt mean that she would continue to sit on the Council so long as she had her present representative. Similarly, Poland would be enabled to have a seat on the Council, so long as her relations with Germany rendered that desirable. The third seat would be available for a South American State if that was desired, or possibly China—now, or in the future.

Again, if the Assembly so wished, it could prevent very small States sitting on the Council, since a five year rotation would give plenty of candidates even excluding such States.

Finally, there may be a demand for giving the Assembly a right to displace a State with an elective seat from the Council if it abuses its power there, as Brazil has done. It seems to me that the words of the Covenant already give such power since the Assembly is authorised to select the non-permanent States 'from time to time at their discretion'. It might be well to ask the legal advisers of the Government what they think about this. If it be so, some regulation of this right of dismissal should be made by providing that it should only be exercised by, say, a three-quarter vote of the Assembly, concurred in by a three-quarter vote of the Council.

It would be desirable to ascertain whether changes such as are here proposed could be made by regulation, or whether they would require amendments to the Covenant [*sic*]. I cannot see why they should require such amendments, but if they do it might be necessary to modify them to avoid this.² C.

² In this connexion Mr. Campbell subsequently recorded in an undated minute of about April 22 that at a recent departmental meeting Sir A. Chamberlain had come to the decision that 'the blow to the League if Spain and Brazil were to withdraw would be so severe and would have such far-reaching consequences that the best course would be to work for Lord Cecil's scheme i.e. the three-category plan'.

No. 400

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 47 Telegraphic [N 1489/718/38]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 7, 1926, 7.15 p.m.*

Your No 93.¹

1. I appreciate Stresemann's courtesy in giving the information. As you know, I have no desire to form Anti-Soviet combination and have done nothing to discourage others from improving their relations with Russia if they find it possible.

2. I assume from your telegram that German Government will keep the

¹ Nos. 391 and 392.

treaty in harmony with the articles of the Covenant. *Article 17* (State not a member of the League) is important as well as Article 16.

3. Stresemann can of course refer to letter of Locarno Powers about Article 16 but it would be most dangerous for him to comment on or interpret its terms. He must please bear in mind that German claim to be 'neutral' was absolutely declined as quite inconsistent with the Covenant.

4. In this connection I do not understand passage in part I of your telegram which runs (begins) 'Germany had always made it clear to western powers and particularly to England that she could not take part in any aggression against Russia' (ends).

The obligations of the Covenant are *against the aggressor* and are similar for all members of the League, but as the Locarno note said the contribution of each state must be conformable to its circumstances. There is no difference here in point of view between England and other powers and no difference in their attitude to German objections to Article 16.

No. 401

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 7, 9.15 p.m.)

No. 101 Telegraphic [N 1573/686/55]

Secret

BERLIN, April 7, 1926, 8.12 p.m.

I have now obtained and am sending by bag full text of what purports to be the Polish-Roumanian treaty signed on March 26th.¹

This document confirms my telegram No. 97.²

New treaty is fundamentally different from that of 1921³ in that it binds Roumania to defend Poland's German frontier as well as her eastern frontier, the latter having been the limited obligation in 1921.

This change in the position is only known to a few here yet but will create an uproar when published. It will be held to substantiate apprehensions of encirclement, more particularly when taken in conjunction with Signor Mussolini's recent speech⁴ and with M. Averescu's⁵ well-known intimacy with Signor Mussolini.

As regards Russia, new treaty confirms engagement of Poland to defend

¹ The text sent by Lord D'Abernon in Berlin despatch No. 193 of April 7 was substantially the same as the official text printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 125, pp. 981-3, but did not include the protocol.

² Not printed. This telegram of April 2 communicated information from the German Government regarding the new Polish-Roumanian treaty.

³ See No. 84, note 5.

⁴ The reference is probably to Signor Mussolini's speech in Rome on March 28, printed in B. Mussolini, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-106. See also *The Times* of March 29, 1926, p. 14.

⁵ General Averescu was President of the Roumanian Council of Ministers. For current Italian-Roumanian *pourparlers* cf. *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Settima Serie, vol. iv, pp. 209, 211, and 216.

Roumanian territory including Bessarabia. Russians have apparently failed to devise means of persuading Poland to renounce this clause.

Effect of Polish-Roumanian treaty, both in Moscow and Berlin, will be to increase powerfully those influences which press for immediate Russo-German agreement. With prospect of *rapprochement* with Poland now rendered more remote Russia will be more eager to come to terms of some sort with Germany and her demands will be proportionately less exacting but she will press more insistently than ever for signature of something. Germany will be afraid to say 'No' to an offer of re-insurance in the presence of what they will consider evidence of a new combination against them.

No. 402

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 8)

No. 632 [C 4336/436/18]

PARIS, April 7, 1926

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 572¹ of March 29th, and to my telegram No. 144² of April 3rd, I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, a copy of a letter from Monsieur Massigli to Mr. Wigram in regard to the German police.³

2. Certain of the points made in Monsieur Massigli's letter are by no means unanswerable, but I do not feel that any useful purpose would be served by continuing the discussion of the details of this matter.

3. In it the real difference between ourselves and the French is that we do not think that the concession of 5,000—or as it may be argued merely 2,000—extra police is from the military standpoint of sufficient importance to delay the settlement of the outstanding details of control. We are inclined even to think that the concession may technically be justified. Politically, in order to expedite the settlement of outstanding control details and to hasten the *détente* between the ex-Allied Powers and Germany, we consider the concession desirable.

4. The French, on the other hand, argue that from the military standpoint, they have open minds. Though there may be no technical reason against the concession, they do not see that there is any technical reason in favour of it. Politically they go further than us. They assert that to whatever degree the concession may seem to expedite the settlement of outstanding details of

¹ Not printed. This despatch had transmitted (a) a copy of a letter of March 25 from M. Massigli to Mr. Wigram which reiterated M. Briand's views on the question of the German police as indicated in No. 322; (b) a copy of Mr. Wigram's reply of March 27 which argued on much the same lines as Lord Crewe's statement of March 4; see *ibid*.

² No. 395.

³ Not printed. This letter, dated April 2, was in reply to Mr. Wigram's letter of March 27 and argued more fully in favour of the views expressed in M. Massigli's letter of March 25 (see note 1 above).

control and to hasten an ex-Allied *détente* with Germany, there is also a real danger that it will in fact work in a contrary direction by encouraging the Germans to ask for yet further concessions. They are not, therefore, from the political standpoint, prepared to make the concession.

5. After my recent interview with Monsieur Briand, I do not feel that there is any good prospect of obtaining satisfaction from the French Government in this matter. In these circumstances, I should be glad to know what answer should be returned to the German Embassy's communications of March 5th (see my despatch No. 448⁴ of March 8th) and of March 15th (see my despatch No. 509⁵ of March 17th) and what decision should be taken on the Versailles Committee's opinion of February 26th (see my despatch No. 413⁶ of March 2nd).

I have, &c.,
CREWE

⁴ See No. 339, note 4.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ See No. 317, note 2.

No. 403

Minute by Mr. Huxley

[C 4186/539/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 7, 1926

Dr. Schacht's arguments¹ are always precisely the same, and run on the lines of 'Es ist so weil es muss so sein' which Mr. Addison regards² as typical of the German mind.

He has three arguments which he continually repeats:—

(1) Germany needs outlets for her surplus population—

(2) Germany needs to draw raw materials from Colonies of her own in order that she may 'extend the radius for reparation payments to Colonial territory'—

(3) There is bound to be difficulty in transferring Reparation payments to the creditor Powers—Germany must therefore be given opportunities for investing the Dawes funds in Colonial enterprise.

In each case the argument is based on an erroneous assumption which Dr. Schacht regards as axiomatic 'weil es muss so sein'—

(1) Is based on the assumption that some area overseas might conceivably become available which would be able to absorb some considerable part of Germany's surplus population—In point of fact all the German colonies put together could only absorb a few thousand Germans, & the pre-war emigration to them was absolutely negligible.

¹ This minute was written in connexion with a summary, transmitted in Berlin despatch No. 176 of March 30, of a speech by Dr. Schacht on March 24 regarding the necessity of some form of colonial expansion for Germany. For a report on this speech see *The Times*, March 26, 1926, p. 13.

² Cf. No. 141.

(2) Is based on the assumptions that it is less dangerous from the Allied point of view to stimulate German competition in the production of raw products than in that of manufactured goods—and that the transfer to German sovereignty of one or more Colonies would direct German energy & industry to some considerable extent from the latter to the former type of production—In point of fact the very last thing we should want to do is to introduce a fresh competitor in the production of, say, cocoa, cotton, palm oil or rubber—and in any case it is absurd to suppose that even if all Germany's colonies were returned to her we should see the slightest diminution of German competition in manufactured goods, not to mention the fact that before the war she drew only an infinitesimal proportion of her raw material requirements from her own colonies.

(3) Is based on the assumption that the difficulties of transferring the Dawes payments to the creditor Powers will be insuperable, or even of importance. Sir O. Niemeyer & the Treasury have denied this absolutely.³

It is a pity that Dr. Schacht continues to 'ressasser ces pauvretés' without contradiction. The agitation for the return of the Colonies has been worked up in the last two years or so from complete quiescence to a condition where, according to this morning's 'Times'—'on no question is public opinion so sensitive or so determined that Germany shall, in some form or other, resume Colonial activity at the earliest possible moment.'⁴

M. H. HUXLEY

³ Mr. Troutbeck here made the marginal note: 'This is, I think, rather an exaggeration.'

⁴ The Chancellor of the Exchequer subsequently minuted to Sir A. Chamberlain:

'I can only express a personal opinion.'

'I have always regretted that Germany was completely deprived of her colonies. They were hostages to sea power, & economic drains.'

'I am sure a long and wise policy on the part of England will favour the resumption by Germany of some of her oversea possessions, not excluding some of those wh. we have added to our list.'

W. S. C. 29.4.'

On May 1 Sir A. Chamberlain noted: 'In other words I can't get help in this from the C/E; but that does *not* alter my policy. A. C. 1.5.'

No. 404

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 453 [C 4168/24/18]

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 8, 1926

My Lord,

You will have observed from recent correspondence with Lord Crewe that the air negotiations now proceeding in Paris have still not yet reached a conclusion. In this connection I learn from the British representative on the Mixed Committee that Dr. Nord, the German representative, has throughout shown singularly little desire to help forward the negotiations. His general attitude appears in fact to have been that of a representative of General von

See[c]kt and the military party in Germany rather than of the German Foreign Office.

2. Your Lordship may find it possible to mention this matter at some opportune moment in conversation with Dr. Stresemann and to drop a hint that it would be helpful if Dr. Nord were instructed to increase his efforts to arrive at a settlement not only of this particular question but of any others with which he may be called upon to deal in Paris.¹

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

¹ Lord D'Abernon replied in Berlin despatch No. 245 of April 23 that he had spoken the previous day to Herr von Schubert who was 'convinced that a wrong impression had been formed of Dr. Nord's tendencies. He promised, however, to do what was possible to facilitate the Paris negotiations.'

No. 405

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 454 [C 3874/71/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 8, 1926*

My Lord,

I have received your despatch No. 162¹ (82/43/26) of the 24th March, transmitting a record of Dr. Stresemann's speech in the Reichstag on the 22nd March relative to the policy of the German Government towards Locarno and the League of Nations. I observe that on page 19 of this record Dr. Stresemann is reported as having said that the Committee of the League decided unanimously that Germany had fulfilled her international obligations. That is incorrect. In actual fact the First Committee of the recent Assembly of the League confined itself to expressing the opinion that, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 1 of the Covenant, Germany is now giving effective guarantees of her sincere *intention* to observe her international obligations.² In this connection I transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a reply I made in the House of Commons on the 31st March to a question by Mr. Rennie Smith on this subject.³ It is important that you should have clearly in mind the facts of the case, in the event of the matter arising in the course of conversation with representatives of the German Government.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

¹ Not printed. For Dr. Stresemann's speech, cf. No. 369.

² See No. 332, note 2; cf. also enclosure in No. 323 and No. 328.

³ The enclosure is not attached to filed copy: see *Parl. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C.*, vol. 193, cols. 2012-13.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 9)
*No. 641 [W 2941/27/17]**

PARIS, April 8, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum¹ covering the development of the political-financial crisis from the 6th March to the 5th April. This memorandum, if read in conjunction with the memoranda¹ contained in my despatches No. 1583 of the 15th July, 1925, No. 2453 of the 19th November, 1925, No. 12 of the 4th January, 1926, and No. 449 of the 8th March gives a complete account of the development of the crisis from the fall of M. Herriot's Administration almost exactly a year ago.

2. During this last year five Finance Ministers and one Minister of the budget have attempted to grapple with the problem. Now after a year's striving only one of the three stages into which the rehabilitation of the French financial system was divided by M. Caillaux last summer has been passed. Of the restoration of a real budgetary balance, of the settlement of war debts, and of the amortisation of the internal debt and currency stabilisation, only the first has been effected. It is by no means certain that even this has been finally effected. For it is interesting to note that, whilst M. Caillaux in June last estimated the 1926 budgetary deficit at 3,500 to 4,000 millions, over 7,600 millions have in practice been required, even according to M. P  ret's² probably optimistic estimates, to meet it. Unless the yield of taxation now comes fully up to estimate, unless the franc remains stable and public confidence does not diminish, it is likely that the last has not yet been heard of the 1926 budgetary deficit.

3. According to his own statements, M. P  ret will leave for London to renew the war debt negotiations as soon as the 1926 budget is finally disposed of by the Chambers. After compelling them, with M. Loucheur's aid, to swallow 7,600 millions of new taxes, he will, with the franc at 140 to the £, have a hard fight to persuade them to accept yet additional *milliards* to meet the British and American war debts. So far as his own parliamentary position is concerned, his statement to the Chamber that he would 'strive to carry the thesis that the payments of France must in equity be fixed in relation to those which she receives from Germany' seems to have been a wise precaution. He made a somewhat similar statement to the Senate on the 4th April to the effect that the arrangement with the creditor countries 'must not sacrifice either the legitimate or moral interests of France. It must take account also of the payments which we receive from Germany.'

4. I find it difficult to see how the war debts question is to be solved without some sort of reference to German payments. Without a solution of this

¹ Not printed.

² M. P  ret was Minister of Finance in the administration formed by M. Briand on March 10, 1926.

question, no final currency stabilisation or even budgetary equilibrium seems possible.

I have, &c.,
CREWE

No. 407

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 13)
No. 196 [N 1617/718/38]

BERLIN, April 8, 1926

Sir,

I had an opportunity during the Easter holidays of discussing with a leading German authority the broad aspect of the international position as it is affected by the future relations between Germany and Russia.

2. He spoke with unusual frankness, and as he is in a position to know what goes on here behind the scenes, I have thought it interesting to set down his views in some detail.

I have, &c.,
D'ABERNON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 407

BERLIN, April 4, 1926

The international position in Central and Eastern Europe at the present time is extremely complicated.

The German-French frontier, which was the main source of potential danger and difficulty in the West having been tranquillised by the Pact of Locarno, the sphere of interest has shifted further East and there appears to be, at the present moment, a vast amount of negotiation, if not of intrigue, centring round Poland and Roumania and Yugo-Slavia.

The first sign that something unusual was in prospect was given by Mussolini's speech on February 6. An endeavour has been made to attribute the origin of this speech to the indiscretion of Dr Held in Munich, but probably the causes lay far deeper and may be found in an intention to extend Italian activity in Central Europe. This development may well become the dominant feature in the European complex during the next phase.

Although the negotiations between Servia and Italy have apparently not yet led to any definite signature there can be little doubt that they indicate a desire on the part of Italy to take a much more active interest in Central Europe than she has hitherto done. The existence of this intention is confirmed by the reports from Bucharest that the new Roumanian Government under General Averescu will entertain relations of the most intimate kind with Italy.

Taken in conjunction with Mussolini's speech it appears not improbable that Italy desires to assume the rôle of protector of certain states in the Petite

Entente against the possibility of German aggression and in this rôle will either supplement or—more probably—rival France.

The terms of the Polish-Roumanian Treaty which was signed on March 26 may be held to confirm the above view. According to Berlin reports this Treaty, which was at first rumoured to be a mere resignature of the Treaty of 1921, differs from that Treaty very materially. The Treaty of 1921 was a defensive alliance directed exclusively against Russia. The present Treaty compels Poland and Roumania to afford one another mutual military support against all attacks whether coming from the East or from the West. It further imposes far more stringent unity of foreign policy upon the Foreign Ministers of the two countries than had been done by the Treaty of 1921. This modification of the direction of the Polish-Roumanian association may again be ascribed with probability to the same general course of policy as that suggested by Mussolini's speech, namely, to a desire on the part of certain powers, under Italian inspiration, to form a fresh group to oppose the extension of Germanism to the east and south.

Clearly these tendencies of an anti-German character could not occur without arousing considerable excitement in Berlin. They may not necessarily have been the main cause of the present intention to come to some agreement with Russia, but they have been a contributing cause of importance.

The main cause of Germany's decision finally to yield to the advances of Russia and sign a new agreement with her is to be attributed to fear of Poland—to alarm lest some alliance might be established between Russia and Poland or between Russia and France.

It was always clear that Germany would not allow close relations between Russia and either France or Poland without intervening. Whenever negotiations between Russia and either of the above-mentioned countries advanced to the stage of probable agreement, Germany was certain to cut in and not allow herself to be deprived of the Russian connection.

The conversion of German Ministers from a negative attitude towards Russia to one of acceptance of Russian proposals has been greatly facilitated by the reduction of the original Russian claim. Throughout 1925 Germany could have had an alliance with Russia for the asking. It was only necessary to make the alliance sufficiently close. This Germany refused. The Luther-Stresemann Government, while determined to maintain a certain connection with Russia, placed greater importance on joining the League of Nations. They refused to be intimidated by Russian menaces although such menaces were repeated in various forms both from Moscow and by Chicherin during his two stays in Berlin. Stresemann assured him that Germany had the most friendly disposition towards Russia but that it was quite impossible for Germany to refuse the advantages offered by the Pact of Locarno and a permanent seat on the Council.

When Russia saw that it was hopeless to deter the German Ministers from this purpose they [*sic*] came forward with more moderate proposals.

After the London meeting of December 1925 they no longer proposed

an alliance but stated that they would be satisfied with a declaration from Germany that she would not join in any military or economic combination against Russia. Until quite recently however they have urged that a convention in this sense might advantageously be accompanied by a secret Treaty giving further guarantees of assistance on the part of Germany if Russia was attacked or unduly pressed. The German Government appear to have declined even to discuss the possibility of a secret treaty. They have, however, maintained their readiness to enter into a formal engagement with Russia not to join in any hostile combination, as well as to give Russia official cognisance of the interpretation placed on Article 16 by the Locarno Powers.

It seems likely that a convention embodying the above conditions will be signed between Germany and Russia at no distant date—probably soon after Dr Stresemann's return from Locarno. It would however be rash to state positively when signature will occur. The Russian negotiators fluctuate between a meticulous precision which considers no detail unimportant and a jealous haste to sign something which esteems all examination of detail a cause of regrettable delay.

Whether the fresh agreement between Germany and Russia is desirable or not, it appears to be almost inevitable.

As above indicated, a variety of causes have contributed to bring it about—

The failure at Geneva;

The increased apprehension in Berlin at favours shown to Poland;

The conception widely propagated by the press both in Paris and elsewhere that when Germany became a member of the Council Poland must be admitted in some form or another to similar rights as a counter-poise;

The negotiations between Servia, Italy and France for an anti-germanic pact;

The signature of the Polish-Roumanian treaty with a new clause extending this treaty to action against Germany;

The signs of Italo-Roumanian rapprochement. All these causes have created profound disquiet in the minds of the German Government and have led them to seek for some counter-stroke which would at once increase Germany's prestige and strengthen her, at any rate diplomatically, against hostile combinations which loom on the horizon.

The first impression which will be formed in western Europe of a German-Russian Rapprochement will probably be unfavourable. It will be thought that by this rapprochement communistic ideas from Russia will possibly obtain increased currency in Germany. But it is doubtful if this will follow. The German Government think the opposite. They say they can control Communism better when relations with Moscow are friendly. Again, of course, it might be argued that a Russo-German combination will result in Germany exercising too dominant an influence over the affairs of Eastern Europe. But much will depend on the nature of that combination. As at present indicated the proposed Russo-German pact will be more of a negative than a positive kind. Germany will only undertake not to enter into a military or economic combination against Russia. But even if the Pact

should take the form of a promise of mutual support in the event of aggression by a third party, Russia under the existing régime may be expected to be guided rather by the interests of the moment than by the obligations of her signature, even if experience had not shown how difficult it is to induce the Soviet Government to act up to their contractual engagements.

The best method of estimating the desirability or otherwise of a German-Russian agreement is, as my informant put it, to consider the alternatives. It is fairly certain that Russia cannot permanently remain isolated and unattached. She will either come to some agreement with Germany or with the French-Polish combination.

At the time of Rapallo it was generally thought that the agreement then come to between Germany and Russia would eventuate in a dangerous military combination. This apprehension has proved unfounded. The possibility of an aggressive military combination between Germany and Russia is remote owing to the widely divergent ideas of policy entertained in German military circles and those in favour at Moscow. It is possible that the proposed agreement, while preventing Russia from entering into binding agreements with France and Poland, can hardly lead to the creation of any great positive and aggressive military strength.

At the time of Rapallo Germany was weaker than to-day—Russia was stronger. Since that date Germany's currency has been stabilised, her financial system has been put on a firm basis, her budget is in order, the reparation problem has been solved, disarmament has been carried out, and last but not least the Treaty of Locarno has been signed. In the same interval Russia has become in many respects weaker—her funds are exhausted—the extreme communistic policy has been discredited and a certain progress has been made towards a reversion to normal economic conditions.

The main obstacle which retards a further economic development of Russia is want of capital and Russian policy will almost inevitably be directed in the near future to the obtaining of the indispensable financial facilities.

The net result of a German-Russian agreement to-day would therefore be quite different from that which might have been apprehended at the time of Rapallo. Then it was Germany who might have been attracted into the Russian orbit. To-day the greater probability is in favour of Russia being attracted into the German orbit. In signing a convention to-day, Russia would sign with a Germany who has already applied for entry into the League of Nations—a Germany whose Ministers are resolutely determined to become members of the League and who are supported in this determination by a considerable majority in the country. To a certain extent it may be said that by signing with Germany, Russia condones Germany's entry into the League of Nations. It is possible that this condonation may be the preliminary towards following Germany's example and entering the League. The path to Geneva for her may lead through the Brandenburger Tor.¹

It remains to consider the result of a Russian-German agreement upon Poland. Without subscribing to the accusations of unreasonableness which

¹ i.e. through Berlin.

are made against Poland, it is clear that her claim to be considered as a Great Power is among the main causes of unrest to-day in Eastern Europe. A Poland allied to France and supported by Russia would become intolerable. A Poland confronted with an understanding between Russia and Germany may become reasonable.

As regards the advance west of communistic ideas, the greater danger appears to be a close understanding between Russia and Poland which would facilitate the introduction of Moscow doctrines into Poland. The large Jewish population there is evidently a ground ready for the reception of subversive doctrines, while the financial crisis in Poland, which is probable in the near future, will give a favourable opportunity to the propaganda of Communism. The danger of communistic propaganda in Germany is to-day less great. It was considerable in 1920—to-day, with the financial crisis overcome and with a stronger Government the danger of any serious communistic extension here becomes less. It may be said that a Russian-German combination in this regard is less dangerous to Europe than a Russian-Polish combination would be.

Finally it should not be forgotten that what Germany contemplates is not an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia, nor is it a political entente involving a close co-ordination of foreign policy. The main plank in Germany's foreign policy must remain Locarno, but she cannot afford to ignore Russia, still less to alienate her, so long as Poland remains what she is and continues within the French orbit. Some form of insurance against what she conceives to be the Polish danger is vital to Germany. She is thus forced into the present rapprochement with Russia and while she rests the bulk of her weight, as it were, on the leg which is firmly planted on Locarno, she can lightly balance the remainder and smaller portion of it on the footing which she hopes now to acquire on Poland's eastern frontiers.²

² Sir A. Chamberlain stated in a minute on April 15: 'Some passages in this gravely disturb me. I *must* know who the speaker was.' In reply to the resulting telegram No. 52 to Berlin, H.M. Chargé d'Affaires stated in Berlin telegram No. 112 of April 16 (docket only preserved in Foreign Office archives) that Lord D'Abernon had not disclosed the name of his informant. Lord D'Abernon had left Berlin for London on April 9, leaving Mr. Ingram, First Secretary in H.M. Embassy, in charge.

No. 408

*Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 10, 9 a.m.)*

No. 103 Telegraphic [N 1593/718/38]

BERLIN, April 9, 1926, 9.20 p.m.

I have communicated to Secretary of State views conveyed in your telegram No. 47¹ and have discussed with him the points in detail.

¹ No. 400: cf. Kurt Rosenbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-14.

Secretary of State was evidently gratified at English attitude on contemplated convention and by your appreciation of Doctor Stresemann's initiative in communicating Germany's intentions in advance. He is fully alive to the fact that to make feeling between Germany and England is one of the main objectives of Moscow. Already they have started the rumour in Paris that negotiations are proceeding between Russia and Germany, the result of which would be renunciation by Germany of obligations to the League of Nations under article 16 and inclusion [*sic*] of an unrestricted treaty of neutrality. This is precisely what Germany has resisted for the last eighteen months and proposes to resist to the end. There will be no commentary on the letter of Locarno powers. Some commentary on article 17 may be inevitable but will be entirely void of objection.

Secretary of State returned to the theme that convention with Russia is really the complement of Locarno. He argued that Russia cannot be left permanently outside European combinations. Somehow or other a bridge to Europe and Geneva must be found and convention might be on the whole the least dangerous of available bridges.

In advancing this argument he did not at all deny that it suits Germany not to estrange Russia and that it is indeed essential to her geographical situation that she should not do so.

Turning to internal politics, he said that it was most desirable that German nationals should not be in a position to talk too much about a German-Russian rapprochement. It was therefore desirable to approve² by some action that Locarno policy was being followed and was bearing fruit. What this action should be he did not specify precisely.

² In another text of this telegram this word read 'prove'.

No. 409

*The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 10, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 153 Telegraphic: by bag [N 1585/718/38]

Confidential

PARIS, April 9, 1926

The memorandum by Monsieur Berthelot transmitted to you tonight in my despatch No. 652¹ reporting on his interview on April 3rd with the German Ambassador respecting the approaching conclusion of a Russo-German convention was handed by Monsieur Berthelot this afternoon to Mr. Phipps. Monsieur Berthelot said that he had had a subsequent interview with Herr von Hoesch and had spoken to him on that occasion with even more freedom. He had pointed out to Herr von Hoesch that whatever Germany might do she could not now go back upon the Locarno policy, to

¹ No. 410 where M. Berthelot's conversation with Herr von Hoesch is wrongly ascribed to April 5.

which she and France were both irredeemably committed. He himself therefore did not mind whether Germany signed such a convention with Russia or not, but if she did so it would be a futile proceeding and one calculated to produce a deplorable effect in England, America and France. M. Berthelot observed to Mr. Phipps that Chicherin's action was perfectly natural, for he is possessed with the 'idée fixe' that Great Britain desires to compass by every means in her power the downfall of the Soviets. Herr Stresemann's action, on the other hand, was due to his desire to play on both 'tableaux', as M. Berthelot put it, and to his insensate fear that if left alone with Great Britain and France Germany will be mercilessly squeezed.

M. Berthelot then stated that Chicherin had, when the recent Franco-Russian debt negotiations opened, offered France to conclude a formal triple alliance with her and Germany (directed, of course, against Great Britain). This offer, Chicherin must have well known, France could and would never accept, but he had presumably made it with a view to reproaching France at some future date for having declined to consider it.

M. Berthelot will be glad to learn what your considered views are on the subject of the proposed Russo-German convention.²

² With reference to this telegram Mr. Phipps stated in a letter of April 10 to Mr. Gregory that M. Berthelot 'seemed more contemptuous than upset over this convention, and he told me in this connection a story of how his father had, in private conversation with a distinguished scientist, demolished one by one all the latter's arguments in favour of some great plan. Berthelot père finally said: "Eh bien, j'ai démolé tous vos arguments, n'est-ce pas?" to which the "savant" replied, "Oui, en détail, mais l'ensemble demeure". Berthelot remarked to me that this represented his view of the convention which, according to the Germans, was perfectly harmless in every one of its details, but which, taken as a whole, would nevertheless create a deplorable impression. Berthelot, however, added, almost under his breath, that for certain reasons it was not an altogether bad thing. I imagine, though he did not, of course, say this, that Berthelot feels in his heart of hearts that the drawbacks of the deplorable impression which the conclusion of the convention will certainly cause in France will be more than compensated for by its effect on Great Britain and America, where incorrigible pro-Germans will perhaps be forced to recognize that Germany is not such a good and innocent little boy as the Liberal and Labour press would have us believe.'

No. 410

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 10)
*No. 652 [N 1587/718/38]**

Very confidential

PARIS, April 9, 1926

His Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum by M. Berthelot to M. Briand respecting the visit of the German Ambassador to M. Berthelot on the 5th [3rd]¹ April, 1926, regarding the Russo-German Convention (handed by M. Berthelot to Mr. Phipps for his confidential information *only*).

¹ Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 212.

Memorandum respecting German Ambassador's Visit to M. Berthelot

PARIS, le 5 avril 1926

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu voir M. Berthelot. Il lui a dit d'abord qu'il avait eu la veille une importante conversation avec M. Briand, qui avait manifesté des sentiments favorables à une collaboration franco-allemande, dans l'intérêt des deux pays. M. von Hoesch a aussitôt télégraphié à Berlin le récit de cet entretien.

Le Président du Conseil a ensuite témoigné de son désir de régler dans de bonnes conditions:

1. La question de réduction des effectifs en Rhénanie, pour laquelle d'ici peu de jours des précisions pourraient être fournies;
2. La question de l'aviation, qui serait examinée dans un esprit bienveillant par le Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

M. von Hoesch a dit ensuite que sa visite au Secrétaire général se référerait avant tout à des instructions qu'il venait de recevoir de Berlin, et qui se référerait aux relations de l'Allemagne avec la Russie.

Un bref historique était nécessaire pour replacer la question dans sa position politique exacte.

En automne 1924, l'Allemagne a été invitée par les Alliés à entrer dans la Société des Nations. Après un examen minutieux de la proposition, le Gouvernement allemand a décidé, en principe, d'accepter cette invitation.

Le Gouvernement russe à ce moment même pressait l'Allemagne d'entrer en association étroite avec la Russie et en particulier de conformer l'attitude des deux Puissances relativement à la Société des Nations. L'Allemagne n'accepta pas en raison de la décision qu'elle venait de prendre. Cependant, en raison de l'importance de ses relations avec la Russie, elle resta en négociation avec cette Puissance.

Conformément à cette politique, le Gouvernement allemand fit, le 9 février, à la France et à l'Angleterre les ouvertures et la proposition d'où sont sortis les accords de Locarno.

A l'occasion de ces accords, les Alliés ont demandé formellement à l'Allemagne d'entrer dans la Société des Nations, et l'Allemagne a accepté.

Cependant la Russie continuait d'agir à Berlin, cherchant à démontrer que l'Allemagne se mettait à la remorque de la France et de l'Angleterre et serait fatalement entraînée par-là contre la Russie. Voyant que l'Allemagne ne changeait pas de position, le Gouvernement des Soviets modifia légèrement son attitude, mais chercha par une pression très forte à obtenir la conclusion entre les deux pays d'un traité de neutralité absolue.

Le Gouvernement allemand répondit qu'il ne pouvait conclure un pareil traité en raison de ses engagements à l'égard de la Société des Nations. Le Gouvernement russe répondit que, dans ces conditions, il serait obligé de mettre fin à ses relations amicales et confiantes avec l'Allemagne. Cette dernière Puissance, embarrassée par ces déclarations catégoriques et ne

voulant pas abandonner ses relations avec la Russie, chercha à trouver une formule acceptable pour les deux pays.

Au mois de décembre 1925, M. Stresemann soumit des formules dans ce sens à M. Tchitchérine (en excluant d'ailleurs la neutralité absolue). Les Russes déclarèrent ces engagements insuffisantes [*sic*], mais les Allemands continuèrent à refuser la neutralité absolue, seule formule acceptée à Moscou.

En présence de cette résistance, la Russie céda légèrement pour tâcher d'entrer dans les voies allemandes et à la suite de longues conversations un accord entre Berlin et Moscou a été presque réalisé (toujours sans la neutralité absolue).

L'échec de la récente Conférence de Genève décida les Russes à intervenir, de nouveau, pour obtenir cette formule de neutralité absolue à laquelle ils tenaient tant, mais l'Allemagne maintint, de nouveau, son point de vue de la politique des accords de Locarno et l'entrée dans la Société des Nations. Elle acceptait cependant l'accord limité avec la Russie, mais chercha à le remettre jusqu'à l'automne, craignant qu'après l'échec momentané de Genève, la conclusion d'un accord germano-russe ne fit un mauvais effet en Europe et spécialement à Londres et à Paris. Mais le Gouvernement soviétique marqua nettement que si l'on ne concluait pas, il se détournerait définitivement de l'Allemagne. Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement allemand s'est décidé à conclure l'accord avec la Russie et M. Stresemann le signera au retour de son congé de Pâques.

Les quatre points principaux de l'accord sont les suivants:

1. Assurance générale de prise de contact amicale dans toutes les affaires communes sans engagement ni lien concret;
2. Engagement mutuel de ne pas participer à une agression non provoquée d'États tiers contre la Russie et respectivement contre l'Allemagne;
3. Engagement mutuel de ne pas prendre part en temps de paix, dans le domaine économique, à une action commune des États tiers contre la Russie et respectivement contre l'Allemagne;
4. Communication à la Russie que l'Allemagne entend remplir loyalement les obligations de l'article 16 du Pacte, tout en se référant cependant à la note des Puissances de Locarno relative à cet article.

M. von Hoesch, après cet exposé, affirma à M. Berthelot qu'il n'y avait dans l'accord germano-russe rien de contraire aux principes sur lesquels les Puissances se sont mises d'accord à Locarno. L'Allemagne désire seulement maintenir ses bonnes relations avec la Russie sans aucun heurt.

Lord D'Abernon a été informé hier [*sic*] très confidentiellement; il a paru tout d'abord bouleversé, puis il a paru comprendre les explications qui lui étaient données.

Le Gouvernement allemand tient essentiellement à prévenir le Gouvernement français, en même temps que le Gouvernement anglais, pour que ce ne soit pas ce dernier qui renseigne Paris de la question.

Aussitôt après l'information donnée à Paris, M. Vandervelde sera également abordé.

L'accord sera publié dès la signature définitive, c'est-à-dire très probablement avant la fin d'avril.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne insiste encore sur le fait qu'il n'y a dans cet accord rien de sensationnel, qu'il ne fait que confirmer un état de choses établi et naturel, et que d'ailleurs il n'y a rien là de contraire ni aux principes de Genève, ni aux accords de Locarno.

Ce n'est, à aucun degré, du dépit de l'Allemagne de ne pas avoir obtenu son entrée à la Société des Nations dès le mois de mars.

M. von Hoesch espère que M. Briand ne sera pas surpris et indisposé par l'accord entre l'Allemagne et la Russie et se tient à sa disposition pour lui en parler, dans une huitaine de jours, quand le Président du Conseil français sera de retour de ses courtes vacances.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demandé à M. Berthelot ce qu'il en pensait personnellement.

Le Secrétaire général lui a répondu qu'il désirait y réfléchir et qu'il voulait avant tout en parler au Ministre des Affaires étrangères. Sur l'insistance de M. von Hoesch, il déclara seulement que si l'Allemagne a voulu faire quelque chose de sensationnel, il est probable qu'elle y réussira et que la signature en ce moment d'un accord avec la Russie paraîtra, quel qu'en soit le contenu, un symbole impressionnant et une conclusion à méditer des conversations récentes à la Société des Nations.

M. Berthelot a ajouté que l'émotion de Lord D'Abernon s'expliquait, car un accord russo-allemand risquait d'être interprété à Londres comme un échec direct de toute la récente politique anglaise.

No. 411

Letter from Wing-Commander Smyth-Pigott (Paris) to Mr. Troutbeck
(Received April 10)

[C 4402/24/18]

PARIS, April 9, 1926

Dear Troutbeck,

(1) On my return from leave yesterday Herr Fisch, of the German delegation, came to see me and we discussed the question of flying by Reichswehr and Navy. Herr Fisch stated that it was impossible to prevent personnel who had already learnt to fly from continuing to do so. After considerable discussion he appeared to agree to the following:

- (a) The existing pilots should be allowed to continue to fly; their names to be placed on a separate list. No fresh names to be added to this list which, in course of time, would gradually disappear. (List A.)
- (b) Every year a maximum of 6 new pilots should be allowed, reaching a total of 36 in 6 years' time. The number of names on this list never to surpass 36. (List B.)

This morning I attended a meeting of the Allied delegates and gave them

an account of my meeting with Fisch. They stated that they would be prepared to accept the German proposal provided the maximum number of names on list A did not surpass 36. Unfortunately, however, there are about 70 officers at present in the Reichswehr who hold Brevets, though only 35 of these fly regularly. Fisch explained to me that it would be impossible, on moral grounds, to withdraw the Brevets from those who do not fly regularly. This one outstanding point does not appear to be insurmountable.

(2) As regards aerodromes and terrains de secours in the *occupied* territory and flying in and over the occupied territory, the French consider that it would be advisable for this matter to be settled in the form of an additional note to be addressed to the German Ambassador by the Ambassadors' Conference, a copy of which is attached. It will be seen in this letter that these questions are really left to the Rhineland Commission¹ to settle with the German Authorities. I gave my approval to this suggestion as it was within my instructions.

(3) Monsieur Massigli is meeting the German delegates this afternoon.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Air Commodore Newall.²

Yours sincerely,

R. SMYTH-PIGOTT

P.S. As regards aerodromes in the demilitarised zone please see Hugessen's letter to you dated April 1st.³

R. S.-P.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 411

Projet de lettre à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne

9 Avril, 1926

1. J'ai l'honneur de vous confirmer, comme conséquence de l'accord intervenu, en date de ce jour, entre la Conférence des Ambassadeurs et le Gouvernement allemand sur le régime à appliquer à l'avenir à l'aviation allemande, que les Gouvernements représentés à la Conférence ont décidé de lever l'interdiction opposée, en vertu de leur décision du [1]5 Décembre 1920, au survol des territoires occupés par les appareils allemands. Ainsi, la souveraineté du Reich en ce qui concerne la navigation aérienne civile, souveraineté dont l'exercice était suspendu en conséquence de la décision

¹ In Coblenz despatch No. 77 of April 15 (docket only preserved in Foreign Office archives) Lord Kilmarnock stated that he considered that the French draft note was satisfactory.

² Deputy Chief designate of the Air Staff.

³ Not printed. This letter reported on an interallied meeting that day and stated in particular: 'As regards the demilitarised zone, it is proposed to agree that the Germans shall have Cologne and Frankfort as permanent aerodromes, and in addition to these three "terrains de secours" at places which it will be left to them to select. As regards the occupied area, the French General Staff are absolutely opposed to allowing the Germans to use any of their military aerodromes, especially Mayence. They do not consider that, if the above offer is made to them regarding the demilitarised zone, it is really necessary for them to have any of the four places which they have asked for in occupied territory.'

précitée, pourra s'exercer à l'avenir, sous réserve des pouvoirs que la Haute-Commission tient de l'Arrangement rhénan et dont il lui appartient de faire application pour assurer la sécurité et les besoins des armées d'occupation.

2. Il résulte de cette décision que les dispositions législatives, administratives et réglementaires allemandes en matière d'aéronautique s'appliqueront en territoires occupés sous réserve des pouvoirs d'examen, de veto et d'adaptation que la Haute Commission applique d'ailleurs déjà à toute législation allemande dans les territoires soumis à sa juridiction.

3. Les gouvernements alliés invitent, d'autre part, la Haute Commission à substituer, à l'Ordonnance 80, une autre ordonnance tenant compte de la situation nouvelle.

4. La nouvelle réglementation, au sujet de laquelle toutes précisions utiles seront données au Commissaire d'Empire, comportera essentiellement l'obligation, pour les avions survolant les Territoires rhénans, d'être munis, indépendam[m]ent de l'autorisation que le Gouvernement allemand jugerait devoir accorder, d'une autorisation de la H[aute] C[ommission] I[n]teralliée des] T[erritoires] R[hénans] cette autorisation pouvant être, suivant le cas, soit collective et délivrée pour une période déterminée, soit individuelle et délivrée pour un ou plusieurs voyages.

5. La H.C.I.T.R. tiendra naturellement compte, en cette matière, des accords intervenus ou à intervenir entre un ou plusieurs Gouvernements alliés et le Gouvernement allemand concernant l'exploitation de lignes commerciales régulières.

6. Il appartiendra, d'autre part, à la H.C.I.T.R. de statuer, après avoir pris contact à ce sujet avec le Commaissaire [sic] d'Empire, sur les demandes qui lui seront présentées concernant la question des aérodromes susceptibles d'être utilisés pour l'aviation civile en Territoires occupés. Les Gouvernements représentés à la Conférence décident dès maintenant qu'ils ne s'opposent pas à ce que les dispositions prises à cet égard entrent en viguerie [sic] après l'évacuation des Territoires occupés.

No. 412

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 1111 [N 1585/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 10, 1926*

My Lord,

With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 153¹ of the 9th instant, I desire to inform you that on the 8th instant M. Cambon,² in the absence of M. de Fleuriau, came to see Mr. Gregory in pursuance of instructions from Paris to discuss the proposed Russo-German Convention, and to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Government upon it. He read aloud a telegram from his Government reporting that the German Ambassador in Paris had

¹ No. 409.

² Counsellor in the French Embassy in London.

informed M. Berthelot of the imminent conclusion of this convention, and had given certain indications as to its probable contents. M. Berthelot's first impressions were exceedingly unfavourable. He was of opinion that it would 'create a sensation', both here and in America, and would be distinctly unfavourable to the development of the Locarno policy. M. Briand had, however, not had time to consider it in all its bearings.

2. Mr. Gregory said that it was obviously disappointing that the Germans should have chosen this moment to take a step which would be unfavourably commented on abroad, but that reflection on the misfortune and the method of dealing with the situation were two distinct things.

3. The considered view, moreover, of the Foreign Office was that, although Dr. Stresemann's explanations of the necessity of concluding the convention at this particular moment were not altogether convincing, and, although in view of past history one could not entirely discard suspicion as to the real motive of the German Government, yet there were one or two points which might be held to some extent to mitigate the situation.

4. First, one must give the German Government credit for not having repeated the tactics of Rapallo. This time they had given His Majesty's Government ample and apparently frank notice of their intentions; secondly, they had given clear and definite pledges that the convention would contain nothing incompatible with the Covenant of the League of Nations or with the obligations of Locarno; thirdly, it appeared that the convention would be signed on lines substantially embodying the German point of view and not on the lines originally proposed by M. Chicherin; and finally Dr. Stresemann [*sic*]³ had now given a different account to that of Herr von Hoesch in Paris as regards the actual purport of the convention—which made a very material change. Instead of the 'engagement général pour concerter sur toutes les affaires communes,' it was now said to be only an engagement 'to remain in friendly contact in order to arrive at an understanding on the question of mutual economic and political interests.' In other words its effect would be limited to Russo-German questions, and would not include questions involving the relations of either party to other Powers.

5. The possible courses open to the British and French Governments appeared to be two. Either they could bring pressure to bear in Berlin to prevent the signature of the convention and let their dislike of it become publicly known, or they could 'faire bonne mine à mauvais jeu.' My view was that the first course would be quite the wrong one. It would almost certainly fail to prevent the signature of the convention; it would certainly strengthen the hands of the Nationalist and Communist parties in Germany, which alone might well have the effect of driving the German Government further along the road to Moscow than they really desired to go; it would certainly accentuate the difficulties of maintaining the Locarno policy and of arriving at an agreed solution of the Council problems next September, and to this extent would, quite unnecessarily, present Moscow with a diplomatic victory.

³ See No. 397. This misattribution was repeated in Nos. 418, 420, 429, and 434.

6. If, on the other hand, the British and French Governments accepted the situation as a *fait accompli*, took the convention at its face value, and allowed it to be known that they were satisfied with the German assurances, then Russia's last effort to wreck the Western Entente would have come to nought; the position of the German Government *vis-à-vis* the opposition to them in Germany on the extreme Right and Left would have been strengthened; and it would become easier to co-operate with Germany in the solution of present problems, thus encouraging her to realise that her interests were best served by facing west rather than east.

7. M. Cambon was told that this roughly represented the principle which the Foreign Office considered ought to guide them in dealing with the new development that had arisen, but there was also a point on which instructions had already been sent to Lord D'Abernon,⁴ namely, the question of Germany's neutrality under a convention with Russia. Lord D'Abernon had been instructed to call Dr. Stresemann's attention to the terms of article XVII of the Covenant and to warn him that in making his reference to article XVI it would be most dangerous for him to comment on it to the Russians or to interpret its terms. Lord D'Abernon had also been told to remind Dr. Stresemann that the German claim to be neutral in disputes involving the League, had been rejected as inconsistent with the Covenant.

8. I should be glad if you will take an early opportunity of explaining the views of His Majesty's Government, as outlined above, to the French Government.

I am, &c.,
(For the Secretary of State),
C. W. ORDE

⁴ See No. 400.

No. 413

*Letter from Wing-Commander Smyth-Pigott (Paris) to Mr. Troutbeck
(Received April 12)*

[C 4480/24/18]

PARIS, April 11, 1926

Dear Troutbeck,

There was a mistake in the annex to the letter¹ which I forwarded you on the 9th; in the last sentence, for the verb 'entrent' please substitute 'demeureront'.

A meeting took place on Saturday² afternoon between the Allied and German delegates; the latter submitted new proposals for the Reichswehr and Marine. For the first time, we were informed that not only the 36 pilots who learnt to fly after the war but also the 40 odd pilots who learnt to fly during the war, continue to fly each year. This complicates the situation and the French, Belgians and Italians are considerably annoyed. The Germans also

¹ No. 411.

² April 10, 1926.

propose that nine new pilots should be allowed to fly each year until a total of 90 is reached in ten years' time. The existing pilots will be put on a list A., which will be rendered yearly, will not be added to, will diminish gradually and eventually disappear. The new pilots will be put on a list B., which will be rendered also yearly. As regards list B. I think I can get the Germans to modify their demands but there will be considerable difficulty in getting the Allies to swallow list A.

As regards aerodromes in the demilitarized zone, I attach copy of a new German proposal³ which is now being studied by the Allied delegates.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Air Commodore Newall.

Yours sincerely,

R. SMYTH-PIGOTT

³ Not printed. The German proposal was for six airports and twelve landing grounds.

No. 414

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 12, 6.40 p.m.)

No. 43 Telegraphic [N 1605/718/38]

Urgent

WARSAW, April 12, 1926, 4 p.m.

Your telegram No. 20.¹

I gave message to President of the Council who expressed doubt as to accuracy of our version of German proposals as his contained further promises for concerting together and affording mutual aid and assistance against unprovoked attack.

He argued that German insistence on Locarno interpretation of Article 16 in their negotiations with Russian government proved that they considered it a bargaining counter. German government regard collective note of December 1st as a concession and a derogation from their obligations under Article 16 while to judge from your . . .² November 18th you regarded it merely as an explanation of those obligations. This doubt must be cleared up by a juridical definition of obligations of members of League of Nations under Article 16, incapable of two interpretations thus avoiding repetition of difficulties that arose in connection with entry of Germany into the Council. Otherwise Germans would present us with *fait accompli* and then plead

¹ Not printed. This telegram of April 11 replied to Warsaw telegram No. 41 of April 10, wherein Sir W. Max Muller reported that Count Skrzynski had spoken in 'most pessimistic terms' of the proposed Soviet-German agreement, as communicated to him by M. Briand, and had described it as 'the defeat of the policy of Locarno' and as implying that the German Government would 'not allow any foreign forces to pass through Germany to the assistance of Poland in the event of an attack by Russia'. Foreign Office telegram No. 20 authorized Sir William to inform Count Skrzynski of the version of the agreement in No. 392, and instructed him to speak on similar lines to the first paragraph and the first two sentences of the second paragraph of No. 418.

² The text is here uncertain. Another text of the telegram here read: 'your speech of 18th November': cf. *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 188, col. 425.

that they had acted in good faith. Their object was blackmail and if we always yielded we should be led far.

He maintained that what was contemplated between Germany and Russia amounted to defensive alliance such an alliance was contrary to the whole idea of Locarno and offence was aggravated in case of a treaty with a country under the ban of the League. In reply to remark of mine he said that a pact of non-aggression between Poland and Russia would be quite another thing as first there was question of common frontier and secondly Poland would always make observance of her obligations under League of Nations *sine qua non* of any treaty.³

³ Sir W. Max Muller further reported in Warsaw telegram No. 44 of April 12 that the Polish Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had spoken to him in terms similar to those employed by Count Skrzynski and had stated that the version of the agreement in No. 392 (described by Sir William as 'widely divergent' from the French version) was 'sufficiently threatening and objectionable in itself'.

No. 415

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon¹ (Berlin)

No. 49 Telegraphic [N 1593/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 12, 1926, 6 p.m.

Your No. 103² and preceding telegrams on same subject.

These negotiations do not greatly disturb me provided German authorities act strictly upon the assurances which they have volunteered to you and of which you should take note. The real danger is in the reactions of German policy on France and Poland. I regard the extension of the Polish-Roumanian treaty as the direct result of Germany's attitude to Poland at Geneva. Germany first frightens Poland and then gets frightened by her. Poland held aloof from Chicherin's overtures and disregarded his threats before Locarno. After Locarno Skrzynski suspended the deportations, a real *beau geste* which might easily have led to improved relations. But German hostility (and worse German contempt for the Poles and all things Polish) is never concealed and breeds resentment and fear.

Again in the case of France Germany constantly talks of further concessions, shortening of the occupation of the remaining Rhineland zones, further limitation of numbers of occupying troops, etc. But what does she do to facilitate progress? Briand has several times spoken with great courage and generosity. I have seen nothing comparable in the speeches of the German leaders and their constantly growing demands (e.g. police) do not encourage concession.

We ourselves cannot view without concern the renewed agitation about mandates for which President of Reichsbank appears mainly responsible. You should repeat to Foreign Minister that there can be no abandonment

¹ In error for Mr. Ingram.

² No. 408.

of any British mandate and that the agitation can only embarrass our new and more friendly relations with Germany.

Unless the German government can give clear evidence that they are as ready to give as to receive and that they recognise that the whole basis of the Locarno policy was mutuality I shall despair of obtaining further concessions for them. They make things too difficult for those who desire to help them in this country and still more in France.

No. 416

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Hodgson (Moscow)

No. 273 [N 1237/90/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 12, 1926*

Sir:

I transmit to you herewith copies of correspondence culminating in a letter¹ to the London Chamber of Commerce which deals with the present attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Soviet Government.

2. There has been an increasing demand for the issue by this department of a public statement of Russian policy, and by January of this year it had become clear that a vigorous press and parliamentary campaign could only be averted by the reception of a deputation from the London Chamber of Commerce and the subsequent issue of some such statement. The letter addressed to the Chamber on the 6th instant was published fairly extensively in the English press the following day, and as it contains passages suitable for perusal by the Soviet Government I shall be interested to learn any indications which you may notice of the way in which it is received in Moscow.²

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

C. W. ORDE

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 416

Letter from the Foreign Office to the London Chamber of Commerce

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 6, 1926*

Sir,

I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to inform you that he has given most careful consideration to the points raised by your president and other speakers of the deputation which waited on the Parliamentary Under-Secretary on the 14th January last to discuss the Anglo-Soviet situation.

¹ The enclosure below, which was published in *The Times* of April 8, 1926, p. 17. The earlier correspondence is not printed.

² No report on this point from Sir R. Hodgson has been traced in Foreign Office archives: cf., however, No. 463; also the *Daily Herald* of April 10 and *The Times* of April 12, 1926, p. 13.

2. The first question raised by Sir James Martin was that of the position of British subjects who had lost their assets in Russia and who at present seemed to have no prospect of obtaining a settlement of their claims, and yet were compelled to watch the produce of their former undertakings sold freely in this country for the further benefit of the authorities who had originally confiscated such undertakings. As your deputation were informed by Mr. Locker-Lampson, His Majesty's Government have every sympathy with these unfortunate people. The experience of previous Governments who endeavoured to obtain satisfaction for these claimants leaves no doubt that up to the present the only possibility of a settlement has been directly contingent on a loan to the Government of the Soviet Union guaranteed by His Majesty's Government. It is obvious that His Majesty's Government could not provide the capital of such loan, which would in any case have to be raised in the open market. Were, however, Soviet credit to be established to an extent which would enable that Government to float a loan on the London market, then the guarantee of His Majesty's Government would not be necessary. It is, however, possible that a growing sense of the economic needs of the Union may in time help the Soviet Government to realise that the development of trade depends upon credit, and that Soviet credit cannot be established in the markets of the world until existing liabilities legally inherited are recognised, and until an honest attempt is made to meet them. His Majesty's Government have repeatedly stated that they are ready to consider any proposals for a settlement made in good faith which the Soviet Government may think proper to lay before them, but they are not prepared to take any initiative towards fresh negotiations so long as the Soviet Government maintain their present attitude.

3. With regard to the sale in this country of the produce of former British undertakings which under Soviet law have become the property of the Soviet Government, the courts of this country have held that where the Soviet Government can prove a good title according to Soviet law such title is valid here. To alter this state of affairs would of necessity involve fresh legislation which, even if it were carried, could hardly be expected to improve Anglo-Soviet relations and with them the chances of a favourable settlement for British claimants, while it would certainly destroy the existing Anglo-Soviet trade, from which an increasing number of British trades are deriving benefit.

4. A member of your deputation suggested that the Trade Agreement should be abrogated. The Secretary of State was impressed by the cogent arguments put forward to show how unfairly that agreement works, and, indeed, the Departments of His Majesty's Government who have had to work the agreement had already realised many of its practical deficiencies, but it must be remembered not only that the present situation is governed by the agreement, which was already in existence when the present Government assumed office, but also that any agreement between two States which carry on their foreign trade on two such diametrically opposed principles as private enterprise and State monopoly must of necessity be both difficult to negotiate and difficult to work. His Majesty's Government have watched with interest

the experiences of other countries, but so far as can be seen not one of them has yet solved this problem satisfactorily. It may be true, as was suggested by your deputation, that British interests would have been better served if the Trade Agreement had not been concluded, but it does not follow, and His Majesty's Government do not consider that they would now be best served by its abrogation.

5. Careful consideration has been given to the suggestion made by the deputation that in order to protect British nationals who are sued by persons of Russian origin in the courts of this country for debts arising out of their former Russian business, and whose assets in that country have been nationalised, it might be possible to declare a moratorium for this class of debt. Such a moratorium could not be declared without legislation, and, though His Majesty's Government have every sympathy with debtors in this position, the legal difficulties alone are such as to make the necessary legislation very difficult of achievement in any practicable form. In some cases of the kind to which Mr. Tweed³ referred, it might be possible to argue that, since the Soviet Government had nationalised the business they must be considered to have assumed the liabilities as well as the assets, and that the claim for the recovery of the debt lay not against the British firm but against the Soviet Government. The legal validity of this argument is, of course, for the courts to determine.

I am, &c.,
LAURENCE COLLIER.

³ Vice-Chairman of the Russian Section of the London Chamber of Commerce and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Association of British Creditors of Russia.

No. 417

*Sir A. Chamberlain to H.M. Representatives at Moscow, Warsaw, Riga,
and Helsingfors*

No. 277¹ [N 1336/124/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 12, 1926*

Sir,

With reference to your/Sir R. Hodgson's despatch No. 208 of the 12th ultimo (a copy of which is enclosed²), regarding the possibilities of a 'guarantee pact' between the Soviet Union, Poland, the Baltic States and Finland, or between some of these States, I have had under consideration the attitude which His Majesty's Government should adopt in the event of the negotiations for such a pact assuming a more definite form.

2. This attitude must of necessity be largely determined by the general policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Soviet Union, and I take this opportunity of outlining for your guidance their views on this question.

¹ No. 277 to Moscow; No. 208 to Warsaw; No. 130 to Riga; No. 66 to Helsingfors.

² Not printed.

They desire to preserve in their relations with the Soviet Government an attitude of reserve, until the Soviet Government puts forward reasonable concrete proposals for the settlement of outstanding differences. This policy of reserve is not dictated by any desire on their part to isolate Russia, but by the fact that the Soviet Government have not up to the present offered any basis for negotiations to which His Majesty's Government could agree, or shown any disposition to control the anti-British activities of the Third International. As long as these continue unchecked and directed by the same influences which control the Soviet Government, it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to place any trust in the good faith of that Government.

3. The power to make possible a resumption of negotiations lies therefore with the Soviet Government rather than with His Majesty's Government, who accordingly await a movement from the other side. Meanwhile, I have not failed either to convey to the Soviet Government indications of this policy and the reason for it, or to invite them to study the action which it lies in their power to take in order to clear the way for an improvement in relations. Instances of this are the suggestion I made to M. Rakovski when he came to pay me a farewell visit, and the message which I sent to M. Chicherin when he was touring in Western Europe. The records of those communications are enclosed herein for convenience of reference.³

4. Apart, however, from this necessary policy of reserve where the relations between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government are concerned, my policy has been to encourage rather than to hinder any effort at neighbourliness between Russia and her neighbours. For example, I have been careful to show Count Skrzynski that I did not wish a *rapprochement* between Poland and Germany, which I considered highly desirable in itself, to impair or to prevent an improvement in Polish relations with Russia (see my despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Warsaw, a copy of which is also enclosed/you No. 8184 of the 16th October last). The tenor of my conversation with M. Stresemann at Locarno was, moreover, such as to help rather than to obstruct good relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

5. It follows therefore that His Majesty's Government view without jealousy negotiations designed to improve the relations between Russia and any of her European neighbours—in fact, any approach which the Soviet Government may make to any of the Western Powers, and particularly towards France, could but harmonise with the desire of His Majesty's Government to see peaceful and cordial relations established between all European Powers without distinction.

6. But this attitude is based on the assumption that any agreements in Eastern Europe, such as are now foreshadowed, would be of an entirely defensive nature and would in no way derogate from the duties of States under the Covenant of the League of Nations. Alliances on the old model are indeed not viewed with favour by His Majesty's Government; they were

³ See Nos. 65 and 46, note 4, respectively.

⁴ Not printed: see No. 118, note 1.

not successful in maintaining peace and are contrary to the policy on which the Western Powers embarked at Locarno. Pacts of non-aggression and arbitration, on the other hand, such as those now under consideration would seem to be, will always have the sympathy and goodwill of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.,
(For the Secretary of State)
C. W. ORDE

No. 418

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir G. Clerk (Prague)

No. 12 Telegraphic [N 1600/718/38]

Very urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 13, 1926, 5.30 p.m.

The proposed Russo-German convention will probably be raised by the Polish President of the Council during his visit to Prague.¹ I desire you will, if possible, take an earlier opportunity of informing the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government have received categorical assurances from the German government that the convention will contain nothing incompatible with the covenant of the League or with the Locarno obligations, and in particular that Germany will never agree to an unrestricted neutrality clause. Moreover Herr Stresemann has assured Lord d'Abernon that co-operation will be limited to the Russo-German political and economic question, and will not cover other political questions in which either party are interested.

His Majesty's Government have already suggested to the French government that provided the convention is compatible with these assurances it would be distinctly inadvisable to raise opposition to the signature of the convention. Such a course is hardly likely to be successful in preventing the signature and might well drive Germany further into the arms of Moscow, which would be a victory for M. Chicherin. The French government have been further informed that His Majesty's Government consider that the best way of dealing with this situation is by further co-operation with Germany on the lines of Locarno, thus proving to her that her real interests are best served by facing west and not east.

You should add that His Majesty's Government would deplore any outbreak of hostility to Germany based on the conclusion of this convention. Such an outbreak might do more harm than the convention itself were the latter to be accepted without comment as a *fait accompli*.²

If you meet Count Skrzynski make a similar declaration to him and add as a personal message from me that in the long run it is the coolest head

¹ Count Skrzynski visited Prague from April 13 to 14.

² Sir A. Chamberlain expressed views generally similar to the foregoing in reply to an enquiry by the Italian Ambassador on April 14. Marquess della Torretta replied in the negative when asked whether he had any indication of Signor Mussolini's view.

which wins. I have reason to know that the Berlin authorities have been as much excited and alarmed by the new Polish-Roumanian treaty as is Poland by the German-Russian treaty. I incline to think that the former may have been the decisive factor. At least it may have tipped the scales. Count Skrzynski knows that I have never sought to impede the establishment of better relations between Poland and Russia and I must act with equal good will to Germany, but all my information goes to show that partly in spite of the Geneva impasse partly because of it, Germany taken as a whole is more pro-League and pro-Locarno than it has ever been. Poland would make a great, perhaps a fatal mistake, if it allowed its policy to be deflected.¹

¹ Foreign Office telegram No. 35 to Brussels of April 16 instructed Sir G. Grahame to make a similar communication to M. Vandervelde. Sir G. Grahame replied on April 19 in Brussels telegram No. 43 that M. Vandervelde considered 'attitude of British Foreign Office eminently sagacious'.

No. 419

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 86 Telegraphic: by bag [C 4488/6/18]

Very urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 13, 1926, 7 p.m.*

Your despatch No. 610¹ (of the 1st April. Statement by German Minister for War on the German Budget).

You may agree to the draft note enclosed in your despatch subject to the omission of the last sentence of paragraph 4 beginning 'Ces exagérations', which seems open to objection on general grounds. At the same time we should like the words 'ou d'approvisionnement' to be inserted in the first sentence of the same paragraph after the words 'd'armements'.²

We see no objection to words in paragraphs 2 and 3 to which you call attention.

¹ No. 393.

² These amendments had been concerted with the War Office, who further stated in a letter of April 12 to the Foreign Office that 'although the German budget has not been examined by any financial expert at the War Office, yet from reports received from the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control at Berlin it would appear certain that several of the votes are excessive, particularly as regards those allotted to the replacement of armament, which are out of proportion to the quota permitted by the Peace Treaty.'

No. 420

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw)

No. 215 [N 1661/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 13, 1926*

Sir,

The Polish Minister told me this afternoon that a further telegram received from his Government confirmed the account given to Lord D'Abernon by Dr. Stresemann of article 2 of the proposed Russo-German Treaty. M. Skir-

munt's first information was that this article constituted an alliance between Russia and Germany against any aggressor, but his later telegram stated that it was merely an engagement on their part not to take part in unprovoked aggression against each other. Further, the second telegram showed that Count Skrzynski had been somewhat reassured by the explanation of the British view which you had given to him. Count Skrzynski's first idea had been that Great Britain, France and other Powers should address a remonstrance to Germany upon embarking on a policy that was incompatible with membership of the League and should call upon the German Government to choose between an alliance with Russia on the one hand and membership of the League and the Locarno Treaties on the other. He had now abandoned this suggestion, but he thought that it might be well that the other Locarno Powers should address to Germany a communication commenting and explaining the letter about article 16 of the Covenant which was signed by the representatives of the other six Powers at Locarno and handed to the Germans on the day of the signature of the treaty.

I told M. Skirmunt that, as he was aware, I had shown no disposition to raise any obstacle to improved relations between Poland and Russia. I did not see upon what grounds I could object to Germany doing what I should not object to if done by Poland. I had not seen the text of the proposed Russo-German treaty; but, assuming that it was as described to Lord D'Abernon by Dr. Stresemann, it did not seem to me to afford any ground for protest or to be of a kind to justify the fears which had been expressed about it. I had, however, insisted to Lord D'Abernon upon the necessity that Germany should carefully avoid in the treaty any language incompatible with the obligations of the Covenant and should refrain from any comment upon the Locarno letter. I was equally opposed to any further explanation or comment upon that letter by those who had signed it. Its terms had been settled after long and careful discussion, and any restatement of the position or commentary upon it, whether by the Germans or by ourselves, could only lead to confusion and controversy.

The Minister said that Count Skrzynski had certainly been greatly disturbed by the first report of these negotiations, which he had interpreted as indicating a new orientation of German policy, a breach with the policy of Locarno, and even as an attempt to prepare for attack at some future date upon Poland. I replied that what had struck me most as a result of recent events at Geneva was the hold which the Locarno policy had now obtained in Germany and on the German Government. If at the time of the signature of the treaty I could have foreseen the check suffered at Geneva, I should have anticipated that it would be fatal; but it was, on the contrary, the Germans themselves who, when the opposition of Brazil proved insurmountable, demanded that the Locarno Powers should issue a joint communiqué maintaining that policy and reaffirming their faith in it. I had been struck by Dr. Luther's new confidence in the policy and above all by his confidence that that policy, and particularly the entry of Germany into the League, now had the support of an overwhelming majority of the German people.

M. Skirmunt said that the commercial and other negotiations between Poland and Germany made so little progress¹ that the Poles were forced to ask themselves whether Germany really wished for agreement, or was not rather trying to keep all causes of friction open. He suggested that it might be useful if I made enquiry through Lord D'Abernon as to the position of the negotiations and urged reasonableness upon the Germans. I replied that I never ceased to insist that the essence of the Locarno policy was mutual co-operation and that, if I pressed moderation upon the Polish Government, I equally pressed the same views upon the Government of Berlin, and I read to M. Skirmunt as an example of the counsels which I give my telegram No. 49² of the 12th April to Lord D'Abernon.

I am, &c.,
(For the Secretary of State),
C. W. ORDE

¹ Mr. Ingram subsequently reported in Berlin despatch No. 238 of April 20 that the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs had informed Mr. Thelwall that no German-Polish commercial negotiations were taking place and no date had been fixed for their resumption. The Ministry further stated that conversations regarding the liquidation of German property in Poland would probably be broken off as the liquidations had been proceeding so fast that most of them would have been completed before an agreement could be made.

² No. 415.

No. 421

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 14)

No. 668 [N 1641/718/38]

PARIS, April 13, 1926

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No: 1111,¹ (1585/718/38) of April 10th, I have the honour to state that I called at the Quai d'Orsay this morning and told M. Briand that you would be glad to know his personal views upon the proposed Russo-German Convention, which had already formed the subject of a conversation between M. Berthelot and Mr. Phipps, as well as of one in London between M. Cambon and Mr. Gregory.

2. I went over the different points which according to the despatch under notice have, in your opinion, somewhat mitigated the unfavourable impression created by the news of this impending *rapprochement*, laying special stress on the comparatively innocuous terms in which a friendly understanding between the two countries is now contemplated, compared with the original engagement to discuss all matters of common interest with a view to agreement. I also laid emphasis on the instructions given to Lord D'Abernon to direct the serious attention of the German Government to Clauses 16 and 17 of the Covenant, as described in Paragraph 7 of your despatch. I also told

¹ No. 412.

the President of the Council that, in these circumstances, you are of opinion that the wisest, because the least dangerous, course is to put the best possible face on the matter, and to assume that the assurances given by Germany will be respected in a manner which will prevent any infraction of the Covenant, or any sacrifice of the principles laid down at Locarno.

3. M. Briand said that the first news of this proposal had come to him as a shock, as he supposed it had to all of us. If he had believed, after full reflection, that a joint protest by France and Great Britain launched at Berlin would be successful, he would have liked to suggest our taking that course; but in diplomacy, almost more than in other affairs of life, it is unwise to pursue a definite line of action without tolerably full confidence that you will gain your ends. In this instance, he gravely doubted whether such a remonstrance would effect its object; on the contrary, it might do positive harm. Besides, much of the sting had been taken out of the transaction by the alteration in the phrase: '*Pour concerter sur toutes les affaires communes*'. As to these words, it should be noted that M. Briand evidently did not think that the German Ambassador had given an incorrect version to the Quai d'Orsay, but that the phrase was originally intended to run thus, and had only been altered at Berlin when it was seen that it caused consternation in Paris. He went on to say that he thought Herr Von Hoesch *très confus* when telling the story of the proposals, which, in M. Briand's opinion, he by no means liked.

4. The President of the Council is, therefore, in complete agreement with you on the inadvisability of lodging any protest at Berlin, but he is equally clear that it is not necessary to hide the opinion that the whole business is ill-timed and unfortunate. When I mentioned the singular assumption of the Secretary of State contained in Berlin telegram No: 100,² that the proposed Convention would be the complement of Locarno, he said that he had pointed out to the German Ambassador that this statement is contrary to the fact, and that the Agreement would be regarded by everybody as a slight to those principles and a more severe slight to the League of Nations.

5. In conclusion, M. Briand expressed the view that it would be far wiser, and it would satisfy the very natural desire of Germany not to turn her back altogether to the East, if she were to conclude with Russia a general Treaty of Arbitration, on the lines of those drawn up at Locarno. I should add that he did not offer any suggestion for making any representation on these lines at Berlin, but I have no doubt he would be relieved if such a limitation of the Convention could be brought about. So far as I am able to judge, M. Briand will have to meet a storm of protests when the signature of this Agreement is announced, protests which will be by no means confined to the purely reactionary element, either of the Press or of the Chamber.

I have, &c.,
CREWE

² No. 398.

Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

[F.O. 800/259]

*Private and Personal**April 13, 1926*

My dear Graham,

I have read your letter of the 2nd April¹ with very great interest. It confirms the impression that I have formed from my personal intercourse with Mussolini that he does care about British opinion and sets considerable value upon a friendly co-operation between our two countries. I believe that this was no small part of the inducement to him to become a guarantor of the Treaty of Locarno, and it was noticeable that from the first Scialoja emphasised the fact that Italy would appear in the Treaty on exactly the same footing as Great Britain. I see every reason why we should cultivate this good disposition and no reason why our two countries should not successfully co-operate unless Mussolini is contemplating or is led to contemplate some *coup de tête*. Personally I am sceptical about his having any such intention as things at present stand, but there is no doubt that the Quai d'Orsay and I think Briand himself are thoroughly alarmed about his intentions. Similar alarming rumours reach me from other sources. I am told, for instance, very secretly that he intends to claim Tunis or later to reclaim Savoy and Nice. Whether he dreams dreams of this kind as things which may be realised twenty or thirty years hence I know not, but I cannot believe that he means to disturb the peace now. Only if Turkey becomes involved in a struggle with some other great Power do I think that he would be likely to plunge Italy into war. Then, no doubt, the temptation to find an outlet for the surplus Italian population in the rich agricultural districts of Asia Minor would be very great, and if we were involved in war with Turkey on account of a Turkish aggression on Irak, I should not be altogether sorry to see him carve out a claim. I am very sorry myself that Contarini has retired. He was not, I think, altogether trusted in this Office, but I regarded him as I think you have taught me to do as a pretty straight man and certainly a moderating influence with Mussolini when he was in one of his fire-eating moods.

The relations of Italy and France cause me anxiety. There appears to be intense suspicion and mistrust on both sides, and neither side as far as I can make out is eager to remove them by a frank discussion. All that I can ask you to do at present is to keep your eyes and ears open and to let me know

¹ Not printed. This letter stated in particular that 'the resignation of Senator Contarini has come as a great blow to me as I had established personal relations with him of a character which I can scarcely hope to repeat with his successor. . . . Contarini stood for a foreign policy on moderate and rather old-fashioned lines. . . . His withdrawal might certainly give grounds for misgiving but I do not myself believe that it foreshadows any essential change in Fascist foreign policy.' Sir R. Graham then cited some reported remarks of Signor Mussolini which confirmed his own 'impression that Signor Mussolini really gives the greatest importance to a good understanding and co-operation with us and that we are the one power to whose good opinion he attaches value'.

at once if you get any confirmation of the rumours that Mussolini intends a *coup* anywhere.

Yrs. sincerely,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 423

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon¹ (Berlin)

No. 50 Telegraphic [N 1605/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 14, 1926, 3.45 p.m.*

Warsaw telegram No. 43² (of April 12th: Proposed Russo-German convention).

I assume that Polish government have got a misleading version given out by Russians. You should point out to German government alarm excited and suggest that everything possible should be done to reassure Polish government.

Repeated to Warsaw No. 22 and Prague No. 13.

¹ In error for Mr. Ingram.

² No. 414.

No. 424

Mr. Ingram (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 15, 9 a.m.)

No. 107 Telegraphic [C 4593/71/18]

BERLIN, *April 14, 1926, 8.41 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Secretary of State in discussing prospects of Germany's entering League in September was definitely pessimistic. He had caused Monsieur Benes to be sounded on subject unofficially by a confidential intermediary and his pessimism had not been decreased by ascertaining Monsieur Benes views which amounted to the conviction that labours of prospective League commission would not result in an unanimous report as to composition of Council, or indeed even in a majority report such as could lead to a definite result in September. Unless ground were very carefully prepared, the Secretary of State feared another fiasco. As regards task of such preparation, it was not for Germany to make the move and he sincerely trusted that he might look to you to take the lead.

As I understand that Dr. Sthamer was receiving instructions to speak to

¹ Not printed. This telegram of April 14 reported that Herr von Schubert had informed Mr. Ingram confidentially that 'Germany's acceptance to sit on commission of League appointed to discuss composition of Council would be handed in at Geneva tomorrow'. A translation of this letter, dated April 12, is printed in League of Nations document C. 299. M. 139. 1926. V: *Committee on the Composition of the Council* (Report on the Work of the First Session with Minutes: Geneva, 1926), p. 114.

you on the whole situation in the near future, I refrained from entering into any discussion of the matter.

Secretary of State added that Germany's relations with Brazil had now been patched up and reverted to normality. He begged me to treat his information regarding Monsieur Benes views as highly confidential.

No. 425

Mr. Ingram (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 15, 9 a.m.)

No. 108 Telegraphic [C 4596/539/18]

BERLIN, April 14, 1926, 8.41 p.m.

My telegram No. 105.¹

I spoke to Secretary of State this morning in the sense of paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 49² which, I informed him, I had received before I read Doctor Koch's³ statement on colonial expansion [*sic*] in yesterday's 'Berliner Tageblatt' and I added that such utterances on the part of responsible Minister of Reich could but increase your apprehensions as to the effect such propaganda would have.

Secretary of State assured me that government was not behind this agitation, but promised to see Dr. Koch³ on the subject at this afternoon's meeting of the Cabinet. His Excellency stated that he fully realised inadvisability of airing colonial aspirations at the moment and that he had not forgotten your language on the subject in London last December⁴ but that there was a large number of German ex-colonials in the country who held strong if somewhat narrow views on the subject which they could not be restrained from expressing and which it was occasionally politic to allow them to utter on the principle of letting off steam. Moreover in one recent instance he said that . . .⁵ had come from discussions in British press indicating that Colonies or mandated territories could be abandoned to other countries such as Italy but never to Germany. I told Herr Schacht⁶ that I had not seen articles in question but that in any case utterances of such persons as Dr. Schacht and Minister of the Interior were in a different category and could not be compared with irresponsible effusions to which he had alluded. Secretary of State did not attempt to deny this.⁷

¹ Not printed.

² No. 415.

³ It was suggested on the filed copy that the reference should be to the German Minister of the Interior, Dr. Külz. For a report on Dr. Külz's article see *The Times* of April 14, 1926, p. 15.

⁴ See No. 122.

⁵ The text is here uncertain.

⁶ It was suggested on the filed copy that this name should read 'von Schubert'.

⁷ Mr. Ingram reported in Berlin telegram No. 115 of April 16 that Herr von Schubert had told him that morning that he had spoken to Dr. Schacht and Dr. Külz who had both justified their remarks on grounds of letting off steam.

No. 426

Mr. Ingram (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 15, 9 a.m.)
No. 109 Telegraphic [N 1672/718/38]

BERLIN, April 14, 1926, 8.41 p.m.

Your telegram No. 49.¹

In the course of conversation with Secretary of State this morning I enquired if any progress had been made as regards German-Russian treaty. Herr Von Schaht² stated that there was one outstanding point over which Russians were proving obdurate. He reiterated to me assurances already conveyed to Ambassador that treaty would contain nothing incompatible with covenant of League or obligations of Locarno policy. At the same time he stated that he had been much upset by article in today's 'Times', gist of which had been telegraphed to him from London, which indicated that there had been a leakage regarding fact that he had informed Lord d'Abernon and, through Herr Hoesch, Monsieur Briand of general lines which proposed treaty was likely to assume. This might prove very embarrassing to him. Although matters were already far advanced one could never be sure of the Russians and he feared that they would attempt to exploit what they would regard as his indiscretion for purposes of blackmail over remaining outstanding questions if not over the whole treaty.

I expressed conviction that leakage had not occurred from the British Embassy and told him that we had not even repeated to Warsaw or Moscow our communications to you on the subject. I told Secretary of State that I was under the impression that it was Paris press which had given the first hints that something was brewing. Secretary of State evidently feels that his confidence has been abused and I should appreciate it if I might assure him that, so far as you are aware, there has been no leakage in London.³

¹ No. 415.

² It was suggested on the filed copy that this word should read 'Schubert'.

³ Foreign Office telegram No. 53 to Berlin of April 16 informed Mr. Ingram that His Majesty's Government were satisfied that the deplored leakage did not take place in London: moreover the story had appeared in the *Chicago Tribune* before it appeared in *The Times*.

No. 427

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 16, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 155 Telegraphic: by bag [General 199/II]

PARIS, April 14, 1926

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the presidency of Monsieur Jules Cambon. I and the Italian Ambassador were present and the Belgian Ambassador, and representatives of the Japanese and United States

Embassies were also in attendance. The following questions were considered:— . . .¹

(4) *Speech of the German Minister for War on the German budget.*

The draft note to the German government on this subject (see my despatch No. 610)² was accepted with the modifications proposed in your telegram No. 86³ of April 13th. . . .¹

(6) *Organisation of the High Command in the German Army.*

The Versailles Committee's report of March 30th (see my despatch No. 679⁴ of April 14th) was approved by the conference. . . .¹

(8) *German Police.*

The German Ambassador's note of March 5th (see my despatch No. 448⁵ of March 8th) and Monsieur Nord's note of March 15th (see my despatch No. 509⁶ of March 17th) were before the conference. The French delegation pointed out that there now appeared to be a complete deadlock on this

¹ The omitted sections related to other matters.

² No. 393.

³ No. 419. The text of the note of April 19 from the Conference of Ambassadors was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 789 of April 29.

⁴ Not printed. The decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, in accordance with the opinion of the Versailles Committee, was as follows:

'1° — Le texte des Articles II, III, IV du Décret sur l'organisation du Commandement dans l'Armée allemande du 28 janvier 1926 étant exactement celui qui a été approuvé par les Gouvernements alliés à la suite de l'accord du 16 Novembre 1925, il n'y a pas lieu d'en demander la modification.

'2° — De même il n'y a pas lieu de faire préciser davantage les rapports entre les Commandants de Division, les Commandants de groupe et le Ministre de la Reichswehr, tels qu'ils sont définis par l'article V — ces rapports étant déjà définis dans les articles II, III et IV approuvés par les Gouvernements alliés.

'3° — Par contre la Commission Militaire Interalliée de Contrôle demandera au Gouvernement allemand que le Ministre de la Reichswehr, usant des droits que lui confère le Décret précité, précise par un texte officiel les points suivants:

a) les attributions des Commandants de Division telles que les définit l'Article V, en ce qui concerne les forteresses et les fortifications ne visent pas les zones où, d'après les art. 180 et 196 du Traité de Versailles, il est interdit soit de construire de nouveaux ouvrages, soit d'améliorer les forteresses dont le maintien a été autorisé;

b) les fonctions d'Inspecteur Général des troupes seront dévolues, comme sous le régime du Décret de 1920, à l'un des deux Commandants de groupe prévus au Décret précité.

'4° — La Commission Militaire Interalliée de Contrôle demandera au Gouvernement allemand de vouloir bien définir exactement le rôle assigné par l'art. XXV du Décret au[x] dépôt[s] de munitions, lesquels ne doivent, en aucun cas pouvoir être assimilés aux Arsenaux, dont le nombre a été fixé conformément à l'art. 168 du Traité de Versailles.'

In a minute of April 17 Mr. Troutbeck commented on the report of the Versailles Committee that 'the chief point of interest is that the new decree which has been promulgated by the German govt. on the High Command, though it keeps within the letter of the agreement reached with the Allies last November as to the suppression of General von Seeckt's functions, actually leaves him in precisely as great authority as he was before. The Versailles Com^{tee} seem to have dealt with the question very sensibly.'

⁵ See No. 339, note 4.

⁶ See No. 402, note 5.

question, and that it was for consideration whether the conference was merely to tell the Germans that the question was still under discussion or whether it was to say that the question was disposed of and settled adversely to the German standpoint. The French delegation pointed out that the matter at issue was that of altering the conditions laid down by the Treaty and by the Boulogne note. His Majesty's Government were the party requesting a modification of the *status quo*, and the French were the party urging its maintenance. For modification unanimity was necessary.

I said that I had referred to you on this question (see my despatch No. 632⁷ of April 7th) and that I was awaiting instructions as to what reply you considered should be returned to the various German communications and as to what decision should be taken on the Versailles Committee's opinion of February 26th (see my despatch No. 413⁸ of March 2nd).

I should be glad to receive these instructions as soon as possible. As I stated in my despatch No. 632, I do not think that any real prospect remains of obtaining satisfaction from the French government in this matter.

9. *Military control in Austria.*

The Versailles Committee's draft reply to the Austrian note (see my despatch No. 627⁹ of April 6th) was read to the conference, and certain minor verbal amendments were made in the text. In the last paragraph of the draft, the concluding passage beginning 'à mettre aussi rapidement que possible' down to the end 'à l'exécution du désarmement' was altered to read 'à se conformer aux demandes précisées dans la présente lettre'.¹⁰ The conference approved the draft in this form under my reserve. I should be glad to know at the earliest possible moment whether I may withdraw this reserve, when the note can be sent off. . . .¹

⁷ No. 402.

⁸ See No. 317, note 2.

⁹ See No. 457, note 1.

¹⁰ For this alteration *v. ibid.*, note 7.

No. 428

Memorandum by Mr. Perowne on the French War Debt

[C 4679/7/62]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 14, 1926*

The French war debt to Great Britain on December 31, 1924, was computed at £638,000,000 sterling, £452,000,000 of which represented the aggregate capital of the loans contracted from time to time during the war period, and £186,000,000 sterling the interest on the principal (present aggregate figures approximately over £650 million). France owes an additional £6,000,000 to the Disposal Board in respect of the purchase of war stocks.

2. France has paid nothing towards the liquidation of this debt of £638,000,000 sterling, though various small French counter claims have

been put forward as a set off to part of the amount. The French government, however, deposited with His Majesty's Government the sum of £53,500,000 sterling in gold, in accordance with the terms of the Calais Agreement of August 24, 1916,¹ as security for such amount of their debt towards this country as had at that time been contracted.

3. The French government were, together with the other debtor Powers, reminded of their financial obligations to His Majesty's Government by the so-called Balfour Note of August 1st, 1922.² To that note the French government replied in vaguely controversial terms and no real progress was made with the matter for the next couple of years, except that the question of inter-allied debts came to be generally regarded as being in direct relation to the payment of reparations by Germany. It was not therefore until the Reparation question had been settled (as a result of the adoption of the Dawes Report and subsequent conclusion of the London Agreements of August 1924), that any concrete advance in the direction of the settlement of these debts proved possible.

4. The London Agreements of August 1924 settled the financial questions outstanding between Germany and the allied Powers. It remained to settle similar questions outstanding between the allies themselves; and for this purpose a meeting of Finance Ministers was held at Paris in January 1925. At this meeting M. Clémentel, the French Finance Minister, indicated to the Chancellor of the Exchequer his intentions to make early proposals to His Majesty's Government to negotiate the settlement of the French debt and if necessary to come to England for the purpose. This offer was a great advance on anything that had previously been heard from the French on the subject.

5. Correspondence was accordingly exchanged between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and M. Clémentel during the first three months of 1925,³ but no definite French proposals had been put forward when the latter fell from power in April.

6. M. Herriot's government gave way after a brief interregnum to one under M. Painlevé, and M. Clémentel was succeeded at the Ministry of Finance by M. Caillaux, who at once publicly propounded as one of the elements of the problem with which he had to deal the settlement of the French debts to Britain and America.

7. French experts visited London at the end of July, but the initiation of serious negotiations did not take place until August 24, when M. Caillaux in person crossed the Channel and began discussions with Mr. Churchill.

8. The upshot of the discussions, which lasted three days, was that the French Cabinet signified their acceptance in principle of a final British proposal that the French War Debt to this country (£638 million) should be liquidated by the payment over a period of 62 years of either (a) £12½ million

¹ See F. François-Marsal, *Les Dettes Interalliées* (Paris, 1927), pp. 107-9.

² See No. 179, note 1.

³ For M. Clémentel's letter of January 10, 1925, and Mr. Churchill's reply of January 13, see *The Times* of January 16, 1925, p. 12; for Mr. Churchill's letter of February 6, enclosing a note from Lord Crewe to M. Herriot, see *The Times* of February 9, 1925, p. 12.

per annum on the sole responsibility of France, or (b) £10 million on the sole responsibility of France plus 10 points of the Dawes payments.⁴ (In a letter dated September 4th M. Caillaux expressly stated that the figure of £12½ million gave rise to no objection of principle on the part of the French government and in a subsequent letter of September 15th he confirmed somewhat nebulously the understanding that these payments should be made on the sole responsibility of the French government.)

9. The position then was that the French government agreed to pay £12½ million annually on their own responsibility subject to the settlement of certain subsidiary questions which are described below.

10. Certain important points were raised during the course of the negotiations some of which came to be regarded as settled, while others were left over for further consideration.

(A) Points regarded as settled:

(1) M. Caillaux did not challenge a British demand that in the event of any payments being made by the French government to other creditor governments on account of war indebtedness, payments not less in amount, due regard being had to the proportionate amount of the debt due in each case, should simultaneously be made to His Majesty's Government.

(2) M. Caillaux did not contest the British claim that the gold (£53,500,000) deposited by the Banque de France as guarantee for the War Debt should be set off against the very substantial reduction which the French would obtain in the total debt by the payment of the annuities decided upon.

(B) Points left over for further consideration:

Two questions of the first importance still stood out in the French contentions, both unacceptable to His Majesty's Government:

(1) that French payments in respect of allied debts should not exceed French receipts from Germany under the Dawes scheme. This claim had already been rejected categorically by His Majesty's Government.

(2) that payment of the annuities should be postponed in the event of danger to the franc exchange.

Besides these two main claims the following questions were still open to discussion.

It was admitted that reduced annuities might be accepted during the earlier years on account of the heavy sterling commitments of the French government during that period. The points which remained for discussion in this connection were:

(3) the exact date of the payment of these reduced annuities;

(4) their amount;

(5) the method in which the amounts by which the earlier annuities are to be reduced will be added to the later annuities.

⁴ i.e. the equivalent of 10 per cent. of the total allocation to reparation from payments under the Dawes scheme.

In addition, there was

(6) the question of the payment of compensation, on a scale similar to that paid to French nationals, to the British nationals whose property in France was damaged during the war.

11. No further progress with the above-mentioned questions (B. 1-6 above) was made during the autumn or winter of 1925-1926. An increasing fiscal deficit, the resulting development of a 'crise de confiance' and the consequent slump of the franc to 140 to the £ rendered internal finance the leading political issue in France, and the settlement of the War Debts, though not lost sight of, receded somewhat into the background. M. Caillaux fell from power at the end of October. M. Painlevé reconstructed his Cabinet, taking himself the portfolio of Finance, but this second administration lasted only until the 22nd November. It was succeeded after a prolonged crisis by an administration under M. Briand, with M. Loucheur at the Ministry of Finance. The latter's budgetary proposals were so drastic that he remained in office only from the 2nd to the 15th December, when he was replaced by M. Doumer. As a result of these changes nothing came of suggestions that M. Painlevé and then M. Loucheur should visit London to continue the debt negotiations. M. Doumer exchanged correspondence with Mr. Churchill on the subject but the government of which he was a member fell on March 6th, 1926, before he had been able to fulfil his promise to come to London. A new French government was formed on March 10th under M. Briand.

12. While M. Doumer had been responding to Mr. Churchill's invitations to come to London, an Italian Mission under Count Volpi came to England (in January) and succeeded in funding the Italian War Debt on very advantageous terms. This led to a revival of interest in France in the debt settlement question, the press demanding that the agreement already reached in principle for the annual payment of £12½ million should be reopened and brought into nearer relation with the Anglo-Italian Agreement.

13. No time was lost in inviting the Finance Minister in M. Briand's new Cabinet, M. Péret, to come to England. M. Péret first expressed a desire to wait for the conclusion of the Franco-American debt negotiations at Washington before himself proceeding to London to discuss the French debt to this country, but finally agreed 'unless something quite unforeseen and improbable should occur before then' to proceed to London on April 16th.⁵

14. It will be recollected that after M. Caillaux's visit to London in August he proceeded to Washington in the hope of funding the French debt to the U.S.A. Here however he failed signally and had to leave Washington without any agreement having been reached even in principle. After M. Caillaux's failure the debt negotiations were entrusted to M. Henry Berenger, the newly appointed French Ambassador at Washington. He was originally stated to be awaiting the upshot of the debate in the U.S. Senate on the

⁵ M. Péret was unable to visit London on April 16 owing to the debates on the French budget. In a letter of April 22 to Mr. Churchill he conveyed an offer from the French government to pay a minimum sum of £4 million during the financial year 1926-7 on account of the settlement of the French war debt to Great Britain.

Italian debt Funding Agreement before renewing conversations with the U.S. authorities on the subject of the French debt. But it is plain, in view of M. Péret's own statements and in spite of the fact that the Senate have not yet dealt fully with the Italian Agreement, that discussions are under way once again.⁶

J. V. PEROWNE

⁶ See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1926*, vol. ii, pp. 91-108.

No. 429

Sir G. Clerk (Prague) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 15, 5.45 p.m.)

No. 20 Telegraphic [N 1675/718/38]

PRAGUE, April 15, 1926, 4.35 p.m.

I gave your messages¹ to Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Skrzynski this evening, both take grave view of Russo-German Convention. M. Benés shared your opinion of the undesirability of any outburst of hostility but thinks that Germany has committed a colossal blunder. If assurances given by Herr Stresemann to Lord d'Abernon are formally confirmed, essence of agreement from Russian point of view is destroyed, on the other hand Germany will find it difficult to reconcile obligations of membership of the League of Nations with engagements she is about to undertake towards Russia and her action alters the whole position as regards her entry into the League.

Count Skrzynski was much more excited and sees in German action a deliberate challenge to the western powers and peace settlements.

Both statesmen consider it of the first importance to make Germany realize unfortunate mistake of proposed Russian convention, before signature if possible.

My conversations were hurried, before State dinner to Supreme Courts and² during reception afterwards, and therefore do not give more than hasty first impressions but M. Benés is sending me a considered memoranda [*sic*]³

¹ See No. 418.

² The preceding passage was amended on the filed copy to read: 'hurried in before State dinner to Count Skrzynski and'.

³ This memorandum was transmitted to the Foreign Office under cover of Prague despatch No. 139 of April 17. In a covering letter of April 15 M. Benés reiterated the views expressed above and added 'je considère comme un danger considérable d'accepter le fait accompli tacitement, comme si rien ne s'était passé. A la fin on payerait les frais de cette tactique.' The memorandum, in particular, suggested that the Locarno Powers and the members of the Council of the League of Nations should ask Germany the following questions:

'1. On se demande quelle obligation l'Allemagne va suivre dans le cas où le fait de se concerter avec un non-membre de la Société la mettra en contradiction avec un des articles du Pacte de la Société. Sera-ce l'obligation envers la Russie ou celle envers la Société des Nations? Est-il même possible dans ce cas de signer à la fois le Pacte de la Société et le traité avec la Russie?

'2. La seconde question: L'Allemagne est-elle prête à accepter d'avance dans un conflit

and I suggested to Count Skrzynski that he could telegraph reply to your message from Vienna when he arrives tomorrow morning.

Your telegram No. 50 to Berlin⁴ reached me during reception and I ventured to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and Skrzynski of your insistence on German government reassuring Poland's apprehensions. As regards text of the convention, both based their views on the text of communications by the German Ambassador at Paris to Monsieur Briand.

éventuel d'une tierce Puissance avec la Russie, qui n'est pas membre de la Société, la décision du Conseil indiquant qui est l'agresseur?

'3. La troisième question: L'Allemagne est-elle prête à se conformer à la décision du Conseil dans le cas où celui-ci déciderait à appliquer les sanctions économiques contre un non-membre de la Société, même si c'était la Russie? J'ajoute que, suivant la conception du Pacte de la Société, l'application des sanctions économiques ne signifie pas juridiquement que l'état de paix a été remplacé par l'état de guerre.

'4. La quatrième question: Explication que donne l'Allemagne à la lettre de Locarno est-elle conforme à l'explication de cette même lettre qui a été donnée officiellement par Sir Austen Chamberlain dans son discours à la Chambre des Commun[e]s après son retour de Locarno?

'5. La cinquième question: L'Accord russo-allemand ne contient-il pas des clauses, des protocoles ou des accords additionnels secrets?'

⁴ No. 423.

No. 430

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 1171 [W 3163/78/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 15, 1926*

My Lord,

The French Ambassador informed me to-day that his Government had not extended to him at present their confidence in regard to their intended action at the Preparatory Conference on Disarmament. They had, however, read Mr. Locker-Lampson's speech in the House of Commons the other day¹ and had seen in some phrases of it an invitation to a conversation. He was authorised to say that if we were prepared for such a conversation, he would be ready to go into the matter with Lord Cecil or me; and at the end of the month Colonel Réquin could come over here as an expert on the subject. Monsieur de Fleuriau added that he was himself rather anxious about the possibilities of this Conference, and in particular lest there should arise serious divergence of views between the French and British Governments. I told him that I also was not without apprehension on this point. I had been somewhat alarmed by many features of the French questionnaire, and though we should not refuse to discuss the advisability of including these matters in the programme for the Conference, I must say frankly that personally I should be disposed to oppose their inclusion, for I thought that the Conference would lose itself in such vast and wholly incalculable issues and

¹ For Mr. Locker-Lampson's speech on April 1, see *Parl. Debts.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 193, cols. 2406-14.

that nothing practical would be done unless, excluding hypothetical fact, the Committee based its programme on the forces immediately available in any given country.

Another point upon which the Ambassador showed anxiety was in regard to the position of Germany at the Committee and the use which she might attempt to make of the opening words of the Disarmament Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. He recalled the observation which I had made on this subject to the Germans at Locarno, but he added that, whilst admitting that no further adjournment was possible, he could not but regret that the entry of Germany into the League had not been completed before they were called upon to take part in a discussion of Disarmament. He thought that not only our position but the position of the Germans themselves would have been easier if they were already members of the League. To this I replied that we could not contemplate any further adjournment. There would be the greatest disappointment in this country if the Committee did not get seriously to work on the date appointed for its meeting; and indeed there was a large section of public opinion here, including, for instance, Lord Grey of Falldon,² who would feel that Locarno was robbed of almost all its merit unless it led to sensible progress in disarmament. I added that I was most anxious to avoid any serious differences with France on this subject. At the same time we must not incur the danger of appearing to the other Powers represented on the Preparatory Committee to have come to a hard and fast agreement between ourselves before the Committee met. I would, however, consult my colleagues, and in particular Lord Cecil, as to his suggestion of a preliminary conversation and would let him know the results of my consultation as soon as possible.

The Ambassador then passed to the proposed Committee on the Composition of the Council. Here too he thought it was desirable that we should have some exchange of views before the Committee met. He observed that Monsieur Briand had been criticised for having too many conversations before the March meeting of the Council, but in fact he had too few, and it would have been much better if there had been a wider exchange of views before we met at Geneva. It must be admitted that the failure to secure Germany's entry and the circumstances of the March meeting had given a check to the League. It was facing a very difficult problem in the question of disarmament where failure would inflict another check and it would be a very serious thing for the League itself if, when September came, we were still as unable to secure agreement as we had been in March.

[I am, &c.,]

(For the Secretary of State)

R. H. CAMPBELL

² Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1905-16.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 16)
No. 690 [C 4608/24/18]

Immediate

PARIS, April 15, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that as a result of meetings held on April 13th and 14th between the Allied and German delegates on the question of German aviation an agreement is now thought to be within sight.

The outstanding points were the following:—

1. *Training of Reichswehr and Naval personnel*

The Allied experts yesterday handed to the Germans a proposal which the German delegates undertook to refer to Berlin. The text of this proposal was subsequently rearranged at an Allied meeting for the sake of greater clearness and has been returned to Dr. Nord in the form given in Enclosure I in this despatch. I would explain with regard to paragraph 3 of this text that the term 'réforme' is a technical military term referring to the withdrawal from the Army of personnel for reasons chiefly of physical or moral unsuitability.

2. *Aerodromes etc., in the demilitarized zone (as distinct from the occupied territory)*

After considerable discussion, the German delegates undertook to submit to the German Government the text which forms enclosure 2¹ of this despatch.

3. *Subventions*

The German delegates have submitted a further text. This text now covers all the Allied requirements with one exception. It is thought that the omission is due to an error in drafting. The question is being further taken up with the German delegates and it is hoped to report again in a very short time.

4. It is hoped to be able to proceed at once to the drafting of the final form of the agreement and to arrange for the conditions of the withdrawal of the Committee of Guarantee.

5. Reports appeared in the press on April 14th to the effect that a Franco-German Commercial Air Agreement had been reached. Monsieur Massigli informed the British delegates that evening that although in substance this was the case, it was not at present proposed to publish anything until the main Allied negotiations had been satisfactorily completed. In any case no such

¹ Not printed. The enclosed draft communication in French stated that the Powers represented at the Conference of Ambassadors took note that the German Government intended to establish four airports and twelve landing grounds in the neutral zone and reserved the right of investigation provided for in Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles. The draft corresponded generally to the final text of May 22 printed in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. lviii, pp. 341-2, but did not include the last clause of the final text beginning 'que lesdits gouvernements'.

agreement would come into force until the general negotiations had been concluded.

I have, &c.,
(For the Ambassador)
ERIC PHIPPS

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 431

*Proposal regarding the training of Reichswehr and Naval personnel sent
to Dr. Nord by M. Massigli on April 14th, 1926*

14 Avril 1926

A titre exceptionnel, des autorisations de piloter pourront être accordées à des membres de la Reichswehr et de la Marine jusqu'à concurrence d'un chiffre total de 36, ce maximum ne pouvant être atteint qu'au bout d'une période de 6 ans à compter du 1er janvier 1926 et à raison de 6 autorisations par an.

Ce maximum de 36 une fois atteint pourra être maintenu par l'octroi d'autorisations nouvelles qui seront accordées jusqu'à concurrence de 3 par an.

Toutefois, les titulaires d'autorisations qui viendraient à être rayés des cadres de l'armée et de la marine par suite de décès ou de réforme pourront toujours être remplacés au début de l'année qui suivra leur radiation en plus du contingent normal fixé.

Les noms des bénéficiaires de ces autorisations seront portés sur des listes publi[e]s chaque année avant le 1er février.

Pour l'année 1926, la liste des autorisations sera publiée dès la mise en vigueur du nouveau régime.

Les membres de la Reichswehr et de la Marine, titulaires d'un brevet de pilote délivré avant le 1er avril 1926 pourront jusqu'à concurrence de 36, continuer à piloter. Ces 36 pilotes dont les noms seront portés sur une liste spéciale qui sera publiée dans les mêmes conditions que la liste précitée, ne sont pas compris dans le nombre des pilotes visés au paragraphe précédent.

No. 432

Lord Kilmarnock (Coblentz) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 19)

No. 78 [C 4703/481/18]

Confidential

COBLENZ, April 15, 1926

Sir,

Nearly six months have now elapsed since the Western Powers agreed to pursue the policy of reconciliation and peace, inaugurated by the initialling of the Locarno Pacts. It may be of interest if I record my impressions of the effect which this policy has produced to date, in so far as the occupation of

the Rhineland is concerned. It would require an unbounded optimism to expect that this short space of time could produce any material effect on the mutual antagonisms and suspicions, which were the relic of the war, and which the subsequent years have strengthened. All that can be looked for now are tendencies, and it is an endeavour to trace these that forms the object of this despatch.

2. In November last the Allied Governments, in addition to notifying their intention of evacuating the Cologne zone, decided to take every possible measure compatible with the interests of the Armies to bring the régime of the Occupation into harmony with the new spirit of reconciliation. The High Commission took action accordingly, and brought in a new Ordinance No. 308, which went a considerable way towards meeting the demands made by the German Delegation at Locarno. In addition the High Commission proposed certain further alleviations which after having received the approval of the Allied Governments were made known to the public by a communiqué to the Press.

3. The immediate German reply was, as past experience might have led one to expect, unsatisfactory. Apart from a grudging appreciation expressed by a few newspapers, the opinion of the large majority of the Press was that the alleviations, given or proposed, were insignificant, and at the best were merely the removal of illegalities which the population, by virtue of the Rhineland Agreement, had long demanded.

4. It may be doubted if this opinion was truly representative of the population of the Occupied Territories as a whole. Apart from the officials, the burdens of the occupation lie lightly on the shoulders of the average Rhinelanders, except as regards the billeting requirements of the Armies: and even in this respect it is not always that the exception has to be made. In these days of heavy taxation and high cost of living, there is many a householder who is only too glad to have an Allied lodger, the rent of whose quarters serves to maintain a standard of living that he would otherwise be unable to afford. Cases are not infrequent in which the Occupying Authorities are requested to requisition billets by the owners of the houses themselves. It is the official who comes mainly in contact with the Occupation, and who resents the most its restrictions. It is he, therefore, who forms the backbone of the resistance, and who is responsible for the propaganda against it.

5. The unpopularity of the Occupation is to be sought in moral rather than in material reasons. The patriotic German not unnaturally resents the occupation of German soil by foreign armies, and the sight of their uniforms in the streets is to him an ever present reminder of Germany's defeat in the war. There is, moreover, a national characteristic of the German which has a not unimportant bearing on the moral side of the Occupation. The German understands only two methods of conduct—to browbeat, or to be browbeaten: for him there is no happy mean. Up to Locarno he found it natural to receive orders from the Occupation. Now he argues that since Germany has been received into the Comity of Nations the situation has been fundamentally altered. He feels that henceforth the Occupation should be run

on the principle that the requirements of the Armies should be notified to the German Authorities, who themselves should give the orders necessary to satisfy them. In other words he demands the revision of the Rhineland Agreement. His pride is accordingly injured when orders continue to be issued to him under that Agreement.

6. The course of events during the past months tends to confirm the truth of the above observations, and I enclose a memorandum¹ drawn up by Colonel Ryan, who has been immediately concerned in most of the negotiations with the Germans, which shows the spirit in which the latter have acted.

7. It is, I think, evident that the attitude of the German Authorities towards the Occupation has undergone no visible change since Locarno. The only positive action that has been taken is the removal of the ban placed by the German Government on social intercourse with the Allies. In everything else their attitude has been negative rather than positive, and I am unable to find any tendency on their part to deal with the problems that arise in a more broadminded and conciliatory manner than in the past. Indeed I have been told on more than one occasion by the Commander-in-Chief British Army of the Rhine, that he finds the attitude of the German officials less rather than more friendly as compared with the pre-Locarno period.

8. There are signs that this disappointing attitude of the German Authorities is not without its effect on the French and Belgian High Commissioners. In November last, M. Tirard carried out loyally, and in the face of considerable opposition from the French Military Authorities, the instructions he received from M. Briand to introduce alleviations in the Rhineland régime. During the past six weeks no sitting of the High Commission has taken place without it being called upon to consider a series of French notes dealing with the activities of German Reactionary Societies, and with reprisals against persons who have had relations with the Armies. The French proposals whether in regard to questions like the Amnesty or to the numerous protests and demands sent in by the German Commissioner, are consistently becoming sharper in tone. I feel sure that this attitude cannot be due alone to the personal sentiments of the French High Commissioner, but that it must reflect to a greater or lesser degree the views of the Quai d'Orsay. Indeed on more than one occasion recently M. Tirard has said that his Government were becoming increasingly concerned with the lack of response by the Germans.

The Belgian High Commissioner is more reserved in his expression of his opinion than my French colleague, but his attitude has also stiffened recently.

9. Equally unfortunate is the effect produced on the British Military Authorities. The latter have shown every disposition to make things as easy for the Germans as possible, but it cannot be reasonably expected that all the toleration shall continue to be on one side, and I fear that if no amendment is forthcoming a change of attitude will become inevitable.

¹ Not printed.

10. I have repeatedly tried to impress the importance of the above considerations on the German Commissioner, but I fear that, though apparently overflowing with the best intentions, he is not capable of realising their full significance, and that, moreover, his influence is not sufficiently strong to secure any tangible results. His attitude is frequently one of complacency, and he seems—perhaps not unnaturally—to be so impressed with recent manifestations of pro-German feeling in the British Press, that he is disposed to discount the importance of conciliating British public opinion. I feel that my hands would be strengthened if I were authorized to tell him that you felt some disappointment at the lack of response shown on the German side.² I would also suggest that a hint in the same sense might be given personally to Herr Stresemann by His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. I feel sure that much of the trouble arises from the fact that affairs in the Rhineland are dealt with by the Ministry for the Occupied Territory, and not by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and that much unnecessary friction might be avoided if the latter Department could be induced to exercise pressure on the former.

I have, &c.,
KILMARNOCK

² Lord Kilmarnock telegraphed for this authorization in Coblenz telegram No. 15 of April 16. Sir A. Chamberlain conveyed his agreement in telegram No. 15 to Coblenz of April 18.

No. 433

Mr. Ingram (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 17, 9 a.m.)
No. 113 Telegraphic [N 1705/718/38]

BERLIN, April 16, 1926, 8.48 p.m.

I spoke to Secretary of State this morning in the sense of your telegram No. 50.¹ He told me that he had taken the opportunity yesterday of informing the Polish Minister here in very general terms of the broad intentions underlying proposed Russo-German treaty. I asked him if he had taken Polish Minister as much into his confidence as he had Lord d'Abernon. Secretary of State replied that he had not.

I proceeded then to state that it was clear that an atmosphere of very definite suspicion and alarm existed at Warsaw and that you felt strongly that no effort should be spared by German government to dissipate it. I added that I had derived the personal impression that Poles feared that the agreement was likely to take the form of a defensive alliance, and that they were particularly apprehensive of its implications in regard to Article 16 of covenant of League. Could he do nothing to disabuse them of these ideas?

Secretary of State said he would think the matter over, and hinted at possibility of his sending a special message, if not a special messenger, to

¹ No. 423.

Count Skrzynski. I urged him to act quickly and he promised to let me know as soon as he had decided on the course he would adopt.²

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 113, repeated to Warsaw and Prague.

² Mr. Ingram reported the next day in Berlin telegram No. 116 that Herr von Schubert had informed him that a speech at Vienna by Count Skrzynski indicated that 'Polish alarm had been substantially allayed' and that he doubted whether a special message was now required.

No. 434

Sir A. Chamberlain to Mr. Ingram (Berlin)

No. 508 [N 1704/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 16, 1926

Sir,

The German Ambassador called this morning.

He explained that, as Lord D'Abernon was for the moment on leave, any further communications which the German Government might have to make to me in relation to the Russo-German negotiations would naturally be made through him and he had, therefore, asked for an opportunity of informing me of the situation as he saw it, though probably what he had to say would contain nothing of which I was not already informed.

He began by reviewing very briefly the course of the negotiations. Some eighteen months ago, the Soviet Government had made proposals to Germany in the nature of a general alliance. From the moment that Dr. Stresemann took his first step in favour of a pact of mutual guarantee, this Russian suggestion had been rejected. Later the Soviet Government had done all that they could to dissuade Germany from conclusion of the pact and from entering the League and had continued to make proposals which were incompatible with this policy. The German Government, whilst denying that the Locarno policy was in any way anti-Sovietic, had also declined these further propositions. More recently the German Government had itself made proposals which constituted the basis of the treaty now contemplated. The provisions of this treaty were described to me by the Ambassador as substantially including four items, which he stated as follows:

- (a) A general assurance of friendly interchange of views in matters concerning both parties, but without any concrete engagements whatever.
- (b) A mutual undertaking not to partake in an unprovoked attack of third Powers against Russia or Germany.
- (c) A mutual undertaking not to join, in times of peace, in any big common economic action of third Powers against Russia or Germany.
- (d) Germany to notify Russia that she will loyally fulfil her obligations deriving from article 16, at the same time drawing Russia's attention to the Locarno Powers' note regarding this article.

This policy was recommended to Germany in the first place because of Germany's need of economic and commercial relations with Russia, and

because, however much other countries might suffer by the absence of good relations in this respect, Germany must be the principal victim. In the second place, it appeared to Germany that she was the natural link between Russia and Europe, and that she could gradually give to Russian policy a Western orientation, which would be the basis of co-operation between Russia and other European Powers. There was, therefore, nothing—and on this point the Ambassador insisted with emphasis—in these arrangements which should disturb the Western Powers; there was nothing which was incompatible with the engagements taken at Locarno or with the obligations which Germany would have when she entered the League, and nothing which indicated any change in their policy or any departure from the decisions taken at Locarno.

The Ambassador went on to say that his Government had, however, been greatly inconvenienced by the premature disclosure of the negotiations in the 'Times'; that there were one or two points outstanding which had yet to be settled with Russia and upon which Germany had hoped that her proposals would be accepted by the Soviet Government. Germany had agreed with the Soviet Government to maintain secrecy, the Soviet Government had observed this obligation, and he feared that as a consequence of the disclosures it might be necessary for the German Government now to make concessions which would otherwise have been unnecessary. In this connection the Ambassador further stated that the German Ambassador at Paris had been told at the Quai d'Orsay that the French Ambassador at Warsaw had reported that the Polish Government had received their first information from His Majesty's Minister at Warsaw. I informed the Ambassador that this statement must be based upon some misunderstanding. In consequence of a telegram which I had received from Berlin, I had made enquiries, as a result of which I had been able to give an assurance that the leakage had not occurred in London, and that the 'Times' information had come from some other source.¹ As to Warsaw, I had certainly expressed my views upon the proposed treaty to Count Skrzynski, but he was already in possession of a report, which was in an important respect inaccurate, as to the contents of the treaty. I had indeed naturally expressed my views at Warsaw and Prague, as at Paris, but always in the same sense that, though I regretted that this new disturbing element should be introduced at the present moment and regretted it especially because of its disturbing effect upon French and Polish public opinion, I did not myself consider that there was anything against which we ought to protest or to which we had a right to object if the treaty was what had been described to Lord D'Abernon by Dr. Stresemann.² I insisted again, however, on the great importance of using no language which

¹ See No. 426 and note 3 thereto.

² Sir A. Chamberlain informed Mr. Ingram, in his despatch No. 518 to Berlin of April 19, of a conversation on April 13 between Mr. Lampson and Herr Dufour-Feronce when Mr. Lampson had expressed views similar to the foregoing, and had added that the moment was somewhat inopportune for such a treaty. 'Herr Dufour appeared to be somewhat startled by Mr. Lampson's observations.'

would be incompatible with the obligations of Germany when she became a member of the League, and of avoiding comment on the letter of the Locarno Powers, since comment or explanation was more likely to provoke than to solve difficulties. The Ambassador reiterated his statement that the German Government remained entirely loyal to the Locarno engagements and to the policy of entering the League. He stated that the Soviet Government were fully aware that the German Government would not be parties either to an anti-British policy or to an anti-League policy, and that this new treaty would be accepted by them with that knowledge.

I then took the opportunity of repeating to the Ambassador the substance of my communications to Berlin in relation to the general attitude of the German Government to Poland and France, and, in particular, my hope that the German Government would take some opportunity of marking its new position towards these countries as strikingly as certain speeches of M. Briand, e.g., that at the Geneva Assembly, or the action of Count Skrzynski in suspending the German deportations, had marked the changed attitude to Germany of those countries. The Ambassador objected that Germany would have the air of making excuses for her action, and that she could not expose herself to that humiliation. I replied that he had entirely misunderstood my suggestion. I assumed that, whenever the German Government published the treaty, they would, as a matter of course, announce their reasons for it, and explain their policy to their own people in terms similar to those in which they had explained that policy in other capitals, and they would make it as clear to the German public as they had done to our Governments that in their new treaty with Russia there was nothing that derogated from their earlier obligations to us or from their determination to pursue a League policy. But the statement or action which I had in mind could be made on some other occasion, and certainly not with any air of excuse or of justifying themselves to foreigners. They were always asking us for concessions. The more concessions we made the more demands they put forward, but I had seen no such generous acknowledgment of the new attitude of France to Germany as M. Briand had accorded to the new orientation of German policy, and I had felt that the acceptance by the Germans of the Polish act of generosity was singularly grudging. We ourselves had reason to complain of the revival at this moment not merely by the President of the Reichsbank but by the Minister of the Interior of the question of the mandated territories. If there were a mandate to be given, and Germany were a member of the League, that mandate would be as open to her as to any other member of the League, but there was no possibility that a British mandate, whether home or Dominion, should be surrendered in order to provide Germany with a mandated territory. How could it serve the interests of Germany to provoke a controversy on this subject? I had been expected to be questioned in the House of Commons on this subject. No question had as yet been put, and I hoped none would be put, but if a question did appear, the answer which I should be bound to give would be a denial of the German claim and could not be made palatable for the German

public.³ Why place me in such a position and expose our relations to these unnecessary difficulties? What troubled me about German public opinion was that it was so 'insular'. There was no nation more sensitive to anything which could conceivably offend its sentiment, but, whilst thus sensitive themselves, the Germans never seemed to remember that other people had toes which could be trodden on. So much of our trouble resulted not from the desire of the Germans to offend other nations, but from their singular insensibility to the feelings of other nations. My earnest desire was to make progress with the changes which Locarno had rendered possible. At the present moment, however, it would be useless to talk of further concessions, such as the addition of yet another 5,000 men to the German police force. In the excitement and perturbation caused by the Russo-German negotiations, we could make no progress, but again I repeated that I earnestly wished the German Ministers would be on the look-out for an occasion which they could choose for a demonstration of their peaceable and good intentions towards France and Poland such as would help the Ministers in those countries who with us had been parties to the Locarno negotiations to derive from them all the advantage for future international relations which we had hoped to secure.

I will not record Herr Sthamer's comments upon these remarks, which in part were a plea for special consideration of the special difficulties of Germany and in part were a purely personal expression of opinion, which was all that I could desire except that it did not in any way commit his Government.

I am, &c.,
(For the Secretary of State),
C. W. ORDE

³ In his despatch No. 556 to Berlin of April 24 Sir A. Chamberlain authorized Lord D'Abernon to repeat the foregoing remarks to Dr. Stresemann. He further recapitulated the relevant passages of Nos. 116, 122, and 415, and requested Lord D'Abernon to 'point out in the clearest language to Dr. Stresemann . . . that if this form of agitation [for colonial mandates] persists the attitude of His Majesty's Government, and no doubt that of the other interested governments, can only be appreciably stiffened in regard to Germany's aspirations'.

No. 435

*Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) and
Sir G. Clerk (Prague)*

No. 218¹ [N 1730/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 16, 1926

Sir,

The Polish Minister urgently requested an interview with me to-day in consequence of a telegram just received from Count Skrzynski at Prague. Count Skrzynski had instructed him to thank me for the communication

¹ No. 218 to Warsaw; No. 176 to Prague, *mutatis mutandis*.

which Sir George Clerk had made to him in my name (see my telegram No. 12 of the 13th April to Prague)². At the same time Count Skrzynski repeated his great concern about the Russo-German negotiations and the terms of the treaty. He mentioned four or five questions on which it seemed to him that further explanations should be sought from the German Government before signature, or further representations made to them. Count Skrzynski indeed expressed his regret that His Majesty's Government did not feel that collective representations should be made to Germany against the conclusion of the treaty, as being in itself incompatible with the Locarno treaties and a League policy.

There was in these questions nothing that was new except the suggestion that the treaty might be accompanied by some secret engagement. I stated that my information was that there was no secret engagement of any kind whatsoever; and, whilst giving full attention to Count Skrzynski's observations, my own view remained unchanged. I regretted the complications and the disturbance caused by the introduction of this new element at the present moment, but I was convinced that it would be a mistake to make any protest in Berlin and a still greater mistake to call upon Germany to choose between this treaty and the Locarno Treaty, as Count Skrzynski suggested. I added that, though I was a little anxious about the exact language of the text which I had, of course, not seen, I had myself no doubt of the sincerity of the assurances given by the German Government that it was their firm resolve to do nothing incompatible with their engagements to us or with their position as postulants for membership of the League. It happened that M. Colijn, a former Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Holland, had just been paying me a short visit. At the moment he is occupying himself with economic and financial affairs and is visiting most of the capitals of Europe in pursuance of his enquiries. In the course of a general conversation, he had told me that what had struck him most during his visit to Berlin the other day was the immense change in public opinion in Germany (not only in Government or Socialist circles but even among men who had at least one leg still in the old Imperialist camp) towards the policy of co-operation with the League. Some fifteen or eighteen months ago when he was last there, the great bulk of opinion had been hostile to the League. Now it saw in a League policy the only hope of Germany's safety and of her future. I cited this expression of opinion to M. Skirmunt as confirmation of the impression which, as I had told him, I had received from my last conversations with Dr. Luther and as showing that the intentions of the German Government were to pursue a League policy. I again repeated to M. Skirmunt that, if the German-Russian negotiations created excitement and anxiety in Warsaw, at least equal anxiety was created in Berlin in consequence of the new Polish-Roumanian Treaty. I thought that treaty had not been without influence on the course of the German Government, and indeed I would add that, if Poland feared a rapprochement between Germany and Russia, Germany was equally afraid, and influenced by

² No. 418.

its fear, of a rapprochement between Russia and Poland at the expense of Germany.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 436

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 17)
No. 700 [C 4664/24/18]

PARIS, April 16, 1926

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 690¹ of April 15th, I have the honour to report that as a result of a further interview between Monsieur Massigli and the German delegates, certain further progress has been made in the negotiations regarding German aviation.

2. The omission in the text regarding subventions alluded to in heading 3 of my above mentioned despatch was brought to the notice of the German delegates, who have agreed to introduce the necessary amendment into the text in order to supply the omission.

3. As regards the drafting of the final form of agreement, the German delegates have now proposed a new draft of the letter to be addressed to the Ambassadors' Conference by the German Ambassador. This draft forms enclosure 1 in the present despatch. It will be seen that the text of the agreement will appear as an enclosure in this letter as indicated in paragraph 2 of the new German draft. Clause 8 of the old draft agreement (that providing for the entry into force of Article 213 of the Versailles Treaty in aviation matters) will, however, appear in the text of the letter as provided for in paragraph 4 of the new draft.

4. With regard to the question of aerodromes, etc., in the demilitarized zone, the German delegates have communicated the text of a note which they propose should be addressed to the Ambassadors' Conference in reply to the note on this subject the draft of which formed Enclosure 2 in my despatch No. 690. This draft reply has not yet been considered by the Allied delegates. Should you desire to make any observations upon it I should be grateful if I could be placed in possession of your views at an early date.

I have, &c.,
CREWE

ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 436

Projet de lettre de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne

(Propositions de la Délégation allemande du 13 Avril 1926)

14 Avril 1926

(1) Les négociations qui se sont poursuivies à Paris, entre les Délégués du Gouvernement allemand, d'une part, et les Délégués des Puissances repré-

¹ No. 431.

sentées à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs, d'autre part, sur le régime à appliquer à l'avenir à l'aviation civile allemande, ont abouti à un accord sur les bases suivantes:

'Le Gouvernement allemand mettra en application la réglementation dont le détail est prévu dans l'annexe ci-jointe; afin d'assurer l'exécution de l'article 198 du Traité de Versailles il prendra sans délai à cet effet les mesures nécessaires.

'Dès que le Gouvernement allemand aura mis en vigueur lesdites mesures, les Puissances représentées à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs déclareront qu'elles donnent leur assentiment à l'abrogation des dispositions actuellement appliquées afin d'assurer l'article 198 du Traité; en même temps, elles retireront le Comité de Garantie.

'Dès le retrait du Comité de Garantie aéronautique, les dispositions de l'article 213 . . . ² etc. . . ² (le reste comme le paragraphe 8 de notre projet de lettre).³

'Les notes échangées et les annexes seront communiquées au Conseil de la S.D.N. en vue de l'application de l'article 213 du Traité de Versailles.'

En confirmant, conformément à l'alinéa 1 de l'article 198 du Traité de Versailles, que les forces militaires de l'Allemagne ne comporteront aucune aviation militaire ou navale, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence, que le Gouvernement allemand est prêt à approuver l'accord réalisé par les Délégués des Puissances et à exécuter les obligations résultant pour lui dudit accord.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 436

Texte remis par la Délégation Allemande le 15 avril, 1926

Le Gouvernement allemand prend acte de la déclaration, communiquée par la lettre de Monsieur le Président de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs du . . . ² selon laquelle les Puissances représentées à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs n'élèveront aucune réclamation, en vertu de l'article 43 du Traité de Versailles, du seul fait de l'aménagement pour l'aviation dans la zone définie à l'article 42, exception faite des territoires actuellement occupés, des terrains mentionnés dans la lettre et de la fréquentation de ces terrains par des avions de commerce et de sport quelle que soit leur nationalité.

Le Gouvernement allemand a l'honneur de faire observer à ce sujet qu'il

² Punctuation as in original.

³ Paragraph 8 of a draft communicated to the Foreign Office by Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen on March 3 had continued: 'du Traité de Versailles s'appliqueront aux engagements ci-dessus mentionnés et, en général, aux engagements pris par le Gouvernement allemand en exécution du Traité de paix en matière aéronautique, sans préjudice du règlement des questions soulevées par le Gouvernement allemand dans la lettre du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères Allemand au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations, en date du 12 Janvier 1926, au sujet des décisions prises par le Conseil de la Société des Nations touchant l'exercice du droit d'investigation. Les listes d'enregistrement seront tenues à la disposition de la Société des Nations dans les conditions que celle-ci fixera.' The last two subparagraphs of this draft corresponded to the two paragraphs below.

est d'avis que la question de savoir si l'aménagement de terrains aéronautiques dans ladite zone peut être considéré comme facilité matérielle de mobilisation dans le sens de l'article 43 est une question d'interprétation du Traité de Versailles qui, selon son opinion, ne saurait être tranchée dans le cadre des négociations actuelles, mais par qui de droit.

La lettre de Monsieur le Président de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs fait observer en outre que les déclarations des Puissances représentées à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs, contenues dans la lettre, ne pourraient faire obstacle à l'exercice éventuel du droit d'investigation prévu à l'article 213. Sous ce rapport le Gouvernement allemand maintient son point de vue que le droit d'investigation s'étend uniquement aux dispositions contenues dans la Partie V du Traité de Versailles mais non pas aux obligations incombant à l'Allemagne en vertu des articles 42 et 43 du Traité; il estime qu'ici aussi il s'agit d'une question d'interprétation du Traité de Versailles.

No. 437

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 17, 6.35 p.m.)

Nos. 47 and 48 Telegraphic [N 1720/718/38]

WARSAW, April 17, 1926, 12 noon

Your telegram No. 22.¹

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs tells me that German Foreign Office has given suggested assurances to the Polish Minister and emphasized necessity of preventing Russia from breaking entirely with Europe but I gather that the arguments have not had much effect with the Polish government.

Polish government learn from Moscow that Soviet government in view of disastrous condition of Russian finances are negotiating simultaneously for further credits which Germany is to obtain first from America but this appears improbable.

Polish papers have been very reticent hitherto regarding German-Russian negotiations but I understand that parties of Right are contemplating a violent attack on the President of the Council on his return on the grounds that he has been following an English policy and signed treaty of Locarno in expectation that it would separate Germany from Russia which has not proved to be the case.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs anticipates the possibility of fall of government but I consider him unduly nervous.²

¹ See No. 423.

² Mr. Orde stated in a minute of April 19: 'The idea of financing Russia from America via Berlin is not so improbable as Sir W. Max Muller supposes; we have other information tending to show that this is really the effect of the credits already agreed to by Germany.'

*Memorandum respecting the Evacuation of the Zones of Occupation in the Rhineland*¹

[C 4877/778/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 17, 1926

The question has recently been raised in several quarters whether the time has not come to bring the Rhineland occupation to an end, and it is clear from a recent debate in the Reichstag that this is going to be the next leading question between Germany and the Western Powers. It may therefore be well to have on record such facts as are relevant to a consideration of the question.

Legal position

2. The legal situation was examined by Sir C. Hurst in 1922 and his conclusions are attached as Annex A.² Briefly his interpretation of articles 428-431 of the Treaty was that occupation was provided for for 15 years from the coming into force of the Treaty. This occupation should terminate however before the lapse of the 15 years and the occupying forces should be withdrawn, if Germany had complied with *all* the undertakings resulting from the Treaty. At the end of 5 years (viz. on the 10th January, 1925) a partial reduction in the area occupied was to take place if at that date Germany had faithfully carried out the conditions of the Treaty, i.e. had faithfully carried out those to be executed before that date, but had not carried out *all* the undertakings of the Treaty so as to bring article 431 into operation. At the end of 10 years, (viz. January 10th, 1930), a further reduction should take place, subject to the same conditions. Re-occupation of the zone or zones so evacuated might take place at any time on the finding by the Reparation Commission in accordance with the provision of article 430, that Germany was refusing to observe the whole or part of her reparation obligations. At the end of 15 years (viz. on January 10th, 1925 [*sic*]) the evacuation of all the territory still under occupation should take place, subject to the same conditions as provided for in respect of the 5 and 10 year periods, and subject to the further condition as to the sufficiency of the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany. If those two conditions were not complied with, there would be delay in the evacuation to the extent necessary for the purpose of obtaining those guarantees.

3. The above interpretation of articles 428-431 would appear, however, to have been written in ignorance of the declaration by President Wilson, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George of June 16, 1919, (Annex B),³ which gave an undertaking to the effect that 'If Germany at an earlier date has

¹ According to the docket this memorandum was written by Mr. Troutbeck.

² This memorandum of July 24, 1922, is not here printed.

³ Not printed. This declaration was published as Cmd. 240 of 1919. M. Clemenceau was then President of the French Council of Ministers and Mr. Lloyd George British Prime Minister.

given proofs of her goodwill and satisfactory guarantees to assure the fulfilment of her obligations the allied and associated Powers concerned will be ready to come to an agreement between themselves for the earlier termination of the period of occupation.'

4. This declaration has only just been brought to our notice through a question to be asked in the House of Commons by Mr. Ponsonby on April 21st.⁴ It appears indeed to have been universally lost sight of, as it has never figured in any of the correspondence or speeches on the subject for years past, whether on the side of the Germans or of the French. Nevertheless it is clearly most pertinent to any consideration of the legal points involved.

Evacuation of the Cologne zone

5. To turn now to the history of the question, the first practical issue to be faced was whether the Cologne zone was to be evacuated on the 10th January, 1925. Before that issue became a real one, the French had already abandoned the Poincaré thesis that owing to German bad faith the period of occupation had not yet begun to run. The point was argued solely on the question whether Germany had on the relevant date fulfilled the obligations that should, according to the Treaty, have been fulfilled by that date. The allied governments decided that the answer must be in the negative in consequence of the many points still outstanding in the matter of disarmament, and they so informed the German government in a note of January 5th, 1925. In a note of June 4th they gave the German government an exhaustive statement of the matters that they still required to be fulfilled before they could regard the disarmament question as sufficiently far advanced to justify the evacuation of the Cologne zone. They added at the same time that so far as reparations were concerned, they had received a statement from the Reparation Commission declaring that Germany was at the present moment faithfully fulfilling her reparation obligations as they were at present fixed. (For the text of the Reparation Com'n's statement see Annex C.)⁵

⁴ For this question, Sir A. Chamberlain's reply and ensuing exchanges see *Parl. Debts.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 194, cols. 1186-8. H.M. Embassy at Paris informed the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs of this question, and were informed in reply on April 19 that M. Briand hoped Sir A. Chamberlain would merely state in his answer that public discussion of the question would be inopportune and that the interested governments had not exchanged views. The French Government considered, as regards the substance of the question, that the moment to raise a question of such gravity was 'particulièrement mal choisi et que l'exécution dans l'avenir du plan Dawes est encore trop incertaine pour que l'on puisse envisager, sous une forme quelconque, l'éventualité prévue dans cette déclaration'. Sir A. Chamberlain telegraphed the text of his reply in telegram No. 90 to Paris on April 21, with instructions to Lord Crewe to inform the French Government immediately and to say to them that 'I believe myself and trust Monsieur Briand will feel that I have protected his position, whilst avoiding any repudiation of what he knows are my own hopes and those of the British Government and people when we have got over our present difficulties'.

⁵ Not printed. Annex C comprised the letter of May 29, 1925, from the Reparation Commission to the Conference of Ambassadors printed as Annex II in Cmd. 2429 of 1925.

6. The Cologne zone was still under occupation at the time of the Locarno Conference, but shortly afterwards and as a direct result of the Conference, agreement was reached on the disarmament questions still outstanding, and the allied governments informed the German government on the 16th November, 1925, that they would proceed to the evacuation of the Cologne zone.

Negotiations leading up to Locarno

7. The question of the Rhineland occupation had meanwhile been the subject of certain discussions in the negotiations leading up to the Locarno Conference, in the course of which it was made clear to the German government that the signing of a treaty of security could involve no modification of the occupation clauses of the Treaty. Thus the French note of the 16th June, 1925,⁶ contained a statement to the effect that 'The search for the guarantees of security which the world demands cannot involve any modification of the peace treaties. The agreements to be concluded ought not therefore either to imply a revision of these treaties or to result in practice in the modification of the conditions laid down for the application of certain of their clauses.' Again, 'It also goes without saying and, further, results from the silence on this point of the German memorandum, that the pact to be concluded on these lines could not affect the provisions of the Treaty relative to the occupation of the Rhineland, nor the execution of the conditions laid down in relation thereto in the Rhineland Agreement.'

8. The German government's reply to this reservation was to admit that the conclusion of a security pact did not represent a modification of the existing treaties, but at the same time to urge that it could not but re-act on the conditions in the occupied territories and the questions of occupation in general. The relevant passage in their note of the 20th July is shown in Annex D.⁷

9. The French replied to these observations in their note of August 24th by reaffirming their previous point of view and insisting that France 'cannot surrender her rights'. The relevant passage of the note is shown in Annex E.⁸

Locarno

10. At Locarno itself the question of alleviations in the Rhineland came up for considerable unofficial discussion between the Allied and German delegates. The alleviations, however, which the Germans then pressed for were such matters as the reduction in the number of occupying troops, the re-casting of the civil régime, and of course the early evacuation of the Cologne zone. No question was raised of the evacuation of the 2nd and 3rd zones.

⁶ Cf. No. 53, note 3.

⁷ Not printed: cf. No. 53, note 4. Annex D comprised section I of the German note dated Paris, July 20, 1925, printed in an English version in Cmd. 2648, pp. 6-7.

⁸ Not printed. Annex E comprised the whole of section I of the French note as printed in English in *The Times*, August 27, 1925, p. 9.

11. At the same time it can hardly be denied that the whole question of the occupation was inevitably affected by Locarno. The final protocol of the conference in the first place contained a declaration on the part of the signatory Powers recording 'their firm conviction that the entry into force of these treaties and conventions will contribute greatly to bring about a moral relaxation of the tension between nations, that it will help powerfully towards the solution of many political or economic problems in accordance with the interests and sentiments of peoples. . . .'⁹ The greatest emphasis was moreover laid on this aspect of the question in every public statement made on the results of the Conference. The Secretary of State, for example, declared that Locarno had been more valuable for the spirit it produced even than for the agreements themselves. 'We regard Locarno', he said in the House of Commons on November 18th, 'not as the end of the work of appeasement and reconciliation, but the beginning'. M. Briand conveyed the same idea when he said in the Chamber on February 26th that the new language we must learn to talk to-day is European.¹⁰

After Locarno

12. Perhaps it was not unnatural therefore that the German government soon began to hint that the occupation of German soil by foreign troops was hardly compatible either with the spirit of Locarno or with the new European language. So far as our information goes, the matter was first broached on November 1st when Dr. Stresemann, in conversation with the French Ambassador in Berlin, said that there was a strong desire in Germany that M. Briand should in the course of the next few weeks make some declaration regarding action under article 431. Dr. Stresemann admitted however that there was no engagement regarding the question.¹¹

13. M. Briand at once made it clear that he was not prepared to consider any concession in the matter at the moment. On the 4th December [November] M. de Fleuriau communicated to the Secretary of State a copy of the instructions that had been sent to the French Ambassador in Berlin on the whole question of alleviations, (see Annex F).¹² These instructions contained a passage to the effect that the French government were not disposed to let Germany raise the question of an anticipated evacuation of the 2nd and 3rd zones, the occupation of which constituted the guarantee for the execution of the Treaty and was still linked up with the payment of reparations. Such evacuation could only arise from events themselves if the hopes raised by the Treaty of Locarno came to be realised.

14. Similarly, in a Foreign Office telegram of November 4th, Lord D'Abernon was informed, with reference to the same question, that there was a limit beyond which the allies could not go, and that Germany was likely to lose everything if she asked too much.¹³

⁹ Punctuation as in original quotation.

¹⁰ See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 188, col. 420, and *Journal Officiel, Débats Parlementaires, Chambre des Députés, Session Ordinaire*, Janvier à Février 1926, p. 1020, respectively.

¹¹ See No. 43.

¹² Annex F comprised No. 56.

¹³ See No. 53.

15. Nevertheless Dr. Luther raised the question in his speech in the Reichstag on November 23rd, in which he asked for the vote of the House on the Locarno policy. The gist of his argument on the point was that since Locarno the occupation of German territory had lost any real foundation. The London Agreement had settled the reparation question and the Treaty of Locarno had settled the security question. The continuation of the occupation could therefore only be felt as an expression of distrust. (For Dr. Luther's actual words see Annex G).¹⁴

16. Naturally the cry was taken up by the German National Party who moved a resolution in the Reichstag on November 26th that Germany's application for admission to the League should be subordinated to the previous recognition of a number of conditions, one of which was the curtailment of the occupation of the 2nd and 3rd zones. The motion was, however, referred by the Reichstag to its committee for foreign affairs who turned it down.

17. Nevertheless it was not long before the German government brought up the question again. Dr. Stresemann raised it himself in his speech at Cologne on the 20th February, 1926, on the occasion of the celebration of the liberation of the Northern zone. He was then reported as having said that if the spirit of Locarno was to be a symbol of future European policy, then its final and visible expression must be the withdrawal of the troops from the occupied Rhineland (for the report of his speech see Annex H)¹⁵.

18. Dr. Stresemann's remarks were not missed by the French and on February 25th in the debate in the Chamber on the Locarno treaties, M. Fabry quoted them as an instance of the present spirit in Germany. M. Briand's reply to the point (see Annex I)¹⁶ was that Dr. Stresemann was merely interpreting the Treaty of Versailles which it was perfectly open to him to do.

19. An interesting feature of the debate was a speech by M. Spinasse who stated that he was speaking in the name of the French Socialist Party. Towards the end of his speech he turned to the occupation of the Rhineland and urged that the question should now be considered of reducing the periods for evacuation.¹⁷ His argument was that the occupation had never been regarded as a guarantee of security. It was simply a guarantee for the

¹⁴ Not printed. Annex G comprised that section of Dr. Luther's speech as reported in the enclosure in Berlin despatch No. 652 of November 28, 1925, which approximated to the words: 'With the conclusion of the Pact . . . unmistakable advance' in the second paragraph of the report in *The Times* of November 24, 1925, p. 13 (cf. No. 116).

¹⁵ Not printed. Annex H comprised an English translation of an extract from a report in the *Vossische Zeitung* of February 21, 1926, which corresponded to the major part (beginning 'Mais si l'esprit de Locarno') of the French version printed in *Les Papiers de Stresemann*, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 293-4.

¹⁶ Not printed. Annex I comprised an extract from the *Journal Officiel, Débats Parlementaires, Chambre des Députés, Session Ordinaire*, Janvier à Février 1926, p. 978 ('Monsieur Fabry, tout à l'heure vous avez fait allusion au discours de M. Stresemann . . . à une disposition quelconque du traité de Versailles.'). For the quotation of Dr. Stresemann by M. Fabry, Deputy for Paris and a member of the Action Républicaine et Sociale, see *ibid.*, p. 974.

¹⁷ For this speech of March 1 see *op. cit.*, Mars à Avril 1926, pp. 1099-1102.

execution of the financial clauses of the Treaty. But the Dawes plan contained arrangements for the settlement of disputes by arbitration, and the occupation was therefore no longer a guarantee for the fulfilment of the Treaty. In any case since Locarno the occupation could not continue.

20. We knew already from confidential sources that M. Spinasse's views had been toyed with by the Quai d'Orsay. Thus Sir G. Grahame on January 18th reported a conversation he had had with M. Vandervelde from which he had learnt that M. Berthelot had recently indicated in conversation (with M. Vandervelde) that if a big financial operation could be brought about which would entail 'une mobilisation des obligations de l'Allemagne' under the Dawes scheme it would be worth while to France, in his opinion, to hasten the time when the Rhineland could be evacuated. M. Vandervelde added that personally he was entirely of the same way of thinking.¹⁸

Geneva March 1926

21. A new factor of some importance occurred at Geneva during the March meeting of the special Assembly called to admit Germany into the League. According to precedent, Germany's application was referred by the Assembly to a Committee which proceeded to examine whether her application was in order. One of the questions upon which the Committee had to pronounce was whether Germany was, in accordance with article 1 of the Covenant, giving effective guarantees of her sincere intention to observe her international obligations. After due consideration the Committee decided that this question should be answered in the affirmative, and in coming to this decision they took their stand upon a statement by the Ambassadors' Conference dated March 4th (see Annex J)¹⁹ that 'As far as it (the Ambassadors' Conference) is concerned, and to the best of its knowledge, Germany is now giving effective guarantees of her sincere intention to discharge her obligations under the Treaty of Peace of 28th June, 1919, and the instruments connected therewith'. This statement clearly has great importance in view of the declaration of June 16th, 1919, referred to in paragraph 3 above.

22. For the rest it may be noted that at the end of the Geneva meeting the Locarno Powers declared (on March 16th) that they were 'happy to recognise that the work of peace which they had realised at Locarno and which exists in all its value and all its force remains intact. They remain attached to it to-day as yesterday and are firmly resolved to work together to maintain and develop it. . . .'²⁰

After Geneva

23. Upon their return from Geneva the German government had to submit to a debate in the Reichstag. The debate took place on the 22nd and

¹⁸ *Note in original:* 'The Treasury, who were informed of this idea, expressed the view that a "mobilization des obligations de l'Allemagne" was quite impracticable.' See No. 188.

¹⁹ Annex J comprised the letter of March 6 from M. Massigli with enclosure dated March 4 referred to in No. 328, note 2.

²⁰ Punctuation as in original quotation from No. 360.

23rd of March and Dr. Stresemann and Dr. Luther both spoke. Dr. Stresemann at the end of his speech took up with some force the question of the continued occupation of the Rhineland and reiterated the views that he had expressed at Cologne (See paragraph 17) that further occupation for a lengthy period was inconsistent with Locarno. He asserted that M. Briand himself in the Chamber had recognised that this was 'an actual question to raise, advocate and press, which the German Foreign Minister has a right'. (For relevant paragraph of his speech see Annex K).²¹

24. Dr. Luther similarly contended that the maintenance of the occupation of the 2nd and 3rd zones was not in harmony with the basic ideas of Locarno.

25. Finally a motion was carried on the proposal of the government parties to the following effect:

'The Reichstag approves the declaration of the government and the attitude of the German delegation at Geneva. It deplores the result of the Geneva negotiations which did not fulfil the just expectations of Germany. The Reichstag expects the government to obtain guarantees that the Locarno reactions, especially as regards the occupied territory, shall be brought with the greatest expedition to a solution compatible with the just German demands and that the declarations agreed upon in Geneva concerning the maintenance and continuation of the policy of Locarno shall become effective before the entry of Germany into the League of Nations.'

²¹ Not printed. Annex K comprised an extract from a report on Dr. Stresemann's speech, which corresponded to the conclusion of No. 369, beginning with the third sentence of paragraph (13) 'It would be illogical etc.'

No. 439

Mr. Ingram (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 20, 5.15 p.m.)

No. 119 Telegraphic [C 4823/234/18]

BERLIN, April 20, 1926, 2.45 p.m.

Stresemann delivered a speech on foreign policy in Stuttgart on Sunday¹ on his way back to Berlin from Switzerland. Only a brief summary is published by Wolff while press versions which vary considerably contain following points:

(1) Locarno signifies recognition of permanent peace. If in our case we waive all claim to cede[d] territories on frontier, France likewise waives right to continue her Rhineland policy with military force.

(2) According to Powers participating in Rhineland pact Germany was to be regarded as already a member of the League. (He read a telegram from M. Briand promising a reduction of Rhineland garrison when Germany

¹ April 18, 1926.

entered the League).² This reduction should be effected at once as Germany was admittedly not responsible for Geneva failure. Maintenance of a garrison of 82,000 men does not harmonize logically with Anglo-French policy of securing peace. If permanent peace is to reign there is no necessity to retain an army corps in Coblenz and another in Wiesbaden.

(3) It is in harmony with this policy when we negotiate with Russia concerning a treaty which lays down afresh that ground principles of Rapallo are unaltered and which perhaps stipulates, as I have reason to assume, that neither state will participate in aggressive measures against the other.

[? 4] The treaty is not yet initialed nor concluded, nor is final draft as yet in existence. If it matures, it will constitute no departure from policy of Locarno but rather the logical completion of treaties concluded there. To hold any other opinion is to regard Locarno policy as Germany's orientalization [orientation] to the west against which we have always protested. It was laid down during Locarno conversations that League was not an institution for a crusade against Russia. M. Briand, Sir A. Chamberlain and M. Vandervelde stated so. Russian Bolshevism is wont to regard the world as peopled by devils or angels and view conclusion of Locarno as a preparatory step to a capital crusade against Russia. That view is false.

(5) The reproach of German press that negotiations only became known through foreign press was unjustified. Germany had given a good example in informing other Locarnites of these negotiations and matter leaked into English press as a result of these diplomatic conversations.

[? 6] If German nationals wish to rejoin government they must support its foreign policy and recognise Locarno.

(7) The evacuation of Cologne meant the end of French policy on the Rhine.

According to Wolff's report, Stresemann stated 'If Germany conducts treaty negotiations with Russia in which both parties take the line to refrain from an aggressive action against one of the two states and depart³ from that to remain in economic and friendly relations that is a ground principle which other states have adopted in their attitude to Russia. If treaty with Russia matures it will be natural complement to Locarno in order to give renewed expression to what is the most fundamental idea of German policy'.⁴

² Mr. Phipps stated in a letter of April 27 to Mr. Sargent that in reply to an enquiry M. Berthelot said that no such telegram had ever been sent by Briand. All Briand had done was to give verbal and somewhat vague assurances to Stresemann in this connection at Locarno and Geneva.

³ In another text of the telegram this word read 'apart'.

⁴ In Berlin telegram No. 121 of April 20 Mr. Ingram stated in particular: 'German Nationals' press, commenting on Foreign Minister's speech, renew their attack on Dr. Stresemann. . . . In accordance with desire of Social Democrats, Committee for Foreign Affairs has been summoned to discuss Russo-German Treaty. "Vorwärts" complains that committee were not informed about these negotiations during last twelve months.'

*Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)**No. 1208 [C 4680/1134/18]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 20, 1926

My Lord,

With reference to your despatch No. 643¹ (86/12/1926) of the 8th April, relative to the definition of war material for the purposes of the Treaty of Versailles, I request that, when this question comes before the Ambassadors' Conference, Your Lordship will be guided by the views expressed in the letter addressed by the Foreign Office to the War Office on the 12th April, a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 1115² of that date, and

¹ Not printed. This despatch transmitted a copy of a draft reply to the German note of March 3 (enclosure in No. 365). This draft maintained the views expressed by the Versailles Committee on November 19, 1925: cf. No. 375.

² Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. This despatch also transmitted to Paris a copy of a letter of April 9 from the War Office to which the Foreign Office letter of April 12 replied. This Foreign Office letter transmitted a copy of the draft reply referred to in note 1 and stated:

'2. This draft would seem to be hardly an adequate reply to the German note of the 3rd March in that it makes no reference to the German claim that the question is materially affected by the prospect of a general disarmament conference, which will have to define war material and moreover, in doing so, will have to take into consideration the economic as well as the purely military aspects of the question.

'3. The German Government presumably have in mind the questionnaire adopted by the Council of the League last December, of which the first question is "What is to be understood by the expression 'armaments'?" At the same time it is not easy to appreciate the force of the German argument, seeing that the term "armaments" in the questionnaire is clearly much wider than the phrase "arms, munitions and war material of every kind" used in Article 170 of the Treaty. For instance, it covers human beings, as appears from question I (b) and question II (b). If, therefore, Article 170 were to be interpreted in the light of the disarmament questionnaire, it would widen the operation of the article and therefore impose a greater burden on Germany.

'4. I am accordingly to suggest that a suitable reply to the German Ambassador might be framed on the following lines, which, subject to the concurrence of the Army Council, it is proposed to instruct Lord Crewe to recommend to the Ambassadors' Conference:—

'(a) It is true that a Committee has been set up by the League of Nations which, among other things, will consider the definition of "armaments" in connection with the approaching disarmament conference. This definition, however, for the reason shown above, will cover a far wider field than is necessary in the case of the definition which the Commission of Control and the German Government are trying to draw up for the purpose of interpreting articles 170, 190–192 and 198 of the Treaty of Versailles.

'(b) If there had been any likelihood of the definition to be drawn up by the League of Nations Committee being available in the near future, it might have been convenient to examine it so far as to see whether it threw any light on the problem of interpreting the above-mentioned articles of the Treaty of Versailles. But as a matter of fact the committee's definition, before having any force or value, will have to be formally and unanimously approved by the disarmament conference, and it is hardly possible that this will take place during the present year. As the Allied Governments attach the utmost importance to the early withdrawal of the Commission of Control, they cannot contemplate any arrangement which would in effect indefinitely postpone the settlement

that you will urge that the reply to the German note of the 3rd March should be re-drafted on the lines set forth in that letter.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

ORME SARGENT

of this outstanding question after all other questions of military control have been settled.

'(c) With good will on both sides it ought to be quite easy for the Commission of Control and the German Government between them to settle the definition of war material. Indeed they were on the point of doing so last year, when the German Government suddenly interrupted the negotiations. Since then, instead of trying to reach a prompt and reasonable settlement, they have obstructed further progress by proposing impracticable methods of dealing with the question. For instance they suggested that the list of war material laid down in the Arms Traffic Convention should be adopted, although the object in drawing up that list had no bearing whatsoever on the problem raised by the military, naval and air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. This proposal having been rejected, they now come forward with a further proposal which can have no other reason than to delay indefinitely the settlement of this question.

'(d) In order, however, to meet so far as possible the point of view of the German Government, the Allied Governments would be prepared, provided that the German Government resume discussion of the Commission of Control's definition of war material and reach a definite settlement within, say, the next two months, to agree not to object to the definition being re-examined in the light of the final and unanimous conclusions which the disarmament conference may arrive at, if Germany, as a member of the League of Nations, asks in the Council that this should be done.'

The War Office replied to the Foreign Office letter on April 16 expressing the complete agreement of the Army Council with the Foreign Office views.

No. 441

Sir A. Chamberlain to Mr. Ingram (Berlin)

No. 54 Telegraphic [N 1719/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 21, 1926, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 116¹ (of April 17th. Russo-German negotiations).

My information hardly tallies with that of the Secretary of State. I believe that Count Skrzynski and M. Benes continue to be greatly alarmed.

¹ See No. 433, note 2.

No. 442

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 55 Telegraphic [N 1840/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 21, 1926, 7.50 p.m.*

Mr. Ingram's telegram No. 119¹ (of April 20th. Dr. Stresemann's speech on German foreign policy).

¹ No. 439.

The summary of Dr. Stresemann's speech at Stuttgart is very obscure in places, and, as it reads causes me great uneasiness.

I shall be glad if you will ascertain immediately what he actually said and what his meaning was.²

² Under cover of Berlin despatch No. 244 of April 23, Lord D'Abernon transmitted translations from the German press regarding Dr. Stresemann's speech at Stuttgart on April 18. These translations were in substance equivalent to the report in No. 439 with the addition that the translation from the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of April 19 included the following passages in particular:

1) 'The ground principles to be observed in the event of entry [into the League] . . . were: the recognition as a matter of course of Germany's position as a great Power in the form of a permanent seat at the Council, the recognition of our right to administer colonies, and the fact that Germany's entry was not a recognition on her part of any moral responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War.'

2) 'It remains to be seen whether the League will continue in future to do us injustice after injustice.'

3) 'To regain our sovereignty over [occupied] German territory must be our first task, and all other tasks must give way to it.'

No. 443

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir G. Clerk (Prague)

No. 14 Telegraphic [N 1726/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 21, 1926, 7.50 p.m.

Your despatch No. 139¹ (Russo-German negotiations).

M. Benes does not say definitely that he wishes to put to the German government the questions he enumerates, but I gather that he thinks this should be done in one way or another. The points they raise are of course important and I am myself deeply interested in them. But they have really already been covered by assurances given by German government and repeated to me by German Ambassador on April 16th² that agreement would contain nothing contrary to obligations under the covenant or to Locarno policy. In the circumstances I should be sorry if any definite questionnaire were addressed to the German government or any step taken which would suggest that their assurances were not given in good faith. If they are sincere Germany is only doing something to which we cannot object and to which we should not object if it were done by, say, Poland, and German government's attention has already been called to points of danger, e.g. article[s] 16 and 17 of the covenant, and that should suffice if their good faith is accepted. In the opposite case step such as M. Benes appears to desire will not avert the evil he seems to fear. I believe myself that German government are acting in good faith; I am impressed by great change of feeling in Germany in favour of the League and of the Locarno policy.

You should communicate with M. Benes in this sense using also such arguments as seem appropriate drawn from my previous telegrams to you and

¹ See No. 429, note 3.

² See No. 434.

others which you will have seen in printed sections.³ Belgian government, possibly at suggestion of Czechoslovakian Minister, have asked some detailed questions of German Ambassador and regard answers as satisfactory.⁴

³ Selections of important telegrams circulated weekly to H.M. Representatives abroad.

⁴ Sir G. Grahame had transmitted these questions with the German Ambassador's answers, which were on the lines of Dr. Sthamer's statement in No. 434, in Brussels despatch No. 369 of April 19.

No. 444

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 1220 [C 4664/24/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 21, 1926*

My Lord,

I have received Your Lordship's despatches Nos. 690,¹ 691² and 700³ (1/132/1926) of the 15th and 16th April and am happy to observe that the negotiations for the restriction of Germany's air power now show some prospect of reaching finality.

2. There are no observations that suggest themselves on the various points raised in these despatches with the exception of the proposed exchange of notes regarding aerodromes etc. in the demilitarised zone. As to that it is for consideration whether the reservations made both in the draft note of the Ambassadors' Conference and in that of the German Ambassador regarding article 213 of the treaty⁴ might not preferably be omitted. While this suggestion need not be pressed if the French delegation attach real importance to the retention of the relevant paragraph in the conference note, yet any such reservation seems quite unnecessary seeing that, so far as aviation is concerned, the *whole* of Germany is covered by Part V of the treaty. There can be no question that the League is entitled to make such air investigations as it may think fit in the Rhineland just as in any other part of German territory. The omission of the passage from the draft note of the Ambassadors' Conference would have the advantage of rendering possible the omission of resultant reservations from that of the German Ambassador.

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

ORME SARGENT

¹ No. 431.

² Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. This despatch transmitted a copy of a letter of April 15 (not printed) from M. Massigli to M. Tirard regarding the draft letter to the German Ambassador in Paris printed as enclosure in No. 411.

³ No. 436.

⁴ Of Versailles.

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with Herr Dufour-Feronce
 [N 1873/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 21, 1926

After dealing with one or two questions of minor importance raised by Herr Dufour yesterday, we had some general and desultory conversation on topics of greater interest. Naturally the question of the Russo-German negotiations formed the main subject of the conversation. Herr Dufour was concerned to prove the innocence and indeed the perfectly normal nature of these negotiations. I took the line that Germany had every reason to be thankful to us for the moderating influence which we had exercised in every quarter in regard to the perturbation which these negotiations had undoubtedly caused, and I rubbed in well my personal view that there could hardly have been a more inopportune time than the present for Germany to have taken up these negotiations with Russia. Further, though I could perfectly understand Russia's desire to extract some form of agreement from Germany, what I could not understand was why Germany should be so anxious to thrust an agreement upon Russia—for that was almost what it came to so far as I could gather from the information which we had received. I continued that the only convincing reason which had been given to me as justification of Germany's haste was the fact that she was afraid that someone else might get in before her with Russia, e.g., either France or Poland.

Herr Dufour said that he did not think that this reason applied so far as France was concerned, but he admitted perfectly frankly that as regards Poland it might well have been one of the determining factors. For instance, supposing Russia and Poland had come to an agreement whereby Russia undertook to defend the western frontier of Poland, how impossible that would have made it for Germany ultimately to secure a rectification of her German-Polish frontier. There was no secret of Germany's ambition that sooner or later some rectification of that frontier might be achieved; he was not suggesting that it would be attempted by any but absolutely legitimate means: but supposing there had been a Russian guarantee of the Polish frontier, that surely would have made it all the more difficult for Germany to secure the ultimate rectification for which she hoped.

I said that I could quite understand that argument. I felt myself that it was not a very conclusive one, for after all we all hoped that sooner or later Russia would join the League herself and would thus be bound by the provisions of article 19 just as all the rest of us were. However, I maintained my opinion that however innocent the forthcoming Russo-German agreement might be, the time chosen for its conclusion was singularly inopportune, and I could not help feeling that Germany was not serving her best interests by signing it now. She might just as well have waited until after September when she had joined the League. Herr Dufour retorted that that was all very well, but what guarantee had we that Germany would in fact be admitted

to the League in September next? I confess that I did not feel sufficiently confident of the outcome myself to be able to reassure him on that point!

I ended by saying that we did not in the least doubt the assurances which we had received from Berlin. Those assurances were accepted here at their face value, but if I might venture a suggestion it was that at the earliest opportunity either the Chancellor or Dr. Stresemann should make a public declaration—in a form that could be accepted as a binding assurance by the world at large—repeating in substance the assurances that the German government had already given to us privately. I felt certain that that was the only sound way of dealing with the numerous criticisms which had been made in a variety of countries of the Russo-German negotiations. As to the wisdom of Germany's concluding those negotiations at all, no doubt she must be presumed to know her own business best, but I quoted the old saying that those who sup with the Devil should be furnished with a very long spoon.¹

MILES W. LAMPSON

¹ Lord D'Abernon was informed of this conversation in Foreign Office despatch No. 572 to Berlin of April 28.

No. 446

Sir R. Hodgson (Moscow) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 3)

No. 315 [N 2017/2017/38]

MOSCOW, April 21, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Consul Paton of Vladivostok.

2. There is nothing new in his report of the disgusting actions of officials of the State Political Department—similar incidents were the object of prolonged correspondence between this Mission and the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in the Summer of 1924, and were commented upon at the time very severely by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in conversation with Monsieur Rakovsky. I am satisfied that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs reprobates the behaviour of the agents of the State Political Department but it seems quite impotent to get its disapproval translated into effective action. Still, I think it quite inadmissible that abuses of the kind should go on where British interests are concerned without any protest being made, and I propose to make representations confidentially to M. Chicherin on the first opportunity.¹

I have, &c.,
R. M. HODGSON

¹ This proposal was approved in Foreign Office despatch No. 350 to Moscow of May 11. Sir R. Hodgson reported in his despatch No. 438 of June 18 that he had spoken to M. Chicherin on June 11.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 446
Memorandum by Mr. Paton

Very secret

TOKYO, March 4, 1926

The following facts which have become known to me since my return to Vladivostock in July 1925 are of interest as showing the system of espionage maintained by the 'G.P.U.'² over British firms operating in Vladivostock district and British subjects residing there.

(1) One of the typists in the employ of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (now closed), a Russian girl who spoke English very well and had been in the Bank's service for several years, was summoned to the headquarters of the G.P.U. and instructed that she must regard herself as a spy and report in detail everything that went on in the bank and also regarding the private life of the bank manager. She refused, and in spite of all efforts to 'persuade' her could not be induced to work for the G.P.U. Her position however became so difficult that she decided to leave the country and the G.P.U., finding that she was useless to them, preferred apparently that she should leave in the hope that they might be more fortunate with her successor. As the oath of secrecy is always imposed in such cases, it was not until after her departure that the bank manager communicated the information to me in confidence. Though none of his other employees ever revealed that they were acting as spies, there is little doubt that one or more of them had to report to the G.P.U.

(2) The Ayan Corporation, Ltd., a British company engaged in gold mining in Okhotsk, took into their employ some months ago a Russian who had been in America, spoke English well, and though regarded as a 'white' was at the time in the service of the Customs at Vladivostock. He was on the point of leaving Vladivostock for Okhotsk when he was summoned to the headquarters of the G.P.U. and instructed that he must act as a spy and report all the doings of the company and his foreign staff. On his refusal to act in that capacity he was consigned to the G.P.U. prison. After he had been in prison for some time I approached the authorities and was informed that there were many charges against him and that it was not advisable to prosecute my enquiries further. As his past was not known to me I dropped the matter. After he had been in prison for some months he was released and up to the time of my departure from Vladivostock (Feb. 16th) no charge had been brought against him. Though it is possible that there are other charges against the man, there is little doubt that his refusal to act as a spy was the cause of his being sent to prison.

(3) About two months ago my typist, a young Russian woman, came to me in great distress and stated that some days before she had been stopped in the street by a representative of the G.P.U. and gruffly instructed to report at G.P.U. headquarters next day. She had done so and had been notified that she must henceforth regard herself as a spy and must report all that went on in the office of the British Mission, furnish copies of all reports and

² State Political Administration (formerly Cheka).

lists of callers, ascertain the subjects discussed, report on all correspondence and all subjects that interested the British agent, also all details of his private life. She refused at first, but on being threatened with various penalties she agreed. She had to sign the usual bond of secrecy, but as it had been wrung from her by force, she did not regard it as binding, though fully aware of the danger if the fact that she had revealed the matter to me became known. She asked me what she should do, and I was at a loss to make any immediate suggestion, but eventually told he[r] that she must keep me informed of everything she intended to report, and after each interview to keep me advised of all questions asked. She reports once a fortnight. It seemed preferable to retain her on the staff than dismiss her, as a substitute would have been hard to find and in any case would have acted as a spy without disclosing the fact to me. She informs me that the G.P.U. are very dissatisfied with the information she has so far furnished. When she protested against being employed as a spy she was informed that there were spies in the other British Missions in Soviet Russia and even 'close to the Foreign Secretary in London'.

A close inspection of my correspondence for the past few months shows that practically everything I receive is censored and that the sealing of envelopes is useless.

(4) Another case, one of blackmail, came to my knowledge a few days prior to my departure (Feb. 17th). A British subject living in Vladivostock came to my office and informed me that he was virtually 'in the hands of the G.P.U.'. An agent of the latter had come to his house one night and informed him that he was wanted immediately at the headquarters of the G.P.U. but that he must tell no one, not even his wife, where he was going. Arrived there he was confronted with the fact, apparently, that he had taken a diamond out of the country (to Harbin) and sold it, an offence which, he was informed, rendered him liable to be sent out of the country, but that if he would undertake a certain business for the G.P.U. they would take no steps in the matter of the diamond. His story, which at my request he put into writing, is told in the attached letter.³ I suggested that he might at his next interview withdraw all the guarantees he had given, but he was not prepared to do so, as he feared for his life, also for his wife and child who were still in the country. Nor was he prepared to antagonise the G.P.U. to such an extent that might result in his being prevented from living in Soviet Russia. He was allowed to leave for Japan on business, and is proceeding to Harbin, where he proposes to temporise by telegraphing that he is detained on business and cannot return in time to assist the G.P.U. I have not yet decided what steps to take, if any, in the matter, but action of some kind may be necessary if, as seems possible, the British firm of 'Becos' became involved.

³ Not printed.

Sir G. Clerk (Prague) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 22, 6.15 p.m.)
Nos. 24 and 25 Telegraphic [N 1849/718/38]

PRAGUE, April 22, 1926, 4.50 p.m.

Your telegram No. 14.¹

I have spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs as instructed and added that speaking personally result which he desired had I thought been achieved. It was to my mind unthinkable that after assurances given to you Russo-German convention would be found to conflict with Locarno policy or covenant obligations and replies given to Belgian government (whose enquiry as you surmise was inspired by M. Benés) strengthened that conviction but, apart from that, publicity which question had now received had practically given German assurances that formality which his questionnaire was designed to elicit and had made it impossible to appear to doubt German good faith. Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed generally and said that to present questionnaire would arouse susceptibilities unnecessarily and expressed himself as prepared to await communication of definitive text of Russo-German convention, subject to reservation that final views of French government which he does not yet know do not cause him to change his present standpoint.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to explain that his memorandum was only meant as a statement of his point of view and to elicit views of other governments and that (? only) after that he had intended to take his definite decision as to line to be adopted. His Excellency was considerably moved by attacks on him in German press. In first place he understood that Stresemann should seek to divert storm somewhere, and towards Prague was much easier than towards London or Paris, and secondly he, M. Benés, had acted as he had done as a conscientious member of the Council of League of Nations rather than as Czechoslovakian Minister for Foreign Affairs and also because by calling down German wrath on himself, should that result, he would at least save any embittering of relations between France and Germany.

Confidential.

I think M. Benés would very much appreciate hint from you to Berlin that he was genuinely (? inspired) by those two considerations only.

¹ No. 443.

*Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)**No. 1230 [C 4855/436/18]*FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 22, 1926*

My Lord,

After receiving your telegram No. 144¹ of the 2nd April and your despatch No. 632² (27/88/1926) of the 7th April, I caused a full reconsideration to be made of the question of the German Government's request for an increase in the number of police effectives. My general conclusion remains that which was conveyed to Your Lordship in my telegram No. 76³ of the 31st March, that the matter is one of subsidiary importance on which the ex-allied governments might well meet the German Government without in any way prejudicing their own interests. It would seem too that the French Government themselves agree that the question has little intrinsic importance, and that the reason why they are not prepared to accede to the German request is the fear that it would only open the door to more requests of a similar nature.

2. This view appears from your telegram No. 144 to be so strongly held by Monsieur Briand that there clearly would be little use in making further representations to the French Government in the present circumstances, more especially at the present moment when they are somewhat disturbed over the Russo-German negotiations. I am afraid, therefore, that if the question is further discussed in these conditions at the Conference, we shall speedily reach a definite deadlock. Rather than that this should happen, I should prefer to see the question adjourned for the time being until the circumstances appear more favourable for persuading the French (and perhaps also the Germans) to agree to a reasonable compromise.

3. A suggestion has reached us unofficially, from what should be a reliable source, that the German Government would not resent such a delay as they themselves are now in no hurry to see the withdrawal of the Commission, the presence of which they greatly prefer to the prospect of an investigation by the League of Nations on which Poland would very possibly be represented in virtue of the scheme of September 27th, 1924. This however is for your personal information only.⁴

¹ No. 395.² No. 402.³ No. 386.

⁴ The Foreign Office had previously sent Lord Crewe, under cover of despatch No. 1136 of April 13 (not preserved in Foreign Office archives) a copy of a letter of the same day to the War Office which stated that Sir A. Chamberlain had observed from a report of March 23 by General Wauchope that 'both General Walch and General von Pawelsz appear to anticipate the retention of the Military Commission of Control in Germany throughout the summer, largely because the German Government will not allow committees of investigation appointed by the League of Nations to act in Germany until Germany is a member of the League.' The Foreign Office letter suggested that General Wauchope 'might be informed that the policy of His Majesty's Government remains that of liquidating the outstanding disarmament questions and of bringing control to an end with all possible expedition.' The War Office replied in a letter of April 13 (docket only preserved in Foreign

4. I request therefore that you will arrange by whatever method you may consider most suitable that this question should until further notice be removed from the agenda of the Ambassadors' Conference. This of course need not mean that the question is to be taboo, nor have I any wish to discourage members of your staff from exchanging views with the Quai d'Orsay and the Allied Military Committee of Versailles when occasion offers, with a view to watching for any indications of a change in the French point of view. But for the moment it seems useless to press it on the Conference itself.⁵

I am, &c.,

(For the Secretary of State)

MILES W. LAMPSON

Office archives) that there was little danger of the British Delegation to the Commission of Control acceding to an artificial spinning out of negotiations.

⁵ Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen referred to this despatch in a letter of April 29 to Mr. Sargent (not preserved in Foreign Office archives). The docket of this letter read as follows: 'Monsieur Massigli upon being asked whether he had any intention of putting police questions on agenda of Ambassadors' Conference for their next meeting, stated Monsieur Briand was determined not to make any concession whatever to Germans on police question. In consequence Monsieur Massigli will endeavour to persuade Monsieur Wagner to withdraw his demands.'

No. 449

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 1240 [N 1871/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 22, 1926*

My Lord,

The French Ambassador told me to-day that public opinion in France was more perturbed by the Russo-German Treaty than even the French newspapers had allowed to appear. M. Briand, however, was inclined to share my view of the character of the treaty, and he approved the course which I had taken in regard to it. M. Skrzynski and M. Benes, however, were very much alarmed. M. Briand was reserving his opinions on M. Benes' questions¹ until he had the text of the memorandum which was to explain them; but it was natural that Poland and Czechoslovakia should feel themselves more threatened and be less able to take a calm view of the situation than France and Great Britain; more particularly as the pressure of the Soviet Government on the Baltic States and Finland to enter into new engagements indicated a general diplomatic offensive against the League on the part of the Soviet Government.

I replied that I had carefully considered M. Benes' observations, but I had already instructed Sir George Clerk² to say that, in my view, it would be a great mistake to address such an interrogatory to the German Government. The German Ambassador had repeated to me the categorical assurances given to Lord D'Abernon in Berlin that the German Government had no

¹ See No. 429, note 3.

² See No. 443.

thought of departing from the policy of Locarno and that there would be nothing in the new treaty incompatible with the Locarno Agreement or with the obligations of the Covenant. When such explicit explanations were made by a Government I felt the wisest policy was to accept them and to take note of them. After all, this was the policy which I had pursued throughout the negotiations which preceded Locarno, when we had far less assurance of the sincerity of the new German initiative, and the policy had been successful. If we accepted the new assurances we could appeal to them and hold the German Government to them, as I had done, for instance, in the case of the assurances they had given me about their readiness to renounce resort to war as a means of changing their eastern frontier. If, however, we embarked on a series of questions leading to counter-questions, we should only be giving Germany an opportunity of qualifying these assurances and perhaps involving ourselves in difficulties in regard to the statement³ of our position in relation to article 16.

In regard to the Russian negotiations with the Baltic States I was imperfectly informed, but such indications as I had received of Finnish policy led me to think that the Finns viewed the Russian proposals with great suspicion and were determined themselves to preserve a Western orientation. I pointed out that it was obvious that the Soviet Government would do its utmost to sow in our minds distrust of the intentions of Germany and the Balkan States and would endeavour to affix to the Russo-German Treaty an aggressive, or at least hostile, interpretation repudiated by the German Government and, as I believed, alien to their intentions. We must not allow ourselves to be influenced by these very obvious and insincere manœuvres.

The Ambassador then spoke of Italy. He said he had found the Quai d'Orsay and M. Briand himself very much disturbed as to the intention of the Italians and fearful lest M. Mussolini was contemplating some active interference in the Balkans. He had himself replied to these fears that he thought M. Mussolini's ambitions were directed rather to Asia Minor, and he had quoted Sir William Tyrrell's account of a conversation which had passed between Sir William Tyrrell and M. Grandi when the Italian Debt Commission was in London.⁴ M. Grandi had not concealed Italy's ambitions in Asia Minor, but Sir William Tyrrell had observed that though this country was very friendly to Italy and I myself had given marked evidence of my desire for cordial relations with the Italian Government, British opinion was very pacific and no British Government could stand up against it in support of a breach of international peace.

I told M. de Fleuriau that I agreed with him that the Italian ambitions were directed to Asia Minor rather than to the Balkans. I did not, however, believe that M. Mussolini contemplated any aggressive action at the present time. I had just received information from Rome that he had taken steps

³ The draft of this despatch here read 'restatement'.

⁴ No records of this conversation, which evidently took place in January 1926, or of any subsequent conversation in this connexion between Sir W. Tyrrell and M. de Fleuriau, have been traced in Foreign Office archives.

to reassure the Turkish Government. If, indeed, the Turkish Government quarrelled with us about Irak, it was not likely that I should be inclined to restrain Italy, but it was a very different thing to contemplate an unprovoked breach of the peace. I mentioned that I had, in the course of a private letter⁵ to Sir Ronald Graham upon another matter, spoken of the apparent success of M. Mussolini's visit to Tripoli and of his triumphant reception when he returned, and added that whilst I had no doubt his speeches were calculated to confirm and edify the national feeling at home, they undoubtedly had a disturbing effect abroad, and that a friendly foreign onlooker would perhaps wish, in Italy's interests, that now that Fascism was firmly established at home, it should so guide its foreign policy as to convince Europe that Fascism was not an enemy to European peace. As to the Balkans, I observed that I did not believe that M. Mussolini contemplated any aggression there, but I thought that he did clearly desire that Italy should be the most influential Power in that part of the world, that he would be jealous of any competition from Great Britain if it were to be feared—which it was not—but still more jealous of any interference from France, and that he would regard any attempt by France to build up a system of alliances in that quarter with grave suspicion and, indeed, as a policy directed against Italy. M. de Fleuriau had formed the same opinion.

Finally, M. de Fleuriau mentioned the proposed economic conference to be held under the auspices of the League of Nations. The work for this conference was to be prepared by a preparatory technical committee and a committee of the Council.⁶ The Technical Committee is meeting in a few days, and M. Briand had intended to propose that the committee of the Council should meet before the conclusion of the work of the Technical Committee, say about the 30th April or the 4th May, which he thought would conform to the decision of the Council taken on the 13th December last year. M. Briand now, however, understood that I took some exception to this proceeding.

I explained that my understanding had been that the Technical Committee would really 'devil' the whole subject for the committee of the Council, and that the committee of the Council would not meet until the work of the Technical Committee had been concluded, when it would examine the programme prepared by the Technical Committee in its broader political aspects and decide to what extent it would recommend that programme to the Council or the Assembly. I understood that M. Loucheur would be the French member of the committee of the Council; and, having regard to the importance of the enquiry, my Government had wished me to be the British representative, but this was only possible to me if the committee of the

⁵ This letter of April 21 is not printed: cf., however, No. 422. For extracts from speeches made by Signor Mussolini during his visit to Libya from April 11 to 15, see *Survey of International Affairs 1927*, pp. 117-18 (Italian texts in B. Mussolini, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-45).

⁶ For a report on the first session of the Preparatory Committee for this Conference, see *League of Nations Official Journal*, June 1926, pp. 816-30, and for the meeting of the Committee of the Council on June 8, see *op. cit.*, July 1926, pp. 937-42.

Council met practically at the same time as the Council itself. It would be quite impossible for me to make an additional visit to Geneva for this particular purpose.

I am, &c.,
(For the Secretary of State),
C. W. ORDE

No. 450

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 23, 5 p.m.)

No. 124 Telegraphic [N 1866/718/38]

BERLIN, April 23, 1926, 2.20 p.m.

I had an interview with Secretary of State yesterday and spoke of position regarding Russo-German convention. He said that full agreement has not yet been come to but I understood that he did not anticipate any long delay before signature.

2. In the course of conversation His Excellency informed me that in proposed document German government will declare that they regard League of Nations as an instrument of peace and that Russian government will take note of this declaration.

3. I discussed question of registering convention with League of Nations. Secretary of State said that question had not yet been considered but he did not at first sight see any serious difficulty.

4. He informed me that convention would contain no financial clauses. Financial negotiations with Russian government were continuing but no solution had yet been reached.

5. Secretary of State reiterated assurance which he had already made to Sthamer in London that convention would contain no clauses inconsistent with covenant or with Germany's obligations as a future member of the League of Nations. His Excellency had consulted his legal advisers as to whether he could make this statement without reserve and was assured that he was fully within the truth.

6. With reference to your telegram No. 54¹ Secretary of State informed me that full explanation of publication of proposed convention had been made to Polish and Czech representatives. I replied that according to my information considerable alarm still exists at Warsaw and Prague and that it would be well if some steps could be taken to allay anxiety.

7. In this connection Secretary of State launched out about Poland, declaring that Poles were politically foolish, that they intrigued with everybody in turn—Russians, with Roumanians, with border states and were always stirring up animosity and hatred against Germany. This was the more foolish in that Poland was threatened with a severe economic and financial crisis and that Germany was the only country in a position to save her.

¹ No. 441.

Germany was quite ready to co-operate economically and financially with Poland if she was met in a friendly spirit. I suggested that the present moment might be opportune for some initiative by Germany in this direction, but Secretary of State said that German initiatives were always misinterpreted at Warsaw.

No. 451

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 91 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 4960/24/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 23, 1926, 4 p.m.*

Mr. Hugessen's letter to Mr. Troutbeck of April 19th regarding air negotiations.¹

¹ Not printed. This letter transmitted a French text of ordinances proposed by the German delegates to put into force the aviation agreement. These undated drafts corresponded generally with the following final texts printed in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. lviii, pp. 349-60:

- (1) the German law of July 8, 1926, for the execution of articles 177, 178 and 198 of the Treaty of Versailles;
- (2) the German decree of July 13, 1926, regarding aerial construction;
- (3) the German decree of July 13, 1926, regarding aircraft without pilots and aircraft with the technical characteristics of modern fighter aeroplanes;
- (4) the German decree of July 13, 1926, regarding the restriction of air training;
- (5) the German decree of July 13, 1926, for the keeping of aviation lists.

The main differences between the drafts and the final texts were:

- (a) the draft of (2) did not include paragraph 3 of the final text;
- (b) paragraph 2 of the draft of (3) began: 'Les avions, qui n'ont aucune importance pratique pour l'aviation civile,' [présentant] Draft paragraph 5 read: 'D'ailleurs, les dispositions de la loi sur le trafic aérien du 1er Août 1922 — Reichsgesetzblatt 1 — page 681 — et les modalités d'exécution de cette loi restent en vigueur.' Draft paragraph 6 corresponded to final paragraph 5. The draft did not include paragraph 6 of the final text of (3);
- (c) paragraph 1 of the draft of (4) read as follows: 'Toute instruction et tout perfectionnement dans le pilotage des avions qui auraient un caractère militaire ou qui tendraient à contrevenir aux engagements pris par l'article 198 du Traité de Versailles, sont interdits'; the draft of (4) did not include paragraph 3 of the final text;
- (d) the draft of (5) did not include paragraph 4 of the final text. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft of (5) corresponded to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the final text respectively. Draft paragraph 6 read as follows: 'Les listes indiquées aux paragraphes 2 et 3 devront être remises à tout moment et à toute injonction au Ministère des Communications du Reich.' Draft paragraphs 7 and 8 corresponded to final paragraphs 8 and 9 respectively.

Mr. Hugessen's letter also transmitted an allied draft of provisions regarding the police. The text, which corresponded closely to that printed *ibid.*, p. 338, concluded as follows:

'Ces 50 brevets de pilotes, ainsi accordés, ne pourront être renouvelés que dans le cas où leurs titulaires seraient rayés des contrôles de la Police.

'Les 50 fonctionnaires titulaires de brevets seront répartis entre les différents aérodromes.

'Les organisations de la Police ne pourront disposer d'aucun aéronef.

'Toute autre organisation de Police relative à l'aviation existant en Allemagne sera supprimée.'

The following points have been raised by the Air Ministry on the draft German decrees:—

1. Ordinance forbidding instruction and training in pilotage.—The Allied demand referred to 'l'instruction ou l'entraînement d'un personnel d'aviation'. The draft ordinance refers to pilotage, which is narrower. It is suggested that the former expression be substituted.

2. Ordinance requiring registration of factories, etc.—The maximum penalty laid down is '150 Reichsmarks or imprisonment or both'—and the imprisonment might conceivably be one day!—It is suggested that a penalty proportionate to those specified in the other ordinances, and stating the terms of imprisonment, should be laid down.

3. Ordinance forbidding pilot-less aircraft and those having the characteristics of fighting aircraft.—The ordinance requires to be supplemented by a guarantee by the German government that the Minister of Communications will not permit aircraft of the latter kind to be built or imported except for racing or record-breaking events. This will no doubt be a separate, diplomatic document.

It is also to be observed that a similar separate guarantee will be necessary as regards the restriction of German civil aviation within limits of a normal development; the non-granting of subsidies by the Reich, the separate States, or the municipalities; the training of personnel of Reichswehr or Marine in flying; and the inspection by the League of Nations of German aeronautical affairs.

While we do not wish to hold up a settlement on the above grounds, it might be well to bring the Air Ministry's points to the notice of the other delegations.

No. 452

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 58 Telegraphic [N 1849/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 23, 1926, 4.20 p.m.*

Prague telegrams Nos. 24 and 25.¹

I must leave action on concluding suggestion to your discretion according as you think that it will or will not be useful.²

Repeated to Prague No. 16.

¹ No. 447.

² Lord D'Abernon reported in Berlin telegram No. 128 of April 24 that on the previous evening he had suggested to Dr. Stresemann and Herr von Schubert that 'Monsieur Benes' action was dictated by solicitude for League of Nations and not by any interested motive. I believe the German government's irritation at what was considered Monsieur Benes' premature action on incorrect data has blown over. There have been lengthy explanations between the two governments.'

No. 453

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir G. Clerk (Prague)

No. 17 Telegraphic [N 1849/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 23, 1926, 4.20 p.m.*

My telegram No. 58 to Berlin.¹

You may in confidence tell Dr. Benes what I have done adding that there is so much on which I have to make representations in Berlin that I feel it would be unwise to give more specific directions to Lord d'Abernon.

¹ No. 452.

No. 454

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received April 23, 10.3 p.m.)

No. 125 Telegraphic [N 1880/718/38]

BERLIN, *April 23, 1926, 8.30 p.m.*

The salient features of the position here are:—

(1) Dr. Stresemann does not receive much support from the Right for his Russo-German treaty, nor is their opposition to government mollified by his adopting this policy.

(2) On the other hand, the Left are suspicious of movement towards Russia.

(3) The main motive of Dr. Stresemann may be assumed to be exercise of pressure on Poland and France so as to counteract their veiled hostility to Germany's entry into the League and Germany's election to the Council.

(4) Germans persist in view that at Geneva the French delegation—more particularly Loucheur and Boncour—were determined not to permit Germany's entry, unless they had a counter-poise in the shape of Poland, unless they were sure of a safe majority on the Council.

(5) Apart from main motive cited above for signature with Russia, subsidiary motive is apprehension aroused by agreements recently signed, or now being negotiated, e.g. Polish-Roumanian, Moscow-border states, Yugoslavia-France-Italy.

(6) The general feeling among public is one of no enthusiasm for an agreement with Russia, but a strong desire—indeed determination—to keep Russia from going anti-German and becoming closer to France and Poland than to the Germans. Russians, of course, exploit to the utmost Germany's apprehension of a Russo-French rapprochement.

(7) The desire to see Germany a member of the League is certainly stronger than three months ago and is not now confined to the Left and Centre. It is argued that, whilst Germany's opponents desire to shuffle her out of the League, it must be of interest for Germany to enter.

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 554 [C 4703/481/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 23, 1926*

My Lord,

I am forwarding, for your Lordship's information, copy of Lord Kilmarnock's despatch No. 78¹ of the 15th April, together with its enclosures.²

2. The general character of these reports does not come as a surprise to me; but the attitude of the German authorities in occupied territory since the more conciliatory policy adopted by the occupying authorities after the Locarno meeting is even more disappointing than I had anticipated. Your Lordship is aware from my verbal communications to you as well as from my despatches how much I feel the lack of response by the German authorities in general and the German Government in particular to the clear manifestations of goodwill which have emanated from the other Locarno Governments, and more particularly from the Polish and French Governments. I have already desired that you should speak seriously to Herr Stresemann upon the subject. You will choose your own time and method, but you should leave him in no doubt as to the very unfavourable impression produced upon my mind by the facts recorded in Lord Kilmarnock's despatch. I need not dwell again upon the extreme difficulty of pursuing a policy of conciliation when the spirit which inspires it finds no echo in the German attitude or in the utterances of German statesmen. Nor does the course of events in the Rhineland conform even to the definite assurances proffered to me by the German Ministers and by the Ambassador here that we should see a quick response on their side to the first evidence of goodwill on our part.

3. Whatever the motives which caused the German Government to make fresh proposals to the Soviet at this moment, I have from the first accepted the assurances which they have given me and relied upon the German Government to see that the text of the treaty completely fulfils their promises. They can be by this time under no misapprehension as to the extent or character of the disturbances which this new development has produced in many quarters, not least, perhaps, in Czechoslovakia, with which country Herr Stresemann informed me at Geneva their relations had become quite satisfactory. It is the desire of His Majesty's Government to pursue the policy initiated at Locarno. I had looked forward to steady progress in the path of concession and conciliation, but I am obliged to ask your Lordship to call the serious attention of the German Government to the obstacles which their attitude places in our path. It cannot be expected that we can make progress as long as the German Government fail to observe the first condition of the new policy, namely, that the new attitude should be reciprocal and should be as clearly marked upon the German side as it has been on that of the occupying Powers.

¹ No. 432.

² Not printed.

4. I call your Lordship's particular attention to the concluding words of paragraph 4 and to the whole of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of Lord Kilmarnock's despatch.³

I am, &c.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN⁴

³ A copy of this despatch was sent to Lord Kilmarnock in Foreign Office despatch No. 172 to Coblenz of April 26. Lord Kilmarnock was authorized 'to speak to the Reichskommissar with the utmost frankness on the lines suggested' in the last paragraph of No. 432.

⁴ Sir A. Chamberlain expressed similar views in a private letter of the same day to Lord D'Abernon, whom he authorized to read No. 432 to Dr. Stresemann.

No. 456

Lord Kilmarnock (Coblenz) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 27)
No. 84 [C 5096/481/18]

Confidential

COBLENZ, April 23, 1926

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 78¹ of April 15th, and to your telegram No. 15² of April 18th, I have the honour to report that I was not able to see the Reich[s]kommissar until yesterday, owing to his absence from Koblenz.

As my experience has been that he is somewhat slow of comprehension, and does not appear as a rule to be thoroughly conversant with the general trend of affairs, I thought it best to draw up a memorandum of what I wished to say, and have it translated into German. I explained to him that I did not mean this as an official document, but that I wished him to regard it as a stenographic reproduction of what I wanted to say to him orally. I enclose copy of this memorandum³ herewith.

He read it slowly and carefully, stopping only occasionally to ejaculate 'Oh! but this is not true'. By the time he had finished, his usual complacency was visibly shaken, and he exclaimed with some emotion 'Oh! but my dear lord you must not say these things; they are not true'. I explained that I did not vouch for the complete accuracy of every statement made, but that what I wished to do was to give him as veracious a picture as I could of the atmosphere which seemed to me to have been created, and of the danger of friction with the Army which continual small irritations by the German officials was producing. He expressed great surprise and said he had, on the contrary, received the impression that everything was going well between the British Army, the population, and the German Authorities in the British zone. He assured me that the idea of any organised propaganda was false, and he did his best to minimise the importance of the press articles which I showed him. He begged me to believe that there was no ill-will on the German side. He said that the question of billeting [*sic*] was a very onerous one for the population, and the fact that the British, contrary to expectations,

¹ No. 432.

² See No. 432, note 2.

³ Not printed.

required more accommodation than the French had led to a certain amount of bitterness, especially in the case of Königstein, which was a summer resort where the local population derived the chief part of their livelihood from the letting of rooms to summer visitors. The fact that this source of income was interfered with must inevitably cause dissatisfaction. He went on to refer with great earnestness to the question of a reduction in the size of the garrison. He quoted the Note of the Ambassadors Conference of November 14th, 1925, in which the words 'reduction sensible' were used and said that what was necessary to bring about the desiderated change in the feeling of the population was that the reductions made should be evident to the man in the street, and above all to the householder. He had just been to Paris where he had seen M. Berthelot whom he had found sympathetic, but it was urgent that this alleviation, which was long overdue, should be dealt with without further delay. I said I would inform you, Sir, of his remarks.

With regard to the question of passage through the evacuated zone he said that the difficulties did not come from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, or the Ministry for Occupied Territory, but from the Passport Office in Berlin, and he again promised to try and get these removed.

I impressed on him that I was as anxious as he was to bring about a more satisfactory state of affairs, and that it was with this object that I had treated him to so frank an exposition of the views which were so frequently put before me.

I also carefully explained to him the disappointment which you yourself felt, as exemplified in your telegram No. 49⁴ of April 12th to Berlin, and the difficulty which the German attitude had placed in the way of further alleviations.

I think that he was genuinely startled at the idea that so much dissatisfaction was felt in British circles, and I feel that he will do what he can to help, though I am not very confident that his intervention will be efficacious.

We parted on an entirely friendly note, and with mutual assurances of cordial co-operation in the work of conciliation.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.⁵

I have, &c.,
KILMARNOCK

⁴ No. 415.

⁵ Lord Kilmarnock's statement to the Reichskommissar was approved in Foreign Office despatch No. 185 to Coblenz, and the above despatch was commended to Lord D'Abernon's special attention in Foreign Office despatch No. 613 to Berlin of May 6.

Letter from Mr. Sargent to Mr. Wigram (Paris)

[C 4306/96/3]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 23, 1926

Dear Ralph,

Your despatch No. 627¹ (88/16/1926) of April 6th and your telegram No.

¹ Not printed. This despatch transmitted a report of April 1 from the Allied Military Committee of Versailles covering a draft reply to an Austrian note communicated to the Allied representatives in Vienna on February 4 and to the Conference of Ambassadors on February 12. Mr. Aveling stated in a minute of April 10 on this despatch:

“The position as regards Austrian disarmament is as follows. On August 19th last the Allied note (C 9097/397/3 flag A. [not printed]), enumerating the final demands to be complied with by the Austrian Government before the military clauses of the Treaty of Saint-Germain could be considered as executed and the Organ of Liquidation withdrawn, was presented to the Austrian Government. The principal demands embodied in the note were:—

‘(a) Industrial Disarmament. Under this heading (see pages 9 and 10 of Foreign Office print, Flag A) the Austrians were called upon to hand over to the Allies for destruction some 1,500 special machines which could only be used for the manufacture of war material and were therefore illegal. In addition some 5,500 semi-special machines were to be destroyed or transformed so as to render them useless for the production of munitions, and only capable of being used for ordinary commercial purposes. In addition a number of workshops were to be dismantled.

‘(b) The completion of the installation of machinery in the guns and small arms section of the Single State Factory.

‘(c) The passage of a law or decree by the Austrian Government prohibiting sporting clubs from occupying themselves with military matters (Article 128).

‘None of these demands is of any vital importance to the Allies; their enforcement, however, may have serious repercussions on the financial and political situation in Austria, already sufficiently critical.

‘After a delay of some six months the Austrian Government replied (C. 1898/96/3 Flag B [not printed]) to the Allied note, and as regards the three principal demands mentioned above, urged the following consideration:

‘(a) *Industrial Disarmament*

‘That a number of the machines referred to in the Allied note had already been adapted to commercial uses or disposed of abroad, and that the Austrian Government should be given time in which to allow this process to continue; that if they were forced to carry out the demands the result would be a considerable aggravation of the present financial and economic crisis for which the Austrian Government would have to decline all responsibility. Moreover, the Austrian Government declared that not only were they unable to raise the money which would be required to compensate the firms whose machinery was to be destroyed, but they doubted whether any Austrian Parliament could be found to vote the necessary sums for the execution of a measure “which would have an enormous repercussion on the public life of Austria”.

‘(b) *Single State Factory*

‘The Austrian Government admitted that the installation of machinery in [sic] the gun and small arms section of the factory had not been installed with the necessary machinery and that the section for the manufacture of small arms munitions had not been established. As regards the former, they pointed out that whilst theoretically the military requirements of the State required the proper installation of the factory, the present financial situation of Austria was such that the expenditure involved could not be met. They pointed out, moreover, that even were the factory complete the financial situation would not allow of the

155² section 9 of April 14th have brought the question of our policy as regards Austrian disarmament to a head. For some time past we have not been very easy in our minds as shown by enclosed correspondence³ with the War Office.

You will see from our letter of February 24th that we proposed to the War Office that the Ambassadors' Conference should agree to abandon any further attempt to enforce compliance with the Allied demands as regards industrial disarmament, etc; that no reply should be returned to the Austrian note, and that the Organ of Liquidation should be withdrawn so soon as sufficient progress had been made as regards the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty of Trianon to enable the Allies to envisage the withdrawal of the Commission of Control from Hungary. Our reason, of course, for suggesting that the withdrawal of the Organ from Austria should be made dependent upon the completion of control in Hungary was that to withdraw from Austria with the Allied demands unfulfilled might well have the effect of encouraging the Hungarians to resist compliance with the final demands made upon them in the hope that the Allies would similarly abandon the attempt to enforce them.

You will retort that this represents a complete *volte-face* from what has been our policy for the last two years. Well, even at the risk of being charged with gross inconsistency we are now resolved to have but one aim and object as regards Austrian disarmament and that is to terminate Allied control and hand over to the League as soon as possible. If we thought that this object could best be attained by insisting on the integral execution of the Allied demands of August 18th [19th] and by ignoring the considerations put forward in the Austrian Government's reply, we should unhesitatingly agree to the recommendations of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles. But, having regard to the notorious weakness of the Austrian Government, the critical economic and financial situation in Austria and the fact that in their note the Austrian Government declared that they would decline all responsibility were the Allied demands regarding industrial disarmament to be enforced, it seems to us that a repetition of the Allied demands would merely cause serious embarrassment to the Austrian Government whilst leaving the possibility of the execution of those demands just as remote as it is at present.

necessary munitions and supplies being manufactured for the army within the limits prescribed by the Treaty.

'(c) Sporting Clubs

'The Austrian Government contended that such clubs as existed were only political, and devoid of any military character. The various clubs, moreover, were pursuing entirely different political aims, and the Austrian Government would find it impossible to dissolve them in the absence of any definite proof of their having broken the laws. In a covering despatch [not printed] forwarding the Austrian note Mr. Leeper called particular attention to the Allied demand in respect of the sporting clubs, and expressed the view that the dissolution of these political associations was "really wholly beyond the capacity of the Federal Government to secure".'

² No. 427.

³ Not printed. Mr. Aveling stated in his minute of April 10 that the War Office were not disposed to agree to the course proposed by the Foreign Office and summarized below.

Moreover, if the Ambassadors' Conference adopt the recommendations of the Allied Military Committee of Versailles it will be all the more difficult for the Allies to climb down and withdraw the Organ in the probable event of the Austrian Government reaffirming its inability to carry out the demands. In fact, the Allies will be committed to a line of action which might well entail their being obliged to maintain control in Austria long after operations have been wound up in the other ex-enemy countries, and eventually, in order to save their faces, having to lay the whole question before the League of Nations. No one can seriously contend that the intrinsic military importance of the outstanding defaults is sufficiently vital to justify steps being taken calculated to land the Allies and Austria into such a position, and for our part, we (the Foreign Office) would be quite willing tacitly to acquiesce in the present state of affairs until such time as control operations in Hungary have been completed when both the Commission of Control and the Organ of Liquidation could be withdrawn from Hungary and Austria simultaneously.

Hitherto it has been the French and Italians who have shown reluctance to bring any pressure to bear on Austria to carry out the military clauses of the treaty, the French being financially interested in certain of the Austrian munition factories and anxious to maintain Austria as an arsenal for the supply of munitions to the Little Entente; and both the Italians and the French presumably being desirous of maintaining the political and economic stability of Austria through fear of the Anschluss. In the circumstances, we were somewhat surprised to hear that the French and Italians had accepted the Allied Military Committee of Versailles' report. It would be interesting to know what is behind this apparent change of policy.⁴ Have they do you think any ulterior purpose or did Cambon and Aveqjano [*sic*]⁵ just accept the report blindly without taking the trouble to think out what it committed them to?

Perhaps you can find out unofficially from the French and Italians the reason for the unexpectedly forthcoming attitude adopted by the French and Italian Ambassadors and also, if possible, whether they have any *arrière pensée* in the matter. It might if necessary be intimated to them that although we have our own views on the question we would be prepared for the sake of interallied solidarity to fall into line with them if they attach real importance to the course of action recommended by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, we do feel that the considerations set out in this letter should be duly weighed before any definite action is taken. Pending the receipt of a reply from you, we are not consulting the War Office further in the matter, nor, of course, shall we send you any official instructions.

The question which we want to get settled is you will see one of purely

⁴ In a final paragraph of his minute of April 16, which was not enclosed in the present letter, Mr. Sargent put forward, among other possible reasons for this change of policy: 'Perhaps the French and Italians consider that the demand in Germany for an economic Anschluss will best be killed by undermining Austria's economic position'.

⁵ The reference was evidently to Baron Romano Avezana, Italian Ambassador at Paris.

political expediency and does not concern the soldiers, who are only called upon to consider the matter from the military aspect. They have stated their proposals and it now remains to be seen whether from a political point of view it is desirable to apply them.

ORME SARGENT

P.S. I enclose a minute which has been written on the subject. It gives a short history of the question and was written before receipt of your telegram No. 155. It obviously must not get over to the soldiers on account of the references to Sherbrooke.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 457

Extract from Minute by Mr. Sargent

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 16, 1926

We seem in this question of Austrian disarmament to have drifted into a most unsatisfactory position and to be now faced with the prospect of having to put forward demands to the Austrian government some of which they are physically unable to carry out while others would produce the most disastrous effect on the economic situation of Austria just at the moment when, the League control being withdrawn, she is expected to stand once again on her own feet.

I don't for a moment think that we ever intended to take up this position and the sooner we back out of it the better.

If we examine the history of Austrian disarmament since the entry into force of the Treaty of St. Germain we find that already in 1921, before the Treaty had been a year in force, it was generally recognised that it was neither in the least necessary or desirable to enforce the military clauses on the bankrupt and impotent Austrian government. Austria could in no circumstances represent a military danger to her neighbours; in fact, far from demanding the strict enforcement of these clauses, they have never, from that day to this, made any complaint as to their non-execution, a striking contrast to their persistent protests in the case of the non-execution of the corresponding clauses by Hungary. The fact of the matter is of course that the continuance of the armaments factories in Austria has been for the last five years of considerable use to the Little Entente, who have found it at times convenient to obtain from them their necessary supplies. On the other hand, the principle [*sic*] Allied Powers up till now have been chiefly pre-occupied in preventing a complete economic collapse of Austria, and have been careful to do nothing which would aggravate the already desperate situation.

The result was that it was agreed early in 1922 to withdraw the Commission of control without its having finished its work and to replace it by a liquidating organ whose function was merely to save the faces of the principle Allied Powers and to sit tight and do nothing in particular. This it did for four years and did it very well.

This idyllic state of affairs was brought to an end by two facts: (1) The appointment of Colonel Sherbrooke, as British member of the liquidating organ, whose zeal impelled him to take up seriously the whole question of Austrian disarmament with a view to making a really satisfactory job of it. He complained bitterly of the lack of support he received from his French and Italian colleagues and bombarded the War Office with reports on the disgraceful state of affairs. At the same time the late Mr. Morel raised the subject in Parliament⁶ and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, fortified by Colonel Sherbrooke's reports, called upon the Ambassadors' Conference to take the matter up seriously and even made personal representations to the Austrian Chancellor. The Conference and H.M. Government in consequence found themselves launched on a new policy of enforcing the strict letter of the Austrian military clauses. General demands addressed to the Austrian government calling upon them to fulfil their treaty obligations having proved useless, a general investigation of the situation was called for on the German model. Arising out of this investigation we are now faced with a series of definite cut and dried demands which are to be presented to the Austrian government under the threat (see last paragraph of draft note) that if they fail to perform them they will be denounced to the League of Nations.⁷

There is still time for us to draw back and I certainly think we ought not to let the opportunity slip. We have throughout taken the initiative and may now be accused of inconsistency; but I think we must risk that. It may be of course somewhat shocking to have to recognise that munition making is one of the staple industries of Austria but I venture to think that it is wiser tacitly to accept this unfortunate fact rather than run the risk of wrecking the whole economic life of Austria in our efforts to enforce the strict letter of the treaty. As for the sporting clubs of the semi-military organisations, it is ludicrous to suppose that they could be of any danger to any foreign country.

A plausible pretext for not pressing our rights at the present moment can if necessary be found in the fact that the approaching disarmament conference will no doubt deal with the question on broader and more equitable lines than the Ambassadors' Conference, whose hands are tied by the strict letter of the treaty.

⁶ In 1924: see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 174, cols. 384-5, 858-9, 1217-18; vol. 175, cols. 14-15, 1842.

⁷ A marginal note by Mr. Sargent here read: 'This threat has now been cut out by the Conference.' Cf. No. 427.

No. 458

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 24, 12.30 p.m.)

No. 126 Telegraphic [N 1882/718/38]

Urgent

BERLIN, April 24, 1926, 11.26 a.m.

Russian agreement will be signed to-day, Moscow government having finally accepted German draft on points remaining under dispute.

Text will be published on Monday.¹

It is proposed to register agreement with League of Nations after ratification.

¹ April 26, 1926. The text of the Soviet-German Treaty of Berlin, with the attached exchange of notes, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 125, pp. 738-41.

No. 459

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 59 Telegraphic [N 1866/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 24, 1926, 4 p.m.

Your telegram No. 124.¹

I am puzzled by paragraph 2. How if at all does it affect or is it affected by paragraph 5.

Paragraph 3. Assuming treaty to be what Secretary of State and Sthamer assure us it is, voluntary registration of it with the League by Germany would be an act which we here should appreciate and would I believe help to produce more favourable impression elsewhere especially if the intention could be announced at once or at least at a very early date.

Last paragraph. Secretary of State's diatribe is wholly characteristic. If Germany makes a treaty with Russia he professes astonishment that anyone should suggest a doubt or a criticism. If Poland holds a conversation with Russia even though nothing results Poland is 'stirring up animosity and hatred against Germany'. This is mischievous nonsense. The only broadly generous act as between these two countries since Locarno was Poland's suspension of deportations. Schubert has no right to use such language about Poland until Germany has done some equally striking and generous act towards Poland and had it received in as grudging and thankless a way as that act was received by the German government. Ask Stresemann what is the German equivalent for English proverb sauce for goose is sauce for gander. As long as Germans persist in treating Poles as pariahs it does not lie in their mouths to complain of Polish ill-will to Germany. It is Germany's own fault if Polish German relations do not improve, for Germans go out of their way to mark their contempt and hatred for Poles on all occasions even to you and me.

¹ No. 450.

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 25, 4.50 p.m.)

No. 129 *Telegraphic* [N 1892/718/38]

BERLIN, April 25, 1926, 2.20 p.m.

Yesterday evening I had a long conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding Russian convention.

He gave me the following details regarding the negotiations:—He had found Chicherin a different man after Locarno. In his first interview with Chicherin before Locarno the latter had ridiculed German draft convention, saying expressions it contained would do very well for an after-dinner speech or for the musings of a beautiful soul but were absurd in the realm of practical politics. Russia wanted something more binding.

When Chicherin found that he could not divert Germany from Locarno he suddenly modified his tone and was anxious to accept what he had before ridiculed. Whereas first draft sent to Moscow had been returned by German Ambassador there with an urgent request that it should not be presented to the Russian government as it would be scoffed at, today Moscow had signed something almost identical with this draft.

I asked Dr. Stresemann what, in his opinion, were the motives for Chicherin's action in accepting today something which he had previously thought so inadequate. Dr. Stresemann replied 'he is alarmed at being isolated. He considers that he must have some means of approach to Western Europe. In my judgment, after signing with us he will sign a similar convention with France and will then approach England. I still consider that Russian financial preoccupations are perhaps the root cause of his action. Today he wants to sell himself too dear but his price will come down with you as it did with us'.

Dr. Stresemann continued 'I regard signature of this convention by Russia as a remarkable evolution in direction of Soviet co-operation with Europe and as a step towards Geneva. Only of course one must not say this publicly. When you have read notes attached to convention of today you will see how different Russia's attitude towards League of Nations is from that which they have been accustomed to express in their speeches. I showed convention and accompanying notes to a leading socialist; he said "I shall be curious to know what communists in Russia and in Germany will say. You have undermined the whole of their previous platform". In my speech at Stuttgart I described convention as complementary of Locarno. This did not please Russians but it did not prevent their subsequently signing'.

In further discussion about Russian position, Stresemann said 'I can understand people arguing that wisest course for European countries would be to leave Russia severely alone and let whole communistic system collapse, but are those who argue thus sure about what would follow upon collapse?

It might not return to what we call order, it might aggravate the present evils'.

Continued in my immediately following telegram.¹

¹ No. 462.

No. 461

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 25, 3.20 p.m.)

No. 131 Telegraphic [N 1884/228/55]

BERLIN, April 25, 1926, 2.20 p.m.

Your telegram No. 59 and my No. 129.¹

Putting together what Dr. Stresemann and Herr Schubert have said about Poland, I shall not be surprised if before long there were interesting developments in this quarter and important negotiations. Now that Germany has insured herself against Russia—insofar as a Soviet contract can be said to ensure anybody against anything—she is more free to deal with Poland. On the other hand, Russo-German convention—notwithstanding any statement to the contrary—is likely to stimulate to a marked degree Polish anxiety to come to some arrangement with Germany.

¹ Nos. 459 and 460 respectively.

No. 462

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 25, 6.32 p.m.)

No. 130 Telegraphic [C 4991/71/18]

BERLIN, April 25, 1926, 4.38 p.m.

Following is continuation of my immediately preceding telegram.¹

As regards German attitude towards League of Nations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said 'The whole position has changed in the last months. The armies have changed places. Before the March meeting the western powers were anxious for us to join League of Nations while German public opinion was shy. Today, public here are determined that Germany shall be admitted, while some of the western powers are less keen than they were. We have made a good selection in sending Hoesch² to Geneva. If it is possible to arrive at a reasonable solution, Hoesch and Gaus will certainly facilitate it'.

Referring to M. Briand, Stresemann went on to say 'I will tell you a

¹ No. 460.

² Herr von Hoesch and Dr. Gaus, Legal Adviser to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had been appointed German representatives on the Committee on the Composition of the Council of the League of Nations.

characteristic story of him. One of the most urgent points for German public opinion is the reduction of troops in the Rhineland, in accordance with the promises made. But when Hoesch spoke to M. Briand about this the other day, Briand replied in the most charming way, "dear me, how stupid I am; I had entirely forgotten this question, but I will speak to my military people about it".

Discussing Geneva further, Dr. Stresemann attributed difficulties there largely to the accursed climate. He said 'that nobody could work properly there—everyone felt depressed and incapable of effort. There has never been a greater mistake than the selecting of Geneva for seat of meetings of the League'. When the happy day came that Germany was a member of the Council he hoped that that body would frequently meet in places other than Geneva.

Regarding future of Europe and results hitherto achieved by Locarno agreement, Dr. Stresemann said he had been deeply impressed by change of spirit in organisations like the 'Jung Deutsche Orden'. He was informed that they had recently entered into discussion with analogous French organisations and both were coming independently to adopt the watchword 'no further war between France and Germany'.

Of course the 'Jung Deutsche Orden' was only one of many organisations and their leaders were rather, he thought, idealistic, but it would have been impossible a year ago to conceive a friendly meeting between the French and German representatives of Nationalist organisations or their talking over anything quietly.

The danger spot in Europe now was Poland. If Polish question had been settled he would be optimistic regarding the future. Were it possible he would like to talk to Szkrzynski [*sic*] on a thoroughly frank basis. He would say to him 'let us try to improve our relations. We are necessary to one another on economic and financial grounds. Let us try if we can come together and abolish as far as possible all obstacles to trade. A Zollverein³ would be impossible but we might go some way in that direction. Of course there would be great difficulty in Germany with agrarian classes, but economic co-operation between Germany and Poland is essential'.

³ Customs Union.

No. 463

Sir R. Hodgson (Moscow) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 25, 9.30 p.m.)

No. 106 Telegraphic [N 1906/718/38]

MOSCOW, April 25, 1926, 4.53 p.m.

M. Litvinoff announced signature of Soviet-German treaty in a speech¹ at session of central executive committee last night. He read text of treaty

¹ Extracts from this speech are printed by Jane Degras, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 104-17.

and summarised notes exchanged at the time of signature. I presume text will have been telegraphed from Berlin but will send by post full account² of M. Litvinoff's speech as soon as official report of meeting is available.

2. General line of M. Litvinoff's argument was as follows: Soviet government's policy is to seek to establish peace and present treaty with Germany is in entire harmony with that policy. If question is asked as to whether treaty is against 'the spirit of Locarno' reply depends on what Locarno really represents. If the authors of Locarno agreement are genuine in claiming that Locarno treaties represent effort to bring peace among nations Soviet-German treaty should surely be welcomed by them. Insofar on the other hand as the object of Locarno, as Soviet government have always suspected, was to isolate Soviet Union and to form a common anti-Soviet front, Soviet-German treaty 'has taken some of the anti-Soviet sting out of Locarno'.

3. M. Litvinoff in the same speech referred at length to Anglo-Soviet relations and emphasised that if Soviet government could be assured that British government were really serious in desire to come to an understanding no question of prestige or 'who is to make the first step' would be allowed to interfere with initiation of negotiations through recognised diplomatic channels. Reference was made to symptoms of changing attitude in Great Britain—export credits debates in House of Commons,³ Mr. Churchill's reference to Russian debts,⁴ and Foreign Office reply to London Chamber of Commerce.⁵

² Moscow despatches Nos. 323 and 325 of April 26 and 28 respectively are not printed.

³ See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 192, cols. 1099–1156, for the debate on March 1, 1926.

⁴ See *op. cit.*, vol. 191, col. 355, for a Parliamentary answer on February 4 and vol. 193, col. 1251, for a statement on March 24.

⁵ See enclosure in No. 416.

No. 464

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 60 Telegraphic [N 1880/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 25, 1926, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 125.¹

Following for your guidance.

Paragraph 3. If this is Stresemann's real motive he has acted under complete misapprehension. French government are determined that Germany must enter League and never questioned her claim to permanent seat on Council.

Paragraph 4. It is not worth my while to discuss Loucheur and Boncour. In all essentials French policy is directed by Briand and he knows as well as I do that a majority on the Council even if 'safe' is useless. His reasons for desiring admission of Poland are quite different and Stresemann himself has recognised their force.

¹ No. 454.

Paragraph 5. (a) I consider Polish–Roumanian treaty to be direct result of uniformly unfriendly and contemptuous treatment of Poles by German government and people.

(b) Soviet negotiations with border states cause as much apprehension in other capitals as in Berlin.

(c) There is not the least chance of a Yugoslavia–France–Italy treaty of alliance. The idea is even more disliked in Rome than in Berlin. I explained the position verbally to you and you will find it recorded in my conversation with French Ambassador last Thursday.²

Paragraph 5 [6]. Always assuming that Russo-German treaty conforms to assurances given to us, I do not desire to make any protest nor have I attempted to prevent its conclusion. The cost will be borne by Germany and I think she is a fool to pay the price, but that is her business. I see no prospect of a successful termination of the Russo-French negotiations and even if they succeed no conceivable menace to Germany in what I know of proposals made by France.

Conclusion. It is obvious that Soviet is trying to play on everybody's fears of somebody else. German government should be on its guard against constant misrepresentation of aims and acts of German policy by Soviet in other quarters.

² April 22, 1926: see No. 449.

No. 465

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Hodgson (Moscow)

No. 113 Telegraphic [N 1906/718/38]

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 26, 1926, 5.30 p.m.*

Your No. 106¹ (Litvinof's announcement).

I have not yet seen text of Russo-German treaty, but assuming as I have done that it conforms to German assurances, I have not and do not intend to raise any objection to it.

2. It is useless to argue with Soviet authorities upon supposed anti-Soviet object of Locarno treaties. They have been told in every capital of Europe that these treaties had no such object and that His Majesty's Government have never sought to form any kind of anti-Soviet bloc. They are really suffering from swollen head. They are of less consequence to us than they suppose and they grossly flatter themselves when they suppose that British policy is dictated by thought of them.

3. As to Anglo-Soviet relations, His Majesty's Government are prepared as Chicherin was told in Paris to receive and consider any serious proposals for bridging the gulf of principle that has hitherto divided us provided that we can be assured that the negotiations or conversations will be conducted in good faith and will not be used like the trade agreement as cover for

¹ No. 463.

continued hostile propaganda here or elsewhere by the Third International. It is obvious as my predecessor wrote in his note to Rakovsky² that the policy of the Soviet Government and the Third International is dictated by the same men and that the government cannot be absolved from responsibility for the latter.

4. Above is for your confidential information and guidance in case you are approached by the Soviet government. I do not think it desirable that you should take the initiative in conversation.

² See No. 46, note 6.

No. 466

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 27, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 158 Telegraphic: by bag [C 5073/24/18]

PARIS, April 26, 1926

German aviation negotiations.

2. Text¹ of various draft documents embodying agreement was sent to

¹ Not printed. These documents in French, which corresponded generally with the final texts printed in G. F. de Martens, *Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités*, Troisième Série (Leipzig, 1909), vol. xvi, pp 889-95, 896-8, and in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. lviii, were as follows:

Pièce A Projet de Lettre du Président de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs (Lettre d'envoi) (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 332-4);

Pièce B Projet de Lettre de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne (Lettre d'envoi) (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 338-41);

Pièce C Annexe I to *Pièce A* — Mesures destinées à assurer l'exécution de l'Article 198 du Traité de Versailles (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 334-7). The last sentence 'Les appareils seront saisis et rendus inutilisables.' of section 2 of paragraph I of the final text was not included in the present draft. Paragraph III (a) of the present draft read 'le Gouvernement allemand subordonnera à une autorisation spéciale par lui délivrée la construction ou l'importation d'avions qui seraient sans objet pratique pour l'aviation civile ou qui posséderaient les caractéristiques techniques d'avions de chasse modernes' etc.;

Pièce D Dispositions concernant la Police—Annexe II to *Pièce A* (cf. *ibid.*, p. 338);

Pièce E Projet de Lettre du Président de la Conférence au sujet du survol en Territoires Occupés (not printed by the League of Nations) and corresponding generally with the text printed as the enclosure in No. 411. The main differences were: (a) the present text of paragraph 4 began: 'La nouvelle réglementation, au sujet de laquelle la Haute-Commission entrera directement en contact avec le Commissaire d'Empire' and ended: '... plusieurs voyages. Si la Haute-Commission se voyait dans l'obligation de refuser un permis ou un visa, il est dans son intention de faire connaître les raisons de son refus'; (b) the present text did not include a paragraph corresponding to paragraph 5 of the enclosure in No. 411.

Pièce F Projet de Lettre du Président de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au sujet des aérodromes en zone démilitarisée (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 341-2). In the present text the final paragraph was bracketed and marked '*Reservé*' and included no phrase corresponding to the last clause of the final text, beginning 'que lesdits gouvernements'.

Pièce G and Pièce H Hangars de Friedrichshafen et Hangars laissés pour servir à l'Aviation Internationale (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 344-6). Draft exchange of letters between the President of the Conference of Ambassadors and the German Ambassador in Paris.

Mr. Troutbeck yesterday. Certain points in this text are still under discussion, but it would appear that complete agreement is now not far distant.

A. Draft letter regarding survol in occupied territory (piece E in text)

Paragraphs 4 and 5 have been agreed to both by the German delegates and the Rhineland High Commission in the form shown in the draft. The French having insisted on the present text, the British delegates have not pressed their objections further.

B. Draft letter regarding aerodromes in the demilitarised zone (piece F)

The views in your despatch No. 1220² were put to allied delegates, all of whom agreed to the omission of the final paragraph regarding investigation under Article 213.³ When the matter was raised with the German delegates, however, the latter objected and insisted that, as any investigation undertaken in the demilitarised zone must be undertaken under Article 213 and not under Article 43, the paragraph should be retained. The matter is being further discussed with the German delegates this evening.

C. As regards the 'ordonnances', the points given in your telegram No. 91⁴ have been put forward and accepted by the Allies. Other allied delegates have drawn attention to one or two loopholes which exist in the present drafts, and the Germans have undertaken to produce a further text.

3. Please inform Air Ministry.

² No. 444.

³ Of the Treaty of Versailles.

⁴ No. 451.

No. 467

Lord Kilmarnock (Coblentz) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 27, 3.20 p.m.)
No. 16 Telegraphic [C 5100/446/18]

Urgent

COBLENZ, April 27, 1926, 12.10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 16.¹

High Commission has received no representations from German government with regard to numbers and dispositions of British garrison now quartered in Rhineland.

The German Commissioner, however, on February 23rd addressed a note to me, as British High Commissioner, on the subject of billeting at Königstein. I referred this to Commander-in-Chief who replied *inter alia* that question of reducing the garrison at Königstein had been under consideration,

¹ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. This telegram evidently referred to Mr. Ponsonby's Parliamentary question on April 28 (see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 194, col. 2009) and asked Lord Kilmarnock the question to which the following paragraph replied.

but that it had been decided that in the present circumstances it was not possible to effect a reduction. I communicated General du Cane's answer to German Commissioner. A further note from the latter was received by me on April 22nd and has been sent to the Commander-in-Chief, whose reply I await.

The German Commissioner has referred in conversation with me to the subject of general reduction of occupying forces (see my despatch No. 27,² last paragraph and my despatch No. 84).³

² No. 241.

³ No. 456.

No. 468

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 1260 [C 4644/446/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 27, 1926

My Lord,

With reference to your telegram No. 144¹ of the 3rd April, I transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch² from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin on the question of reducing the number of troops occupying the Rhineland.

2. The present situation is certainly indefensible, seeing that the number of troops occupying the second and third zones to-day is greater by nearly 10,000 men than that of the forces occupying those zones before the Locarno Conference. A short statement of the facts as known here is enclosed herewith. This not only runs counter to the assurances given verbally by M. Briand to the German delegation both at Locarno and in London on the 1st December, but is incompatible with the terms of the note addressed by the Ambassadors' Conference to the German Government on the 14th November last, and it seems inevitable that this subject will not be allowed to drop by the German Government. At the same time, in view of the present state of French public opinion, it seems of doubtful utility or wisdom to take the matter up again with the French Government at the present moment. I should, however, be glad of your views on that point.³

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

¹ No. 395.

² Berlin despatch No. 216 (not printed) of April 14 had transmitted a copy of a confidential memorandum prepared by the German High Commissioner for the Rhineland which had recently been handed to Lord D'Abernon by Herr von Schubert. The memorandum argued in favour of a further reduction in the number of the troops occupying the Rhineland.

³ Lord Crewe replied in Paris despatch No. 804 of April 30 that in view of the reactions in France to the Soviet-German treaty, 'I feel strongly that it would be most unwise to raise this question with Monsieur Briand at the present time'.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 468

Statement as regards Numbers of Troops in the Rhineland

The approximate figures for second and third zones before Locarno and after Locarno, as given by the War Office last January, were:

September 1, 1925	64,200
January 1926	75,800

In reply to a question in the House of Commons on the 10th February, the Secretary of State gave the actual figures as '74,500 or very close to that figure.'⁴ Before replying to that question we had consulted the French, which accounts for the difference with the War Office figures.

Since then the situation has been modified to the following extent:

1. M. Briand told Lord Crewe on the 2nd April that a reduction of 4,000 had taken place in the last two months (in other words, since the Secretary of State gave the figure of 74,500 in the House of Commons).
2. The March figures for the Belgian army, as given to us by Lord Kil-marnock, showed an increase of over 400 and brought the total up to 8,000 (as against 7,500, approximately, before).

⁴ See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 191, cols. 1019-20.

No. 469

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 561 [C 4886/481/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 27, 1926*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 554¹ of April 23rd, I transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Coblenz relative to conditions in the Rhineland. This despatch further confirms my view as to the obstructive and unconciliatory attitude of the German authorities in the Rhineland in regard to which I instructed you to make earnest representations to Dr. Stresemann in my despatch under reference.

I am, &c.,
(For the Secretary of State)
ORME SARGENT

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 469

Lord Kil-marnock (Coblenz) to Sir A. Chamberlain

No. 80

COBLENZ, *April 20, 1926*

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 78² of April 15th, I have the honour

¹ No. 455. ² No. 432.

to transmit herewith for your information copy of a secret report on a meeting held at Wiesbaden on April 13th, at which Herr Severing, the Prussian Minister of the Interior, was present. The British Military Authorities in forwarding this report to me state that they have reason to believe that it is accurate. Owing to its source, it is of course impossible to make use of it with the German Authorities.

2. The contents of this report go to confirm the views put forward in my despatch under reference, that the officials in the Occupied Territories are largely responsible for the resistance to the Occupation, and that the press is being made use of to circulate propaganda [*sic*] against the Occupation.

I have, &c.,

KILMARNOCK

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 469

Report on Meeting held at Wiesbaden under the auspices of the Regierungspräsident,³ at which Herr Severing, Prussian Minister of the Interior, was present

(Secret and Confidential)

The following report has been received from informants who have previously given reliable information:

1. At 5.30 P.M. Severing met representatives of the local authorities, press, trade unions and political parties at the Regierungsgebäude, 22, Luisenstrasse. For some reason which is not known, the leader of the local Zentrum party was not invited. Apart from that which is reported in the press this morning (14th April, 1926), the following took place:

The Regierungspräsident opened the meeting by saying that this was the first opportunity Severing had had of introducing himself to the local authorities in occupied territory. His tour was one of study, as he wanted to become acquainted at first hand with the conditions prevailing. He would not, therefore, make many speeches; he would be pleased to hear any complaints and suggestions put forward. He, the Regierungspräsident, had already had occasion to point out to the Minister on the way several examples of the pressure and strain under which Wiesbaden was suffering, and that [*sic*] they would find in the Minister a prepared and sympathetic mind anxious to do its best for them.

2. Severing then spoke, and said, after the usual polite formalities, that during the moments he had been in Wiesbaden he had already noticed that it looked like an armed camp. The Regierungspräsident had told him that, in spite of Locarno and the professions made, conditions here had become worse instead of better. He could make no promises except one, and that was to see Stresemann and inform him of his personal observations, in the hope that the Foreign Minister would accelerate the process leading to a reduction of the garrison or to its complete removal.

³ President of the local administrative district.

3. A number of speeches were then made by Government officials, and most of them set out grievances arising from the occupation.

The requisitions at Rambach were a very sore point; something must be done to repeal them. Two city councillors—Finke and Haese—inspected the requisitioned grounds the day before yesterday, and described them as 'a typical picture of war time conditions in France.' The speeches emphasised over and over again the terrible hardships of the German officials of Wiesbaden, the 'seelischer Druck'⁴ under which they lived. It was quite evident that an effort was being made to produce a picture of a gallant band of officials working under tremendous difficulties, and their claim to increased emoluments and promotions.

4. Severing replied that he would see Stresemann. In the meantime nothing could be done, but the press must continue to emphasise the uselessness of the occupation and demand its reduction and withdrawal.

5. The Regierungspräsident then spoke again. He said that it was most undesirable that the press should refer to the abuses of the British at present, as if their behaviour became known generally there was no doubt that the Wiesbaden season would be ruined, and many prospective visitors would stay away. It would probably become necessary for him soon to make a public official protest against the behaviour of the British, and that would be given the widest possible publicity.

6. Interrupting several speeches, Severing remarked that the local authorities might have to suffer a good deal, but they must remember that they had 'a gentleman's life' in occupied territory, where order was maintained for them, as compared with their colleagues in unoccupied territory. There were no complaints from delegates of the trade unions or political parties, with one exception; a trade union delegate complained that the British had prohibited demonstrations of the Reichsbanner,⁵ and said that a procession had been broken up a few days ago by the German police on the Luisenplatz 'by the orders of the British.'

7. The meeting closed at 8 P.M.

⁴ Psychological pressure.

⁵ The *Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold* was an association of ex-servicemen loyal to the Weimar Republic, symbolized by the black, red, gold flag of the Republic.

No. 470

Sir G. Clerk (Prague) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 28, 2.45 p.m.)
No. 28 Telegraphic [N 1959/718/38]

PRAGUE, April 28, 1926, 12.10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 17.¹

Minister for Foreign Affairs is not happy about Russo-German treaty and accompanying notes but is awaiting views of London and Paris before

¹ No. 453.

deciding on definite attitude. At present his view seems to be that treaty is there and we cannot get away from it but that it *has* brought fresh considerations into the question of German entrance into the League of Nations.

No. 471

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 93 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 5073/24/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 28, 1926, 12.55 p.m.

Your telegram No. 158¹ (of the 26th April. Aeronautical negotiations).

As regards the draft letter respecting aerodromes in the demilitarised zone we remain of opinion, for the reasons given in Foreign Office despatch No. 1220,² that the paragraphs about investigations under article 213³ would be better omitted. As indicated in that despatch however we do not wish to press this suggestion if it means causing further delay in completing the negotiations. At the same time it should be made clear to the German delegation that we do not accept their contention that an investigation more particularly as regards aerodromes in the demilitarised zone can only be undertaken under article 213 of the Treaty. To our minds article 4 (2) of the Treaty of Locarno impliedly conferred upon the Council of the League all necessary powers to satisfy itself by investigation as to the accuracy of an allegation that a violation of article 42 or 43 has been or is being committed. (In this connection please see paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Foreign Office memorandum of February 18th,⁴ Germany print February 18 § 2).

¹ No. 466.

² No. 444.

³ Of the Treaty of Versailles.

⁴ Not printed. Paragraphs 32 and 33 of this memorandum corresponded closely with section II of No. 205, after incorporation of the revisions in notes 8 and 9 thereto.

No. 472

Sir A. Chamberlain to H.M. Representatives at Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Montevideo, Caracas, Lima, Guatemala, Havana, and Panama

No. 25¹ Telegraphic [W 3438/223/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 28, 1926, 8 p.m.

It may be useful for you to know the broad outline of the direction in which the thoughts of His Majesty's Government are moving in preparation for the meeting of the committee appointed to examine the question of the future constitution of the Council of the League of Nations.

In the first place His Majesty's Government feel, and they have publicly

¹ No. 25 to Buenos Aires; No. 19 to Rio de Janeiro; No. 26 to Santiago; No. 7 to Montevideo; No. 8 to Caracas; No. 4 to Lima; No. 11 to Guatemala; No. 9 to Havana; No. 8 to Panama. This telegram was also sent to Bogota as No. 18 on April 29, with the addition of a final paragraph explaining that these instructions should be carried out as an informal and friendly enquiry.

announced,² that the events of last month have created an entirely new situation, and that they will enter the discussions free from any engagement or obligation whatsoever. Secondly, they regard the admission of Germany in the League without further delay as essential both in the interests of world peace no less than in those of the League itself. They must therefore make this the first object of their policy and they can consequently approve no course which does not lead directly to Germany's entry. Thirdly, His Majesty's Government do not find it possible to support any addition to the existing permanent seats in present circumstances except for the one which it has always been assumed that Germany would eventually fill. The distinction created at the peace conference between the Great Powers, i.e. those with interests in every part of the world, and those whose interests are restricted, is the only practicable dividing line; no one has been able to think of any alternative, and the March meeting showed that if once the line ceased to be clearly marked there would be no end to the claims to which the door would have been opened. Lastly, His Majesty's Government are disposed to favour a reasonable increase in the number of non-permanent seats, accompanied if possible by some arrangement which would provide for the case of those states whose special position or situation render it desirable that they should be represented on the Council for longer and more regular periods than is necessary in the majority of cases.³

At the March meeting Brazil founded her claim principally on the supposed wish of all American members of the League (including Canada whom she wrongly supposed to be in favour of her claim) that one South American should have a permanent seat on the Council and argued that this American demand could not be resisted and that if it were granted Brazil was the natural state to fill that place. She even persisted in this claim in spite of the courageous and statesmanlike appeal made to her representative by the representatives of other South American states and treated this appeal with scant consideration and even courtesy to the obvious though restrained indignation of the Assembly. I should be very glad to have any indication you can obtain for me of the views of the government to which you are accredited on this claim by Brazil. Is it supported by them?⁴ If in order to

² See Lord Cecil's statement on April 21 in the House of Lords, *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of L.*, vol. lxiii, cols. 868-79.

³ Lord Cecil's instructions, as British representative on the Committee on the Composition of the Council, were to the above effect; he was given full discretion as to the time to put forward the proposal in No. 399. His instructions further stated: 'That any enlargement of the Council beyond 16 as an outside limit would be prejudicial to the effectiveness of the Council, especially in view of the importance of retaining the principle of unanimity: That if the proposal is made for abolishing the permanent seats on the Council, the British delegate should not take the lead in opposing it. If the proposal is opposed by other nations, it would be sufficient for him to point out that the opposition of a single member of the Council or of the Assembly was sufficient to rule it out: That any alterations in the Council should, if possible, be carried out without requiring the amendment of the Covenant, which experience has shown to be almost impossible to secure in any point of consequence.'

⁴ The replies received from H.M. Representatives showed that there was no unanimity of opinion among the Governments in question.

draw information, you find it necessary to give some, you may say that as far as you can gather from such official papers as you have seen, the views of His Majesty's Government are pretty much as stated in the earlier paragraphs. You may state definitely that you know that His Majesty's Government would regard any action which delayed the entry of Germany beyond September as wantonly endangering the peace of the world and would view its consequences most seriously.⁵

⁵ Sir C. Hurst had previously been instructed 'to consider what steps could be taken, in the event of Brazil remaining obdurate, to secure her immediate removal from the Council in September, so that Germany's entry should not be further delayed'. In a memorandum of May 7 he concluded: 'I can see no means of ejecting Brazil from her present position on the Council at the beginning of the Assembly.'

No. 473

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard (Washington)

No. 88 Telegraphic [W 3497/78/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 28, 1926, 10 p.m.*

My despatch No. 446 [466]¹ (of April 13th, United States participation in the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament).

In his promised memorandum² Mr. Houghton stated that the United States Government though they had accepted invitation to sit on the Preparatory Committee, had not consented to be represented on any other organisation. They were now disturbed at learning that it was proposed that they should sit on Permanent Advisory Commission and Joint Commission. It seemed that these two League Commissions were intended to play a more active part than was originally contemplated by the United States Government.

The United States Government had not consented to this procedure and their participation in the work of the Preparatory Committee could not be effective unless the Committee itself conducted the discussion and appointed its own sub-committees.

At my suggestion the Ambassador had a talk with Lord Cecil, the British representative on the Preparatory Committee, who explained the position both orally and in a written memorandum, of which the following is a summary:—

The Preparatory Committee is to draw up the principles of a scheme which should form the basis of discussion in a Disarmament Conference. To assist

¹ Not printed. This despatch recorded an interview between Sir A. Chamberlain and the American Ambassador on April 13, when Mr. Houghton read to Sir A. Chamberlain the telegram of April 8 from Washington printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1926*, vol. i, pp. 72-74. Mr. Houghton's report on this interview is printed *ibid.*, p. 76.

² Not printed. This memorandum of April 14 was based on the telegram of April 8 referred to in note 1 above.

the Committee in this technical and complex work it was given power to consult experts and appoint sub-committees. The Council of the League further placed at the Committee's disposal the technical organisations of the League, and with that object constituted two sub-committees drawn from those organisations, one military and the other economic, which the Preparatory Committee would have the right to consult direct without the special authorisation of the Council. It was clearly understood that the Preparatory Committee was to retain full control of the enquiry. It is not bound to consult the economic or military sub-committees at all and may constitute other sub-committees in their place.

Since the Preparatory Committee includes representatives of countries outside the League, it was considered desirable that its sub-committees should also include representatives of nationals of those countries. It was therefore proposed to add to the two sub-committees created by the Council additional members from the outside countries.³ If this suggestion creates difficulties for the United States Government there should be no difficulty in substituting for the proposed sub-committees new sub-committees appointed by the Preparatory Committee itself, which would probably consist of the same individuals as those who would sit on the sub-committees as at present proposed. The question is chiefly a matter of form.

Please take an early opportunity of communicating the substance of Lord Cecil's memorandum to the State Department either verbally or in writing as you think best.⁴

³ See *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1926, pp. 534-5, for the decision of the Council of the League of Nations on March 18 in connexion with a British proposal of March 8 (*ibid.*, p. 633).

⁴ No record of such a communication has been traced.

No. 474

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 29, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 160 Telegraphic: by bag [C 5133/24/18]

PARIS, April 28, 1926

Your telegram No. 93.¹

Question of omission of paragraph in question in draft letter respecting aerodromes in the demilitarised zone was again discussed with Germans yesterday. German delegates are entirely opposed to omission. They explain that covering letter from Ambassadors' Conference (Pièce A.,² paragraph 5) provides for entry into force of Article 213³ in regard to aviation matters, and that in consequence they insist on retaining reservation in their draft reply⁴ to allied letter about aerodromes. French delegates, who have been informed of your telegram, agree that at this late hour it will scarcely be possible to overcome German objections. It will, however, be made clear

¹ No. 471.

² Cf. No. 466, note 1.

³ Of the Treaty of Versailles.

⁴ See enclosure 2 in No. 436.

that their reservation is only a statement of German point of view which Allies do not admit. Monsieur Massigli will consult Monsieur Fromageot as to how Allied reservation on this point can best be accentuated.⁵

Text of draft protocol covering all documents under negotiation goes to you tonight in my despatch No. 788.⁶ This protocol is still subject to amendments as regards certain details. When final agreement has been reached with German delegates on all outstanding points it is intended that this protocol shall be *initialled* by the various delegates. It is hoped to do this this week. The protocol and all documents will then be placed in the hands of the Ambassadors' Conference. Before final *signature* of letters, it is considered by the Allied delegates advisable that the Ambassadors' Conference should be in possession of army orders to be issued by Reichswehr Ministry in regard to flying by personnel of Reichswehr and Navy, as well as documents ensuring putting into force throughout Germany of provisions regarding police and 'subventions'. German delegates have already put forward on their own initiative proposals to cover these points which, on general lines, would appear to be satisfactory. Germans have stated, however, that they are unable at present to give the exact text of these documents owing to the fact that the various ministries concerned in Berlin must first be consulted.

Your telegram No. 91.⁷

As regards 'ordonnances' amendments desired by Air Ministry have been accepted by Germans with the exception of that concerning penalties (point 2 of your telegram). The Allied delegates considered it advisable not to insist on this on account of strong German opposition. The Germans have agreed to insert paragraph laying down that all machines, etc., constructed contrary to the provisions of the 'ordonnances' shall be seized and rendered useless (*unbrauchbar gemacht*).

The Germans have also agreed to insert a paragraph⁸ bringing in necessary amendments to an existing law in Germany which would have enabled a certain category of pilot to have flown without being registered. German delegates are awaiting approval from Berlin before accepting further proposal from the Allies that glider pilots should be registered.

As regards paragraphs 5 and 6 of the 'ordonnance sur le tenu des contrôles dans l'aviation'⁸ the French are nervous that, as drafted at present, these clauses admit of a possibility of too great delay in the furnishing of lists by

⁵ Lord Crewe's immediately following telegram of April 29 reported that as the German delegates insisted on maintaining their reservations regarding article 213, the allied reservation (cf. No. 466, note 1, Pièce F) should read: 'Rien dans ce qui précède d'ailleurs ne pourrait faire obstacle à l'exercice [*sic*] éventuel du droit d'investigation prévu à l'article 213 dudit traité, et que les Gouvernements représentés à la Conférence persistent à considérer comme s'appliquant aux dispositions des articles 42 et 43 du traité.'

⁶ Not printed. This despatch transmitted a draft French text of the protocol relating to German aviation which corresponded generally with the text printed in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. lviii, pp. 346-8, except that this draft included neither the last sentence of the first sub-paragraph and the last two sub-paragraphs of paragraph 2 nor paragraph 7 of the final text.

⁷ No. 451.

⁸ Cf. No. 451, note 1 (d).

the German government, if called upon. They are trying to arrange for avoidance of this difficulty by some provision whereby German government should be in possession of up to date lists at stated intervals. The British delegates have taken the line that they have no objection to this proposal if acceptable to the Germans but that they cannot consent to final agreement being delayed by this point.

Please inform Air Ministry.

No. 475

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 1288 [C 5158/5139/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 28, 1926

My Lord,

The French Ambassador asked me to-day if I could give him my first impressions of the Russo-German Treaty and notes.

I replied that, if I said anything, it must be under the greatest reserve, for I had not yet had time to study the texts, and they certainly required very careful examination. This fact, however, was itself a little disturbing, and whilst postponing any definite expression of opinion, I had told Lord D'Abernon that they were not as clear as I had hoped from the assurances given to us, and that I was a little disappointed on a first perusal of them. I felt they were not calculated to help me allay the suspicions which the negotiations had aroused in some quarters.¹

M. de Fleuriau said that his personal impression was that Dr. Stresemann's note was more objectionable than the treaty itself. It seemed to him that Dr. Stresemann had been thinking much more of Locarno than of the Covenant and attached more importance to the treaty than to the League. As he seemed to imply some doubt of Germany's real desire to enter the League, I told him that, before the publication of the text, Lord D'Abernon had had a long and on the whole a satisfactory conversation with Dr. Stresemann,² and that it was curious, in view of what he had just said, that in this conversation Dr. Stresemann had observed that it was no part of Germany's original plan that Germany's entrance into the League should be coincident with the conclusion of the pact of guarantee. This had been in the first instance a condition imposed by the Allies, but it now seemed that the position had changed, and that France and some other Powers were unwilling that Germany should enter the League unless her position in the Council found a counter-weight by the admission of another Power and a safe majority was secured to France and her allies in that body. I added that I was myself convinced that it was now an object of German policy to secure Germany's admission to the League, and that either Lord D'Abernon or Dr. Stresemann himself had remarked that people in Germany who had hitherto been hostile

¹ See No. 477.

² The reference is presumably to the conversation reported in Nos. 460 and 462.

to the policy were now beginning to argue that, if France or other Powers showed this reluctance to admit Germany, it must be to Germany's interest to enter!³ It was curious to find a suspicion in the mind of a Frenchman that Germany was not anxious to be a member of the League almost at the same moment that a German was expressing his suspicion that France was unwilling to see her there. Summarising generally my impression of the German texts, I said that I did not think they contained any great mischief, but they had been drawn up with more consideration for the susceptibilities of the Soviet Government than for those of Germany's partners at Locarno, and I hoped that, on further examination, I should not find in them any matter of serious trouble.

M. de Fleuriau said that they would certainly increase the difficulties of M. Briand's position, since the conclusion of the treaty had produced a very considerable anxiety in France, and M. Briand was sure to be questioned closely upon the subject. He thought that M. Briand's attitude would be very much the same as mine, but his difficulties with his public opinion would be greater. He added that he personally was rather disturbed at the moment chosen by Germany for the negotiations. I replied that I believed that it had always been the intention of the Germans to take up the negotiations again, that they were not in any sense the result of the check at Geneva, but that, as originally planned, Germany would have first become a member of the League, and then, having already accepted the obligations of the Covenant, would have made her treaty with Russia. I added that Dr. Stresemann had not sought to conceal the fact that one reason for hastening their conclusion was fear lest Germany should be forestalled by France or Poland. In short, everyone was inclined to do something foolish lest someone else should steal a march on him.

M. de Fleuriau said the Franco-Soviet negotiations were making little or no progress.

I am, &c.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

³ See No. 454.

No. 476

Memorandum by Mr. Orde

[N 1928/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 28, 1926

The Russo-German treaty and the letters attached to it are full of obscurities. There are a number of passages which can be interpreted in a satisfactory or an unsatisfactory manner from our point of view. The most charitable view is that the text 'represents the common frontier between the respective meanings of the two parties, which lie on opposite sides of the said frontier', and that the German Government mean to interpret it with loyalty to the

Covenant and Locarno, while the Soviet Government desire to have it interpreted in a hostile sense. Granted this assumption there still remains the objection that Germany may not always find it easy or convenient to maintain her own interpretation.

Article 1. The Treaty of Rapallo is maintained as a basis of relations. Besides the mutual renunciation of claims and the renewal of diplomatic and consular relations, that treaty provided for reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment and for mutual assistance in supplying each other's economic requirements.

'Questions . . .¹ jointly affecting their two countries'. Does this go beyond questions affecting Germany and Russia only?

Article 2. 'In despite of its peaceful attitude (*friedlichen Verhaltens*)'. Does a bare abstention from hostilities constitute a 'peaceful attitude'? If so, the consequences require careful consideration.

Article 3. 'involved in warlike complications (*Kriegerischen Verwicklungen*)' is similarly ambiguous. If it means actual hostilities the consequences again require careful consideration, and at first sight the article would seem to debar Germany from taking part in or giving consent to economic and financial pressure which might be justified (I am not certain whether it can be) and desired under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant. If I am not mistaken, the German word '*kriegerisch*' connotes actual hostilities rather more definitely than the English word 'warlike', and the inference is strengthened by the use of the expression '*armed conflict*' in paragraph 3, sentence 3 of Herr Stresemann's note.

Herr Stresemann's note

(2) The words 'contrary to that fundamental idea of peace' seem possibly to be a very important saving clause which would enable Germany to take part in any measures against Russia designed to carry out the purposes of the Covenant.

(3) First sentence. On the whole in view of the grammatical construction of paragraph (2) this seems unobjectionable. But from the League point of view the proposition is put the wrong way round; the satisfactory thing would have been to have it laid down that loyal observance of the Covenant was not to be affected by the prescribed attitude towards Russia.

(3) Second sentence. This, I think, is true in the event of a dispute between Russia and a member of the League, but is it certainly true of a dispute between Russia and another non-member, e.g. Turkey? The last paragraph of article 17 of the Covenant does not make League measures in such a case depend on the existence of hostilities. And what does 'apart from other considerations' mean? If it means anything it seems to negative the sentence. I am not at all sure of the meaning of the German. '*Voraussetzung*' means 'supposition', 'hypothesis', 'assumption'. I have used the ambiguous word 'considerations', but a better one may be found.

¹ Punctuation as in original quotation.

(3) Paragraph 2, first sentence.² Apparently unobjectionable as a statement: if and so far as it holds out hopes of a pro-Soviet use of Germany's veto on the Council it is objectionable.

I think on the whole it can be said that the treaty *can* be interpreted as fully consonant with the Covenant; the most dangerous spot seems to me to be article 3.

C. W. ORDE

² The reference was evidently to the third sentence of paragraph 3 of Dr. Stresemann's note. Cf. the text printed in *The Times* of April 27, 1926, p. 16.

No. 477

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 570 [N 1954/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 28, 1926*

My Lord,

I enclose for your information Mr. Lampson's record of his conversation with the German Ambassador yesterday.

2. Like Mr. Lampson at the moment of his conversation, I have not yet been able to study as they deserve the texts of the treaty and of the letters exchanged at the same time, nor had I had any opportunity of discussing with Mr. Lampson such information as was available to us before his interview with Dr. Sthamer. But as I have constantly found to be the case, Mr. Lampson has on his own motion seized and expressed with great accuracy the first impressions produced on His Majesty's Government by the published information.

3. Now that the texts are available to me, I perhaps attach less importance to the question of time and opportunity, though I share, as your Lordship knows, the regret expressed by Mr. Lampson that this disturbing factor should have been introduced into international relations at this moment. I am much more concerned by the texts themselves. Accepting as I have done your Lordship's belief that the German Government were acting in good faith, and their own reiterated assurances that they remain loyal to the aggregate of the Locarno treaties and to the Covenant of the League, I yet feel that the language of these texts is, to say the least, singularly ill-chosen to inspire confidence in the minds of the British and other Governments with whom they had previously contracted, and that it must inevitably produce upon other minds the impression which it made on Mr. Lampson's, that Germany's chief preoccupation is 'to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.'

4. His Majesty's Government have, from the first notification to them of these negotiations, accepted the assurances of the German Government, given the most favourable interpretation to their intentions and used every effort to allay suspicion in other quarters and to secure an unbiassed and even consideration for this new development of German policy.

5. I reserve for further consideration any detailed observations on the documents now made public, but your Lordship should tell Dr. Stresemann that His Majesty's Government are rendered very uneasy by their first perusal of the texts which seem to them not merely likely to increase the fears and suspicions of German intentions in other quarters which His Majesty's Government have been at pains to allay, but in themselves a very inadequate fulfilment of the assurances given to His Majesty's Government by the German Government.

I am, &c.,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

ENCLOSURE IN No. 477

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with Dr. Sthamer

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 27, 1926

The German Ambassador called to-day upon what was evidently a palpable excuse and introduced the question of the Russo-German agreement. Now that I had seen the text of the document, he asked what my impressions were.

I said that I had only seen the version in the 'Times' and I did not even know if that was an accurate translation. It was difficult, therefore, to express any particular opinion. He said that if I cared to have the German translation both of the agreement and of the attached notes, he was delighted to give it to me, and at once produced a typewritten copy out of his pocket (herewith),¹ thereby proving, incidentally, that he had expressly come down in order to talk on this subject.

I said that I had no authority to express a view on these documents. Moreover, I had only read the 'Times' version very hurriedly and had neither had time to clear my own ideas or to ascertain the views of the authorities here on the text. But if he would allow me to sum up my impressions very frankly I would do so by saying that on reading the 'Times' article my feeling had been: 'Well, Germany evidently intends to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds'. As one of the reasons for this somewhat blunt view, I would call his attention to the second paragraph of the paragraph numbered 3 in the German explanatory letter², which, it seemed to me, might be read as an implicit undertaking by Germany that in regard to the application of article 16 of the Covenant, Germany would always be in a position to block the application of that article insofar as Russia was concerned. I admitted readily enough that in the hands of a juridical expert it might or might not be possible to argue that there was nothing in the German note or treaty which in any way ran counter to the obligations imposed by the Covenant, but I hazarded a guess that a Russian, reading the passage I had mentioned in the particular context in which it stood,

¹ Not attached to filed copy.

² The reference was evidently to the third and fourth sentences of paragraph 3.

would see in it a veiled pledge that the pains and penalties prescribed under articles 16 and 17 would not be allowed to apply as against Russia.

The Ambassador would not admit this.

I again made our old point as to the unfortunate moment which had been chosen to conclude the agreement, but he would not admit that either. He said that it had all along been intended to sign some agreement with Russia at this time, though of course the German government had believed that they would have been in the League before the time came to sign the agreement. I said that might be so, but circumstances obviously altered cases, and it had always struck me since we first heard of these negotiations that it was unfortunate, to put it mildly, that Germany should have added yet one further complication to an already sufficiently involved situation. Nothing that he could say would shake my conviction to that effect. However, the treaty was now signed and we were faced with the accomplished fact. Germany certainly could not accuse us of unfriendliness or bias in the way in which we had dealt with the whole matter. We had accepted the German assurances at their face value. It was my personal opinion that it would have been far better if the text of the agreement had contained some simple and straightforward passage—such as was, for example, contained in the Treaty of Locarno—to the effect that nothing in the agreement could be held to run counter to the obligations imposed by the Covenant of the League of Nations. Herr Gaus had had a hand in the drafting of the Locarno Treaty and I should have thought that it would have been wiser in the circumstances that he should have been asked to draft some similar phrase for insertion in the text of the treaty with Russia.

The Ambassador took the line that it was quite unnecessary, for the wording of the treaty and of the note annexed to it fully covered the point. Shifting his ground he said that he presumed everybody would at least agree that it was a good thing that there was now some prospect of a regular treaty of arbitration between Russia and Germany. I said I could agree to that without any reservation: in fact I could even see that if the present treaty were loyally interpreted so as not to run counter either in letter or in spirit to the Covenant, it might conceivably work out in the long run to the general good, but that must depend wholly upon how it was in fact interpreted when a case arose. I ended by saying that I wished again to emphasise that what I had said was the expression of my own purely personal view; I had no authority whatever to discuss the treaty; I had had no opportunity to talk it over with anyone in authority here, and finally I might even modify that view when I had had time to look at the text more closely. At the moment I had only read it in the columns of the newspaper and was talking of the matter much as the ordinary man in the street.

The Ambassador said he fully understood and would not take anything I said as being more than my private opinion. He added that if at any time additional information or explanations of any given point were required, he was at the disposal of the Secretary of State.

MILES W. LAMPSON

Record by Mr. Lampson of a conversation with the German Ambassador
[C 5150/5139/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 28, 1926

As directed, I this afternoon read to the German Ambassador the Secretary of State's despatch to Berlin No. 570¹ of to-day, omitting the personal passages.

His Excellency listened with attention and was evidently particularly struck by the last paragraph—more especially by the words of the concluding sentence, 'the texts which seem to them' (His Majesty's Government) 'not merely, &c., &c., . . .² but in themselves a very inadequate fulfilment of the assurances given to His Majesty's Government by the German Government.' At his request I read him the last paragraph a second and yet a third time. He appeared perturbed at it.

We had some general conversation, in which he expressed the apprehension that our critical attitude might be imparted to other Powers. I said that if we were asked we should doubtless say what we thought, but that so far as I knew no foreign Government had asked our views since publication. In any case his Government had every reason to be grateful for our attitude up to date.

I told him that the German text which he had been good enough to give us yesterday was being studied, and that what I had said before or was saying now was without prejudice to what might result from a scrutiny of that text by the legal and other experts. The despatch to Berlin which, by the direction of the Secretary of State, I had just read him dealt with first impressions, but it was first impressions which, generally speaking, influenced public opinion.

We then recurred to the second paragraph of paragraph 3 of the explanatory German note, but there was nothing new on either side. I maintained there was a, perhaps tacit, implication therein in favour of Russia; he said that there was nothing of the kind.

I ended this part of the conversation by putting it to him that if the German Government were really sincere they ought to make an announcement *coram publico* that there was nothing in the agreement which they would allow to run counter either to the Covenant or to Locarno. He said that it might be difficult to do this, but he seemed to make a mental note of it.

Before leaving, I asked him if he had read to-day's leader in the 'Times,' and if so, if he had observed the comment on the reference to Rapallo in the first paragraph of the treaty. The same thing had struck me yesterday when I saw this version published in the press. Was it not a little curious that the present treaty, which was of high political importance, should be hung on to that particular peg? For Rapallo, as published, dealt with what one might almost regard as purely departmental matters, such as war damages,

¹ No. 477.

² Punctuation as in original quotation.

war prisoners, debts and the like. Perhaps it was an improper question to ask, but was there anything behind Rapallo which had not been published?

The Ambassador denied this categorically.³

M. W. LAMPSON

³ A copy of this record was sent to Lord D'Abernon on April 30.

No. 479

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir G. Clerk (Prague)

No. 18 Telegraphic [N 1959/718/38]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 29, 1926, 1.55 p.m.

Your telegram No. 28¹ (of the 28th April. Russo-German treaty).

I am carefully considering text of Russo-German treaty and notes accompanying it. At present I can speak only with greatest reserve but my first impression is that whilst awkwardly worded and in some parts ambiguous they do not in fact contain and certainly were not intended to contain anything inconsistent with the policy adopted at Locarno or with the covenant. My information leads me to believe that Germany has now become keen to enter the League and suspects some of us of a desire to keep her out. I shall address you again when my examination of the texts is completed. In the meantime I hope that government to which you are accredited will preserve a like reserve and will do its best to prevent premature or exaggerated expression of any doubts which texts may have raised in the public mind or even in their own.

Repeated to Paris No. 95, Brussels No. 38, Rome [No.] 120, Warsaw No. 27 for information and guidance. Repeated to Berlin No. 62.

¹ No. 470.

No. 480

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 63 Telegraphic [N 1959/718/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 29, 1926, 3 p.m.

My telegram to Prague No. 18¹ repeated to you is for your own information. It in no way qualifies opinion expressed in my despatch No. 570 to you² (sent by bag yesterday) which was yesterday read to German Ambassador by Mr. Lampson; but faithful to the policy of reconciliation so earnestly pursued by His Majesty's Government I am unwilling at this stage to admit to other Locarno Powers full extent of my own misgivings.

Repeated to Paris only No. 96 'for your own information'.

¹ No. 479.

² No. 477.

No. 481

Letter from Mr. Orde to Sir R. Hodgson (Moscow)

[N 1834/245/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 29, 1926*

Dear Hodgson,

I enclose a copy of an account by Gregory of an interview with a Colonel Mackie, whom you may perhaps know.

The Secretary of State directed Gregory to inform Colonel Mackie that he had reported to him and that he (Sir Austen) was much obliged for his interesting account of the situation. He did not for one moment accept M. Chicherin's account of what the latter was told in Paris, for he had information concerning what passed there direct from M. Briand himself. The Secretary of State added that at any rate M. Chicherin now knew that he was ready to consider any serious proposals made in good faith through official channels, but he regarded any attempt to proceed by unofficial conversations of whatever kind, including Members of the House of Commons, as certain to lead to misunderstanding and therefore to be avoided.

Yours sincerely,
C. W. ORDE

ENCLOSURE IN No. 481

Memorandum by Mr. Gregory

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 17, 1926*

If you¹ remember, you directed me to see—in connection with Russia—a certain Canadian, named Col. Mackie, who had asked for a personal interview with you. Col. Mackie is an old friend of mine and we have discussed Russia on many occasions during the last few years. He is just back again from Moscow where he long ago—in the matter of relief work—established cordial relations with Chicherin. Although a Conservative himself, he has always been perfectly consistent (and perfectly honest) in endeavouring to bring about normal relations between Russia and this country in the interests of trade and decrease in unemployment.

His latest impressions of Russia are more or less as follows. Russia is quite plainly in a very bad condition financially and economically and in such need of manufactured articles, that it is apparently quite a common sight in Moscow to see queues of men and women lined up in the streets waiting their turn to buy what little there is. Consequently the Soviet Government under this pressure is in a very different mood to two years ago and is, so he says, ready to make even the concession of recognising its debt obligations, if only that will facilitate the re-opening of negotiations with us. The so-called 'extremists' are to a large extent outed, to wit Zinovieff, and even such a man as Kameneff has abandoned his inflexible attitude in regard to debts and so

¹ The Secretary of State, for whom this record was made.

on. It is actually possible that the Foreign Trade Monopoly may have to go and private trading be allowed once more. Stalin remains the real ruler of Russia, but is by no means so uncompromising as he was, and the concessions committee is in the hands of Djerdjinsky and Trotsky. Chicherin's influence is practically paramount in dealing with foreign affairs.

As regards propaganda, the Third International is, according to Col. Mackie, a waning force, and the disestablishment of Zinovieff has been a big blow to it. The Cheka however still functions actively and is having a bad effect on the internal situation. But the peasants are becoming every day a more potent factor in the situation.

Chicherin appears to have spoken pretty freely to Col. Mackie and in particular on the subject of his failure to meet you after his visit to Warsaw, Berlin and Paris last October. You will no doubt remember that you let it be known to Monsieur Briand that, if Chicherin showed any disposition to come on here from Paris, you would be willing to see him. The message however as delivered to Chicherin was that, if he chose to come on here, 'Sir William Tyrrell would be ready to converse with him'. This Chicherin took—perhaps not unnaturally—somewhat amiss, and went back to Moscow and sulked. Nevertheless he has now recovered and is once more anxious to have a conversation with you. Col. Mackie was evidently given a hint to convey this message and tried very hard to make me say I would pass it on. But I was of course quite non-committal and made it clear, firstly, that the proper person through whom messages should be sent was Sir R. Hodgson, and secondly—on the merits—that it was one thing for Chicherin to endeavour to see you, while on a general tour round Europe, but quite another out of the blue like this. Col. Mackie insisted that it was quite a misapprehension that Chicherin was Anti-British as such, and that the real Anglophobe of the party was Litvinoff. He said that we were well rid of Rakovsky, who was a dangerous type of extreme Communist, as also was Madame Rakovsky.

The only other point of some interest that Col. Mackie mentioned to me was a private and somewhat unholy negotiation—in which he was concerned—on the part of American Catholic interests (though he himself is a Canadian Presbyterian) to obtain some satisfaction from the Soviet Government in the matter of ecclesiastical persecution. The suggestion is that, if the Soviet Government will release the Catholic clergy which it keeps in Siberia and permit the entry for ecclesiastical purposes of a few American priests, then American finance will appear on the scene and provide credits for Russia! This kind of strange transaction on the other side of the Atlantic seems to be perfectly in order, and, given the growing importance of the Catholic vote in the United States might conceivably become embarrassing for us.

J. D. G.

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 1, 9 a.m.)

No. 137 Telegraphic [C 5237/5139/18]

BERLIN, April 30, 1926, 8.32 p.m.

In my conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning I read him your despatch No. 570.¹

He did not at first understand the meaning of 'running with the hare and hunting with the hounds' but I explained it to him. I also expatiated upon confidence which you had shown in assurances of German government and the powerful influence which your attitude on the subject of the Russian treaty had exercised on other nations.

After considering your despatch for some time the Minister for Foreign Affairs said 'Pray tell Sir Austen Chamberlain that I am not less concerned with Locarno or less responsible for Locarno than he is himself. It has been the main basis of my policy for last year and more. The same can be said of Luther. I should as soon entertain . . .² of committing suicide as of abandoning that basis. Indeed to abandon it would practically be equivalent to suicide. I propose in the course of next few days to make two speeches which will make my position clear.

'The first will be given to radio tomorrow at 7.50 p.m. That will define broad aspect but my most important speech I shall reserve for the Reichstag. Although we are not constitutionally bound to do so, I am anxious to have a debate on the subject in the Reichstag, when I can make absolutely clear my position as regards Locarno and as regards League of Nations.

'I notice that criticisms of Russian treaty centre upon paragraph 3 of the letter to Krestinsky, namely that regarding article 16. I am not disposed to deny that this paragraph might have been worded in such a way as to open the door less for discussion. Speaking privately, I may tell you I said as much to Dr. Gaus. But the original of this clause is quite clear. The Russians are persuaded that France and England planned a crusade against Russia on account of her political constitution; they believe that we shall be persuaded to take part in this crusade and to furnish troops for it. I have told them again and again that any such conception is inane and insane—that neither France nor England have the least idea of any crusade and that we certainly should not participate in it. We are therefore ready to give Russia every conceivable declaration and guarantee that participation in such a campaign would never be accepted by us. To pretend, from this, that we have bound ourselves to represent Russia in the League of Nations is quite unjustified.

'The Paris press begins by misquoting and then proceeds to misinterpret. There is no limit to possibilities of misinterpretation if you only lay a sufficient

¹ No. 477.

² The text is here uncertain. On another text of the telegram it was suggested that 'the idea' should be included.

foundation of misquotation. Even the "Echo de Paris" has had to correct the "Temps".'

No. 483

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received April 30, 10.30 p.m.)
No. 139 Telegraphic [C 5225/481/18]

BERLIN, April 30, 1926, 8.32 p.m.

Press this evening gives prominence to statements by leading Palatinate newspapers recognising great advance made and alleviations effected in occupied Palatinate since Locarno and repudiating Bavarian Prime Minister's recent speech¹ to the contrary.

¹ For a report of Dr. Held's speech on April 26 at Regensburg, see *The Times*, April 27, 1926, p. 18.

No. 484

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 1, 9 a.m.)
No. 138 Telegraphic [C 5238/481/18]

BERLIN, April 30, 1926, 8.48 p.m.

In an interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, I communicated to him substance of your despatch No. 554¹ and went through memorandum furnished by Lord Kilmarnock² in full detail.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said 'the questions which are raised in memorandum seem rather small and should certainly be susceptible of rapid arrangement. I will telegraph at once to Reichskommissar and to railway authorities and I will telephone to Oberbürgermeister of Wiesbaden. I shall urge them to do what is possible to arrive at a friendly and rapid settlement. I hope corresponding instructions will be sent from London to the different English authorities.'

Doctor Stresemann added 'the simple truth and the real explanation of these difficulties is that failure to reduce number of troops in occupied territory has put everyone there in a bad temper and has created an atmosphere which is quite undesirable.³ Let the promised reduction of troops of occupa-

¹ No. 455.

² See No. 432.

³ In a letter of April 28 to Sir A. Chamberlain, Lord D'Abernon had briefly reported an interview that day with Herr von Schubert who had taken a similar line to Dr. Stresemann. Lord D'Abernon stated that in reply to a remark corresponding to the foregoing he 'at once pointed out that this question was in a different order of ideas and that it was impossible to press for a reduction of the French garrison at the moment when the new Russo-German agreement had been signed and had not yet been fully examined by the Allied authorities. The matters to which I had referred were much more easy of solution, granted

tion be carried out and the tone of the population will alter at once. You have no idea how considerable the disappointment on this subject is nor how much of the internal difficulty of the German government is due to this cause. I am pestered by deputies who tell me that I was deceived in London and fooled at Locarno.'

His Excellency is satisfied that number of French troops in second and third zones is today considerably larger than before evacuation of first zone. He attributes this not so much to the French government as to military subordinates who have been theoretically scrupulous about breaking up strategical units.

At conclusion of our interview he said 'pray do not forget to mention that as regards question of passports for English officers and men, cabinet yesterday decided to afford all possible facilities. We are told that there are 29 different kinds of passports which are furnished to different categories of military. We do not understand why the number is so great but at any rate we have told our authorities to grant all possible facilities.

'I hope something will be done to lessen the pressure of housing at Königstein. Press is full of complaints about that place.'

I understand houses there belong largely to Frankfurt Jews and there is no power in earth or heaven which will stop these gentlemen from making trouble when their interests are affected.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 138, repeated to Coblenz No. 2.

goodwill on the German side and a recognition of how much had been done to facilitate their position.' See Lord D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 251, for similar remarks made by Lord D'Abernon at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 26.

No. 485

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 1, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 162 Telegraphic: by bag [C 5207/24/18]

PARIS, April 30, 1926

German aviation.

A serious hitch has occurred at the last moment. The French delegates, during the final revision by the Allied delegates of all texts, raised three points which, when communicated to the German delegates, caused the latter to state that they did not think for a moment they could agree to any further modifications of texts and that they were of the opinion that the Allied delegates were deliberately trying to raise new points which would wreck the negotiations. Two of these points are of serious importance.

First point

In the ordonnance 'sur la tenue des contrôles dans l'aviation'¹ the French and Belgian delegates considered that there was some doubt as to whether

¹ See No. 451, note 1.

glider pilots were included. The British delegates at first did not attach much importance to this point of view, but stated that, provided the negotiations were not delayed, they had no objection to the French endeavouring to induce the Germans to include some phrase which would incorporate pilots of all categories, including glider pilots. The Germans then stated that glider piloting was not aviation and that the official description of aeronefs and avions, as laid down by the International Commission for Air Navigation, clearly proved that gliders did not come under either category. They further stated that they considered that Reichswehr personnel should be allowed in unlimited numbers, if they so desired, to learn how to fly gliders. This standpoint appears to be totally contradictory to the wording in paragraph V.c.1² 'pour interdire dans l'aviation quelle qu'en soit la catégorie, etc.' and the British delegates do not consider that they can do anything other than support the Allies in insisting that glider piloting obviously is included in the word 'aviation'.

Second point: Avions de chasse

In paragraph 3 A. of the Annex, the existing text is as follows:

'III (a) Le Gouvernement allemand subordonnera à une autorisation spéciale par lui délivrée la construction ou l'importation d'avions qui seraient sans objet pratique pour l'aviation civile et qui posséderaient les caractéristiques techniques d'avions de chasse modernes, en ce qui concerne le poids mort, etc., etc.'³

The French point out that in the phrase 'qui seraient sans objet pratique pour l'aviation civile et qui posséderaient les caractéristiques' etc., the word 'et' should be replaced by 'ou'; otherwise the original Allied requirement is not achieved. They say that the Germans could construct an unlimited number of 'avions de chasse modernes' by asserting that the latter had an 'objet pratique' (e.g. for very rapid postal work), whereas if the word 'ou' was inserted in lieu of 'et' they would be unable to do so. As a compromise the Allied delegates proposed to the Germans that the words 'seraient sans objet pratique pour l'aviation civile et qui' should be erased. The German delegates have submitted this to Berlin but state that they very much doubt whether they will get their government to approve. The German point of view is that the original text was definitely approved by the Allied delegates long ago and that it is now too late to change. The Allied point of view is that the original wording will allow the Germans to do something which the Germans themselves have realised all along the Allies would never permit them to do, and that this has been caused merely by a slip, probably due to typewriting. This wrangle over one little word appears to be very petty but if the German point is upheld and the existing phrase remains, it would appear that the Germans will be able to have, under pretext of postal machines, as many modern fighter machines as they desire.

² Of Annex I to the Lettre d'envoi from the Conference of Ambassadors: cf. No. 466, note 1, Pièce C.

³ Cf., however, the text cited *ibid.*

Third point

My telegram No. 160,⁴ last paragraph. The Germans suggest that in lieu of altering the ordonnance some phrase should be added to the protocol in which the German government would state that lists should be furnished to them regularly. We are awaiting a definite text to this effect from the German delegates.

I would again emphasise that the Germans are opposing the first two points above mentioned with the utmost vigour; they believe that the Allies are deliberately trying to wreck negotiations, and state that they do not consider for one moment that the German government will give in. The situation is no doubt regrettable but at the same time it would appear almost impossible for the British delegates to support the Germans on these points in order to bring about a rapid conclusion of negotiations. Hints are already appearing in the French press which lead me to believe that there may be a very violent outburst against the agreement when it is published, and this outburst may take the form of a bitter attack against Great Britain, especially if the British delegates attempt to force the French to give in at this last moment. At present neither Germans nor French show the least inclination to give way on these points. French delegates urge that they receive our support on these two points and I certainly think that it should be given. Germans appear to be quibbling. Please telegraph urgently.⁵

⁴ No. 474.

⁵ Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen subsequently wrote to Mr. Troutbeck on May 3 that the first two points had been settled (see No. 500). Mr. Troutbeck replied on May 5 that, in view of this letter, instructions to support the French point of view on racing machines and glider pilots had not been despatched. Mr. Troutbeck enclosed a letter from the Air Ministry expressing agreement with the French experts and stating in particular that, 'pilots who have been trained to fly a glider have practically learnt how to fly an aeroplane, except for the use of the engine and rudder for leaving the ground. They could become competent aeroplane pilots with a very short period of further instruction.'

No. 486

Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 1, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 48 Telegraphic: by bag [C 5205/5139/18]

Confidential

BRUSSELS, April 30, 1926

Russo-German Treaty.

I thought it advisable to communicate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of your telegram No. 18 to Prague¹ which I told him I had received for my information and guidance. He was glad to have this expression of your opinion.

M. Vandervelde then read to me a communication which he had received from the Belgian Ambassador in Paris. The latter reported that M. Briand had not yet expressed a definite opinion about the treaty, but that a committee

¹ No. 479.

of Quai d'Orsay officials, consisting of MM. Berthelot, Fromageot, Corbin² and Massigli, had carefully examined it. The Belgian Ambassador then gave the result of their examination. The committee considered that the treaty was 'exécrable'. They fastened upon Article 3 which, they said, was aggravated by Herr Stresemann's letter, and they declared that the question would now arise whether Germany ought to be admitted into the League of Nations, having previously announced her intention of 'torpedoing' some of its most important powers.³

As M. Vandervelde read the account of the Committee's views, it sounded to me like a vehement denunciation made by people too angry to take a temperate view of the facts.

M. Vandervelde has been stirred thereby to write an energetic and closely reasoned refutation of these views which he declared he could not share. He pointed out incidentally in it that he was somewhat at a loss to understand the sudden revulsion which had taken place at the Quai d'Orsay with regard to the treaty which they had at first seemed to accept in a more philosophic spirit. At Prague, a reverse process had taken place. He especially objected to the final observations of the Quai d'Orsay committee with regard to Germany's entrance into the League of Nations.

I suggested to M. Vandervelde that it would be useful that you should see his reply and he is consequently sending to Baron Moncheur this evening a copy of his despatch to the Belgian Ambassador in Paris with instructions to communicate the substance to the Foreign Office. It had not yet received the final touches.⁴

² Assistant Director for European Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ In a letter of April 29 to Mr. Gregory, Mr. Phipps had stated that M. Massigli had told Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen the previous day that the treaty of Berlin 'had produced at the Quai d'Orsay "un effet effroyable" . . . Massigli also stated that the Treaty seriously complicated the question of Germany entering the League of Nations.'

⁴ The despatch to Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy was communicated to Sir A. Chamberlain in a letter of May 1 from Baron Moncheur (not printed).

No. 487

Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

[C 5181/778/18]

Private and personal

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 30, 1926

My dear Crewe,

You will remember Arthur Ponsonby's question in the House on April 21st and my reply on the distinctly ticklish question of the Anglo-Franco-American Declaration of June 16th, 1919? In case you should not have seen the supplementaries, I now send you an extract from Hansard.¹

Now it would be idle to pretend that this is the last of the matter that we have heard: or indeed that I myself am happy as to the position. For though

¹ Not printed: see No. 438, note 4.

I think that the point I took is a material point, yet it is too subtle to appeal to the general public. And I expect therefore that great play will be made with the Declaration in the next few months.

This brings me then to my point. I think we must all be agreed that the French have behaved badly about the numbers of troops in the Second and Third zones of the Occupied Rhineland. We cannot get away from the fact that there are actually ten thousand more allied troops there than there were before the evacuation of Cologne, and that this is quite irreconcilable with the language held by Briand himself to Luther and Stresemann in our private conferences both in Locarno and London. I do not believe that Briand would attempt to plead the fact that nothing of a formal nature was said to Stresemann on either of these occasions and in any case it is beyond dispute that France is morally committed to a reduction of those troops. If there were any doubt on the point, it is given its quietus by the note of November 14th 1925 which the Ambassadors' Conference addressed to Germany.

It is thus plain that we—the ex-Allies—are guilty of a very ugly breach of faith: and when we find ourselves further reminded by the Labour Party here of the 1919 Declaration I am bound to confess that my uneasiness becomes greater for it is clear that I may at any moment be further questioned and I cannot continue to defend a position which I and all British opinion hold to be radically indefensible.

Now what can we do about it? Frankly I am somewhat at a loss to know. I do not want to add to Briand's already colossal difficulties; on the other hand I do not feel that I can, in justice either to my country or myself, let matters rest as they are. And I would much rather take the initiative in advance rather than as a consequence of debates and questions here.

My thoughts therefore run on these lines. For the moment—and until Germany has joined the League and Locarno thereby become operative—there can hardly be any question of hastening the evacuation of the Second and Third zones. But that is not to say that the continued occupation will not become every day a more obvious anomaly once that treaty is in force. My idea therefore is that until next autumn we must ride off any attempt to press upon us the implementing of the 1919 Declaration. But meantime we must do what we can to nurse France along the line we would ourselves like to go. In this I fancy that in their heart of hearts we have Briand and Berthelot with us; for my impression is that, on the whole, they are more broad-minded than their military and public opinion allow them to reveal. I know we shall have to go very cautiously. But what I am driving at is that we should quietly and as occasion offers endeavour to cause the doctrine to infiltrate that continued occupation is in fact an anomaly once France and Belgium have the Locarno safeguards in actual operation. Do you think you and your staff could do something to get these ideas simmering fruitfully in the proper quarters?

Now as to the present number of troops. The situation to-day is little short of intolerable: every time I have to deliver a bludgeon blow on the head of Stresemann, I have a feeling that he might very reasonably retaliate with a

bland query as to how we reconcile with our consciences the increased numbers of troops.² Could you not get Briand to see that it really is imperative that something should be done to carry out what we solemnly undertook in the Ambassadors' note of November? After all that is not asking much, when all is said and done, and you may tell him frankly that I cannot hold the fort much longer, and that it is urgent that he should act soon if we are to avoid the public expression of divergent views on a matter of prime political, though very secondary military importance.

Do this in the first instance as informally as you can. He knows that I have tried to help him with his public opinion. I must now appeal to him for similar help with mine, and I want to do it with every consideration for him and for France.³

Yrs. sincerely

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

² *Note in original:* 'He has in effect done so, but in gentler terms, since this letter was dictated.' See No. 484, to which Sir A. Chamberlain referred, in a further letter of May 6 to Lord Crewe, as giving additional point to his views.

³ In a private letter of April 30 to Lord Crewe, Mr. Lampson explained that the present letter was not intended to contradict No. 468, which referred to formal discussions with the French Government as contrasted with the informal discussions envisaged above by Sir A. Chamberlain.

No. 488

Letter from Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Mr. Lampson (Received May 3)

[C 5343/2664/22]

ROME, April 30, 1926

My dear Lampson,

Many thanks for your letter of April 26th regarding the need of finding some outlet for the surplus population of Italy.¹ I have harped on this subject to the Foreign Office ever since I came here to a degree which must have bored you all, but it does seem to me the crux of the situation. I will have prepared for you the report² you suggest, although once one gets into figures

¹ Not printed. This letter suggested that Sir R. Graham should report on this subject.

² This report was transmitted in Rome despatch No. 511 of June 24. Sir R. Graham stated in particular: 'There is likely to be in future a natural increase in the population at the rate of rather less than 500,000 a year. Of this increase more than one-third is now absorbed by emigration, the remaining two-thirds going to swell the population of the mother country. . . . The question of how the problem will develop in the future is one on which it is extremely difficult to form a definite opinion. Owing to the restrictions on the entry of Italian labour into the United States the stream of emigration is now being forced into channels which are not entirely natural and which are less advantageous to the emigrants than those which were open to them before the war. As it is necessary that a large proportion of the increasing population should leave the country, we may expect that the movement to secure for Italy a share of "white man's country" overseas will gather strength. If this be so, the development of such a feeling in the conditions of the modern world must constitute a danger. It may be said that Italy has a real case for obtaining an area for overseas expansion, but the recognition that her claim deserves consideration brings us no

it must all be rather guess work. The rate of increase in the population is clear enough and is now well over 400,000 a year. France took about 200,000 last year but this must be exceptional, and South America takes a good many but conditions for emigrants are not satisfactory. As regards Tripoli there is a divergence of views. Count Volpi, when I spoke to him on the subject, was discouraging as to the prospect of its ever being able to absorb any considerable number of immigrants; other people hold a different view and I gather that Mussolini has come back from his colonial trip with rather favourable ideas on the subject. So far the industrial and agricultural development in Italy has undoubtedly succeeded in absorbing the surplus population but how long it can continue to do so is a problem. The present Italian Government is of course anxious for Italian emigrants to maintain their national individuality as much as possible and this must necessarily render those emigrants unpopular in the countries where they settle.

My impression is that the question will not become really vital for another 6-10 years but that then the pressure will be so strong as to force the Government to relieve it at all costs. Anything, therefore, that we can do to help removes the future danger. As you say, there are a number of wild and irresponsible stories of Mussolini contemplating some immediate *coup* and I must say that certain of his speeches and those of his followers give colour to ideas of the kind. I do not myself believe that there is anything in them. He knows that Italy is not yet ready for an effort of the dimensions required. His present preoccupation is to strengthen her in every direction, especially economically. At the same time he is attempting to develop her fighting powers. But he knows as well as anyone else that a rash adventure would be more likely than not to upset his whole apple cart and I am sure that he will avoid it if he can. Moreover I am convinced that we have a strong influence with him and that he would be most unwilling to adopt a course of action

nearer to suggesting a solution of the problem. All that can be said with certainty is that Italy will constantly be on the watch to secure, whenever an opportunity occurs, a suitable outlet for her surplus population. An instance of the sensitiveness of Italian opinion on this point is afforded by the intense irritation which is caused whenever the suggestion is made in the foreign press that Germany may possibly be granted a mandate. The area on which Italian claims will be concentrated is likely to depend on the nature of the circumstances through which she secures her opportunity. All that can be said on this point is that at present, as I have already indicated, the territories which find most favour are Anatolia and Angola. In these observations I have assumed that emigration from Italy is likely to continue at about the present rate. It is true that the development of Italian industry has to some extent coincided with the reduction of facilities for emigration, and that the increased population has been absorbed into the working force of the country in a way which could not have been anticipated. The Government are fully alive to the importance of exploiting to the full the natural resources of the country, and much may still be done in the way of land reclamation, the development of mineral resources, and in other similar directions, to make room for a larger population. By this active policy, aided as it is by a large supply of cheap labour, much may be effected, but these processes are expensive and capital is not available in sufficient quantities. If therefore, Italy, by the development of her natural and industrial resources, can continue to absorb, as she now does, two-thirds of her natural increase of population, this will be in itself a considerable achievement, but is almost too much to expect.'

certain to meet with our disapproval. There are, of course, dangerous elements in Fascismo who would do anything, however foolish, but it seems that for the time being at any rate the moderate and reasonable elements have the upper hand. I have said all this to you in other forms and can only repeat it. There remains of course the factor of Mussolini's incalculable personality and violent temper. If any unfortunate incident, involving a slight to Italy, happened again, such as that of the murder of the Italian General in Albania,³ he might once more go straight in off the deep end, indeed I should rather expect him to do so, although he has learnt a lot in these last two years.

You will find that Tyrrell has returned home⁴ with clearly formed impressions on the whole subject and that he was favourably struck not only by the attitude of Mussolini but also by that of the other statesmen he met, especially Federzoni.⁵

Yours ever,
R. GRAHAM

³ On August 27, 1923, General Tellini, President of the International Commission for the Delimitation of the Greco-Albanian border, was murdered in Greek territory close to the Albanian frontier. For Signor Mussolini's demands, and the Italian occupation of Corfu, see *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-23*, pp. 348-56: for action by the League of Nations, see *League of Nations Official Journal*, November 1923, *passim*.

⁴ Sir W. Tyrrell had recently paid a private visit to Rome.

⁵ In a further letter of the same date to Mr. Lampson, Sir R. Graham added: 'I should say that the French are quite right in their idea that Mussolini desires to usurp France's position and to play the leading role in Central and South Eastern Europe. His attitude over the proposed Triple Pact made this pretty clear to me. You will see in my other letter what I think about the probability of Mussolini running amok. Unless some extraordinary incident makes him lose his self-control I do not believe that there is any danger of the kind. Whether that danger exists in the future will depend more than anything upon whether a suitable field for Italian expansion can or cannot be found. It is no good disguising the fact that the feeling here against France is very strong and general, but I do not believe that any Italians except the insane extremists dream of taking on the French. Certainly Mussolini has no idea of the kind.'

No. 489

Sir A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 99 Telegraphic [C 5205/5139/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 1, 1926, 3.15 p.m.

Sir G. Grahame's telegram No. 48.¹

Decision of Quai d'Orsay officials, if as reported, shows that it is necessary that you should reinforce communication to M. Briand which I requested you to make in my telegram No. 97.² Please urge upon him strongly not to

¹ No. 486.

² Not printed. This telegram of April 30 instructed Lord Crewe to give M. Briand the following message from Sir A. Chamberlain regarding the Treaty of Berlin: 'I desire to reach general agreement with him before saying anything further to German government to whom as you know I have hitherto adopted a reserved but critical attitude.'

commit himself to any hard and fast view until he has received my considered opinion.

No. 490

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 1, 5.45 p.m.)

No. 140 Telegraphic [C 5239/5139/18]

BERLIN, May 1, 1926, 3.20 p.m.

Papers publish interview with Stresemann in which he discusses Russian treaty.

Main points are:

1. No valid argument has so far been brought against the Treaty of Berlin showing that it is in conflict with Locarno.

2. The argument that Russia is hostile to the League is inadmissible; it would block any agreement between a League state and Russia. Precisely because Russia is not a member, efforts must be made to bring her into the orbit of the League. I will not say that it is our concrete task to make Russia friendly to the League but the special character of our relations to Russia to-day constitute a strong tie with the League of Nations association.

3. There are no secret clauses or agreements of any kind between Germany and Russia.

4. Germany has been reproached with having sacrificed her freedom of decision within the League. That is an incredible suspicion of our intentions. Nothing in the treaty justifies it. It is a recognised basis of the League that every member must settle independently whether a state has committed a breach of the peace and if thereby the conditions for League action are established. How can we be reproached when we make a declaration to this effect to Russia? It is an admitted right. An independent decision is never equivalent to a prejudiced decision.

5. We demand that clear and simple sentences of our treaty with Russia should not be given an interpretation which they have not and which they can never have. German statesmen can be trusted to do nothing in 1926 which would stand in contradiction to their action in 1925. In no stage of pact negotiations did we leave it doubtful that good relations with Russia were an indispensable portion of our foreign policy. I cannot therefore conceive how the strengthening of these good relations can give any cause for the non carrying out of Locarno treaty.

I do not telegraph a fuller summary as I imagine that this interview was a kind of dress rehearsal for a radio speech which will presumably be audible in London to-night.¹

¹ See *The Times* of May 3, 1926, p. 14, for a report on Dr. Stresemann's interview and broadcast.

No. 491

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 2, 11 a.m.)

No. 164 Telegraphic [C 5236/5139/18]

Urgent

PARIS, May 1, 1926, 7.55 p.m.

Your telegram No. 99.¹

Brussels telegram No. 48² not yet received.

Meanwhile as M. Briand is at Cocherel till late on Monday³ evening, Mr. Phipps begged M. Berthelot to suspend any action French government might be contemplating at Berlin pending the receipt of your considered views. M. Berthelot said no action was contemplated until French Ambassador in London replied to telegram sent him this morning instructing him to set forth to you views of M. Briand.

Perhaps you could telegraph me your opinion on those views in the course of Monday so that I may convey it to M. Briand that evening.

¹ No. 489.

² No. 486.

³ May 3, 1926.

No. 492

Sir A. Chamberlain to H.M. Representatives at Prague, Paris, Brussels, Rome, and Warsaw

No. 19¹ Telegraphic [C 5369/5139/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 3, 1926, 4.45 p.m.

My telegram to Prague No. 18² (of the 29th April: Russo-German Treaty).

I have now had the Treaty and accompanying notes fully examined from the legal point of view and the general conclusions broadly bear out the result of my first impressions as already telegraphed to you.

The important question is whether the terms of the treaty and accompanying notes afford any grounds for maintaining that Germany has acted inconsistently with the obligations by which she is bound or will be bound when she enters the League, and when the Treaty of Locarno becomes operative. On this I am advised as follows:—

As regards *Article 1* of the Treaty, there is nothing inconsistent with the Covenant or with Locarno in an agreement that two states will remain in friendly contact in order to bring about an understanding on questions affecting the two countries. A provision of this kind is quite usual where two states desire to introduce and maintain terms of intimacy.

Article 2. The phrase 'in despite of its peaceful attitude' would seem to be

¹ No. 19 to Prague; No. 100, by bag, to Paris; No. 39 to Brussels; No. 123 to Rome; No. 28 to Warsaw.

² No. 479.

the equivalent of 'unprovoked', and the article therefore means 'should either party suffer an unprovoked attack by one or more other states . . .'.³ This embodies no idea contrary to the Covenant or to Locarno. The undertaking contained in the article is an undertaking to remain neutral. As between Germany, a member of the League, and Russia, a non-member, this does not run counter to the Covenant. The intention of the article is to make sure that if either party is the subject of an 'unprovoked' attack by a third state, the other party will not co-operate in the attack. As between two members of the League the undertaking to remain neutral would be inconsistent with the Covenant because it would run contrary to the League undertaking to come to the help of such member when attacked, but there is no obligation on a member of the League to come to the help of a non-member who is attacked; still less is there an obligation on a non-member to come to the help of a member who is attacked.

What this provision is aimed at is preventing Germany from joining in an attack on Russia or Russia joining in an attack on Germany. There being no obligation to come and help, it at least ensures a negative attitude.

If Russia was the attacking state, an obligation binding Germany to remain neutral might be contrary to the Covenant because the state attacked might be a member of the League, and therefore entitled to call for Germany's help, but that is not the case covered by the article. It refers only to the case where Russia (or Germany) is herself attacked.

Article 3 prohibits Russia or Germany from participating in a collective economic boycott aimed at the other.

It applies in two cases. The first is where article 2 applies, i.e., where either party is the victim of an unprovoked attack at the hands of a third state, and the other contracting party is bound under article 2 to abstain from joining in the attack. By this article it becomes bound also to abstain from collective economic action. There is nothing in this which is contrary to the Covenant. Russia being, *ex hypothesi*, that state *attacked*, an undertaking by Germany not to join in a boycott *against* her is not a violation of the Covenant.

The second case where article 3 applies is where there is no war at all—where in time of peace an attempt is made on the part of other powers to organise an economic boycott of Russia or of Germany, the other party (i.e., Germany or Russia) is bound by this article not to participate.

There is nothing inconsistent with the Covenant in this undertaking. The case is outside the Covenant altogether. It is to occur only in peace time, and the Covenant deals only with cases where there has been a resort to war.

I now come to Herr Stresemann's explanatory note of April 24th attached to Treaty.

Paragraph 2. To arrive at what seems to be the real meaning of this paragraph two things must be borne in mind. Firstly, it is no breach of the Covenant for a Member of the League to go to war with a non-member. The case can only be dealt with under article 11 of the Covenant. Article 16 does not

³ Punctuation as in original quotation.

apply. Secondly, Russia is obsessed with the idea that she is the object of malevolent schemings on the part of other states.

Germany's undertaking in this paragraph of the note is that should a group of Members of the League ('Should there take shape within the framework of the League') organise a joint effort against Russia, Germany will from within the League do what she can to oppose their efforts.

This cannot be regarded as contrary to the Covenant—either to the letter or to the spirit. The members of the League, in concerting an effort against a non-member, would not be doing anything which is prohibited by the Covenant, but their action would be inconsistent with 'that good understanding between nations upon which peace depends' (see article 11 of the Covenant), and Germany is entitled to pledge herself to use her influence to frustrate their efforts.

Paragraph 3. Germany's desire here is to make it clear to Russia that she (Germany) cannot be obliged by a majority vote, from which she herself dissents, to apply the sanctions of article 16 against Russia. Russia has probably been saying to Germany 'I shall get no justice at the hands of the Council; they are all leagued against me. I shall be denounced as an aggressor when I am nothing of the sort'. Germany's answer is 'You may count on my playing the game. A decision by the Council on such a matter must be unanimous, and I am not going to participate in a decision against you unless I am convinced that on the facts you deserve it'.

There is nothing inconsistent with the Covenant in any such pledge to Russia, nor anything disloyal to the Locarno Powers. Indeed the more I study this paragraph the more impressed I am by the care which Stresemann has taken to confine himself strictly to what was said or admitted by us in the Locarno discussions on article 16 whilst seeking to remove the Soviet obsession that our object at Locarno was to form under cover of the League an anti-Soviet Alliance.

To sum up then, *from the legal point of view* I am satisfied that neither the treaty nor the Stresemann note justifies a complaint that Germany has entered into pledges inconsistent with the Covenant or with anything she agreed to at Locarno.

In order to prevent what I should regard as a false move in any quarter, you are authorised at once to reinforce what you have presumably already said to government to which you are accredited on receipt of my telegram No. 18 to Prague, by giving them the gist of preceding paragraphs of my present telegram. You should do this as soon as possible in order to give the lead before others do so; you should at the same time make it absolutely clear that His Majesty's Government would deprecate anything in the nature of formal representations to the German government—and indeed would definitely decline to take part in them. It should be evident in the light of what I have said as regards legal aspect, that such a move would be both technically unjustifiable and politically unwise. It might merely serve to drive Germany further into the other camp. We have a right to expect from Germany loyalty to the Locarno covenants and to the League but it

would in my view be madness to take any step or action which might seem to imply that in our view loyalty to the covenant is synonymous with hostility to Russia. I do not of course wish it to be inferred that I in any way welcome the treaty: but its text and that of the accompanying note is apparently beyond challenge juridically and however much we may all regard signature as significant of a political tendency, it would be highly unwise to place ourselves in a false position.

Attitude which I therefore propose to adopt is one of reserve. If Germany really acts in good faith, no great harm will have been done; it all turns on how she interprets the treaty, and that time alone will show.

But in this connection it is well to remember that whilst it is natural and indeed inevitable that Germany should do her utmost to secure herself against danger from Russia and to cultivate the political and economic relations with that country which are so necessary to her, she rejected Russia's attempt to prevent the conclusion of the Locarno treaties, has maintained her demand for admittance to the League and has only consented to give Russia a very different treaty from that which Russia originally sought. That Russia should now accept what she previously refused shows the effect of Locarno on Soviet policy and goes far to prove Germany's determination to abide loyally by her engagements to us.

I am convinced more than ever that the only sound policy for us all to pursue is to work solidly for the earliest possible admission of Germany to the League. Events at Geneva in March last may have contributed in some degree to the development with which we are now faced; in any case it is the fact that Germany has not yet assumed obligations of covenant which is so largely responsible for alarm aroused by new treaty, and it would really be disastrous if the irresponsible act of a non-European power far removed from our dangers were allowed by the European Powers to end by destroying our work for peace.

To Berlin Only.

I shall look anxiously to Stresemann's promised speeches for confirmation of the accuracy of my interpretation of the treaty and for clear proof of the good faith with which I have credited German government.

Addressed to Prague No. 19, Paris by bag No. 100, Brussels No. 39, Rome No. 123, Warsaw No. 28. Repeated to Berlin No. 64 for your own information only.

No. 493

Letter from Mr. Sargent to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

[C 5092/116/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 3, 1926*

Dear Eric

I enclose a copy of a letter from Leith-Ross¹ from which you will see that

¹ Deputy Controller of Finance in H.M. Treasury.

the Treasury have instructed Kembball-Cook² to try to get the French to put up a proposal to alter the procedure at present laid down for dealing with the expansion of the Dawes Annuities due to the increased yield of the Controlled Revenues.

No action on the part of the Embassy is required, but it is as well that you should be informed of what is going on in case anyone at the Quai d'Orsay should mention the matter in conversation with you or with the Ambassador.

Yours ever,

ORME SARGENT

ENCLOSURE IN No. 493

Letter from Mr. Leith-Ross (Treasury) to Mr. Sargent

TREASURY, April 26, 1926

Dear Sargent,

You will remember that the amount of the first four Dawes Annuities is as follows, in millions of gold marks:

First year	1000
Second year	1220
Third year	1200
Fourth year	1750

As regards the third and fourth years, the figures are subject to a contingent addition or reduction not exceeding 250 million gold marks equal to one-third of the amount by which the controlled revenues exceed or fall short of 1000 million gold marks in the third year, or 1250 million gold marks in the fourth year.

It is now clear that the full contingent addition of 250 million gold marks will be payable in respect of the third year, but under the Protocol forming Annex I. to the Agreement between the Reparation Commission and the German Government of the 9th August 1924, for putting into operation the Dawes Plan, the contingent addition would be effective by payment of one-quarter in each of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth months of the fourth year. This is an obviously inconvenient arrangement as it makes the Third Annuity too low and the Fourth and Fifth Annuities too high for a reasonable scale.

We understand privately that the Agent General for Reparation Payments realises the undesirability of the existing arrangements and would welcome a modification by which the contingent addition would be paid during the third year instead of postponed to the fourth year in return for some concession to the Germans, e.g. a suitable discount on early payment. He does not, however desire to make any suggestion of this kind himself but would welcome it if it came from the French. I have informed Kembball-Cook of the position, and suggested that he should stimulate the French to put up some suggestion on these lines.

² Assistant British Delegate to the Reparation Commission.

We shall, of course, let you know if anything definite is proposed, but I thought you would like to have information at this stage in case the French might happen to mention the matter in diplomatic circles.³

Yours sincerely,
F. W. LEITH-ROSS

³ On June 5 Mr. Sargent sent to Mr. Phipps and to Mr. Addison at Berlin copies of a further letter of May 31 from Mr. Leith-Ross which stated that, as the result of informal discussion between the Assistant Delegates to the Reparation Commission and the Agent General's representative in Paris, Mr. Parker Gilbert had been invited to arrange for earlier payment of the contingent additions to the third and fourth Dawes annuities. 'The Agent General was informed that the principal Reparation Powers would be glad if in place of the two contingent annuities of 250 million gold marks each, payment could be obtained of 300 million gold marks, in equal monthly portions during the third Dawes annuity, and 100 million gold marks in equal monthly portions throughout the fourth annuity, the remainder of the contingent annuities, if any, to be cancelled. He was authorised to open negotiations with the German Government with the object of securing these terms. Should he be unable to secure these terms he is asked to report the result of his negotiations for further consideration by the Powers concerned.

'The result would be that instead of receiving in

Third Dawes year	£60 millions	
Fourth	„	£100 „
Fifth	„	£137½ „
Sixth	„	£125 „ (plus index of prosperity)

the Allies would receive:

Third Dawes year	£75 „
Fourth	„ £92½ „
Fifth	„ £125 „

which is a much better scale and helps us over the third "lean" year.'

No. 494

Note communicated by the French Ambassador

[C 5334/5139/18]

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE À LONDRES, 3 Mai 1926

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris est venu remettre le 27 Avril dernier au Quai d'Orsay le texte officiel du Traité russo-allemand et des deux notes annexes. Ces documents ont été l'objet d'une étude attentive de la part de M. Briand dont les sentiments sont les suivants.

La lecture de ces textes a causé à M. le Président du Conseil une impression de surprise confirmant les appréhensions suscitées par les premiers renseignements reçus par lui de Berlin.

Même en évitant de donner au fait seul de l'accord d'ensemble de l'Allemagne avec la Russie son importance de politique générale, même en s'efforçant de ne pas attribuer à l'article 1er une portée trop grande, même en acceptant les assurances allemandes (le Traité ne serait ni la manifestation d'une nouvelle politique, ni la confirmation et l'aggravation de la politique de Rapallo) M. Briand estime que le texte du Traité l'autorise à demander

au Gouvernement de Berlin des explications et en outre l'assurance que le Reich ne saurait se prévaloir de ce nouvel accord en ce qui concerne les engagements déjà pris par lui à Locarno ou qu'il contractera par son entrée dans la Société des Nations.

Parmi les éclaircissements que souhaiterait recevoir le Gouvernement français les suivants seraient particulièrement opportuns.

1°—Comment l'article 2 du Traité Germano-russe (neutralité en cas d'agression non provoquée) et les commentaires qu'en donne la lettre de M. Stresemann peuvent-ils se concilier avec les devoirs qui incomberont à l'Allemagne lorsqu'elle fera partie de la Société des Nations? L'Allemagne et la Russie semblent s'estimer seules juges des cas où jouerait la neutralité. Il paraît improbable que la Russie, dans l'éventualité d'un conflit entre elle et un état membre de la Société, accepte l'application de l'article 17 du pacte.

2°—Article 16 du pacte de la Société. Le Gouvernement allemand insiste sur le fait qu'après l'entrée de l'Allemagne dans la Société des Nations l'article 16 du pacte ne saurait jouer sans que le Reich donne son assentiment et M. Stresemann assure que cet assentiment ne sera pas donné si, même contre l'unanimité des autres membres du Conseil, son pays estime injustifiée l'accusation d'agression portée contre la République des Soviets vis à vis d'autres Puissances. Or l'article 1er du Traité germano-russe stipule que les deux signataires resteront en contact amical. Comment ce contrat [*sic* ? contact] amical serait-il conciliable avec un assentiment que donnerait l'Allemagne à une mesure de coercition contre le Gouvernement des Soviets? L'accord germano-russe laisserait donc entendu que l'article 16 du pacte ne pourra pas jouer?

3°—Par l'article 3 du Traité, l'Allemagne s'engage à ne pas participer à une mesure collective de coercition économique et financière contre la République des Soviets. D'après le paragraphe 3 (dernier alinéa) de la lettre de M. Stresemann à M. Krestinsky l'Allemagne s'estime libre de prendre cet engagement en invoquant la lettre qui lui a été adressée le 1er Décembre 1925 à l'occasion de la signature des Traités de Locarno. Cette lettre, qui apprécie le caractère des obligations de chaque état selon les termes de l'article 16 du pacte ne contient aucun passage susceptible d'une pareille interprétation. Comment les signataires de cette lettre auraient-ils pu avoir l'intention de permettre à l'Allemagne d'éluder les sanctions d'ordre économique et financier prévues par l'article 16 du Covenant, quelques-unes puissent être d'ailleurs la nature et l'étendue des mesures à prendre par le Reich?

Le Gouvernement français souhaiterait recevoir sur ces divers points des explications écrites, précises et de nature à être rendues publiques. Elles seraient nécessaires vis à vis de l'opinion et pour éviter dans la Presse des polémiques inopportunes et susceptibles de provoquer de nouvelles difficultés à Genève au mois de Septembre prochain.

Le pacte de la Société des Nations condamne dans son article 20 tous les engagements qui seraient incompatibles avec les stipulations sur lesquelles repose la Société. Aussi les divers Traités conclus entre Membres de la

Société stipulent ils soigneusement que rien n'en saurait être interprété comme portant atteinte aux dispositions du Pacte. Le Gouvernement allemand en concluant, à la veille de son entrée dans la Société, un Traité avec les Soviets, non seulement a évité toute clause de ce genre, mais a adopté un texte qui risque d'être, dans son application, en contradiction avec le Pacte.

Si il n'était pas donné suite aux demandes de précision et d'assurance générale, qui précèdent, des explications seraient certainement demandées à l'Allemagne lors de la réunion de Septembre du Conseil de la Société. Ces demandes se produiraient alors dans des conditions plus délicates qu'aujourd'hui. Le texte du Traité germano-russe tel qu'il a été publié fournirait en effet au cours des prochains mois des occasions d'accuser l'Allemagne d'avoir créé une situation nouvelle et dégagé les autres Puissances des promesses et assurances données par elles au Reich.

M. Briand serait donc heureux de savoir si Sir Austen Chamberlain dans l'intérêt de la réunion de Septembre serait disposé à se rallier à ces impressions et à s'associer à une démarche faite à leur sujet auprès du Gouvernement allemand, démarche qui serait effectuée après accord entre la Grande Bretagne, la Belgique, l'Italie et la France.

En dehors de cette demande d'explication, M. le Président du Conseil se propose de faire part au Gouvernement allemand les réflexions que lui ont inspiré les modifications introduites à Berlin dans le texte du premier projet d'accord dont l'article 3 contenait une formule précise relative au blocus en temps de paix sur la portée de laquelle M. Von Hoesch avait attiré l'attention du Gouvernement français.

M. de Fleuriau saisit, &c.,

No. 495

Memorandum by Viscount Cecil

[W 3832/30/98]

May 4, 1926

The American Ambassador came to see me this afternoon, to speak in a purely personal manner, as he insisted more than once, about the Senate's reservations to the American adhesion to the Court.¹ He was anxious to explain that the Executive Government could not in any way alter the Senate's reservations and that therefore it was very little use for them to attend a Conference on the subject and that if they had done so and had been asked to give any explanations all they could have done would have been to have referred such questions back to the Senate. It would therefore be much better that the League should formulate questions and send them into the State Department who could refer them straight to the Senate. I said

¹ Documents regarding possible American adhesion to the Permanent Court of International Justice will appear in a subsequent volume of this series. Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1926*, vol. i, pp. 1-39.

that I fully understood, and proceeded to explain the difficulty that I personally felt about the fifth reservation. I said to him that if the right of veto on the taking of advisory opinion were granted to the United States it would have to be granted to other states since it was very difficult to give any litigant before any Court a privileged position. To that he warmly assented, and then I added that though it was possible that such a privilege might be granted to the United States in view of their great position without fear of misuse, yet if it were granted generally we should run a very grave risk of ham-stringing the Court. He said that he fully understood my point of view, and even went so far as to say that if he were a member of the League he would probably take the same view. Indeed I think he is rather anxious, possibly on political grounds that the League should reject the reservation so that American participation in the Court might be avoided.

He then asked me whether anything further had transpired from my interviews with Colonel Requin, and I told him that either because the French had slightly altered their position or because there had been a misunderstanding there seemed to me much less danger of any irreconcilable difference between the French and ourselves, particularly on the question of the potential strength of a country. I told him that Colonel Requin had explained that all that the French meant was that if one country had great potential strength and another country had none, the country with none might justly claim to be allowed greater initial armaments, and that to me that seemed a perfectly reasonable contention which would have to be examined. The Ambassador dissented from this view, evidently regarding disarmament as simply an agreement amongst the nations to cut down their armaments by a certain percentage, following the model of the Washington Treaties. I suggested to him that there were considerable differences between land armies and navies, but he did not seem to agree, apart from special cases such as those of the enemy Powers. I further told him that the thing that seemed to alarm the French most was lest we should support a German claim to increase their armaments in order to put them more on a level with other countries, and that I had told Colonel Requin that I did not think there was any danger of our doing that because, after all, this was a conference for disarmament and not for the increase of armaments for anybody. The Ambassador warmly assented to this view, and he was quite sure the Germans would not put any such claim forward.

R. C.

No. 496

Memorandum by Viscount Cecil

[W 3831/78/98]

May 4, 1926

I have seen Colonel Requin two or three times and found him on the whole very reasonably disposed. I have already described his position as to the

potential strength of countries in my record of my interview with the American Ambassador.¹ We also discussed many of the technical questions involved without committing ourselves on either side, and I pressed upon him that we should try and deal with other questions before we came to the examination of the actual principles of reduction. He appeared to be nervous about this because of the attacks that have been made upon France as being not ready for reduction whereas he assured me they had a definite scheme of that kind, but he did not tell me what it was and I did not ask him. But later he appeared to have rather changed his opinion and to agree that we must proceed with great circumspection. He raised rather strongly the question of the distinction between imperial and colonial forces, being anxious to assure me that of the 600,000 French fighting men some 300,000 were negroes. I told him clearly that if such a question as that was raised I should have to say that pending a discussion of such a matter by the Imperial Conference it was impossible for me to express any opinion although, of course, I should be glad to listen to what other people had to say on the subject. I asked him very informally whether he thought that any provisional agreement might be arrived at between England and France on aerial armaments. He did not reject the idea, but it was evidently quite new to him, and he refrained from expressing any opinion upon it. But as he returned to it in my last interview of all I think it had made some impression upon his mind. Finally I told him that if he desired to avoid misapprehension in the Press, as indeed we all wished, the best remedy was complete publicity, and that I hoped he would tell Monsieur Boncour that in my judgment we ought to have as many meetings in public as possible. He rather agreed with this proposition and promised to tell Boncour.

R. C.

¹ No. 495.

No. 497

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 6, 10.30 a.m.)

No. 168 Telegraphic: by bag [C 5403/5139/18]

PARIS, May 5, 1926

Your telegram No. 100.¹ Russo-German treaty.

I saw M. Briand this afternoon, and left with him an *aide-mémoire*² paraphrasing the first eighteen paragraphs of your telegram, to the point at which you sum up the position from the legal point of view. I then explained orally your ideas of the proper course to take in view of the paramount importance of securing the entry of Germany into the League, and was able to enforce your plea for patience and an attitude of reserve by reference to

¹ No. 492.

² Not printed. A copy of this *aide-mémoire* was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 839 of May 5.

Herr Stresemann's speeches briefly reported in the newspapers of Monday, May 3rd.³

M. Briand expressed himself as being in complete agreement with you as to the uselessness and possible risk of any sort of formal protest against the treaty itself or the notes accompanying it. Like you, he could not pretend to be gratified at the step taken by Germany, or at the manner of its taking. He himself fully accepted Germany's declaration of continued adherence to the Locarno principles and of loyalty to the covenant; but he wished that they would make a more formal declaration of their intention to deal with matters arising under articles 16 and 17 with no bias in favour of either side. He would like to see this done voluntarily, because they might be sure that when the admission of Germany to the League is being carried out, Roumania, Czechoslovakia and Poland would demand an explicit statement to that effect. He thought, indeed, that application might be made for an amended provision, such as that contained in article 10 of the [Geneva] protocol, whereby, in certain circumstances, a state is liable to be presumed to be the aggressor unless a decision of the Council, which must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare, thus precluding the possibility of an unreasonable refusal to recognise an aggression by Russia against one of her weaker neighbours, which in present circumstances is admittedly in the power of any one member of the Council.

M. Briand went on to say that he would not do anything or countenance anything which would interfere with Germany's admission to the League. He considered that the statements of Herr Stresemann in his speech made on Saturday, May 1st, had distinctly improved the situation.

Confidential

In view of Brussels telegram No. 48 and your telegram No. 99,⁴ I thought it advisable to see the Belgian Ambassador on Sunday, so as to obtain first-hand information. He told me he had failed to see M. Briand at the end of last week, and had, therefore, had an interview with the officials, whose opinions he felt it necessary to report to Brussels. But an exaggerated notion had been formed there of the importance of what they said, there being no report of a committee, but simply the expression of opinion by permanent officials not responsible for policy.

³ See No. 490, note 1.

⁴ Nos. 486 and 489 respectively.

No. 498

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 6, 9 a.m.)
No. 101 Telegraphic [C 5404/5139/18]

ROME, May 5, 1926, 8.20 p.m.

Communication in the sense of your telegram 19 to Prague¹ was made today to Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs who promised to

¹ No. 492.

inform Prime Minister and foreshadowed a subsequent official reply. Views of Italian government would he believed be substantially in accord with those of His Majesty's Government, namely, that Russo-German treaty was not inconsistent with treaties of Locarno or covenant and that it was desirable to admit Germany to League of Nations as soon as possible. Those views had not yet however been expressed officially and he could therefore only say unofficially what he thought they would be.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 101. Repeated to . . .²

² The text is here uncertain.

No. 499

Memorandum by Sir C. Hurst respecting the Belgian-Dutch Treaties of 1839¹ [W 3857/350/4]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 5, 1926

1. The conversation between the Belgian, British, Dutch and French representatives on the abrogation of the above treaties took place on Saturday, May 1, 1926, at the Quai d'Orsay. The Dutch Government were represented by M. Beelaerts, formerly Dutch Minister at Peking, and the Belgian Government by M. de Ruelle and M. Rolin.²

2. Previous to the meeting I had a talk with M. Corvin [Corbin] and M. Fromageot, who acted on behalf of the French Government, as to the line to be taken at the full meeting.

3. Annexed is a draft of the treaty and of a draft protocol and a draft note prepared for consideration of the various Governments. The three drafts together constitute the machinery by which it is proposed that the Allies should abrogate the treaties of 1839 and recognise the new régime established between Holland and Belgium by their treaty of April 3, 1925.³

4. The proposal now submitted is very unlike the draft which M. Fromageot and I prepared in Paris in February⁴ and is not quite so satisfactory as we had hoped. It secures, however, what the Allied Powers are entitled to insist on as of right now that by the Paris decisions of 1919 they stand committed to the abrogation of the neutrality of Belgium and of the exclusively commercial status of Antwerp. Neither Holland nor Belgium (but more particularly Holland) are prepared to give the Allied Powers anything which they are not entitled to as of right, and if the Allied Powers insist, the

¹ For these treaties cf. No. 99, note 9. For previous negotiations regarding their abrogation see First Series, Volume V, Chapter I, and Volume XII, Chapter I.

² M. Deruelle was legal adviser and M. Rolin was an assistant legal adviser to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ For a summary of this unratified treaty see *Survey of International Affairs* 1925, vol. ii, pp. 169-70.

⁴ Not printed. This draft treaty replaced an earlier draft prepared by Sir C. Hurst and M. Fromageot in April 1925 to which the Belgian and Netherland Governments had expressed objections.

Dutch-Belgian treaty is likely to be rejected, a set back to the present good relations between Belgium and Holland will result and the responsibility be thrown on the Allied Powers.

5. The second Hurst-Fromageot project embodied safeguards for the Allies as to (1) liberty and equality of commercial navigation on the Scheldt; (2) exclusion of warships therefrom; (3) maintenance of the independence of Belgium, and (4) choice pilots.

6. The first point is covered by a proposed protocol to be signed at the time of the signature of the treaty. Neither Holland nor Belgium dissent from the view that by their bilateral treaty they cannot prejudice Allied rights derived from the Treaty of Vienna.⁵ They both maintain that under the 1839 treaties the Allies enjoyed no rights as to commerce and navigation on the Scheldt beyond what flowed from the Treaty of Vienna, though Holland and Belgium by their treaty of 1839 had stipulated for certain larger reciprocal rights. These, however, were limited to the two Powers, e.g. article 8(5) [*sic*]⁶ and article 10. The Dutch-Belgian treaty of 1925 confers benefits on the commerce and flags of all nations, but so far as its provisions go further than the Treaty of Vienna, the two Powers claim that they are entitled—should they wish to do so—to modify those rights by a subsequent treaty between themselves. At any rate they will not enter into a treaty with the Allies which would prevent them from doing so, because they would be giving away something in return for nothing, and any such action would imperil M. van Karnebeeck's⁷ chances of getting the treaty through the Dutch Parliament. Lastly, both the Dutch and Belgian representatives argued strongly that policy and self-interest would lead Holland and Belgium to encourage foreign shipping and commerce on the Scheldt and it was, therefore, wholly unnecessary for the Allies to ask for more. What is promised in the suggested 'protocol de signature' is the continued application of articles 108 to 117 of the Treaty of Vienna, not only to the Scheldt, but to the canals and waterways connecting the two countries. So far as concerns canals and connecting waterways this gives the Allies more than they are entitled to under the Treaty of Vienna or enjoyed under the letter of the treaty of 1839. The Dutch representative said he must consult his Government about this wording and he has now telegraphed (May 4, 1926) saying he is sending an amended text.

7. The new project is silent about warships, as were the treaties of Vienna and of 1839. As the result we get no guarantee of the exclusion of warships from the Scheldt. So far as the exclusion of warships depended on the neutralisation of Belgium, the *raison d'être* of the exclusion has disappeared. However desirable it would have been to secure a definite treaty guarantee against the opening of the Scheldt to warships, there is no means of forcing Holland and Belgium to agree to it.

⁵ For the general treaty of the Congress of Vienna of June 9, 1815, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 2, pp. 3-180.

⁶ Cf. *op. cit.*, vol. 27, p. 994.

⁷ Jonkheer van Karnebeeck was Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs.

8. The maintenance of the independence of Belgium is constituted by the preamble to the new treaty the basis on which it is concluded.

9. Technical information as to the pilotage practice now in force on the Scheldt was somewhat lacking. I used the information contained in the Board of Trade letter of April 28⁸ as strongly as I could, but the precise means by which effect was to be given to the Board of Trade desires was not very clear. Are British vessels with a Belgian pilot on board, for instance, to be allowed to use a channel where in general the pilotage is done by Dutchmen? We all agreed at Paris that the method of meeting the Board of Trade requirements must be discussed by technical experts, and as the Dutch and the Belgians seemed anxious to meet the Board of Trade as far as possible, a draft letter was prepared to be signed simultaneously with the signature of the treaty, pledging the two Governments to try and meet the demand for the maintenance of pilotage privileges. The detailed arrangements about choice pilots could be worked out between the signature and the ratification of the treaty.

10. The net result is that under the new draft all the points provided for in the second Hurst-Fromageot scheme are covered except the exclusion of warships.

11. The relegation to the preamble of the provisions about the maintenance of the independence of Belgium necessitates a change in the form by which the ex-enemy Powers were to become participants in the treaty. It is most desirable to obtain German acceptance of the view that the independence of Belgium is the basis on which the treaty is concluded, and this will be more satisfactorily achieved by the accession of the ex-enemy Powers to the treaty as a whole than by signature in the form provided for in the second Hurst-Fromageot project.

12. The Dutch and Belgian Governments will probably press for the rapid conclusion of the treaty and it is, therefore, desirable to try and secure Dominion concurrence as quickly as possible.

C. J. B. H.

ANNEX I TO No. 499

Le 1^{er} Mai 1926

Révision des Traités
de 1839

S[a] M[ajesté] le Roi des Belges, le Président de la République française, S.M. le Roi du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne, etc . . .,⁹ S.M. la Reine des Pays-Bas, signataires des traités conclus à Londres le 19 avril 1839,

⁸ Not printed. The Board of Trade expressed the opinion that the British Lines should continue to be allowed to employ a particular pilot (Dutch or Belgian) for a particular ship irrespective of the nationality of the channel used.

⁹ Punctuation as in filed copy.

1^o entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, la Prusse et la Russie d'une part et les Pays-Bas d'autre part,

2^o entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, la Prusse et la Russie d'une part, et la Belgique d'autre part,

Étant tombés d'accord pour reconnaître, sur la base de l'indépendance complète et inaliénable¹⁰ de la Belgique, l'abrogation desdits Traités,

Et ayant pris en considération le Traité que S.M. le Roi des Belges et S.M. la Reine des Pays-Bas ont conclu à La Haye le 3 avril 1925, à l'effet d'en substituer les dispositions à celles du Traité conclu par la Belgique et les Pays-Bas à Londres le 19 avril 1839,

Ont résolu de consigner dans un Traité leur assentiment réciproque à cet égard et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs, savoir
.⁹ lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et dûe forme,

Sont convenus des dispositions suivantes:

ARTICLE 1

Les H[autes] P[arties] C[ontractantes] sont d'accord, chacune en ce qui la concerne, pour reconnaître que sont abrogés:

1^o les traités conclus le 19 avril 1839 entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, la Prusse et la Russie d'une part et les Pays-Bas d'autre part,

et 2^o entre l'Autriche, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, la Prusse et la Russie d'une part, et la Belgique d'autre part.

Les H.P.C. sont également d'accord pour reconnaître que la neutralité de la Belgique et le régime spécial du port d'Anvers ont pris fin.

ARTICLE 2

Le présent Traité sera ratifié aussitôt que possible.

Le dépôt des ratifications sera effectué à Paris et dès ce moment le traité aura pleine force et valeur.

L'Allemagne, l'Autriche et la Hongrie seront invitées par le Gouvernement de la République française à donner leur adhésion au présent Traité.

L'Union des Républiques Soviétistes Socialistes sera également invitée par le Gouvernement de la République française à donner son adhésion au présent Traité, étant entendu que la présente disposition ou l'adhésion éventuelle de ladite Union n'impliqueront pas la reconnaissance, à quelque titre que ce soit, du Gouvernement de cette Union par les Puissances qui ne l'ont pas reconnu.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires susnommés ont apposé ci-dessous leurs signatures.

Fait à Paris, le . . .⁹

(Signature des Puissances par ordre alphabétique)

¹⁰ This word was subsequently amended, in order to meet a Belgian request, to read 'inviolable'.

ANNEX II TO No. 499

NEW DUTCH TEXT¹¹

Protocole de Signature

Au moment de procéder à la signature du Traité en date de ce jour, il reste bien entendu que les Gouvernements belge et néerlandais n'ont voulu toucher en rien aux dispositions des articles 108 à 117 de l'Acte général du congrès de Vienne du 9 juin 1815 qui continueront comme par le passé d'être la base du régime des fleuves et rivières navigables qui séparent ou font communiquer les territoires belge et néerlandais.

ANNEX III TO No. 499

Projet de Note

Les Gouvernements belge et néerlandais se déclarent disposés à rechercher et à prendre les mesures propres à assurer¹² aux navires de commerce britanniques et français fréquentant régulièrement le port d'Anvers des facilités de pilotage analogues à celles dont ils jouissent actuellement.¹³

¹¹ Thus in filed copy. The earlier draft of the protocol is untraced in Foreign Office archives. Sir C. Hurst stated in a minute of May 10: 'When I was in Paris on Saturday, May 8, I asked Monsieur Fromageot whether he thought the new version of the Protocole de Signature, put forward by Mr. Beelaerts in substitution for that provisionally agreed on in Paris on May 1, was acceptable.

'The difference between the two is that the new Dutch proposal omits all reference to canals and intermediate waterways connecting Holland and Belgium and limits the obligation to the rivers to which articles 108 &c. of the Treaty of Vienna apply.

'Monsieur Fromageot told me that he could see no ground upon which we could object to it. The Allies were not in a position to claim as of right freedom of navigation on the artificial waterways which Holland and Belgium may construct for their mutual advantage. Furthermore, he considered the whole point academic. Holland and Belgium would both lose and not gain by any attempt to limit the navigational rights of foreign flags on these waterways. The fact that no binding obligation is recognised by the Protocol will not make any difference in the practice followed in Holland and Belgium.

'If France is determined to accept the new form of the Protocole de Signature, it does not seem feasible for H.M. Government to object.

'C. J. B. HURST 10th May, 1926'

¹² The following words were here subsequently inserted in order to meet a Netherland request: 'jusqu'à l'expiration des arrangements en cours'.

¹³ Owing to discussions regarding the amendment referred to in note 12 above, the treaty and protocol, though dated May 22, were not signed until May 27 by Lord Crewe. The Belgian and Netherland notes to Lord Crewe, incorporating the formula above, amended as in note 12, were also dated May 22, though apparently signed on May 28.

*The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 6, 2 p.m.)*

No. 169 Telegraphic: by telephone [C 5411/24/18]

PARIS, May 6, 1926

My telegram No. 162.¹

Difficulties referred to in above-mentioned telegram have been overcome.

First point. Germans have agreed to include in protocol of signature the following phrase.

Si les mesures ainsi édictées pour l'application de l'accord intervenu se révèlent insuffisantes dans la pratique, il appartiendra au gouvernement allemand, dont l'attention aura été attirée sur ces insuffisances, d'y remédier dans la mesure où l'expérience en aura montré la nécessité.

Il en sera ainsi, en particulier, si en ce qui concerne la formation du personnel, le développement de l'aviation à voile (Segelflug) en Allemagne, par ses répercussions sur la situation générale de l'aviation allemande, affecte l'application de l'article No. 198 du traité.²

Les listes des pilotes et élèves-pilotes de vol à voile seront tenues à jour. Elles seront mises éventuellement à la disposition de la Société des Nations en cas d'application de l'article No. 213 du traité de Versailles dans l'hypothèse prévue à l'alinéa précédent.

Second point. Avions de chasse.

Germans have agreed to suggested omission and relevant passage in article 3 of agreement now reads as follows:

'Le Gouvernement allemand subordonnera à une autorisation spéciale par lui délivrée la construction ou l'importation d'avions qui possèderaient les caractéristiques techniques d'avions de chasse modernes ou [*sic*] en ce qui concerne etc. etc.'

The full text of protocol and all documents were yesterday read through at meeting of allied and German delegates and agreed to by all.

It is intended to initial all documents tomorrow May 7th at 4 p.m. after which a short communiqué will be issued to the press to the effect that an agreement has been reached in this form of an exchange of letters. Separate communiqué will announce signature of Franco-German and Belgian-German air agreements.³

Details of agreement will be explained to the press in time for issue of Saturday⁴ morning's newspapers. Text of document goes by next bag.⁵ Please inform Air Ministry.

¹ No. 485.

² The Treaty of Versailles.

³ For the Franco-German and Belgian-German conventions of May 22 and May 29, respectively, concerning air navigation see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 126, pp. 656-61, and vol. 131, pp. 753-9.

⁴ May 8, 1926.

⁵ Lord Crewe transmitted French texts of the air agreement as initialled, and of the

attached protocol signed, in Paris on May 7 in his despatch No. 866 of May 10 (not printed), in which he also requested authority to sign the various documents. The texts transmitted were: (i) the protocol of May 7 with eight annexes as printed in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. lviii, pp. 346-62, except that the German law and decrees (annexes 1-5) were undated; (ii) undated letters (Pièces A and B) to be exchanged between the Conference of Ambassadors and the German Ambassador in Paris, with Annexes I and II thereto printed *ibid.*, pp. 332-4, 338-41, and 334-8, as signed on May 22; (iii) an undated letter from the Conference of Ambassadors to the German Ambassador in Paris regarding the régime of civil aviation in the occupied territories corresponding closely to the draft noted as Pièce E in note 1 to No. 466, with an undated German acknowledgement, printed in G. F. de Martens, *op. cit.*, vol. xvi, pp. 895-6, as exchanged on May 22; (iv) undated letters to be exchanged between the Conference of Ambassadors and the German Ambassador in Paris regarding airports in the demilitarized zone and installations at Friedrichshafen respectively, printed in *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. lviii, pp. 341-6, as signed on May 22.

No. 501

Sir G. Grahame (Brussels) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 6, 8.30 p.m.)

No. 54 Telegraphic [C 5416/5139/18]

BRUSSELS, May 6, 1926, 5.40 p.m.

I have given Minister for Foreign Affairs a paraphrase of first portion of your telegram No. 39¹ and a verbal exposé of last four paragraphs.

Being very busy and occupied with internal situation, he could not study paraphrase but I have little doubt but that he will agree with all your views. Chef de Cabinet expressed² absolute concurrence with those in last four paragraphs.

I also gave an account of them to Monsieur Rolin who exclaimed that they were 'golden, good sense'. He told me that Belgian government were still rather apprehensive of attitude of Quai d'Orsay. Monsieur Berthelot has said to Belgian Ambassador in Paris that at least German government should be categorically asked what they would do, after Germany was admitted to the Council, in the event of other ten members being unanimous. Would Germany undertake not to block a decision?

Monsieur Rolin enlarged on futility of such a step and impossibility of getting a satisfactory response from Berlin.

¹ No. 492.

² The preceding passage was subsequently amended to read 'He expressed'.

Sir W. Max Muller (Warsaw) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 7, 9 a.m.)

No. 56 *Telegraphic* [C 5439/5139/18]

WARSAW, May 6, 1926, 9 p.m.

Your telegram No. 28.¹

I have handed to retiring President of the Council paraphrase of first part of your telegram and spoke to him in the sense of the latter part leaving with him *aide mémoire* embodying substance of my remarks.

Count Skrzinski said that he must submit to expert examination juridical interpretation given by competent² advisers to Russo-German treaty and accompanying note and would communicate results to me later. Meanwhile he felt, however, that valuable opinion of British legal advisers with a statement³ from German government as to exact sense of ambiguous passage in the two documents would carry more weight with members of League of Nations. In his opinion question concerned not only Locarno powers but all members of the League and he was convinced that many of these would require from German government before they would vote for Germany's admission to the League definite assurances or at all events convincing explanations as to exact meaning of treaty.

Count Skrzinski agrees with you that we must avoid action that might drive Germany into the arms of Russia or imply that loyalty to the Covenant is synonymous with hostility to Russia though in his opinion whole German attitude in this matter implies that League as a body is hostile to Russia. He is anxious lest by adopting attitude of reserve as suggested by you Powers should again become the dupes of Germany who after entering League will interpret treaty as she likes and then assume an air of injured innocence and plead that she acted in good faith. To avoid . . .⁴ he felt that before Germany was admitted to the League she should be required in whatever manner was thought most politic to give categorical and satisfactory assurances as to precise meaning of treaty and (? note) and also as to her interpretation of note of December 1st regarding Article (? 16).

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 56. Repeated to Berlin No. 4.

¹ No. 492.

² This word was subsequently amended to read 'your'.

³ The preceding passage was subsequently amended to read 'however valuable opinion of British legal advisers might be a statement', &c.

⁴ The text as received was here uncertain and was subsequently amended to include 'this'.

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 7, 10.30 a.m.)

No. 171 *Telegraphic: by bag* [General 199/II]

PARIS, May 6, 1926

The Ambassadors' Conference met this morning under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon. I and the Japanese Ambassador were present. The Belgian Ambassador and representatives of the Italian and United States Embassies also attended. The following questions were considered: . . .¹

2. *Definition of War Material*

The Conference had before it my memorandum of April 26th² (see your despatch No. 1208³ (C. 4680/1134/18) of April 20th). It was decided to refer to a committee of secretaries the task of modifying the original draft to the German government (see my despatch No. 643⁴ of April 8th) in accordance with the observations contained in my memorandum.

3. *Presence of German military bands in the demilitarised zone*

It was decided to refer to the legal advisers and the Rhineland High Commission the Secretariat-General's note of May 3rd (see my despatch No. 845⁵ of May 6th). . . .¹

¹ The omitted sections related to other matters.

² Not printed. This memorandum followed closely the text cited in No. 440, note 2.

³ No. 440.

⁴ See No. 440, note 1.

⁵ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives; this note recorded a conversation between M. Massigli and Herr Rieth who maintained that the presence of military bands in the demilitarized zone did not constitute an infraction of article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles (cf. No. 140, note 6). In an opinion of June 14, the Drafting Committee stated that strictly speaking such presence was an infraction of article 43, but that the present case scarcely justified the strict application of the Treaty. The Committee suggested that an authorization might be granted to the German Government in each case before a band entered the zone. On July 28 the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission commented that in occupied territory it was necessary to prevent military concerts rousing the passions of the population, and in unoccupied territory the High Commission could not extend their mandate without the consent of the German Government. In a minute of August 16 Mr. Lampson proposed a policy of 'masterly inactivity' in this connexion.

Sir R. Hodgson (Moscow) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 17)

No. 348 [N 2241/387/38]

MOSCOW, May 6, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 273¹ of April 12th in which you were good enough to outline the policy of His Majesty's Government towards Soviet Russia.

2. The policy is a negative one and the question arises how long a purely negative policy is adequate to meet changing circumstances. It is a truism that the process of pacification in Europe cannot be regarded as complete so long as Soviet Russia remains outside the scope of those international agreements by which it is sought to attain that consummation: further, that the more successful the efforts made in that direction in the west, the more subtle will be the expedients which Moscow will devise to hamper a settlement which, not being a party to it, it persists in regarding as containing a covert menace to its security. Altruism is a virtue not known to the Soviet vocabulary and the sentiments which inspired the Locarno policy are rudely mistranslated in Moscow. Hence the frenzied activity which has characterised Soviet diplomacy of recent days:² hence M. Chicherin's pilgrimage around Europe last October with its fruitful³ visits to Berlin and Paris.

3. So long as Russia remains outside a rearranged Europe she will be an antagonist to it and will be a centre of intrigues directed to safeguarding her own position against what she believes to be a conspiracy against her. As to how deep the conviction goes that Western Europe is merely obedient to the behest of the British Foreign Office is a question which will not reward discussion. That Soviet leaders are day and night impressing upon their audiences the wickedness of western diplomacy, ever intent upon overthrowing the government of the 'first victorious country', does not mean that they necessarily believe in the hostility of those whom they decry: that M. Chicherin in the course of his travels abroad should have in season and out

¹ No. 416.

² Sir R. Hodgson had concluded his report, in Moscow despatch No. 313 of April 22, regarding possible agreements between the U.S.S.R. and limitrophe states, as follows: 'I think that it may fairly be assumed that the Soviet Government's abnormal activity on the international front is not unconnected with its misfortunes in Asia. With China and India, Persia and Afghanistan acclaiming her as their champion in the fight for freedom from imperialism, Soviet Russia is the centre of a wide and impressive panorama: when these countries fail her she becomes a dancing dervish in the wilderness. This is a rôle which, with the economic difficulties now besetting her, she cannot maintain for long, and the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is making desperate efforts to consolidate (? redeem) a menacing position in Europe by concluding arrangements with the neighbouring states such as will at once impress the Russian people with a sense of their importance as a factor in international affairs, and will make friends for this country among those who are liable to be drawn into hostile combinations against an isolated Soviet Union.'

³ This word was queried on the filed copy by Sir A. Chamberlain.

of season preached on the same text indicates that he, at all events, does.⁴ The position, I think, is that, having made up their minds that the proletarian state must of necessity be a butt to the enmity of the imperialistic world, the Bolsheviks have assimilated this conviction to such a degree that they cannot imagine anything else being the case, that they read into every word of those whom they regard as their natural foes a set hostility to the Soviet Union. This state of affairs is harmful from several points of view.

4. It is harmful because it renders the Soviet Government a foe to the efforts of western statesmen to restore peace and prosperity in Europe. And the time has passed when the Soviet Government can be written down as an insignificant group of fanatics which imposed its will upon an exhausted country by the aid of terroristic measures. It has by insensible progress become the Government of Russia. Whether it is a popular government or not is beside the point—certainly it has not succeeded in bringing well-being to any appreciable class and it is now struggling along under great difficulties, financial and economic. But it has destroyed all opposition and little by little is getting, if not the support, at all events the acquiescence of those who so lately as a couple of years ago were its irreconcilable adversaries. That it has been ostracised by western powers plays into its hands. Chicherin's reply to the invitation to take part in the Disarmament Conference, his refusal to let bygones be bygones in the matter of Vorovsky's murder, his contemptuous attitude towards Poland—these and a hundred other incidents go to strengthen the hold of the Bolsheviks on this country, to win the admiration, ever less and less reluctant, of their enemies at home.

5. It is harmful because it engenders an atmosphere of suspicion which makes the prospect of an understanding of any sort ever more remote—it widens the breach and there is a danger that it may culminate in a state of affairs which it will be past the ingenuity of man to mend. National animosities are unpleasant things, hard to reason with and very difficult to eradicate. The belief in the traditional enmity of England towards Russia dies hard: it is easy to revive it by the help of a subservient press which has the monopoly of news and uses this monopoly in order to persuade the masses that the leaders of British policy are spending sleepless nights weaving plots for the undoing of the Russian people. Public opinion in Russia is a force which is only beginning to come into existence: it is child's play to guide this nascent power in the direction which the ruling party wishes. A government which can claim that it has countered the machinations of the League of Nations by an arrangement with Germany to disarm the League as a weapon of offence against Russia, wins the easy applause of the Russian proletariat: a government which can scoff at the League's advances and turn them to ridicule has the suffrages of those who await the return of a 'Mighty Russia'.

6. It is harmful because, so long as Soviet politicians can convince their people that they are the victims of the nefarious designs of foreign statesmen, they can be sure of internal support for anything they may do in order to

⁴ Sir A. Chamberlain here made the marginal comment: 'The proof is insufficient. He *did*, but does he any longer?'

counter those designs. They will thus continue to form a focus of intrigue which will radiate distrust and uneasiness among neighbouring countries. They will always be endeavouring by one means or another to strengthen their position in Eastern Europe, to meet every move towards consolidation coming from the West by a counter move designed to protect their own interests.

7. It stands to reason that all this would be of no account were the Soviet Government tottering towards its fall. It is not—on the contrary, it is in spite of many troubles, gaining ground, winning through to solidity.⁵ Much ballast has already been thrown and much more has got to go, but there is not the slightest reason to believe that in the end it will not emerge, chastened no doubt, but a living and despotic organisation. Not long ago I had the honour to forward a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Peters which constitutes, I think, a most able summary of the economic situation and prospects of this country.⁶ The conclusions Mr. Peters states are those to which, as it seems

⁵ Sir A. Chamberlain here made the marginal comment: 'I have throughout held this opinion.'

⁶ The reference is probably to a long memorandum transmitted in Moscow despatch No. 147 of February 24. Mr. Peters described the essential features of the situation as follows:

'1. There has been a good harvest, and the peasants are relatively prosperous.

'2. Soviet industries have been and are very busy. Production has increased enormously; the difficulties experienced are shortage of raw materials (including fuel) and of goods which have to be obtained from abroad.

'3. There is a shortage of skilled labour. Industry, however, although absorbing large numbers of the unskilled workers who flock to the towns in search of employment, is unable to employ them all, and the total number of unemployed remains more or less the same. In the trade unions one out of nine members is out of work.

'4. Trade in almost all branches has been very good. The difficulty has been not in the sale of goods, but in finding goods to sell.

'5. Foreign trade, after expanding rapidly in 1925, is now restricted, partly as a result of a shortage of foreign currency caused by the failure to carry out the autumn programme of grain export, partly owing to the fact that prices in the Soviet Union make the export of many Soviet products actually unprofitable.

'6. As regards State finance, State revenue has increased enormously in recent years, and the State budget in 1924-25 was balanced without recourse to the printing press (a small item of revenue from silver coinage can hardly be considered in this connection). The deficit was at one time made good by forced loans, but since February 1925 subscription to loans has been made voluntary.

'7. As against the above the currency position has been causing anxiety, and measures have had to be taken to check inflation (withdrawal of currency from circulation, policy of credit restriction).

'In addition there continues to be, as noted above, a severe shortage of foreign currency which has led the Soviet Government—

(a) To undertake a campaign for the development of Soviet exports.

(b) To restrict the issue of import licences to cases where foreign goods are absolutely indispensable.

(c) To revise and usually to reduce all programmes of industrial reconstruction which involve the purchase of material or equipment from abroad.

'8. The difficulties now being experienced are financial. Since foreign commitments are not large, and since the Soviet Government are adopting a very cautious policy in the matter

to me, any person who has studied objectively the course of recent events in Russia will accord adhesion. Roughly speaking, Russia, which has been living on the capital wealth which the nationalisation of all property, all commercial and industrial enterprises, placed at her disposal, has now reached the point when this capital needs renewing—the apogee has been passed and a general movement of regression has set in. The failure of the export plan last year has left her without the wherewithal to make good the wastage against which in the past years she has been unable to provide a sinking fund. But, with the immense reserve of wealth which the country possesses, there is no reason to doubt but that she will be able, by granting occasional concessions to the imperative demands of her economic position, to get through the present crisis just as she has weathered those which preceded it. To discard the most treasured principles of the revolution presents no serious difficulty to the Soviet Government to-day.

8. These premises once conceded—and it would appear to me difficult to contest their validity—it follows that settlement of one kind or another with Russia will before long have to be made a practical issue of immediate moment. It will be objected that it is waste of time to seek agreement with a government which depends for its existence upon a political party, which as a matter of doctrine, clamours for the abolition of those very bourgeois governments with whom it has to treat and which enjoys the most intimate relations of parentage with an organisation in the shape of the Third International whose confessed aim and end it is to encompass the downfall of those governments and to substitute for them the dictatorship of the proletariat. And this argument is to a point unanswerable. There is no reason to think that the Communist party will abandon its precepts, or the Third International its practices. Yet the answer can no longer be regarded as complete; it does not meet the circumstances of to-day.

of any increase of these commitments there does not appear to be any reason why the present difficulties in regard to foreign currency should not be merely temporary. The *prospect* of a good harvest would in any case ease the position in May or June.

‘9. As regards the internal currency difficulties, the measures being taken now seem well designed. The pace of economic development may be slowed down. But it must not be forgotten that Soviet industry, which was expected to increase production in 1924–25 by 30 per cent., actually increased it by 60 per cent., and that even after recent pruning the programme of production for 1925–26 shows an increase of some 40 per cent. over actual output in 1924–25.

‘10. Leaving out of consideration the difficulties of liquidating the past (questions of debts and claims), and the political difficulties resulting from the association of the Soviet Government with the Communist party (all questions coming under the head ‘propaganda’), the impartial observer cannot but come to the conclusion that there is a steady trend upwards in the Soviet Union, and that long period credits granted to the Soviet Union for purposes of industrial reconstruction would have every reasonable prospect of being repaid at due date. The extent of the orders which might be placed in connection with reconstruction schemes in industry on condition that foreign suppliers grant long term credits is very considerable. The credit factor was never so important as now, when the Soviet Government have to strain their resources to supply requirements in respect of foreign currency. All engagements entered into by Soviet buyers in connection with purchases on credit have so far been scrupulously fulfilled.’

9. For inevitable processes have been and are at work. The Soviet Government has been continually in conflict with the conceptions to which it owes its being—to cope with practical exigencies it has had to recede little by little from the ideas which inspired the revolution and one of the difficulties which confront it to-day is so to camouflage its continued retreat as to allow a trusting proletariat to cherish the illusion that it, and not a very ordinary bureaucracy governs Russia. The fever of the revolution has subsided; the ardour of the revolutionary has spent itself: the Bolshevik Government, however much it dislikes it, is ever more and more becoming the prey of a bourgeois psychology. How can it be otherwise? The success of the Communist idea demanded, if not a new heaven, at all events a new earth. And the earth has refused to adapt itself. Thus Moscow, however much nonsense is exhibited on red banners, stuffed into youthful brains, or poured out through loud speakers to the populace, has to deal with precisely the same problems as any of its neighbours—and is dealing with them in very much the same way. The Soviet Government is ceasing to be a thing apart and its policy is crystallising into something which, but for the form in which it is enveloped, bears an ever-increasing resemblance to that of its predecessor. Nor is it surprising, for the new autocracy has the same elements to work upon as the old: it has evolved nothing startlingly new in its handling of them.

10. Granted that a settlement with Russia is in itself commendable, it becomes necessary to consider, first, whether the policy followed till now is apt to lead to one, secondly, should the first question be answered in the negative, what modifications of policy are likely to lead to the desired result, thirdly, whether the present is a suitable moment for putting into practice such modifications of policy as may be judged proper, fourthly, what tangible results a settlement is capable of giving.

11. The reply to the first question is, I think, that though the attitude of reserve maintained hitherto has been justified by results, the time has come when it is convenient to examine the merits of a more constructive policy. True, the Soviet Government has not put forward any reasonably concrete proposals for the settlement of outstanding differences, nor has it renounced allegiance to the Russian Communist Party. It has, however, declared its desire to resume negotiations; it has made unofficial enquiries as to what are the conditions in the agreement concluded in the time of the MacDonald Government which are unacceptable to the British Government of to-day;⁷ it has—by the mouth of M. Litvinov in his recent speech to the Central Executive Committee of the Union⁸—intimated its readiness not to let a question of prestige stand in the way of the initiation of conversations. To insist upon the literal fulfilment of the postulate that it should renounce allegiance to the Communist Party as a prelude to any attempt to settle differences is to postpone an understanding to the Greek Kalends. Nor, indeed, is it easy to rebut the contention that the Soviet Government is not unique in being the instrument of a political party or parties—that in this respect it presents no essential difference to other governments with which

⁷ See Nos. 142 and 150.

⁸ See No. 463, note 1.

His Majesty's Government is content to conduct negotiations when occasion demands.

12. And here the question of the Third International arises. The dependence of the Soviet Government on the Russian Communist Party is eminently distasteful to His Majesty's Government because of the organic connection between the same Russian Communist Party and the Third International. I should be the last to call in question the existence of intimate ties between the two organisations—but I would submit that it is possible to flatter the second of them, by attaching excessive importance to its powers for evil. In the last paragraph of my despatch No. 463⁹ of July 8th last, I ventured upon an appreciation of the value and probable progress of the Third International. Subsequent events have not tended to weaken the convictions to which I then gave expression. On the contrary, since that despatch was written, Zinoviev has been relegated to a position of secondary importance, the Chinese adventure with which he associated himself has ended—for the time being at all events—in an ignominious fiasco¹⁰ and the recent plenary session of 'Comintern' in Moscow took the shape of a long-drawn and intensely tiresome squabbling match. The association between the Soviet Government and the Third International can at any time be used as an argument for putting the former outside the pale—if that serves a purpose: it can be passed over with contempt should that attitude suit practical exigencies. And indeed it may be argued that there are and must be points of antagonism between Russia and Great Britain, and that it is not a matter of vital importance whether these inevitable differences find their manifestation in the actions of acknowledged agents of the Soviet Government or of individuals working for an organisation for which the Soviet Government can be held responsible.

13. In reply to the second question I would state the opinion that any arrangement which would place large sums of money, in cash or in the form of credits, at the free disposal of the Soviet Government would be manifestly harmful both as tending to support a vicious economic system whose innate weaknesses are already patent and as acting as a direct incentive to the Soviet Government to pursue, in China and elsewhere, its subversive activities. But it seems to me that advantage might usefully be taken of the professions of Soviet statesmen of their readiness to reach an accommodation with the country's creditors to invite them to give concrete form to their declarations, provided always that such proposals as shall be made will not be considered unless they contemplate a settlement of debts and compensation to British subjects for losses sustained in Russia as a result of the revolution. Also I consider that the decision to refuse the extension of export credits to Russia might well be reviewed in the light of the favourable experiences of foreign firms dealing with the Soviet Government during the last few

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ The reference was possibly to the expulsion from Peking in April by Marshals Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu of forces of the Kuominchun, under General Feng Yu-hsiang who was receiving Soviet support.

years and the fact that one other government at all events—the German Government—proposes to concede such credits and that it is undesirable that British trade should be placed in a disadvantageous position in the Russian market. Whether it will be convenient when discussing financial issues to import into the conversations the study of the political differences which divide England and Russia is a question which, I think, can only be decided when the nature of the proposals which the Soviet Government is prepared to make for debt settlement emerges.

14. As for the question whether the present is a propitious moment for giving the Soviet Government to understand that His Majesty's Government is prepared to re-open discussions with it, it seems to me that several considerations point to an affirmative reply. In the first place, the very difficult economic period which the Soviet Union is now traversing should incline it to adopt a reasonable attitude, secondly, the imminent breakdown of the Paris negotiations should serve as a warning, if one is needed, that it would be quite useless to approach London with a programme which does not include an attempt to give satisfaction on the principal points at issue. Thirdly, the failure of the Soviet Government's Asiatic policy should induce in it a frame of mind favourable for discussion of political questions in addition to those of economic or financial import.

15. The positive results which might accrue from a settlement stand out to some extent from the earlier paragraphs of this despatch. It should disabuse the Soviet Government of its obsession that British policy is directed to its undoing. If it fails in this it will at least deprive Moscow of much of the pabulum on which it battens and thereby diminish its capacity for doing harm by obstructing the efforts of Western statesmen to bring into being the pacification of Europe. One of the sources of the Bolsheviks' strength is that, being outside the comity of nations, they are to a proportionate extent relieved of the obligations of courtesy which international relations ordinarily imply—they feel themselves to be outlaws and use the wolfhead's privileges. Contact with Europe brings them into an orbit in which the observance of international amenities is inevitable—this influence has operated in the past and, as circumstances are continually driving existence in the Soviet Union into normal channels, it must operate more powerfully in the future. As for the concrete advantages to British trade which a settlement might bring it is needless here to insist upon them in detail. 'Industrialisation' is the watchword of Soviet Russia to-day and—it being obvious that cunctatory methods are useless to bring orders our way—any procedure which might assist our trade with this country is worth considering.

16. It is with extreme diffidence that I venture to place the foregoing considerations before you, more particularly as I realise that, in face of recent events connected with the strike in England,¹¹ they lose much of their appositiveness. I have, however, decided to put them before you thinking that it is incumbent upon me to acquaint you with the repercussions of the policy

¹¹ The coalminers' strike from April 30 to the end of November 1926 had led to a general strike from May 4 to 12.

of His Majesty's Government upon Anglo-Russian relations as seen from Moscow.

I have, &c.,
R. M. HODGSON

No. 505

*Letter from the Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 8)*

[C 5502/778/18]

Confidential

PARIS, May 6, 1926

My dear Chamberlain,

With reference to your private and personal letter of April 30th,¹ after talking the matter of the Russo-German Treaty over with Briand yesterday, as stated in my telegram No. 168² of yesterday, I asked him casually if he had noticed the terms of your reply to Ponsonby's question of the 21st April on the Allied occupation of the Rhineland. This was not strictly ingenuous, as I knew he had expressed admiration of it,³ which he repeated in unstinted terms. I said that you would be glad of this, and added that it might not be possible to regard the episode as closed, since it is likely that you will be further heckled by the Labour party in Parliament. Whenever the immediate excitement caused by the strike has diminished they will be looking round for sticks with which to beat the Government, and this is one ready to their hand. Briand saw that this was likely, and added that it would probably give the Labour party almost as much pleasure to deal a blow at him as at His Majesty's Government. He thought that if the question is raised again you can do nothing but repeat your answer in a somewhat different form, since, as a matter of fact, it cannot be said that Germany has actually fulfilled her obligations under the Treaty. He went on to observe, with a freedom which almost surprised me, that when Germany has joined the League of Nations this question of military occupation is bound to come up, as it were automatically, but until that day arrives it is impossible to deal with it in any form.

I then remarked that in the meantime there was always the troublesome question of the number of troops and of the hopes that had been held out of a considerable lessening of their number. If further questions are asked, as it is almost certain they will be, it would be the greatest help to you if you could reply, on his authority, that a progressive reduction is taking place. I did not go into any figures with him, or discuss the defence which, as you know, has been made for the failure to reduce, to the effect that the cadres just before the Treaty of Locarno had been exceptionally depleted by sending drafts to Morocco, so that it was only the bringing up to strength of these

¹ No. 487.

² No. 497.

³ In a letter of April 26 to Lord Crewe (copy transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 776 of April 27).

which keeps the total figure so high. This, by the way, is an explanation of the increase in some degree, but would not be regarded by the public as a justification. Briand went on to say that he supposed that if a parliamentary question is asked, there would be time enough for him to be able to supply you with information which would enable you to give a satisfactory answer. I will try to find out from the military side what the immediate prospects of reduction are, as it is not much use trying to get specific figures from our friend without giving him notice that they are required.

Briand was perfectly good-humoured about the whole business, and I do not think he got the notion that I was pressing him unfairly or at an inconvenient time.

Yours sincerely,
CREWE

No. 506

Letter from Mr. Lampson to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

[C 5436/5139/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 6, 1926

My dear Phipps,

This letter is written entirely on my own and without higher authority! Nonetheless I feel moved to write it, having just read your letter to Gregory of yesterday.¹

Are the French really quite mad? Do they realise that (apart from pushing Germany further into the arms of Russia, which they seem set on doing) any failure to bring Germany into the League means the non-entry into force of our guarantee under Locarno? Do they realise that if they lose Locarno they lose *almost certainly for all time* all chance of a guarantee from us? You probably know that in their heart of hearts there are many influential people here who don't really like that guarantee even as it is. But the public have endorsed it because they believe it is essential, to get back to a state of reasonable political and economic stability in Western Europe. And for that some risks and some sacrifices are necessary and justified. But the longer Locarno hangs fire the greater the risk that things may go wrong. Ergo, get Germany into the League as soon as possible and put an end to this period of transition which we none of us want.

Perhaps it is unnecessary for me to write this to you. But I feel sure that it does not overstate facts: and if our French friends could be made to realise

¹ Not printed. This letter reported conversations with M. René Pinon, foreign editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and M. Jules Sauerwein of the *Matin*, who both took 'a very unreasonable view of the Russo-German Convention and both declare that we should make it an excuse for postponing the entry of Germany into the League of Nations'. Mr. Phipps thought M. Sauerwein's expressing such views was significant owing to his connexions with M. Berthelot.

that over this Russo-German treaty they really are in danger of destroying Locarno *perhaps* they might be more inclined to go a bit slow?

I may say that in a very friendly and informal way, I said as much to Fleuriau the other day: and I think he realised that it was true.

Incidentally, how has Briand received our final considered opinion on the Russo-German treaty? To my mind it largely answers and refutes the French view, as communicated to us by Fleuriau on Monday in a memorandum:² indeed it is questionable to my mind whether any further reply is really necessary or wise—for we don't want to get drawn into an exchange of contentious arguments on such a subject. What do you feel about it?

M. W. LAMPSON

² See No. 494.

No. 507

Sir G. Clerk (Prague) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 8, 9 a.m.)

No. 31 Telegraphic [C 5453/5139/18]

PRAGUE, May 7, 1926, 8 p.m.

Your telegram No. 19.¹

Substance communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs and he agrees generally with juridical appreciation except possibly with regard to statement that second case of article 3 applies where there is no war at all, but where in time of peace attempt is made to organize economic boycott of Russia and that such a case is outside the covenant, as it is to occur only in peace time and covenant deals only with cases where there has been resort to war. Minister for Foreign Affairs is inclined to think that juridically speaking application of economic sanction by League of Nations does not necessarily mean resort to war. Point is more or less academic since Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that treaty and accompanying notes are juridically speaking unassailable, and that as you say everything really depends on how Germany interprets treaty, which time alone will show.

Minister for Foreign Affairs therefore entirely agrees with your intention to adopt attitude of reserve.

In further conversation Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that none the less certain political results had flowed from signature of Russo-German treaty. Rightly or wrongly signature had aroused general uneasiness, further, Germany had given definite direction to her policy, namely, as Bismarck in his time had sought to do, to 'marcher ensemble' with Russia.

Such a policy was not of necessity anti-western but it was a fact that must be borne in mind by other European powers.

Lastly although it was always known that unanimity was necessary for decisions of Council of League of Nations, Doctor Stresemann's note had brought home with unpleasant bluntness, especially to smaller states, that

¹ No. 492.

not only was it necessary but unlikely. There was now fear that an aggressive state would feel encouraged to pursue its policy because it could count upon odds against unanimity of Council. This apprehension had not been aroused by thought of Germany's entry into League of Nations, but by terms of Doctor Stresemann's note.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me he had definitely decided not to attend commission for discussion of reorganisation of Council which would meet on May 10th, first because no other foreign ministers were going and secondly because he had already been brought into sufficient notoriety in the matter of Russo-German treaty and should the findings of the commission make Germany's entry any more difficult he would, had he been present, certainly be once more accused of being the evil genius of the piece.

No. 508

Memorandum by Sir C. Hurst respecting Disarmament
[W 3903/78/98]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 7, 1926

Lord Cecil's question is: 'How far is it true that Germany's obligation to maintain disarmament is dependent on the Allied obligation to formulate a scheme of disarmament?'

I append a memorandum by Mr. Beckett¹ with which I agree.

If by the word 'formulate' in the question is meant 'formulate and bring into operation', the memorandum shows that except so far as article 164 of the Treaty of Versailles operates, the continuance in force of Part V of that treaty, regulating the naval, military and air forces of Germany, is not dependent on the adoption of any disarmament scheme by the Allies. The obligation of all Members of the League, including the Allies, to co-operate in disarmament flows from article 8.

C. J. B. H.

ANNEX TO No. 508

Memorandum by Mr. Beckett

1. Morally, as both Lord Cecil and Sir C. Hurst have agreed, there is a very strong obligation on the Allies towards Germany to carry out themselves a scheme of disarmament, which arises out of the Preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, the memorandum attached to the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers of June 16th, 1919 (part V, Section I, paragraphs I, II and III²), and statements made at Locarno³ and elsewhere. The Allies

¹ An assistant legal adviser to the Foreign Office.

² These paragraphs are cited in paragraph 3 of No. 326.

³ A copy of the last two paragraphs of the Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference was annexed to another copy of this memorandum. These paragraphs are cited in the Appendix, paragraph 52.

have made declarations to Germany in these various places of their firm intention to do so. Article 8 of the Covenant is part of the Treaty of Versailles and prescribes the method and machinery for the bringing about of a general limitation of armaments (in which the Allies will of course be included) which the Allied and Associated Powers agreed both amongst themselves and with all other Members of the League to adopt. (Germany of course, until she becomes a Member, has no rights under Article 8.)

The reference to a general limitation of armaments in the Preamble to Part V and in the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers, which the Allied and Associated Powers in these texts intimated their intention to carry out, must be references to a general limitation carried out by the method and machinery of Article 8 of the Covenant and by no other. Therefore it follows that the obligation, of whatever kind it may be, on the Allies towards Germany which springs from these texts is not 'themselves to carry out a scheme of disarmament' but can only be 'to work by means of the machinery of Article 8 to bring about the general limitation of armament by all nations'.

The limits to which the Allied Powers have thus declared to Germany that it is their intention to disarm are therefore those prescribed in paragraph 1 of Article 8, viz. 'the lowest point consistent with national safety and [the] enforcement by common action of international obligations, taking into account the geographical situation and circumstances of each State'. The disarmament which is imposed on Germany by Part V of the Treaty is described as 'the first steps'⁴ towards it. It does not follow that the standard of limitation prescribed by Part V is precisely that which is indicated in Article 8—it may be more and it may be less, because, until Germany becomes a Member of the League, she has no duty 'to enforce by common action international obligations', and, when she becomes a Member of the League, the Council of the League may agree that the armament allowed by Part V is not great enough for that purpose and increase it (see Article 164).

I fully realise that this last is a dangerous argument to employ, though I think it is legally correct.

2. So much for moral obligations. Is there any legal obligation on the Allies towards Germany to 'carry out a scheme of disarmament'⁴? The passages from which such an obligation must be deduced, if it exists at all (viz. the Preamble to Part V and Part V of the memorandum referred to) only speak of a 'general limitation of the armaments of *all* nations'. Therefore there is clearly no obligation on the Allies to carry out any disarmament themselves except as part of a scheme for the disarmament of all nations.

3. The obligation on Germany to disarm to the limits prescribed by Part V was clearly (as Lord Cecil points out) unconditional. Is the obligation to remain disarmed (which is found in Article 164) also unconditional?

On what can it be said to be conditional, if it is conditional on anything?

If the condition is to be extracted from the Preamble to Part V, it must be either 'the general limitation of the armaments of *all* nations' (viz. the

⁴ Cf. No. 326.

reduction of the armaments of all nations to the standard prescribed by Article 8) or the 'initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations' (viz. some general agreement which is a first step to the reduction to that standard; though the limitation created by this general agreement may be less than that standard requires. In any case it has no relation to Germany's limitation under Part V).

In either case it is the limitation of the armaments of *all* nations which is envisaged. Therefore, if this is a condition, it must be supposed that the Allied and Associated Powers made Germany's continued disarmament dependent on all nations (including Russia) doing something, a condition whose fulfilment the Allies were powerless to secure.—This seems to be on the face of it somewhat unlikely.

The memorandum of July [June] 16th, 1919, Part V, Section I, paragraph I, is at any rate open to the more reasonable construction that the 'condition' (if there is a condition) is that the Allied and Associated Powers *will seek* to bring about a general reduction by the machinery of the League of Nations.

4. On the construction, however, both of the Preamble to Part V and of the relevant passages of the memorandum of July 19th [June 16, 1919], the references to 'general limitation of armaments' are clearly not inserted in the form of *either* obligations undertaken by the Allies towards Germany *or* conditions on whose fulfilment any obligations undertaken by Germany were dependent. The Preamble says: '*In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation . . .*'⁵. That is to say, it constitutes a declaration by the Allies of the reasons why they are requiring this limitation of Germany's armaments. This is not the same as making Germany's obligation dependent on the fulfilment by the Allies of their own purpose. The memorandum of July 19th [*sic*] shows this very clearly: 'The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely *with the object* of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume a [her] policy . . .'⁵; i.e., it is simply a declaration of the object of the Allied and Associated Powers themselves. In a legal instrument *obligations* and *conditions* must be clearly expressed. They cannot be construed from such words as these.

5. The obligation on Germany to keep her armaments within the narrow limits of Part V is unconditional.

It is not necessarily perpetual. Its duration is prescribed by Article 164; she is obliged to keep within these limits till she becomes a Member of the League. After that the Council of the League may modify them.

Even if the Allies do not carry out or succeed in their intention of promoting general disarmament, it does not follow that the Germans 'shall be for ever kept in a condition of inferiority to the other nations of Europe'.⁴ The Council in acting under its powers in Article 164 will take the existing state of affairs into consideration.

W. E. BECKETT

⁵ Punctuation as in original quotation.

No. 509

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

No. 66 Telegraphic [C 5403/5139/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 8, 1926, 8 p.m.

Paris telegram No. 168¹ (of the 5th May. Russo-German treaty).

M. Briand's desire for some voluntary declaration regarding articles 16 and 17 of the covenant is very natural and entirely shared by me. I should hope that if generously and clearly expressed it would much ease the situation.

As it appears from fourth paragraph of your telegram No. 137² that Dr. Stresemann in fact already contemplates a Reichstag speech in order to dispel all doubts as to the good faith of German government as regards both the League and Locarno, he might well use that opportunity to dispel any doubts as to Germany's intention regarding articles 16 and 17 of the covenant.

You will presumably already have spoken to him on this very point on the strength of the final paragraph of my telegram No. 64;³ and I request that you will now follow that up by letting him know the desirability in the general interest of some specific reference to articles 16 and 17 to meet M. Briand's point.

I do not however wish you to say anything to Dr. Stresemann regarding Monsieur Briand's allusion to Article 10 of the Geneva Protocol. I could not favour anything of the sort; nor would there in any case be any useful purpose in now suggesting amended provisions to a document already signed.

Addressed to Berlin, repeated to Paris by bag No. 106, Brussels No. 41 and Rome No. 129.

¹ No. 497.

² No. 482.

³ See No. 492.

No. 510

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)

Unnumbered Telegraphic [C 5403/5139/18]

Personal

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 8, 1926, 10.50 p.m.

My telegram No. 66¹ of today.

You are aware that I have from the first presumed the good faith of the German government and used all our influence to secure fair and even friendly consideration of the German action in other capitals. Stresemann owes me something in return and I rely on you to persuade him to make this time a speech directed to foreign audiences and calculated to reassure them. The trouble with the Germans is that they never think of any public opinion except their own. You can help greatly by showing Stresemann what are the points which he ought to make.

¹ No. 509.

Letter from Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Mr. Lampson (Received May 10)

[C 5503/5139/18]

PARIS, May 8, 1926

My dear Lampson,

Your letter of May 6th.¹

I do not think the French are really mad, but they are very feminine. Perhaps you will be unkind enough to say that the two things are almost identical. They are certainly at present in a very pettish frame of mind, but it must be admitted that things have not gone any too well for them lately. They came out of the Ruhr and the franc fell. They agreed to the Dawes plan and the franc fell. They signed the Locarno treaties and the franc fell. They have failed to make peace in Morocco and the franc will presumably fall still further. The substitution of Jouvenel for the ineffable Sarraïl² has not brought peace to Syria. That bearded Socialist Niebelung, Varenne,³ seems to have wrought chaos in Indo-China. Even the misfortunes of their British friends, such as our general strike, have only contributed to make the franc fall further still and neither the American debt settlement nor the balancing of the budget has arrested that fall. In the political sphere the recent Russo-German Convention has been the bitterest pill of all for the French to swallow. Legally and technically and even actually that Convention may be innocuous, but its psychological effect on France has been and continues to be deplorable, whatever sound and solid arguments one may use to that unreasonable lady. Many of the above-mentioned contretemps are doubtless due to her own mistakes, but the realisation of that fact would not make her temper any the sweeter.

Perhaps some of my recent letters have been too pessimistic, but I felt it was only right to let you know the change which has come over Berthelot and indeed a large section of French public opinion since the announcement of the fatal Russo-German Convention. We must not, however, I think, take things too tragically, for after all Berthelot, brilliant and clever as he is, is only a tail, and seems with time, less and less able to wag the Briand dog, who, I feel convinced, having staked everything on Locarno, will continue to make every sacrifice in order to carry through that policy, which, indeed, seems to be the only one that has any chance of averting a catastrophe. Fortunately, Parliament does not meet until May 27th, and things may by then look a little brighter and the shock of the Russo-German Convention may have had time to be somewhat deadened. Fortunately also, Pinons and Sauerweins do not count with the Cartel of the Left, who are a majority—though not an overwhelming one—in the present Chamber and who are irremediably committed to Locarno. I think, however, after all the setbacks and disappointments which the Left have encountered despite their

¹ No. 506.² As French High Commissioner in Syria and the Lebanon.³ Governor-General of Indo-China.

so much more reasonable policy, that we should do well to avoid as far as possible, until the entry of Germany into the League, raising any such ticklish and delicate questions as the curtailment of the occupation of the second and third zones, or indeed any serious alleviations such as would have been natural, if Germany had been content only to face west instead of simultaneously ogling the Russian bear. If we 'nurse' frightened France, provided British public and parliamentary opinion permit such treatment, until the entry of Germany into the League, I feel sure that we shall, in spite of all firebrands here, succeed in implementing the Locarno policy. Afterwards . . .⁴ having tried the honey, we can, if need be, uncork our bottle of vinegar.

Yours ever,
ERIC PHIPPS

⁴ Punctuation as in original.

No. 512

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 11, 9 a.m.)

No. 145 Telegraphic [C 5565/5139/18]

BERLIN, May 10, 1926, 8.10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 66.¹

I had a long interview this morning with Minister for Foreign Affairs and discussed the position in the light of above-mentioned telegram.

His Excellency began by saying that in every capital German government had found evidence of the beneficial influence you had exercised over European opinion as regards approval of German treaty. He desired to express appreciation of what you had done: his gratitude was evidently sincere.

As regards further declaration respecting articles 16 and 17 he was disposed to take whatever steps would be appropriate.

The Reichstag debate would not take place till June. That was too late. He could not invent an occasion for a speech and pull in a declaration by the ears. That would be too obvious. He thought the best plan was to wait till Dr. Gaus had a conversation with Sir C. Hurst and M. Fromageot at Geneva.² They would talk matters over and see if any further explanation of a specific kind would be useful. He would telegraph to Dr. Gaus and await his answer.

Then—having heard what Dr. Gaus had to say—he would give a special interview to 'Times' correspondent and make Germany's position quite clear.

He thought this better than waiting for Reichstag: better than statement through Wolff.

¹ No. 509.

² In a letter of May 9 to Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir C. Hurst had welcomed a proposal by M. Fromageot that they should hold a discussion with Dr. Gaus and 'should make sure that he corroborates the view of the treaty and of the Stresemann note taken in our recent communication to the French'.

In the whole conversation attitude of His Excellency was extremely forthcoming—he appeared anxious to remove any legitimate cause of apprehension.

No. 513

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 11, 9 a.m.)

No. 146 Telegraphic [Germany 24/11]

BERLIN, May 10, 1926, 8.10 p.m.

My telegram No. 145.¹

At close of interview this morning Minister for Foreign Affairs desired me to tell you formally that if anyone felt anxious as to continuation of Locarno policy by German Government, such anxiety was completely and absolutely groundless. There was no reason for it. You could make any public use of this statement that you thought expedient.

His Excellency added that conclusion of air negotiations had made an excellent impression; the fact that agreement had been reached had increased the already large majority in Germany who were in favour of Locarno.

¹ No. 512.

No. 514

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 11, 9 a.m.)

No. 147 Telegraphic [C 5555/5139/18]

Secret

BERLIN, May 10, 1926, 8.10 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Speaking privately Minister for Foreign Affairs fully recognises that the wording of paragraph 3 and of commentary thereon² might easily have been better. He had told Gaus that the actual text was all very well for Legists, but would certainly arouse suspicion in the lay mind. Gaus had insisted that nobody who understood German and legal phraseology could possibly feel alarmed.

Happily Dr. Stresemann had been able to eliminate two further passages of a similar character which stood in the original draft. These would have created a terrific fuss if they had been retained.

¹ No. 513.

² The reference is presumably to article 3 of the Treaty of Berlin and to paragraph 3 of Dr. Stresemann's note to M. Krestinski.

No. 515

Viscount D'Aberton (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 11, 9 a.m.)

No. 148 Telegraphic [C 5556/5139/18]

BERLIN, May 10, 1926, 8.10 p.m.

Russo-German treaty.

Turkish government have telegraphed to German government congratulations on the treaty which they regard as tending to promote peace and security.

German reports from Constantinople and my colleagues state that Turkish government are considering question of joining League of Nations.

Speaking confidentially Minister for Foreign Affairs anticipates that Russia will be represented at Geneva within eighteen months. He is convinced that whole tendency of Moscow is to get in touch with the west. Locarno and want of money have made such an impression on them that they are no longer truculent. But he desires that these views of his should be kept entirely private.

No. 516

Note from Sir A. Chamberlain to the French Ambassador
[C 5403/5139/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 10, 1926

Your Excellency,

His Majesty's Government have studied with all the attention which the importance of the question demands Your Excellency's memorandum of the 3rd May¹ setting forth the views of the French Government in regard to the Russo-German Treaty of the 24th April and the accompanying exchange of notes between the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador in Berlin. You are already aware of the views that His Majesty's Government have formed after a considered examination of the text of these documents, from the aide-mémoire handed to Monsieur Briand by His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris on the 5th May,² of which I had the honour to transmit to you a copy in my note of May 7th.³

2. I need not say that the particular points of difficulty to which attention is drawn in your memorandum at once presented themselves to His Majesty's Government on their first perusal of the documents in question; but after further consideration, they reached the conclusion that, however inopportune might have been the moment chosen for the signature of the treaty, there was nothing in the actual terms of the treaty itself or of Doctor Stresemann's note of the 24th April which could be held to be incompatible either with the

¹ No. 494.

² See No. 497, note 2.

³ This interim reply to No. 494 is not printed.

Covenant of the League or with the Conventions of Locarno. It was for that reason that His Majesty's Government deprecated any demand for explanations from the German Government on the part of other powers.

3. It may be useful to convey to you the impressions of His Majesty's Government in respect of the three points on which the French Government lay particular emphasis. As regards the first point, His Majesty's Government for the reasons given in Lord Crewe's aide-mémoire of May 5th, are satisfied that Article 2 of the treaty embodies no idea contrary to the Covenant or to Locarno. They feel, moreover, that the fact that Russia might refuse to accept the obligations of membership of the League under Article 17 of the Covenant has no bearing on the article in question, seeing that the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant only apply when a non-member both refuses to accept the obligations of Article 17 *and resorts to war*, against a member of the League. But article 2 of the Russo-German treaty only contemplates cases where one of the parties has suffered an unprovoked attack.

4. In regard to the second point raised in your memorandum, His Majesty's Government cannot feel that the assurances given in Doctor Stresemann's note of the 24th April, even when read in conjunction with Article 1 of the Treaty itself, can be considered as in any way running counter to Article 16 of the Covenant. Doctor Stresemann's assurances as regards Article 16 cannot in the view of His Majesty's Government be regarded as amounting to more than an undertaking that Germany will consider without prejudice any complaint by a member of the League that Russia has been guilty of an act of aggression. This undertaking would seem to be unaffected by the provisions of Article 1 of the Treaty, which is no more than the usual provision whereby two states express their desire to introduce and maintain terms of intimacy.

5. In regard to the third point in your memorandum, His Majesty's Government do not read the third paragraph of Dr. Stresemann's note of April 24th as invoking the note of the Locarno powers of December 1st 1925, to justify the provisions of article 3 of the treaty whereby Germany undertakes not to take part in an economic or financial boycott against Russia in certain conditions. That undertaking would indeed seem to require no such justification, seeing that, for the reasons given in Lord Crewe's aide-mémoire of May 5th the article cannot, in the view of His Majesty's Government be regarded as inconsistent with the Covenant.

6. But not only are His Majesty's Government of the considered opinion that there is nothing in the treaty or the exchange of notes which can be held to be inconsistent with the Covenant, but they are also of opinion that there is nothing to which the Locarno powers could take exception as being in conflict with the verbal explanations given by the German Delegation during the discussions of article 16 of the Covenant at Locarno. The upshot of those discussions was that, in deference to the earnest representations of the allied delegates, the German delegation abandoned the right to neutrality which had been previously claimed by the German Government in the case of sanctions under article 16 coming into play. The German delegates contended

that they were not asking for privileges, but only for special treatment so long as Germany was disarmed to an extent out of all proportion to other powers, and finally they accepted the note from the Locarno powers of December 1st 1925, as satisfying their special position. But that note, as you are aware, makes it clear that every member of the League is bound to collaborate loyally and effectively to the best of its ability in defence of the Covenant and to oppose any act of aggression. Moreover, the reason, apart from the question of Germany's disarmed condition, given by the German delegates for their desire for some recognition of Germany's difficulties was that she neither desired, nor would in practice be able, by her vote to prevent the Council from taking action under Article 16 against a state which had clearly proved itself to be the aggressor, even though such action was unwelcome to her.

7. A careful examination of the Russo-German treaty and of Doctor Stresemann's note of April 24th would seem to show that the German Government have given no undertaking to the Russian Government contrary to the principles which were recognised by the delegates of all the powers represented at Locarno. This is a further reason why His Majesty's Government would be reluctant to join in any representations to the German Government on the question, and it is with considerable satisfaction that they now learn that Monsieur Briand in conversation with Lord Crewe on May 5th declared himself as being in complete agreement as to the undesirability of a protest to the German Government against the treaty or the accompanying notes.

I have, &c.,
A. CHAMBERLAIN

No. 517

Sir A. Chamberlain to Mr. London (Geneva)
*No. 32 Telegraphic [W 4304/223/98]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 11, 1926

Following for Lord Cecil:¹

'I think it is important that, if you have not already done so, you should have early frank exchange of opinion with German representative.'

¹ Lord Cecil was attending the Committee on the Composition of the Council, which sat at Geneva from May 10 to 17. The minutes of this committee are printed in League of Nations document C. 299. M. 139. 1926. V: *Committee on the Composition of the Council* (Report on the Work of the First Session with Minutes: Geneva, 1926), pp. 8-112.

No. 518

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 12, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 75 Telegraphic [W 4139/223/98]

GENEVA, May 12, 1926, 5.55 p.m.

Following from Lord Cecil:

Your telegram No. 32.¹

I have seen German representative who assures me of his desire to co-operate whole heartedly in finding a solution. He says failure of last March has inevitably produced unfortunate impression in Germany. Repetition of failure in September would make it very difficult for Germany to maintain her application for admission. Point on which German government must insist is that Poland be not given permanent seat at the same time as Germany. Moreover, if any system of semi-permanent seats is instituted German government would strongly object to any recommendation that one of these be reserved for Poland: they could not of course object if Assembly in free exercise of its right of selection chose Poland to fill one of them. As regards Spain, German government would be prepared to go as far as possible to satisfy Spanish aspirations. Von Hoesch even suggested that Locarno powers might sign declaration in favour, in principle, of re-election of Spain for a more or less indefinite period but personally I hardly think this feasible or desirable.

I had private conversation with Spanish representative who informed me that his instructions are categorical viz: Spain must have permanent seat and can accept no other solution. Attitude of Brazilian representative seems to show that he is in the same position. This being so I think it would be best for the committee to continue discussions with a view to arriving at the largest possible measure of agreement on other aspects of the problem i.e. duration of mandate, rotation etc., and, when they reach the deadlock caused by Spanish and Brazilian attitude in regard to permanent seat, to adjourn. Polish representative who I think can be induced to be satisfied with system of semi-permanent seat[s] suggests that adjournment could be ostensibly for the purpose of drafting definite regulations giving effect to decisions taken by committee on other points. Interval might be utilized in trying effect of special appeal by governments.

¹ No. 517.

No. 519

Sir A. Chamberlain to Mr. London (Geneva)
Unnumbered Telegraphic [C 5540/5139/18]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 12, 1926, 7 p.m.

Following for Sir C. Hurst.

Your letter to Tyrrell of May 9th.¹

¹ See No. 512, note 2.

As a result of our arguments Monsieur Briand has agreed to abandon his proposal that the German government should be asked officially by the Locarno powers for definite explanations on points raised in French Ambassador's note of May 3rd.² He now suggests that as you and the French, Belgian, Italian and German legal advisers are all together in Geneva, advantage should be taken of this fact for you and your foreign colleagues to exchange views on the questions which have been raised. Gaus has we understand been authorised to participate.

The Secretary of State agrees and indeed sees advantage in your exchanging views with your colleagues at Geneva, provided always that these are strictly unofficial and informal. He has so informed French Ambassador here. Our policy, as you know, is to avoid getting drawn into any contentious discussion of the treaty and to prevent as far as possible the German government's assurance from being undermined by hostile legal arguments. Our aim is to still the suspicions of France by strengthening and developing the assurances already given by Stresemann, and thereby help to make the latter's case still more convincing.

LAMPSON

² No. 494.

No. 520

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 13, 9 a.m.)

No. 154 Telegraphic [C 5624/234/18]

BERLIN, May 12 [13],¹ 1926, 12.9 a.m.

Considerable sensation has been caused to-day by publication of a report of Prussian President of police stating on information received he had made perquisitions in the houses of several leaders of patriotic societies. These perquisitions have led to discovery of incriminating documents showing that plans existed for a putsch and for overturn of regular government.

Principal association concerned was 'Sportverein Olympia' whose leader is Colonel Luck, one of the most fanatical of reactionaries.

Another leader who appears deeply compromised is Justizrat Class, leader of 'Alld deutscher Verband'. In his desk was found a copy of an urgent decree suppressing regular government together with correspondence with Imperial family. Several leading industrialists in the Ruhr are also stated to be involved.

On basis of material in its possession Prussian police has demanded immediate dissolution of following sport organizations—Werwolf Wiking, Olympia, Ostmaerkischer Heimatsbund.²

¹ Presumed date of despatch of this telegram which was drafted on May 12.

² In amplification of this telegram Lord D'Abernon transmitted, in Berlin despatch No. 285 of May 12, a report of the same date by Lieutenant Hume, who concluded: 'It

would appear probable that the energetic interference of the Prussian police will be successful in suppressing any possible outbreak. As regards the attitude of the Reichswehr towards such a plan, this is not easy to define. Connection between units and individuals of the Reichswehr and of Associations has undoubtedly existed in the past, the relationship being in many cases extremely close. Such relationships still exist, but are largely on an individual basis. The Reichswehr, as such, is united in its allegiance to its Commander-in-Chief, the President, who, as Germany's military hero, has, in the eyes of the soldier, now filled a gap which, until his election to the presidency, was very noticeable in the Republican Constitution, and which could only be inadequately filled by the "Chef der Heeresleitung", General von Seeckt. It may therefore be assumed that the Reichswehr, itself in many respects a "state within the state", would refuse to co-operate on a grand scale with the Nationalist Associations in the erection of a dictatorship of the extreme Right.'

No. 521

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 13, 9 p.m.)
No. 112 Telegraphic [C 5671/5139/18]

ROME, May 13, 1926, 6.35 p.m.

My telegram 101.¹

Signor Mussolini says that he is in such entire agreement with your views that he has no observations to offer upon them. The only sensible policy is to put the best face on the situation, and any recrimination would only aggravate it.

His Excellency then drew my attention to Senator Scialoja's speech at Geneva,² saying that he trusted that it would cause you satisfaction. He had given to Senator two clear instructions. One was that the admission of Germany into the League must be secured at all costs, and any proposals, from whatever quarter, likely to hinder or retard this entry must be opposed. The Polish Minister here had already delivered a protest on behalf of his government against the line Senator Scialoja was taking. The second point was to insist on unanimous League decisions. He would sooner that Italy left the League than agree to any proposal which limited her independence.

¹ No. 498.

² See League of Nations, *Committee on the Composition of the Council*, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12, for Signor Scialoja's speech of May 10.

No. 522

Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin)
No. 69 Telegraphic [C 5565/5139/18]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 13, 1926, 10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 145¹ and my telegram to Paris No. 112² (of the 10th and 12th May: Russo-German treaty).

¹ No. 512.

² Not printed. This telegram, repeated to Rome, Brussels, and Berlin, was substantially the same as the instructions to Sir C. Hurst in No. 519, omitting the last two sentences.

Please inform Dr. Stresemann of my instructions to Sir C. Hurst and add that I warmly welcomed Dr. Stresemann's suggestion for an exchange of views between the lawyers and highly appreciate his readiness to do anything appropriate to clear up existing doubts and misunderstandings.³

³ Lord D'Abernon replied in Berlin telegram No. 159 of May 14 that Dr. Stresemann was 'much gratified' by this message.

No. 523

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 14, 11 a.m.)

No. 180 Telegraphic: by bag [C 5657/5139/18]

PARIS, May 13, 1926

Your telegram No. 112 of yesterday.¹

2. Monsieur Berthelot told Mr. Phipps today that Monsieur Fromageot had informed the French government by telegraph that he was well satisfied with the conversations he had had at Geneva on the Russo-German Convention with the German legal adviser, who had given him satisfactory assurances on all the questions raised in connection with the Convention. Dr. Gaus had merely stipulated that these assurances should not be made public.²

3. Monsieur Berthelot seemed to be in a much more reasonable frame of mind, and to have put a good deal of water into his wine.

¹ See No. 522, note 2.

² Sir C. Hurst reported similarly in Geneva telegram No. 82 of May 14.

No. 524

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 17, 9 a.m.)

*No. 90 Telegraphic [W 4304/223/98]**

GENEVA, May 16, 1926, 6 p.m.

My telegram No. 87.¹

Sub-committee yesterday agreed on text embodying principles of British proposals (Locarno document No. 8).²

Article 1 unchanged.

Article 2 now reads:

'Retiring member may not be re-elected for three years from date of expiration of mandate unless Assembly decides otherwise, either at that date or in the course of three years, by a majority of (*blank*) number.

¹ Not printed. This telegram reported on the session of the Committee on the Composition of the Council on May 15: see League of Nations, *Committee on the Composition of the Council*, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-92.

² The reference would appear to be to the document printed as Annex I to No. 525.

Members thus re-elected shall not, however, exceed one-third of total number of non-permanent members.

'As transitional measure, decision provided for in the preceding paragraph may at the election of 1927 be taken not only with regard to members whose mandates expire at that time, but also those whose mandates expire in 1928 and 1929.'

New article 3 runs:

'Notwithstanding above provisions, Assembly may at any time by two-thirds majority decide in application of article 4 of Covenant to proceed with new elections of all non-permanent members. In those circumstances Assembly shall determine rule applicable to new elections.'

Old article 3 becomes article 4 with the omission of provision for proportional representation.

Old article 4 becomes article 5.

Principal change thus introduced is that declaration of re-eligibility cannot be made until expiry of mandate, i.e., not till 1927 Assembly. Thus all nine members elected in 1926 remain for one year on equal footing without distinction. This postpones and thereby renders somewhat more remote compensation intended for candidates disappointed of permanent seat. To that extent the scheme may be harder for Spain to accept. Reason for the change was that on the one hand Belgian representative hesitated to approve of scheme, which might immediately on entry into force put back his country to the third category, and on the other hand Italians fear that immediate declaration in 1926 of re-eligibility of Poland might render Germany's entry more difficult.

On the whole I am not sure that difference is really serious. In order to solve crisis satisfactorily, Spain and other claimants would in any case have to (? come to a)³ definite decision before next Assembly, and before they could be assured of obtaining their compensation in the form of semi-permanence. Prolongation by one year of their uncertainty will no doubt increase their hesitation, but does not change essential nature of decision they have to take or risk they have to accept.

³ The text is here uncertain.

No. 525

Viscount Cecil (Geneva) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 18)
No. 2 L.N.C.C. [W 4304/223/98]

GENEVA, May 16, 1926

Sir,

Owing to the uncertainty of postal communication during the past week, I have endeavoured to keep you informed daily by telegraph of the proceed-

ings of the Committee on the Composition of the Council.¹ It may, however, be difficult to form a clear general impression of the course of events from such periodical telegraphic reports, and I therefore have the honour to submit the following brief survey of the week.

2. Although the Committee owed its appointment to the fact of the crisis that arose over the question of permanent seats during the session of the Special Assembly in March, and although its main object was to find a solution of that crisis, its terms of reference directed that 'a thorough study should be made of the problems connected with the composition of the Council, [and] the number and the method of election of its members'.² Evidently, therefore, the Committee could ignore no question relating to these points and was in fact particularly bound to examine proposals made in the past, notably in regard to duration of mandates, rotation, equitable geographical distribution of seats, etc.

3. It appeared to me that it would be well if the Committee could begin by devoting its attention to these less delicate questions, in the hope that from their discussion might possibly emerge a scheme affording sufficient compensation to those who claimed permanent seats and who, in the nature of the case, were doomed to disappointment.

4. The Committee did in fact adopt this course, leaving aside at first the question of the permanent seats.

5. Quite early in the discussion it became evident that ideas were beginning to take shape in various quarters somewhat on the lines of the proposals contained in the memorandum³ which I had the honour to circulate to the Cabinet on April 6th, and which was approved by the Cabinet decision of April 21st. The speech of the Belgian representative, in particular, on the morning of May 11th, showed that he was prepared to accept the principle that the Assembly might, in its discretion, grant to a limited number of States exemption from the operation of a rotatory system. This had been the principal point of my proposals, but it will be remembered that I had contemplated that there should be two categories of elective seats, one consisting of three seats carrying with them a three-year or five-year tenure, with the possibility of re-election, and the other consisting of six seats tenable only for one year, the holders of which would not be re-eligible for a certain period. The Belgian representative seemed to contemplate that all nine members would be elected on the same basis, and for the same period, but that the Assembly might have the power, by a definite resolution to that effect, of suspending in favour of certain States the compulsory retirement required by a system of rotation. I found that there was considerable opposition, amongst various members of the Committee, to creating two distinct categories of seats with different periods of tenure, as it was considered that such a plan would involve at once an arbitrary classification of Members of the

¹ With the exception of No. 524, these telegrams are not printed.

² See the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on March 18 (*League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1926, p. 534): cf. No. 362, note 2.

³ No. 399.

League into three classes—permanent Members of the Council, semi-permanent and temporary.

6. I therefore drew up proposals, adapting my original conception to the desires of the majority of the Committee, and circulated them to the members after the sitting of the morning of May 11th. (See Annex I).

7. These proposals were accepted as a basis of discussion and the Committee began their examination of them that afternoon. My telegrams will have given you some idea of the course of the discussion.

8. When it became clear that one of the main objections to these proposals was prompted by a feeling that the necessity of obtaining from an Assembly a declaration of re-eligibility might entail undesirable manœuvres and possibly embarrassing discussions, I took the opportunity of circulating to the Committee a memorandum suggesting two other methods of giving effect to the principle that the Assembly would have the power of conferring re-eligibility, whilst avoiding the necessity for any special declaration. This memorandum, copy of which I enclose (Annex II),⁴ by the first of the alternatives which it offered, approximated more nearly to my original idea in that it divided the elective seats into two categories, though both categories would have the same period of tenure. As a second alternative I suggested that a definite number of seats carrying re-eligibility should be reserved for those obtaining the highest number of votes at the poll—a suggestion which you will remember having heard made at a recent meeting in the Foreign Office.

9. Discussions in the Committee itself proceeded on the basis of the proposals which I had originally submitted to them (Annex I), but meanwhile, outside the Committee, the other two alternative methods were being examined, and the Sub-Committee which had been appointed for the purpose of incorporating the Committee's conclusions in a definite draft scheme, held a preliminary meeting at which the various methods were examined. The Sub-Committee were not inclined to accept the first alternative in Annex I[I], as the idea of dividing the seats into two categories was, as explained in paragraph 5 above, distasteful to various members. The second alternative presented this difficulty, that if, in any given year, three seats fell due to be filled, one of them carrying re-eligibility and the other two not, the situation would be that in theory, of the 55 Members of the League, 49 would be eligible to any of the three seats, only the two members vacating the two seats being incapable of election, and the 4 permanent Members not, of course, presenting themselves as candidates. It might be that the Member who had held the 're-eligible' seat during the expiring period was now placed second in the poll and would not be able to sit, while those placed third and fourth, with fewer votes, would take their places on the Council. This was thought to be a fatal objection.

10. I think it unnecessary to summarise again the course of the discussions in the Committee, as I hope that their general trend is sufficiently apparent from my telegraphic reports.

⁴ Not printed. This memorandum, printed in *League of Nations: Committee on the Composition of the Council, op. cit.*, p. 142, document C.C.C. 13, was as here indicated.

11. The Sub-Committee met yesterday afternoon and my telegram No. 90 L.N.⁵ of today's date, shows the result of their work. The meeting was presided over by Senator Scialoja (Italy) and was attended by M. de Brouckère (Belgium), Sir C. Hurst, M. Fromageot (France), M. Sokal (Poland), M. Sjöborg (Sweden), and M. Guani (Uruguay). Herr Gaus (Germany) attended in the capacity of an observer. At the outset M. de Brouckère submitted a draft giving effect to the principle embodied in Article 2 as finally approved by the Sub-Committee. He explained that this scheme was, in his opinion, more logical as well as politically more opportune. In point of fact, he maintained, the question of re-eligibility did not arise until a seat or seats fell vacant, and this would not happen until 1927. What, therefore, was the use of declaring in 1926, or at any time before the election of 1927, that a member would be re-eligible in 1927. Perhaps in 1927 the Assembly might no longer wish to re-elect him. (M. de Brouckère had to admit that his own scheme did not entirely avoid this difficulty as he proposed that the Assembly might declare in 1927 that a Member or Members due to retire in 1928 or 1929 would be re-eligible at the expiration of their tenure of office. But he thought this inevitable in order to avoid the danger of the Assembly in 1927 light-heartedly, or soft-heartedly conferring re-eligibility on all three retiring members, and having no more favours to bestow in the succeeding two years.) Sir C. Hurst at once explained that the disadvantage of this procedure resided in the fact that it made more remote and uncertain the compensation of 'semi-permanence' that was designed for disappointed aspirants to permanent seats. On being pressed to explain exactly what advantages his scheme offered, M. de Brouckère admitted that he had in mind his own public opinion. Belgium, he was ready to concede, had been generously treated by the Assembly, which had always re-elected her: he thought his government did not expect, and he was not sure that they desired, to remain permanently on the Council. But there undoubtedly was a strong current of public opinion in Belgium with which he had to reckon, and he must hesitate to subscribe to a scheme which might conceivably result, immediately on its entry into force, in the relegation of Belgium to the third category. M. de Brouckère was evidently convinced that the lapse of a year before the ultimate, and possibly embarrassing, consequences of his scheme became apparent to his countrymen, might do something to soften the reproaches which they would wish to level against him. At this point Senator Scialoja, in seeking to re-inforce M. de Brouckère's arguments, made a somewhat unfortunate intervention. He observed that if, on the one hand, we were engaged in trying to find some scheme of compromise that might satisfy Spain and other aspirants to permanent seats, we must not, on the other hand, forget the crisis in March that had given rise to the appointment of this Committee. If the Assembly were free at any time to proceed to a declaration of re-eligibility, it might be that the Assembly in 1926, when electing the nine members, of whom he supposed Poland to be one, might simultaneously, or immediately after, make such a declaration in favour of

⁵ No. 524.

Poland. In such a case, he wondered whether Germany would still maintain her application for admission? Herr Gaus explained that he was not properly accredited to the Committee and could not therefore speak with authority as a member, but gave it to be understood that in such a situation Germany might find a difficulty in maintaining her application. Perhaps, when the question was put to him directly in this way—it was unfortunate that it was ever so put—he had no alternative but to reply as he did. In any case, the effect of his reply upon M. Sokal was naturally unfortunate, and led to a fruitless discussion bristling with every possibility of embarrassment. Senator Scialoja's lengthy and perhaps designedly involved explanation to M. Sokal at length reduced the latter to a more or less sullen silence, and the Sub-Committee resumed and finished their work of drafting, the result of which has already been conveyed to you in my telegram No. 90 L.N. of today's date. You will see that it embodies M. de Brouckère's ideas, Sir C. Hurst finding no support for his alternative which was, in fact, actively opposed by most of the other members, the Polish member only indicating his preference for it and the French member taking no active part.

12. I have already, in my telegram just referred to, given you my appreciation of the scheme in its present form. It will be submitted to the plenary Committee tomorrow morning, and I think it will be useless to try to introduce any substantial change, while at the same time I fear that a discussion of its principles might stray on to the very dangerous ground invaded yesterday by Senator Scialoja.

13. So far as I can see this is the most that we shall be able to achieve at present, and I anticipate that the Committee will adjourn tomorrow, perhaps for some weeks. If so, it will have avoided bringing the crisis to a head—it may be said that the Committee have only postponed it—but it will, I trust, have produced a scheme which makes some attempt to meet all points of view. If there is any chance—I admit that it is extremely remote—of the particularly insistent claimants to permanent seats being ready to retire from their extreme positions without too much loss of dignity, I still hope that the publication of this scheme might just render that retirement possible for them. Brazil is proved to have no case at all: she puts herself forward as the representative of Latin-America in the presence of representatives of two Latin-American countries who neither of them ask her to undertake that responsibility. If she maintains her claim under these circumstances, there is evidently no appeal to her good sense or spirit of co-operation, and nothing but the full satisfaction of her selfish demand would content her, and there is nothing more to be done in that direction. Things must take their course, and we must hope for her disappearance from the Council and be prepared for her dissociation from the League.

14. The Spanish case is rather different. I must, in justice to Señor Palacios, the Spanish representative, say that he has conducted it with considerable moderation and dignity. I regret that his Government should continue to maintain an absolutely uncompromising attitude, and I can only continue to entertain the very faint hope that they may, by some means,

be induced to resign themselves to accepting the most that their friends in the League can possibly offer them, and that thereby the League may not be deprived of the very valuable co-operation which it has received from the Spanish Government in the past.

I have, &c.,
CECIL

ANNEX I TO No. 525

Note by Viscount Cecil

GENEVA, May 10, 1926

1. The non-permanent members of the Council shall be elected for a term of three years. They shall assume office immediately on their election. One third of their number shall be elected each year.

2. In principle the non-permanent members shall not be re-eligible for three years after the expiration of their term of office. Nevertheless the Assembly may by resolution passed by a majority of not less than two to one declare that a non-permanent member actually in office shall be re-eligible for another term, provided that not more than one third of the sitting non-permanent members can be so declared re-eligible.

3. The non-permanent members shall be increased to nine in number and shall in future be elected by proportional representation.

4. In order to bring the above system into operation there shall be elected nine non-permanent members as soon as possible in the next Assembly. Three of them shall be elected for a term of three years, three for two years and three for one year.

No. 526

Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 17, 3.30 p.m.)

No. 163 Telegraphic [C 5791/234/18]

BERLIN, May 17, 1926, 1.40 p.m.

Ministerial crisis¹ has ended in appointment of Marx as Chancellor, other ministers remaining at their posts.

Main feature of interest in negotiations leading up to this result was candidature of Adenauer for the post of Chancellor.

Proposed by Gessler, and supported by the right, he was rejected by centre and left as not sound on Locarno to which policy he had previously declared himself opposed.

¹ On May 12 Dr. Luther's Cabinet had resigned on a vote of censure on the question of the display of the German commercial flag, which incorporated the black, white, and red colours of the former Imperial flag, by German representatives abroad. See Erich Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic* (trans. by H. P. Hanson and R. G. L. Waite: Cambridge, Mass., 1962), vol. ii, pp. 66-68.

Herr Stresemann and Socialists, who differ on most points, agree in this that they impose fidelity to pact as an article of faith.

In the same connection centre and Volkspartei have now issued a joint declaration that while they recognise necessity of constituting as soon as possible a ministry with a parliamentary majority they will only consider as possible elements of this majority those parties who 'recognise existing international conventions and who furnish guarantees for continuance of present foreign policy'.

This declaration means in other words adherence to Locarno and exclusion from a future combination of German nationals who oppose the pact and Dawes plan. Acceptance of this formula by Volkspartei involves a cessation of their recurrence to an inclination to the right and their final adoption of broad coalition as basis of future policy.

Without attributing excessive validity or durability to such declarations it may be said that proceedings and negotiations during the last few days constitute a marked crystal[l]ization of Locarno policy and a considerable development of coherence and co-ordination in the forces behind it.

No. 527

*Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 18, 10.15 a.m.)*

No. 91 Telegraphic [W 4306/223/98]

GENEVA, May 17, 1926, 2.10 p.m.

Following from Lord Cecil.

Committee this morning adopted proposals formulated by sub-committee;¹ article 1 adopted unanimously with four abstentions Germany, Argentine, Brazil and Spain; Brazilian and Spanish representatives explained that for reasons already given they abstained from voting on whole project. Article 2 first paragraph; after some discussion committee agreed two-thirds majority necessary for re-eligibility declaration. Second paragraph; Polish representative made reservation, observing scheme not complete and lacking in precise indication of manner in which declaration would be made, he would however not oppose only abstain. British representative said committee were under debt of gratitude to their Polish colleague who had displayed statesmanlike moderation by which he and his country had lost nothing; he had given proof of true league spirit which would always secure goodwill of members. Article 2 adopted; also article 3.

On article 4 Swedish representative recalled his objections to increase and announced he would abstain; articles 4 and 5 adopted. Uruguayan representative wished something inserted in text to meet his demand for three elective seats for Latin America. British representative thought it better to insert passage in report, attempt to bind Assembly by rule might go too far

¹ See Cmd. 2665 of 1926, *League of Nations, Committee on the Composition of the Council, Report to the Council adopted by the Committee, Geneva, May 17, 1926.*

and defeat object. Uruguayan representative observed whole scheme was only in nature of recommendation without binding force; his recommendation only one accepted unanimously and without reserve and therefore should be included.

French representative argued that five articles just passed were in nature of rules of procedure that might automatically be made binding by entry into force of amendment to article 4, he doubted whether Uruguayan representative's proposal was of same nature. President observed committee would have to approve report to council, he suggested report, after quoting five articles, should indicate that these in opinion of committee would enable Assembly to observe principle of proper geographical distribution and add that committee were in fact unanimous in approving Uruguayan proposal.

Chinese representative asked for similar declaration in regard to Asia. British representative said this showed danger of beginning to provide special treatment for different parts of world. He thought first part of President's formula ought to satisfy China. Chinese representative said he did not wish to insist on insertion of rule in text of scheme but must emphasise principle.

Committee this afternoon approved terms of report to council. Report states that task of committee is not yet finished and that it represents stage reached so far, it then quotes five articles already approved emphasising that these have been approved only in first reading and with reserve of modifications which may be introduced at second reading as result of conclusions on number of permanent members.

Second reading fixed for June 28 when decision will be taken on permanent seats including applications of Brazil, China, Spain and Poland, and on total number of council. Report refers to Brazilian and Spanish reservations on whole report, Chinese and Polish reservations on paragraph 2 and Swedish reservation regarding increase of council. Report ends with expression of opinion that increase of council will enable Assembly to apply principle of equitable geographical distribution and records fact that committee unanimously accepted Uruguayan recommendation that three elective seats should be allotted to Latin America and recognises that adequate representation should be given to Asia adding that Chinese delegate has strongly pressed for two seats for parts of the world outside America and Europe.

Committee adjourned.

No. 528

*The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received May 18, 8.30 a.m.)*

No. 183 Telegraphic: by bag [C 5790/5139/18]

PARIS, May 17, 1926

My telegram No. 180¹ of May 13th.

Monsieur Berthelot told Mr. Phipps that he was informing the French

¹ No. 523.

Ambassador at Berlin of the assurances given by Dr. Gaus to Monsieur Fromageot in regard to the Russo-German Convention. Monsieur de Margerie has been instructed to ask the German Government whether they can confirm Dr. Gaus' assurances, which Monsieur Berthelot considers to be satisfactory. No request is being made by the French Government that these assurances should be published.

No. 529

Memorandum by Mr. Gregory respecting the Polish situation

[N 2291/41/55]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 17, 1926

It is now possible to form a preliminary estimate of the recent events in Poland.¹ The position appears to be that Marshal Pilsudski, having made his coup, is not going to establish a dictatorship but is anxious to abide by the Constitution, leave the Polish parliament unimpaired and in fact get the situation legalised as soon as possible. The President and the Government have resigned constitutionally, placing their resignations in the hands of the Marshal of the Diet, who thereupon assumes the Presidency ad interim. A provisional government has come together, pending the election of a new President, and, as soon as the latter is elected, a new definitive government will be formed. It is not clear that Pilsudski desires to become President, but, if he does, he will, it is assumed, get the necessary votes. If not, the present Marshal of the Diet will become President, with Pilsudski as Minister for War in the new Cabinet. Whatever happens, however, it is understood that Count Skrzynski will once again become Minister for Foreign Affairs.

This information is based on the latest reports received by Monsieur Skirmunt, who—after having been completely downcast by the earlier events and outlook—is now much reassured and is confident that there is going to be no attack on the Constitution and that everything will soon be legal once more. He has been at great pains to explain the origin of Pilsudski's action, but it seems unnecessary to go into that at length. He wishes, in short, to explain it as an attack of fever liable to occur in countries where the Constitution is inelastic and the Electorate has only once in five years the opportunity of expressing its opinions. It is also, in his opinion, symptomatic of the discontent with Parliamentary institutions that now prevails generally on the Continent. He further makes a considerable point of the German propaganda which has been very active during the last few days, and which I can confirm. This has been directed to the spreading of alarmist rumours, as

¹ Marshal Pilsudski had entered Warsaw with military support on May 12. MM. Wojciechowski and Witos, respectively Polish President and Prime Minister, subsequently resigned, and a provisional government was formed with M. Bartel as Prime Minister and Marshal Pilsudski as Minister for War.

for instance, that General Haller² is marching at the head of a large army from Posen, or that the Lithuanians are massing on the frontier or that the Bolsheviks are concentrating on theirs. Unless therefore some fresh event supervenes meanwhile, we may hope to see a return to the normal within a week or so. The new order will only differ from the old in that the real, if not nominal, direction of affairs will be in the hands of Pilsudski, whose strong and impetuous personality will necessarily be felt all along the line.

Monsieur Skirmunt brought this evening a message from Monsieur Zaleski, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government, to the effect that nothing will be changed in Polish foreign policy, whose sole object will be peace, and that he looks forward to the closest relations with Great Britain. Monsieur Skirmunt does not intend to ask to see the Secretary of State, until it is quite evident that there has been a return to the legal and a new President and Government have been elected according to due Constitutional form, but he is anxious that the above message should be transmitted with an assurance from himself that there will be no departure from existing policy. The fact that it appears now almost certain that Count Skrzynski will be back at his Foreign Office under the new Government is a sufficient guarantee of this.

In all the circumstances, therefore, it may be that after all we shall not have to take up an attitude. At first it looked uncommonly as though we should be faced once again with the tiresome position of whether or not to recognise a government which had seized power by force and in defiance of the will of the majority in the country. In the present case, as far as we can gather, Pilsudski, who is after all the national hero, can rely on general support and his old popularity seems to have returned. So we may be saved after all from the precedents of Moscow, Mexico or Athens³ and spared the nuisance arising from delayed recognition or debating the distinction between a *de facto* and a *de jure* Government.⁴

There seems, in other words, no reason to take tragically what has happened, but to regard it not so much as a national crime as a national disaster, such as an earthquake or some uncontrollable upheaval. There are no malicious or underground forces at work, as far as we know, as in some other countries, and the general outlook is wholesome and patriotic—though true patriotism is often misguided. German and Russian propaganda, particularly the former, will utilise this incident to demonstrate once again the historical instability of Poland and to spread the usual gloomy rumours about a future partition. Our way of countering that is by an indulgent attitude in regard to the political lapse of last week and continued benevolence towards the

² The reference is probably to General Joseph Haller, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in France, 1918–19.

³ The reference was to deliberation regarding British recognition of the new régimes in Russia 1917–24, Mexico in the years preceding 1925, and Greece 1922–4, respectively.

⁴ In his despatch No. 1478 to Paris of May 17, Sir A. Chamberlain recorded that the French Ambassador had informed him the same day that his government had decided to establish '*relations de fait*' with the government of Marshal Pilsudski while reserving the question of recognition.

Polish State. The worst that we could do would be to return to the school-mastering attitude, to put it at its mildest, that characterised our relations with Poland from 1919 to 1923. As this synchronised with almost the whole of the last Pilsudski régime, it is astonishing that he should preserve any regard for us at all. In those days we appeared (and indeed to some extent we actually were) pro-Russian, pro-German, pro-Czech, even pro-Lithuanian. Nothing could have exasperated the Poles more than our constant advocacy of the Lithuanian cause, as though—quite apart from the merits of any particular controversy of which, we were really totally incapable of judging—Lithuania mattered to us in the very least. On the contrary we went on steadily alienating Poland, and it has only been within the last year and a half that the importance to peace of a strong and friendly Polish State has been recognised at all. Consequently it does seem important that nothing should happen to impair or change in any way this necessary policy. The Poles are notoriously sensitive and susceptible of friendly treatment. They can be easily pleased by small attentions and given considerable satisfaction in matters that appear to us relatively unimportant. They can be maddened by lack of sympathy and pinpricks. Whatever view then may be taken elsewhere of the recent incident—and it may be taken for granted that the press will be full of denunciations and sarcasms and forebodings in regard to Poland,—it does seem essential that we should not be deflected from a settled policy, but should, as part and parcel of that policy endeavour to give satisfaction to Poland when and where the other interests concerned are immaterial from our point of view.⁵

J. D. G.

⁵ Sir W. Tyrrell and Sir A. Chamberlain minuted on May 18 in general agreement with Mr. Gregory.

No. 530

*Record by Viscount Cecil of an interview with Count Bernstorff*¹
[W 4396/78/98]

GENEVA, May 17, 1926

Count Bernstorff came to see me today, as he is to sit on the Disarmament Committee for Germany. He explained that he wished, as he put it, to follow me in everything. He assured me that the Germans had no desire to make difficulties of any kind; they only hoped something in the nature of disarmament might result, but they quite recognised that it must be a long and gradual process. He went out of his way to say that the standard of Article 8² was not so low as the standard of disarmament imposed on Germany and he did not breathe the slightest suggestion that he wanted a relaxation of

¹ This record was received in the Foreign Office on May 20 under cover of Geneva despatch No. 4 L.N.C.C. (not preserved in Foreign Office archives).

² Of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

German disarmament terms. The furthest he went was to say that, as Germany was disarmed, she naturally wished other nations to be disarmed also. He does not make so good an impression as the other German, Von Hoesch, but his words were softer than butter. Even when I suggested that it might be a good thing to ask Boncour to preside over the Committee, he raised no objection.

R. C.

CHAPTER V

Correspondence on British Policy on Middle Eastern Questions: Agreement regarding the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq October 16, 1925–June 5, 1926

No. 531

*Sir R. Lindsay¹ (Constantinople) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received October 26)*

*No. 785 [E 6527/175/44]**

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 16, 1925*

Sir,

Turks are never tired of saying that Mosul² is the only stumbling-block in the path towards Anglo-Turkish friendship, and the statement contains more truth than is usually to be found in parrot cries. There is a very fair prospect that for some years to come general conditions of international politics will be favourable for a return to relations of confidence and even cordiality between Great Britain and Turkey.

Russia

2. In spite of favours and sympathy received since 1920, in spite of the close relations of the present day, Turkey is quite conscious of intense Russian activity towards the south, and making allowance for changes of mottoes and battle-cries, finds that there is an unpleasant similarity between the policy of the Soviet Union and that of the old empire. The future holds out little or no prospect of alleviation, for Russian political thought can hardly be expected to move to the left, whereas it may well move to the right; and if the ostensible internationalism of to-day disappears, it can only be replaced by the open acquisitiveness of a former age. Nor is this all; the eclipse of Germany and the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire have *pro tanto* removed two healthy checks on the Russian appetite, especially where Turkey is concerned.

¹ H.M. Ambassador to Turkey, resident at Constantinople.

² For the question of Mosul cf. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, vol. i, Part III (xi).

Great Britain

3. Similarly, Great Britain's relationship to Turkey should revert to something like what it was in a past age, and from Constantinople to Vladivostok the outlook of British agents is already that of their remoter predecessors. It is the Empire's interest to prop up a whole row of buffer States, and these States, of course with infinite tergiversations, blackmail, and playing off of north against south, will nevertheless come to recognise that on their national existence the British influence must exercise a preservative and the Russian a corrosive effect. For Great Britain the attainment of good Anglo-Turkish relations may be the easier because the problem of Christian minorities has assumed far smaller dimensions than it ever had in the past. On the other hand, the need for it is the greater owing to the existence of politico-religious nationalism in India and other Moslem dependencies.

Turkey

4. Chastened by fifteen years of war, the young Turkish Republic, in common with the rest of the world, looks forward to-day to a breathing-space, and prepares to use it to the utmost advantage. Modernisation is the heart and soul of its policy; nationalism and secularisation are its necessary handmaids. In all that the Turks do there is and will be infinite muddle, and in their ideals there may be a plentiful absence of logic; but their convictions are deep and genuine, and they are pursuing the realisation of them with passion. In the modernisation part of their programme they have the Japanese example before their eyes, and they purpose not only to introduce everything that steam, petrol and electricity can provide, but also to remodel from top to bottom their codes and their administrative and social institutions. Secularisation should not be regarded as a mere outburst of crude atheism; it is adopted as a deliberate act of State with the purpose of making a programme of modernisation possible of execution; for it has been dinned into their ears by every European writer, and Turks have come to understand that Islam is a strait waistcoat within which reform is doomed to be suffocated. Nationalism came into being years ago, but recent events have made it for the first time a living force in the hearts of the people. It now constitutes the driving power behind the whole programme of the Government. More important still, it provides to the commonalty some substitute for that which is lost through secularisation. The Government's ideal is to have a compact rectangular Anatolian State into which it would welcome with open arms any and every Turkish-speaking peasant in the world. Aliens are not wanted; but Kurds are a necessary evil.

With this programme, the branches of which are indissolubly bound up together, it is hoped to bring Turkey within a few years to such a pitch of strength and prosperity that she will be able to face confidently any menace that may come from north or south. There is no sign at present of any genuine aggressiveness in Turkish foreign policy, and if His Majesty's Government could feel assured on this point as regards the future, it would be to their interest that the Turkish effort should be crowned with success.

Kurdistan

5. The Kurdish rebellion of last spring³ was a terrible shock to this policy. There is a nationalism in Kurdistan, but it is Kurdish and not Turkish, and the Turkish nationalism, inculcated by the Government, is too narrow and sectarian in character to reconcile backward Kurds to the unpalatable programme of secularisation. Small wonder that the tribesmen broke into revolt. To reinduce contentment the Government has applied fiscal reforms (abolition of the tithe), but it feels its whole programme is imperilled by such outbursts, and that it must at any cost suppress Kurdish nationalism; and yet it finds that just across its southern frontier His Majesty's Government proposes to found a sort of Kurdish National Home. This is a direct menace to the very heart of Turkish policy. It is one thing for His Majesty's Government to stand aloof and have as little to do with Turkey as possible; but a very different thing to administer to her a heavy blow right on the mark.

And so we return to the point from which we started—that the Mosul question is the only stumbling-block in the path towards Anglo-Turkish friendship. After the agitations of the past month or two it looks as if the game is fairly in the hands of His Majesty's Government and that they can play it out as they like; but it may be well to remember that more is at stake than a mere frontier line. Perhaps His Majesty's Government are already irretrievably committed to fostering nationalism in Southern Kurdistan; if not, there are strong reasons for wishing that the League will not impose on the mandatory Power any obligation in that direction.⁴

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.,
R. C. LINDSAY

³ Cf. *ibid.*, section (e).

⁴ Mr. Chamberlain replied in Foreign Office despatch No. 1151 to Constantinople of November 30. This despatch concluded as follows: 'It would beyond doubt be most helpful, both as regards Anglo-Turkish relations in general and with a view to secure a satisfactory settlement of the Irak frontier dispute, if means could be devised of allaying the Turks' apprehensions in regard to a quasi-autonomous Kurdistan over their border. I fear, however, that having regard to the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government to the League and to their responsibilities towards Irak, it is impossible to attain this object by withdrawing the measure of autonomy already granted to the Kurds in Irak or by declining to extend it in the sense of Mr. Amery's declaration at Geneva. [See *League of Nations Official Journal*, October 1925, pp. 1314 and 1334 respectively, for declarations on September 3 and 4 by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and for Colonial Affairs.] There is, however, no idea in this of creating anything in the nature of an autonomous Kurdish State for the Kurdish districts of Irak or of reviving the policy contemplated in the Treaty of Sévres [the unratified Turkish peace treaty of August 10, 1920, printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 113, pp. 652-776], and there is no reason why you should not, on a convenient occasion, make this clear to the Turks.'

*Sir P. Loraine¹ (Tehran) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received October 20, 11.53 a.m.)
No. 328 Telegraphic [E 6429/18/34]*

Urgent. Confidential

TEHRAN, October 20, 1925, 10.53 a.m.

My telegrams Nos. 317 and 327.²

I have had two very confidential and intimate conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs.³ His chief apprehension is evidently lest outcome of events should be such as to alienate the goodwill and sympathy of His Majesty's Government, which he and his friends consider indispensable to Persia.

He did his best to extract from me an indication of what solution would be most likely to find favour in London and seemed to believe that such a solution would be best for Persia. I declined to be drawn into any statement and said that Persia must face the issue herself. I dwelt on the firm resolution of His Majesty's Government not to take sides nor be involved in this internal question and explained how this attitude besides being the only loyal one was also wisest and best in the interests of both countries. He did not dispute soundness of my analyses but nevertheless seemed very uneasy in his mind. He appeared to think willy-nilly circumstances would compel us at some juncture to take up more definite position in the defence of our interests, and to fear that the situation might by then have gone too far. He hinted broadly that if we did not define our position some designs or other would be imputed to us and would obtain general credence, against which an assertion of disinterestedness would carry no conviction. He said that when the Shah announced intention to return,⁴ instant conclusion was that he had arranged matters with His Majesty's Government. He and the Prime Minister knew from me that this was quite untrue but impression was widespread that he would not have dared to make announcement without foreign support, and this belief was specifically alluded to in latest telegrams from Tabriz. He clearly feels certain that unless we have an attitude, one will be invented for us, that it will be a damaging one and will be relentlessly exploited by Russians and their friends for their own disruptive purposes.

This forecast that we shall not be allowed to be disinterested corresponds too closely with my own experience in other and less serious matters for me to deny probability of its accuracy. On other occasions however we could afford to let time sift out the truth: on this one if a fundamental change comes about time element may not work.

¹ H.M. Minister at Tehran.

² Not printed. These telegrams of October 13 and 19 respectively referred to the possibility of the deposition of the Qajar dynasty in Persia and to the likely attitude of the Prime Minister, Reza Khan.

³ Mirza Hassan Khan Mushar.

⁴ Sultan Ahmed Shah of the Qajar dynasty had, in September, decided to return to Persia from France, but subsequently cancelled his passage.

I am, as you know, unconditionally in accord with your policy of absolute neutrality. I do not wish to suggest any departure from that policy but I think that it is now advisable to make it clear to public both here and elsewhere that such is the policy of His Majesty's Government and why.

I am hardly competent [to suggest best]⁵ method of making such an announcement. Greatest effect would clearly be produced if you found a suitable occasion for making some public statement.

Failing that one of your colleagues which⁶ should at once be broadcast by Reuter and wireless. Alternatively or simultaneously you might instruct me to make a textual communication from yourself to Persian government worded for immediate subsequent publication. Any such action must be prompt to be effective.

It would be desirable to quote some phrase about ancient ties of friendship, abiding mutual interests, sincere and friendly British sympathy with Persia and her efforts to progress and to create ordered national life with free institution . . .⁷ compatible alike with her ancient greatness and her modern needs.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 328. Sent to India.

⁵ The text was here uncertain. The words in brackets were inserted subsequently in accordance with a note of December 4 from the Chancery in H.M. Embassy at Tehran.

⁶ Another text of the telegram here read: ' . . . making some public statement, or, failing that, one of your colleagues, which' &c.

⁷ The text is here uncertain. Another text of the telegram here read 'institutions'.

No. 533

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Sir P. Loraine (Tehran)

No. 225¹ Telegraphic [E 6429/18/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 23, 1925, 11 a.m.

Reports have recently reached me that in some quarters it is believed that His Majesty's Government lately instigated the Shah to return to Persia.

There is not a vestige of foundation for this allegation. His Majesty's Government have no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of another and friendly country. So far from entertaining any such idea, His Majesty's Government have no desire to take sides in any constitutional struggle, arising from causes affecting the internal affairs of Persia and capable of solution only by the action of the Persian people themselves. His Majesty's Government are animated now as in the past, by the most sincere and friendly feelings towards Persia, feelings which are based upon the ancient ties of friendship between the two countries, and upon their abiding common interests. Persia may therefore continue to count upon the sincere sympathy of Great Britain in her efforts to develop the prosperity of her country and to

¹ The present telegram transmitted the text of a personal message from Mr. Chamberlain to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs as suggested in No. 532.

create an ordered national life with the institutions best suited to her ancient greatness and her modern needs. She must not, however, expect any advice on matters which it is her privilege to determine.

You may inform Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, should local considerations render this desirable.²

² Sir P. Loraine reported on October 29 in Tehran telegram No. 340 that he had handed this message to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the previous day, and had that morning seen the Prime Minister who had already seen the message. 'The effect seems to have been quite excellent and the moment well chosen.' Reza Khan stated that he 'stood by his former statements in regard to Persia's relations towards England and he would see that they were given effect to as soon as he was freed from present anxieties'.

No. 534

Memoranda respecting the Iraq Frontier Dispute¹

[E 6635/32/65]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 23, 1925*

I. AN ATTEMPT TO ESTIMATE THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT WILL INFLUENCE OR DECIDE TURKISH POLICY IN THE QUESTION OF MOSUL

General

For all practical purposes Mustafa Kemal² is both the Turkish Government and Turkey. He is a practical idealist and a constructive patriot with far-reaching ambitions which have already attained a considerable degree of realisation. His aim is to create a new, modernised, independent Turkish State which will be recognised as an equal by the civilised States of the world. His model is Japan and his methods are those of Mussolini. His difficulties are formidable. The country is impoverished in population and wealth, and poor in commercial and industrial experience and organisation. Politically, it is hardly awakened and unfit, for at least a generation, for the parliamentary self-government which he plans for it. He has few able assistants and is unfortunate in having antagonised several of the men who might have been of greatest assistance to him. He will not tolerate personal or parliamentary opposition. The modern parliamentary system which he established has proved to be premature, and he has assumed an undisguised dictatorship. This has made him enemies and imposed on him the necessity of maintaining his popularity at all costs.

Political: Internal

The question of prestige is the lesser of the two vital considerations governing Kemal's attitude in the Mosul question. In mistaken reliance on the

¹ These memoranda were circulated to the Cabinet on October 25. No. III is filed as E 6634/32/65.

² President of the Turkish Republic.

power and authority of the Rothermere-Beaverbrook³ press he launched the Turkish press, to which he allows less independence even than Mussolini to the Italian, on a campaign which has practically committed him to obtaining Mosul for Turkey. His failure to do so will be a severe blow to his personal prestige at home and abroad. And at home it is manifestly in need of the stimulus of a success; both the large and influential officer class and the mass of the population are chafing under his necessarily autocratic methods and are inclined to ask whether the system of a personal dictatorship, with all its inconveniences, is justified by its results. A complete and confessed failure to fulfil his boasts and promises about Mosul will therefore be a very severe blow, and he may well be regretting the commitment deriving from his unsuccessful bluff at the time of the last meeting of the Council of the League.⁴

A second and more important consideration of internal politics is the question of Kurdistan. Kemal's policy is to assimilate the Kurdish population into the new State of Turkey. The Kurds are essential, both racially and militarily, as breeders of citizens and as defenders of the State. The policy of the Irak Government and of His Majesty's Government, endorsed by the League Commission,⁵ is to plant the seeds of autonomy among the Iraki Kurds. The inevitable result is that the Kurds over the Turkish border, always in a state of effervescence and at present openly rebellious, will be fortified in their resistance to the process of assimilation and sooner or later will claim their right to coalesce with their semi-independent brothers in Irak. This will mean the loss of valuable population and territory to Turkey—a threat which must be averted at all costs. This realisation probably explains the Turkish suggestion of a guarantee of the Turkish and Iraki frontiers, and it might go far to satisfy Kemal if we could in any way guarantee Turkey against this danger. But it is difficult to see how we can do so without betraying the unquestionable rights of the Kurds to national development and ultimate independence.

So much for the considerations of internal policy in Turkey. They are not calculated to facilitate acceptance by Kemal of any award by the Council that does not satisfy the Turkish claim.

Political: External

Kemal undoubtedly looks to the time when the new Turkey will be received into the comity of civilised States, and probably, if it were not for the Mosul question, he would not hesitate to signify Turkey's accession to the League

³ Lord Rothermere and Lord Beaverbrook were chief proprietors respectively of the *Daily Mail*, *Daily Mirror*, *Sunday Dispatch*, and *Evening News*, and of the *Sunday Express*, *Daily Express*, and *Evening Standard*.

⁴ For speeches made by Tewfik Rushdi Bey, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in September 1925 see *League of Nations Official Journal*, October 1925, pp. 1307–86 *passim*. See also in this connexion L. S. Amery, *My Political Life* (London, 1953), vol. ii, pp. 325–33.

⁵ See the report, dated July 16, 1925, printed as League of Nations Document No. C. 400, M. 147, 1925, vii, *Question of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq. Report submitted to the Council by the Commission instituted by the Council Resolution of September 30th, 1924.*

of Nations. For he would realise the value to Turkey of the guarantees contemplated by the Covenant as an insurance against the Russian danger. He would also appreciate the recognition of Turkey by the other members of the League. During the period between the armistice and the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne⁶ Turkey enjoyed a fictitious power and importance, largely owing to her skill in exploiting differences between the Allies. Now she stands alone and friendless except for Russia, whose immediate motives and ultimate ambitions are the greatest menace she has to face. No doubt Kemal justly appreciates the value and danger of Russian support. In the past he was able to make good use of this support—political, financial and military—without incurring counter-obligations. It is by no means certain that he could do so again. He is probably acutely conscious of Turkey's loneliness and, equally probably, would go to great lengths to secure a guarantee of Turkish territory by His Majesty's Government. The Locarno meeting has proclaimed the solidarity of a saner Europe, with which Turkey hopes to associate herself, and revealed the isolation and failure of Turkey's only friend and most dangerous enemy, Russia.

Financial

Kemal is aware that Turkey will need foreign capital for the many development schemes which he contemplates. Her credit does not stand high abroad and her needs are probably becoming increasingly urgent. In these circumstances, deliberately to flout the League would inevitably jeopardise her prospects of obtaining loans from the members of the League. Military operations against Irak and Great Britain would throw a further burden on the already overtaxed Turkish exchequer and the expenditure could only be justified by desperate need or by the prospect of assured political and financial results.

On the other hand, it is likely that the hope of securing for Turkey the wealth inherent in the oil deposits of the Mosul Vilayet remains a consideration of great weight.

Military

On the face of it it would seem that Kemal could only be induced to embark on a military venture by the imperative needs of internal politics or by a confident belief that a military bluff would succeed owing to the refusal of opinion in this country to sanction a war with Turkey on behalf of Mosul. For there are cogent arguments against a military adventure, the success of which would inevitably be precarious. While a forced march on the city of Mosul might succeed, it would be another matter to occupy and hold the vilayet; reinforcements would probably be forthcoming from India and elsewhere, the lines of communication would be difficult, and, in the winter months, impossible, the imperfectly pacified and disarmed Kurds would be in the rear of the Turkish forces, the Turkish coast would be vulnerable from

⁶ This peace treaty of July 24, 1923, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 117, pp. 543-91.

the sea and the interior of the country from the air, and the political and financial effects of flouting the League and defying His Majesty's Government would be incalculable.

The deductions from the considerations suggested above (and both premises and deductions are necessarily of an exceptionally speculative nature) would seem to be as follows:

1. A military adventure would be a policy of desperation and of doubtful success. It would not appear that Kemal's need is immediately desperate. May the adoption of the policy, therefore, not be regarded as unlikely?
2. An intensification of military bluff is a possibility, or even probability, which must be contemplated and met, if need be, with all firmness.
3. Whether or not combined with 2, a continuation of the policy of obstruction and procrastination by the exploitation or improvisation of legal objections and any other expedients that offer themselves may probably be looked for as long as the game pays.
4. This may be terminated by an eventual climb-down, represented as a reluctant yielding to moral and material *force majeure*, in return for any compensatory and face-saving concessions that can be secured.

Putting aside any possibility of territorial readjustments, it is perhaps not inherently fanciful to suggest that a compromise settlement might be attained, with or without the aid of the League, in return for the following:—

- (a) Some sort of guarantee against the danger of the loss of Turkish Kurdistan. The obvious suggestion is a guarantee of the Turkish and Iraqi frontiers, but it is questionable if we could give this. A frank recognition and discussion of this difficulty might be of value in evolving some expedient.
- (b) Some face-saving device by which Kemal could justify himself to Turkey. This would have to be based upon some actual or apparent concession by His Majesty's Government and combined with some political compensation involving a personal success for Kemal and a political advantage for Turkey.

We have heard much of the effects that would result from a friendly gesture, though we have hitherto been led to suppose that this was simply another name for submitting to the Turkish claim to Mosul. It may be capable of other interpretation and expression. Politically isolated as she is, and yet aspiring to recognition as a modern civilised State, Turkey should be doubly susceptible to any international courtesy. Uncouth, ill-mannered, aggressive and unreliable, she is at the same time conscious of her isolation and anxious to exchange the sinister patronage of Russia for political friendship and financial support. And, in spite of her mistrust of us, she would probably be glad to see us in the position of her insurance broker and financial backer. But while His Majesty's Government ask nothing better than to live in amity with her, and while British capital could probably be attracted to her

industrial development in return for adequate security, we cannot contemplate a reversion to the Victorian policy of guaranteeing Turkey against Russia. The suggestion of any guarantee of Turkish territorial integrity is, therefore, excluded. But might not something in the nature of a spectacular burying of the hatchet be contrived? For example, might not a treaty of friendship and arbitration, combining the maximum of moral implication with the minimum of material commitment, be suggested? The initiative would have to come from His Majesty's Government and the moment carefully chosen. It would unfortunately be useless to propose that Kemal should come to London, whether to discuss Mosul or a treaty, but something might possibly be made of a flattering invitation, conveyance on a British warship, &c. However, in present circumstances, it is perhaps useless to speculate upon such possibilities. We are still too much in the dark in regard to feelings and intentions at Angora. And Sir R. Lindsay can be relied upon to offer suggestions for the friendly gesture that has on various occasions been hinted at, should he consider that the time for it has arrived. It is, however, conceivable that a variation of the policy adopted towards Germany at Locarno might succeed with Turkey.

It would also be useful if His Majesty's Government could give Turkey some assurances in respect of financial assistance, but, pending a settlement of the debt question, this presents considerable difficulty. It is unfortunately too late to offer her a share in the Mosul oil development scheme.

II. AN APPRECIATION OF THE TURKISH ATTITUDE

The question has been raised, what action are the Turks likely to take in connection with the Irak frontier question? Will they await the outcome of the impending proceedings at The Hague Court,⁷ and the action subsequently taken by the Council of the League of Nations? Or are they likely to embark on aggressive movements against Irak, with a view to create an accomplished fact, as was done by General Zeligowski in the case of Vilna?⁸

Several factors exist which may restrain the Turks from resorting to aggression. In the first place, the winter is coming on and in a few weeks the provisional frontier ('Brussels line')⁹ will be well nigh impassable for any considerable bodies of troops with their baggage and ammunition, except in the small non-mountainous section at the western end of the line, where our defensive measures could be concentrated. Secondly, the Turks would have to the rear of their attacking force the region of Turkish Kurdistan, which is still far from completely pacified after the recent rebellion, and has kept a large part of the Turkish army busy throughout the present year. Thirdly, it would not be easy for the Turks, even if they succeeded in pushing their troops forward as far as Mosul town, to maintain the long line of communications

⁷ See III below.

⁸ See No. 83, note 2.

⁹ This line was defined in a resolution adopted by the special session of the Council of the League of Nations, meeting at Brussels on October 29, 1924, and printed in annex to Cmd. 2333 of 1925.

with their bases at Jezireh and Diarbekir; for this line runs through a country with a mixed population of Arabs, Kurds, Christians and Turkomans, who would not be unanimous in welcoming the invading force, and the Turks must realise that we have quite sufficient air forces to impede their progress by aerial bombardment.

Apart from these military considerations, there are certain indications of a political nature that the Turkish Government are not anxious to court a serious quarrel or an open breach with us at the present juncture. They have evidently 'called off' the violent agitation in the Turkish press which persisted throughout the recent discussions at Geneva; the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs talked hopefully to Sir R. Lindsay at Constantinople (on his way back from Geneva to Angora) about the possibility of a settlement by diplomatic discussion between the two Governments; the Turkish newspapers have since then been full of statements that direct negotiations are about to open; the difficulties of the internal situation in Turkey (Kurdish unrest, financial embarrassment, &c.) are still sufficiently acute to render a breathing space of peaceful progress highly desirable, if not an absolute necessity; and although Russian influence continues to count for much at Angora, the friendship of Moscow is not yet a factor on which the Turks can rely with absolute confidence. It may also be observed that while the Turks have declined to appear before The Hague Court, their message to the court was couched in studiously courteous terms, and they have not taken any step which could be construed as flouting the League or forcing the pace by any flagrant and open violation of the *status quo*—apart from their habitual persecution of Christian minorities on their side of the Brussels line.

On the other hand, it would be a mistake to suppose that all danger of the Turk running amok is now definitely eliminated. Like all dictatorships, the Kemal régime can only subsist on successes; and it seems more than doubtful whether Kemal could survive a complete climb-down from the Turkish claim to the whole Mosul vilayet (possibly excluding the small Diala irrigation region), which he has so long and loudly proclaimed to be an irreducible minimum. It is therefore quite possible that the Turks' motive in adopting a less truculent attitude and mooted the ideas of direct negotiation, of an Anglo-Perso-Turkish Security Pact, &c., is to be found in a belief that these tactics are more likely to secure a settlement favourable to their claims than awaiting an arbitral decision or even a mere mediation by the League Council. Unfortunately, our whole position in Irak is such as to render it impossible for us to make any concession or abatement of our claim,¹⁰ which would save Kemal's face or give him a golden bridge over which he could retreat and justify himself to the Angora Assembly and public opinion.

¹⁰ On November 2 Mr. Chamberlain recorded that M. Uden, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, had proposed to him that the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry should mediate between Great Britain and Turkey on the basis of partitioning the vilayet of Mosul. Mr. Chamberlain had replied that with their responsibilities for the young state of Irak it was impossible for His Majesty's Government to settle the dispute 'by selling the interests of Irak in return for economic and financial concessions to citizens of Great Britain'.

III. MEMORANDUM BY THE LEGAL ADVISERS TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

The Council of the League has,¹¹ acting under the last sentence of article 14 of the Covenant, requested the Permanent Court of International Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following questions:

1. What is the character of the decision to be taken by the Council in virtue of article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne; is it an arbitral award, a recommendation or a simple mediation?
2. Must the decision be unanimous, or may it be taken by a majority? May the representatives of the interested parties take part in the vote?

It is somewhat misleading to speak of the finding of the Court in such circumstances as a 'decision'. There is a clear distinction between the determination of a dispute by the Court under the second sentence of article 14 and an advisory opinion under the last sentence. The latter is merely an opinion given to the Council at its request to assist it in dealing with some matter which is before it. As between Turkey and Great Britain, the finding of the Court will not, from a legal point of view, alter the existing situation at all; it is merely a preliminary step in the proceedings of the Council, and it is the final action of the Council for which Turkey and Great Britain have, under article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne, to wait.

Further, while the opinion of the Court would no doubt be regarded by the Council as authoritative as regards the legal questions submitted to it, it does not necessarily follow that the Council would act upon it any more than an individual necessarily acts upon the advice of the lawyer whom he consults. If the Court were to advise that the Council has the power to give an arbitral decision which is binding on Turkey and Great Britain, the Council would no doubt accept this definition of its powers; but, although it may be hoped that the Council would then be prepared to give such a decision, one cannot be certain that political considerations might not lead it to attempt to effect a settlement by agreement. Similarly, if the Court advised that the arbitral decision could be given by a majority of the Council, the Council would no doubt accept this as a correct statement of the legal position, but it does not necessarily follow that the Council would be prepared to promulgate a decision which was only supported by a bare majority.

For present purposes it will suffice to consider the possible findings of the Court under two heads:

1. Where the Court holds that the Council has power to give a decision which is binding on the parties, even if it is not accepted by one or both of them.
2. Where the Court holds that no settlement of the frontier question can be effected by the Council unless both parties concur in it.

In the first case, it may, perhaps, be assumed that the Council would ultimately succeed in laying down a frontier line, but, if the Turks continue to maintain their present attitude, it is possible that the tendency of the

¹¹ By a decision of September 19, 1925.

Council would be to compromise, i.e., to divide the disputed territory. This tendency is more likely to prevail if opinion on the Council is divided; if the Court advises that unanimity (apart from the parties to the dispute) is necessary, a compromise may be the only means of getting a decision at all, while, even if the Court advised that a majority decision would suffice, an appreciable minority might quite likely be in a position to impose a compromise.

If, on the other hand, the Court advises that the consent of the parties is necessary, it would seem that the result must be either a compromise accepted by both parties or no decision, in the sense of a definitive fixing of the frontier, at all. In the latter case, it would seem that the 'decision' referred to in article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne would not have been taken, and consequently that the *status quo* provided for in that paragraph would continue. The result as regards the *status quo* ought to be the same if the Court found that the Council had power to give an arbitral decision without the consent of the parties and the Council gave a decision which Turkey refused to accept, for, as the Turks maintain that the powers of the Council under article 3 (2) do not extend to imposing a frontier upon them, they would in the suggested circumstances be bound to hold that the decision referred to in that paragraph had not been given, in which case the *status quo* would have to be maintained.

There remains the question of what the position would be if Turkey were to commit an act of aggression against Irak. This might happen either before the decision of the Council was given, or after a decision had been given which Turkey did not accept, or after the Council had failed to reach a decision.

The normal procedure would be for Great Britain to notify the League of the violation of the *status quo* and of the existence of a dispute between Great Britain and Turkey, and Turkey would be invited under article 17¹² to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute upon such conditions as the Council might deem just.¹³

If Turkey refused the invitation and resorted to war against Great Britain by invading Irak, article 16 would apply and the sanctions provided by that article should be let loose against Turkey.

If Turkey accepted the invitation, the matter would be dealt with in accordance with articles 12 to 15. Acceptance of the invitation by Turkey should involve the cessation of any hostile measure against Irak, because otherwise article 16 would at once apply, since Turkey had accepted membership of the League for the purposes of the dispute.¹⁴

¹² Of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

¹³ *Note in original*: 'It would not be so effective to bring the matter to the notice of the League under article 11, because it is held that the powers of the Council under that article are confined to making recommendations.'

¹⁴ *Note in original*: 'Under article 16 it would, following the resolution of the Second Assembly, be the duty of all members of the League, subject to the general initiative of the Council, in the first place to break off diplomatic relations with Turkey, and then progressively to adopt coercive measures against her until she abstained from warlike proceedings.'

The action which the Council would take would depend on the circumstances in which the act of aggression had been committed. If the decision of the Council had not yet been given, Turkey would have violated not only the last paragraph of article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne, but her undertaking given to the League, and the Council could hardly refuse to call upon Turkey to withdraw her forces pending the League's decision, and if she refused, to apply article 16. If the act of aggression occurred after the Council had given a decision which, according to the opinion of the Court, it was competent to give but which Turkey did not accept, the Council would be bound to stand by its decision as to the frontier and to call upon Turkey to withdraw behind it, and, if Turkey refused, article 16 would again apply. If the act of aggression occurred after the Council had failed to reach a decision, the position would (assuming that it can be successfully argued, as suggested above, that the *status quo* is to continue until such time as the Council finally succeeds in reaching a decision) be the same as in the first of the three cases under consideration, since Turkey would have violated the *status quo*.

In the above observations no attempt has been made to distinguish the present question from an ordinary frontier dispute, on the ground that Great Britain is only concerned in Irak as a mandatory under article 22 of the Covenant. The point is obviously important, but as the position of Great Britain depends not on an ordinary mandate, but on the Council's decision of the 27th September, 1924, accepting the Anglo-Irak Treaty and the British undertakings to the League in connection therewith,¹⁵ the situation is not quite the same as it would be in the case of an attack on an ordinary mandated territory. It seems probable, in any case, that the special position of Great Britain in the matter would result, not so much in any alteration of the procedure by which the League would deal with the matter, as in a greater willingness on the part of the Council to assist a country which may, at any rate to some extent, still be regarded as representing in Irak the interests of the League. It is obvious that this willingness should be increased if it could be shown that Turkey's action amounted to a flouting of the authority of the League, as it would do if it involved either a breach of Turkey's undertaking to the Council to maintain the *status quo* pending its decision, or a refusal to accept a decision which the Permanent Court had held that the Council was entitled to give.

¹⁵ The text of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of October 10, 1922, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 119, pp. 389-94. For the decision of the Council of the League of Nations of September 27, 1924, see Cmd. 2317 of 1925, *Application to 'Iraq of the Principles of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations*.

Memorandum by Mr. Oliphant¹

[E 6772/32/65]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 1, 1925

I had a talk with Mr. Phipps yesterday just before he started for Paris and after he had seen the French Ambassador.

Monsieur de Fleuriau had been greatly struck by a remark made to him in Paris on Wednesday² by the Secretary of State that our wish was that the Irak trouble should be regarded as a matter of the League versus Turkey and not a dispute between the British and Turkish Governments. Monsieur de Fleuriau had reflected on it and, though he had not expressed this opinion to the Secretary of State, felt that it would be an excellent thing for us to give as much publicity as possible to this view. Mr. Phipps asked me whether on arrival in Paris he should take any steps to cast a fly over Monsieur Briand.

My answer was to the following effect.

The desirability of engaging the League so far as possible in the matter had been for some time the object of the Secretary of State, and the possibility of Mr. Chamberlain sounding Monsieur Briand in Paris when he broke his journey there *en route* home from Locarno had been raised. Mr. Chamberlain had, however, desired to avoid any appearance whatever of striking a bargain with Monsieur Briand consequent on Locarno and had therefore decided not to raise the point then. Subsequently, the Secretary of State had had a memorandum on the point prepared by the Legal Advisers³ and circulated to Ministers with a note that he would express his views orally in Cabinet.

I thought then that until the S. of S. had had an opportunity of doing so, Mr. Phipps should hold his hand, but that I would report our conversation and later would let Mr. Phipps hear the wishes of the Secretary of State.⁴

L. OLIPHANT

¹ Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

² October 28, 1925.

³ No. 534, Part III.

⁴ Mr. Oliphant subsequently sent a letter (text not preserved in Foreign Office archives) to Mr. Phipps on November 4, presumably in accordance with the following instructions from Mr. Chamberlain: 'Call Mr. Phipps attention to my reply [see No. 537] to the Turkish proposals for a deal . . . Mr. Phipps is quite safe in saying that we have from first to last shown the greatest confidence in & respect for the Council. Clearly what is at stake is the Council's & the League's authority. If the Council allows itself to be defied or intimidated, no great power will again submit a dispute to it & the sanctions which are proved useless in this case will be equally useless in all others. The Council & the League have scored a success in the Grecko-Bulgar case & as Paul Boncour said to me I "was building up a jurisprudence for the League." Is Mosul to be allowed to destroy what has been accomplished? Are the sanctions available only if Great Britain applies them for someone else's protection?

'Mosul really matters very little to us—we can exist & flourish without Irak—but can the League stand such a failure for itself? & can France stand such a failure for the League? A. C. 2/11'

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Sir P. Loraine (Tehran)

No. 230 Telegraphic [E 6683/18/34]

Very urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 2, 1925, 9 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 340 to 348 inclusive (of 29th October to 1st November).¹

From information contained therein, revolution appears to have been entirely orderly and without detriment to British interests. To this extent events have in no way run counter to views of His Majesty's Government embodied in my telegram No. 225² (of 23rd October).

There is certainly no objection to your carrying on as suggested in paragraph numbered 1 in your telegram No. 345 (of 31st October) with provisional Government.

As regards question of recognition by His Majesty's Government suggestion in your telegram No. 345 of acting in concert with friendly Governments while omitting those of Russia and Turkey is presumably superseded by your telegram No. 348 (of 1st November) last paragraph of which advocates recognition of provisional Government by us at first possible moment.

On this supposition, you are authorised to inform Reza Khan that, on the understanding that all treaties etc. between the two countries are recognised and all obligations under them faithfully executed under the new régime, His Majesty's Government are prepared to accord provisional recognition to that régime pending a final decision by Persia as to its future form of government. There appears no need to concert with your colleagues representing other capitulatory powers, in making joint or identic communication in this sense and I assume you would prefer to act immediately and by yourself, but there is no objection, especially if you are approached by them, to your suggesting that they shall follow your lead.

Until constituent assembly mentioned in your telegram No. 346 (of 1st November) has been convoked and definite decision taken, it is not possible to go beyond above declaration.

¹ Not printed. For Tehran telegram No. 340, see No. 533, note 2. Tehran telegram No. 344 reported that on October 31, the Majlis, the Persian Parliament, had voted by a large majority to depose the Qajar dynasty and entrust the temporary government to Reza Khan. In Tehran telegram No. 345 Sir P. Loraine discussed the attitude to be adopted by His Majesty's Government in the light of this development, and in Tehran telegram No. 348 he reported that the Persian Government were 'most anxious that His Majesty's Government should be the first foreign Government to afford what recognition they think proper to the new state of affairs'.

² No. 533.

No. 537

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)
No. 133 Telegraphic [E 6589/32/65]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 2, 1925, 10 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 122¹ (of October 2) and your despatch No. 766¹ (of October 10th: Irak frontier question).

His Majesty's Government do not consider that anything new has occurred to justify change from policy followed hitherto of declining to entertain Turkish suggestions of direct negotiations. Decision now lies with Council of League. Departure from present policy would not only be regarded at this juncture as act of discourtesy to League, but would be unlikely to serve any useful purpose since His Majesty's Government are not prepared to make any territorial concession likely to be acceptable to Turkish government.

You should be guided by above considerations if Turks broach question again.

There is no foundation for Minister for Foreign Affairs statement to you that Secretary of State for the Colonies referred at Geneva to possibility of a settlement by agreement between interested parties.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram and despatch Sir R. Lindsay referred to the conversation on October 1 with Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which the most important point is indicated in the third paragraph of Part II of No. 534.

No. 538

Sir P. Loraine (Tehran) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 4, 9 a.m.)
No. 354 Telegraphic [E 6683/18/34]

TEHRAN, *November 3, 1925, 6.25 p.m.*

I handed this afternoon to Head of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs being also present, note in accordance with your telegram No. 230.¹ His Imperial Highness (as he is now styled) expressed the liveliest satisfaction at the communication and at the fact that His Majesty's Government were the first foreign government to recognise the new state of affairs and said that it was a further proof of the friendly feelings entertained by His Majesty's Government towards Persia and himself which he had been able to appreciate on many previous occasions.

He authorised me to inform you at once that Persia unhesitatingly accepted the observance of the treaties in force between the two countries.

I expressed the hope that Persia would reciprocate British friendliness which His Imperial Highness so frankly recognised and he said there could be no possible doubt of that.

¹ No. 536.

Reza Khan's attitude towards myself was extremely cordial and your action has made a deep impression on him which I do not think will be lightly removed. He referred at the end of the interview to the incalculable services His Majesty's Government and yourself had rendered to the cause of peace in the negotiations terminated at Locarno whereby, in his opinion, England had almost certainly averted another world war and rendered world peace possible.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 354, sent to India.

No. 539

Mr. A. Chamberlain to Sir G. Lloyd¹ (Cairo)
No. 261 Telegraphic [E 6651/10/91]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 6, 1925, 3 p.m.*

Mr. Henderson's telegram No. 352² (of October 6. Egyptian mediation in Hejaz conflict).

You should inform King Fuad that His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot undertake to advise His Majesty in this matter. They are of course anxious to see peace restored in the Hejaz in order that British Moslems may be able to make the pilgrimage in comfort and security. At the same time, they feel that the future régime in the Hejaz is a matter for the decision of Moslems alone and that they cannot themselves properly intervene in what is primarily a religious question.

Please repeat to Jeddah.

¹ H.M. High Commissioner at Cairo.

² Mr. Henderson was Minister in H.M. High Commission at Cairo. This telegram referred to possible mediation by King Fuad of Egypt in the dispute between King Ali of the Hejaz and the Emir Ibn Saud, Sultan of Nejd.

No. 540

Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)
No. 3779 [E 6984/357/89]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 14, 1925*

My Lord:

The latest reports which I have received from Syria are causing me grave concern, since they indicate a serious failure on the part of the French authorities to give effect to that policy of Anglo-French cooperation throughout the world which it has been the object of our two governments to secure.

2. On December 5th 1924, in my first conversation with Monsieur Herriot after I assumed my present office, I observed to His Excellency that national friendship could not be confined only to the relations existing between the governments in London and Paris but must extend to the

relations of our representatives in all parts of the world. Monsieur Herriot cordially agreed, and as a result all French and British representatives abroad were instructed to maintain close and continuous collaboration with their respective British and French colleagues. I am satisfied that my instructions in this respect have been scrupulously observed by British officials and by no one more so than His Majesty's Consul at Damascus; and I have reason to know that Monsieur Briand desires that the similar instructions issued by Monsieur Herriot should be observed with equal loyalty.

3. But what has happened as regards Anglo-French cooperation in Syria? I find that Mr. Smart, His Majesty's Consul at Damascus, an admirable public servant, known to possess the strongest sympathy and goodwill towards France, who has handled a difficult situation with consummate skill, has been accused by high French officials of direct responsibility for provoking the recent troubles at Damascus¹ by means of alarmist notices which he is alleged to have placarded in the town. These accusations are devoid of any foundation whatever. Notices based on definite notifications made to Mr. Smart by the delegation of the High Commissioner were affixed by him after the first bombardment in the waiting-room of the Consulate only, with a view to the removal of British subjects out of the danger zones in case the bombardment of the town should be renewed—an eventuality which had been foreshadowed if the town should fail to comply with the conditions imposed on it by the French authorities. These notices were withdrawn as soon as the delegation notified Mr. Smart that the bombardment would not take place. The false accusations against Mr. Smart have nevertheless been given wide publicity in the Paris press, and not one word of denial has been issued by the French Government who should be acquainted with the real facts of the case. I must express my profound regret at this omission and my earnest hope that the French Government will take immediate steps to correct it. His Majesty's Government are anxious to avoid the necessity for making any announcement or taking any steps which could appear to reflect on a French official or encourage controversy between the newspapers of the two countries, but the French Government will understand that they cannot leave His Majesty's Consul exposed without defence to such attacks when his action in a most anxious situation has merited their warm approval.

4. This is not the only matter in which the French authorities in Syria have seriously failed to carry out the policy of Anglo-French cooperation in accordance with the instructions of the French Government. That government is well aware of the concern which His Majesty's Government feel as regards the passage of Turkish troops eastwards over the Syrian section of the Bagdad Railway. Earnest representations have repeatedly been made during the last few weeks on this subject both in Paris and in London; and according to the categorical assurances given to Your Lordship by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 9th, it had been clearly laid down by the French Government that no greater number of Turkish troops would be allowed to pass eastward than that which was passing west, i.e. that the former category

¹ For the Syrian revolt of 1925 cf. *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, vol. i, pp. 416-39.

of troops must represent not reinforcements but only reliefs. I now learn that the French authorities have allowed a Turkish troop train hitherto detained at Islahie to proceed eastwards, although no further Turkish troops have passed westward and that another eastward-bound train is to follow. I am at a loss for any explanation of an action so definitely at variance with the undertakings emphatically renewed by Monsieur Briand only a few days since.

5. The present relations between the French and British Governments are happily so cordial that they can speak to each other with complete frankness about any difficulties or misunderstandings which may arise. I therefore believe that I am acting in accordance with Monsieur Briand's wishes as well as my own inclination in bringing my anxieties at once to the notice of the French Government. I should fail in my duty were I not to call their attention frankly to the grave danger which threatens the relations between the two countries unless steps are taken forthwith to bring the actions of the French authorities in Syria into harmony with what I know to be the general policy of the French Government. I am firmly convinced that Monsieur Briand is as anxious as I am to avoid any such risk at a time when the fullest confidence and cooperation is more than ever necessary for the execution of the great work of pacification in which we are engaged.

6. Your Lordship should read this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and leave a copy of it with His Excellency.²

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

² Lord Crewe reported in Paris telegram No. 443 of November 18 that he had carried out these instructions in an interview with M. Briand on the previous evening. M. Briand expressed 'cordial agreement' with the views on Anglo-French relations in paragraph 2 above but would not comment regarding Mr. Smart as the whole matter was before the Foreign Relations Commissions of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies respectively. Lord Crewe continued: 'In the matter of the Syrian section of the Bagdad railway Monsieur Briand was more forthcoming. He promised to enquire closely into the allegations which I set out, saying that he had telegraphed quite ten times with instructions that no Turkish troops should be allowed to go eastwards as reinforcements, but only as reliefs, and that those who did so travel must proceed without arms or stores. He thought there must be some mistake or exaggeration in the account which I had given him, but he repeated his continual anxiety to act in consort [*sic* ? concert] with you in this matter, of which he fully realises the importance.'

No. 541

Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Mr. A. Chamberlain
(Received November 22, 9 a.m.)

No. 130 Telegraphic [Telegrams 44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 21, 1925, 6.30 p.m.

I returned yesterday from a visit to Angora.

No suggestion was made to me of any desire to undertake direct negotiations about Irak frontier, and I of course avoided any language that might

be construed as inviting them. Conversations were thus rather uninteresting and inconclusive, though entirely friendly in tone. I received plenty of assurances that Turkey harboured no aggressive intentions,¹ and from Prime Minister² an admission that Turkish Government have been bluffing, but of so sweeping a character that I am inclined to discount its value and attribute it to his imperfect command of the French language. He informed me most categorically that Kurdish question is the most vital part of the frontier difficulty and constitutes true menace to Turkey's security. He said that, so long as any large number of Kurds are included in Irak, Turkish Government would have perpetual trouble in her eastern provinces, and trouble would arise automatically, however loyally British authorities might act as neighbours.

I took opportunities of warning Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of War that any attempt at *coup de main* against Mosul must lead to difficulties on widest scale.

My impression is that Turkish Government, including Minister for Foreign Affairs, is desirous of keeping the peace, but it is in low spirits over situation into which its policy of the past few months has brought it, and has been disappointed that I had nothing to say. Military class and General Staff may desire violent methods, and decision lies in the hands of the President. I think he will back his Government.

Prime Minister did not disguise his dislike of the Locarno treaties, but his objections to them were of an entirely childish character. True reason of dislike is that, as Turkey has always profited by discord among the Western Powers, so any rapprochement among them *pro tanto* diminishes her chances of getting advantages.

Fuller report by bag.³

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 54.)

¹ In Constantinople despatch No. 840 of November 11, Sir R. Lindsay had reaffirmed his view, on balance, that the Turkish Government would not attack Mosul.

² Ismet Pasha.

³ In Constantinople despatches Nos. 863-4 of November 22-23, not printed. In the former despatch Sir R. Lindsay reported in particular that he had explained to Ismet Pasha as regards the Locarno treaties that 'for the present it was clearly not possible to make them universal. To this Ismet answered that if we would guarantee Turkey's frontiers Turkey would be prepared to guarantee ours—an answer on which further conversation was impossible.'

No. 542

Mr. A. Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

No. 3891 [E 7232/357/89]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 23, 1925*

My Lord,

The French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and read to me the reply which M. Briand had sent to the communication which I desired

your Lordship to make to him on the subject of Anglo-French relations in Syria.¹

M. de Fleuriau left with me a copy of M. Briand's despatch, and I enclose a transcript for your Lordship's information.²

M. de Fleuriau called my attention to the fact that this letter was dated the 20th and had reached him on Saturday, the 21st, but he understood that it had in fact been approved before M. de Jouvenel's interview with Mr. Amery and myself.³ It was therefore to some extent a twice-told tale.

I asked the Ambassador to thank M. Briand for his communication, and to say that I was gratified, though not surprised, by the terms in which he wrote of Anglo-French co-operation. I felt that with the appointment of a new High Commissioner our difficulties on either side would be at an end, and we might treat the matter as closed.

There was only one point in the letter to which I must recur. M. de

¹ See No. 540.

² Not printed. This long despatch stated in particular:

'Les agents anglais sur place ne sont pas plus sans reproche que les nôtres. Sans aller plus loin que Mr. Smart, dont l'attitude, inspirée des instructions récentes qu'il a reçues et de la situation politique des deux pays dont le mandat est également en cause, répondra certainement à l'avenir à nos intérêts communs, le Gouvernement anglais ne peut ignorer que cet agent n'a pas toujours pratiqué, lorsqu'il était à Alep en particulier, une politique de sympathie et de bon vouloir. . . .

'Les agents consulaires n'échappent pas aux passions locales et n'évoluent pas aussi vite que leur Gouvernement. Cela ne justifie pas d'ailleurs les accusations portées dans quelques journaux français contre Mr. Smart, qui a montré en dernier lieu un haut sentiment de son devoir et une plus juste compréhension de son rôle, sans s'attarder aux difficultés qui avaient marqué ses relations avec le Haut-Commissaire français.

'Mais Mr. Chamberlain ne peut ignorer ni la liberté complète de la presse française ni les polémiques de politique intérieure qui rendent difficile d'agir sur elle. La situation présente en Angleterre les mêmes caractéristiques, les mêmes attaques injustes et précipitées contre la France et ses agents sans aucune critique sérieuse des événements. . . .

'En ce qui le concerne, le Gouvernement n'a jamais manqué, comme je viens de le faire devant la Commission du Sénat et de la Chambre, de formuler des déclarations très nettes relativement à la loyauté de la collaboration britannique en Syrie, déclarations qui ont été reproduites par la presse tout entière.

'A cet égard, il m'est impossible de ne pas attirer de nouveau l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur l'attitude véritablement peu amicale et passionnée de Sir Frederick Lugard, membre britannique de la Commission des Mandats à Genève [see note 4 below], dont l'indépendance théorique vis-à-vis du Gouvernement britannique ne suffit pas à expliquer l'action. . . .

'Quoi qu'il en soit, j'ai la plus ferme conviction que, grâce à une collaboration efficace et loyale, recommandée de nouveau à tous nos agents, non seulement les incidents locaux relevés de part et d'autre ne se reproduiront plus, mais que la nature des rapports franco-britanniques en Orient ne fera désormais que resserrer les relations générales des deux pays, dont l'amitié vient de s'affirmer avec tant de force pour le plus grand bénéfice de la paix européenne.'

As regards the passage of Turkish troops through Syria, M. Briand repeated his assurance to Lord Crewe (see No. 540, note 2) that the French authorities had controlled this as far as was possible.

³ This interview with the French High Commissioner designate in Syria and the Lebanon had taken place on November 19.

Fleuriau had already spoken to me about the complaint of the French Government as to Sir Frederick Lugard's action.⁴ I must ask M. de Fleuriau to impress upon M. Briand the British view in regard to this particular matter. Sir Frederick Lugard was appointed to the Mandates Commission by the League of Nations and not by His Majesty's Government. Incidentally I observed that I believed Sir Frederick had in the past examined the British mandates quite as critically and cross-questioned the British representatives with at least equal severity to any which he had shown to the French. He did not consider himself, and he was not in any way under the control of, or responsible to, the British Government. He would resent as personally dishonouring to himself any suggestion on my part that I had a right to control his actions. I had indeed taken advantage of my personal friendship with Sir Frederick Lugard to ask him to lunch with me, and during the luncheon I had spoken of the sensitiveness of the French Government on this question, and of their feeling that he had unduly pressed them at a moment of great difficulty; but this I had only been able to do as a personal friend and not in any sense as a Minister. I wished, therefore, to make it clear that His Majesty's Government could not accept responsibility for the action of any British subjects who were appointed by the League to its committees and over whom they had no right to exercise any control. To expect them to control ex-officials or other British subjects in such circumstances was not merely to ask of them an impossibility but also, as it seemed to me, to call upon them to do something injurious and derogatory to the League. The League had, for instance, appointed, I believed, a Spanish or Dutch national to some committee in connection with the Port of Danzig, but how impossible would be the position of the League if any Power which thought itself aggrieved by the decision of those gentlemen had felt itself entitled thereupon to address remonstrances to the Spanish or Dutch Governments.

I dwelt upon this matter because I am well aware that foreign Governments do, in fact, habitually exercise a great influence over their own nationals in similar circumstances, and it is important that they should understand the limitations which the traditions of English public life and service, as well as our respect for the League, impose upon us in similar circumstances.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁴ In a memorandum of October 28 from Paris, Mr. Lampson had reported M. Berthelot as saying that 'it had been a matter of some regret to the French Government that Sir Frederick Lugard had strongly supported' a proposal not to postpone discussion of the report on the French Mandate in Syria in 1924, and had thus increased the French difficulties (cf. League of Nations, *Permanent Mandates Commission: Minutes of the Seventh Session held at Geneva from October 19th to October 30th, 1925*, pp. 14-16).

Memorandum by Sir C. Hurst¹

[E 7436/32/65]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 26, 1925

Secretary of State.

If the recalcitrant X does not attack, there is, I am afraid, no provision in the Covenant which enables or obliges the other Members of the League to apply coercion to compel him to comply with the Council's decision.

Before last Saturday's decision at The Hague² it would have been possible to make out a plausible case the other way, as it could have been maintained that the provision at the end of article 13 of the Covenant applied—'In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto'.

In extreme cases it would, I think, be held that this entitled the Council in the last resort to recommend coercion, but the Court has now held that the function of the Council under article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne is not that of an arbitrator within the meaning of article 13.

The result is that if the Council arrives at a unanimous decision as to the Iraq frontier and the Turks refuse to carry it out, but abstain from any action which constitutes a resort to war, the Council can only exercise peaceful pressure on Turkey to comply. If the states represented on the Council can really be induced to exercise such peaceful pressure it ought to be effective.³

C. J. B. H.

¹ This memorandum was written for Mr. Chamberlain, who had sent to Sir C. Hurst a memorandum by Lord Cecil which stated in particular: 'I do not think that as things stand the League could be called on to enforce a decision of the Council about the Mosul question. The reference to the Council under the Treaty of Lausanne appears to be outside the Covenant altogether.' Mr. Chamberlain explained that Lord Cecil had written his memorandum because he had not altogether agreed with a statement made by the Foreign Secretary. Mr. Chamberlain added: 'I think that he & I are in complete agreement if the recalcitrant X attacks. But do you agree that if X, after accepting in advance the decision of the Council, refuses to carry it out *without attacking*, the Council is reduced to impotence? Can it do nothing but ask: Do you bite your thumb at me, Sir? A. C. 25.11.'

² The advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice is printed in *Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Series B, No. 12, November 21st, 1925. Collection of Advisory Opinions*, 'Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Turkey and Iraq)'. The opinion was to the effect that the decision of the Council of the League of Nations would be binding on the parties, and that the votes of the parties would not be counted in ascertaining whether there was the necessary unanimity in reaching this decision.

³ Mr. Chamberlain minuted as follows on the present document: 'In regard to Iraq the point is I think academic for we shall obey the League if it deprives us of territory & it is not to be anticipated that in any cir[cumstance]s the frontier will be drawn north of the Brussels [*sic*] line, i.e. the line now occupied by us. But the case might be different if X were Greece or Bulgaria. The Council might then be in a very difficult position. A.C. 26.11.'

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

No. 1159 [E 7485/32/65]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 4, 1925

Sir,

I invited the Turkish Ambassador¹ to come and see me this morning.

I told his Excellency that I had a communication to make to him, but he himself had apparently wished to enter into a conversation with me after the dinner which I gave to the signatories of the Locarno Treaty on Tuesday² evening, and, as it was impossible for me at that moment to free myself from other duties, I invited him now to say whatever he had wished to express on that occasion. The Ambassador replied that he had merely wished to express the hope that we might find a friendly solution of our differences. He did not develop and evidently did not desire to develop this theme, and I accordingly made to him my own declaration.

I told his Excellency that it was the earnest desire of the British Government to cultivate friendly relations with the Republic of Turkey. Between our two countries there had been a traditional friendship. British blood had been shed in defence of Turkey. It was only when Turkey joined our enemies in the late war that a quarrel arose between us, and it was our desire to resume the relations of confidence and friendship which had formerly prevailed between us. His Majesty's Government had shown that their policy was inspired by a sincere desire for peace. They had effected a reconciliation with the country to which they had been most immediately and most bitterly opposed during the war, and they felt that it should be easier to restore good relations between Turkey and Great Britain than it had been to effect this reconciliation with Germany. I greatly regretted that our two Governments had not been able to settle the frontiers of Irak between themselves without reference to any third party. Failing a direct settlement, our two Governments had agreed to refer the matter to the League of Nations, to respect, pending its decision, the boundary which it had provisionally fixed and, when its final decision was given, to accept the award. His Majesty's Government had renewed this assurance on every appropriate occasion. They had observed with regret that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, when appearing before the Council in September last,³ had avoided renewing the Turkish acceptance and had sought to qualify it or to withdraw it. His Majesty's Government had observed the nature of the polemics indulged in in the Turkish press and even in speeches delivered by persons of authority. They were aware of the concentration of troops which had taken place in the neighbourhood of the frontier, and I desired, while carefully avoiding even the appearance of menace, to call his Excellency's attention to the gravity of

¹ Ahmed Ferid Bey.

² December 1, 1925.

³ On September 3, 4, and 19, 1925. See *League of Nations Official Journal*, October 1925, pp. 1322-7, 1336-7, and 1379-82.

these public declarations and this concentration of troops and to the menace of an attack upon the frontier from the Turkish side which they would seem to convey. I could not believe that the Turkish Government could contemplate a step which would not only be a flagrant breach of the engagements which they had undertaken to the League of Nations, but would bring the young republic into direct conflict with the League and with all that it stood for. The League was the greatest moral force existing in Europe and daily it was becoming a greater material force. Apart from the general condemnation which such a flagrant breach of international engagements would bring upon the Turkish Government, they must consider what under the terms of the Covenant of the League would be the position of all the members of the League towards Turkey if it thus broke its engagements to the Council and defied the Council's judgment. I must add that the British Government was the mandatory for Irak under the supervision of the League, that it could not allow an attack upon the frontier which the League provisionally fixed or might ultimately determine, and that, if Turkey were to make such an attack, it would be faced not only with the whole authority and power of the League of Nations, but with that of the British Empire. I said that I made these observations as one who earnestly desired peace and friendship between our nations. I felt that it would not be frank or loyal to leave for the Council meeting at Geneva without informing the Turkish Government how gravely His Majesty's Government viewed the situation and what must be the consequences of any attack on the frontiers of the mandated territory. But I added that, when once the decision of the League had been given, if it should prove to be in our favour, I was prepared, if desired by the Turkish Government, to enter into conversations to see whether any *accommodements* were possible which might render more acceptable to them a solution which disappointed their hopes. I told his Excellency that I made this declaration both as to the gravity of the issues involved and as to our friendly dispositions and desire to live in relations *de bon voisinage* with Turkey by the express desire of my Government.⁴

The Ambassador asked me in the first case to define more exactly what I had meant. Was I contemplating some territorial concession? His Excellency had observed suggestions in the Press that a method of accommodation could be found in the grant of a loan to Turkey. He must say that the Turkish Government had never thought of bargaining for economic advantages, and that no satisfaction could be found in the pursuit of such an idea. I told the Ambassador in reply that I could make no promise, and could indicate no specific proposals. I had in fact none in my mind, but I excluded none. What I had wished to make clear to him was our friendly disposition and the fact that, when a decision had been given, if that decision were in favour of

⁴ In Constantinople telegram No. 134 of December 1 Sir R. Lindsay had recommended that such a communication should be made to the Turkish Ambassador, in order to strengthen the hand of Ismet Pasha, who with Mustapha Kemal Pasha was believed to favour a peaceful policy, 'by dispelling ignorance prevailing at Angora as to results of an unprovoked aggression'.

the line which we had defended, we should be glad to consider any possible method of rendering the decision of the Council more acceptable to the Turkish Government and thus promoting the friendship between our Governments and nations which it was our desire to attain.

The Ambassador then began *à titre personnel* to enter into some detail as to territorial arrangements. He insisted again that economic and financial considerations had been no part of the Turkish preoccupation, and in this connection he said that he desired to assure me that, if financiers here had spoken of making a bargain with the Turkish Government on the basis of commercial concessions to British subjects and if they had come to him to enquire his views, this propaganda was in no way instigated by him and he had declared himself unable to entertain such propositions. I accepted his Excellency's assurance as I was bound in courtesy to do, and took the opportunity of observing that I attached no importance to what emanated from the quarters to which he had alluded. They never would be countenanced by His Majesty's Government. They had no influence upon British policy and I had not supposed that his Excellency would allow himself to be engaged in any compromising conversations with them.

As regards the discussion of boundaries which he had opened, I said that I felt that at this moment we were too widely separated to enter usefully into such discussions. Perhaps when the Council's decision had been given, both sides might feel that proceeding from that decision as we necessarily must do, some accommodation was possible which neither of us could accept at this moment. I must, however, insist that I was making no promises and no proposal. I was only desirous at the same time that I called his attention to the gravity of the situation to assure him that it was our desire to live in amity with Turkey and that, if the decision were in favour of our claim, that would not, in our view, preclude the consideration of any possible arrangement for rendering the decision more easily acceptable to the Turkish Government.

The Ambassador repeated that nothing was likely to satisfy the Turkish Government except such a division of the disputed territory as would give a large part of it to Turkey. He and his Government were most anxious on their side to renew the friendly relations of which I had spoken, but a decision in favour of the present boundary must be unacceptable to Turkey. He did not wish to say that it would be forcibly resisted, but it would poison our relations.

I replied that I could add nothing to what I had already said. What had passed between us was very grave. I would beg him to report faithfully to his Government both the warning which our earnest desire for peace had obliged me to give and the expression of our willingness to enter into conversations when the Council's award had been delivered. I repeated that my declaration had been made to him by the express desire of my Government.

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Sir A. Chamberlain
 (Received December 8, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 482 Telegraphic: by bag [Telegrams 44]

Confidential

PARIS, December 7, 1925

Mr. Phipps mentioned to M. Berthelot in the course of conversation this afternoon how anxious His Majesty's Government were over the question of Mosul. M. Berthelot replied that he had the day before yesterday spoken with rough frankness on the subject to M. Undén.¹ M. Berthelot made it quite clear to M. Undén that, placed between Turkey on the one side and Great Britain on the other, France had no kind of hesitation in ranking herself by the side of the latter. Turkey, he pointed out, no longer counted. She was incapable of doing anything useful or of producing anything whatever. She could not govern, and her only speciality was massacre. M. Berthelot pointed out that France, both on account of her interests on the spot and of her general world interests, was absolutely determined to stand by Great Britain. If M. Undén imagined that by giving way to the Turks over Mosul and awarding some such line as that of the Lesser Zab² the Council would in any way be settling the question he was very much mistaken. All that would happen would be that the entire Christian population allotted to Turkey in those regions would be massacred, and the League would incur the odium. France herself had endeavoured to come to an arrangement with Turkey by the Treaty of Angora,³ and on six occasions had tried to settle the Turkish-Syrian boundary on the spot. Four times the Turks had failed to put in an appearance, and on the other two occasions they had, after a few hours' fruitless discussion, advanced such impossible pretensions that the negotiations had had to be broken off. Any undue encouragement to the Turks over Mosul would merely make them more intransigent elsewhere. M. Berthelot admitted that M. Undén had not seemed to be in the least shaken by these arguments. Mr. Phipps remarked that M. Undén appeared to be a rock, but M. Berthelot replied that he was merely an imbecile.

M. Berthelot said that M. Briand was fully determined to stand by Great Britain through thick and thin over this question, which was so serious a one for His Majesty's Government, and in return France would expect Great Britain in her turn to support France if serious occasion arose.

M. Berthelot said that only yesterday M. Briand had himself, in reply to a telephone call from M. Paul-Boncour at Geneva, impressed upon the latter

¹ M. Undén was a member of the Committee of the Council to reconsider the 'Brussels line'. For a report of December 16, 1925, by M. Undén see Cmd. 2565 of 1925.

² The Lesser Zab River flowed across the vilayet of Mosul, dividing it into two approximately equal portions.

³ For this treaty of October 20, 1921, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 114, pp. 771-4, and for the notes and letters attached thereto see *ibid.*, pp. 318-22.

that he must support His Majesty's Government in every way.⁴ M. Paul-Boncour, not satisfied with this personal message from M. Briand, had to-day asked for written and definite instructions, which are being sent to him, but meanwhile M. Berthelot hopes that you will inform M. Paul-Boncour that you have been told by M. Briand of his personal telephone message to him at Geneva, and that you therefore rely on him for full support.

M. Berthelot incidentally remarked that both he and M. Briand entirely disapproved of the ambiguous attitude which had been previously adopted in the matter by M. Loucheur.

M. Berthelot is convinced that the Turks are merely bluffing, for after Locarno they must realise that they will get no assistance from Germany, and, according to reliable information recently received by the French Government from Moscow, the Soviets have no intention of helping them either. M. Berthelot has seen the Turkish Ambassador several times lately, and says that he seems to be completely unnerved.

(Sent to Geneva.)

⁴ The Council of the League of Nations was to discuss Mosul on December 8: see *League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1926, pp. 120-9.

No. 546

Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. London (Geneva)

No. 271 Telegraphic [E 7715/32/65]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 11, 1925, 9.30 p.m.

Following for Secretary of State.

Your telegram No. 409¹ was considered by Defence Committee this morning. A Committee was set up under Lord Balfour to consider action which League could usefully take to apply pressure to Turkey in event of her resisting Council's decision as to frontier.

Defence Committee decided to recommend to Cabinet that if Council's decision were followed by military action by Turkey against Mosul, Navy should be empowered to take action in the Straits without awaiting formal decision by Council as to measures to be taken, since this would involve delay and thus enable Turks to take counter measure.

It was decided that as soon as evidence in our possession was sufficient to establish Turkish violations of demilitarization provisions of Straits Convention² it should be laid before Council.

Sir R. Lindsay is being instructed³ to obtain through all possible sources as much authentic information as possible about Turkish activities as regards

¹ Not preserved in Foreign Office archives. This telegram evidently requested the study of the question referred to Lord Balfour's committee (see below).

² This convention was signed with the peace treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923, and is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 117, pp. 592-600.

³ In Foreign Office telegram No. 147 of December 11 to Constantinople.

prohibited measures either in maritime zone of the Straits or in demilitarised zones.⁴

It is hoped that minutes of to-day's meeting may be despatched evening of 12th December.

⁴ Sir R. Lindsay replied in Constantinople telegram No. 144 of December 18: 'I have fairly definite information that [*sic* ? of] construction of heavily timbered gun emplacements near Selimie barracks at (? Scutari). I hope to obtain full report from secret sources within a (? month). Meanwhile I deprecate action.'

No. 547

Sir W. Tyrrell to Sir P. Loraine (Tehran)

No. 259 Telegraphic [E 7622/18/34]

Very urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 14, 1925, 1.15 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 392¹ (of 9th December. New régime).

On occasion in question you may certainly act as proposed. As you have already received official note from Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs that treaties, etc., between the two governments are recognised and all other obligations will be faithfully executed under the new régime, I am content to leave actual wording to you.

The King has expressed his willingness to send a telegram direct to Reza Khan and text will be sent later for your information, in my telegram No. 261.²

I am glad to avail myself of suggestion to telegraph to Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and text of message which you should deliver at appropriate moment is contained in my immediately succeeding telegram.³

In view of situation in general and difficulties of travelling in particular, special envoy will not be sent. You will therefore be appointed such for the occasion. Necessary credentials will be sent by next air bag on December 24th.

¹ Not printed. This telegram referred to information that Reza Khan would take the oath as Shah on December 15 and made the suggestions to which the present telegram replied. Sir P. Loraine's first proposal was that on being notified officially of the new monarchy he should communicate His Majesty's Government's recognition of the new régime. His last suggestion referred to British representation at the Coronation of the new Shah.

² Not printed. The message read as follows: 'On the solemn occasion of your accession, I desire to offer you my congratulations and my heartfelt wish that Persia under your rule may enjoy the benefits of peace and prosperity. The friendly feelings entertained by me and my people for the Persian nation can only be deepened by that era of development which, I confidently hope, may redound to the honour of Your Majesty and the whole Persian nation.'

³ Not printed. This message was on similar lines to that from H.M. King George V.

Mr. London (Geneva) to Sir W. Tyrrell (Received December 15, 4.35 p.m.)
No. 430 Telegraphic [Turkey 127/4]

GENEVA, December 15, 1925, 4.10 p.m.

Following from Secretary of State for the Colonies for Lord Cecil:

'At a late hour yesterday evening Avenol¹ informed me Council had decided to fix definitely on Brussels line, subject, however, to decision becoming of no effect and question opened again if new treaty embodying mandatory conditions of current treaty is not carried through and ready for submission to League by a certain date.² He officially transmitted to me question asking me to state definitely within what time His Majesty's Government would be in a position to submit to Council of League of Nations, in the same way as was done with present treaty, a new treaty for twenty-five years embodying clauses in present treaty which Council's resolution of 27th September, 1924, accepted as equivalent to clauses of other A mandates. I have replied as follows:

' "In answer to question put to me by Council, I see no difficulty in submission within six months from present date of a new treaty with Irak which will continue mandate responsibility towards League which is embodied in current treaty and in League decision of 27th September, 1924, for twenty-five years or until such early date as Irak is, in the opinion of Council, qualified for admission to membership of League.³

' "I need not assure Council that His Majesty's Government is anxious to arrive at a final settlement of this question at (? omitted: earliest) possible date."

'Avenol is transmitting verbally our view that we confidently expect to have treaty ready for March session, if not before. The mandatory clauses referred to in question fall within conditions laid down by Cabinet for my guidance, nor (? would their) continuance in a new treaty affect policy embodied in military and financial agreements of bringing our military expenditure on Irak to an end after terminating present treaty period. As regards twenty-five years, Avenol assures me decision which . . .⁴ is drafting will make it clear that it is a maximum. Both Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and I regard this as under all the circumstances a satisfactory solution and one most fully safeguarding liberty of Parliament; in signing declaration we were prepared to submit . . .⁴, but if we judge it advisable Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will make on announcement of our decision the statement which you suggested as to our anxiety to come to friendly arrangement with Turks.'

¹ The Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

² For the Council's decision of December 16, see Cmd. 2562 of 1925.

³ This paragraph was cited in a slightly variant form by M. Unden in his report of December 16. See No. 545, note 1.

⁴ The text is here uncertain.

No. 549

Sir W. Tyrrell to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

No. 151 Telegraphic [E 7773/32/65]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 19, 1925, 5 p.m.*

Soviet Ambassador in Paris in conversation with Lord Crewe on December 14th spoke of Turkey and critical position of Mosul question.

He said he was anxious to repeat what had already appeared in English press as *démenti*, that no treaty obligations of any kind existed between Russia and Turkey which would oblige the former to support the latter in case of a rupture occurring over the frontier line. Further than that, his government had no intention of interesting themselves in this question in any form; they were far too much occupied with difficult internal questions to engage in any foreign dispute.

No. 550

Mr. Jordan¹ (Jeddah) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received December 22, 10.30 p.m.)

No. 191 Telegraphic [E 8012/10/91]

JEDDAH, *December 22, 1925, 6.10 p.m.*

I proceeded to Ibn Saud's camp with the head of the Provisional Government in Jeddah² and Commander-in-Chief of forces yesterday. They officially surrendered and I informed Ibn Saud that my work as intermediary was now finished.

Ibn Saud replied before his full Divan thanking British Government for efforts put forward and assured me in a most vehement and sincere manner that Nejd nation was bound to Great Britain by closest bonds of friendship and treaty relations³ which they would always hold sacred and that he would never have any relations with any other Power big or small as long as Great Britain respected her religion and honour.

Situation in Jeddah is quiet; disarmament is completed. Troops of Ibn Saud enter tomorrow Wednesday.⁴

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to India, Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad and Singapore.

¹ H.M. Acting Consul at Jeddah.

² King Ali had abdicated on December 19.

³ The independence of the Emir Ibn Saud had been recognized by Great Britain in a treaty signed on December 26, 1915. The text is printed by C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries* (5th ed., Calcutta, 1929), vol. xi, pp. 206-8.

⁴ His Majesty's Government recognized the Emir Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz on March 1, 1926. See also the Appendix, paragraph 77.

No. 551

Sir W. Tyrrell to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)
No. 152 Telegraphic [Telegrams 44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 22, 1925, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 146¹ of 20th December.

The Prime Minister asked the Turkish Ambassador to call this afternoon, and renewed to him the statement made to his Excellency on the 4th instant by Sir Austen Chamberlain, and recorded in his telegram No. 142² of the 5th instant, to the effect that in the event of the decision of the League being in our favour he would be ready, should the Turkish Government so desire, to enter into conversations to ascertain whether any *accommodements* were possible to render more acceptable to them a solution which disappointed their hopes.

The Prime Minister then proceeded to hand to the Ambassador the declaration made on the 16th December by Sir Austen Chamberlain, on behalf of His Majesty's Government (see telegram No. 441³ of 17th December from Geneva repeated direct to you).

The Prime Minister added that he would be grateful to his Excellency if he would communicate this statement to his Government and ascertain whether they would be prepared to enter upon a friendly exchange of views to achieve this end. In the event of a favourable reply from the Turkish Government, he would immediately instruct you to proceed to Angora in order to get into touch with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency replied that he would lose no time in transmitting the Prime Minister's message to his Government, and promised to use his utmost endeavour to obtain a favourable reply, as he considered it the duty of an Ambassador to promote the best relations between his country and the Government to which he was accredited.

¹ Not printed. This telegram recommended the action recorded below in view of the unlikelihood of the Turkish Government's taking any initiative for conversations with His Majesty's Government owing to Turkish bitterness regarding the decision on Mosul.

² Not printed. This telegram was a slightly more condensed version of No. 544.

³ Not printed. This telegram cited the statements by Mr. Amery and Sir A. Chamberlain to the Council of the League of Nations on December 16 printed in Cmd. 2562 of 1925, pp. 4-5.

No. 552

Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 4, 1926)
No. 941 [E 63/62/65]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 29, 1925*

Sir,

I have the honour to report that Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, returned here yesterday morning from Geneva and Paris

having stopped 48 hours en route at Belgrade, and I had a conversation with him of over an hour's duration in the afternoon. His Excellency's mind works on very subjective lines and he was therefore full of his recent experiences at Geneva and whatever efforts I might make to turn the conversation into other channels he always brought it back to the past. He spoke bitterly of the proceedings before the League and characterized the decision as an injustice. He maintained, as Turkish newspapers always do, that the report of the League's Sub Commission of Enquiry¹ was in favour of the inclusion of Mosul in Turkey, and yet its conclusion was set aside by the Council. He said that Turkey had never agreed to arbitration or to anything more than [*sic*] mediation by the League. If she had wanted arbitration, she would not have accepted as arbitrator any body of men who merely voted as their Governments instructed them to vote, but would have asked for some individual who would act independently. Nor would she have accepted any body of men among whom not a single one could be counted as a friend, for if Turkey had had a single friend on the Council, unanimity would not have been attained and the present finding could not have been rendered. He himself had gone to the utmost limits of conciliation; he had been ready to accept partition at the line of the Lesser Zab, with demilitarization of the contested area, a security treaty, an economic agreement to preserve the economic unity of the vilayet, and he thought an exchange of population too might be desirable. The exchange should be a voluntary exchange only, on the lines of the Greco-Bulgarian convention,² and he was sure there were just as many Turks and Turcophiles in Irak anxious to emigrate northwards as there were native Christians in Turkey who would wish to move to the south. Beyond this point of concession Turkey could not possibly go: nor could she possibly accept and recognize a decision which gave every single point against her and afforded her no satisfaction whatever.

2. To these observations I rejoined that Turkey had only herself to blame. Twice last spring I had warned His Excellency not to let public opinion get over excited about Mosul. I had said that a decision would be given by the League which would certainly be distasteful to Turkey, and if national feeling were over-heated a difficult situation would ensue for the Turkish Government. This is precisely what had now happened. For months past the press had been allowed and encouraged to indulge in every possible excess. Not only had Great Britain been overwhelmed with opprobrium, but every day the League of Nations was grossly insulted. Was this the way favourably to predispose a Tribunal before which an appearance had to be made? If, as he said, Turkey was friendless, whose fault was it? What friendship could survive the spectacle of a deportation of Christians³ at the very moment when

¹ On December 10, 1925, General F. Laidoner had presented to the Council of the League of Nations his *Report on the Situation in the Locality of the Provisional Line of the Frontier between Turkey and Irak fixed at Brussels on October 29, 1924*. See Cmd. 2557 of 1925.

² This convention of November 27, 1919, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 112, pp. 997-1000.

³ For these deportations see General Laidoner's report of December 10 (cf. note 1 above) and Cmd. 2563 of 1925, *League of Nations, Turko-Irak Frontier: Memorandum on the Enquiry*

the League was in session? As to the question of arbitration or mediation, it was submitted to the Hague Court, and why should His Excellency now quote the opinion of Maître Gidel⁴ against the Court's decision? These arguments should have been stated to the Court itself as the Turkish Government was invited to do, and if they chose not to plead they also forfeited their right to complain. To this Tewfik Rushdi Bey's answer was that he could not appear before the Hague Court because by doing so he would be casting doubt on the correctness of his Government's view!

3. There was thus a good deal of recrimination in our conversation but it was nevertheless conducted in a tone of friendliness, and we did succeed in exchanging some views as to the future. His Excellency told me that he had not yet seen Ferid Bey's report of what Mr. Baldwin had said in London and I repeated to him briefly the substance of what had passed, asking him what the Turkish Government would do about it. Tewfik Rushdi Bey expressed natural reluctance to pronounce himself till he had seen his Ambassador's report and consulted with his Government, but he did say that no negotiations would be possible 'on the basis of the League's verdict' and that no solution would be possible that did not provide for the cession to Turkey of a large area of the Vilayet of Mosul.

4. One other point I made to the Minister. If, I said, things so turned out that I should be negotiating with the Turkish Government, and if the Turkish Government should desire the negotiations to succeed, then I must beg them not to appoint a Commission to conduct the discussions on their behalf. Tewfik Rushdi Bey said he shared my view on this point and would support it. I should inform you that in making this proposal I was bearing in mind the experience of the French in their efforts to settle the Syrian frontier question. Here M. Sarraut⁵ has been confronted by a commission on which local deputies sit. These men put up a first class fight over every market garden and there is no possibility of any progress.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.,

R. C. LINDSAY

conducted by MM. Ortega-Nunez, Markus and Charrère into the Deportations of Christians in the Neighbourhood of the Brussels Line.

⁴ At the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on December 8, the Turkish representative had cited extracts from this opinion by Maître Gidel, Professor of the Faculty of Law in Paris: see *League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1926, pp. 124-6.

⁵ French Ambassador at Constantinople.

Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 4, 1926)

No. 943 [E 65/43/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 30, 1925

Sir,

In my despatch No. 930¹ of 23rd December I had the honour to transmit to you the Text of the Russo-Turkish Treaty signed by Tewfik Rushdi Bey and M. Chicherin at Paris, as published in the local press. This treaty has certainly had the effect of heartening up Turkish feeling. As the League's procedure over the Mosul case slowly developed opinion at Angora got more and more depressed, and the Polish Chargé d'Affaires tells me that towards the end of the League's session Angora felt so much cowed that there was practically no more talk of war. Hoping against hope that the worst would not come to them with the Council's decision, the depression had reached its lowest point when the Treaty was published and the reaction was quite striking. Angora behaved as if a great weight had been taken off its chest.

2. In the psychology of these reactions one naturally finds exaggeration and this is freely expressed in the newspapers. The feelings of joy are now stated in almost lyrical terms; Turkey at last feels secure; the West has made its own Locarno Security Pact which is aimed at the East, and now the East has answered with its own pact which establishes a solid Asiatic front. European press writers, it is suggested, are in consternation at finding that Asiatic countries can no longer be bullied. Nevertheless there are signs of weakness; naturally enough the Turkish case rests on assumptions and no analysis of the Treaty is attempted—or could be attempted without giving the whole case away. If writers feel that the treaty itself is somewhat jejune, they supply the deficiency by broadly suggesting that it has secret articles, though they specifically deny their existence. For those in Turkey who still hanker after a western orientation of policy, the press makes the very utmost of the forty eight hours which Tewfik Rushdi Bey spent at Belgrade on his way home and on the remarkably cordial reception he received there. What, I wonder, will they say to the very chilly communiqué which according to this morning's news the Yugoslav Government has now seen fit to issue? To praise of Serbia is added abuse of France who is reproached and taunted in the bitterest terms for having attached herself to the chariot wheels of Turkey's enemies; and to a less extent of Bulgaria whose reluctance to ratify M. Radeff's treaty² comes in for a good deal of blame. On the whole the Turkish press to-day reminds one of a man walking through a dark forest by night and singing at the top of his voice to keep up his own courage.

3. As to the genesis of the treaty Tewfik Rushdi Bey—as I reported in my

¹ Not printed. For the Soviet-Turkish treaty of December 17, 1925, see No. 155.

² M. Radeff, while Bulgarian Representative at Angora, had negotiated the Bulgarian-Turkish treaty of friendship, signed there on October 18, 1925, but not ratified by Bulgaria until August 2, 1926. For the text see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 122, pp. 213-16.

despatch No. 942³ of yesterday,—suggests that it was a brilliant improvisation of his own, and so far as he is concerned this may be so, for I have no doubt that for a long time the Russians have desired to involve the Turks in some sort of political treaty, and if they have not actually proposed one, it was because the Turks were hanging back. Now however it was the Turks who must have taken the initiative, anxious in the last degree, after a serious check, to reestablish the confidence of their public and the internal prestige of their Government. It is typical of Turkish diplomacy that it should put itself in the position of having to beg for something which the Russians wanted to give, but at a moment when the latter were only prepared to give with a stingy hand. I see no necessity to suppose that any secret clauses are attached to the Treaty. It is the general opinion of neutral observers here that none such exist.

4. In the Treaty itself therefore there is little significance, but in the fact that a political treaty of any sort has been concluded between Turkey and Russia, there is a good deal. It is an indication of the stress which the Turkish Government has undergone, and of the severity of the check which it has received. For years past, in spite of Russian blandishments, Angora has refused to have anything but the loosest, if the most cordial relations with Moscow, and the underlying distrust of Russian policy has sufficed to restrain the Turks from entering into any binding political relations. Even now the future is not compromised, but the Turk means his signature of the Treaty to serve as a warning to the west that circumstances may force him to leave his position of equilibrium and come down on the Russian side of the fence.⁴

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.,

R. C. LINDSAY

³ Not printed.

⁴ In his despatch No. 6 of January 6, 1926, Sir R. Lindsay further reported that when the German Ambassador saw Tewfik Rushdi Bey on December 28, 1925, 'the talk turned on the approaching adhesion of Germany to the League of Nations and Herr Nadolny said something about Turkey's being now far from taking any such step. Tewfik Rushdi replied that it was so and that the matter was at present academic. The Ambassador said it was more than that; it was impossible; Turkey had bound herself not to enter into any combination directed against Russia; Russia would certainly maintain that the League was so directed and would not allow Turkey to join it. Tewfik Rushdi was startled at this idea; he maintained rather indignantly that the League was not in any way aimed against Russia and said he would have to combat vigorously any suggestion that it was. It is interesting to see Tewfik Rushdi reacting strongly against a suggestion that Turkey is now bound irretrievably to Russia in any particular.'

Letter from Sir W. Tyrrell to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

[E 489/62/65]

Private and personal

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 30, 1925

My dear Ronald,

You will have seen that we adopted your suggestion and that the Prime Minister asked the Turkish Ambassador to ascertain from his government whether it would be agreeable to them to discuss with us any alleviations that may occur to them in connection with the Geneva award. If they are willing, you are to go up to Angora and receive any suggestions they may have to make.

I think it was an admirable idea of yours in order to prevent our drifting into a deadlock, and we must now await the pleasure of the Turk.

I take this opportunity of telling you what my forecast of the near future is, and I should be very grateful to you for any comments that may occur to you upon it.

The Turk has discovered that the Anglo-French front is a solid wall and he has therefore submitted to the award. But that does not in the least mean that he has given up all hope of altering it. His present mood is one of sulks, and I do not think we can count upon his co-operation to smooth out matters. He knows perfectly well that we are very anxious to curtail as much as possible our Mesopotamian liabilities, but I don't think he has any intention of assisting us. On the contrary, his policy will be to keep the pot boiling on the frontier, and perpetuate as long as possible a condition of unrest in the Mosul district. Nor do I see any prospect of our being able to offer him substantial territorial concessions, as I think he remains of opinion that the only compromise he can accept is the grant of Mosul. As regards financial assistance, I do not think that he will be willing to offer guarantees of sufficient value to enable the money market here to grant him a loan, and it is the only practical alleviation we can give him, as I do not think the Government would be willing to grant a government loan for purely political purposes without substantial guarantees. If, however, you find the Turk keen on the subject, I should be inclined to explain to him that government loans are out of the question, but that the best that we can do is to recommend him to the City here which will decide the question on its financial merits. For that purpose he would no doubt be well advised to send a financial expert to London for the purpose of negotiation.

I entirely agree with you that he is very largely preoccupied with the Kurdish question. Here again we are in a position to assure him that we have no intention to promote, on our side of the border, anything like Kurdish home rule, and that all we have done and intend to do is to allow the Kurds in our sphere the use of their language and the employment of Kurdush [*sic*] local officials. Will that, however, satisfy him? I don't think so.

If, therefore, we wish to wind up our Mesopotamian liabilities within the

next few years and stimulate Iraq to become eligible to be a member of the League, we must contemplate the adoption of more heroic remedies. Under this head, I should place foremost an alliance with Turkey, limited, say, to ten years, possibly renewable at the expiry, with the consent of both parties, guaranteeing the integrity of the present Turkish dominion. I should think it desirable, if not essential, to associate France and Italy with such an instrument.

Such an alliance might appeal to the vanity of the Turk and also to his desire to avoid becoming too dependent on Soviet Russia.

I am throwing out these ideas for the purpose of getting your views, and in the endeavour to discover some policy which will enable us to placate the Turk sufficiently to associate him with our endeavour to free ourselves from the Mesopotamian incubus.

As you know, there is no enthusiasm in this country for the Mesopotamian adventure, and if the latter should increase our military and financial commitments I anticipate a strong movement in favour of cutting the painter. On the other hand, the new Turk, by assuming a western garb has undoubtedly succeeded in disarming here both Liberal and Labour antagonism. In this connection I was amazed at the absence of all reference to Turkish atrocities, as disclosed in the League report,¹ on the part of the Liberal opposition during the recent Mosul debate in the House of Commons.² You will have noticed the same absence in our press. This state of public opinion would facilitate the adoption of what I described above as a heroic policy, namely, that of alliance.

This change in the English attitude towards the unspeakable Turk of old is a further proof, if one were needed, of the power and influence of modern formulas. The fact that the new Turkish state calls itself a republic, that it pretends to be governed by a general assembly, that it is shedding its theocratic character and is adopting a bowler hat is considered sufficient proof of its having become a western democratic country. To you and me, familiar with the practice of all these theories, such a change, brought about by such flimsy factors, is a source of sorrow and not of laughter—considering what is at stake. There was something to be said for the old Turk, and I think we had our share of responsibility in turning him into the hopelessly destructive being that he became; there may have been something to say for the young Turk, whom at the start we undoubtedly mismanaged; but there is nothing to be said for the new Turk, who strikes me as a most unpleasant mixture of incompetence and humbug.

This effusion is an attempt at thinking aloud, and I beg of you to make as much mince-meat of it as you like.

Yours ever,
W. T.

¹ See No. 552, note 3.

² On December 21: see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 189, cols. 2076–85 and 2133–52 respectively, for statements by Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Amery.

Sir W. Tyrrell to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

No. 3 Telegraphic [E 137/62/65]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 5, 1926, 6 p.m.*

Following from Prime Minister:

The Turkish Ambassador this morning communicated to me, in reply to my statement of December 22nd (see my telegram No. 152),¹ a memorandum to the following effect:

'The Turkish government is animated by the hope that its point of view concerning the programme to be followed in the question of the delimitation of the Turco-Irak frontier has been clearly set forth by the negotiations which have taken place up to the present and by the official declarations which have been made on various occasions. The Turkish government is convinced that in the dispute regarding the Mosul Vilayet, which is in reality a question of territorial sovereignty as well as a question of peace and security, the fixing of a stable frontier is of primary importance. The Turkish government is ready to resume new negotiations to settle the dispute which exists between the two states. The choice of Angora as the place of negotiation is also convenient to the Turkish government. That government has not failed from the outset to indicate by the line of conduct which it has followed hitherto its preference for a direct solution of the question between the two governments. Turkey, taking into consideration the value and the importance of the happy expansion which would ensue in the relations between the two powers in consequence of the solution of this dispute, has always desisted, on condition that a final result should be reached, from claims which were of vital interest to her.² The proposals which the British government will be so good as to make for the discussions relative to the fixing of the frontier in the disputed territory and for the procedure which it will follow in these discussions will render it possible to foresee the result of the negotiations. Turkey desires very sincerely to live on terms of perfect and cordial friendship with Great Britain. It is specially desirable that the single dispute which exists between the two countries should be brought to a happy conclusion.'

I have informed His Excellency in reply that, in taking note of the agreement of his government to Angora being the most convenient place for negotiation, I would gladly authorise you to proceed to the capital in order to explore the ground and ascertain what *accommodements* or *alleviations* might be possible in connection with the decision given by the Council of the League of Nations on December 16th. I also assured him that I cordially reciprocated the desire of his government for the promotion of

¹ No. 551.

² On January 21 the Turkish Ambassador requested that the original French text corresponding to the preceding phrase should be amended to read: '*désistée des réclamations qui ne lui étaient pas d'un intérêt vital.*'

the friendliest relations between our two countries and that I shall spare no effort to achieve that end.³

Repeated to Bagdad No. 1.

³ Sir W. Tyrrell sent a letter to this effect to Ahmed Ferid Bey on January 5.

No. 556

Note from the Turkish Ambassador to Sir W. Tyrrell
(Received January 11)

[E 216/62/65]

LONDRES, le 9 Janvier 1925 [sic]

Chère Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date du 5 courant.¹

2. Lors de notre entrevue du 5 Janvier, j'avais communiqué textuellement à Son Excellence le Premier Ministre, la réponse de mon Gouvernement au désir que le Cabinet Britannique avait manifesté pour la reprise des négociations.

3. Comme Votre Excellence a dû le remarquer, la réponse de mon Gouvernement aux propositions britanniques ne contenait aucune allusion se rapportant de près ou de loin aux délibérations de la Société des Nations, et j'informai Monsieur le Président du Conseil que j'en comprenais que mon Gouvernement désirait, uniquement pour arriver à déterminer une frontière acceptable de part et d'autre dans les territoires contestés, que la question fut remise en discussion, sans aucune réserve.

4. J'avais, en outre, eu le plaisir d'ajouter que mon Gouvernement était animé des meilleures intentions pour arriver à une bonne entente et que, en agissant avec une bonne volonté réciproque, on était certain d'arriver à un résultat satisfaisant.

5. Je vous priai, d'autre part, afin de faciliter les négociations, d'éviter de mentionner dans les communications, la recommandation et la décision formulée par la Société des Nations.

6. Du désir exprimé par Son Excellence le Premier Ministre, à l'issue de notre entrevue, de donner à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique en Turquie, l'instruction de se rendre à Angora, j'avais compris que ce voyage devait être entrepris pour entamer des négociations en vue de régler la question d'une frontière acceptable de part et d'autre et j'avais avisé mon Gouvernement dans ce sens.

7. J'ai transmis télégraphiquement à mon Gouvernement la teneur de la lettre du 5 Janvier de Votre Excellence, tout en lui adressant le texte par courrier.

8. En réponse aux informations que je lui ai télégraphiées, je viens d'être invité par mon Gouvernement, d'aviser Votre Excellence que le Gouverne-

¹ See No. 555, note 3.

ment de la République, lors des négociations qui seront entreprises à Angora et de l'examen des propositions qui lui seront faites ainsi que dans les contre-propositions qu'il fera, se basera sur ce principe qu'il se trouve en face d'une question pendante et non encore résolue et, sous cette réserve, est prêt à entrer en pourparlers, dans l'espoir d'arriver à une entente finale.

9. Mon Gouvernement enregistre avec une grande satisfaction, les nouvelles assurances du Gouvernement Britannique de répondre cordialement au désir du Gouvernement Turc pour l'établissement des relations les plus amicales entre nos deux pays et son intention de ne rien ménager afin d'arriver à ce but.

10. Je suis également chargé de renouveler à Votre Excellence les sentiments de cordialité réciproque que le Gouvernement de la République nourrit à l'égard du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

11. Veuillez agréer, &c.,

A. FÉRID

No. 557

Letter from Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Sir W. Tyrrell

[E 489/62/65]

Private

CONSTANTINOPLE, January 12, 1926

Dear Willie,

I am both grateful for and interested in your letter of December 30th about the Turks and the Mosul question.¹

I agree as to your general diagnosis of the situation. The Turk does not intend to help us in the slightest; he may hold his hand for a while to see whether we mean business, but after that the extent to which he will make himself disagreeable will depend merely on the character and number of his own opportunities and of our embarrassments in other fields.

As to methods of appeasing him, assurances about the administration of Southern Kurdistan will have no effect whatever. The financial weapon affords no leverage, for while he is capable of swallowing a subsidy and not even saying thank you for it, he is incapable of assuming the obligations which any loan entails. It is very much in the air here that he would be satisfied with 'the town of Mosul', by which I imagine he means some line intermediate between the present frontier and the Lesser Zab; but I feel that this is an impossibility from our point of view.

And now I come to your own heroic suggestion of a guarantee of Turkish territory by Great Britain, France and Italy. First I will deal with the Turkish aspect. I feel that any such offer would have an immense and beneficial effect on the Turks. They believe that all they want is ten years security in which time they will be able to turn themselves into a strong and formidable power. They cannot be ignorant of Russia's endeavour to come to terms

¹ No. 554.

with Western Europe, and this brings before them the old nightmare of a Russo-British Entente against them; a guarantee of their frontiers should lay this nightmare. I cannot help remembering that when I was talking to Ismet last November about Locarno and Security Pacts, he said to me 'if you would guarantee our frontiers, we will guarantee yours'.² They are longing for a breathing space—this would give it them, with security all round while it lasted. They really desire friendship with us (witness the last three months, when their bluff brought the army to the point of desiring war, and yet they would not strike) and this would give it them for so long as they were changing their skin.

Yet I am not sure the guarantee would be enough. The Russians would be in a terrible state of excitement and would use every effort to bring about rejection; and their influence is very great. Angora's Kurdish difficulties would be alleviated, as her Kurds would cease to hope for help from the south; but they would not be removed. We may say that a guarantee ought to satisfy the Turks, but things do not in practice work out as they ought to, and I expect you would have to throw in the mountainous North Eastern corner of Irak down to Rowanduz. And now let us turn to the other parties to the suggested guarantee.

First France. I imagine the French Government would accept the idea. I feel fairly sure it would find a strong supporter in Sarraut. And it should help France in her difficulties over the Syrian frontier no less than it should help us over Irak.

But how about Italy? She has never forgotten the Tripartite agreement.³ For her superabundant population the depopulated areas of South Western Anatolia are an ideal outlet; though she does not talk of Adalia, she is always thinking of it, and will find it difficult explicitly to renounce her ambitions. It is true that at present an Italian can hardly show his nose anywhere between Adalia and Smyrna, and by joining in a guarantee Italy might get a freer hand and do some peaceful penetration; but this would be small comfort. The Italians would be greatly embarrassed at having the idea put to them, for they would find it equally difficult to say yes or no; if they decided to accept, would they not, *more Italiano*, ask a price? If we refused the price, or if they refused to join in the guarantee on any terms, could we with the French proceed without them, and face the possible strain of [*sic* ? on] Anglo-Italian relations?

And now let us come to the Russian. Turkey does not want to be too dependant [*sic*] on Moscow, but she certainly also does not want yet to be too much subject to our influence. The Russian who wants to keep a running sore between us and Turkey, would try to defeat the proposal of a guarantee; yet that would be the sole object of his attitude; for he has no immediate intentions of aggression on Turkey, and there are other items of his pro-

² See No. 541, note 3.

³ The text of this unratified Anglo-Franco-Italian agreement respecting Anatolia, signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 113, pp. 797-803.

gramme which precede the reconquest of Kars and Ardahan. Would not the Turkish answer to Russian protests be 'why should not you too guarantee our frontiers in the same way as the English, and so preserve our balance between north and south?' Now it seems to me that this is unobjectionable from our point of view—perhaps it would even be desirable; a chain of treaties making a sort of Turkish Security Pact.

And now one last point—the commitment for Great Britain involved in such a guarantee. The Turks, as I have said, expect in ten years to turn themselves into a strong and vigorous Power. If they succeed, then I think, though I am not quite sure, that it will be the Russians who will be disquieted at the change far more than we; but in any case with a strong Turkey any necessary readjustment of policy would be easy for us. I think it however far more likely that by the end of ten years, muddle, maladministration and internal dissension will make Turkey into something far weaker than she is to-day—a succulent morsel tempting the appetites of all her near and distant neighbours—perhaps a kind of Near Eastern China and there may be a peck of troubles for the whole world. Surely the last thing we should desire would be a scramble for Turkey. Would not a guarantee, if given now, prove in this eventuality the best means of preventing a scramble from starting? and perhaps too a sort of ring fence to stop trouble from spreading into other countries? and still more likely—the best way of enabling Turkey to reduce at once her preposterous military expenditure, devote such means as she does possess to genuine reconstruction, and so do what can be done to prevent the trouble from arising?

Yours ever,
RONALD LINDSAY

No. 558

Sir W. Tyrrell to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

No. 7 Telegraphic [E 247/62/65]

Urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 14, 1926, 4.20 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 4¹ (of 11th January. Mosul negotiations).

We have received letter from Turkish Ambassador in sense communicated to you.

Nevertheless it is desirable in order to avoid any appearance of not wishing to give effect to Ministers' statements in House of Commons² etc. expressing willingness to negotiate that you should proceed to Angora to hear what Turkish government desire to say. If, however, Turks stipulate as *sine quâ non* discussion of subject *de novo* you must express regret at the inability of His Majesty's Government to ignore decision of Council and their promise loyally to observe it, and return to Constantinople.

¹ Not printed. This telegram reported that the substance of the Turkish note of January 9 had been communicated to Sir R. Lindsay.

² See No. 554, note 2.

Sir P. Loraine (Tehran) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received January 28, 9 a.m.)

No. 30 Telegraphic [E 642/642/34]

Confidential

TEHRAN, January 27, 1926, 12.55 p.m.

Local situation is at the moment dominated by Caspian fisheries question for previous history of which see my despatch No. 736¹ of 1922 and annual report for 1923.¹ Fisheries have meanwhile remained in forcible Russian possession.

It appears that Shah when Prime Minister and his Minister of Public Works (now Minister of Court) initialled a draft agreement with Russians in early autumn of 1924 for exploitation of fisheries nominally by a Russo-Persian company on a 50-50 basis, but actually under Russian management and technical control. Agreement to take the form of a treaty *in perpetuity*. Under it Russians would virtually become employers and paymasters of whole Persian fishing population and masters of Caspian littoral. Agreement was withheld from Council of Ministers but sent to Majlis, although condemned by American adviser as utterly unfair and injurious to Persian interests. Majlis has used hitherto with success all its arts of procrastination to² discussing or passing it.

Since Shah's accession Russians have exerted strongest possible pressure to secure ratification and execution of agreement, claiming that failure to do so constitutes violation by Persia of article 14 of treaty of 1921.³ As a result Shah during last few weeks aided by Minister of Court, has brought strong personal pressure to bear on Minister of Public Works and Majlis commissions to finish the matter off. Considerable majority of Majlis is stubbornly hostile to agreement and I do not think anything short of an ultimatum from the Shah can force it through before imminent dissolution, perhaps not even that.

Prime Minister dislikes agreement but is inert. I gather from him that feeling of Persia . . .⁴ is a mixture of exasperation, impotence and lassitude in face of Russian domination⁵ and fear of reprisals. Dr. Millspaugh⁶ regards it as inequitable [*sic*] and immoral and describes the Shah's attitude as one of inexplicable subserviency to Russians. I have spoken personally to both. Situation arising is examined in my immediately following telegram.⁷

¹ Not printed.

² The word 'avoid' was subsequently inserted in the text in accordance with a letter of March 25 from the Chancery in H.M. Embassy at Tehran.

³ The Soviet-Persian treaty of February 26, 1921, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 114, pp. 901-7.

⁴ The text was here uncertain but was amended in accordance with the Tehran letter to read: 'feeling of Persian Government is'.

⁵ This word was amended in accordance with the Tehran letter to read: 'insistence.'

⁶ American Financial Adviser to the Persian Government.

⁷ No. 560.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 30, sent to India No. 17, copy by bag to Bagdad.

No. 560

Sir P. Loraine (Tehran) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 28, 9 a.m.)

No. 31 Telegraphic [E 644/644/34]

Confidential

TEHRAN, January 27, 1926, 6.50 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

I am not quite easy about the way in which situation here is developing. It looks as if Russians were getting their way far more than I care about. Indications are as follows:

- (1) Acceptance of Soviet Ambassador.
- (2) Choice of present Prime Minister in preference to ex Minister for Foreign Affairs.²
- (3) Framing of railway bill which suggests a distinct inclination to disarm Russian hostility if . . .³.
- (4) Question of Caspian fisheries—most serious one.

Personal role which Shah has played in all these matters cannot be doubted. I cannot believe His Majesty is deliberately inaugurating a pro-Russian policy and therefore argue either that he is under some obligation to them or that he dreads their displeasure to an extent which compels him to placate them. Nearly all important Persians are themselves puzzled and uneasy.

I still think, see my despatch No. 20,⁴ that assembly of new Majlis will be starting point of new Shah's policy but am feeling less hopeful about it being a revolutionary⁵ one. If meanwhile fisheries agreement is rammed through the mischief will have been done: otherwise there will be more trouble ahead since Russians are unlikely to let the question go. See also my despatch No. 592,⁶ paragraphs 9 to 11.

¹ No. 559.

² The Persian Cabinet had resigned on the Shah's accession and had been reconstituted under Mirza Muhammad Ali Khan Ferouhi: Mirza Hassan Khan Mushar had resigned as Minister for Foreign Affairs on January 2.

³ The text is here uncertain. It was suggested on another text of the telegram that the words 'nothing more' should be inserted. A bill authorizing the Persian Government to construct railways between Tehran and (i) Mohammerah, (ii) Duzdap, Seistan, (iii) Charbar, (iv) Saoujbolak, (v) Astara, (vi) Bunder-i-Gaz, (vii) Lingah, (viii) Kotur, had been submitted to the Majlis on January 19.

⁴ Not printed. This despatch of January 14 discussed the resignation of Mirza Hassan Khan Mushar and commented that the composition of the present Persian Government appeared to be a concession to the Soviet Government. Sir P. Loraine's 'conjectural explanation is that the Shah is giving the Russians their head in order to make out a case against them'.

⁵ It was suggested on the filed copy that this word should read 'sound'.

⁶ Not printed. In this despatch of November 6, 1925, Sir P. Loraine had stated in particular: 'Reza Khan has, as you are well aware, always maintained in speaking with me his

Situation may clear up as it has done before but my misgivings are strong enough to necessitate this note of warning.

Addressed to Foreign Office, No. 31 of January 27th. Sent to India, No. 18.

firm belief in an orientation of Persian policy, in Persia's own interests, towards Great Britain. I have many reasons for thinking that his professions in this respect are genuine. He has equally maintained hitherto that neither the time nor the circumstances were ripe for giving that definite inflection to Persian policy in a clear and open manner.' Sir P. Loraine had concluded by expressing the hope, though he could not be entirely confident, that Reza Khan would adopt such a policy when he became Shah.

No. 561

Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 29, 3.15 p.m.)

*No. ?8 Telegraphic [E 676/62/65]**

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 29, 1926, 1 a.m.*

I have to-day¹ returned from Angora, where I had two interviews with Minister for Foreign Affairs and one with Prime Minister.

With former, conversations were friendly and, on the whole, quite business-like. There was in his language an absence, though unusual and incomplete, of quibbles, insincerities and false arguments. We soon disposed of preliminary question of conditions or reservations formulated in note of 9th January from Turkish Ambassador in London.² I made it unmistakably clear that views of His Majesty's Government as to Geneva proceedings were radically different from those of Turkey in the note, and on this Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his readiness to continue conversations, each side, as he said, maintaining its own opinion.

I said that I had come to ascertain what adjustments were possible to facilitate matters for Turkish Government, and to do so I was anxious to find what were reasons of State underlying their wide territorial demands. He said first point was question of security as affected by Kurdish situation. With Persian Kurds he said that no trouble need be anticipated, but with passing of any considerable number of Kurds under a third Power interminable difficulty was to be anticipated. He gave an odd turn to this question by maintaining, I think insincerely, that southern Kurds would always be desirous of joining themselves to their kinsmen in Turkey, and would therefore be impelled to organise constant raids across northern frontier and keep up a state of perpetual insecurity. He said that Turkey did not wish to incorporate Arabs in the State and that Turkish Government had no hostility to Irak and no desire to reconquer lost territories. He referred more than once sympathetically to 'Arab ethnic (? entity).' Turkey had no fear of any Arab aggressiveness against herself. It is particularly to be noticed that he stated no arguments in favour of inclusion of Mosul town in Turkey.

¹ This telegram was drafted on January 28.

² No. 556.

Another point made was what he called 'floating frontier.' At a previous stage of dealings between the two countries, he said, frontier claimed or held by Great Britain during last six years had been steadily pushed further north till now we have a *de facto* line more unfavourable than that of rejected Treaty of Sèvres. To convince Turkey of permanence of any arrangement now made, frontier must go a good way back to the south.

I asked him to develop idea he had in mind at Geneva, when he had suggested a guarantee pact.³ He replied that, presupposing settlement of a frontier, he had contemplated a three-Power pact, including Persia, and guarantee of joint frontiers between them; then later on he had hoped for a similar pact for Syrian frontier bringing in French. This, he said, would have necessitated conclusion of similar arrangements with Russians, and so attainment of her final aim, which was neutralisation of Turkey.

He made no mention of any idea of demilitarisation, though I gave him every opportunity. I also ascertained that commercial (? adjustments) had no attraction for him. He was not in the least interested in a scheme for transit of Turkish goods through Irak to Basra, which has been mentioned in a newspaper.

With Prime Minister I had a good deal more difficulty. He told me quite frankly that he wanted to leave Mosul negotiations solely to Minister for Foreign Affairs and did not wish to discuss it with me, and I found it hard to make him talk till quite at the end, when he relaxed somewhat. He said at one moment that possession of Mosul City was the crux of the whole question, but perhaps the remark may be discounted somewhat, as it was in reply to a challenge which I put. He referred to Kurdish question, as he did last (? November),⁴ but rather subordinated it in importance to territorial and frontier question. Latter, he said, was only aggravated by existence of former. He referred to Minister for Foreign Affairs' suggestion about 'floating frontier', saying that, as a result of it, everyone in Eastern Turkey and Western Persia now believed that England intended to push to Van and that resulting disquietude was intolerable. The frontier to be fixed could not be acceptable unless it was such that tribes would be convinced by its nature that it was final and that no further expansion northwards would take place.

My general impression is that Turkish Government have now made up their mind to give up claim to Mosul town, but that they are determined to obtain a cession of territory further east and to have as much as they can possibly get. I obtained no indication as to what line would satisfy them. I do not think that they have any idea of other alleviations in their mind at present.

General atmosphere at Angora is calm and there is no longer any talk of war. The tone with regard to my visit, both at the capital and in Constantinople press, is one of indifference and scepticism over outcome of negotiations. This, I think, is an inspired *mot d'ordre*.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 2.)

³ See *League of Nations Official Journal*, October 1925, p. 1380.

⁴ See No. 541.

No. 562

Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 29, 10.30 p.m.)

No. 29 Telegraphic [E 687/62/65]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 29, 1926, 4 p.m.*

(Reference omitted).¹

Neither of Ministers mentioned internal prestige of government as a factor impelling them to demand concessions from His Majesty's Government but it was stated very explicitly to me by Yunus Nadi a . . .² deputy-journalist who is well in the presidential circle. He said British pressure over Mosul question was constituting a peril to the Republican régime. I think this is true. The hat orders³ have caused wide dissatisfaction to lower classes. New taxation proposals are likely to make it extend to upper classes while new civil code, which is to be voted *en bloc* in a few days by Assembly and put into force at once, affecting as it does whole status of the family and of women in particular is giving serious misgivings even to President's friends. Thus though government is strong it is also menaced at its base. If as I believe is the case it is to the interest of His Majesty's Government that present secular and republican régime should continue in Turkey then this matter of prestige is an argument in favour of finding some solution for Mosul question which will give Turkish government something to be proud of.

¹ It was suggested on the filed copy that the reference should be to No. 561.

² A personal reference is here omitted.

³ In September 1925 all public officials in Turkey were required to wear hats. By a law of November 1925 this decree was applied to all private citizens.

No. 563

Sir P. Loraine (Tehran) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 31, 9 a.m.)

No. 32 Telegraphic [E 689/642/34]

TEHRAN, *January 30, 1926, 5.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 30.¹

I am now satisfied that fisheries agreement will not pass present Majlis. Addressed to Foreign Office No. 32, sent to India No. 19, copy by bag to Bagdad.

¹ No. 559.

No. 564

Sir W. Tyrrell to Sir P. Loraine (Tehran)

No. 18 Telegraphic [E 644/644/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 30, 1926, 6.40 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 31¹ (of January 27th. The Shah and the Russians) augments anxiety which has recently been present in my mind regarding disconcerting attitude of the Shah.

Please explain grounds which lead to you to believe that he is not deliberately inaugurating a pro-Russian policy. Total absence of any attempt to meet our requirements regarding e.g. settlement of debt, recognition of Irak and application of new tariff to north and south indiscriminately, when followed by the four indications of pro-Russian tendency enumerated in your telegram are rapidly leading me to conclusion that present situation calls for far stronger action than mere note of warning. I will however await your observations on this telegram.

¹ No. 560.

No. 565

Sir P. Loraine (Tehran) to Sir A. Chamberlain

(Received January 31, 9 a.m.)

No. 33 Telegraphic [E 690/642/34]

Most confidential

TEHRAN, *January 30, 1926, 6.45 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Russian counter stroke has been swift and heavy. Russian Ambassador yesterday informed Prime Minister that as from (? January 19th)² all Persian exports to Russia (? will be) refused entry (? except) cotton. Reason given is adverse balance of trade with eastern countries Persia, Afghanistan and China. For details as regards Persia see my despatch No. 60³ of January 29th by last bag.

Blow thus struck at slowly reviving trade of northern provinces will I fear be staggering. I regard Russian step as a declaration of economic war on Persia for political ends.

Please respect scrupulously confidence of my informant.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 33, sent to India No. 20, copy by bag to Bagdad.

¹ No. 563.

² This date was amended in accordance with the Tehran letter of March 25 to read 'February 1st'.

³ Not printed.

Letter from Mr. Oliphant to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

[E 687/62/65]

Personal

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 1, 1926

My dear Ronald,

In view of the contents of your telegrams Nos. 8,¹ 9¹ and 10², reporting your conversations at Angora, I looked in on Tyrrell this afternoon to ascertain whether he himself was writing to you by this bag. To his great regret, he will be unable to do so owing to the many interviews which are fixed for to-day, and he therefore asked me to explain in my letter to you this inevitable silence on his part.

With this preface I may explain that when submitting to the S. of S. your telegrams 8 and 9, Tyrrell put up simultaneously copies of his letter of 30th December and your reply of 12 January about the Mosul question.³ He also wrote the memorandum, of which I enclose a copy herein for your personal information.

The S. of S. has since expressed the opinion that Tyrrell's proposal goes further than he considers desirable.

Sir Austen would welcome a treaty on the lines of the Turco-Soviet one, i.e. one in which the parties pledged themselves not to attack one another. He explained that one which contained a guarantee against attacks by any one else would entail:

- (1) an immense extension of our liabilities;
- (2) would be very ill looked upon by Italy;
- (3) would be regarded as proof conclusive of our hostility and of our intention to encircle Turkey [*sic*] by Russia;⁴
- (4) would, when actually presented to Parliament, be certain to be met by even more hostility than the present Mesopotamian commitment.

The S. of S., therefore, wishes us to examine as comprehensively as possible the chance of doing anything on the more restricted line, i.e. on the lines of the Turco-Soviet Treaty, coupled with,

- (a) some re-adjustment of the mountain frontier, and
- (b) the establishment of the Embassy at Angora.

France would, in his opinion, almost certainly do likewise; Italy might go so far; the Soviet would have no ground for suspicion or complaint; we would incur no new liabilities, and the Turk would get some security and some satisfaction for his *amour propre*.

¹ Nos. 561 and 562 respectively.

² Not printed. This telegram of January 29 referred to No. 562 and requested instructions.

³ Nos. 554 and 557 respectively. This correspondence had also been seen by Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Amery.

⁴ In a private letter of February 1 to Sir R. Lindsay, Sir A. Chamberlain expressed point (3) as follows: 'it would inevitably confirm the Soviet Government in their belief that I was pursuing an anti-Russian policy directed to their encirclement'.

Now, we are at once getting busy with these points, and, in case of need, will telegraph to you within the next few days. On the other hand, it will be a great help if you will, on receipt of this letter, take into consideration the line favoured by the S. of S. and telegraph your comments either criticizing or amplifying, so that before we think of going to the French and Italians we may be strengthened by your views.⁵

L. OLIPHANT

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 566

Memorandum by Sir W. Tyrrell

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 30, 1926*

The passive and quiescent attitude of the Turks, as described in Sir Ronald Lindsay's telegram,⁶ is mainly due, I believe, to the following reasons:

- (1) the Turks have found that we have a policy and mean to stick to it;
- (2) they have received no encouragement from Russia to go to war with us;
- (3) they are convinced that the Triple Entente, consisting of England, France and Italy, is a reality;
- (4) Mustapha Kemal is obviously weakening at home and seeking a line of least resistance policy.

How long the Turks will remain in their present frame of mind remains to be seen, and we shall have to go on testing them by discovering what kind of frontier delimitation will satisfy them. But I do not think this will offer a permanent solution.

Having failed to obtain satisfaction by direct action, as it were, the Turk[s] may be tempted to refuse to come to any settlement locally in order to continue a state of unrest on the Irak frontier which will make it more difficult for us to unload our responsibilities. They will be encouraged to adopt such an attitude by the efforts of all those at home who wish for various reasons to upset the settlement we have achieved by means of the League of Nations.

It is in view of this situation that I have been tempted to put forward an alternative policy aiming at an alliance with Turkey guaranteeing to her her integrity for a limited number of years, say ten. There are several ways of achieving this end: we may make a direct alliance with Turkey and try to get Persia to join, or we may try and persuade France and Italy to join in such a treaty. I do not expect that France would raise any difficulties, but I think that Italy will have to be satisfied that such a treaty is not a permanent bar to her ambitions in Asia Minor, where she seeks an outlet for her overpopulation.

If the Secretary of State is inclined to consider such an alternative, I could submit a memorandum on the subject, together with a draft treaty providing for the various contingencies that I have mentioned above.

⁵ No reply from Sir R. Lindsay has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

⁶ No. 561.

I feel convinced that we shall be strongly pressed this session to announce some kind of policy that will satisfy people that in an appreciable future we may be able to retire from Irak and get the latter state elected a member of the League. I therefore venture to urge that we should consider seriously if an alliance with Turkey will enable us to satisfy this wide-spread desire at home.

I submit my private correspondence with Sir Ronald Lindsay on the subject.⁷

W. T.

⁷ Cf. note 3 above.

No. 567

Sir P. Loraine (Tehran) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 4, 9 a.m.)

No. 39 Telegraphic [E 824/644/34]

TEHRAN, February 3, 1926, 10.30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 18.¹

Adoption of a pro-Russian policy by Shah would be contrary to his antecedents and what is more important to feeling of the country: his frequent assurances to myself might perhaps be discountenanced² except for the fact that his Persian intimates are convinced of their sincerity; moreover I cannot see what he stands to gain by it.

He told me yesterday that when he ascended the throne he expected nothing but difficulties from Russian side, that he had not been mistaken and anticipated plenty more. His policy towards them has been already described in my telegram No. 35.³

I admit that at times I have to draw rather large cheques on your confidence in my judgment of the situation here, always puzzling and now in a state of flux consequent on change of dynasty.

Situation as I see it now is this:

1. Popular opinion is stiffening against Russian pressure and is more and more impressed with our friendly sympathy and non-interventionist attitude now similar to American advisers'.⁴

¹ No. 564.

² This word was subsequently amended in accordance with the Tehran letter of March 25 to read 'discounted'.

³ Not printed. In this telegram of February 2 Sir P. Loraine reported as follows on an audience that morning with the Shah: 'Shah says that for reasons of state and because Persia has got to live somehow with Russia he and his government have got to keep Russians in play, yielding as little as possible to Russian pressure and leaving nation through its parliament free to decide where limits of national security and essential interest lie. His Majesty cited attitude of Majlis towards Caspian fisheries agreement as an instance of what he meant.'

⁴ The preceding passage was amended in accordance with the Tehran letter to read: 'attitude now. Similarly American advisers.'

2. Shah cannot afford a breach with Russians and does not feel strong enough to defy them. He is therefore humouring them and playing for time.

3. Russians are obsessed with idea that Shah and Persian government are falling more and more under our influence and are furious with American advisers for opposing fisheries agreement and exposing Russian sharp practice as regards grain deliveries. They complain that Persian government under these malign foreign influences are becoming more and more unfriendly and have tricked them over Caspian fisheries: they are therefore hitting back e.g. embargo on Persian imports.

Failure of Persian government to settle . . .⁵ is certainly very irritating, to no-one more than myself, but I think it would be a great mistake for His Majesty's Government to be deflected from their policy of forbearance and patient rebuilding of our position which shocks from (? Russia omitted) can only serve to accentuate.

Moscow's policy here is rank imperialism: they are acting as Russians not as Bolsheviks and their primary object is to make trouble for us and between us and Persia. For that purpose they are reverting to time honoured tactics of bullying Persian government. If we retaliate in kind and put forward imperative demands for settlement of our questions which is what you presumably mean by 'far stronger action' not only will Persians be utterly dismayed but also there is grave danger of our slipping back to state of pressure and counter pressure which obtained before Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907⁶ and of recommencing weary and unprofitable cycle of subsequent years.

Now that Russia has begun to bully I am certain that the right thing is to show Persia that our sympathy and moral support are with her.

Events subsequent to my telegram No. 31⁷ have gone far to allay the uneasiness which I then felt and to confirm diagnosis outlined at end of my despatch No. 20.⁸

⁵ The text was here uncertain but was amended to include 'our questions'.

⁶ This convention of August 31, 1907, relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 100, pp. 555-60.

⁷ No. 560.

⁸ See No. 560, note 4.

No. 568

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

No. 15 Telegraphic [E 838/373/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 8, 1926, 12.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 13 (of the 4th February. Proposed visit to Angora regarding attitude of Turks against all foreign interests).¹

Visit to Angora at present appears to me inopportune. Your presence there would inevitably call attention to Mosul question and this would be

¹ Not printed. This telegram foreshadowed No. 569.

undesirable until further progress has been made. Further, as present campaign appears to be directed against all foreign interests impartially, is it necessary that you should alone raise this matter? Would not identic action with other ambassadors culminating if necessary in identic notes to Turkish government be preferable?

In any case, I will await receipt of your despatch before taking definite decision.

No. 569

*Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 15)*

No. 59 [E 1072/373/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 8, 1926

Sir,

For some time past I have noticed an increasing wave of acute nationalism in this country making itself felt sometimes by direct legislation aimed against foreign interests, sometimes by petty interference in the private affairs of individuals. I have, however, hesitated up to the present to take any forcible action for a variety of reasons and it was not until I received your telegram No. 12 of February 2nd telling me that concrete proposals for a friendly settlement of the Irak frontier dispute were receiving sympathetic consideration¹ that I made up my mind that I now had a suitable opportunity for reviewing the general position of the British resident in this country with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In my telegram No. 13 of February 4th² I had the honour to inform you that I was preparing a general report on the subject and I shall now endeavour to give you as clear an idea as I can of the tendencies at work without obscuring the main features of the picture with unnecessary detail.

2. Turkish nationalism does not differ in essentials from other forms of European nationalism. It is however aggravated by the isolation of Turkey in her distant capital at Angora and by the novelty of the disease which runs a high fever in its early stages. It is a disease which has affected the whole nation and one should, I think, guard against ascribing it too much to the personal caprices of the Ghazi.³ At the same time I believe it is correct to say that the present rising wave of nationalism is following closely the course of the Ghazi's increasing restlessness (I had almost said madness, but the Ghazi has a curious knack of keeping different sides of his personality in water-tight compartments and combining a very level judgement on some matters with an unbalanced restlessness in others). In this case I am inclined to date the

¹ Not printed. This telegram, with reference to Constantinople telegram No. 10 (see No. 566, note 2), further informed Sir R. Lindsay that no definite instructions could be sent for some time.

² See No. 568, note 1.

³ Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

present phenomenon from the Ghazi's speech at Castamouni last September when the campaign against the fez was launched.

3. Since the Castamouni speech the Ghazi's lieutenants have been indulging in an orgy of projected legislation. Some of the draft laws which are now before the Commission of the Assembly may never see the light of day, but they are none the less important as a sign of the tendencies now at work. I have before me at the moment of writing at least ten such draft laws all of recent date, some of which are so prejudicial to foreign business interests that the head of the largest British company in Turkey recently informed me that should they become law he might have to close down the whole of his business here.

4. Let me quote a few examples of this projected legislation. The Minister of Commerce, a particularly violent nationalist, has recently given birth to a project for the appointment of Turkish commissars on the boards of all Turkish and foreign companies, the commissars to be appointed by the Ministry of Commerce and their salaries paid by the company at a rate fixed by the Ministry of Commerce. The presence of the commissar on the board would of course deprive the company of all secrecy and control and would paralyse operations.

5. If the above project became law all companies would be affected. In addition to this there are draft laws affecting only Turkish companies, the most obnoxious provisions of which are that all reserve funds of the company must be converted into Turkish Government bonds, the capital of companies newly constituted must be 51% Turkish and a large proportion of the members of the board must be Turkish. For foreign companies it is being proposed that they should be forced to keep their books in Turkish and that they should be subjected to a rigorous control generally. The distinction, however, between Turkish and foreign companies is being interpreted in such a way by the Turkish Government that, were their interpretation to be accepted, those British companies whose major operations are in Turkey would be forced to register as Turkish companies. This interpretation contravenes Article 5 of the Residence Convention.⁴

6. It may be that not one of these projects will become law. They show, however, quite unmistakeably [*sic*] that there is a strong movement on foot to assume such control over foreign companies as to squeeze them out of the country. I have heard from at least one long-established British firm that Turkish officials have admitted quite openly that this was the intention.

7. To pass from projected to actual legislation the most significant feature is the tendency to increase the number of monopolies. There are now four monopolies in existence viz. explosives, matches, sugar and petroleum, the two last having just been added to the list. According to the Treaty of Lausanne the Turks have a perfect right to create monopolies. In doing so I think they have a two-fold intention. One motive is no doubt to obtain

⁴ This convention, signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 117, pp. 605-12 (see *ibid.*, p. 550, for the abolition of the capitulations by article 28 of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne).

revenue for immediate needs, but a more important motive is, I am convinced, to restrict foreign economic penetration. If the Turks continue to increase the number of monopolies they will gradually approximate to the Soviet system of the control of foreign commerce by the Government. Their motives are not the same as those of the Russians whose main purpose is to prevent bourgeois penetration of their country though I suspect that Russian nationalism, which has shown a certain sympathy for the Bolshevik opposition to all foreign governments, plays its part there too. In the case of the Turks it is not based on opposition to the capitalist but to the foreign capitalist and, in so far as the Turks take leaves out of the Russian book they do so quite dispassionately for their own ends.

8. I wish to lay the main emphasis in this report on projected and actual legislation, as the points I have referred to above are more important though perhaps less vexatious than the numerous minor complaints which are constantly being brought to my notice. If these complaints to which I shall refer presently stood by themselves I might ascribe them to the inefficiency or corruption of minor officials, but, when taken in conjunction with actual legislation, I can only regard them as part of a deliberate campaign to make the life of the foreigner here an intolerable burden.

9. I will confine myself to a few instances of this campaign. Numerous orders and decisions by the police or Municipal authorities, which are never put in writing, are being produced to force foreign firms of all kinds whether shops, banks, etc., to employ at least 75% Moslem Turks on their staff. They are also being ordered to keep their books in Turkish. Hitherto these orders were confined to concessionary companies, then came the turn of the banks and now shops are being molested. When the port services were nationalised foreigners and non-Moslem Turkish subjects were prevented from carrying on professions such as pilotage, diving and ship chandling.

10. In addition to this certain cases have been brought to my notice in which foreigners have been called upon to dismiss their porters and employ Turks. The Municipal authorities are trying to reserve all kinds of callings for Turks. For example on the plea of revising chauffeurs' licenses they are holding back all licenses belonging to foreign and non-Moslem Turkish chauffeurs. Also foreign masters and engineers employed on vessels flying the Turkish flag have been notified that these callings are reserved for Moslem Turks.

11. I will not burden you with further examples of these petty vexations. The cases I have mentioned affect the interests of foreign employers, foreign employees and non-Moslem Turkish employees. Discrimination of this kind against non-Moslem Turks infringes the Rights of Minorities as guaranteed by the Treaty.⁵ This being so foreign employers cannot legally be forced to carry out an order which is illegal and which is damaging to their business and interests. As regards foreign employees their rights are already safeguarded by the Residence Convention and the Turkish authorities have no justification in depriving them of their sole means of livelihood.

⁵ i.e. the Peace Treaty of Lausanne: *v. British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 117, pp. 552-5.

12. There is one further case of high-handed action against a long-established British institution which I am reserving for treatment in a separate despatch.⁶ The British High School for Girls has been subjected to quite unwarranted interference as regards liberty to choose and discharge Turkish teachers and the work of the school has suffered in consequence.

13. Before closing this long record of misdemeanours I must say a few words about the treatment of British capital in general in this country. The cases of the Anatolian Railway, the Eastern Telegraph Company, the Public Debt and the Galata Bridge Tolls have been reported in previous despatches. Two further British concern[s] viz. the Aidin Railway and the Telephone Co., have been subjected to vexatious interference and are unable to get any satisfaction. As a result of these interferences neither company is making any profit.

14. Such are briefly the facts, and the indictment is a heavy one. With the nature of the campaign you are already familiar for in every respect it resembles that conducted against the Christian minorities and described in reports prepared by the Interallied Conferences of Ambassadors, in its open violation of the spirit of the Lausanne Treaty and in its more furtive but even more widespread violation of its letter. The difference is that now, in the course of intensification, it is becoming a source of acute discomfort to foreign traders established here. Its object is easy to see. Imbued with a profound distrust of all non-Turkish elements, a distrust due to the policy of the Powers towards Turkey for more than a hundred years, the Republic is resolved to surround itself with a Chinese Wall of exclusiveness and reconstruct a state in which there shall be no room for the exercise of foreign influence even by individuals or traders. This policy is being pursued with the remorseless pertinacity characteristic of Mustafa Kemal and it receives the cordial support of the whole population. In many respects the offences complained of are intangible in character and it must pass the wit of man to devise a formula for insertion in a treaty which will prevent their constant repetition. In the last few weeks they have become greatly accentuated, and if at the present moment His Majesty's Government hope, by achieving a broad settlement of the Mosul question, to bring about a détente or even cordiality in Anglo-Turkish relations, it is well that the dangers to non-political intercourse should be present to their minds.

15. It has seemed to me that if His Majesty's Government are contemplating some concrete proposal for dealing with the Mosul question, it were well that I should first open up the whole of the situation above described with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have therefore proposed to you that I should proceed to Angora forthwith for the purpose, and I await your telegraphic instructions.⁷

I have, &c.,

R. C. LINDSAY

⁶ Angora despatch No. 61 of February 10 is not printed. For the question of the British High School for Girls at Pera, see *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 192, cols. 1925-6, and vol. 193, col. 2010.

⁷ See No. 568, to which Sir R. Lindsay replied in Constantinople despatch No. 65 of

February 10 that he acquiesced whole-heartedly in Sir A. Chamberlain's decision, that his colleagues had 'all been occupied for some time in earnest remonstrances', but that he thought that 'to ignore completely what has been going on would be even more harmful to our negotiations than to proceed to Angora specially for the purpose of remonstrating, as it would give the Turks the idea that His Majesty's Government were so anxious to come to terms over the frontier that they would submit to any ill treatment without complaint. I have therefore adopted the via media of acting through Nusret Bey [representative at Constantinople of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs], on whom I called this afternoon with four notes of the more important specific cases.' This action, as reported in a private telegram to Mr. Oliphant, was approved by Sir A. Chamberlain on February 11.

No. 570

*Memorandum by Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)*¹

[E 1131/62/65]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 8, 1926*

For three or four years at least Turkish policy, both internal and foreign has been in the control of two men, Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pashas, who have very definite ideas of what they are aiming at and who have pursued their objectives with courage and pertinacity, and not without an element of statesmanship, whatever may be said of their diplomatic tactics.

2. In the foreign field they desire to have a Turkey balanced as securely as possible between Russia on the North and Great Britain on the south. Possibly even a kind of Swiss neutrality would suit them best of all. For five years however the pressure on Turkey has always come from Great Britain who has been strong enough to claim fearlessly what she has considered to be her just due. From Russia, who is weak and whose outlook is diverted to other objectives than Turkey itself, she has received a series of aimiabilities [*sic*] though occasional quarrels have not been lacking. Between the two in these circumstances Turkey has not been able to preserve any true equilibrium and so far she has only just succeeded in not completely ruining her chances of achieving one in the future. With Russia she has pushed cordiality very far, but has not fallen into the arms of the Muscovite. She has refused to come to terms over a commercial treaty and though Constantinople has been allowed to become a headquarters for Russian propaganda in Egypt, Greece, Syria and North Africa, the Independance [*sic*] Tribunals have no hesitation in hanging communists when suitable. Conversely with Great Britain she has pushed hostility to the very verge of the precipice; and yet, after using a servile press to bring Turkish public opinion to a high state of exaltation over Mosul, the Turkish Government has preferred to take lying down the serious rebuff to its pride administered by the Geneva award. On the one side Turkey has not compromised the future, on the other she has not burned her boats.

3. If only they can achieve the equilibrium or neutrality they aim at, the

¹ Mr. Oliphant minuted that this memorandum, which was received not later than February 16, had been sent to him privately by Sir R. Lindsay.

two Pashas desire to avail themselves of the security so obtained in order to modernize the state and rebuild its strength. Modernization means secularization—the separation of church and state, and the excision of Koranic law from the body of state legislation; and this programme has been pursued in spite of other distractions and difficulties with remarkable boldness, not to say temerity. To facilitate its prosecution they avail themselves of the acute nationalism which arose during and since the war and which owes its intensity mainly to the Greek occupation of Smyrna. This nationalism the Turkish Government encourage in every way and it serves partly as the motive power behind the modernisation programme, and partly as a substitute for the time honoured devotion to the House of Osman,² the expulsion of which was necessary as part of the work of secularization. It is narrow, bitter and sectarian in character, but it has created even among the lower classes a sentiment more resembling European patriotism than anything that has existed in Turkey hitherto. This encouragement of nationalism leads the Turkish Government into many acts of tyranny and illegality against all the non-Turkish inhabitants of its territory, but speaking broadly it also removes from its mind any real desire to bring within its frontiers further non-Turkish populations—except Kurds.

4. The Kurds constitute a formidable danger to the ideals of the Turkish Republic. It cannot abandon the vast territory in which they form the major part of the population; at the same time the Kurds are socially more backward than the Turks, they are more deeply devoted to their religion, and they have some beginnings of a national consciousness. The Republic is not firmly enough established to be able to apply one policy in the east and another in the west of its Empire, and it therefore finds itself committed to forcing modernisation and secularism on its Kurds as on its Turks, and furthermore to suppressing if necessary by force every symptom of Kurdish nationalism. The task is a formidable one in the best circumstances, but it becomes doubly formidable if a considerable Kurdish population passes under the rule of a Power imbued, as Great Britain always has been, with essentially liberal principles. Nothing but this menace to the whole policy of the new Turkish state can account for the persistency with which ever since its foundation at Erzeroum,³ the Republic has tried to extend its sovereignty over the former vilayet of Mosul.

5. Looking broadly at the situation of Turkey, it would well suit the policy of His Majesty's Government that that country should for a period at any rate achieve the position of stable equilibrium between the North and the South to which she aspires. His Majesty's Government might expect with some confidence that if other circumstances allowed such a situation to be brought about, the lapse of a very few years would be enough to make clear the essentially corrosive character of Russian and preservative character of British foreign policy, and to bring about some return to the cordiality in

² Osman I (1281–?1325) was the first sultan of the Ottoman dynasty which held the sultanate until its abolition in November 1922.

³ In July 1919: cf. First Series, Volume IV, Chapter III.

Anglo-Turkish relations which prevailed in the 19th century. If furthermore equilibrium means stability and security it is precisely what His Majesty's Government most desire in order to liberate themselves at the earliest date from the dangers involved in the commitment of the Irak mandate. Again, His Majesty's Government have been considerably embarrassed in the past in India and other Moslem dependencies by the existence of a politico-religious Caliphate agitation. Cordiality in Anglo-Turkish relations cuts at the base of the political aspect of this movement, while the secular tendencies of the Turkish Republic alienates [*sic*] the purely religious sympathies of the more devout Moslems of the British Empire. It thus becomes an interest of His Majesty's Government, pro tanto, to support the laic Turkish Republic, to deal gently with its internal prestige and so far as possible to help it to root itself firmly in Turkish soil.

6. Indeed there is much in common between the aims of the New Turkey and the interests of Great Britain and His Majesty's Government will not reject off hand any solution of the Mosul question which will be acceptable to Turkey and afford Irak a fair chance of making good her national existence. The Turks on the other hand have been greatly chastened by their recent rebuff at Geneva, and discouragement almost amounting to demoralization has set in. The Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked recently to a diplomat at Angora that at Geneva he had realized for the first time that Turkey is only a small Power. The extravagance has gone out of their language, it is unlikely that they will stand out for exorbitant demands and probably they are prepared to lose Mosul town. On the other hand there is still a minimum below which they cannot descend, and rather than accept which they will prefer the existing unsettled frontier and a liberty to make trouble across it as and when may be convenient. The minimum must (a) re-establish the internal prestige of the Republican Government. The young secular Republic has many enemies, who are encouraged in their disaffection by the indignities inflicted on it in foreign affairs. (b) be of such a nature as to convince the tribes of South Eastern Anatolia that finality has been reached and that the frontier is fixed for ever.

7. There is a whole mass of minor proposals which may be disposed of very briefly. Demilitarization, tariff arrangements across the frontier, facilities for commercial transit through Irak, assurances about the régime to be applied in Southern Kurdistan, all these are matters which carry no weight in the balance. There is a curiously persistent rumour passing from mouth to mouth in Turkey that the Mosul question will be settled by a large money payment from Great Britain. Angora could use up any number of millions to good or bad purpose, but there is nothing to show that a money payment has been contemplated there as a possible solution in itself. A loan is of course out of the question.

8. A mere rectification of the frontier would fall short of the minimum requirement.

9. A serious adjustment of the Brussels line so as to take Rowanduz into Turkey while excluding Mosul town might induce the Republican Govern-

ment to sign a frontier treaty, though it is by no means certain; but it is very doubtful if this concession, while solving the immediate frontier problem, would do anything towards really helping to bring about decent relations between Irak and Turkey, or with Great Britain. Turkey would view it as a hard bargain, extorted from weakness and so far from reconciling herself to it would regard it merely as giving her a breathing space in which to prepare means to overthrow it. It would provide no radical cure to the Kurdish difficulty, and it would give Turkey no sense of security, nor would it give Irak the freedom from external trouble necessary to enable her to develop her strength and qualify herself for complete independance [*sic*].

10. Next comes the idea of a non-aggression treaty with Turkey similar to that recently signed between Turkey and Russia. This Russo-Turkish Treaty was certainly hailed in Turkey with great enthusiasm and it served the Government the very useful but entirely transitory purpose of breaking to the public the blow of the League of Nations' verdict. But apart from that it has served no useful purpose; its true value has been realized, it is talked about no more, and there are indications that it has, if anything, rather set back Russia's relations with Turkey.

11. If France and Italy would simultaneously join in a non-aggression treaty, its value would be somewhat enhanced, but even then it would not be high. Turkey is obsessed with panic fears—fears of Russia and England, of Italy with its Mussolini, Greece with its Pangalos, even (quite lately) of disarmed Bulgaria. She has many reasons for fear, and fears assail her without reason. Promises of non-aggression will inspire her with no confidence unless backed by unequivocal sanctions. Of course non-aggression pacts cannot touch the Kurdish difficulty; and it is hardly to be thought that they can twice serve as a face-saving device.

12. Lastly comes the idea that Great Britain should guarantee the frontiers of Turkey against any aggression for a limited number of years, and that she should endeavour to associate with herself in this action France, Italy, and possibly Russia. This raises very wide issues.

13. There can be but little doubt that this scheme, if it could be realized, would have an immense effect on Turkey by substituting a feeling of security for the mentality of constant fear. It would enable the Republic to prosecute without interference its programme of internal reform and to repair much of the damage suffered in fifteen years of constant war. It would have the effect of crystallizing for as long as it lasted the frontier settlement of a large area of the Middle East. The Turkish Government might indeed argue that a territorial satisfaction was necessary and ask for a re-adjustment of the Brussels frontier. The demand would hardly be justifiable, because the guarantee itself should go far to solve the Kurdish difficulty by making it clear to the tribes of Turkey that no help or sympathy could be expected from across the Irak border. It would not be out of place to meet any demand for territory by asking Turkey what she had done to merit the guarantee which was being offered. Indeed it is not unlikely that France and Italy, if they did consent to join in the alliance, would require

some serious concession as a price. To ask Turkey to join the League of Nations might perhaps create difficulty with Russia, but a compulsory arbitration Treaty enabling the Powers to nail to the counter any violations of the treaty of Lausanne, would be an inestimable boon to all foreign traders in Turkey, especially when nationalism is being carried to undue excesses.⁴

14. Russia, with her eyes now turned towards the coffers of Western Europe, has certainly discouraged the Turks from recourse to violence in the Mosul controversy; but almost as certainly it is her desire that Mosul shall remain as a bone of contention between Turkey and Great Britain. She could hardly therefore be pleased at being asked to join with Western Europe in a guarantee of Turkish frontiers and so to contribute to a scheme designed to bring about a condition of security. At the same time she could not demur, nor could she complain that she was being encircled. The invitation to her to join in would rather appear as a reserved gesture of conciliation.

15. It seems unlikely that France would find any serious difficulty in adhering. It would probably help her in her frontier difficulties between Syria and Turkey, and it might help and certainly could not increase her difficulties in dealing with the Syrian revolt.

16. The most serious difficulty would come from Italy, who has never forgotten though she now never speaks about the Tripartite Agreement attached to the Treaty of Sèvres. The depopulated areas of South Western Anatolia form an ideal outlet for the surplus inhabitants of Italy, and the ambitions centered round Adalia have never been completely abandoned. It is probably true that Italy has no idea of attempting to realize these ambitions at present; she would prefer to wait some years in the confidence that in the interval Turkey through sheer maladministration will become weaker and weaker and an easier subject of aggression; but it is certain that an invitation to adhere to a guarantee would be most embarrassing to her Government, who would find it equally difficult to answer either yes or no.

16. [*sic*] For His Majesty's Government the immediate commitment involved in a Four Power guarantee for a limited number of years would be inconsiderable. Even if Italy remained out the danger of its having to be implemented would be only remote. The real risk is that in the course of the next few years Turkey may travel rapidly down the hill and through maladministration and internal dissension bring herself to a deplorable state of weakness and chaos, and become an inviting prey for the ambitions of all her neighbours. It seems however quite likely that if events were to develop in this direction it would be a primary interest of His Majesty's Government to protect Turkey from all encroachments and to preserve her integrity, and if so it would probably be easier for them to induce Powers to prolong an existing guarantee Treaty than to devise in difficult circumstances a new self-denying agreement.

⁴ Sir R. Lindsay added in Constantinople telegram No. 19 of February 14: '(? I presume) compulsory arbitration treaty deserves more emphasis than I have given it . . . it would also afford to all three guaranteeing powers a considerable control over Turkey. . . .'

17. Some sort of guarantee appears to be the only device containing the elements of a satisfactory solution of Anglo-Turkish relations. In it lies the possibility of changing the whole atmosphere of the Middle East, but it is bound to involve contingent liabilities, and the main question is whether the price is too high a one for His Majesty's Government to pay.⁵

⁵ In this connexion Sir A. Chamberlain stated in a minute of February 20: 'to me it is certain (a) that we cannot give a general guarantee of the territories of the Turkish Republic against all & sundry even with all & sundry joining in (b) that we cannot repudiate or compromise our duties under the Covenant (c) that it would be of doubtful utility and more doubtful wisdom to ask Italy to give a guarantee.'

No. 571

Sir P. Loraine (Tehran) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 15, 8.30 p.m.)
No. 58 Telegraphic [E 1116/644/34]

TEHRAN, February 15, 1926, 11 a.m.

My telegram No. 39.¹

Now that Majlis has dissolved and Caspian Fisheries bill has been practically thrown out, situation needs examination. It hinges on Russo-Persian relations where tension is considerable and, in opinion of Persian government, likely to increase. Russians are baffled, angry with Persia, and convinced that Persian 'unfriendliness' is solely due to her subservience to England. Persians fear active Russian displeasure, anticipating forcible exploitation of fisheries by Russia, and vaguely dread other reprisals. Russians have already cut off supplies of petrol.

As regards ourselves, Persian government wish to settle our four main questions,² but this fear of embittering relations with Russia and of strong Russian action restrains them. Soviet are making Persian relations with Great Britain the criterion of their own attitude towards Persia: They regard the settlement of *any* questions with us as an instalment of a Persian *rapprochement* with England: Their attitude towards such a *rapprochement* is strikingly similar to that which they adopted at Berlin towards Locarno and Germany's entry into the League of Nations. Unfortunately they can do more harm to Persia than to Germany and Persia is much more at their mercy.

Despatches sent by bag leaving February 12th will make position clearer. I propose to continue to persevere in my efforts to solve our own questions, regarding which I am not unhopeful, to show sympathy to Persia in small ways whenever possible, and wait for Russians to show their hand.³

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 58, sent to India No. 43, copy by bag to Baghdad.

¹ No. 567.

² These were: Persia's debt to Great Britain, the Sheikh of Mohammerah's affairs (see the Appendix, paragraph 87), the recognition of Iraq by Persia, and the differential tariff in favour of Russian merchandise.

³ This proposal was approved in Foreign Office telegram No. 32 to Tehran of February 18.

Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir P. Loraine (Tehran)

[E 419/419/91]

Personal

FOREIGN OFFICE, February 17, 1926

Dear Sir Percy,

I have read with attention your letter of the 30th December on the subject of Bahrein¹ and owe you an apology for my delay in answering.

I quite understand that your burden might be eased were it possible to remove the irritation which is inevitably created from time to time when matters connected with the island arise. I have no doubt that Lord Curzon realised this when he addressed to you the despatches to which you refer. There are, however, certain matters which we have to take into consideration in weighing the whole question.

Since your return to Persia fifteen months ago you have been most successful in improving the relations between the two Governments. It is not your fault if the major difficulties in the way of a complete agreement are still unsettled; I allude especially to the unsettled debt of Persia to this country, the affairs of the Sheik of Mohammerah and the application of the tariff to both North and South Persia without discrimination. The Persians have had, no doubt, great internal difficulties throughout this period. On the other hand, the hard fact remains that none of these questions has as yet been solved satisfactorily. I think, then, that you must continue to peg away at these questions and later on when they have been settled, I trust satisfactorily, matters may improve even about Bahrein. At any rate, until all these points are out of the way, I share Lord Curzon's disinclination to pursue the question of the island.

¹ Not printed. In this letter Sir P. Loraine referred to correspondence of 1923 with Lord Curzon and to 'a persistent and rather inarticulate Persian irredentism as regards Bahrein'. He considered that there was 'some danger that, as Persia grows stronger and more prosperous, as we sincerely hope she may under her new Shah, this shadowy irredentism may become rather more substantial and less inarticulate', and therefore proposed the following formula for disposing of Persian claims: 'mutual agreement to submit the respective cases to the Council of the League of Nations and an undertaking on either side to abide by its ruling; the agreement could be embodied in an exchange of notes'.

Sir P. Loraine commented: 'If the temper of the present Persian Government is the same as that of their predecessors of 1923, it is quite possible that they would welcome this as a ground for abandoning their pretensions which would protect them from the popular accusation of taking on themselves a renunciation of Persian claims. Our case should not, I imagine, be a difficult one to establish and, with reference to paragraph 5 of Lord Curzon's despatch No. 480 [not printed], I suggest that the ruling for which we might press is not the confirmation of the sovereignty which we exercise *de facto*, but the rebuttal of the Persian claim to sovereignty. The problem thus presented ought not to prove an onerous one for the Council of the League, especially in view of the eleven repudiations of Persian sovereignty during the last one hundred years, as recorded by Lord Curzon, and a decision against the Persian contention would, in my humble opinion, tend to strengthen our position in the Persian Gulf and with the Trucial Chiefs of the Arab coast, rather than to weaken it as Lord Curzon appeared to apprehend.'

But apart from these considerations, there are grave objections to the particular solution which you propose. I should regard it as little short of a disaster to be obliged to bring another dispute in which we were a party before the Council of the League until much time and many other peoples' quarrels have deadened the memory of our litigation over the frontier of Irak.

The Council are sick of us and our affairs. They were thoroughly embarrassed by being obliged on merits to decide in favour of a great power against a small one and of a permanent member of the Council against one who was not a member except for the purposes of that dispute. If we now take a second mid-eastern dispute to them, they will feel that we have little consideration for them and their difficulties, that we are a litigious people who are merely encouraged by success not to settle disputes directly with the other party as they ought to be settled, and I would bet any reasonable odds that they would decide against us, no matter what the merits, in order to show that they were not mere instruments of British policy and creatures of Great Britain.

On no account, therefore, must we carry this question to the League. You must and, with your customary skill, I am sure that you will find some way to parry any attacks from the Persian Government and succeed in allowing the question to slumber.²

² Signature lacking from filed copy.

No. 573

Sir P. Loraine (Tehran) to Sir A. Chamberlain
(Received February 19, 2.50 p.m.)

No. 62 Telegraphic [E 1194/1194/34]

Urgent

TEHRAN, February 19, 1926, 10.15 a.m.

Following sent to Ahwaz No. 8.

Please inform Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Begins:

Following for Jacks' personal and urgent.

'Persian government and public are looking to Anglo-Persian Oil Company to help them out of crisis threatened by Russian refusal to supply petrol. Political and moral effect if you take prompt and efficacious measures to meet desiderata of Persian government and American advisers will be considerable. If at this juncture Anglo-Persian Oil Company fails them, Persia's hope of freeing herself from economic servitude to Russia will receive damaging blow. I would even urge you to meet Persian requests at risk of loss;

¹ General Manager at Mohammerah for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

I do not think however you will lose materially and feel confident that you will gain morally'.²

² In a letter of June 1 to Mr. Oliphant, Sir P. Loraine reported on a visit to Tehran in April-May by the Deputy Chairman of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Sir John Cadman, when the questions discussed with Persian officials included the system for calculating oil royalties payable to the Persian government and educational facilities provided by the company. Sir P. Loraine considered, however, that even more interesting and important than these questions was 'the atmosphere which has been created, not only in the mind of the Persian Government, but also, and especially, in the mind of Dr. Millspaugh. The attitude of the company had been seen to be consistent with that pursued by His Majesty's Government through the agency of this Legation, i.e., fundamentally fair, friendly, helpful and ungrasping. An excellent impression has thus been caused, and has greatly helped to reinforce the growing appreciation of the British attitude which I have been able to report to you during the past year.'

No. 574

Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received March 1)

No. 79 [E 1384/47/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, February 23, 1926

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 118¹ of February 12th about the rumoured violations by Turkey of the Straits Convention by fortification of the Dardanelles.

2. I think there would be no objection to joint representations by the Allied Ambassadors, if my two colleagues will agree to them, and as there is a chance of our having a meeting next week, I will put the matter before them and see what they think. The difficulty is that, so far as I know, the evidence of Turkish evasions is extremely unsubstantial though I have very little real doubt that the Turks are or have been hard at work on all sorts of illicit military paraphernalia.

3. I entirely agree with you that I had better not allow Mosul negotiations to be prejudiced by this question, and I think I should prejudice them if I took an active initiative in remonstrating with the Turks on the evidence now available. But I do not in the least mind broaching the subject if Tewfik Rushdi will give me the least opening. When I was at Angora last month I tried hard to get him to talk about demilitarization in connection with Mosul, and if he had mentioned the idea I should have attacked him savagely over the way they have been 'demilitarizing' at and around Chanak.

¹ Not printed. This despatch referred to a note of January 11 from the Italian Ambassador in London who proposed that the governments concerned should collectively demand from the Turkish Government an explicit declaration that the demilitarization of the Straits Zone had been effectively carried out. The Secretary of State asked for Sir R. Lindsay's views on the proposal and on its possible effect on the Mosul negotiations, a point on which the Admiralty had expressed anxiety. He also asked for conclusive evidence without which 'the French and Japanese Governments might be reluctant to incur the odium of criticising the Turkish Government and we ourselves might be placed in a very humiliating position'.

Unfortunately he could not be induced to mention the word, and I shall have to await some other opportunity before I can do anything myself.²

I have, &c.,

R. C. LINDSAY

² Sir R. Lindsay subsequently transmitted in Constantinople despatch No. 218 of May 5 a report of the previous day from the Military Attaché who had recently visited Chanak. Major Harenc therein referred to previously apparently reliable reports regarding contraventions in respect of (a) concentration of troops, (b) erection of permanent fortifications, of the provisions of the Lausanne peace treaty regarding demilitarization of the Dardanelles Zone. As regards (a) Major Harenc stated that 'there is now at any rate no cause to cavil at this period', and as regards (b) he also concluded that there was no cause for complaint. On June 15 the Turkish Government stated in reply to a joint note of March 29 in accordance with the Italian Ambassador's proposal that: 'le Gouvernement de la République Turque qui respecte soigneusement tous les engagements internationaux découlant du Traité de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923 respecte aussi bien les dispositions de la Convention des Détroits annexés au dit Traité.'

No. 575

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

No. 23 Telegraphic [E 1515/62/65]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 5, 1926, 12 noon*

Your telegram No. 26¹ (of 4th March. Proposed visit to Angora).

Turkish attitude as reported in your telegram No. 25² (of 4th March) certainly calls for strong representations and your presence at Angora for this purpose is no doubt desirable. On the other hand, it would be most unfortunate were action in this matter to render subsequent negotiations regarding Irak frontier difficult to continue. With this caveat I feel sure that you will act circumspectly at Angora and I approve your proposal to return thence to this country.³

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed. This telegram referred to No. 569 and reported that Turkish activities directed against foreign interests had 'become more numerous and more systematic. . . . Situation is distinctly serious. Great Britain has abandoned capitulations in exchange for a residence convention and latter is practically a dead letter. It is no use for Turks to profess anxiety to settle Mosul question and establish good political relations if at the same time they are resolved on squeezing out British institutions and commercial activities and it seems absurd to pursue Mosul negotiations while these tendencies are so prevalent.' Sir R. Lindsay proposed to make a strong protest to Nusret Bey in Constantinople and to proceed to Angora to make a further protest.

³ In Constantinople despatch No. 101 of March 10 Sir R. Lindsay reported on his interview with Tewfik Rushdi Bey on March 8 when he made representations accordingly. Tewfik Rushdi Bey promised to look into the cases mentioned by Sir R. Lindsay and expressed disappointment that the negotiations on Mosul had not yet begun.

In his further despatch No. 103 of March 10, Sir R. Lindsay replied to a request for his comments on the view that it would be undesirable for His Majesty's Government to intervene with the Turkish Government regarding the treatment of Christian minorities. Sir

Ronald concluded: 'Reasons, good in the moral sense, against intervention I cannot find, but from the point of view of expediency in the interests of the minorities I fully concur in your view that we cannot usefully raise the question. Without the use of force, I fear that we cannot save the Christian minorities of Constantinople from having their teeth drawn gradually: intervention, without a threat of force would expose them to the danger of a wholesale extraction. Moreover, if His Majesty's Government were to take the initiative, such prospects as there are of a friendly settlement of the Irak frontier would be wrecked for the time being.'

No. 576

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

No. 305 [E 2176/62/65]

FOREIGN OFFICE, April 5, 1926

Sir,

His Majesty's Government have had under consideration your Excellency's reports on your recent conversations with the Turkish Government at Angora with a view to arriving at a final and friendly settlement of the Irak frontier dispute;¹ and the question has further been discussed with you, during your visit to London for consultation regarding the proposals which you should be authorised to make to the Turkish Government on your return to Angora. As a result of these discussions, the following instructions have been prepared for your guidance.

2. Your Excellency is already aware that His Majesty's Government are desirous of coming to a friendly agreement with the Turkish Government in regard to a definitive frontier between Turkey and Irak, and thus removing the one subject which has of late rendered difficult the relations of friendship which both countries are anxious to see restored. Such an arrangement should, moreover, be one that will benefit the populations on both sides of the frontier.

3. Your main object on your return to Angora will therefore be to conclude an Anglo-Turkish Treaty laying down a frontier which, while involving substantial concessions to Turkey to the south of the eastern section of the 'Brussels' line, shall not involve such considerable transfer of population as would create serious unrest throughout Irak, increase the administrative difficulties and military expenditure of His Majesty's Government in that country, and be out of harmony with the principles of the League of Nations. The limits within which you are authorised to offer territorial concessions to Turkey will be communicated to you separately.²

¹ See Nos. 561 and 562.

² The reference would appear to be to the draft of an Anglo-Iraqi-Turkish treaty which Sir R. Lindsay had taken back to Constantinople. The more important provisions of the draft treaty were substantially the same as those of the treaty signed at Angora on June 5, 1926 (printed in Cmd. 2912 of 1927), with the following exceptions:

(a) the draft did not include the paragraphs of the preamble of the final text referring to the Treaty of Lausanne and the Anglo-Iraqi treaties (cf. note 3 below);

(b) there was no geographical description or explanatory map annexed to draft article 1

4. In view of the responsibilities assumed by His Majesty's Government towards the League of Nations in respect of Irak, as set forth in the League Council's decision of the 27th September, 1924, in the Anglo-Irak Treaty of 1922 annexed thereto, and in the new Anglo-Irak Treaty of the 13th January, 1926, which was approved by the League Council on the 11th March, 1926,³ the sanction of the Council will have to be obtained before any Territory now included in Irak is transferred to Turkey. Article 8 of the 1922 Treaty provides that no territory in Irak shall be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of any foreign Power; paragraph IV of the British undertakings accepted by the League Council on the 27th September, 1924, provides that no modifications of the 1922 Treaty will be agreed to by His Majesty's Government without the Council's consent; and the Council on the 11th March, 1926, pronounced the 'Brussels' line, as described in their decision of the 16th December, 1925, to be the definitive frontier between Turkey and Irak, while postponing to a later date consideration of the steps required to ensure its demarcation. The sanction of the Council will therefore be required for the transfer to Turkey of any territory south of the 'Brussels' line; the most convenient time for obtaining such sanction will probably be after the signature of the treaty and before the exchange of ratifications.

5. As regards the general form of the treaty, it should be concluded, in view of the international status already acquired by Irak as a State capable of making treaties, between Great Britain and Irak of the one part and Turkey of the other part. The question whether an Irak plenipotentiary is to take part in the negotiations or whether you are to act as sole negotiator and signatory on behalf of both Great Britain and Irak is reserved for further consideration. You should ascertain from the Turkish Government as soon as you arrive at Angora whether they agree that an Irak plenipotentiary should

which stated: 'La frontière entre la Turquie et l'Irak est fixée comme il suit (voir la carte annexée au présent Traité): (Geographical description).': cf., however, No. 577, note 1;

(c) draft article 3 provided that the president of the proposed boundary commission should be nominated by the Council of the League of Nations from the nationals of a third Power and that a copy of the definitive record of the boundary should be communicated to the League of Nations;

(d) draft article 4 provided for mutual recognition that the territories north and south of the new frontier formed part of Turkey and Iraq respectively;

(e) draft articles 6-9 (cf. final article 4) were on the same lines as articles 30, 31, 33, and 36 respectively of the Treaty of Lausanne;

(f) draft article 15 provided for a frontier zone of 50 kilometres whereas final article 10 provided for 75 kilometres;

(g) draft articles 20 and 24 were respectively in accordance with the proposals in paragraphs 12 and 7 below;

(h) draft article 25 (cf. final article 18) provided for exchange of ratifications as soon as possible after the new frontier line had been adopted by the Council of the League of Nations;

(i) the draft treaty included no provisions corresponding to final articles 14 and 16 or to the exchange of letters attached to the treaty as signed.

³ See *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1926, pp. 502-3. The treaty of January 13, 1926, regarding the duration of the treaty of October 10, 1922, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 123, pp. 446-8.

take part in the negotiations and sign the treaty; and you should at once report their reply to His Majesty's Government. Further instructions will then be furnished to you on the point with the least possible delay.

6. It appears preferable that the treaty shall be drawn up in the French language only, provided that the Turkish Government agree to a single authentic French text. If they insist on an authentic Turkish text also, you will explain that His Majesty's Government and the Irak Government must in that event claim authentic texts in English and Arabic.

7. In accordance with the usual practice as regards treaties laying down frontiers, the treaty shall not contain any clause limiting its duration to a particular period. It will, however, be necessary to include in it a provision releasing His Majesty's Government, on the termination of the special Anglo-Irak relations created by the existing Anglo-Irak treaties, and the League's decisions in regard thereto, from any obligations under the new Anglo-Turco-Irak Treaty except those mentioned in paragraph 9 below.

8. No full and accurate geographical survey has yet been made of the country through which the frontier line to be agreed upon must pass; and it will therefore be necessary, in defining the frontier in the treaty, to indicate as far as possible the physical features, villages, &c., which are to be assigned to Turkey and Irak respectively. This description must cover the whole line from Syria to Persia, including the portion of the 'Brussels' line which it is not proposed to alter. The actual demarcation of the frontier line should, in accordance with the usual procedure, be effected by a commission composed of representatives appointed by the contracting parties, with a neutral president chosen by the Council of the League of Nations.

9. His Majesty's Government regard it as important that the treaty shall provide that the contracting parties accept as final and definitive the Turco-Irak frontier laid down therein, and will make no attempt to alter it.

10. Apart from the territorial clauses indicated above, the treaty should comprise articles designed to promote good-neighbourly relations between Turkey and Irak, by means of provisions dealing with matters such as tribal disputes, migrations, brigandage, and in general all matters usually regulated by a treaty of *bon voisinage*. It should provide, in particular, for the establishment of a standing joint commission, meeting periodically, to discuss questions arising out of matters of this kind and to settle them in an amicable manner.

11. The treaty should contain provisions on the lines of those in the Treaty of Lausanne regarding the nationality of residents in transferred territories and their right to opt within a certain period for Irak nationality.

12. It should, if possible, be laid down in the treaty that the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt shall decide what portion of the debt attributable to the former Mosul Vilayet shall be borne by Turkey and Irak respectively in consequence of the new determination of the frontier. This arrangement should be proposed to the Turkish Government as a reasonable and equitable solution; but you are authorised to drop the proposal if they make serious difficulty regarding its acceptance.

13. The treaty should provide for the application as between Turkey and Irak, of (a) the convention respecting conditions of residence and business and jurisdiction, and (b) the Commercial Convention, both signed at Lausanne in 1923.⁴

14. His Majesty's Government would welcome the conclusion of a Turco-Irak extradition treaty in accordance with the usages prevailing among friendly States; and the agreement of Turkey and Irak to enter into negotiations for this purpose as soon as possible might well be embodied in an article of the new Anglo-Turco-Irak Treaty.⁵

I am, &c.,

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

⁴ These conventions are printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 117, pp. 605-22.

⁵ For British policy towards Turkey at this time see also the Appendix, paragraphs 61-66.

No. 577

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 19, 9 a.m.)

No. 1 Telegraphic [E 2485/62/65]

ANGORA, April 18, 1926, 11.20 p.m.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday and Prime Minister to-day. To the former I gave general sketch of draft treaty and proposal of a cession of territory comprising all of area number 1 and northern half of area number 3.¹ This he was unable to understand without technical advice and his

¹ In his despatch No. 193 of April 18 from Angora Sir R. Lindsay stated that he had handed to Tewfik Rushdi Bey the following descriptions of the proposed frontier line with an illustrative map (untraced in Foreign Office archives): (a) 'La ligne de Bruxelles jusqu'au confluent du Rudbar-i-Haji Beg avec l'affluent descendant de Shanasha à 400 mètres à l'Est de Ramana. De ce point une ligne droite Sud Est rejoignant le Rudbar-i-Barasgird immédiatement au Nord de Qalat Haruna (village Est) en laissant Ramana, Kani Rash (village Sud Ouest) et Chinara à la Turquie. De ce point en laissant à l'Irak les deux villages de Qalat Haruna vers le Sud Est le long de la crête de partage des eaux passant par le sommet situé à 7 kilomètres au Sud de la lettre v de "Unsurveyed" (approximativement lat. 36°. 51' long. 44° 40') jusqu'au sommet de la crête à 4 kilomètres au Nord Ouest du point marqué Gerwa Zhor et environ deux kilomètres à l'Ouest de la route Sideka Kalishin. De ce point une ligne Nord-Est parallèle à cette route et à deux kilomètres au Nord de la route jusqu'à la côte 9800 (Mergeberi Dag). De ce point une ligne Est jusqu'à la frontière persane au poteau frontière 124 en laissant le col de Kalishin à l'Irak.' (b) 'La ligne de Bruxelles jusqu'au point où elle traverse la crête de partage des eaux à trois milles à l'Est de Nervek. De ce point une ligne sud le long de la crête de partage jusqu'à un point de la ligne de longitude 44° à 5 kilomètres à l'Ouest de la lettre D de Doski. De ce point Sud Est jusqu'à la côte 1800 au confluent de Shamsdinan Su et du Rudbar-I-Shin. De ce point Sud Est jusqu'à la côte 6500 en laissant à l'Irak le village dénommé Ranjbraka. De ce point le long de la crête de partage jusqu'au premier "i" du mot Shirin sur l'arête Nord Est du Mont Chia Shirin. De ce point Est et Nord Est le long de la crête de partage en passant par la lettre "s" de Ergosh. De ce point Est en continuant le long de la crête de partage jusqu'à la ligne de Bruxelles la rejoignant à un point situé à mi-chemin entre Begalto et Karituk de façon à laisser Gelona à la Turquie.'

remarks were entirely non-committal. As regards treaty he had criticisms to make of some details as to which I will refer to you as and when necessary.² He appeared to accept broad principle, especially association with Irak as cosignatory.

Prime Minister said he had not yet completely realised what proposed cession amounted to but he said that to transfer territory 'was the whole thing', and that cession proposed was 'nothing at all'. He talked a good deal about security and was disposed to attribute all Turkey's troubles in the East to activities of British agents in Irak.

I prefer not to draw any deductions from these two conversations but I think Prime Minister's demeanour was that of a man worried and grieved rather than indignant.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to Bagdad, figures by post to Constantinople.

² Sir R. Lindsay further stated in particular in his despatch No. 193 that Tewfik Rushdi Bey had 'demurred with an insistence that rather surprised me to the mention in the treaty of approval by the League of Nations to the treaty prior to its ratification. I explained that in honesty to Turkey we must put in this point, and without disrespect to the League we could not omit it.'

No. 578

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 22, 10 a.m.)¹
No. 2 Telegraphic [E 2555/62/65]

ANGORA, April 21, 1926, 9.4 a.m.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday and frontier negotiations took a surprising turn.

Minister stated that what Turkey desired was not territory in itself but security. The latter might be obtained by a large accession of territory or by other means. It was now clear that considerable transfer was (? not omitted) to be contemplated and the Turkish government must turn to other methods to secure its object. It therefore declined offer made to cede territory to it while expressing appreciation of friendly sentiments which had actuated that offer.

As substitute Turkish government had three proposals to make by which it might receive satisfaction. He put them forward unofficially not as coming from the government but said he had consulted his most influential friend. It is inconceivable to me that he can have formulated them without approval of the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic. I take them in order.

(1) He proposed an undertaking of mutual neutrality on model of recent French² and Russian treaties. I replied that this had been carefully considered in London and discarded for three reasons. Firstly, it really meant nothing but aimed at creating in the public mind impressions of a condition

¹ The text here printed is that of an amended text received subsequently.

² For the Franco-Turkish treaty of May 30, 1926, see No. 329, note 4.

of affairs that did not exist. As such we should dislike it. Minister agreed that mutual neutrality agreement was really only 'propaganda'. Secondly, it would necessitate our inserting so many stipulations and reserves as to our duties under pact that document would be complicated and difficult to understand. I had seen a draft and felt sure it would be most distasteful to Turkish parliament. The Minister agreed that National Assembly would only accept simple and easily comprehensible engagements. Thirdly, I said that opinion in England was unprepared at present for entanglements involving widespread ramifications and His Majesty's Government could now only contemplate agreement dealing with frontier under discussion. I then restated what was contained in Article 5 of draft treaty³ adding that if he wished terms might be drafted in even more solemn form. He considered that this was just as good as mutual neutrality proposal, which he then dropped.

2. Minister's second idea changed its form in course of discussion. As first put forward he proposed that Turkey should formally cede the whole territory south of Brussels line to Irak, but that sovereignty should only pass when special relations with Great Britain cease. After surprisingly little discussion this changed into a proposal that both territory and sovereignty should finally and definitely pass to Irak on ratification of treaty. This cession would be made to Irak as to a 'fully self governing state' in words of article one, paragraph two of⁴ pact (see especially French text passage). There was no desire to affect in any way existing special relations between Great Britain and Irak; nor was there objection on her [sic] part to arrangement being embodied in tripartite treaty formed as contemplated in our draft. Object of this curious proposal is even more curious than proposal itself. Minister wishes that in its present difficult position Turkish government shall be able to face Assembly in best possible posture. He intends saying to it in substance 'here is Irak, a recognised self governing state, young and revolutionary in character like ourselves. By our constitution we are debarred from hampering in any way development of such a state and we can therefore only wish it well and happy'. With such arguments he believes Assembly will easily be convinced.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had prepared no text embodying his idea but said he would gladly consider one.

3. Last proposal of Minister for Foreign Affairs was that Turkey should be given a participation in Irak oil. A guaranteed supply would be no good and he would want an allotment of shares. He had no idea how many shares he wanted. Object of this was not merely pecuniary profit but also to foster the feeling of security all round, for he maintained that if Turkey were materially interested in Irak oil industry she would clearly be indisposed to disturb the tranquillity of the country. If required he would have no objection to engagement by the Turkish government not to alienate its interest in the

³ This article was in accordance with paragraph 9 of No. 576.

⁴ A note on the original by Mr. Spring-Rice of Eastern Department here read: 'i.e. Covenant of the League.'

company. I strongly expressed the view that this was unpractical. The company consisted of various groups of different nationality who quarrelled freely and would never be able to agree as to where a Turkish participation was to come from. He expressed some doubt as to this and hinted that as a *quid pro quo* Turkish government would be able to provide documents disproving claims of civil list heirs thus removing last doubts as to validity of Turkish Petroleum Company's concession.⁵ I remarked that Irak oil was highly speculative and that at the best years might pass before any profit could be realised. He answered that Turkey could afford to wait in the same position as other participants. Discussion was entirely on the basis of allotment of shares. There was no mention of participation in royalties.

I undertook to refer this suggestion to you but warned the Minister that if it was not turned down immediately it would probably be several weeks at least before anything definite could be said about it.

As regards other articles of our draft treaty which I had sketched to him previously the Minister stated that they would probably present no difficulty.

Addressed to Foreign Office. Repeated to Bagdad, figures by post to Constantinople.

⁵ For the question of the concession of the Turkish Petroleum Company cf. S. H. Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East* (2nd ed., London, 1961), pp. 27-32, 41-47, and 68, note 2.

No. 579

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 23, 9 a.m.)
No. 4 Telegraphic [E 2574/62/65]

ANGORA, April 22, 1926, 2.45 p.m.

My telegram No. 2.¹

I . . .² Minister for Foreign Affairs last night and referred again to his proposal about the oil question and said I did not know whether His Majesty's Government would find it practicable at all but if they did, the more I thought about it the more sure I was that it would be many weeks before any engagement on the subject could be entered into. I thought he ought to realize this quite clearly, especially as atmosphere for negotiations at this moment seemed to me so particularly favourable.

Minister's face fell visibly at this and he asked almost at once whether there was any other similar concession that could be made by which Turkey might be materially interested in peace and well-being of Irak. I said that I knew of none.

I hope very much that something may be possible in the direction of oil and that a decision on the point may be come to quickly. The situation for reaching a settlement could not be more favourable than it is now but there is no telling what it may be three weeks hence.

¹ No. 578.

² The text is here uncertain.

Part II.

It seems to me there are very great advantages in meeting Turkish wishes over oil.

(A) We should reach settlement on terms (? agreeable to) Turkish government itself and against which it could not afterwards cavil.

(B) It would save Irak all the trouble involved by disturbing present territorial settlement.

(C) If we could first get Turkish government to accept satisfactory formula for cession of sovereignty and territory to Irak, there would be no danger of³ giving them a percentage of Irak government royalties.

(D) This would associate Turkish government closely with Irak government in oil interests in the manner Minister for Foreign Affairs affected to desire and it could be effected quickly and without disturbing the constitution of Turkish Petroleum Company.

(E) It is worth while to remember that idea of paying Turkey off in oil was first hinted at by Sir P. Cox at Constantinople in 1924 so that it is rather difficult now to reject their suggestion of it.⁴

If you agree with above, it becomes urgent for you to send me a formula about transferring sovereignty and territory.⁵

Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to Bagdad, figures by post to Constantinople.

³ It was suggested on the filed copy that this word should read 'in'.

⁴ Mr. Spring-Rice noted against this paragraph: 'Mr. Hall of the C[olonial] O[ffice] who was at the C'ple Conf^{ce}, tells me the suggestion was never made by Sir P. Cox at the Conf^{ce} table. He only asked Fetti Bey during a walk whether anything could be arranged *quid* oil, & got a negative reply. T. A. S-R.' For the Conference at Constantinople in May and June 1924 between British and Turkish delegations headed by Sir P. Cox and Fetti Bey respectively cf. *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, vol. 1, pp. 496-7.

⁵ In his despatch No. 203 of April 24 wherein he commented on the negotiations to date Sir R. Lindsay referred to the weak Turkish financial position and fears of an Italian attack and concluded: 'as it seems to me, it is not to the interest either of Great Britain, or of Irak whose fortunes for some years will be closely bound up with those of Great Britain, that Turkey should be unduly weak; and you, Sir, may shortly find it necessary to decide how far it is right or wise to profit by Turkey's present weakness in driving a bargain.'

No. 580

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 23, 2.3 p.m.)

No. 3 Telegraphic [E 2575/62/65]

ANGORA, April 22, 1926, 11.5 p.m.

My telegram No. 2.¹

It is most remarkable that Turkish government should have abandoned claim for territorial concessions in such a manner that it will be difficult to revive it effectively, and that they should have done so without first making sure that there is some chance of their obtaining a *quid pro quo*. The turn negotiations have now taken indicates absolute surrender by Turks which is

¹ No. 578.

somewhat confirmed by the desperate straits in which the state now finds itself and by the extraordinary amiability with which we have been received here this time by everyone from the President of the Republic downwards. There is only one opinion here, namely that the Turks are most anxious to come to terms.

As to Minister for Foreign Affairs' second proposal, the danger is in the underlying idea that Turkish sovereignty, even in a nominal form should be kept alive. I presume this to be quite inadmissible. It is true that Minister abandoned it so completely that it is now difficult to see what virtue even of a face-saving nature remains in his proposal but I cannot feel nominal . . .² of Turkish sovereignty may not be plan of government and that, that being so crop up again and perhaps be pressed more strongly. Yet as Minister left it, idea seems to me innocuous and if you agree in order to put the matter to the test I would ask if you could have a text drafted and telegraphed to me.

As to oil proposal I do not know what is or is not possible with company. Minister for Foreign affairs gave me impression that he knew more about feasibility of proposal than he cared to say but I may well be mistaken. It is possible that in this too it is hoped to introduce some vague recognition of principle of Turkish sovereignty though I cannot now see how and if so it might be easier for them to do so if participation in royalties were accorded instead of in shares. I do not think share in oil can have same face-saving advantages in Turkey as cession of territory we were prepared to offer but it is quite possible that Turkish government really believe it would bring them large accession of wealth in short time. Possibly it may have effect of increasing their prestige in Irak.

I am much vexed that Turkish government should now have introduced into discussions a topic which I presume must cause at the best several weeks delay because time is of more value here than in London in this negotiation. Atmosphere here is at present extraordinarily favourable and has been created by Turkish government as I think with genuine purpose of bringing things to a satisfactory end. I should therefore be grateful if you could give me very soon some sort of interim reply about oil indicating whether something may possibly be done in this line and how much time must elapse before any concrete proposal is to be expected.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 3. Sent to Bagdad.

² The text is here uncertain.

No. 581

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 3)

No. 201 [E 2770/62/65]

ANGORA, April 23, 1926

Sir,

I had occasion to call today on the Russian Ambassador, and in the course of conversation M. Suritz asked me how the negotiations with Turkey over

the Irak frontier were proceeding, remarking that according to the papers the prospects were favourable. I replied that His Majesty's Government had always wanted a settlement: they had indeed stood out strongly for what they honestly regarded as their just rights, but if that were attainable they were prepared to be conciliatory; as for the Turks their attitude now seemed to me for the first time to indicate that they really did want to come to terms, and the atmosphere seemed to me to be favourable. M. Suritz said he hoped that a successful issue would result; he himself had spoken to the Turkish Ministers and had urged them strongly to come to some compromise. He hoped very much there would now be no breakdown. I said I would return the compliment by informing him that during all the two years I had been in Turkey, I had never once spoken to a Turk in disparagement of Russia, and had never once attempted to cause or to foment any difficulties between the Turkish and Russian Governments. M. Suritz thanked me for my compliment by saying that he earnestly desired good relations between Turkey and Great Britain. I said I was glad to hear it, because many people in England imagined that the Soviet Government desired that there should be constant difficulties between the British and all Oriental Governments. After many protestations to the contrary on his part, the conversation turned to other topics.

2. It is interesting to find the Russian Ambassador adopting a sympathetic attitude towards the present Anglo-Turkish negotiations; and I have met with several persons with whom he has used language similar to that reported above.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.,
(For the Ambassador)
R. A. LEEPER¹

¹ First Secretary in H.M. Embassy at Constantinople.

No. 582

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora)

No. 6 Telegraphic [E 2575/62/65]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 24, 1926, 4 p.m.*

Reference your telegrams Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (of 21, 21 and 22 April).¹

You may be sure that His Majesty's Government will do their utmost to respond to new spirit of conciliation shown by Turkish government which coincides entirely with our own desire for restoration of really friendly relations.

¹ Nos. 578, 580, and 579 respectively. No. 580 was drafted on April 21.

As regards their first proposal we are already preparing a text which when completed and approved by Cabinet I will telegraph to you.²

As regards oil we are similarly engaged in endeavour to frame practicable scheme which would meet Turkish wishes. I incline to securing for Turkey participation in royalties since this involves consent only of the three governments immediately concerned whilst any attempt to re-distribute share interest must involve prolonged and most difficult negotiations with private interests, French and American as well as British, which we have only just succeeded in reconciling and might well provoke objection from French and American government[s].

You may be certain and assure the Turkish government that we will not be responsible for a moment's unnecessary delay but you will be able to explain convincingly that a little time is necessary for communication with Irak in addition to that required for working out practical schemes and their embodiment in appropriate texts.

You are of course right in holding that we cannot directly or indirectly recognise continued Turkish sovereignty or suzerainty, but subject to this condition and to observance of our obligations as a mandatory under the treaty³ I am now very hopeful of reaching an early and mutually satisfactory solution, but it will be obvious to you that in matters of such consequence I must have time to consult Cabinet.

In my conversation on Friday⁴ with Turkish Ambassador he showed liveliest anxiety about Italian intentions and supposed Italian Greek pact. I did not seek to play upon these fears though most governments would have done so. I do not myself believe that Mussolini intends to break the peace by embarking upon a policy of adventure. I have however no doubt that if peace were once broken he would seize the opportunity to further Italian ambitions and to secure the outlet for its surplus population which Italy will eventually need. Turkey's best security against unprovoked aggression by another power lies in securing good relations with her present neighbours in Irak and Syria and thus preventing any incident which would invite or encourage intervention by another state. You should bear these considerations in mind, for it is not possible wholly to exclude the thought that the sudden change in Turkish attitude may be due to fear of Italian action and that their attitude may change again if that fear is removed by assurances⁵ which Mussolini has volunteered.

Not repeated to Constantinople.

² Amendments concerning the question of transfer of sovereignty were included in a revise of the draft treaty sent to Sir R. Lindsay on May 3.

³ The Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1922.

⁴ April 23, 1926.

⁵ Cf. *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Settima Serie, vol. iv, p. 218.

No. 583

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received April 28, 9 a.m.)
No. 8 Telegraphic [E 2667/62/65]

ANGORA, April 27, 1926, 11.15 p.m.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday who was very satisfied at the conversation between you and Turkish Ambassador.

He asked me about Russo-German treaty and I stated the view of His Majesty's Government as I had gathered it from telegram sections.¹ He said that he was very glad at its conclusion. He had been attacked for concluding December agreement with Russians. It opened a gulf between Turkey and the League of Nations.

This had not been his intention and the fact that Germany who is about to enter League of Nations is signing a precisely similar treaty proves that this would not be its effect. I asked for information about resumption of payments of bridge tolls to National Bank.² He said that he had heard and knew nothing about it. Surprising as it may seem, this may be true. If so it is a good sign as showing that Ministry of Finance independently of Ministry of Foreign Affairs is anxious to conciliate His Majesty's Government.

Minister said that if and when our frontier negotiations reached a favourable point he intended to ask His Majesty's Government to use their good offices to bring about a settlement between Turkey and her bond holders.³ I explained how much more interested the French were than we, and he said he would address himself both to British and French governments.

His tone was very friendly and intended to suggest he desired rapprochement with Great Britain all along the line. There was no hint of any reversion to territorial concessions.

¹ Copies of important telegrams circulated weekly to H.M. representatives abroad. For the views of H.M. Government on the Treaty of Berlin see Chapter IV.

² The payment into the National Bank of Turkey of these tolls on the Galata Bridge, which formed the security of French and British bondholders in respect of the Municipal Loan of the City of Constantinople of 1909, had recently been resumed after having been suspended for some time.

³ The reference was to the failure of negotiations between representatives of the Turkish Government and of the bondholders of the Ottoman Public Debt regarding the fulfilment of assurances given at the Lausanne Conference by the Turkish Government that the servicing of the debt, which had been suspended owing to the war, should be resumed.

No. 584

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora)
No. 14 Telegraphic [E 2788/62/65]

Very urgent

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 4, 1926, 3.40 p.m.

My telegram No. 6¹ (of 24th April: Negotiations for Turco-Anglo-Irak Treaty).

¹ No. 582.

As regards the oil question, re-distribution of the share capital in the Turkish Petroleum Company would raise well-nigh insurmountable difficulties and the Company will not agree to any increase in the amount of the royalties payable by them to the Irak Government. His Majesty's Government have therefore decided that all efforts must be concentrated on obtaining assignment to Turkey of a certain percentage of Irak Government's royalties. It appears to His Majesty's Government that preferable scale would be for whole period of concession at minimum rate of 10 *per cent* which you are authorised to raise to 15 *per cent* if essential.

An alternative on which you will report after exploring the ground would be a limited period, e.g. 25 years, to coincide with maximum period of our special relations with Irak as defined by recent Anglo-Irak Treaty. In that case percentage must naturally be higher up to maximum of 25 *per cent*. In either case Turks will appreciate fact that oil may not be workable for first few years and that there may in consequence be no royalties for similar period.

Irak Prime Minister favoured an alternative scheme whereby His Majesty's Government would offer Turkey assistance to effect an improvement in communications between Turkey and Irak and in particular the construction of railway between Nisibin and Mosul, a fixed percentage of oil royalties of Irak Government being set aside annually for this purpose. It would, however, be understood that on completion of the railway the Turkish section thereof would be made over to the Turkish Government free of cost. His Majesty's Government are unaware of any desire on part of Turks themselves for such railway development. On contrary, Turks might in our opinion regard it with suspicion as a disguised form of British penetration into Turkish territory, even though railway would be begun at Turkish end. Attitude of Turks has, however, recently changed so completely that even this scheme may now be palatable at Angora, especially in view of enquiry by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs reported in your telegram No. 4² (of 22nd April) paragraph 2.

You are therefore authorised to bear this proposal in mind in oral negotiations and to make such use of it as may appear to you desirable. Should Turks rise to this fly you would let them understand that royalties to be earmarked for this purpose would be on similar terms as first proposal, viz: 25 *per cent* for 25 years or at lower rate for longer period.

Objection to this proposal is possibility that *tracé* would cross Syrian territory, in which case prior negotiations with French would be essential and considerable delay might thereby be involved.

If danger foreshadowed in your telegram No. 9³ (of 29th April) that territorial cession may be revived, materialises, you are authorised to adhere to offer of territorial adjustment within limits already approved. You will of course abstain from taking initiative on this point which would, in view of great concession in matter of royalties, embarrass His Majesty's Government *vis-à-vis* of Irak Government.

² No. 579.

³ Not printed: see below.

If we read situation aright, Turks are obsessed with fear of isolation and they desire above all security. I am not unmindful of your previous remarks regarding Turkish view of League of Nations.⁴ It seems to me however possible that in their present temper their attitude on this subject may have changed. You should therefore, if opportunity offers, explain to them that membership of League would furnish all advantages in matter of security which Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had in mind when he asked for pact of mutual neutrality.

Repeated to Baghdad, No. 2.

⁴ Cf., for instance, No. 552 and No. 553, note 4.

No. 585

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 5, 5.15 p.m.)
No. 14 Telegraphic [E 2868/62/65]

Private

ANGORA, May 5, 1926, 12.20 p.m.

I fear delay inevitable as it may have been is having prejudicial effect as it is being said here that owing to internal situation¹ negotiations have been broken off.

Nevertheless Turkey's desire for settlement continues unabated. If Cabinet would devolve on you and Secretary of State for the Colonies duty of sending me instructions quickly as and when necessary we might get an agreement irrespective of what happens in England.

¹ See No. 504, note 11.

No. 586

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 8, 9 a.m.)
No. 18 Telegraphic [E 2859/62/65]

ANGORA, May 7, 1926, 5.15 p.m.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs last night and negotiations took another surprising turn.

Before receipt of your telegram No. 14¹ I had warned him that allotment of shares would be most difficult and that participation in royalties might be possible. He had expressed unofficially readiness to accept this and even preference for it.

Last night when I was about to talk in the sense of your telegram referred to above he began to urge allotment of shares. I said that I had come to inform him definitely and officially that this was impossible. He then said that what Turkish government desired was to turn their participation immediately into cash. I pointed out that no basis exists on which such a transaction

¹ No. 584.

could be calculated but he answered that he hoped the two governments would arrange it somehow and agreed with me when I said that in fact the whole treaty thus came down to fixing a lump sum of money. He had no idea what that sum should be. When I observed that Turkey would thus lose all her material interest in peaceful development of Irak he replied that it was not so as pipe line to Mediterranean would almost certainly have to traverse Turkish territory and come out at Alexandretta or Payas. Turkish government had already received proposals in this sense from some oil companies. I asked if he was speaking officially and he answered that this was a proposal put forward in the course of negotiations, that he could not divest himself of his character of Minister for Foreign Affairs and that he regarded himself as bound by his proposal.

I elicited from him that it would be hurtful to Turkish amour-propre to put down any lump sum of money in the treaty. Procedure should be to provide in it for some participation in royalties with stipulation that if Turkey wish[ed] to capitalize she would approach Irak and/or British governments. Capitalization would then be arranged by exchange of notes effected simultaneously with signature of treaty.

I have had no discussion as to figure of participation in oil; and railway proposal falls to the ground as it is obvious that Turkish government only want money.

I pointed out to him that any figure of payment would have to fall on Irak government whose financial position was now extremely difficult² in view of burden of Ottoman Public Debt falling on it. His present proposal was so unexpected by me that I could give him no idea how it would strike His Majesty's Government but I would telegraph it to you immediately, comments follow.³

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 18. Repeated to Bagdad No. 14.

² The decypherers suggested that there was here a lacuna in the text.

³ In Angora telegram No. 19 of May 7 Sir R. Lindsay suggested that 'latest development is due to extreme financial embarrassment of the government combined with the fear of Italy (or) urgent desire to come to terms with His Majesty's Government', and that a settlement might be purchased for £300,000 to £500,000.

No. 587

Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople)

No. 55 Telegraphic [E 2957/62/65]

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 17, 1926, 10.30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 77¹ (of May 11th. Angora negotiations).

If on return to Angora you find your surmise about Turkish attitude correct

¹ Not printed. In this telegram Sir R. Lindsay urged that in view of the 'undoubtedly very bad' Turkish financial position an endeavour should be made to bring the negotiations on Mosul to a rapid conclusion.

and see that a deal is feasible it is essential that so favourable an opportunity be not missed. His Majesty's Government agree to the payment by Irak of a sum of £300,000 or if necessary any sum up to maximum of £500,000 and you are authorised to negotiate with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs with a view to immediate settlement on this basis.

You will understand that this financial proposal is in lieu of and cannot be additional to territorial cession, and can only be admitted if it creates a complete settlement.

If Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs prefers participation in oil royalties up to maximum of 20% for 25 years or as Irak would prefer up to a maximum of 15% for the whole period of the concession, Your Excellency is at liberty to accept. You are already aware that in this event there would be no royalties for first few years and that even later amount is entirely problematical.

Settlement on a lump sum basis would be in effect compensation for final extinction of Turkey's interest in Irak oil. Had Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs not objected to mention of lump sum in treaty, no difficulty would have arisen in drafting formula. In present circumstances formula in treaty might be that His Majesty's Government and Irak Government recognising Turkey's desire to participate in development of Irak oil are prepared to agree to Turkey having an annual charge of £— over a term of years in lieu of active participation or royalties.²

This would be followed by clause making provision for commutation of annuity by lump sum payment. The amount of annuity would of course depend on the exact lump sum for which you settle. In any case payment will not be made until treaty enters into force.

Repeated to Bagdad No. 3.

² Sir R. Lindsay reported on May 21 in Angora telegram No. 30 that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had no objection to this formula.

No. 588

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 21, 7 p.m.)
No. 25 Telegraphic [E 3131/62/65]

ANGORA, May 21, 1926, 12.25 p.m.

My telegram No. 77.¹

Last night I officially offered Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs maximum sum named by you for complete settlement. I will explain reasons for my procedure by despatch² but I feel confident that it was wisest course. He quite understood that offer will not be increased. He expressed great disappointment but said he must refer matter to the head of government. No

¹ See No. 587, note 1.

² Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 244 of May 22 from Angora is not printed. His chief reason was that the Turkish financial situation was not so critical as he had previously believed and the Turkish Government appeared to be in no hurry to receive the money which the treaty might bring them.

question of any alternative offer arose. He will give me an answer tomorrow or Saturday.³

Addressed to Foreign Office, No. 25. Repeated to Bagdad No. 21.

³ Angora telegram No. 31 of May 21 reported that Tewfik Rushdi Bey had informed Sir R. Lindsay that £500,000 was 'entirely inadequate'.

No. 589

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 29, 9 a.m.)
No. 38 Telegraphic [E 3279/62/65]

ANGORA, May 28, 1926, 12.10 p.m.

I have received Turkish counter-draft.

The first important point is that it omits all mention of League of Nations, viz. article 3, where a Swiss is to act as president,¹ and where League of Nations is left out of last paragraphs, article 20² where mention of League of Nations is also expunged. Paragraph 3 of preamble is also omitted.

On the other hand, article 1 says definitely that 'frontier line is that laid down by the Council of the League on September 27th [sic],³ 1925'.

I trust that British & Irak Govts.⁴ can accept this.

The Turkish counter-draft inserts another article 1 (a), by which Turkey renounces in favour of Irak all sovereignty south of the line.⁵

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 38. Repeated to Bagdad No. 36.

¹ Of the proposed boundary commission: see article 3 of the final text of the treaty.

² This article corresponded to article 25 of the earlier draft noted in No. 576, note 2.

³ This date should presumably be December 16, 1925: see No. 548, note 2.

⁴ The preceding three words were inserted in ink on the filed copy.

⁵ In his telegram No. 30 of June 2 Sir A. Chamberlain informed Sir R. Lindsay of his refusal to accept the Turkish draft in article 1 (a) on the ground that the view of H.M. Government was that 'sovereignty over territory to south of Brussels line is already vested in Irak in consequence of Council decision and article 16 of [the treaty of] Lausanne' but expressed willingness to accept any form of words thought suitable by Sir R. Lindsay and not running counter to this view. Foreign Office telegram No. 31 of the same day stated: 'I accept the omission from the treaty of the references to the League of Nations. I shall make the necessary communications unilaterally and ask the Council's consent at its meeting next week to the slight rectification of the frontier.' See *League of Nations Official Journal*, July 1926, pp. 858-9, for Sir A. Chamberlain's statement on June 7.

No. 590

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received May 31, 9 a.m.)
No. 43 Telegraphic [E 3291/62/65]

ANGORA, May 30, 1926, 11 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me verbally but officially that Turkish government accept 10% for twenty-five years.¹

¹ Sir R. Lindsay had reported in his telegram No. 36 of May 28 that on the previous day he had offered this percentage of the Iraq oil Tewfik Rushdi Bey.

I have asked Irak plenipotentiary to proceed immediately.
Assembly is being kept in session in order to ratify at once.
Addressed to Foreign Office No. 43. Repeated to Bagdad No. 41, and
Constantinople No. 9.

No. 591

Sir R. Lindsay (Angora) to Sir A. Chamberlain (Received June 4, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 57 Telegraphic [E 4316/62/65]

ANGORA, June 4, 1926, 11.30 a.m.

After long interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs last night, all points except one or two of minor importance were settled and I hope to sign the treaty tomorrow.

Following are the only important changes.

Article 1a. Sovereignty. As Minister for Foreign Affairs would not agree to our requirements,¹ we decided to omit the article altogether.

Royalties. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked for option to capitalize for one year at £500,000. I agreed.

I hope you will not disapprove.²

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 57, repeated to Bagdad No. 52.

¹ See No. 589, note 5.

² Foreign Office telegram No. 34 of June 5 informed Sir R. Lindsay that these changes were approved on the understanding that the meaning of the preceding paragraph was that one year was the period within which the Turkish Government might exercise the option. The treaty was signed that day and is printed in Cmd. 2912 of 1927.

APPENDIX

Memorandum on the Foreign Policy of His Majesty's Government, with a List of British Commitments in their Relative Order of Importance¹

[W 3260/1/50]*

1. BROADLY speaking, the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government remains what it has been for many years, i.e.,

- (1) to seek peace and ensue it;
- (2) to preserve the *status quo* and the balance of power; and
- (3) to protect and develop British interests in foreign countries.

It may be well to emphasise at the outset the cardinal difference between our foreign policy and that of many other countries. Obviously the ultimate, if not the immediate, aim and object of the foreign policy of countries such as Germany, Hungary and Russia is to recover the territory lost in the war. Italy has her eye on the *Ægean* Islands and parts of Asia Minor. Japan may well hope some day to absorb Manchuria. We, on the other hand, have no territorial ambitions nor desire for aggrandisement. We have got all that we want—perhaps more. Our sole object is to keep what we have and live in peace. Many foreign countries are playing for a definite stake and their policy is shaped accordingly. It is not so in our case. To the casual observer our foreign policy may appear to lack consistency and continuity, but both are there. We keep our hands free in order to throw our weight into the scale on behalf of peace. The maintenance of the balance of power and the preservation of the *status quo* have been our guiding lights for many decades and will so continue.

2. At first sight it would seem that British foreign policy is altruistic, but in truth His Majesty's Government cannot lay this unction to their souls. The fact is that war and rumours of war, quarrels and friction, in any corner of the world spell loss and harm to British commercial and financial interests. It is for the sake of these interests that we endeavour to pour oil on troubled waters. So manifold and ubiquitous are British trade and British finance that, whatever else may be the outcome of a disturbance of the peace, we shall be losers. Frontier disputes between Greece and Jugoslavia or the ownership of the Åland Islands concern us in one sense as little as they concern Spain or the Argentine; but war in the Near East or the Baltic concerns us as much as it would concern Roumania or Norway. This is the explanation and the reason of our intervention in almost every dispute that arises, and one justification for the maintenance of the armed forces which enable us to intervene prominently and with authority. Without our trade and our finance we sink to the level of a third-class Power. Locarno and the unemployed have an intimate connexion.

¹ This undated memorandum was submitted to Sir A. Chamberlain under cover of a minute of April 10, 1926, by Mr. Gregory.

3. There is another aspect of foreign policy involved by the multiplicity of British interests abroad, and that is the conflict with foreign Powers into which their protection often brings us. The wave of chauvinism which is now passing over the world has in many cases taken the form of opposition and hostility to foreign interests. Apart from high tariffs, oppressive legislation aimed at foreign enterprise and even open attacks on, and barefaced extortion from, foreign concerns are only too common. The ceaseless protests and representations which we have to make and the long list of claims which we have to support and endeavour to enforce do not facilitate good relations or render easier the conduct of purely political foreign affairs.

4. Before proceeding to an examination of the problems of foreign policy arranged under geographical headings, it will be convenient to consider the commitments of His Majesty's Government under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Locarno.

5. Articles 10, 11, 13 and 16 of the Covenant provide as follows: . . .²

6. The precise obligations involved by article 10 were for some years the subject of discussion. The Canadian Government, taking the view that it created a definite obligation for every member of the League to go to the assistance of any other member whose territorial integrity or political independence was attacked from outside, proposed in 1921 that the article should be abrogated. In 1924 the Assembly adopted by a vote of all the members present, except Persia, who dissented, the following resolution, defining the extent of the obligation which the article imposed:

'The Assembly, desirous of defining the scope of the obligations contained in article 10 of the Covenant so far as regards the points raised by the Canadian delegation, adopts the following resolution:—

'It is in conformity with the spirit of article 10 that, in the event of the Council considering it to be its duty to recommend the application of military measures in consequence of an aggression, or danger or threat of aggression, the Council shall be bound to take account, more particularly, of the geographical situation and of the special conditions of each State.

'It is for the constitutional authorities of each member to decide, in reference to the obligation of preserving the independence and the integrity of the territory of members, in what degree the member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.

'The recommendation[s] made by the Council shall be regarded as being of the highest importance, and shall be taken into consideration by all the members of the League with the desire to execute their engagements in good faith.'³

This resolution was concurred in by the British representatives and, so long as the article undergoes no amendment, may be taken as indicating the extent of the British commitment.

7. *Article 11* authorises the League to take any action which may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. Action is taken under this article by the adoption and issue by the Council or the Assembly, as the case may be, of recommendations to the States concerned, but it was agreed by the Assembly

² The citations from these articles, here omitted, were the same as in paragraph 19 of No. 1.

³ See Cmd. 2015 of 1924, p. 7.

in 1924 that such recommendations have no binding force and impose no obligation upon a State without its own concurrence.

8. *Article 13* enables the Council in the event of a failure on the part of a State to carry out an arbitration award to propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. The rule which renders unanimous decision necessary in the Council ensures that, so long as there is always a British member on the Council, no proposal will be made under this article to which the British representative feels unable to assent.

9. The text of article 16 as quoted in paragraph 5 is in process of amendment. It has also been the subject of lengthy discussions at Geneva in 1921, and a series of resolutions, on which the draft amendments of that year were founded, were adopted by all the members of the League as embodying the principles on which they would act in case of any application of article 16 before the amendments came into force.⁴ The net result of these resolutions of 1921 is briefly that when any case for the application of article 16 arises the Council of the League will meet and, so far as is possible, will take charge of the situation. A State which takes no action except in accordance with the recommendations of the Council will run no serious risk of being alleged to have failed to fulfil the obligations under the article.

10. The intention of the article undoubtedly was to impose on members of the League an obligation to sever financial and economic relations with the covenant-breaking State and to take in addition military and naval action if the Council thought it expedient. As regards such naval and military measures, it is clear that the particular measures recommended by the Council are not obligatory upon the State concerned, but the fact that it is at liberty to form its own judgment as to the naval and military measures which it will take when action is called for does not entitle it to sit still and do nothing. It is bound to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant to such extent as is compatible with its military situation and its geographical position.

11. Generally speaking, the obligations which the Covenant of the League imposes on His Majesty's Government to take action in support of the Covenant of the League will be confined to measures recommended by the Council and consequently will not be recommended at all without the concurrence of the British representative on that body.

12. The settlement reached at Locarno was based on certain principles directly relevant to our commitments thereunder:

- (a) The arrangements made are purely defensive and are supplementary to the Covenant of the League of Nations.
- (b) They are mutual in character and do not constitute in any sense a unilateral alliance between certain Powers directed against other Powers.
- (c) The obligation undertaken by His Majesty's Government is limited to the maintenance of the existing territorial arrangements in that area with which British interests are most closely bound up, namely, the frontier between Germany and her western neighbours. His Majesty's Government have assumed no fresh obligation elsewhere in addition to those devolving on them as signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

13. The main instrument in the settlement, . . .⁵

⁴ See Cmd. 2241 of 1924.

⁵ The remainder of paragraph 13 and paragraphs 14-16, being the same as the last two sentences of paragraph 28 and paragraphs 29-31 of No. 1, are here omitted.

17. Our commitments may therefore be summarised as follows:

Outside the Rhineland our obligations remain what they were, *i.e.*, they are those which devolve upon us as signatories of the Covenant of the League. Only in the Rhineland have we assumed extra obligations. Before the Treaty of Locarno we *might* have been called upon, both by our membership of the League of Nations and our participation in the Treaty of Versailles (articles 42, 43 and 44), to intervene in any struggle which broke out in the Rhineland. By the Treaty of Locarno we declare that we *will* intervene—

- (1) If the Council of the League holds that an attack has been made on Germany by France or Belgium, or on France or Belgium by Germany: an 'attack' in this sense including a violation of the demilitarised zone established by articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.
- (2) If there occurs an 'attack' as under (1) of so flagrant a nature that His Majesty's Government are convinced that it constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression, and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary. His Majesty's Government would only act in such a case in anticipation of a confirmatory decision on the part of the Council of the League.
- (3) If the Council of the League decides that warlike measures are necessary to enforce an arbitral or judicial decision given under the arbitration treaties between Germany and Belgium or Germany and France.

18. Two further points may be noted:

- (a) No obligation is imposed by the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee upon any of the British Dominions, or upon India, unless the Government of such Dominion, or of India, signifies its acceptance thereof.
- (b) Our special commitments under that treaty are terminable one year after the Council of the League, acting on a request of one or several of the High Contracting Parties notified to the other signatory Powers three months in advance, and voting at least by a two-thirds majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the High Contracting Parties.

19. In conclusion, attention may be drawn to the following note by Mr. Headlam-Morley (Historical Adviser at the Foreign Office):

'If any British Government, after full and mature consideration, after debate in Parliament and general public discussion, feel themselves authorised to become parties to a treaty of guarantee and to make the maintenance of this a permanent part of British policy; if this is publicly proclaimed; if in presenting the estimates for naval and military defence, the importance of providing for liabilities under this treaty is shown; then I believe that in the long run the treaty will become effective.'

That is to say, the more the nations of Europe become convinced of our readiness to fulfil our guarantee, the less likelihood will there be that we shall be called upon to do so.

I. *Western Europe and Morocco*

FRANCE

20. Nothing is impossible, but some contingencies are so improbable that they may legitimately be dismissed in any survey of the immediate future. Among such improbable contingencies may be reckoned war with France during the next decade. Indeed, it is unlikely that Franco-German relations will ever be of such a kind as to make it possible for France to contemplate an armed conflict with Great Britain. It will take fifty years at least to make good the losses of the late war. An Anglo-French war during the next ten years would finally ruin both countries, whatever were its outcome, and this alone is enough to deter either party from pushing things to an extremity. Moreover fear of German revenge, based on German population and German efficiency, is now so deeply ingrained in French imagination that France cannot and will not go to war with us, her one bulwark and defence against Germany. She would have to bow before an Anglo-German combination. She will not make a Franco-German combination against us, knowing full well that her turn would come next. So far as French armaments are concerned, we can be certain they will not be directed against us.

21. Given the gulf—a gulf which no bridge will span—between Anglo-Saxon and French mentality, there will continue, probably for ever, to be differences of opinion and friction in almost every question which arises. Nevertheless, the basic policy of both countries will continue in theory, and in the last resort in practice, to be co-operation in settling post-war problems. Wherever and whenever we legitimately can we shall not only avoid placing ourselves in opposition to the French, but shall endeavour to help them. It is to our interest to see a strong and prosperous France, financially, commercially and politically. We, too, have to reckon with a German revival and with Italian ambitions. In spite of the poison distilled daily by the Paris press and the mischievous activities of French agents in many parts of the world, the two countries are bound to stand together for many years to come.

22. A question which is likely to give rise to some trouble is that of the New Hebrides. This group of islands is governed by His Majesty's Government and the French Government under a condominium set up by the protocol of the 6th August, 1914.⁶ The protocol provides that the group 'shall form a region of joint influence, in which the subjects and citizens of the two signatory Powers shall enjoy equal rights of residence, personal protection and trade, each of the two Powers retaining sovereignty over its nationals . . .⁷ and neither exercising a separate authority over the group.'

23. The joint administration has proved a complete failure, and at the Imperial Conference in 1923 it was decided to approach the French Government with a suggestion that the islands should be divided between the British Empire and France. Steps have recently been taken to sound the French Government on this point, but no negotiations have yet been initiated. The difficulty is that, owing to the fact that the French planters can obtain abundant coloured labour from French Cochinchina, whereas the British planters are obliged to rely on the scarce and unsatisfactory local labour, the French have now secured a very predominant position in the islands, and any division to which the French Government would agree would be hotly repudiated by Australia, which would like to see the whole of the group in her own hands.

⁶ See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 114, pp. 212-57.

⁷ Punctuation as in original quotation.

SPAIN

24. Notwithstanding her pretensions to rank as a Great Power, Spain is too vulnerable to attacks from the British fleet to be a potential danger. Rumours have reached us that Signor Mussolini has made attempts to inveigle Spain into some form of alliance or understanding, but there is every reason to believe that nothing has resulted from these efforts.

25. On more than one occasion recently the King of Spain and the Dictator have, in conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid, urged the desirability of exchanging Gibraltar for Ceuta. Sir H. Rumbold has, with the approval of the Secretary of State, replied that there can be no question of any such exchange, which cannot even be discussed.

MOROCCO

26. When His Majesty's Government agreed in 1904 to French predominance in Morocco in return for British predominance in Egypt, it was only on condition that the Mediterranean coast of Morocco was handed over to Spain and that Tangier remained under a special régime. By article 7 of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904,⁸ both French and British Governments are pledged 'not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on the portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou.' The French Government are also pledged not to modify the existing territorial status in Morocco without previous consultation with Spain and Great Britain.

27. We are not prepared to see the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, and especially the southern shore of the Straits of Gibraltar, in the hands of a first-class Power, and some apprehensions were aroused last year by the initial successes of the Riffis against the Spaniards. Had the Spaniards been finally driven out of the Spanish zone of Morocco, a most embarrassing situation would have arisen. We are certainly not prepared to take over the Riff coast ourselves, and equally we are not prepared to see the French or the Italians installed between Ceuta and Melilla. Happily, the danger, for the moment at any rate, is averted. As a matter of fact, the information in possession of the Foreign Office shows that the French would be exceedingly reluctant to take over the Spanish zone at present. They perhaps hope that it may fall to them some day, but they have no desire whatever to put their hands into the hornet's nest now. It is worth adding that competent observers, including Marshal Lyautey,⁹ consider it not improbable that the rise of nationalism in Morocco will put an end to the French protectorate in about thirty years, and that the whole of Morocco may then be once more in the melting-pot. If this prediction is borne out, the French scheme for a vast North African Empire will receive a severe blow and British policy will require careful reconsideration.

28. The position of Tangier has been a particular pre-occupation of His Majesty's Government. The possession and fortification of Tangier by any Power would weaken our position in the Western Mediterranean and would compromise our lines of communication with the East. It has, therefore, been a cardinal factor in the policy of successive British Governments to prevent this, and the whole web of Moroccan treaties since 1904, to which Great Britain is a party, provides for the establishment at Tangier of an international régime.

⁸ See *op. cit.*, vol. 101, pp. 1053-9.

⁹ French Resident-General in Morocco 1912-16 and 1917-25.

29. The exact nature of this international régime was the subject of long diplomatic discussions between France, Spain and Great Britain, which terminated in December 1923 in the conclusion of the Tangier Convention. Article 3 of the convention provides that the Tangier zone shall be placed under a régime of permanent neutrality, and that no act of hostility on land, on sea or in the air shall be committed by or against the zone or within its boundaries. The terms of this article impose on Great Britain no obligation to guarantee the neutrality of Tangier or to protect it from attack. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government are undoubtedly under the implied obligation to do all they can to preserve the neutrality of Tangier, and they would doubtless be entitled to invoke the Tangier Convention as justification for intervening to ensure the neutrality of the zone. When, in July last, the contingency of an attack on Tangier by Abd-el-Krim arose, the Committee of Imperial Defence 'deemed the maintenance of the neutrality of the international zone at Tangier so important that if this zone were attacked they would be ready to join in concerted defence measures,' and the War Office were requested to prepare plans for the despatch of a force of two brigades and ancillary units. What the attitude of His Majesty's Government would be if the neutrality of Tangier were violated by a European Power, for example, Italy, in a war against France, or France in a war against Spain, it is impossible to forecast. It is certain that British interests would demand that every possible effort should be made to ensure respect for the neutrality of the zone.

30. In addition to the commitments described above, His Majesty's Government have, under article 4 of the Tangier Convention, incurred an obligation to co-operate with the French and the Spanish navies in the surveillance of contraband traffic in arms in the territorial waters of the Tangier zone. This work is being carried out by two British destroyers from Gibraltar.

31. The success of B[r]itish policy in regard to Tangier depends, of course, on the successful working of the new international régime. A year's experience shows that, despite the disturbance and losses caused by the Riff war, the Tangier Convention is a workable instrument; and it was mainly, if not wholly, owing thereto that His Majesty's Government were able last summer to resist the Spanish proposal to send troops to Tangier and so to avoid the serious consequences which must have ensued. Nevertheless, there is serious danger ahead, unless means can be found of inducing Italy to follow the example of the other Powers concerned and to accede to the Tangier Convention. So long as Italy maintains her present refusal to accede, Italian subjects at Tangier are not amenable to the local courts, to taxation, or to any laws and regulations, and it is thus impossible to realise the principle of economic equality, which is one of the bases of the Tangier Convention. In short, the international administration is so seriously embarrassed that the indefinite prolongation of the present state of affairs may bring about the collapse of the whole delicate structure. Every effort is now being made by His Majesty's Government to secure the accession of Italy, but should they fail, it is not impossible that the whole Tangier question may have to be reviewed. His Majesty's Government will again be faced by demands from France or Spain for the incorporation of Tangier in their respective zones, and the long struggle which was terminated with such difficulty in 1923 will be reopened. The dangers of this contingency are so obvious that there is no need to emphasise the importance of conciliating Italy and so ensuring the success and continuance of the existing régime at Tangier.

32. By an exchange of notes in May 1907,¹⁰ the British, French and Spanish

¹⁰ See *op. cit.*, vol. 100, pp. 570-1 and 933-4.

Governments declared their resolve to preserve intact their rights over their respective insular and maritime possessions in the Mediterranean and East Atlantic Ocean, and to concert with each other in the event of any threat of a disturbance in the existing territorial *status quo*.

PORTUGAL

33. Under Anglo-Portuguese treaties,¹¹ the earliest of which dates back to 1373, His Majesty's Government are under a general obligation to defend Portuguese territories and colonies against all enemies of Portugal. The obligation contained in these treaties was confirmed in 1815 and 1899; and the preamble of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1904 (Treaty of Windsor) refers to 'the friendship and alliance which have happily subsisted for so long a period between them (the two monarchs) and the two nations which they represent,' and would thus appear to recognise once more the validity of the old treaties. The Anglo-Portuguese Declaration of 1899 quoted and specifically confirmed the following passage from the treaty of 1661:

'Over and above all and singular agreed and concluded . . . it is by this secret article concluded and accorded that His Majesty of Great Britain . . . shall promise and oblige himself, as by this present article he doth, to defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies as well future as present.'

34. The Portuguese colonial possessions are: In Africa: Portuguese East Africa, Portuguese West Africa, Guinea, Cape Verde Islands, São Tomé and Príncipe Islands; in Asia: Timor, Goa, Damão and Diu in India; Macao in China. The Azores and Madeira have not the status of colonies, but are regarded as an integral part of the territory of Portugal itself.

35. It is clear, therefore, that we are under a general obligation to defend Portuguese territories and colonies against all enemies of Portugal. This obligation has been explicitly acknowledged several times during the last century, and, on at least one occasion, viz., in 1826, when the assistance of His Majesty's Government was requested by Portugal under the treaties, an armed force was sent. It is to be noted, however, that, in consequence presumably of the antiquity of most of the treaties in question and the very different circumstances in which they were concluded, His Majesty's Government have in the past considered themselves entitled to scrutinise in each particular case the circumstances in which their help was invoked by Portugal under the treaties; and in 1873 His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon was specifically instructed to make it clear to the Government of Portugal 'that Her Majesty's Government reserved to themselves to judge of the circumstances under which any appeal was made to them by Portugal for succour.' In regard to this point, the late Sir E. Hertslet wrote in 1877: 'It will, therefore, be seen that, although the old treaties of alliance and guarantee are admitted to be still in force, yet Her Majesty's Government have never considered that they are bound under all circumstances to defend Portugal "as England itself"; on the contrary, that they have reserved to themselves the right of judging of the circumstances in which help may be given or withheld; or, in other words, that, whilst

¹¹ For Anglo-Portuguese agreements of 1373, 1661, 1815, and 1904, see respectively *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 462-8 and 494-501; vol. 2, pp. 348-55; vol. 97, pp. 68-69; for the Anglo-Portuguese Declaration of October 14, 1899, see G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 93-94.

the old treaties give this country a right to interfere in any case of external attack against Portugal, they do not compel it to do so.'

36. In 1913, since when nothing has occurred to modify the situation, Sir E. Grey wrote as follows:

'The conclusion therefore seems to be that while the treaties are admitted to be still in force, His Majesty's Government reserve to themselves the right of judging the circumstances under which help may be given or withheld.'

37. The British alliance is the sheet-anchor of Portuguese foreign policy, and though the Portuguese Government are behaving extremely badly in commercial and financial matters, notably as regards British claims, we can safely count on their support in any question of really first-rate importance. Such support would be of negative rather than of positive value. The Portuguese army and navy do not count, but, on the other hand, it would add to our liabilities if there were any danger of the mouth of the Tagus or the Portuguese Atlantic islands being placed at the disposal of a hostile Power.

38. The maladministration of the vast Portuguese possessions in Africa is a source of constant trouble to us, though the chief sufferer is the Union of South Africa owing to the fact that two of the chief outlets of the Union, Lourenço Marques and Beira, are both in Portuguese territory. Unless the Portuguese set their house in order, of which at present there is neither sign nor prospect, the conscience of the civilised world will one day demand that Mozambique and Angola should be handed over to some other Power. In spite of the Anglo-Portuguese treaties, we shall find it difficult to resist such a demand, especially as the Union of South Africa will obviously be the most suitable Government to take over the administration of the Portuguese colonies. Although this contingency is hardly likely to arise in the immediate future, it cannot be dismissed as altogether improbable.

THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

39. The independence of Belgium and Holland and their continued retention of the mouths of the Scheldt will in the future as in the past remain of vital importance to this country. Apart from the Locarno treaties we should be obliged as in 1914 to fight in order to prevent the absorption or conquest of the Low Countries by any Great Power.

40. Contrary to the general belief, the Treaty of Versailles itself did not abrogate the treaties of 1839 by which the Powers guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. A separate instrument is required for this purpose, and nothing could be done in the matter until Holland and Belgium had concluded a new treaty with each other. It was not till last year that they at last succeeded in coming to terms. The first Anglo-French draft of a new multilateral treaty to replace the multilateral treaty of 1839 proved unacceptable to the Dutch and Belgium Governments, and a fresh draft has been prepared which it is proposed to discuss at a conference at The Hague. Article 1 of this new draft states that 'L'indépendance de la Belgique reste inaliénable,' and article 2 confirms the freedom of the Scheldt for all ships except warships.

41. The question of Luxemburg is exceedingly involved, but luckily this is a matter of small importance. By the Treaty of London, 1867,¹² the Powers guaran-

¹² For this treaty of May 11, 1867, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 57, pp. 32-35.

teed the neutrality of Luxemburg. As in the case of the 1839 treaties relative to Belgium, the Treaty of Versailles assumes that the régime of neutrality in Luxemburg will come to an end, but does not specifically terminate it. It follows therefore that the 1867 treaty is still in force. In 1920, however, Luxemburg applied for and was admitted unconditionally to membership of the League of Nations, and this, of course, is incompatible with the maintenance of her neutrality. The 1867 treaty, of which Luxemburg is a signatory, cannot be denounced without Luxemburg's concurrence, since it contains no clause enabling the parties thereto to denounce it, nor is there any stipulation as to the length of its duration. Luxemburg would certainly not consent now to the abrogation of the treaty and the loss of her neutrality without some *quid pro quo* in the shape of a territorial guarantee. To complicate matters still further, the French Government have let us know that they are determined to send troops through Luxemburg if at any time they become involved in a war with Germany under conditions consistent with the Locarno treaties. The Secretary of State has decided to leave the questions of the status of Luxemburg alone for the present. If and when it arises, our hands will be free to act as we think best.

II. Central Europe and the Balkans

42. The countries comprised under this heading are Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Roumania, Bulgaria and Albania. For the purposes of this memorandum these countries have been grouped as follows: (1) Central Europe, comprising Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia; (2) Germany; (3) Italy; and (4) the Balkans, comprising Yugoslavia, Roumania, Greece, Bulgaria and Albania. It will be seen that two States, viz., Roumania and Yugoslavia figure in two categories (1) and (4), the reason being their geographical position, which involves them in two separate groups of problems, those concerning Central Europe and those concerning the south-east corner of Europe, which is known by the illogical, but customary, title of 'the Balkans.'

43. The main problems to be envisaged are (1) the *Anschluss*, or union of Austria with Germany, (2) the attitude of Hungary.

(1) By article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, Austria undertakes not to make any change in her national status without the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. It is unlikely that the Council would ever agree to the *Anschluss*. France fears it, as it would add 8,000,000 to the population of the German Reich; Italy would fight to prevent having a common frontier with Germany; Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia would also oppose it. It is not easy to assess Austrian feeling regarding the *Anschluss*. It seems probable that the Austrians realise that the *Anschluss* affords a very convenient bogey with which to frighten their neighbours and France when they wish to extract something from them. How far there is any genuine desire for union with Germany is at least problematical. The more desperate Austria's position, the more talk do we hear of the *Anschluss*; the more hopeful the outlook, the less seriously is it discussed. On the other hand, Germany's interest in the question is presumably largely dependent on whether Austria is prosperous or not. For the present the problem is probably remote, but should a crisis arise over this question, this country would be affected as signatory of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, and of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(2) The position of Hungary is a perpetual menace to the peace of Central

Europe. Faced with the system of alliances between Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Jugoslavia, known as the Little *Entente*, she is impotent; but she suffers under a feeling of grievous wrong owing to her belief in the injustice of the frontiers laid down by the Treaty of Trianon, and is determined to secure the revision of this treaty in her favour. British policy is directed to endeavouring to make plain to Hungary and to her neighbours that the peace treaty must stand, and that the true road to peace is by way of acceptance of the position as consecrated by the peace treaty, and by mutual arrangements for conciliation on the model of the arbitration treaties signed at Locarno. At the moment distrust of Hungary among her neighbours is accentuated by the bank-note forgeries scandal, which will embitter relations, especially with Czechoslovakia, for some time.

44. At any moment, too, peace may be disturbed by a movement in Hungary to restore the House of Habsburg to the throne. Full memoranda upon the Little *Entente* alliances and the King question in Hungary¹³ have been prepared.

GERMANY

45. The commitments of His Majesty's Government, so far as Germany is concerned, are determined in the first place by the Treaty of Locarno (see paragraphs 12-19 above), and, secondly, by section I of Part XIV of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides that certain Rhine territories shall be occupied by 'Allied and Associated troops' for a period of fifteen years from the 10th January, 1920, as a guarantee of the execution of the treaty. If at or after the expiry of that period the treaty is not executed or Germany ceases to observe her reparation obligations, the period of the occupation can be extended and territory evacuated can be reoccupied. Whilst the treaty provides only for an occupation by 'Allied and Associated troops' and therefore lays no legal obligation upon His Majesty's Government themselves to maintain in the Rhine territories a quota of the occupying troops, it can scarcely be denied that the Rhine occupation does constitute for His Majesty's Government a commitment which cannot be lightly jettisoned.

46. To turn to the general political situation, the relations of His Majesty's Government with Germany after the war were determined by the fact of this country's membership of an alliance whose *raison d'être* had now become to exact from Germany the execution of the Treaty of Versailles. In this alliance our rôle proved to be that of preaching the gospel of reasonableness. We were always ready to join our Allies in insisting upon Germany fulfilling her obligations so far as they were consistent with her capacity and with common-sense, but beyond that we would not go; and, above all, we insisted that we Allies were bound equally with Germany by the terms of the Treaty we had signed. This was our policy in great matters and in small.

47. As an example of our loyalty in resisting German obstruction and bad faith, may be cited our attitude towards the evacuation of Cologne in January 1925, the date on which evacuation was due provided that Germany had faithfully fulfilled the terms of the treaty. We agreed with our Allies that as regards military disarmament, the execution of the treaty was not such as to warrant immediate evacuation, and we joined our Allies in refusing to leave Cologne until our requirements had been carried out. More often, however, our rôle proved to be that of resisting the extravagance of our Allies' demands. Thus, in reparations, we early

¹³ Not printed.

recognised that Germany's obligations as fixed were impossible of fulfilment, and it was our continual policy to have them placed upon a common-sense footing. When our Allies rejected our proposals and marched into the Ruhr, we refused to march with them. Again, in the Rhineland we all along dissociated ourselves from the illegal and disreputable practices of the French. We not only dissociated ourselves, but often drove the French to abandon such practices. Thus it was largely the firm attitude of His Majesty's Government that killed the Separatist movement.

48. Up to 1924 the position as between the Allies and Germany, and indeed as between the Allies themselves, was one of continual strife. In 1924 the clouds began to clear. That year saw the settlement of the reparation problem by the Dawes scheme. The same year the Allies all agreed to waive their ban upon Germany entering the League of Nations. The policy of appeasement continued and grew in 1925, culminating in the Locarno Conference. Looked at from one point of view, the Locarno Treaty may be regarded as the triumph of the British idea of compromise and conciliation over the continental idea of compulsion. But it was more than that; its greatest significance was that Germany was now brought into the Concert of Europe as an equal with the other Powers, the old war alliance was broken, and the terms 'victor' and 'vanquished' became things of the past.

49. The question of the future is, what will Germany make of her new position? It is unnecessary to enlarge upon such ephemeral questions as military control, the Rhineland régime, the Saar, &c., for which a solution will surely be found with no more than customary diplomatic friction. Bigger questions are those of Danzig, Upper Silesia, Austria and general disarmament.

50. On the first two questions it seems clear that, in spite of her arbitration treaty with Poland, Germany will never rest until her present wrongs, as she considers them, have been righted. What will our attitude be if these questions arise in an acute form? Our only *obligations* are those of a member of the League of Nations. In the negotiations leading up to Locarno, we made it clear that we would take on no further obligations in Eastern Europe. But as members of the League we are bound to do our part in resisting any forcible solution of these questions. What our obligations would amount to in practice is a matter of great legal complexity and is dealt with in the introduction to this memorandum. But the matter may, of course, be decided not in terms of law and obligations, but of interest. It is hardly possible at the present time to suggest what line it will prove to be our interest to take, but as a matter of history it may be recalled that this country has never in the past taken up arms to resist the dismemberment of Poland, even in days when we were not crippled by a colossal war debt.

51. It may be anticipated that sooner or later the union of Germany and Austria will become a live issue. This question is dealt with in the section headed Central Europe.

52. Lastly, it is clear that general disarmament is going to hold a foremost place in the diplomatic programme of any German Government. The Germans contend, and with some justice, that the contrast between the armed and disarmed nations of Europe is unnatural and dangerous to peace. No German Government will ever be satisfied until the general disarmament foreshadowed in the peace treaties has become a reality. And they have, on their side, not only a good case in equity, but the letter of the Treaty of Versailles, which specifically states in the Preamble of Part V that Germany was to disarm, 'in order to render possible the initiation of a general reduction of armaments of all nations.' The German delegation at Locarno made great play with their contention in this respect, and

it was on their initiation that the final protocol of the conference included the following paragraphs:

'The representatives of the Governments represented here declare their firm conviction that the entry into force of these treaties and conventions will contribute greatly to bring about a moral relaxation of the tension between nations, that it will help powerfully towards the solution of many political or economic problems in accordance with the interests and sentiments of peoples, and that, in strengthening peace and security in Europe, it will hasten on effectively the disarmament provided for in article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

'They undertake to give their sincere co-operation to the work relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of Nations and to seek the realisation thereof in a general agreement.'

The German delegation had, indeed, asked for something more, viz., that the conference should give expression to the principle that the armaments of all members of the League should be not only as small as possible, but also *proportional*. This, however, was unacceptable to the Allied delegations. Sir Austen Chamberlain declared that 'German disarmament remained a thing apart. The other Powers could not agree to disarm in a measure proportionate to Germany's disarmament.'¹⁴

53. If and when a definite attempt to bring about general disarmament has been made and failed, the German grievance will become still more acute, and she may be tempted to repudiate or evade her obligations under the Treaty of Versailles to remain disarmed. Any attempt to recreate a navy would presumably be treated as a direct threat to Great Britain, nor would His Majesty's Government acquiesce in a violent repudiation by Germany of her obligations in respect of land armaments, especially if her policy was clearly that of recovering her pre-war military strength. But on the other hand, the attitude of His Majesty's Government as regards a moderate or gradual increase of the German army or even the reintroduction of compulsory military service would largely depend on circumstances existing at the time and which cannot be foreseen, and more particularly on the attitude of the French Government.

ITALY

54. Generally speaking, relations between this country and Italy have been consistently friendly since the consolidation of the Italian kingdom in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The likelihood of this country being involved in war with Italy, save in virtue of our obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations, is therefore remote. At the same time, the present foreign policy of Italy is aggressive and constitutes a disturbing element in Europe. This is due to three main causes: (1) The continued increase of Italian population, for which an outlet must be found—Italy's chief problem; (2) Jealousy of France and a determination, if possible, to play the deciding rôle in Central Europe and the Balkans; (3) The policy of 'prestige' [?in] which a dictator like Mussolini is bound from time to time to indulge in foreign affairs, in order to distract attention at home (e.g., Napoleon III in the 'sixties).

55. (1) may bring Italy into diplomatic conflict with the Dominions. Now that the United States of America have adopted the quota policy for immigrants, Italy's field for the disposal of her surplus population is practically restricted to France,

¹⁴ *Note on filed copy*: 'Quoted from the unofficial notes of the British Secretary.'

South America and the British Dominions. This same problem may much more probably lead Italy to a policy of adventure in Anatolia, possibly in conjunction with Greece.

56. There has recently been a rapprochement between Italy and Greece. This may have been facilitated by the fact that both countries are under the régime of a dictator, but, in any case, it seems likely that, in her desire to expand, Italy believes that the support of Greece will be useful. The ports and islands of Greece are naturally important as submarine and naval bases, and the development of relations between Greece and Italy may require to be watched.

57. (2) and (3) need not necessarily affect the relations between this country and Italy, and at present it is not possible to state with accuracy what exact form her policy will take, but with the lesson of the Corfu incident of 1923 (a typical instance of the policy of 'prestige') before us, it will be necessary carefully to watch Italian policy in case this country should suddenly be called upon to fulfil her obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

THE BALKANS

58. There is a variety of problems arising out of the relations with each other of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Roumania and Turkey, and of the policies of France and Italy regarding these countries. Any of these problems may at any moment lead to war. It should, however, in practically all cases be possible to localise the conflict, as was done in the Græco-Bulgarian dispute of October 1925, unless, as the result of a further regrouping of Powers, France and Italy are found in opposite camps. At present, although these two Powers appear to be jealous of each other's influence in the Balkans, it is too soon to say that they are definitely antagonistic.

59. The position is not the same as in 1914, and the Balkans are not, as then, the 'powder-magazine' of Europe. The Balkans are no longer the pawns in the game between two great empires. British interests in the Balkans are confined to maintaining the peace so far as it is possible by advice and moderating counsels acting through the League of Nations. A detailed memorandum on the present situation as it affects British interests is available.¹⁵

60. Apart from the obligations of the peace treaties, the only obligation—and that an implied one—accepted by Great Britain in the Balkans is that contained in the Bessarabian Treaty. Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan signed with Roumania in 1920 a treaty recognising Roumania's rights to Bessarabia. No obligation to maintain this right is entailed other than under article 10 of the Covenant of the League. Great Britain and France have ratified the treaty, but Italy and Japan have not, and it is therefore not in force. It is, moreover, considered unlikely that Russia will endeavour to secure Bessarabia by force of arms. This is, perhaps, chiefly a problem to be considered in connection with Russia, but it is not thought that the danger of a Russian invasion is serious or one in which this country need in any way become involved.

III. *Turkey and Middle East*

TURKEY

61. Our relations with Turkey since the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne have been vitiated by two acute controversies: the major dispute about the Mosul

¹⁵ See No. 129.

Vilayet and the increasing friction arising out of the anti-foreign policy of the Turkish Government in defiance of the provisions of the treaty. The former question has now been theoretically settled by the recent award of the League of Nations, but Turkey has refused to acknowledge this award and professes to regard the issue as still open. We are endeavouring to devise some treaty or other compensatory arrangements that may soften the blow to Turkish pride and prestige and induce them to accept the verdict of the League. But the negotiations for this purpose have so far achieved nothing, and their continuance is complicated, not only by the inherent difficulty of satisfying the Turks, but by the increasing virulence of their attacks on the rights and interests of foreigners. The deliberate anti-foreign policy of the Turkish Government has become more and more severe in its effects on British individuals and institutions in Turkey, and has recently reached a point that seriously endangers our relations.

62. Sir R. Lindsay has recently arrived home from Constantinople to discuss the present situation. In general, our policy in Turkey may be said to be aimed at the restoration of amicable relations, and we are ready to assist the Turks in their task of modernising and developing the country. While there are signs of willingness on their part to bury the hatchet at a price, it is questionable whether the price is not higher than our obligations towards Irak will allow us to pay. The situation is therefore a difficult and anxious one.

63. It is unlikely that the controversy over British rights in Turkey will lead to hostilities between the two countries. We are not the only sufferers, and a more logical result of the continuance of the present Turkish attitude would be united action by all the Powers concerned, including possibly joint political and economic pressure on Turkey. But it is unfortunately still impossible to count on unanimity among the European Powers in their relations with Turkey, even under extreme provocation. We may therefore be forced to act alone, but it is hardly conceivable that any action, *on this question alone*, will involve military, naval or air measures against Turkey.

64. But there is at present no assurance that such measures may not be involved over the question of Mosul. It is impossible to make any predictions about what the Turks may or may not do, since Turkish policy is dependent on the whim of an individual. It is not inconceivable that Mustafa Kemal may suddenly decide that his prestige requires him to implement his undertaking to recover Mosul for Turkey. On the other hand, having survived the immediate crisis of the adverse decision of the League, he may, in return for any compensation we may find it possible to offer him, gradually adopt a position of protestant acquiescence in the *fait accompli*.

65. There remains, however, a risk—it is impossible to estimate its proportion—that the Turks may decide on an attempt to recover the Mosul vilayet by military means, or, failing this, embark on a series of frontier raids. We may therefore be called upon to fulfil our obligations in respect of the defence of Irak. (See under Irak.) In such event it is necessary to contemplate the contingency of overt or secret Russian support to Turkey. It seems, on the face of it, unlikely that the Russians would openly make common cause with the Turks over the question of Mosul, just as it is unlikely that the latter would so far commit themselves to Russia by the acceptance of any such offer. But while the offer of Russian troops would probably be declined, munitions and supplies of all kinds would be welcomed and the geographical situation of the two countries would render abortive any attempt at an economic blockade of Turkey.

66. Another factor that should be borne in mind, in spite of the uncertainty

attaching to it, is the possibility of a Græco-Italian occupation of Thrace, Smyrna and Adalia in the event of Turkey becoming involved in hostilities with another Power. Sooner or later the two countries are likely to make a bid for the satisfaction of their ambitions in Asia Minor. For the moment the main importance of this possibility probably resides in its moral effect at Angora in restraining the Turks from embarking upon any policy that would provide an opportunity to Italy and Greece.

THE STRAITS

67. British potential obligations in regard to the freedom of the Straits are defined in article 18 of the draft Straits Convention, negotiated at Lausanne, but not yet signed [*sic*]¹⁶, which runs as follows:

'The high contracting parties, desiring to secure that the demilitarisation of the Straits and of the contiguous zones shall not constitute an unjustifiable danger to the military security of Turkey, and that no act of war should imperil the freedom of the Straits or the safety of the demilitarised zones, agree as follows:

'Should the freedom of navigation of the Straits or the security of the demilitarised zones be imperilled by a violation of the provisions relating to freedom of passage, or by a surprise attack or some act of war or threat of war, the high contracting parties, and in any case, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, acting in conjunction, will meet this violation, attack or other act of war or threat of war, by all the means that the Council of the League of Nations may decide for this purpose.

'So soon as the circumstances which may have necessitated the action provided for in the preceding paragraph shall have ended, the régime of the Straits as laid down by the terms of the present convention shall again be strictly applied.

'The present provision, which forms an integral part of those relating to the demilitarisation and to the freedom of the Straits, does not prejudice the rights and obligations of the high contracting parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations.'

PERSIA

68. British policy in Persia aims at affording moral support to the Persian Government in resisting the encroachments and unjust pressure of Soviet Russia, without, however, undertaking to give Persia any form of military assistance in the regrettable event of hostilities with that country. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has made clear to the Persian Prime Minister that Persia cannot expect armed intervention by Great Britain on her behalf. His Majesty's Government wish to see Persia strong and independent, able to stand on her own legs and to provide an element of stability in the Middle East and bar the road to India against Russia.

69. In the Persian Gulf the paramount position of Great Britain should be maintained.

IRAQ

70. The Anglo-Iraq Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, defined British military commitments as follows:

¹⁶ See No. 546, note 2.

'Article 7. His Britannic Majesty undertakes to provide such support and assistance to the armed forces of His Majesty the King of Irak as may from time to time be agreed by the high contracting parties. A separate agreement regulating the extent and conditions of such support and assistance shall be concluded between the high contracting parties and communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.'

71. The separate military agreement mentioned in this article was concluded on the 25th March, 1924.¹⁷ The essential features of it are:

'Article 1. The two Governments hereby recognise the principle that the Government of Irak shall, at the earliest possible date, provided it shall not be later than four years from the date of the conclusion of this agreement, accept full responsibility both for the maintenance of internal order and for the defence of Irak from external aggression. With this end in view, it is agreed that the material support and assistance now being rendered by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Government of Irak shall be progressively reduced with all possible expedition.

'Article 2. Such support and assistance as may for a time be provided by the Government of His Britannic Majesty shall take the form of the presence in Irak either of an Imperial garrison or of local forces maintained by His Britannic Majesty's Government, and of the granting of facilities in the following matters, the cost of which will be met by the Irak Government:

- '(1) Military and aeronautical instruction of Irak officers in the United Kingdom so far as this may be possible.
- '(2) The provision in sufficient quantities of arms, ammunition, equipment and aeroplanes of the latest available pattern for the Irak army.
- '(3) The provision of British officials whenever they may be required by the Irak Government within the period of the treaty.

'Such support and assistance shall in no case take the form of a contribution by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the cost of the Irak army or other local forces maintained and controlled by the Government of Irak, and similarly the Government of Irak shall not contribute to the cost of the Imperial garrison or forces maintained and controlled by His Britannic Majesty's Government.'

72. These instruments were approved by the Council of the League of Nations on the 27th September, 1924, and came into force by exchange of ratifications on the 19th December, 1924.

73. The new Anglo-Irak Treaty of the 13th January, 1926, which was approved by the Council of the League on the 11th March, 1926, and is about to be ratified, extends the duration of the 1922 treaty and subsidiary agreements for a period of twenty-five years from the 16th December, 1925, unless Irak is admitted to membership of the League before the expiration of that period, whereupon the treaty and agreements shall terminate. But it does not alter the provision of article 2 in the military agreement that Irak is to take over full responsibility for her own defence and security in 1928.

74. Article 8 of the 1922 treaty provides that no territory in Irak shall be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of any foreign Power. But neither that treaty nor the military agreement contains any definite undertaking on the

¹⁷ See *op. cit.*, vol. 119, pp. 410-16.

part of His Majesty's Government to come to the assistance of Irak if she is attacked.

75. The nature of our undertakings as regards Irak was defined in the following statement of policy, prepared by the Cabinet Committee, which the Prime Minister read out in the House of Commons on the 21st December, 1925:

'The undertaking we have given is not for a definite twenty-five years, but for what I believe, as the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated to the Council, will be a far shorter period, namely, until such time as we can make it clear to the League of Nations that Irak has acquired the stability which justifies its admission to membership of the League. It is not an undertaking to spend money on, or to keep troops in Irak, either for the maintenance of internal order or for its defence against external aggression, but to continue our co-operation and advice in maintaining a stable system of government.

'It may be asked what will be our responsibility for the defence of Irak if, after the expiration of the present treaty, that country should be attacked by any foreign Power. It is obvious that the responsibility which we should have towards Irak, if, as a fellow-member of the League of Nations, she were the victim of unprovoked aggression, would certainly not be diminished by any treaty relationship with us which continued our mandatory position, but the League itself has a special responsibility towards a State over which it exercises a mandatory supervision, and if the aggression in question were directed to the forcible overthrow of the boundary fixed by the Council of the League itself, the responsibility of the League, as the authority directly challenged and affronted, would obviously be the primary and dominant one. Our responsibility in any future situation must necessarily depend on the circumstances of that situation. The action which we should take and the measure and extent of any support which we might give in a particular case cannot be fixed in advance or be a matter of prior obligation. They must be determined by the Government of the day, if ever the case arises, in the light of the then existing circumstances of world peace and the general interests of the Empire.'¹⁸

PALESTINE AND TRANSJORDAN

76. British commitments in regard to Palestine and the Transjordan are covered by the British mandate, which was passed by the League of Nations in July 1922.¹⁹ A special autonomous régime under the Emir Abdullah, a son of King Hussein, has been set up in the Transjordan under the mandate. British military commitments arising out of a territorial guarantee are comprised in article 5 of the mandate, which reads:

'The mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.'

HEJAZ AND NEJD

77. The British assurances of a general nature made to ex-King Hussein during the Great War have been liquidated by the final collapse of the Hashimite dynasty and the recognition by His Majesty's Government of Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its dependencies. The new ruler has already given

¹⁸ See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., *H. of C.*, vol. 189, cols. 2080-1.

¹⁹ See *League of Nations Official Journal*, August 1922, pp. 823-5 and 1007-12.

proof of his desire for friendly relations with Great Britain, and in November 1925 signed with Sir Gilbert Clayton two agreements, known as the 'Bahra' and 'Hadda' agreements, regulating his relations with Irak and Transjordan.²⁰ His Majesty's Government have no intention of entering into any commitments with Ibn Saud of a nature to involve armed assistance to him. The treaty signed with him in 1916,²¹ which provided in certain circumstances for military assistance by His Majesty's Government, concerns only Nejd and not the Hejaz; though still nominally in force, it is recognised by both parties as no longer appropriate in view of the greatly enlarged dominions now ruled over by Ibn Saud, and a new treaty of friendship is contemplated in which no promise of British armed support will be given.

THE IDRISI SAYID OF ASIR

78.²² The treaties with this ruler made during the Great War bind His Majesty's Government to assist him in the event of aggression by a foreign Power. His Majesty's Government have decided that this stipulation does not bind them to assist him in war with other Arab rulers.

79. The Idrisi is at present engaged in a conflict with the Imam of the Yemen, in which His Majesty's Government have declared their neutrality. It is doubtful if he will continue to exist as an independent potentate.

ADEN PROTECTORATE

80. His Majesty's Government are bound by treaty to grant 'gracious favour and protection' to a number of tribal chiefs in the area lying to the north of Aden and known as the Aden Protectorate. A similar treaty exists with the Sultan of Shihr and Mokalla, whose territory lies on the southern coast of Arabia some way to the east of Aden.

81. The frontier between Turkish Arabia and the Aden Protectorate was laid down in the years 1904 and 1905. Since the war the Imam of the Yemen (sometimes known as the Imam of Sanaa), who has succeeded the Turks as master of the Yemen, has shown a disposition to interfere with these tribes, and to encroach upon the Protectorate territory. He had recently stated quite definitely that he does not accept the frontier agreement as binding upon him. The situation thus created is at present under consideration.

MUSCAT

82. By a declaration signed at Paris on the 10th March, 1862, the British and French Governments bound themselves reciprocally to respect the independence of the Sultan of Muscat (Oman). This agreement has precluded the establishment of a British protectorate over Muscat.

83. In 1891 the Sultan entered into an agreement with Great Britain not to alienate any of his territory to any Government other than that of Great Britain.

PERSIAN GULF TRUCIAL CHIEFS

84. These petty chieftains are bound by treaties concluded in 1892 to enter into relations with no other foreign Power. They are virtually British protected States

²⁰ See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 121, pp. 950-3 and 818-22 respectively.

²¹ This treaty was signed on December 26, 1915: cf. No. 550, note 3.

²² For the agreements between Great Britain and Arab rulers referred to in paragraphs 78-89, see C. U. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, vol. xi, *passim*.

and would expect British assistance in the event of unprovoked attack by another Power.

EL KATR

85. His Majesty's Government are bound by their declaration of the 29th July, 1913, not to permit the annexation of El Katr or the infringement of its autonomy by the neighbouring Sheikh of Bahrein.

86. By a treaty, dated the 3rd November, 1916, His Majesty's Government undertook to protect the Sheikh of El Katr from all aggression by sea, and to extend to him their good offices in the event of unprovoked aggression by land. (This clause presumably has Ibn Saud in view.)

MOHAMMERAH

87. The Sheikh of Mohammerah has been forced by the Persian Government to recognise his position as a subject of the Shah. His former semi-autonomous position is at an end, and he has been given to understand that His Majesty's Government will not support him by force of arms in any defiance of the Persian Government.

KOWEIT

88. A secret agreement was signed with the Sheikh of Koweit on the 23rd January, 1899, binding him and his successors to cede no territory and to receive no foreign representative without the sanction of His Majesty's Government. In return the sheikh was assured of the good offices of His Majesty's Government and received £1,000. A British Political Agency was established at Koweit in 1904. On the 5th July, 1918, Sir P. Cox informed the present Sheikh of Koweit that the British Government would extend to him the 'friendship and protection and assistance' given previously to his father.

BAHREIN

89. The Sheikh of Bahrein in 1820 signed a general treaty of peace, including the cessation of piracy by land and sea. From that date Great Britain has refused to tolerate the pretensions of Persia and other Powers to Bahrein, which have frequently been formally repudiated. By a series of treaties, the most important of which are those of 1861 and 1880, the Sheikhs of Bahrein have bound themselves to abstain from maritime aggression, piracy and the slave trade so long as they receive the support of the British Government in the maintenance of the security of their possessions, and have agreed to abstain from negotiating with other foreign Powers, and to refuse to allow other Powers to establish diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling depots in Bahrein territory, except with the consent of His Majesty's Government. A further exclusive agreement was signed in 1892, and a British political agent was appointed to Bahrein in 1905.

IV. *Northern Europe and Afghanistan*

POLAND, THE BALTIC STATES AND SCANDINAVIA

90. Of these countries little need be said. Our general aim here as elsewhere is peace and stability. In the multilateral declaration of the 23rd April, 1908,²³

²³ See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 101, pp. 179-81.

His Majesty's Government announced, jointly with the Danish, French, Dutch and Swedish Governments, their firm resolution to preserve intact and mutually to respect the sovereign rights at that time enjoyed by the parties concerned over their respective territories in the regions bordering on the North Sea, and to concert together 'such measures as they (the signatories) may consider it useful to take' in the event of any menace to the *status quo*. The original German participation in this declaration has lapsed in accordance with article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles. There is no such agreement relating to the Baltic, and, apart from obligations which may arise under the Covenant of the League, we should not feel called upon to object to any change such as the federation of the Baltic States, or their reabsorption by Russia. The questions of Danzig and Upper Silesia have been dealt with in paragraph 49.

RUSSIA

91. It seems most probable that Russia will not be in a position for many years to wage war on a considerable scale outside the boundaries of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The action which is to be feared from her is that of gradual extension of those boundaries in directions which affect British interests.

92. British policy towards Russia aims at peace and commercial intercourse in conditions securing justice for British trade and investment. Since the breakdown of the negotiations of 1924 for a general settlement of outstanding questions, the tactics followed have been those of patience and expectancy, in the hope that a growing realisation of the advantages of foreign intercourse will lead to offers of compensation to foreigners whose property has been confiscated and a measure of recognition of debts sufficient to restore confidence in Russian integrity. There are signs of a gradual development in this direction, and no other and more active policy, whether aggressive or friendly, on the part of His Majesty's Government, is thought likely to hasten the process.

93. From the more purely political point of view it can be stated that the belief of the Soviet Government that His Majesty's Government are in principle hostile and foment opposition to them on every side is a myth. Our attitude is purely defensive. Apart from our obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations, we have no obligations to render military assistance to any foreign country in the event of Russian aggression. So far as attacks on our own territory are concerned, the point of interest is, of course, India, and Russian policy in Afghanistan and Chinese Turkestan demands our unremitting vigilance. That policy, if it succeeds at all, will take the shape of an extension of Russian influence and perhaps control, but any such development will be gradual and any early effect on the requirements of British military preparedness will be indirect. The dangers to be feared are those of tension with Afghanistan and hostile activity on the part of the frontier tribes of India, rather than the debouching of Russian forces on Indian territory. Russian policy in the Far East is dealt with in a later section.

AFGHANISTAN

94. There are no signs at present of any likelihood of acute trouble with Afghanistan, such as might lead to a repetition of the war of 1919. Unless and until Russia becomes more aggressive and aims at creating a breach, our responsibilities will probably be limited to ordinary watchfulness and the endeavour to prevent any undesirable extension of Russian influence.

95. The precise legal position in regard to the northern frontier of Afghanistan is somewhat uncertain and is at present being examined. It is, however, clear that, while Soviet Russia may have obligations towards us in respect of those frontiers, we are under no obligation towards Afghanistan to defend them.

V. *Egypt and Abyssinia*

EGYPT

96. British policy in Egypt is based primarily on the Declaration to Egypt of the 28th February, 1922, under which, whilst recognising Egypt as an independent sovereign State, His Majesty's Government reserved to their absolute discretion, pending the conclusion of agreements with Egypt in regard thereto—

- (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.
- (b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.
- (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt.
- (d) The Sudan.

97. An immediate sequel to the approval of the declaration by Parliament was the notification conveyed by His Majesty's Government to all foreign Powers on the 15th March, 1922.²⁴ This notification concluded with the following passage:—

'These special relations (i.e., between Great Britain and Egypt) are defined in the declaration recognising Egypt as an independent sovereign State. His Majesty's Government have laid them down as matters in which the rights and interests of the British Empire are vitally involved, and will not admit them to be questioned or discussed by any other Power. In pursuance of this principle they will regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another Power, and they will consider any aggression against the territory of Egypt as an act to be repelled with all the means at their command.'

98. It is clear from the preceding paragraphs that we are definitely committed to the defence of Egyptian territory. As long as we hold the command of the Mediterranean and the mandate for Palestine the defence of Egypt against foreign aggression resolves itself into preventing invasion across the western frontier. In practice, as Colonel Spinks, the Acting Sirdar of the Egyptian army, has shown in a recent report, a serious attempt at invasion can only take place across the strip of hard desert between Siwa Oasis and Sollum—a distance of about 150 miles, readily defensible by light armoured cars with the co-operation of aeroplanes.

99. But we are also committed to the defence of British communications in Egypt and the protection of foreign interests. So long, therefore, as British troops remain on Egyptian territory—and without their presence the defence of British communications cannot be ensured—we are in the last resort committed to the maintenance of internal order, in the absence of which neither our communications nor the lives and property of foreigners would be safe. To fulfil these obligations the High Commissioner must be able to rely upon a British force strong enough to be able to look after itself and to lend the requisite weight to the recommendations which he may have to make or enforce the advice which he may give.

²⁴ For the Declaration of February 28 and the notification of March 15, 1922, see Cmd. 1592 (item No. 35, enclosure) and Cmd. 1617 of 1922 respectively.

THE SUDAN

100. Under the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899²⁵ the British flag is flown together with the Egyptian flag throughout the Sudan, and the Governor-General, in whom is vested 'the supreme military and civil command of the Sudan,' is appointed 'on the recommendation of His Britannic Majesty's Government and shall be removed only . . .²⁶ with the consent of His Britannic Majesty's Government.' The effect of these provisions is to make His Majesty's Government ultimately responsible for law and order throughout the Sudan. The removal of all Egyptian forces from the Sudan at the end of 1924 following on the murder in Cairo of the then Governor-General has only lent emphasis to a situation which was already tacitly recognised.

101. The European Powers other than Great Britain possessing colonies coterminous with the Sudan are France,¹ Belgium and Italy. The danger of hostilities with either of the two first named Powers hardly appears to be sufficiently real to merit serious consideration in present circumstances. In the case of Italy, it appears unlikely that Eritrea, which is dependent for touch with the outside world on sea communication through the Red Sea, could be used as a base for serious military operations against the Sudan. Apart from Egypt, the only other foreign Power coterminous with the Sudan is Abyssinia. Political upheavals in that country are always possible, and might conceivably create so dangerous a situation on the frontier as to call for more extensive precautions than those at present taken by the Sudan Government. These are designed to deal with the raids for loot and ivory which take place from time to time across the frontier and in which Abyssinian soldiers sometimes participate.

102. But there is much inflammable material in the Sudan. Egyptian propaganda and the growth of a local nationalism are phenomena with which the Sudan Government already have to reckon, whilst the danger of an outbreak of Mahdism, though latent, is none the less alive. On the whole, therefore, internal disorder rather than foreign aggression appears to constitute the chief danger which might call for an increase in the British garrison.

ABYSSINIA

103. The Tripartite Agreement of 1906²⁷ between Great Britain, France and Italy provides under article 1 that the three Powers named 'shall co-operate in maintaining the political and territorial *status quo* in Ethiopia as determined by the state of affairs at present existing.' This is qualified by article 3, which provides that 'in the event of rivalries or internal changes in Ethiopia, the representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy shall observe a neutral attitude, abstaining from all intervention in the internal affairs of the country, and confining themselves to such action as may be, by common consent, considered necessary for the protection of the Legations, of the lives and property of foreigners and of the common interests of the three Powers. In no case shall one of the three Governments interfere in any manner whatsoever except in agreement with the other two.'

104. If and when success attends the efforts which for many years past His Majesty's Government have been making to secure the consent of the Abyssinian

²⁵ See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 91, pp. 19–21, for this agreement of January 19, 1899.

²⁶ Punctuation as in original quotation.

²⁷ For this agreement of December 13, 1906, see *op. cit.*, vol. 99, pp. 486–90.

Government to the construction of a dam at the mouth of Lake Tsana, the protection of that work will involve a further potential commitment. Once it is in full operation any interference with the working of the dam would have a disastrous effect upon large areas of the Sudan and Egypt and their respective inhabitants so that disorders in Northern Abyssinia which appeared to menace the safety of the dam could not be regarded with indifference by His Majesty's Government.

VI. *The Far East*

105. The essential factors in the Far Eastern situation are (1) the great weakness and great potential riches of China; (2) the political ambition, the economic need and the relatively great strength of Japan; (3) the commercial predominance of Great Britain, now being threatened by Japan; (4) the fact that two of the great Powers with important interests in the Far East, namely, the United States and the Soviet Union, are not members of the League of Nations. The effect of this is that although the Soviet Union is not a party to the Washington Treaties,²⁸ it is these treaties rather than the League that govern the situation in the Far East. The League has so far played a very small part in Far Eastern affairs.

106. The two principal international instruments which at present govern the relations between the four great Pacific Powers (Great Britain, Japan, United States and France) and between the Powers enjoying treaty rights in China and China herself, are—

- (a) the Four-Power Treaty signed at Washington on the 13th December, 1921; and
- (b) the Nine-Power Treaty signed on the 6th February, 1922.

These two treaties are at once the result and the guarantee of the attitude of quiescence or policy of co-operation and non-interference in Chinese affairs, adopted by the Powers with good or ill grace after the war, and they are characteristic of the phase through which the relations of the Far Eastern Powers are still passing.

107. By the Four-Power Treaty the contracting parties (The United States, the British Empire, France and Japan) agreed to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean. Any controversies arising out of any specific question not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy are to be submitted for consideration to a joint conference; the contracting Powers are to communicate with one another in the event of aggressive action by any other Power threatening the said rights; the treaty is to be in force for ten years, and thereafter to continue in force subject to twelve months' notice by any contracting party; upon ratification of the treaty (i.e., the 17th August, 1923) the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Agreement²⁹ had to terminate. A subsequent treaty (the 6th February, 1922) defined the term 'insular possessions and insular dominions' in its application to Japan as *not* to include the main islands of Japan.

108. On the 2nd February, 1922, His Majesty's Government gave an assurance to the Government of Portugal, and on the 4th February to the Government of the

²⁸ See Cmd. 1627 of 1922, *Conference on Limitation of Armament: Washington, 1921-22 (Treaties, Resolutions, &c.)*.

²⁹ For the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of July 13, 1911, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 104, pp. 173-4.

Netherlands, that although these countries were not parties to the Four-Power Treaty, yet Great Britain was firmly determined to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific. Similar assurances were given by the United States of America, France, and Japan.

109. By article 19 of the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, signed on the 6th February, 1922, His Majesty's Government undertook to maintain the *status quo* with regard to fortifications and naval bases at Hongkong, and in our insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean, east of 110° longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada; (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories; and (c) New Zealand.

110. By the Nine-Power Treaty, the contracting Powers other than China (United States, Belgium, British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and Portugal) agreed (1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; (2) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

111. They further agreed not to enter into any treaty or agreement contrary to these principles, and that in deference to the principle of the 'open door' or equality of opportunity in China they would not seek nor support their nationals in seeking: (a) any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests, any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China; (b) any such monopoly or preference as would deprive nationals of any other Power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government or with any local authority in any category of public enterprise which, by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent, is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

112. Other articles of the treaty stipulate: (i) that there will be no attempt by the Powers concerned to create spheres of influence; (ii) that there will be no unfair discrimination on Chinese railways; (iii) that Chinese neutrality in future wars will be respected; (iv) that the Powers concerned will communicate frankly and freely between themselves in any future situation affecting the treaty; (v) that other Powers, having treaty relations with China, shall be invited to adhere to the treaty; (vi) that the treaty shall come into force on the deposit of ratifications (i.e., the 5th August, 1925). No definite date is fixed for the duration of the treaty.

113. The following Powers have acceded to the treaty: Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Spain.

114. Before considering the bearing of these treaties upon the possibility of this country being involved in hostilities in the Far East in the future, it will be useful to review the situation and policy of the three principal Far Eastern Powers, Japan, China and the Soviet Union, in order to determine the causes of the present period of quiescence and to show its possibly transitional character. It will be shown that each of these Powers has, since at any rate the first decade of this century, undergone changes, whether of structure or orientation, which have contributed to the substitution of an expectant and possibly uneasy passivity for the

active and sometimes warlike competition for political and economic advantages at China's expense which had been the rule hitherto.

JAPAN

115. The two objects which Japan set before herself when she decided that the only way to survive the impact of western civilisation was to meet it with its own weapons, were strategic security and economic strength. The threat to strategic security was Russia; the source of economic strength was China. Both objects were sought on the best models of western military imperialism; and when vital territory had been acquired at the expense of China, Russia and Germany, in 1895, 1904 and 1914, Japan set out, by the Twenty-One Demands of 1915³⁰ to complete her programme by securing political and economic domination over China. She had, however, come too late into the field. China, though still politically weak, was, with the growth of nationalism and a public opinion, developing peculiar powers of resisting or nullifying acts of aggression. Further, the European imperialist examples upon which Japan had modelled herself were already out of fashion, and she was compelled, before her designs were fully achieved, to conform to the new principles of international conduct embodied in the Covenant. With characteristic readiness, she adapted herself with good grace to the new situation, joined the League of Nations, associated herself with the self-denying ordinances of the Washington Treaties and adopted a policy of co-operation as opposed to competition and of non-interference as opposed to aggression, in China. She had, however, secured the strategic security she desired, the more so as Russia had collapsed, and she has since devoted her chief efforts to strengthening her economic position in China, which is the source of the raw materials she almost entirely lacks. She now adopts a conciliatory policy towards Chinese national aspirations; and though she manoeuvres discreetly to prevent the emergence of a strong central Government, she has abandoned the methods of political aggression for those of peaceful penetration, and in fact poses as the protector of China against foreign rapacity.

116. Further, her own economic fabric has been much weakened by inexperience in dealing with the economic effects of the war: the earthquake caused heavy material damage, and dealt a stunning blow to the self-confidence of the nation. There are signs that Japan is about to pass through the industrial crises familiar to western countries and that the rapidity with which industrialisation was effected renders her economic fabric ill-adapted to stand the strain of social unrest. The termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance induced a feeling of isolation. For all these reasons Japan is in no bellicose mood, and Sir Charles Eliot³¹ said a few months ago that he regarded her as a weak rather than as a strong Power. Although the old ideas of blind loyalty and obedience to authority do not now command the unquestioning adherence of the younger generation, it should not, however, be overlooked that Japan is still essentially autocratic and militarist by origin, tradition and social structure, with a common people that is intensely conservative and easily rallied to the standard. No consideration of political probabilities in the Far East should, therefore, disregard the possibility of a reversion at a favourable moment to a policy of conquest, and of a recrudescence of the war spirit. There is, however, no immediate prospect of such a reversion.

³⁰ See *The Sino-Japanese Negotiations of 1915* (Carnegie Endowment, Washington, 1921), pp. 2-8.

³¹ H.M. Ambassador at Tokyo from January 1920 to February 1926.

117. China is, under the impact of Western civilisation, undergoing decisive changes, which are even more important than the new orientation in Japanese policy, and are, in fact, comparable to the rapid transformation of Japan at the end of the 19th century. In Japan, change was imposed from above; in China, it is growing from below. As a Power China is weaker than ever, her successive Governments hardly exercise their authority beyond the capital, and the country is rent with civil wars between rival and semi-independent militarists. The past fifteen years have shown, indeed, that the Chinese social régime, however well adapted to the art of collective living, is not calculated to give political coherence and strength under the pressure of western civilisation. Side by side, however, with this territorial disintegration, there is taking place a political reintegration and the growth of a national conscience existing and acting independently of organs of government. This nationalist movement finds its most concrete expression in the Kuomintang³² but extends far beyond the limits of the party, and though owing its origin to the student class, has influence on Chinese of all classes and opinions. The task of Chinese statesmen is to adapt the ancient fabric so that it may hold its own under modern conditions, without undermining its foundations. The task will be a lengthy one, and during the transition period China must be politically weak. It was the realisation of China's weakness, the conviction that co-operation would be better for China than the continuance of competition and less likely to give rise to disputes among themselves, together with the already appreciable pressure of Chinese nationalism, that brought the Powers at Washington to adopt a policy of co-operation in place of one of competition. No term is set to the continuance in force of the Nine-Power Treaty, and the question is whether, during the transitional period, the international guarantees provided by it will be strong enough to keep the field clear against foreign aggression. The indications are for the moment favourable, but it must not be forgotten that China is still an almost untapped source of wealth for foreign enterprise, and that should conditions in China improve so as to make exploitation again a practical proposition (which at present it is not), the temptation to disregard the self-denying provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty might be irresistible. In such an event the now perfected method of boycott might well be of more avail to China than the provisions of the Washington Treaty.

118. The Chinese nationalist movement, roused to new activity by the shooting incidents at Shanghai and Canton, is now working strenuously for a revision of the so-called unequal treaties conferring extra-territorial privileges on foreign residents and containing other restraints on Chinese sovereignty in regard to tariffs and other matters. At the Tariff Conference now sitting, the Powers have been brought to consent to the grant of tariff autonomy as from the 1st January, 1929, and there is little doubt that when the recommendations of the Extra-territorial Commission are considered, China will be able to secure here also substantial alleviation. It seems fairly clear that the treaties imposed by force and maintained hitherto by the show, if not often by the use of force, are crumbling; and the only wise policy for the Powers to adopt is to carry out, if possible, a dignified retreat and to save what privileges they can. The most striking recent example of the power of Chinese nationalism is the present boycott of Hong Kong. The boycott, as practised in China, is a weapon against which no adequate remedy has yet been found, either

³² The Kuomintang Chinese Nationalist Party, founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, formed the basis of the Chinese Government of Canton.

by the Americans, Japanese or by ourselves. The bearing of this new state of affairs in China upon British military commitments in China will be examined in a subsequent paragraph.³³

RUSSIA

119. Russia's grand drive to the Far East was brought to a halt by Japan in 1904 and Manchuria was left partly in the sphere of influence of the one, partly in that of the other. It might have been expected that the Russian revolutions of 1917 would have left Japan a free hand to extend her control over Manchuria and possibly Siberia; but the factors already described, together with the slow revival of Soviet Russia, were sufficient to bring to naught any large adventures on the part of Japan. The only Russian territory retained by Japan was the northern half of Sakhalin, and this was relinquished under the treaty of the 21st [20th] January, 1925,³⁴ which now governs the relations between the two countries. Relations are cool, but correct. There is a permanent opposition of interest in Manchuria, where the Soviet Government has inherited the rights (some of which she has relinquished to China) retained by the Imperial Government after the Russo-Japanese war. This opposition turns at the moment on Japanese schemes of railway development northward and finds expression in an underground conflict through the anti-Bolshevik Marshal Chang Tso-lin, who enjoys Japanese sympathy, if not support.

120. Relations between China and the Soviet Union are governed by the treaty signed on the 31st May, 1924,³⁵ Relations are, on the whole, less correct than those between the Soviet Union and Japan. While it is true that the Soviet Government has relinquished all extra-territorial rights and poses as the protector of China against western imperialism, the Chinese have been quick to see that in Outer Mongolia (where the Soviet Government still maintain a small occupying force and work for the incorporation of the whole territory in the Union) and in Manchuria the Soviet Union reproduces what is substantially the old imperial Russian policy.

121. The Soviet Union is still materially a weak Power and unlikely to risk a military campaign abroad unless in support of an actual revolutionary outbreak; and while it still preserves in part the imperialist ambitions of the Tsarist Government, it is driven by its revolutionary doctrines, not only to disguise them, but also, from time to time, to act in a contrary sense and jeopardise their fulfilment; and although, by its methods of political propaganda, it has developed a technique for influencing the decisions of foreign Governments to its own advantage by pressure from within, it is still, nevertheless, as a world Power, less aggressive and dangerous than the Imperial Government was. The collapse of Russia might well have opened a new period of conflict in the Far East; but not having done so, it has contributed to tranquillity by putting one of the imperialist Powers out of action and has favoured the adoption of a peaceful policy on the part of the other.

122. The principal objects of British policy in China are to maintain the 'open door,' to prevent any other Power from acquiring economic ascendancy, and to

³³ For the incidents at Shanghai and Canton see Cmd. 2636 of 1926; for the Tariff Conference, October 1925-July 1926, see *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, vol. ii, part III, sect. viii; the report dated September 16, 1926, of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in China is printed in Cmd. 2774 of 1926.

³⁴ See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 122, pp. 894-905.

³⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 263-70.

protect and promote British interests, which are largely commercial, and comprise, first, between 40 and 50 per cent. of the whole export and import and carrying trades of China, and, secondly, the lives and interests of 16,000 British subjects resident in China under British consular jurisdiction, of whom 8,000 are in Shanghai alone. The best guarantees for the preservation of these interests are a prosperous and orderly China, under a stable, though not necessarily a centralised, Government; and a friendly, non-aggressive Japan. British policy in China aims, therefore, not at territorial expansion or political influence, but at commercial security, and this can best be gained by a policy of conciliation, but firmness, towards China; the maintenance, by international co-operation, of the Washington guarantees for her protection and for equal commercial opportunity for all nations; and a policy of friendliness but watchfulness towards Japan, giving her no excuse for aggression, while affording her the maximum scope compatible with world interests for her economic development.

123. It is now necessary to estimate in the light of the foregoing analysis the probability of this country being involved in hostilities in the Far East.

124. In the first place, it may safely be said that, of the signatories of the Four-Power Treaty, none has any intention of provoking war, at any rate within the ten years that the treaty is to remain in force, that is, until August 1933, and it is difficult to believe that any of them will take the responsibility of terminating it even then. Japan is perhaps the least dependable of the signatories of the treaty, but until a new group of Powers has asserted its influence in the Far East sufficiently to attract Japan's apprehension or interest or friendship, she is bound to co-operate in some degree with Great Britain and the United States, and to avoid any serious divergence with them. Such a group might be formed by Russia or China, or by both, if they became sufficiently strong to attract Japan, perhaps together with Germany, into an alliance against the influence of the Anglo-Saxon Powers. Of the emergence of such a group there is at present no sign, though it is one of the stock projects of Soviet statesmanship, but if it were to appear there is no doubt that there would be a party in Japan in favour of associating with it.

125. Beyond the term of the Four-Power Treaty is not easy to foresee, but it may be useful to examine three possible ways in which a conflict between this country and Japan might be brought about:

- (1) An open attempt by Japan to oust us from our predominant position in the Far East, to seize Hong Kong, and possibly attack Australia.

Some of the conditions for such an attack are: (a) The restoration of Japan's material and moral striking power, at present somewhat diminished; (b) the formation by Japan of new international arrangements with a restored Russia and/or Germany for the exploitation of China; (c) embarrassments in other parts of the world preventing our fleet from operating in the Pacific.

This contingency is remote. If Japan is to attack anybody, it is America rather than ourselves who would be the victim, for there are political issues between them almost entirely lacking in the relations between this country and Japan. The issue between us and Japan in China is principally economic, and, although we must expect to meet Japanese intrigues against us, the issues can be fought out by peaceful means, and need not themselves entail a resort to arms.

- (2) Hostilities arising out of intervention in China.

It is possible (though the possibility is rather remote) that some sudden

incident might lead to armed intervention in China and to dissensions arising among the Powers after intervention. In such a case, Great Britain might find herself in opposite camps to Japan; but as we can depend on sympathy and perhaps support from the United States in our China policy, we should probably not have to stand alone. In any case, no Power, not even Japan, will rashly incur the risk of a world war in order to solve the problem of China.

- (3) Intervention by this country as a third party in case of war between Japan and another Power, e.g., United States or Soviet Union.

126. If Japan were to attempt to annex Manchuria, the question would become an international affair, so long as the Four-Power Treaty was in force, and Great Britain would have to act in concert with the other Powers. Only if these treaties failed to act and British interests were vitally affected would a *casus belli* arise as between this country and Japan alone. This is a possibility which seems exceedingly remote.

127. From time to time feeling in Japan against the United States is strong, and there are many in Japan who regard a war with America as inevitable. The renunciation by America of the right to equip the island of Guam as a naval base has removed the danger of aggression by the United States, while the establishment of the British base at Singapore and the knowledge of our possible intervention will probably deter the Japanese from violent action against America. On the whole, therefore, the Japanese may be expected to concentrate, not on preparations for an offensive, but upon making their defensive position sufficiently strong to enable them to prevent aggression by other Powers upon China, or, if need be, to take aggressive action against China herself and defy the Powers to prevent her. In her present political frame of mind—whatever may be her ultimate intentions—relations with other Powers and, above all, her fear of political isolation, make such action on her part, within the limits of reasonable prophecy, improbable.

128. There is no substantial cause, therefore, to regard Japan as a potential enemy. All that it seems necessary to do is to make our strategic position in the Far East defensively as safe as our resources allow. A strong position at Singapore and the power to defend it seem to give us all that we require at present in the Far East. We do not want to attack Japan, but we must be strong enough to deter her from attacking us.

129. Under the Protocol of 1901,³⁶ the Powers have the right to maintain garrisons at certain points between Peking and the sea, of which Tien-tsin is one. The intention of this arrangement was to avoid in the future the danger of having communications between the capital and the sea cut by forces hostile to the Powers, and to maintain a way of escape for the staff of the foreign missions at Peking, whose lives might be threatened. These arrangements may have been adequate for the purpose when they were made, but in the present condition of China they are no longer so, and any attempt to keep the communications open would entail the use of large reinforcements, and could only arouse a strong feeling among the Chinese people as a whole. Even so, it is doubtful whether, were the lives of the staffs of the foreign missions in danger, they could be saved by the use of these forces. The maintenance of these troops under the protocol is nowadays out of date as well as useless, and if and when a suitable opportunity presents itself, the view of the Foreign Office is that His Majesty's Government would be well advised to get the

³⁶ See *op. cit.*, vol. 94, pp. 686–715, for the Protocol of September 7, 1901.

other Powers to agree to their withdrawal. And so long as the forces are maintained, the Powers would be wise to resort to armed intervention only in the event of a serious menace to the lives of their nationals, and not merely to preserve a now largely academic treaty right. In spite of disorders in China and of a widespread movement for treaty revision there is remarkably little acute personal hostility to foreign nationals. There is no sign of a recrudescence of the fanaticism of 1900, and even if there were a new anti-foreign outbreak, the small foreign forces available would be quite inadequate to deal with it; and their premature and ineffective use might even serve to provoke it.

130. In the present disturbed condition of China, it is clear that the chance of Great Britain being involved in war cannot be dismissed as an impossibility. Our obligations under the 1901 Protocol have been examined in the foregoing paragraph. Any action taken in defence of such rights against Chinese aggression would clearly involve joint action by all the treaty Powers concerned, and the part played by Great Britain would not involve this country in military operations on a large scale. It is conceivable that attack from Canton against British territory, or a series of outrages against British subjects, might eventually force us to take strong action against Canton. In this case, it is unlikely that any other country, except perhaps France, would actively assist us, and a campaign against Canton would involve a considerable military expedition and an indefinite duration of hostilities. We have, therefore, preferred to endure the almost intolerable conditions inflicted by the boycott on British trade in general, and on Hong Kong in particular, rather than expose this country to the even greater loss and misfortune which we believe would be entailed by war against Canton.

131. Our policy in China has been to regard that country as in a state of transition and of abnormal conditions, to which ordinary rules do not apply. We believe that patience and non-interference are the only means by which a satisfactory solution can be reached. We do our best to defend our interests (which are almost entirely economic) against the innumerable and complicated difficulties which beset them owing to the anarchic condition of China; we have no intention of resorting to armed force unless British property is actively attacked and British lives are in danger; we do not believe that the present ferment in China is moving in the direction of hostilities between China and foreign Powers; but, in a situation which is so obscure and so changeable, it is impossible to guarantee that there is no risk of such an eventuality.

SIAM

132. By a declaration of the 15th January, 1896, Great Britain and France each bound themselves not to advance armed forces into Siam, except with the consent of the other, and not to acquire any special privilege or advantage which shall not be equally enjoyed by both countries. This was, however, without prejudice to any agreed action for the purpose of upholding the independence of Siam. Great Britain and France also engaged not to enter into separate agreements permitting a third Power to take any action from which, by the declaration in question, they themselves were bound to abstain.

133. A general treaty and a treaty of commerce and navigation between this country and Siam were signed on the 14th July, 1925, and ratifications are now on the point of being exchanged. These two treaties mark the opening of a new era in Anglo-Siamese relations. The general treaty gives Siam full jurisdictional autonomy and the commercial treaty gives her fiscal autonomy. In both cases,

however, there are certain safeguards. A protocol is annexed to the general treaty providing that, pending the enforcement of the Siamese codes, now in preparation, and for five years thereafter, His Majesty's diplomatic and consular officials may evoke any case pending in any Siamese court, except the Supreme Court, in which a British subject is involved and dispose of it themselves in accordance with English law. An article of the commercial treaty stipulates that the articles of principal interest to British trade with Siam, namely, cotton yarns, threads, fabrics, and all other manufactures of cotton, iron and steel and manufactures thereof, and machinery and parts thereof, manufactured in any of His Majesty's territories to which the treaty applies, shall not, on importation into Siam, be subjected to any customs duty in excess of 5 per cent. *ad valorem* during the first ten years after the coming into force of the treaty.³⁷

134. Relations between the two countries are cordial. British trade with Siam has been longer established and is larger in volume than that of any other country and more than 50,000 Indian British subjects are resident in Siam.

VII. *North and South America*

UNITED STATES

135. Broadly, the policy of His Majesty's Government has aimed and continues to aim at co-operation with the United States Government in large world questions, more especially where British views on these questions differ from those of other Powers owing to the preoccupations of local international politics.

136. For this purpose, His Majesty's Government have sought to remove any possible causes of friction between the two nations.

137. Questions which in more recent years have been possible sources of irritation have been: (1) the Irish question; (2) the War Debt; (3) the smuggling of liquor into the United States by British ships; and (4) naval competition.

138. The Irish question has been settled and may be taken to be eliminated as a danger. The War Debt has been funded,³⁸ and the removal of these two questions from the sphere of criticism has had not only the negative effect of removing causes of irritation, but the positive one of producing goodwill and sometimes even admiration.

139. Though so much cannot be said of the liquor smuggling question, the danger of acute differences on this head may be said to have been minimised by the conclusion of the Liquor Convention.³⁹ Moreover, His Majesty's Government are now voluntarily offering further assistance to the United States Government in the prevention of smuggling by means of certain administrative measures. It should be said, however, that Sir Esme Howard continues to show anxiety on this head and to argue that His Majesty's Government should leave nothing undone which would prevent all possible chances of controversy. He fears lest any such controversy, which he thinks not inconceivable, should remotely quicken the never too soundly dormant agitation for United States acquisition by means, financial or other, of British West Indian possessions.

³⁷ For the declaration of 1896 and the treaties and protocol of 1925, see *op. cit.*, vol. 88, pp. 13-17, and vol. 121, pp. 840-57, respectively.

³⁸ For the Anglo-American agreement of June 18-19, 1923, see *op. cit.*, vol. 126, pp. 307-17.

³⁹ For this convention of January 23, 1924, see *op. cit.*, vol. 119, pp. 467-9.

140. The fresh goodwill displayed, however, in the aforesaid measures, super-added to the Liquor Convention, should remove any reasonable or calculable prospect of friction in this connection. As for the possibility of an agitation for an 'American Caribbean,' it is true that this has long had some shadowy and seasonal existences on the face of things before returning underground, and this not only in connection with the decreasing use of the West Indies as a smuggling base, but also in connection with the unthreatened defences of the Panamá Canal. As bearing on this, the Resolution of the Senate of the 12th August, 1912, may be recalled: 'When any harbour or other place in the American Continent[s is] so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbour or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government not American as to give that Government practical power of control for naval or military purposes.' Further, in a speech on the 30th November, 1923, Mr. Hughes⁴⁰ emphasised the determination of the United States at all costs to do what was necessary to ensure the defence of the Panamá Canal. This question may nevertheless be regarded 'without grave concern' by His Majesty's Government.

141. The danger to good relations arising out of naval competition was almost entirely removed by the conclusion of the Washington Naval Treaty, though it must be admitted that the question of the numbers of cruisers to be possessed by both countries may, indeed almost certainly will, raise difficulties in any further discussion of naval disarmament.

142. While it can be said that the above sources of possible irritation have been removed, there remain others not wholly negligible. These are:—

- (1) *Claims between the two countries.*—Justifiable, or even incontestable, British claims meet with habits of regrettable scurviness; but this is a small matter compared with the possible presentation by the United States of claims of United States citizens—or Big Business—arising out of the blockade of Germany. Such an event would be unfeignedly detrimental to Anglo-American relations, less perhaps from the stand-point of American insensibility than from the natural and inevitable reaction upon public opinion here.
- (2) *General attitude of the United States Government towards Canada.*—There has been unwarrantable delay and jockeying in regard to Canadian representations concerning the Pacific halibut fisheries, Atlantic fisheries, and undue diversion of waters from the Great Lakes, as well as a rather ambiguous attitude to the apparently well-founded Canadian claim to sovereignty over all territory, discovered or not yet discovered, lying between Canada and the North Pole.

These questions will need settlement in the near future. They are, however, susceptible of amicable arrangement, and compromises are likely to be found.

143. In fine then, and even with these reservations, relations between the two countries may safely be said to have been never so good as they are at present, nor has the atmosphere been *more* propitious for a settlement of possible future controversies. Yet the possibility of controversy of course exists, and optimism alone would permanently rule out the possibility of all but inconsiderable consequences. The American characteristics of emotionalism, ignorant irresponsibility in high

⁴⁰ Mr. Hughes was U.S. Secretary of State from March 1921 to March 1925.

place, and—lower—whirlwind press campaigns, abide. Nor can dispassionate review overlook on the one hand a certain commercial imperialism, on the other a new superiority which, in banishing jealousy, tends to promote a slightly aggressive expectation—often confirmed—of having things one's own way.

SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA (INCLUDING MEXICO)

144. As regards *South America*, it may be said that there are no questions involving the possibility of war. Relations with the South American Republics are friendly, our only differences, with the exception of a nebulous Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands, arising from claims and debts that stand over wearily.

* * * * *

145. In dealing with the American Continent mention must needs be made of the *Monroe Doctrine*.⁴² There is no reason inherent in this Doctrine which need lead to difficulties. As understood and enunciated up to recent times by responsible United States statesmen, it is a prescription in the interests of United States security. It is passive—though not entirely so—rather than active. It is a 'policy of exclusion.' As far as the actions of foreign countries are concerned, it was summarised by Mr. Hughes in 1923 as being 'opposed (1) to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American States under any guise, and (2) to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any non-American Power.' Mr. Hay⁴³ in 1903 said, in connection with the naval blockade of Venezuela by Great Britain, Germany and Italy, 'that the United States could not object to foreign Powers taking steps against American countries to obtain redress for injuries suffered by their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated.'

146. In 1914, Mr. J. W. Foster (ex-Secretary of State) said: 'Succeeding Administrations have repeatedly stated that European Governments are free to make war on the American States or to resort to force to support their complaints, provided that they observe the two conditions above stated as to territory and political institutions.' Since only an Aristotelian eccentricity would desire to be so saddled, the Doctrine might for our practical purposes resemble La Fontaine's floating sticks: *de loin c'est quelque chose, et de près ce n'est rien*; and only a German might deem it necessary to plaster the Serbonian bog with notices to 'keep off the grass.'

147. Mr. Root⁴⁴ said in 1914: 'The Monroe Doctrine has nothing whatever to do with acts of this description.' This attitude really follows from another statement by Mr. Root in 1914, that: 'As the Monroe Doctrine neither asserts nor involves any right of control by the United States over any American nation, it imposes upon the United States no duty towards European Powers to exercise such a control.'

148. The Monroe Doctrine, which Great Britain recognises, should not be confused with what Mr. Hughes described in 1923 as 'a series of affirmative policies which is growing up, and on which the United States are now acting.' There is no reason for this country to recognise and rule its conduct by these affirmative policies. They are a manifestation, but no more, of the desire on the part of the United

⁴¹ Punctuation as in filed copy.

⁴² Mr. Monroe was U.S. President from 1817 to 1825: for his doctrine cf. S. F. Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (New York, 1943), pp. 63–65.

⁴³ Mr. Hay was U.S. Secretary of State from 1898 to 1905.

⁴⁴ Mr. Root was U.S. Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909.

States to secure the hegemony of the American Continent and to play the part of major to reluctant Latin minors. Their importance, perhaps, lies chiefly in their effect upon the League of Nations and its relations with the Latin-American countries. In general, the effect is that, while many of the Latin Republics feel drawn towards the League of Nations, the United States attempt to exercise a drag in the opposite direction. The ultimate object of the United States has been to form, if possible, all the countries of the American Continent into a purely American League of Nations, of which they would be the leader. For this purpose they make use of the Pan-American movement, which was founded several years ago and before the birth of the League of Nations, largely no doubt with a view to facilitating the acquisition and exercise of this leadership. British policy is, on the other hand, to encourage participation by Latin America in the League of Nations.

List of British Commitments in relative Order of Importance

- (1) Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919. See [paragraphs 5-11].⁴⁵
- (2) Treaty of Versailles.

Occupation of Rhine Territory. See [paragraph 17].

Demilitarisation of Rhine Territory.

Article 44 of the Treaty of Versailles binds the signatories to consider it a 'hostile act' if Germany erects fortifications or maintains troops or works for mobilisation on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank within the 50-kilometre zone.

Switzerland.

By article 435 of the treaty the signatory Powers confirmed, with certain modifications, the recognition of Swiss neutrality stipulated by the treaties of 1815. It has, however, never been finally established whether the original recognition implied an actual guarantee similar to that given in 1839 in the case of Belgium, and the Treaty of Versailles has left this question still an open one.

- (3) Treaty of Locarno, 1925. See [paragraphs 16-18].
- (4) Washington Treaties, 1921 and 1922. See [paragraphs 107-12].
- (5) Egypt and the Soudan. See [paragraphs 96-102].
- (6) The Straits (Dardanelles and Bosphorus). See [paragraph 67].
- (7) Abyssinia. Tripartite Agreement, 1906. See [paragraphs 103-4].
- (8) Hedjaz, Irak, Transjordan, Arabia. See [paragraphs 70-77].
- (9) Persian Gulf.

Trucial Chiefs, Mohammerah, Koweit, Bahrein. See [paragraphs 84, 87-89].

- (10) Anglo-Portuguese Treaties, 1373-1904. See [paragraphs 33-35].
- (11) Mediterranean and East Atlantic Agreement, 1907. See [paragraph 32].
- (12) North Sea Agreement, 1908. See [paragraph 90].
- (13) Anglo-Chinese Convention, April 1846.⁴⁶

By article 4 of this Convention, His Majesty's Government undertake to

⁴⁵ The page references given here and below in the filed copy have been replaced editorially by references to the corresponding numbered paragraphs.

⁴⁶ See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 34, pp. 26-27.

protect the Island of Chusan (near Ningpo) and its dependencies in the event of an attack upon it by an invader, and to restore it to the possession of China.

Not included in the above list are a number of treaty engagements on the part of His Majesty's Government of a negative or self-denying nature.

